FROM THE TWO-PARTY TO THE DOMINANT-PARTY SYSTEM IN MOZAMBIQUE, 1994 – 2012
Framing Frelimo Party Dominance in Context

Adriano Alfredo Nuvunga
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From the Two-Party to the Dominant-Party System in Mozambique, 1994-2012: Framing Frelimo Party Dominance in Context

Van een tweepartijenstelsel naar een stelsel met één dominante partij in Mozambique, 1994-2012: De dominantie van Frelimo in context

Thesis

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Dedicated to my late dad
Uafengane Alfredo Nwumga (1910–1987)
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Note on Terminology

Throughout the thesis, not only the terminology but also the meaning of ‘Frelimo’ varies. In the first part of the introductory chapter, the term FRELIMO is used as an acronym of Frente de Libertação de Moçambique, the Mozambique Liberation Front, which conducted the liberation struggle and won independence for the country in 1975. Two years after independence, FRELIMO became Frelimo, the name of the political party created in 1977. So, from the second part of the introductory chapter onwards, the term Frelimo is used to refer to this political party.

Within the thesis the term ‘Frelimo’ is used mainly in relation to the other parties within the political system, mainly RENAMO. ‘Frelimo party’ is used when referring to the intra-party organization. The expression ‘Frelimo political elites’ refers to the political leaders of Frelimo and finally, the expression ‘Frelimo elites’ refers to leading Frelimo cadres who are involved in businesses.
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Abstract

This thesis examines the abrupt end of Mozambique’s vibrant two-party system, which, by the middle of the past decade, had developed into a dominant-party system, instead of institutionalizing, as was the case in other African third wave democracies. While, from the second election, in 1999, the former rebel movement, RENAMO, went head-to-head with the former liberation movement, the ruling Frelimo, from the third election, held in 2004, RENAMO experienced a significant loss of votes, a loss repeated in 2009. This paved the way for a Frelimo breakthrough to dominance despite the fact that its voter share remained almost the same in all four elections.

These developments are probed through a two-perspective theoretical framework consisting of the social conflict theory and the historical institutionalism. While social conflict theory views the political phenomenon at hand in terms of structural factors, for example, deep political changes and transformations in society, historical institutionalism views it in terms of path-dependence, implying that ‘history matters’. The theorising generated an analytical framework consisting of four units of analysis, namely, the workings of the electoral institutions, the weakness of the opposition parties, the playing field for electoral competition and the economic instruments of party control of society. Following the single-case study research design with embedded cases, these units of analysis were researched as sub-cases.

The actual research found neither salient structural factors nor legacies of the past to account for the developments in the party system. The underlying mechanisms in each of the sub-cases unveiled strategic factors related to the political use by Frelimo of the state apparatus for partisan gain. As far as the sequence is concerned, the thesis shows that after retaining state control in a problematic election in 1999, the government embarked on administrative reforms, mainly at the local level, resulting in an uneven playing field for political competition.
This has resulted in shrinkage of the political space available for RENAMO, for example, its local structures for political and electoral mobilisation collapsed, which contributed significantly to its disastrous results in the 2004 and 2009 elections. While there are internal weaknesses within the opposition, the use of state power to enrich the Frelimo elites, strengthening the financial capacity of the Frelimo party and promoting intra-party unity while starving the opposition groups, has exacerbated the weakness of the opposition.

All things considered, the thesis argues that the failure to institutionalise the two-party system and the development in its place of a dominant-party system is embedded in the political use by Frelimo of the state apparatus to weaken the ability of opposition groups to challenge its grip on control of the state. So, although there are internal weaknesses within the opposition parties, the conclusions underscore the role of the state not as a neutral playing field but rather as playing role in protecting Frelimo’s power.

**Key words:** Mozambique, Frelimo, RENAMO, two-party system; dominant-party system, election, state.
Van een tweepartijenstelsel naar een stelsel met één dominante partij in Mozambique, 1994-2012

De dominantie van Frelimo in context

Samenvatting

Dit proefschrift beschrijft het abrupte einde van het bloeiende tweepartijenstelsel dat zich in Mozambique in de afgelopen tien jaar heeft ontwikkeld tot een stelsel met één dominante partij. Het tweepartijenstelsel is niet geïnstitutionaliseerd in Mozambique zoals in andere Afrikaanse democratieën van de derde democratiseringsgolf. Vanaf de tweede verkiezingen in 1999 deed de voormalige rebellenbeweging RENAMO het net zo goed als regeringspartij en voormalige bevrijdingsbeweging Frelimo, maar vanaf de derde verkiezingen in 2004 verloor RENAMO veel stemmen, en dit gebeurde in 2009 opnieuw. Zo kwam de weg vrij voor een doorbraak waarbij Frelimo de grootste partij werd, hoewel het aantal mensen dat op deze partij stemde in alle vier de verkiezingen ongeveer gelijk bleef.

Deze ontwikkelingen zijn onderzocht vanuit een tweezijdig theoretisch kader dat bestaat uit de sociale-confliccttheorie en het historisch institutionalisme. De sociale-confliccttheorie beziest het politieke verschijnsel waarom het gaat in termen van structurele factoren, zoals diepgaande politieke veranderingen en transformaties in de samenleving, en het historisch institutionalisme beziest het in termen van padafhankelijkheid, wat impliceert dat ‘de geschiedenis ertoe doet’. Op basis van de theorie is een analytisch kader ontwikkeld dat bestaat uit vier eenheden van analyse: de werking van de electorale instituties, de zwakte van de oppositiepartijen, het speelveld van de verkiezingsstrijd en de economische instrumenten waarmee de partij de maatschappij controleert. Binnen de onderzoekspopzet van een enkelvoudige case study met sub-eenheden zijn deze eenheden van analyse onderzocht als sub-casussen.

Uit het onderzoek blijkt dat noch opvallende structurele factoren, noch erfensissen uit het verleden de ontwikkelingen in het partijenstelsel kunnen verklaren. De onderliggende mechanismen in elk van de sub-casussen hebben strategische factoren blootgelegd die te maken hebben met het
Van een tweepartijenstelsel naar een stelsel met één dominante partij
in Mozambique, 1994-2012

gebruik van het staatsapparaat voor eigen gewin door Frelimo. Wat de
volgorde betreft blijkt uit het onderzoek dat de regering, die de macht had
behouden in de problematische verkiezingen van 1999, daarna vooral op
lokaal niveau bestuurlijke hervormingen doorvoerde waardoor er een
ongelijk speelveld ontstond voor de politieke strijd.

Hierdoor kreeg RENAMO minder politieke ruimte, wat bijvoorbeeld tot
uitdrukking kwam in de ineenstorting van de lokale structuren voor
politieke en electorale mobilisatie van deze partij, die op haar beurt
bijdroeg aan de rampzalige verkiezingsuitslagen in 2004 en 2009. Ofschoon
de oppositie interne zwaktes kent, heeft het gebruik van staatsmacht om de
partij-elite van Frelimo te verrijken, waardoor de financiële positie van
Frelimo en de eenheid binnen de partij versterkt werd en de oppositie niet
de benodigde middelen kreeg, de oppositie verder verzwakt.

Concluderend wordt in dit proefschrift betoogd dat het onvermogen om
het tweepartijenstelsel te institutionaliseren en de ontwikkeling van een
stelsel met één dominante partij dat daarvoor in plaats is gekomen, te maken
hebben met het feit dat Frelimo het staatsapparaat heeft gebruikt om te
zorgen dat de oppositie Frelimo’s machtige positie binnen de staat niet zou
c kunnen verzwakken. Hoewel er interne zwakheden bestaan binnen de
oppositiepartijen, onderstrepen de conclusies dat de staat geen neutrale rol
heeft gespeeld binnen het politieke speelveld, maar betrokken is geweest bij
het beschermen van de macht van Frelimo.

Trefwoorden: Mozambique, Frelimo, RENAMO, tweepartijenstelsel,
stelsel met één dominante partij, verkiezingen, staat.
This dissertation comprises nine chapters. The first chapter is the introduction, which, among other aspects, contains the research problem and the research question. The second chapter is dedicated to the literature review and conceptual framework. The third chapter is the analytical framework, which, among other aspects, contains the theoretical framework and the units of analysis.

The fourth chapter is dedicated to the research methods, presenting the research design, data collection, analysis and limitations of the study. Following the chapter on methods are the four substantive chapters. Consistent with the research design, these four chapters contain the embedded cases which emerged from the analytical framework. Framed as journal articles – two have already been published, the other two have been submitted for publication – they present the key findings and the substance of the research.

The final chapter, the conclusion, not only discusses the findings presented in each of the four embedded cases in light of the research question but contains a section on the analytical generalisation, contribution and prospects for future research. The bibliography lists all the sources used in the research.
1 Introduction

This chapter starts with the statement of the research problem, followed by the historical background. Before presenting the research objectives and the research question it sets out the scope and object of the study which is followed by the presentation of its significance.

1.1 Statement of the Research Problem

The former Marxist-Leninist-led socialist one-party state of the People’s Republic of Mozambique underwent democratic transition as part of the third wave of democratisation that swept the African continent early in the 1990s. In the case of Mozambique these reforms involved resolving two tensions: the peace process to end the violent civil war that had raged since 1977, two years after independence, and democratic transition to end one-party rule. The political opening in 1989 and the establishment of multiparty politics in the country’s first multiparty approved Constitution in 1990 were followed by a two-year democratic transition enabled by the signing on 4 October 1992 of a General Peace Agreement between the Frente de Libertação Moçambique – Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo) government and the then rebel movement, the Resistência Nacional de Moçambique – Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO). These political developments culminated with the democracy-founding elections held in 1994. Since then elections have been held regularly, with Frelimo winning both the presidential and legislative elections.

The second election, held in 1999, merits particular attention. Following the relatively smooth victory of the Frelimo presidential candidate in 1994 it seemed inconceivable that the situation could turn upside down in 1999 but it did. Not only was there only a marginal difference between the number of votes for the two presidential candidates – Frelimo’s
Joaquim Chissano and RENAMO’s Afonso Dhlakama, astonishingly the number of invalid votes excluded from final count was equal to the difference between the two candidates. ¹ Thus Chissano won a problematic and somewhat fraudulent electoral victory (Rønning 2011; De Brito 2008; Hanlon & Fox 2006; Nuvunga 2005). Had the first-past-the-post electoral system been used in both 1994 and 1999, however, RENAMO might have won the legislative election because it obtained the majority of votes in five constituencies, including the country’s two biggest constituencies, the northern province of Nampula and the central province of Zambézia. This would have given it 141 of 250 seats in 1994 and 136 in 1999. These results substantiate the balanced distribution of constituencies between the two major parties, which has rightly led scholars (Carbone 2005; Nuvunga 2005; Mohamed Salih 2003; Harrison 1996) to classify Mozambique as having a two-party system – a situation relatively rare in sub-Saharan Africa.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Registered voters</td>
<td>6,396,061</td>
<td>7,099,105</td>
<td>9,142,151</td>
<td>9,871,948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Votes cast</td>
<td>4,953,074</td>
<td>4,821,499</td>
<td>3,321,926</td>
<td>4,387,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of voter turnout</td>
<td>77.74</td>
<td>67.92</td>
<td>36.34</td>
<td>44.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRELIMO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absolute Votes</td>
<td>2,115,793</td>
<td>2,008,165</td>
<td>1,889,054</td>
<td>2,907,335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Votes Cast</td>
<td>44.27</td>
<td>48.55</td>
<td>62.03</td>
<td>74.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Registered Voters</td>
<td>33.08</td>
<td>28.28</td>
<td>20.66</td>
<td>29.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Parliament Seats</td>
<td>51.60</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>76.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RENAMO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absolute Votes</td>
<td>1,803,506</td>
<td>1,604,470</td>
<td>905,289</td>
<td>688,782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Votes Cast</td>
<td>37.74</td>
<td>38.79</td>
<td>29.73</td>
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<tr>
<td>% of Registered Voters</td>
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<td>22.60</td>
<td>9.90</td>
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<tr>
<td>% of Parliament Seats</td>
<td>44.80</td>
<td>46.80</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>20.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: author’s compilation using official results from CNE/STAE

However, in the 2004 election RENAMO lost a significant amount of the vote – almost one-third compared to its 1999 results (see table 1). It
Introduction

lost the election in two of five constituencies it had previously controlled, including the country’s major constituency, Nampula. Support for RENAMO was reduced even further in 2009 when it won only 52 of the 250 seats and lost two of the three constituencies in which it still had a major influence, including the second-biggest constituency, Zambézia. The only constituency that remained faithful to RENAMO in the 2009 elections is the central province of Sofala. The abrupt erosion of RENAMO’s share of the vote paved the way for the early end of what had been a vibrant two-party system, replacing it with a dominant-party system, with Frelimo as the ruling party.

What is striking about the rapid decline of the two-party system is that Frelimo became the dominant party without substantially increasing its share of the vote, as shown in table 1. Also striking is sharp decline of the voter turnout. In the 2004 elections only about one-third of registered voters went to the polls. The figure increased slightly in 2009 but was still below 50%. So the problématique is the abrupt failure to institutionalise what had seemed to be a promising two-party system and its replacement with one-party dominance in a context of increased voter apathy.

1.2 Background

After almost 500 years of colonisation the liberation movement, FRELIMO, was founded in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, in 1962, when three regionally based nationalist movements: the Mozambican African National Union (MANU)², the National Democratic Union of Mozambique (UDENAMO)³ and the National African Union of Independent Mozambique (UNAMI)⁴ ‘merged’ into one broad-based guerrilla movement with the intention of liberating the land and the people (FRELIMO 1980). However, scholars (Sitoe 2004; De Brito 2009) question the notion of a ‘merger’ of these three pre-existing movements on the grounds that their leaders soon abandoned FRELIMO and attempted to re-launch their former organisations, with differing degrees of success. The internal tensions were tribal and regional in nature, with people from the central and Northern provinces alleging exclusion by those from the south (Chichava 2010b).
Following tensions and expulsions from the original movement, a separatist movement, the National Union of Rombézia, was formed in 1968 and sought independence for the region from the Rovuma to the Zambezi River. According to Chichava (2010) the leaders of this
movement alleged that the southern leaders of FRELIMO were using the northerners as ‘cannon fodder’, while keeping themselves in office or going abroad to study – and waging the war only in northern Mozambique, harshly punishing the people of this region. This motivated another wave of desertions from FRELIMO when a sizeable number of key leaders abandoned the liberation movement following deep political and ideological confrontations within the leadership in the mid-1960s. These desertions and expulsions paved the way for the formation of a hegemonic bloc at the helm of FRELIMO, which was ‘fairly cohesive, firmly bound together and somehow immune to outside influence’ (Sitoe 2004: 50).

These political dynamics within and around the formation of FRELIMO created the core of Mozambique’s main political cleavage to date: the South-Centre divide, which was further aggravated by the exclusion of the political groups that appeared during the transitional government in 1974, following the Lusaka Agreements, with the intention of participating in the process of national independence. Indeed, independence was proclaimed on 25 June, 1975, with FRELIMO as the only representative of the Mozambican people (De Brito 2009; Poppe 2009; Jossias 2007; Cahen 1998; Serra 1993). Two years later FRELIMO formally became the Frelimo Marxist-Leninist political party during its Third Congress in 1977, adopting the name Frelimo.

FRELIMO (and later Frelimo), defined as the vanguard of the revolution, initially created and ran (1975-1990) a constitutional one-party socialist state, banning the formation of political parties – apparently in an effort to exclude the above mentioned political groupings which attempted to take part in the independence process. Article 3 of the 1975 Constitution defined the People’s Republic of Mozambique as guided by the political line defined by FRELIMO, which was the directing force of state and society. The article also stated that FRELIMO developed the basic political path of the state and directed the action of state institutions. Under this Constitution power belonged to the workers and the peasants. Frelimo’s power rested on a tripartite allegiance: the modernising state bureaucracy, the peasantry and the proletariat. Ideologically, FRELIMO intended to end exploitation of ‘man by man’ and to create a ‘homem novo’, a new man (De Brito 2010; Francisco 2009), a transformational force that would shape the new society ‘sociedade nova’ (Poppe 2009). In this respect, Dorman (2006: 1097) is perhaps right in saying
that the ‘goal of liberation movements was not just to seize power but also to reshape the state’.

Frelimo’s leading role in society was shaped by its victory in the 10-year liberation struggle and particularly by the proclamation of independence in 1975 (De Brito 1988, 2009; Sitoe 2004; Lundin 1995). In other words, it was moulded, on the one hand, in the context of liberating the ‘land’ and ‘the people’ from colonial rule and, on the other, by the nature of the post-independence state that was subordinated to Frelimo as the vanguard of the revolution: ‘the state-builder’.

Frelimo took the desire to create a ‘new man’ and a ‘new society’ to the extreme, since, like any other former liberation movement turned ruling party, it ‘not only felt [it had] won the right to govern the state through sacrifice and military victory, but this also imbues their state reform project’ (Dorman 2006: 1097). So, stimulated by Marxist-Leninist ideology and rhetoric, Frelimo embarked on the creation of a state which, to some extent, was hostile to African society (Cahen 1998; Newitt 1995) and where there was the ‘imposition of a homogeneous nation through the repression of identities’ (Cahen 1998: 10).

Indeed, Frelimo attempted to abolish several of the core of values of most communities, including chieftaincy and/or traditional authorities and witchcraft. Frelimo also implemented somewhat aggressive policies: communal villages, state farms, a bias towards cities compared to rural areas, intense repression and rigid social organisation (Cahen 1998; Newitt 1995; De Brito 1991) – a situation not dissimilar to the one that existed under the colonial regime (Sitoe 2004). With regard to this aspect, Melber (2009: 452) is perhaps right in saying that ‘it is not unusual for a new regime to quickly resemble an old one’.

Almost two years after independence, RENAMO had appeared as a rebel movement – initially backed by the racist Rhodesian regime and then, after Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980, much more vigorously by the South African apartheid regime.

However, scholars (De Brito 2009; Cahen 1998) suggest that what started as external aggression evolved into a civil war, around the mid-1980s. ‘It is evidently impossible to define a precise date for the passage from a war of aggression to an atypical civil war … it seems clear the process of transformation took place between 1982 and 1985, the period when the war extended to the entire country’ (Cahen 1998: 11). The fact
that all RENAMO leaders came from the central region of the country exacerbated the South-Centre cleavage which still shapes voter behaviour (Tollenaere 2004; De Brito 1995; Lundin 1995). RENAMO leaders claimed, *inter alia*, to be fighting against Frelimo’s southern tribalism (Chichava 2010).

The near-collapse of the Mozambican state due to the intensity of the civil war and severe recurrent droughts compelled the then Marxist-Leninist regime to turn to the Bretton Woods institutions for help and, in 1987 it subscribed to their Structural Adjustment Programmes – loans provided by the two institutions to countries experiencing economic crises. The economic reforms were followed by an announcement by Frelimo at its fifth party congress in 1989 that it was abandoning its Marxist-Leninist ideology and a year later, and despite the fact that Mozambique was still at war, the then People’s Assembly promulgated the first constitution in the history of the country to provide for a multiparty system. Dozens of political parties emerged, changing the political landscape. To distinguish them from RENAMO, still a rebel movement, they were popularly known as the non-armed opposition parties (Nuvunga 2005). A two-year democratic transition followed the signing of the General Peace Agreement between the government and RENAMO in October 1992 and the first democratic election was held on 27 and 28 October 1994.

It is worth considering that regardless of the complexity of the democratic reforms Frelimo maintained its party unity. De Renzio & Hanlon (2009: 252) stress this point, writing that:

Frelimo has always been a broad front, with internal divisions along regional, ethnic, and ideological lines. Groups and factions form and shift according to the issue at hand, but differences are largely argued out within the party. There are no expulsions or splits, and all factions remain inside the party. The highly corrupt have not been expelled, nor have the outspoken opponents of corruption left the party to set up an alternative political force.

Similarly, Cahen (1998: 6) described Frelimo as ‘a coalition of factions united only by their fear of losing power’.

RENAMO also showed solid internal cohesiveness in the early days of democratic politics but it failed to build alliances with the non-armed opposition parties that emerged after the promulgation of the 1990 Con-
stitution, setting itself apart from them (Nuvunga 2005). In fact, the non-armed opposition parties were marginalised in the peace process (De Brito 2008; Carbone 2005; Harrison 1996) and thereafter their participation in the political arena was made problematic by the 5% threshold for parliamentary representation set in the peace agreement (MARP 2010; De Brito 2008; Nuvunga 2005).

In fact, a 20% threshold for parliamentary representation had been proposed by RENAMO during the peace talks in Rome, arguably because the non-armed opposition parties were a Frelimo creation intended to weaken RENAMO (Nuvunga 2005). In the end the threshold was lowered to 5%, which, however still had an impact on the likelihood of the small opposition parties being able to elect members of Parliament (De Brito 2008; Nuvunga 2005). The situation was similar to the exclusion of the political groups that emerged during the transitional period in 1974 intent on participating in the process of national independence.

The 1990 Constitution envisaged a separation between party and state, although Frelimo skilfully retained significant control of the army and police institutions, a legacy of the past. According to Sumich & Honwana (2007: 4), ‘The military and the security services were seen to be the armed wing of Frelimo and their duty was to defend the revolution, as the nation was thought to be an extension of the revolutionary process that was embodied by the party.’

Political developments in Mozambique cannot be fully understood if the role of aid is not properly considered. Since the implementation of the Structural Adjustment Program under the aegis of the World Bank in 1987, Mozambique’s dependence on foreign aid has increased considerably. From about $360-million in 1985, the aid inflow increased to about $1.1-billion at the peak of post-war reconstruction, between 1991 and 1996. It decreased slightly to an annual average of $700-million from 1997 to 2006 (De Renzio & Hanlon 2009; Awortwi & Nuvunga 2006).

While scholarly literature (Moore 2001; Brautigam 2000; Knack 2000) has demonstrated that aid dependence has a problematic effect on domestic institutions, the major problem in Mozambique’s case is that the aid is supporting the Frelimo regime. Not only is it channelled through an executive branch of government that is controlled by Frelimo, giving Frelimo the means to govern, other forms of aid (e.g., project-based aid) directly helps the state machinery to fill gaps in service delivery, thus reducing the dissatisfaction and social tensions that might otherwise
emerge between the people and the state. So aid not only helps Frelimo maintain political and social stability, it also, and perhaps most importantly, helps it to exclude opposition groups because there is no need for it to negotiate and compromise in order to establish order as it has a windfall income.

1.3 The Scope and Object of this Study

Three types of questions have surfaced in the study of dominant party systems. First, how should dominant parties be identified? In other words, what is a dominant party and what makes a party dominant? Second, how should dominant parties be analysed? In this case, two lines of enquiry prevail, depending on the object of study. One is focused on the party system, with the most recent and influential work (Doorenspleet & Nijzink 2013; De Jager & Du Toit 2013) looking, among other aspects, at the origins, endurance and demise of one-party dominant systems in African democracies and beyond while others (Bogaards & Boucek 2010) also look at aspects of the nature of dominance and its arenas of manifestation. A second line of enquiry focuses on dominant parties per se, that is, in isolation from the party system in which they compete. A third question asks the nature of the relationship between dominant party and democracy?

This thesis is situated within the first and second dimensions. Although the problématique it probes is that of the early demise of Mozambique’s once vibrant two-party system and its replacement with one-party dominance, in fact, it examines the mechanisms behind the development and endurance of the one-party dominant system featuring Frelimo as the ruling party. As far as the research object is concerned, an important consideration put forward by Bogaards & Boucek (2010) was whether dominant parties and dominant party systems are separable as objects of study. Sartori (1976) made a clear distinction between the two and decided to focus on the party system. This thesis aligns with Sartori, focusing more on the party system than on Frelimo as the dominant party, although inevitably much of the discussion relates to the strategies of Frelimo elites in entrenching the party within the state and society.

As far as the temporal boundaries are concerned, the thesis covers the democratic period, which, in real terms, started in 1994 with the democracy-founding election and ended in 2012, three years after the most re-
cent election, held in 2009. While the early temporal boundary is unambiguous, the later one, 2012, was set in an attempt to cover as much as possible of Mozambique’s short democratic experience and thereby be consistent with the most demanding time spans for a party system to be considered as dominant (as discussed in chapter II).

1.4 Significance Of The Study

Following Bogaards’s suggestion (2004: 193) that there is an ‘urgent need for systematic research into the nature, sources, conditions and consequences of dominant parties’ several empirical studies (single-case and comparative) were published. Influential comparative scholarly work (Doorenspleet & Nijzink 2013; De Jager & Du Toit 2013) covered several cases in the African region but no consideration has been given to Mozambique either in comparative scholarly literature or in single-case studies.

There is a dearth of scholarly literature about Mozambique, both its politics in the context of the region and its dominant-party system. Among those who have addressed elements of the topic are De Brito (1988), Manning (1998), Sitoe (2004), Carbone (2005), Nuvunga (2005), (Sitoe, Matsimbe & Pereira 2005), Kadima & Matsimbe (2006), Poppe (2009), Orre (2010); Chichava (2010a; 2010b) Nuvunga & Mohamed Salih (2010) and Nuvunga & Adalima (2012). None of these studies is focused either on Frelimo as a dominant party or on the dominant-party system.

While it is an important subject, however, it is not merely the dearth of such studies that has prompted the topic of this thesis, it is the uniqueness of the system in Mozambique that motivated the research. Contrary to most dominant-party systems in the region, mainly those in South Africa, Namibia, Tanzania and Botswana, whose ruling parties moved smoothly either from independence or democratic transition (multiparty system) to one-party dominant systems, Mozambique actually had a two-party system which, rather than becoming institutionalised as did that in Ghana, ended abruptly.

After experiencing a long period of single-party rule before the breakthrough to multiparty politics Mozambique’s dominant-party system, like that of Tanzania, is enduring, thus differentiating it from most peer countries with similar experience. For instance, dominant-party systems
have come to an end in Mali, Senegal and Zambia (Doorenspleet & Nijzink 2013; 2011). It is on this peculiar set of circumstances that the relevance of this research – a single-case study with embedded cases (multiple units of analysis) – rests.

It emerges from the above that the evolution of Mozambique’s dominant-party system is a departure from the African norm. In this thesis Mozambique is used as a case study, but not, as Gerring (2007) would say, for it to performs the heroic role of representing a population of cases (African countries with dominant-party systems) but rather to unveil its peculiar features. Although it is not possible to extrapolate from a single case to the wider population of cases, the thesis uses analytical generalisations to engage with and contribute to the existing knowledge about one-party dominant systems, that is, the analytical generalisation enables the interrogation of the empirical results of this thesis against the assumptions underpinning the theory and concept of dominant-party systems and, in the end, the relevance of the concept to the current political situation in Mozambique.

1.5 Research Objective and Research Question

This thesis generally aims to contribute to an understanding of the development of Mozambique’s dominant party system and, specifically, to establish the mechanisms behind the development and endurance of the dominant party system in Mozambique. In this undertaking it has responded to the following research question: what mechanisms and how they account for the abrupt end of Mozambique’s two-party system and its replacement with a one-party dominant system?

Notes

1 The Frelimo candidate, Joaquim Chissano, won 52% of the vote and the RENAMO candidate, Afonso Dlhakama, 48% (Nuvunga & Salih 2010), with some 300 000 votes invalidated.

2 MANU, whose leaders were Mateus Mole and Malinga Milingo, was a movement formed essentially by Makonde migrants in Kenya and Tanzania.

3 UDENAMO’s founders were Mozambican emigrants in the former Southern Rhodesia, most of whom were from the former colonial district of Manica and Sofala, except for the movement’s president, Adelino Gwambe, who was born in
Inhambane, southern Mozambique, and worked in Beira, the old capital of Manica and Sofala district, before emigrating to Southern Rhodesia.

4 UNAMI, led by Balthazar da Costa Changonga from the former district of Tete, was formed in 1961 mainly by natives of the same district.

5 Land was nationalised by the 1975 Constitution and remains state property under the 2004 Constitution.

6 This region covers the following provinces: Cabo Delgado, Niassa, Nampula, Manica, Sofala, Tete and Zambezia.

7 Grupo Unido de Moçambique (GUMO), Comité Revolucionário de Moçambique (COREMO) as well as others that existed underground during the fight for independence (Adalima 2009; Newitt 1995).

8 The Lusaka Agreement (Zambia) was signed on the 7th September 1974 between the Portuguese Government and the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO). In this Agreement the Portuguese Government formally acknowledged the right of the Mozambique people to independence and in consequence agreed with FRELIMO the principle of transference of power to the Mozambican people.
This chapter contains a review of the literature on dominant-party systems, focusing on the mechanisms that underpin their endurance in African democracies. It then describes the conceptual framework of Mozambique’s system.

2.1 Development and Endurance of Dominant-Party Systems

In analysing party systems in Africa, scholarly literature has documented a trend towards declining political competitiveness and the entrenchment of ruling parties and presidents (Sanches 2010; Erdmann & Basedau 2007; Bogaards 2004; Mohamed Salih 2003; Van de Walle & Butler 1999), with the parties that ushered in independence and/or the former one-party state enjoying prolonged periods in government to the point of becoming the “parties of the state” (Kopecký & Mair 2003: 287). Similarly, an extensive body of scholarly literature (Carbone 2007; Mozaffar & Scarritt 2005; Manning 2005; Kuenzi & Lambright 2005; Bogaards 2004; Karume 2004; Mohamed Salih 2003; Doorenspleet 2003; Van Cranenburgh 2003; Van de Walle & Butler, 1999) has concluded that “the spread of multiparty politics in the 1990s has given rise to dominant parties” (Bogaards 2004: 173).

Indeed, Lindberg (2007) found that of the 21 electoral democracies in sub-Saharan Africa 11 could be characterised as stable and that eight of these had a dominant-party system. This led Lindberg (2007) to conclude that stable party systems in Africa seemed to mean stable one-party dominance. Most recent and influential comparative scholarly literature on dominant-party systems (Doorenspleet & Nijzink 2013; De Jager & Du Toit 2013) has presented several explanations for the development
and endurance of dominant-party party systems in African democracies. The variety of explanations stems from different approaches to the phenomenon of party dominance but, importantly, is grounded in country case studies. They include the following:

**Historical legacy:** scholars (Doorenspleet & Nijzink 2011; 2013; De Jager & Du Toit 2013; Doorenspleet 2003; Kopecký & Mair 2003; Mohamed Salih 2003; Van Cranenburgh 2003) argue that the development of dominant-party systems partly relates to the historical background of the formation of political parties in the new African democracies. Since, in most cases, after independence these countries had suffered traumatic experiences such as revolution or severe repression by authoritarian and military regimes, they tended to favour undemocratic means of crystallising party systems. “The political goodwill earned in the popular mobilisation for independence or liberation seems to provide a basis for the development of a one-party dominant system” (Doorenspleet & Nijzink 2011: 6). Accordingly, in most cases, “the introduction of multi-party elections in the 90’s transformed these single party systems into one-party dominant systems” (Doorenspleet & Nijzink 2011: 6).

History also plays a significant role in the fact that former liberation movements have turned into ruling parties (e.g., South Africa’s African National Congress – ANC; Namibia’s South West African People’s Party – SWAPO), seeing their role as “an historical mission” (Schrire 2010: 139) and “turning the independence struggle soon thereafter into a myth … and permanent institution” (Melber 2009: 451). For example, in analysing one-party dominance in Namibia, Du Pisani (2013: 136) contends that “the history conspired to elevate SWAPO to a position of first among equals”, to the point that the “symbolic narrative continues to supersede considerations of uneven delivery in a number of policy domains, and as such resembles a ‘founding myth’ in terms of which the party and the post-apartheid state share a moral and historic assignment”.

However, Doorenspleet & Nijzink (2011) draw a clear distinction between first-generation political parties rooted in nationalist and liberation movements and pro-democracy movements – those parties that emerged in the context of political liberalisation as part of the third wave of democratisation that swept the African continent – some of which later gained a dominant position in their respective polities (e.g., Zambia’s Movement for Multiparty Democracy – MMD). In their view, while the
former are more stable in their dominant position, the latter are more vulnerable (as evidenced by Zambia’s MMD). This again emphasises the role of historical legacy in the endurance of one-party dominance, the extent of the impact of which requires further research.

Social cleavages and ethnic, religious and linguistic fragmentation: Doorenspleet & Nijzink (2011, 2013) and De Jager & Du Toit (2013), for instance, believe that because of their historical legacy dominant parties tend to “have a broad multi-ethnic and/or multi class character” (Doorenspleet & Nijzink 2011: 7) and benefit from their dominant position in that they “transcend social cleavages – religious, ethnic and linguistic divisions in society – and attract voters from various social groups” (Doorenspleet & Nijzink 2011: 7). Opposition parties, on the other hand, suffer from factionalism (De Jager & Du Toit 2013; Bogaards & Boucek 2010; Kopecký & Mair 2003; Mohamed Salih 2003; Van Cranenburgh 2003). Case studies (e.g., De Jager 2013 on South Africa’s African National Congress) also substantiate the significance of social cleavages in one-party dominance but Greene (2013) disputes this link.

Institutional architecture (the electoral system and arrangements for executive-legislative relations): Since it is within this framework that political competition takes place it would be expected to have an influence on the development and endurance of one-party dominance (Doorenspleet & Nijzink 2011, 2013; De Jager 2013; Van Cranenburgh 2003). However, having established that there are dominant-party systems in polities with both first-past-the-post and proportional representation electoral systems as well as in countries with presidential and those with parliamentary systems, on the other, Doorenspleet & Nijzink (2011, 2013) and Van Cranenburgh 2003 conclude that “the institutional arrangements of parliamentary versus presidential or semi-presidential systems although interesting seem to have little influence on the patterns of one-party dominance” (Doorenspleet & Nijzink 2011: 8), that influence is exercised by the president. “Instead of formal rules and constitutional frameworks, personal motives and idiosyncrasies determine outcomes to a significant extent” (Van Cranenburgh 2003: 190).

Similarly, Greene (2013) disputes the link between electoral institutions and one-party dominance. He agrees not only with Doorenspleet & Nijzink (2011, 2013) about the influence of the presidency but also with case studies (Sebudubudu & Bothomilwe 2013; De Jager 2013; Du Pisa-
ni 2013) highlighting the role of charismatic leaders in producing one-party dominance and, more importantly, the power of appointment and patronage networks orbiting around the incumbency (Greene 2010, 2013; De Jager & Du Toit 2013). “In South Africa, party leadership maintains strict discipline by controlling party, public services, parastatal and statutory body appointments” (De Jager & Du Toit 2013: 200) which results in “pre-eminence to the ANC’s authority over constitutional arrangements” (De Jager & Du Toit 2013: 200).

Comparative scholarly literature also grounded in case studies (De Jager & Du Toit 2013; Sebudubudu & Bothomilwe 2013; De Jager 2013; Myburgh & Giliomee 2010) identified the link between political culture and the endurance of one-party dominance (Doorenspleet & Nijzink 2013; 2011; De Jager & Du Toit 2013). Accordingly, defining political culture as consisting of widely shared fundamental beliefs with political consequences, Doorenspleet & Nijzink (2011, 2013) argue that it is not separate from institutions like political parties. “Rather institutions like dominant political parties are infused with cultural norms that are constantly being reinvented and redefined” (Doorenspleet & Nijzink 2013: 16), implying that “cultural patterns could reinforce the position of dominant parties through the lived experiences of their leaders, members, and voters” (Doorenspleet & Nijzink 2013: 16).

By the same token, focusing on Botswana, Sebudubudu & Bothomilwe (2013: 124) use the example of the people of that country who do not have a culture of challenging authority. For this reason, “[i]t seems reasonable to argue that the culture of not challenging authority, combined with ‘risk aversion’ partly explains the apparent reluctance of the Botswana electorate to vote the BDP [Botswana Democratic Party] out of power”. Similarly, Du Toit & De Jager (2013) emphasise the role of culture, which, in their view, is embedded in ethnicity. The conclusion is that political culture plays an important role in the endurance of dominant-party system in African democracies.

Actual and perceived government performance is another important factor (Doorenspleet & Nijzink 2013; De Jager & Du Toit 2013; Bogaards & Boucek 2010). The departure point is that party dominance originates from the ballot box, implying that it occurs because “the voters continue to vote for the party in power” (Doorenspleet & Nijzink 2013: 17). The authors recognise the growing trend of voters making informed decisions and choices, evaluating government performance and
promises and acting accordingly (Doorenspleet & Nijzink 2013: 11). Sebudubudu & Bothomilwe (2013), for instance, point to the indisputable success of the BDP government in ruling the country, which has resulted in continued support at polls. In the case of Namibia, however, du Pisani (2013: 136) writes about a dominant party that “has been able to retain its grip on the politics of the country despite uneven delivery in respect of public health, housing, land redistribution, employment creation and corruption”.

The relationship between state and party is another factor that features in most comparative scholarly literature on dominant-party systems (Doorenspleet & Nijzink 2013; De Jager & Du Toit 2013; Bogaards & Boucek, 2010). Arian & Barnes (1974: 608) argue that “the strength of the dominant party lies in its ability to make identification with the political system and support for the party interchangeable”, which results in an uneven playing field for electoral competition (Levitsky & Way 2002, 2010). An uneven playing field is one where incumbent abuse of the state generates such disparities in access to resources, media, or state institutions that opposition parties’ ability to organize and compete for national office is seriously impaired. These disparities rarely emerge naturally; rather, they are usually rooted in illicit or autocratic behaviour, including partisan appropriation of state resources, systematic packing of state institutions and state-run media, and politicized distribution of state resources, concessions, and licenses. (Levitsky & Way 2010: 57ff)

So the major argument is that ruling parties are better off in terms of access to state resources than opposition parties and use this advantage to further entrench their dominant position in politics and society (Doorenspleet & Nijzink 2011, 2013). This gives rise to the so-called ‘cycle of dominance’ (Doorenspleet & Nijzink 2011, 2013; Kopecký & Mair 2003) in which “long-term victory allows a dominant party better access to state resources, thus increasing the opportunity for further electoral successes” (Doorenspleet & Nijzink 2013: 19). A decade ago Kopecký & Mair (2003: 288) had seen a similar pattern where government parties in the region have also often used their privileged access to the state in order to manipulate, and sometimes to intimidate, the opposition, and in this sense they have used their office to maintain power within the newly competitive political environment.
These advantages relate not only to state resources but also to external resources (Doorenspleet 2003). So all in all “incumbent parties have the advantage of access to both public and private funding sources” (Doorenspleet & Nijzink 2013: 19). Focusing on South Africa, De Jager (2013) gives an account of the capture of the state and society as part of the political resources and strategies deployed by the ANC. Likewise, Du Pisani (2013: 136), writing about Namibia, gives an account of the capture of the society by SWAPO. This is embedded in the maxim: “One Namibia, One Nation and SWAPO is the nation’. In this respect, Sanches (2010: 8) writes that as the “state constructors” the former ruling parties “made it difficult for newcomers to break in and to challenge the control over the state. Ultimately these parties persist simply because they got in first.”

Karume (2004: 4) highlights the manipulation of electoral rules to give advantage to the ruling party, writing that this favours the entrenchment of dominant parties, which “have usually gone on to win one election after the other”. This enables the ruling party to blur the boundary between the party and state (Brooks 2004) “with the result that the ruling party comes to be seen as the state rather than a temporary government” (Karume 2004: 4) which gives it the instruments and strategies not only to weaken but to demonise the opposition (Warner 1998). Indeed, “[d]e-legitimation of the opposition is the logical corollary to political hegemony” (Levite & Tarrow 1983: 297).

Nevertheless, some scholars (Brooks 2004; Karume 2004) believe that regardless of all the above considerations party dominance may not necessarily result from any form of coercion or electoral manipulation. “There may be some parameters of politics which do indeed aid dominance in democratically acceptable ways … dominance may be based on consent or even indifference on the part of the citizenry, it may be entrenched by real electoral support” (Karume 2004: 5). The most vocal defenders of dominant-party systems are Alan Arian and Samuel Barnes, who see such systems as “a model of how democracy and stability may be combined under difficult conditions … since it permits more than one party to compete, it is certainly democratic in the procedural sense” (Arian & Barnes 1974: 593). They see the major issue as government stability “… its superiority as a means to guarantee stability in fragmented policies becomes apparent” (Arian & Barnes 1974: 600).
These authors inspired other scholars (Brooks 2004; Karume 2004) who have come to defend dominant-party systems for their ‘democratic-ness’.

Considering the issue from the perspective of party system institutionalisation, Carbone (2007: 16) suggests that dominant-party systems in African may be associated with positive developments.

In Mozambique or Zambia, for example, the temporary presence of a dominant party may produce positive gains ... observers stress that out of 20 cases 14 countries with dominant parties score better in the most recent rating (e.g. degree of democracy scores by Freedom House Index), than in the election year multiparty elections was established ... there is no evidence that suggests that one-party dominance generally puts democracy at risk ... the other way around seems even more plausible ... one-party dominance comes with favourable features such as political stability and government efficiency.

According to this school of thought, dominant parties are “benign bridge builders” (Karume 2004: 8) for both social and democratic progress. However, apart from a tendency towards stability and predictability dominant-partyism is usually seen as a problematic phenomenon (De Jager & Du Toit 2013; Bogaards and Boucek 2010; Sanches, 2010; Doorenspleet, 2003; Heywood 2002; Van de Walle & Butler 1999).

With regard to the implications for democracy of dominant-party systems, many scholars see them as inimical to democracy (De Jager & Du Toit 2013; Bogaards & Boucek 2010; Giliomee, Myburg & Schlemmer 2010; Schrire 2010; Melber 2009; Brooks 2004; Cranenburg & Kopecký 2004; Kopecký & Mair 2003; Mohamed Salih 2003; Heywood 2002; Warner 1998; Levite & Tarrow 1983). They also blur the boundary between party and state and “the vital elements of democracy, namely genuine competition and uncertainty in electoral outcomes are removed in a process that is self-sustaining” (Brooks 2004: 2).

The fact that governments cease to come and go results in an “insidious process of politicization through which state officials and institutions adjust to the ideological and political priorities of the dominant party” (Heywood 2002: 263) to the point that dominant parties do not look at themselves as parties but rather as the state. Dominant-party systems are seen as awkward phenomena because they upset the party competition (Doorenspleet 2003) that underpins power alternation, a central aspect of democratic politics. “The existence of a ‘permanent’ governing party
may corrode the democratic spirit by encouraging the electorate to fear change and to stick with the ‘natural’ party of government” (Heywood 2002: 263). Nevertheless, several dominant-party systems have come to an end with the defeat of the ruling party at the polls. Scholarly literature (Doorenspleet & Nijzink 2011; 2013; Bogaards & Boucek 2010) gives a detailed account of several such instances both in Africa and beyond.

Dominant-party systems are not solely a phenomenon of the developing world. The work by Alan Arian and Samuel Barnes makes it clear that industrial and post-industrial societies also experienced party dominance. However, compared to their counterparts in the developing world, it appears that the defining difference of these dominant-party systems is that they are either seen as ‘uncommon democracies’ (Pempel 1990) or are categorised as dominant-party democratic regimes where “challengers operated without threat of repression” (Greene 2010a: 157).

Another category is that of “dominant party authoritarian regimes” where “despite meaningful elections, incumbents supplemented resource advantages with targeted and episodic repression” (Greene 2010a: 157). Indeed, Giliomee & Simkins (1999) argue that compared to the industrialised dominant-party democracies, dominant-party regimes in semi-developed countries were much less likely “to be punished by the electorate” and “to limit the abuse of power” and “they tended to be more authoritarian” (Orre 2010: 32).

In conclusion, dominant-party systems, whether democratic or non-democratic, develop over time, with divergent trajectories, processes and strategies of entrenchment within politics and society. The literature highlights the role of ruling elites in strategically skewing the playing field of electoral competition in manifold ways. Among these are former liberation movements turned political parties or the former ruling parties of one-party states playing the card of ‘state constructors’, thus making it difficult for newly created opposition parties to break in and challenge their grip on power. Another ploy is to use the liberation struggle as a credential and to demonise and legitimise opposition parties, thus weakening them. However, according to the literature, not all party dominance has come about illegitimately. There are cases where historic factors which resonate with voters may lead political parties to gain a dominant position.
2.2 Does Mozambique Have a Dominant-Party System?

This section responds to the question of whether Mozambique in fact has a dominant-party system. While there is no scholarly consensus about just what constitutes one-party dominance, it is acknowledged that such dominance becomes established over time (Doorenspleet & Nijzink 2013; Boogards & Boucek 2010) so dominant-party systems are defined as procedurally democratic regimes dominated by one party for prolonged periods (Doorenspleet & Nijzink, 2013; De Jager & Du Toit, 2013; Du Pisani, 2013; Boogards & Boucek 2010; Dunleavy 2010; Greene 2010a, 2010b, 2013; De Jager 2009; Eardman & Baseda 2007; Bogaards 2004; Cranenburgh & Kopecky 2004; Kopecky & Mair 2003; Doorenspleet 2003; Sartori 1976).

Since some political parties have prolonged their rule by undemocratic means, scholarly literature (Doorenspleet & Nijzink 2013; De Jager & Du Toit 2013; Bogaards & Boucek 2010) not only distinguishes between dominant-party systems and dominant-authoritarian-party systems it also sets criteria for the identification of dominant (democratic)-party systems, namely, the nature of the political system, the threshold for dominance, the nature of the dominance, the inclusion of opposition features and the temporal dimension (De Jager & Du Toit 2013; De Jager 2009). In all cases clear benchmarks must be met before a ruling party in a given country is considered to have a dominant position. So how does Mozambique feature in this conceptual framework?

The Political System

Dominant-party systems are characterised by democratic regimes which are set up and maintained through regular elections and where a multiplicity of political parties compete for power (De Jager & Du Toit 2013). What is the situation in Mozambique? In a context in which many third wave democracies in southern Africa have failed to hold second presidential and parliamentary elections (Bratton 1999), Mozambique is praised for conducting regular, relatively free and fair elections, with opposition parties winning some local government elections and considerable, although declining, representation in Parliament, the Assembleia da República (Nuvunga & Mohamed Salih 2010; Hanlon & Fox 2006; Nuvunga 2005). Frelimo not only obtained a parliamentary majority in all
four elections but with every election it has increased its parliamentary seats to the point of obtaining over two-thirds of seats in 2009.

So, from a procedural standpoint, the government is legitimised by popular vote in reasonably free and competitive elections, but there are problems with the protection of civil and political liberties. In fact, between 1999 and 2013 Mozambique has consistently been classified by the Freedom House Index as ‘partly free’. This is consistent with other classifications that label Mozambique’s political regime ‘ambiguous’ (Diamond 2002); as ‘electoral democracy’ (Bogaards 2004; Van Cranenburg 2003); as having ‘limited freedoms and high levels of corruption’ (Transparency International 2005); as a ‘minimal democracy’ (Tollenaere 2005; Doorenspleet 2003) and as being ‘in the gray zone’2 (Forquilha 2009). Accordingly, Doorenspleet (2003) contends that Mozambique cannot be regarded as a ‘liberal democracy’ on the grounds that the state controls the media and the opposition gets marginal coverage, an assessment which is corroborated by the 2011 Mozambique Media report by African Media Barometer.

Although the criterion under consideration is less concerned with the substantive dimension of democracy than with its procedural aspect, the Mozambique case is not only problematical when viewed against rigorous definitions of democracy such as Robert Dahl’s ‘polyarchy’ – which argues that on top of free, fair and competitive elections there must also be freedom of expression, alternative sources of information and associational autonomy (Dahl 1989) – but also when viewed against less demanding conceptions of democracy, for example, that presented by Joseph Schumpeter, who defines it as the political system in which the principal positions of power are filled “through a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (Schumpeter 1961: 321ff).

Although the formal institutions of a democratic regime are in place and the election is the constitutional mechanism for the appointment of political leaders, the reality is that to date Mozambique’s democratic pitfalls (Nuvunga 2012; Nuvunga & Mohamed Salih 2010; De Brito 2008) affect important definitional aspects of a democratic regime such as competition and/or contestation by opposition groups. Indeed, competition is a fundamental aspect of a democratic regime (Lindberg 2006a; 2006b; Doorenspleet 2003; Dahl 1998; Bartolini 1999; Alvarez, Cheibub, Limongi & Przeworski 1996; Schmitter & Karl 1991; Przeworski 1986).
However, to do justice to the political developments in Mozambique, it is worth setting a temporal boundary. To start with, the assessment by Carbone (2005) that overall progress towards a pluralist political culture and fully democratic politics in Mozambique has been limited is worth mentioning. From a chronological viewpoint it is possible to distinguish two distinct periods in Mozambique’s short democratic experience, namely from 1994 to 1999 and from 1999 to date. In the first period the country was under the leadership of President Joaquim Chissano, whose second term was won in a non-transparent and somewhat fraudulent manner (Ronning 2011; De Brito 2008; Hanlon & Fox 2006; Nuvunga 2005). Regardless of this aspect, the space for political and electoral competition by the opposition parties was significant, as President Chissano centred his reformist governance in the machinery of the state, favouring the disentanglement of party from state.

As argued above, initially Mozambique had a vibrant two-party system underpinned by political and electoral competition (Carbone 2005; Nuvunga 2005; Mohamed Salih 2003; Harrison 1996), which came to an abrupt end after President Armando Guebuza took over the leadership of the Frelimo party. Once in power he embraced the opposite path to that of his predecessor as he moved to revitalise and entrench Frelimo within the state and to ensure its control of the state. Among the measures he introduced were the gradual suspension of the Global Strategy for Public Sector Reform initiated by President Chissano and the revitalisation of Frelimo party cells within the state machinery (Nuvunga & Sitoe 2012). This reduced the space available for opposition groups as the state machinery was increasingly aligned with Frelimo party directives. So it was under the heavy-handed leadership of President Guebuza that Frelimo met the procedural criteria for party dominance but also exerted much control over society, particularly in rural areas, where the majority of the people live.

Thus it would be correct to speak of a significant opening up of the political system by the mid of the past decade which underpinned Mozambique’s two-party system, and a move towards closure soon after Guebuza’s ascent to the presidency (De Brito 2008). Therefore, conceptually, electoral or minimal democracy would better characterise the nature of Mozambique’s democracy by the mid of the past decade. For the sake of clarity, “minimal democracies” are defined as “regimes in which there are elections which are relatively free and fair and there is the pos-
sibility of competition and inclusive suffrage in the political system” (Doorenspleet 2003: 170). From the second half of the past decade onwards the concept of minimal or electoral democracy, although still relevant, would not properly reflect the political and electoral dynamics on the ground, particularly in relation to core aspects of democracy, such as competition and/or contestation.

With this said, and considering the difficulties of setting conceptual boundaries to characterise dynamic political processes, the constructive way of going about this was to suggest that Mozambique’s ‘partly free’ democracy from the second half of the past decade lies somewhere between minimal/electoral democracy and competitive authoritarianism. According to Levitsky & Way (2002), in competitive authoritarian regimes, although there may be routine manipulation of formal democratic norms by power holders, they do not go as far as eliminating them or reducing them to a mere façade. In these regimes, “incumbents are more likely to use bribery, co-optation, and more subtle forms of persecution, such as the use of tax authorities, compliant judiciaries, and other state agencies to ‘legally’ harass, persecute, or extort cooperative behavior from critics” (Levitsky & Way 2002: 54).

However, since the democratic institutions still create arenas in which the opposition may pose significant challenges, the result is that “even though democratic institutions may be badly flawed, both authoritarian incumbents and their opponents take them seriously” (Levitsky & Way 2002: 54). So, although there has been no formal democratic reversal since the democracy founding elections in 1994 there has been a democratic deterioration characterised by a growing reduction in the political space for opposition groups, which significantly affects the overall political competition. This implies that there are more elements of competitive authoritarian democracy than electoral democracy, epitomised by the electoral fraud related to the 1999 elections and the exclusion of opposition parties in the 2009 elections.

Time Span

There is scholarly consensus that one-party dominance is gained over time but that there are different opinions about how long a political party must be in power before it is considered dominant (De Jager & Du Toit 2013; Bogaards & Boucek 2010; Doorenspleet 2003). Some argue
that the dominant party has to win ‘usually’ (Ware 1996). Others say that dominance occurs after a ‘substantial period’ in power (Pempel 1990). Heywood (2002) believes a party must enjoy ‘prolonged’ periods in power but for Doorenspleet (2003) a single re-election is enough for a party to be considered dominant. Van de Walle & Butler (1999) consider that two consecutive elections are needed for a party to reach dominance status.

Sartori (1976) sets the time span at three consecutive elections while Greene (2010a; 2013) sets the longevity threshold at five election or 20 years of control of both Parliament and the executive. De Jager & Du Toit (2013: 10) take a midway position, opting for “a period of time of at least four consecutive national elections”. Frelimo has not only won four general elections, in the most recent election, in 2009, it won a landslide victory for its presidential candidate and two-thirds of the popular vote, surpassing Sartori’s criterion.

The Threshold of Dominance

Scholars differ on the threshold for identifying dominance. Some (Bogaards 2004; Ware 1996; Pempel 1990) argue that a party can reach a dominant position with a plurality of votes but others (Van de Walle & Butler 1999; Sartori 1976) posit that an absolute majority is required for a party to enjoy dominant status. However Bogaards (2004) warns that since most African political systems are presidential any meaningful definition must take into consideration the dominance of the executive and not solely of the legislature. Sartori (1976) calls for ‘more than 50 per cent’, while van de Walle & Butler (1999) believe the threshold should be ‘more than 60 per cent of the vote’ – a percentage superseded by Frelimo in 2009, though its victory was won in the context of a voter turnout of less than 50%. The percentages cited above substantiate the view that in dominant-party systems the opposition parties “are small and often toothless” (Doorenspleet 2003: 185).

The Nature of Dominance

At the core of one-party dominance is “a symbolic attachment to a particular party” (De Jager & Du Toit 2013: 9), usually as a result of a particular event” (De Jager & Du Toit 2013: 9) which allows the dominant party to enjoy the support of the majority despite non-delivery, misman-
agement and corruption. This view led Duverger (1954: 6) to argue that a dominant party had to be identified with an epoch, implying that “a party is dominant when it is identified with an epoch; when its doctrines, ideas, methods, its style, so to speak, coincide with those of the epoch … a dominant party is that which public opinion believes to be dominant.”

In the Mozambique situation Frelimo’s liberation credentials, its project of building a nation and the state and its association with the new political order ushered in by the General Peace Agreement signed in 1992 results in what De Jager & Du Toit (2013: 9) term “an affinity with the party that goes beyond its mere instrumentalist relationship between it and its constituency”. Frelimo successfully articulates the mantra of anti-colonial nationalism when the party is in need of a real or imagined enemy. Its political symbols, colours, heroes, myths and revolutionary songs are those of the liberation movement and, in turn, those of the state. Frelimo’s narrative is identical to that of the state and its political institutions, to the extent that party and state share some kind of moral and historical past, which – using the example of Namibia as depicted by Du Pisani (2013) – elevates Frelimo to the position of first among equals.

However the extent of the contribution of this narrative to Frelimo’s dominance is still to be proven. The fact is that although Frelimo plays its symbolic narrative card and is unpunished in every election regardless of its poor service delivery and corruption, its dominance does not seem, in Duverger’s terminology, to ‘influence the epoch’. Neither of Mozambique’s effective parties – RENAMO and the Mozambique Democratic Movement (MDM), which broke away from RENAMO, see it as dominant, considering it rather to be undemocratic. The high voter apathy may also be an indication that Frelimo’s dominance has no substantial public recognition, implying that although it meets the conceptual requirements of a dominant party this dominance is not identified with the epoch. So, Frelimo has the authority to – as Arian & Barnes (1974) would say – set the limits between the permissible and the unacceptable in the public domain but its historical narrative is not enough to secure its electoral victory at polls, at least as demonstrated in the 1999 and 2009 elections, in which only fraud and the exclusion of opposition parties allowed it to retain power. Thus is follows that Mozambique’s dominant-party system is grounded in a problematic nature of dominance.
The Inclusion of Opposition Features

The configuration of the opposition parties is particularly important to the definition of a dominant-party system. Greene (2010b; 2013) argues that the opposition forces must be allowed to form independent parties and compete in elections, but, as Ware (1996: 159) points out, the nature of this competition is such that the “predominant party never loses an election since the other parties are without hope of being in government”. In the case of Mozambique, while, in the 1994 and 1999 elections there was a high level of competition and victory could have gone either to Frelimo or RENAMO, in 2004 and 2009 the opposition parties had ‘no hope of winning’. RENAMO experienced abrupt and significant electoral erosion and Frelimo triumphed in almost all constituencies.

These developments are directly linked to the democratic pitfalls mentioned above, epitomised by the exclusion of opposition parties from the 2009 elections (Nuvunga 2012; Ronning 2011; Nuvunga & Mohamed Salih 2010), which undermined one of the key features of a democratic regime: electoral competition and contestation by opposition groups. As argued elsewhere in this section, although opposition parties are allowed by law to form and contest elections, the de facto political space available for them to compete with Frelimo, is deliberately reduced, giving the opposition ‘no hope of winning’ but still tolerated to give the political system the features of democracy.

In conclusion, Mozambique’s party system meets the procedural requirements for inclusion in the category of democratic dominant-party systems. However, it is cemented in a political process that has developed from electoral or minimal democracy in the second half of the past decade to something close to competitive authoritarianism, with a mix of manipulation of formal democratic rules resulting in the exclusion of political opponents from electoral contestation and the use of other political strategies that render the electoral playing field uneven. The fact that the opposition forces still pose a significant challenge to Frelimo, however, renders its dominance somewhat uncertain.

Notes

1 Mexico, Taiwan, Malaysia, South Africa, Singapore (Giliomee & Simkins 1990).
2 ‘Zona cincenta’ author’s translation.
In 2001 the Mozambique government approved the Global Strategy for Public Sector Reform, 2001-2011 comprising five major components: (1) strengthening service delivery through decentralisation and institutional restructuring; (2) policy formulation and monitoring; (3) public sector professionalism; (4) financial management and accountability; (5) good governance and combating corruption. To oversee the implementation of the reform, the government established an Inter-Ministerial Committee for Public Sector Reform (CIRESP) and a Technical Unit for Public Sector Reform (UTRESP).
This chapter frames the development of Mozambique’s dominant-party system in context through the theoretical framework, that is, social conflict theory and historical institutionalism.

3.1 Elements of the Theoretical Framework

This section presents the theoretical angle for the political analysis of Mozambique’s dominant-party system. It is a combination of two theoretical perspectives, namely social conflict theory and historical institutionalism. Social conflict theory is a Marxist-based social theory concerned with the delineation of the patterns of power that produce particular institutional, political and social outcomes. Social conflict theorists contend that institutions are not just about efficiency, implying that they are not necessarily neutral all the time. Central to this theory is the explanation of particular structures of power and politics accounting for the features of political parties and the relations they develop within the party system.

Social conflict theorists focus their analytical attention on the different but competing interests that structure political developments as reflected in the party system. In their view, this aids the understanding of how institutional transformation takes place within broader patterns of social and political power. In terms of this theory the development of a dominant-party system relates to deep political change and the transformation of power relations in society, not merely an election result (Rodan, Hewison & Robinson 2006).

In this sense social conflict theory views party system as reflecting these struggles in society and its institutionalisation along the lines of party dominance as a process of profound political transformation in-
volving competing interests that structure political developments and inevitably involve winners and losers. This theoretical perspective is concerned with the structural factors behind changing power relations that enable the development of a dominant-party system. Among these structural factors are features such as urbanisation, economic transformation and social cleavages anchored in, for example, race, religion and language, which give a certain party sufficient electoral advantage to gain a dominant position over its rivals (Boucek & Bogaards 2010).

However in the main these structural factors tend to produce particular political outcomes only when they are strategically brought into play by power elites, implying that it is not only research into the structural factors behind the development of dominant-party systems that matters but also the search for the strategic factors which, conceptually, are related to the behaviour of dominant parties that adapt their strategies to existing structures of competition or may seek to alter them (Bogaards & Boucek 2010). Since the subject of the research for this thesis is the development of Mozambique’s dominant-party system, which has been cemented in the past decade, this suggests the need to look at the origins of the current political order. Indeed, Arian & Barnes (1974) demonstrate that dominant parties have been closely identified with the creation of the constitutional and political order they have come to dominate.

With this in mind there was a need to interrogate what Dunleavy (2010) terms the ‘historical momentum’ and probe the extent to which it has established the foundations of the current political order, which is dominated by Frelimo. So it was not just ‘history matters’ (Kelemen & Capoccia 2007) but rather an emphasis on the need to look at current political developments as potentially ‘path-dependent’ or historically dependent, implying the search for institutional legacies in the political processes that ushered in the current political order and questioning the extent of their influence over the development of Mozambique’s dominant-party system (Kelemen & Capoccia 2007).

With this in mind the merit of historical institutionalism, particularly the concept of ‘path dependency’, was in suggesting that the traits and dynamics of political institutions in Mozambique partly reflected a self-reinforcing process described in scholarly literature (Mahoney 2000, 2001; Sydow, Schreyögg & Koch 2005; Pierson 2000; Thelen 1999) as ‘increasing returns’, implying that the choices made by key Frelimo actors, first, at the time of democratic transition and, second, in institution-
al design throughout the political process of the democratic transition, set a path that not only had an impact on the nature of state (as the key playing field for political and electoral competition), but also on the state’s relations with political parties, party system and society more generally.

This is not unique to Mozambique. Moe (2005: 218) documented cases in which “the political process often gives rise to institutions that are good for some people and bad for others depending on who has the power to impose their will”. This suggests that political institutions can also be considered as the structuring variables through which battles over interests, ideas and power are fought (Steinmo 2001). So the political institutions that emerged out of the peace process were – as Moe (2005) would say – ‘structures of power,’ which, according to social conflict theory, were embedded in a battle between two groups, the former belligerents, namely Frelimo and RENAMO, for the capture and control of the state.

In conclusion, following on this theoretical framework, the explanation for the development of Mozambique’s dominant-party system relates to the identification of the structural factors, e.g. the changes and transformations in society as well as the legacies of the past underpinning these developments, on the one hand, and the strategic factors related to the mechanisms of power-holders to maintain their grip on power and how, on the other.

3.2 Framing the Development of Mozambique’s Dominant-Party System in Context

A good departure point for a theory about Mozambique’s dominant-party system is the concept of a political party. There have been several definitions of political parties (Mohamed Salih 2003; Heywood 2002; Svåsand & Randall 2002; Moreira 2001; Randall 1988; LaPalombara & Weiner 1996). The most nuanced definition for the present purpose is proposed by Mohamed Salih (2003), who states that political parties are the instruments of collective human action and creatures of political elites – either politicians trying to control governments or government elites trying to control the masses.

The importance of this conceptualisation for the present purpose is in that it emphasises the role of elites in party formation and the instrumen-
tal nature of political parties in the hands of these elites. In this sense, to probe one-party dominant systems is to interrogate the structural and strategic factors that lead political parties – as controlled by elites – to dominate politics and government in specific arena (Boucek & Bogaards, 2010). The implication is that the study of one-party dominant systems tends to analyse the structural and strategic factors deliberately used by political elites to gain and maintain prolonged rule.

How then to look at the research problem at hand? To begin with, scholarly literature has documented elements of ethnic voting (De Tollenare 2004; De Brito 1995; Lundin 1995) but not as a salient feature of Mozambique’s democratic politics. In fact, unlike South Africa’s African National Congress (ANC), whose dominance has, since the country’s democracy-founding election in April 1994, been underpinned by racial cleavage (De Jager 2013), Frelimo’s electoral triumphs are not significantly embedded in social cleavages. In the democracy-founding election of 1994 and the second election, held in 1999, Frelimo drew much of its electoral support from the northern (Cabo Delgado and Niassa) and southern (Inhambane, Gaza and Maputo) provinces, which are linked to its history and roots (De Brito 1995) while RENAMO’s support came from the northern province of Nampula and the central provinces of Tete, Manica, Zambézia and Sofala, over which it had considerable influence rooted in its significant control of these provinces throughout the 16-year civil war.

As argued in chapter I, the aforementioned distribution of electoral-constituency strongholds underpinned Mozambique’s vibrant but short lived two-party system until the beginning of the past decade, when RENAMO suffered a sudden and crushing defeat and Frelimo went on to win almost all the previously RENAMO-dominated constituencies and consolidate its dominant position. However, contrary to what social conflict theory anticipates, no significant structural changes or transformations of society were found in the literature review to account for these electoral dynamics.

Interestingly none of the most recent comparative work on one-party dominant systems in African democracies (Doorenspleet & Nijzink 2013; De Jager & Du Toit 2013) has found significant structural changes or transformation to be relevant to the development and endurance of one-party dominant systems. So, what accounted for this phenomenon in Mozambique? To begin with, its development coincided with the
leadership change within Frelimo in 2002, following the threat of loss of power in the 1999 election. Power was transferred from the reformist President Joaquim Chissano to the party-centred and heavy-handed leadership of President Armando Guebuza. It was only after this leadership change that RENAMO’s decline began, as evidenced in the 2004 election, the first after Guebuza took over Frelimo.

Scholars (De Tollenaere 2013; Forquilha & Orre 2012; Ronning, 2011; 2010; Nuvunga & Mohamed Salih, 2010; Pereira, 2008; Mazula1995; Sitoe, Matsimbe & Pereira 2005; Nuvunga 2005; Osteheimer 2001) have documented the weaknesses of Mozambique’s opposition political parties, which is consistent with the general African trend (Rakner & van de Walle 2007; Kuenzi & Lambright 2005; Mohamed Salih 2003; Kopecky & Mair 2003; Svåsand, & Randall 2002; Bogaards 2000; Van de Walle & Butler 1999) towards weak opposition parties.

The weakness of opposition parties is a telling sign of weak party institutionalisation, which, theoretically, is an enabling factor for the development and endurance of dominant-party systems (De Jager 2013; Du Pisani 2013; Sebudubudu & Botlhomilwe 2013). Indeed, according to Sebudubudu & Botlhomilwe (2013: 121), “democracy is about the ability of opposition parties to challenge ruling regimes”, so, if they are weakly institutionalised it means that they cannot perform this function effectively. With this happening, the way is paved for the entrenchment of the ruling party in politics and society which is the prelude for the development of one-party dominant system.

In the absence of major socio-political transformation and social cleavages to account for the development of Mozambique’s dominant-party system is the reason to be found in RENAMO’s collapse? This is the case, but it raises the question of why it should have happened so quickly, after the party had done exceptionally well in the 1994 and 1999 elections? Some scholars argue that opposition weaknesses may be structurally induced (Greene 2013; 2010a; Boucek & Bogaards 2010; Wanjohi 2003; Mohamed Salih 2003). Scholars (Doorenspleet & Nijzink 2011, 2013; Sanches 2010; Manning 2005; Doorenspleet 2003) observe that most dominant parties in Africa are either the pre-transition incumbent or the party that won the first transitional elections (e.g., Zambia’s Movement for Multi-party Democracy, MMD, which won its dominant position after defeating the long-serving independence party, the United National Independence Party, UNIP, in 1991), which tend to coincide
with a trend towards declining political competitiveness (Sanches 2010; Bogaards 2004; Mohamed Salih 2003; Van de Walle & Butler 1999), arguably because “they made it difficult for newcomers to break in and to challenge the control over the state. Ultimately these parties persist simply because they got in first” (Sanches 2010: 8).

So Mozambique’s shift from a two-party to a dominant-party system is the result of RENAMO’s abrupt electoral decay, which is embedded in the strategy employed by Frelimo – particularly the vehement impact of President Armando Guebuza – to maintain its grip on power. However, there is a section of scholarly literature (De Tollenaere 2013; Forquilha & Orre 2012; Ronning 2010, 2011; Nuvunga & Mohamed Salih 2010; Pereira, 2008) that points out that RENAMO is also to blame for its electoral misfortunes. Factors like its personalised leadership and a lack of internal democracy, which resulted in the expulsion of influential cadres and a party breakaway in 2002, which weakened the party. While these are relevant arguments their direct link to RENAMO’s abrupt collapse is problematic.

Firstly, RENAMO’s support is mainly rural. At the time of these events, a decade ago, rural voters had little information about the politics of party leadership in the capital city of Maputo but it is in these rural areas that RENAMO lost support. Secondly, the breakaway party, the Party for Peace, Democracy and Development (PDD), which contested the 2004 election, won less than 2% of the vote, which shows its marginal impact in RENAMO’s voters. Thirdly the party’s leadership has not changed since 1994 and RENAMO almost won the presidency in the 1999 election. The conclusion is that while RENAMO’s internal problems may have contributed to a gradual decline in support for the party they do not explain the abrupt drop in support in the rural areas. This set of circumstances indicates the need not to take the weakness of Mozambique’s opposition parties for granted but to probe how it came into being.

It is intriguing that Frelimo’s breakthrough to party dominance came about despite the fact that the level of basic service delivery in most rural areas ranges from insufficient to non-existent. It also took place at a time of growing voter apathy and an increase in the number of voters who stayed away from the polls. Although the 2013 Human Development Index (HDI) shows that only two countries, namely Niger and the Democratic Republic of Congo, had an HDI lower than that of Mozambique
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and despite ever-growing inequalities within cities and between cities and rural areas, Frelimo still wins.2

Are Frelimo’s electoral victories attributable to the weakness of the opposition parties or to a ‘moral and historic assignation’? Dominant parties are expected to harvest electoral triumphs despite poor service delivery partly because the opposition is “small and toothless” (Doorenspleet 2003: 185) and partly because people are attached to the ruling party because of a particular historical event (Du Pisani 2013; Ari-an & Barnes 1974). The fact that RENAMO’s loss was rapid and its vote was not gradually eroded over time suggests that neither of these two reasons properly accounts for the development of the dominant-party system in Mozambique. The argument by Arian & Barnes (1974) that dominant parties have been closely identified with the creation of the constitutional and political order that they came to dominate offers an important entry point for the interrogation of the underlying dynamics of the processes that ushered the current political order.

Scholarly literature on historical institutionalism (Kelemen & Capoccia 2007; Mahoney 2001; Sydown, Schreyögg & Koch 2005) defends the need to look into the “legacies of the past” and their influence in order to understand certain developments in a given political system. In Mozambique’s case it is important to understand not only the legacies but also – given the absence of structural factors and significant transformations within society impacting on the party system – the strategies put in place by Frelimo to ensure the political survival of the state it liberated, created (and perhaps owned) not only throughout the uncertain democratic transition but after the threat of loss of power in the 1999 election.

From an historical institutionalism viewpoint, Frelimo’s political elites not only sculpted the political processes astutely to favour the political objectives of the party, they also had what Machiavelli termed fortuna. Pempel (1990) argued long ago that one-party dominance requires both effort and luck. The political reforms initiated in the mid-1980s, which culminated with the promulgation of the 1990 Constitution, revived Frelimo’s international credibility, which enabled it to build a new political order based on this new Constitution.

This new order not only envisaged a rule of law based on the principle of separation of powers but also a disentanglement of the then one-party from the state. However, Frelimo harvested institutional ad-
vantages from transforming the system at a time when the former rebel movement was still in the forests. As Sumich & Honwana (2007: 3) put it, by “transforming the political system from one-party socialism to multiparty capitalism before the peace accords and without dialogue with the rebels, Frelimo had the opportunity to design the system and create ways to structurally disadvantage RENAMO”.

This suggests that if the ‘regime’ is considered as “the authority structure, or the structure of the formal, legitimative power of a state, or alternatively, the constitutional order, the norms, or the basic form of the system” (Lasswell & Kaplan 1982, cited in Nwokedi 1995: 26) then – as Velenzuela (1992) would say – transition occurred without breaking the rules of the previous regime, which, inter alia, made it possible for Frelimo to place certain issues underpinning its political rhetoric above public debate, for example, the sacrosanct myth of “national unity”. To date, debating ‘national unity’ is synonymous with anti-patriotism; questioning the political independence won by the then liberation movement. In so doing, Frelimo has set the constitutional instruments for its own legitimisation by giving itself what Arian & Barnes (1974: 597) term “the authority to define the boundaries between the permissible and the unacceptable”.

Pertinent to these aspects and of significant importance in relation to current political developments is Mozambique’s democratisation from above, which is a problematic form of democratisation (Valenzuela 1992). It enabled Frelimo to regain the aura and ethos of the liberation struggle and the ascendency as ‘liberator’, ‘creator’ and perhaps ‘owner’ of the state. This situation was exacerbated by the fact that the ‘democratic transition’ did not take the form of a struggle by ‘society’ against the ‘state’, as was the case in countries that experienced democratisation from below. Although a military group fighting the one-party regime might potentially have been considered a ‘society’ against the ‘state’, this perspective did not take hold in Mozambique where RENAMO has always had a negative image (Lalá & Ostheimer 2003; Cahen 1998) “the debate about the civil war has been obscured for moral reasons that Frelimo has adroitly exploited” (Cahen 1998: 11).

As Giliomee, Myburg & Schlemmer (2010) wrote in relation to South Africa’s African National Congress (ANC), Frelimo had recovered the platform to play its ‘historic role’ of both representing and controlling the masses in the context of a ‘new beginning’ (Sumich & Honwana
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2007) enabled by the new political order Frelimo had built. It appears that Frelimo was well aware that the ‘international community’, which played a fundamental role, first, in brokering the peace and second, in the implementation of the peace process, was more concerned with pacification and stability than with democratisation. “[T]he fact remains that the fundamental goal of the international presence in Mozambique was not the democratization of the country, but rather its pacification and stabilization” (Cahen 1998: 7). De Tollenaere (2004) saw a similar pattern, with the international community giving much attention to institutions while disregarding the political process, another fortuna for Frelimo.

In the same vein, the ‘international community’ not only accepted Frelimo’s rejection of RENAMO’s proposal of a transitional unity government that would lead to the democracy- founding elections and any form of national unity government after the 1994 elections (as was the case in South Africa, following its first democratic elections in 1994), it also accepted an agreement in which only elections, not democratisation, featured. Perhaps the ‘international community’ believed in democratisation by election, as do many scholars, who argue that repeated elections improve and spread democracy beyond the electoral arena (Lindberg 2007). Schedler (2002b) argues for the ‘democratizing effects’ of election; Howard & Roessler (2006) for the ‘liberalizing outcomes’ of elections; Hadenius & Teorell (2007) for elections as an ‘electoral route’ to democracy and Bunce & Wolchik (2006) for the power of ‘electoral revolutions’.

The reality, however, is that these factors legitimated the political order that Frelimo had built with the 1990 Constitution, although there have been some constitutional amendments to accommodate the agreement that emerged from the peace negotiations (Nuvunga 2005). So, from a historical institutionalism perspective, Mozambique’s peace and democratic processes to some extent prepared the terrain for Frelimo’s future political dominance. Sitoe (2003: 29) is therefore correct in asserting that the “inauguration of political pluralism was a mechanism which allowed Frelimo to renew its mandate for ruling without fundamentally changing basic ingredients of its ideological commitments and political preferences”.

Using ‘constitutional reform’ as a way of ending the single-party system and having gained the privilege of remaining in power unchallenged throughout the two years of democratic transition leading the implemen-
tation of the protocols of the General Peace Agreement, which included RENAMO’s integration into society and its transformation into a political party, Frelimo had the ‘historical momentum’ – time and resources – to (re)build political institutions while moulding them to fit its preferences. From an historical institutionalism perspective, it was at this point that the playing field for political competition in Mozambique was laid down.

Importantly, the peace process was elitist in the sense that it marginalised the political parties that emerged soon after the promulgation of the 1990 multiparty constitution and was restricted to Frelimo and RENAMO (De Brito 2008; Carbone 2005; Harrison 1996). At the same time, RENAMO was excluded from participating in government, as Frelimo did not allow either a transitional government or a national unity government after the 1994 elections. So, to some extent, RENAMO was simultaneously in and out of the process of democratic transition.

From the viewpoint of social conflict theory the result is that the new political arena was dominated by the former belligerents, namely Frelimo and RENAMO, with Frelimo flagging its heroic history and its claim to have liberated the ‘man’ and ‘land’ and RENAMO claiming the ‘fatherhood of democracy’ for having fought against Frelimo’s one-party state. For RENAMO, the 16-year-long civil war was a struggle for democracy but for Frelimo there has never been a ‘civil war’ but rather an externally driven destabilisation war (Cahen 1998). This was the basis of what scholars (De Jager & Du Toit 2013; Bogaards & Boucek 2010; Melber 2009; Warner 1998; Levite & Tarrow 1983) termed the ‘de-legitimation of the opposition’, particularly RENAMO.

All in all, having started from an extremely unfavourable position (Kapstein & Converse 2008) Frelimo took advantage of the bonanza of democratic reform to recapture the state it ‘liberated’, ‘created’ and ‘owned’. As argued above, from the viewpoint of social conflict theory these reforms were embedded in a battle by Frelimo and RENAMO for the capture and control of the state. Frelimo was successful not only in holding firmly and reinforcing its control of the state but also in insulating it from RENAMO’s influence. Sumich & Honwana (2007) were therefore right in saying that while Frelimo lost the war (the civil war in which, by 1992, RENAMO was attacking the surroundings of the capital city, Maputo), it won the peace.
This aspect is embedded in the legacy of a concentration of power within the executive branch of government, something that “… has not disappeared overnight with the introduction of multiparty elections” either in Mozambique or in the rest of Africa (Van Cranenburg 2003: 190). RENAMO’s exclusion from participating in government handed control to Frelimo, which used it for political gain. Although his focus on South Africa, Schrire (2010: 138) might have been writing about Mozambique when he stated that “… in the modern world the state thus becomes the site of struggle however, the consequences of this struggle will be shaped significantly by the role played by the state”. This situation has not come into being naturally but is, rather, deeply embedded in the logic of maintaining a certain order which is, in the language of Chabal & Daloz (1999: 147) “justifiable and instrumentally profitable” for Frelimo’s power elites.

Given the key role of elections in democratic transitions (Schedler 2003; Reynolds & Reilly 1997; Linz & Stepan 1996) and the view that the challenge of such transition is to establish electoral rules that all parties can accept and respect (Pastor 1999) as well as what Kopecký & Mair (2003: 285) term ‘institutional engineering’, which is the “process whereby the institutions of new democracies are consciously shaped”, electoral institutions played an important role in the development of Mozambique’s one-party dominant system. These institutions, the National Electoral Commission (CNE) and its subordinate, the Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration (STAE) became the focus of attention after the problematic and fraudulent 1999 election (Rønning 2011; De Brito 2008; Hanlon & Fox 2006; Nuvunga 2005).

In view of the notion that power elites perpetuate an environment of inefficient and ill-functioning institutions which produce certain political outcomes (Chabal & Daloz 1999), it is important to focus on the electoral bodies. The focus, however, is not on the way they are set up but rather on their structure and the way they work. In fact, the institutional architecture has not featured in most recent and influential scholarly literature on dominant-party systems as a significant mechanism behind the endurance of such systems in African democracies (Doorenspleet & Nijzink 2011, 2013; De Jager & Du Toit 2013).

However, while the operations of Mozambique’s electoral institutions is important to an understanding of the problematic and fraudulent election of 1999 and the most recent, and somewhat problematic, election of
2009, they do not account for the more structural electoral dynamics related to development of Mozambique’s dominant-party system, namely the sharp drop in support for RENAMO in its strongholds. Indeed, not only elections can be an instrument of authoritarian control (Schedler, 2006; 2003; 2002a; 2002b) but also the weaknesses of the opposition parties may also be structurally induced (Greene, 2013; 2010a; Boucek & Bogaards, 2010; Wanjohi, 2003; Mohamed Salih, 2003). Clearly these aspects are far beyond the way the electoral institutions work. To account for this a substantive examination of the electoral playing field is required. A pertinent entry point is the interrogation of the dynamics of electoral competition with a focus on the local level, particularly those constituencies that apparently switched allegiance from RENAMO to Frelimo.

One reason for this shift in allegiance might be Mozambique’s presidential system, which, in itself, is a ‘legacy’ of the past. Another is the ‘partly free’ nature of the country’s democratic development, which has the potential to undermine the aspect of uncertainty that underpins democratic elections. Power concentration within the executive branch of government, which has been used to explain party dominance (Doorenspleet & Nijzink 2013; Van Cranenburg 2003), is an important feature, particularly in the African context where constitutionally powerful presidents abound.

In Mozambique, however, the same system has produced the reformist President Joaquim Chissano, under whom a two-party system thrived, and his successor, President Armando Guebuza, who presides over a dominant-party system – consistent with Doorenspleet & Nijzink (2013) – it appears to be less the presidential system than the leader of the incumbent party that is most important in shaping the dynamics of inter-party electoral competition. So, while the presidential system is not the direct source of Mozambique’s dominant-party system, it is its institutional underpinning.

The presidential system and/or concentration of power in the hands of the president are still very important to an explanation of dominant-party systems because they are instrumental in the system of patronage that is a salient feature of African democracies (Bayart 2010). The importance of these aspects is mainly that the opportunities for opposition parties to compete meaningfully with the ruling party are, inter alia, dependent on the level of funding they receive (Doorenspleet & Nijzink
This, in turn, is dependent on the institutional arrangements for political parties, which vary from polity to polity (e.g., some countries provide funding for political activities, some only fund electoral activities and others provide no funding at all) and also on aspects of state-party relationships, which, in turn, are shaped by the power of presidents (Doorenspleet & Nijzink 2011, 2013).

Taking into consideration aspects of state-party relationships and the advantages of incumbency, that result in resource asymmetry, as discussed in scholarly literature (Doorenspleet & Nijzink 2013: 201; De Jager & Du Toit 2013; Greene 2010a, 2010b, 2013) the missing piece of the puzzle, that is, the explanation for the development of Mozambique’s one-party dominant system, is the extent of Frelimo’s internal cohesion. Bogaards & Boucek (2010: 135) posit that it is not possible to “explain single-party dominance completely and adequately without looking at the intra-party politics of dominant party”. This piece of the puzzle is linked to the nature of the state-party relationship and the incumbency advantage in that partisan control of state resources enables ruling parties to transform the state into what Dunleavy (2010) terms the ‘piggy banks’, not only for their richly-funded political and electoral activities but also to keep the party that supports the ruling regime internally unified.

The problem extends beyond the ‘resource asymmetry theory’ of party dominance put forward by Greene (2010a, 2010b, 2013: 27), which posits that “dominant parties win consistently because they generate advantages derived from the public budget that fundamentally skew the partisan playing field in their favour”. This enables the incumbent party to use public funds to promote intra-party cohesion, which is, in turn, instrumental in the development and endurance of a one-party dominant system.

How then, does this issue speak to the mechanisms behind the development of Mozambique’s one-party dominant system? Looking at it from the viewpoint of social conflict theory, which posits that the development of a one-party dominant system relates to deep political change and the transformation in society, it is crucial to probe the transformation that took place within the economic sphere, underpinning the shift from Marxist-Leninist-led socialism to the market economy, shap-
ing access by Frelimo and RENAMO to resources, on the one hand, and affecting the internal cohesion of Frelimo on the other.

Like the leaders of ruling parties in other former socialist African countries (e.g., Angola), Frelimo’s leaders have worked to ensure that the dynamics and development of the economy reflect their own preferences and interests. In doing so, apart from enriching themselves personally, they have tried to ensure that, should the party’s grip on political power be weakened it would still be sufficiently entrenched in the economy, with enough economic and financial capacity to participate in elections with a chance of returning to power.

Therefore, the dynamics within the economic sphere have a bearing on the development of the one-party dominant system, not only in terms of providing the basis for resource asymmetry between Frelimo and RENAMO, which further skews the playing field of party competition, by giving Frelimo the resources and instruments of patronage it results in internal unity. Du Pisani (2013) gives a detailed account of how resource endowment impairs party competition in Namibia. Taken together, the aspects cited above form what is conceived to be the economic instrument of party control of society as they impact in both intra-party and inter-party domains.

In conclusion, it emerges that Mozambique’s dominant-party system is neither embedded in structural factors nor on legacies of the past but rather in strategic factors related to political use of the state apparatus. With this happening, it is clear that the development of Mozambique’s dominant-party system encapsulates most of the mechanisms behind the development and endurance of one-party dominant systems in African democracies authoritatively presented by the most recent scholarly literature (Doorenspleet & Nijzink 2011, 2013; De Jager & Du Toit 2013). However four major units of analysis have surfaced of the discussion in this chapter. These are the following: the workings of electoral institutions, the weakness of opposition parties, the playing field for electoral competition and the economic instruments of party control of society.

Notes

1 The Party for Peace, Democracy and Development (PDD), was set up in 2002 by Raul Domingos, the former RENAMO chief negotiator at the Peace Process
in Rome and later head of RENAMO’s parliamentary group, who was expelled from RENAMO in 2000 in the aftermath of the problematic 1999 election.

2 The mean share of the lowest 20% of the population is 5.2% of total income, while the top 20% has a share of 51.5%. This has urban-rural implications, as the majority of the poor live in rural areas.

3 Nwokedi (1995) classifies the modalities of democratisation in sub-Saharan Africa in two broad categories: democratisation from above and democratisation from below. The distinctive feature of democratisation from above is that the authoritarian regime or the military dictatorship in question undertakes the democratisation process, albeit, under sustained pressure from its opponents in civil society. The emphasis is normally on the reform of the constitution and the existing institutions of government through the normal reform processes; the opposition may or not make an input into the reform embarked on.

4 Democratisation from below is characterised by civic associations and associations in civil society emerging as opposition to the continuation of authoritarian one-party rule in the absence of formal channels for the expression of political views different from those of the single parties in power (Nwokedi 1995).

5 The final phase of the peace talks (1990-1992) took place in Rome under the mediation of the Community of Sant’Egidio and the Italian Government. After the signing of the General Peace Agreement on 4 October 1992, the government invited the United Nations to oversee the implementation of the accords. The United Nations Security Council established the United Nations Operations in Mozambique (ONUMOZ). Under the leadership of Aldo Ajello (chief of the UN mission and the Representative of the UN General Secretary to Mozambique) several countries, including the US and Portugal, worked closely with ONUMOZ in different capacities (Della Rocca 1998).
This chapter elaborates on the research methods: the research design and strategy, the instruments and process of data collection, the process of data analysis and the limitations of the study.

4.1 Research Design and Strategy

The thesis focuses on understanding how Mozambique’s once vibrant two-party system had given way, in the second half of the past decade, to the development of the dominant-party system that exists today. The epistemological orientation of this type of research is rooted in the interpretative tradition of data generated from key and privileged observers and actors in the processes being researched, which is embedded in the qualitative paradigm of social science research. Given the overall objective, and particularly the type of research question, which is intended to achieve a contextualised understanding of the nature of a political phenomenon, the qualitative research method was better placed to generate the required data as this type of research is “sensitive to the social context in which the data are produced” (Grix 2004: 120).

The research design was developed as a single-case study (as opposed to multiple-case design), with embedded cases (as opposed to holistic design) aiming to unveil the features of the development and endurance of Mozambique’s dominant-party system. The uniqueness of the case at hand substantiated the option for the single-case design and its theorising generated four units of analysis, taken as sub-cases. Apart from linking these sub-cases with the overall research question, the value of the single-case study with embedded cases was that it allows the subject to be analysed at an operational and detailed level which goes deeply into underlying mechanisms, while a single-case study without embedded cas-
es remains at a broader more abstract level and may therefore lack sufficient data.

Accordingly, given the macro nature of the case at hand, the strategic way was to probe the above political developments in theoretically grounded embedded case studies (sub-cases) and then interrogate how the results of each sub-case spoke to the major research question, on the one hand, and to the theory and concept of dominant-party systems on the other. Following on the theorising contained in chapter III, the sub-cases are the following: the workings of the electoral institutions (sub-case a); the weakness of opposition parties (sub-case b); the playing field for electoral competition (sub-case c); and the economic instruments of party control of society (sub-case d).

The research strategy entailed probing the traits and features of each of the above sub-cases in light of the research question and thereafter detailing how the results of each sub-case spoke to the main research question. Each of the four sub-cases was first developed for publication as a scholarly paper and was subsequently integrated as a chapter of the thesis. So, the following four chapters not only present the traits and features of each of the four sub-cases, they also demonstrate how these traits and features are the underlying mechanisms behind the development and endurance of Mozambique’s dominant-party system.

These underlying mechanisms are highlighted in the concluding chapter, thus avoiding one of the major pitfalls of single-case studies with embedded cases – the localisation of focus on the units of analysis and the ensuing difficulty of conceptualising individual findings vis-à-vis the major research question. Apart from being consistent with the research design, in so doing our attention was returned to the overall conclusions of the case study, this time to engage with the existing knowledge of dominant-party systems through analytic generalisation, which entailed questioning how the conclusions spoke to the concept and theory of dominant-party systems, focusing on the similarities, dissimilarities and the reasons for their development (Meyer 2001).

4.2 Data Collection

As a research method, the merit of case studies is that they provide the opportunity for a holistic and in-depth investigation which enables a clear understanding of the sequence of events and the motivations of key
actors. This enables the researcher to untangle cause and effect (Engel & Nicolai 2012) and to inquire into social phenomena in which the behaviour of the actors is observed in a natural setting (Gerring 2004, 2007). For this purpose, the main technique for data collection was interviews. The reason for this choice was that it recorded in detail how the interviewees arrived at their opinions. In this respect, Gerring (2007: 45) posits that

while we cannot actually observe the underlying mental process that gives rise to their responses, we can witness many of its outward manifestations. The way subjects ramble, hesitate, stumble, and meander as they formulate their answers tips us off to how they are thinking and reasoning through political issues.

Although there were some structured interviews with officials of political parties, most of the interviews used were semi-structured. The reason for this choice was that it allowed for the degree of flexibility necessary to allow interviewees to bring to the attention of the researcher experiences with a bearing on the main issue and allowed the researcher to take certain aspects presented by the interviewees further. In addition to interviews, archive and observation were used as methods of data collection.

Data collection was divided into three phases. The first phase consisted of desk research within political parties, the Ministry of Justice, the National Electoral Commission (CNE) and the perusal of media reports and interviews, mainly with party leaders, officials of political parties, political journalists, civil society actors, church leaders, academics, current and previous high ranking officials from the CNE and the Technical Secretariat of Electoral Administration (STAE). These focused on two sub-cases, namely, the workings of electoral institutions (sub-case a) and the weakness of opposition parties (sub-case b) this one measured through the framework of the party institutionalisation index. This set of interviews took place mainly in Maputo city, with a few interviews held in Beira and Nampula, respectively the second and third cities of the country, between July and December 2011.

With regard to party leaders, the selection criteria were that the parties they led had to have stood in any of the four elections that had been held thus far. Of the 50 registered political parties in the country, 25 party leaders, including Afonso Dhlakama, the leader of the former rebel
movement, RENAMO, were interviewed. Within Frelimo, the highest hierarchy interviewed was that of the general secretary. The choice of interviewees was based on their role as key actors in the political process. Other key interviewees included two high-ranking officials from CNE (one currently serving, the other having served in a previous term); two high-ranking officials from STAE (also one current, the other a former official).

Members of civil society and church leaders interviewed were chosen partly because of their roles in influencing the phenomenon being researched (either because they had participated in election observation missions or because they aimed through their actions to influence the political system) and partly because they were privileged observers, who had, for instance, commented on these events in the media. The selection criteria were based on their active and outspoken involvement in spheres such as the peace process, elections and political governance. Among those selected were leaders of organisations who had featured in publications dealing with the above processes, had been interviewed or had appeared in the media or had issued advocacy reports in the previous two years. Some were suggested by other interviewees based on their knowledge of the issues being researched. In total 11 civil society and church leaders were interviewed in Maputo, Beira and Nampula.

The 10 journalists interviewed in Maputo, Beira and Nampula were either editors of newspapers, senior independent journalists or retired senior journalists, mainly those who had covered the peace and democratic processes. To broaden the picture, seven scholars were interviewed, selected on the basis of publications on the issues being researched. Civil society members, church leaders and journalists responded to questions relating to both sub-cases a and b. The lists of questions are contained in Annexures 1 and 2. CNE and STAE officials responded only to questions pertaining to sub-case a (listed in Annexure 1) and political party officials of the three effective parties, namely Frelimo, RENAMO and RENAMO breakaway, the MDM, only to sub-case b (listed in Annexure 2).

The second phase of data collection consisted of interviews in two districts, namely Angoche (Nampula province) and Ncoadala (Zambézia province). Those interviewed were members of local elites: the village secretaries, traditional authorities (régulos), religious leaders, local traders and permanent secretaries (ministerial, provincial and district), focusing
on the issue of the playing field for electoral competition (sub-case c). In different capacities, these interviewees were key players in the local political systems (districts) where aspects of the playing field for electoral competition could be thoroughly observed. Field work took place in two administrative posts in each of the two districts. In district, 10 traditional leaders and 10 village secretaries were interviewed, as were five religious leaders and five local traders, one ministerial, two provincial and two district permanent secretaries.

In total, 65 interviews were conducted between June and August 2012, with the selection of respondents aided by three independent local journalists in each district. Journalists were asked to write down the names and locations of the most influential traditional leaders and village secretaries, religious leaders and local traders. In both districts there was almost 2/3 overlap of names. The next step was to contact the interviewees either by telephone or home visits to request an interview. The questions asked in the semi-structured interviews with village secretaries, traditional authorities (*régulos*), religious leaders, local traders and permanent secretaries are contained in Annexure 3.

The third phase of data collection consisted, first, of the perusal of the computer-based database of the Centre for Public Integrity (Centro de Integridade Publica³, an anti-corruption civil society watchdog organisation) which traces the business interests of the political elite in search of conflicts of interests and corruption; the ATNEIA⁴ database, which is an electronic register containing all official company registrations, and desk research from the (confidential) data of business concessions awarded by the Council of Ministers, focusing on the last 10 years. These three data sets were the departure point for the embedded case on the economic instruments of party control of society (sub-case d). Secondly, interviews were held with business people, Frelimo elites (politicians) who own businesses and with senior officials at the Secretariat of the Prime Minister’s office, the Ministry of Industry and Commerce and at the Roads Fund of the Ministry of Public Works and Housing.

Given their privileged positions these interviewees were well placed to give a balanced perspective on the role of Frelimo in businesses and the intersection between business and the state. The main criteria for the selection of the business people included their having attended at least four of the 13 Private Sector Annual Conferences (CASP) of the Confederation of the Economic Associations (CTA)⁵ held thus far or having
been awarded at least two public tenders of state procurement or con-
cessions from 2010 to 2012 or at least one non-tendering concession
from the Council of Ministers in the past 10 years. These criteria would
lead to interviewees who are connected to or navigate the corridors of
state business.

As for the Frelimo elites who owned businesses, the criteria were
aimed at targeting those entrepreneurs whose businesses or companies
were dealt with in this sub-case because they demonstrated some of the
ways in which Frelimo elites dispossessed the state. Apart from some
informative informal conversations with insiders, 37 people were inter-
viewed between February and August 2013: 20 business people, 10
Frelimo elites who owned businesses and seven civil servants. The ques-
tions they were asked are contained in Annexure 4.

Other sources of data
Secondary data was collected through comprehensive media perusal,
mainly of the oldest weekly independent, Savana, which has appeared
without interruption since 1992; the Mozambique Political Process Bulletin,
the only specialist bulletin covering Mozambique’s political process since
the early 1990s, and the investigative daily electronic newspaper,
CanalMoz. All three were perused from their first edition to the edition
of February 2013. While the Mozambique Political Process Bulletin and
CanalMoz are electronically available, Savana is only available in hard
copy at the archives of the media house. The reason for the study of the
media was to provide an historical perspective by establishing how the
four sub-cases had evolved since the early days of reform. This gave the
contextual background for understanding the cases at hand.

Another source of information was the observations of the author
during the two years of field work. Acting as a complete observer –
“who merely stands back and eavesdrops on the proceedings” (Meyer
2001: 340), the author observed three annual CASPs (2011, 2012, 2013),
at which business people met with government. The striking aspect of all
these conferences is that regardless of the fact that business people criti-
cised government, they all treated each other as comrades. Participation in
these conferences enabled the author to realise that considerable num-
bers of the business people who attend them also appear at Frelimo par-
ty events, particularly the annual meeting of Frelimo cadres and the cen-
The central committee of the Frelimo party, but none is linked to the opposition political parties.

The author also attended the 10th Frelimo congress in 2012, as an observer, which allowed him to watch key business people who attended the sessions as delegates and also to observe delegates who were senior civil servants, mainly permanent secretaries, national directors and heads of public companies, regulation and oversight institutions, rectors of public universities and heads of public television and radio.

Similarly, the author followed closely the 2011 by-elections in three local governments, in one of which, Quelimane (capital of Zambézia province), the opposition defeated Frelimo, and the November 2013 ordinary municipal elections in the 53 existing municipalities. During these elections the author read media reports of the use by Frelimo of state assets such as vehicles and independent media reports of senior civil servants leaving their offices and staying for weeks in local municipalities to support the Frelimo local electoral campaign. In these elections the author also observed on independent television footage the police disbanding gatherings of the opposition, firing gas bullets, arresting opposition candidates and shooting to kill opposition supporters. In Quelimane municipality, for instance, three people were killed by policemen during opposition election rallies.

Throughout the two years of field work the author – as complete observer – also observed in different locations aspects of the political behaviour of different actors. For instance, the author saw on several occasions civil servants, including teachers and nurses, wearing Frelimo campaign T-shirts during working hours; school teachers mobilising pupils to attend Frelimo elect rallies; business people, including local traders, not only wearing Frelimo T-shirts but also attending and giving financial support to Frelimo fundraising events such as business dinners; religious leaders treating Frelimo leaders cordially, giving them preferential seating and, above all, allowing them to address religious gatherings.

4.3 External Factors and Constraints

Substantial numbers of interviews were recorded, but some interviewees did not allow recordings, so only field notes were taken. Interviews took place either in public or in private (homes or offices). Most business people, civil servants, high ranking officials from the CNE and STAE,
local traders and religious leaders and some civil society actors asked for anonymity, while others wanted assurances that the findings would only be used for academic purposes, would be archived safely and would not be released to third parties. In all cases a form had to be signed indicating the terms of these agreements (Annexure 5).

In most cases, although almost all interviewees initially said they would have only half an hour available, many of the conversations lasted for anything between an hour and two hours. All the interviewees were initially hesitant about their answers, but, as time passed and they began to trust the interviewer, they began to speak out in a very critical manner. None of these reservations applied to opposition supporters, who were vehemently critical and ready to speak for four hours without any kind of restriction or promise of confidentiality.

At the district level it was not only far harder to arrange interviews, with the local secretaries demanding to play a facilitation role, particularly in relation to the selection of interviewees and interpreters but also the logistics of the interviews was extremely demanding and costly, given the distances between localities. In both districts a motorbike had to be rented for a period of one month but still logistically difficult because it was not only complicated to combine interviews but also because of recurrent postponements of interviews. Interviews were generally held in Portuguese, but a few interviewees needed interpretation as respondents were keen to communicate in their mother tongue, which was not always Portuguese.

4.4 Data Analysis

Data analysis was oriented towards writing the four papers which comprise the following four chapters of the thesis. The two years of fieldwork consisted of a sequenced process of data collection, analysis and writing of papers for publication. This meant that at the end of each of the three phases of data collection one or two papers corresponding to the sub-cases at hand were written up. As far as the analysis it is concerned, there were two distinct processes.

While the main source of data collection for the sub-case on the workings of the electoral institutions (sub-case a) and the playing field for electoral competition (sub-case c) was the interviews, the other two, namely the one on the weakness of opposition parties (sub-case b) and
the economic instruments of party control of society (sub-case d) combined a comprehensive perusal of the three aforementioned datasets and of comprehensive desk research within political parties on the one hand and interviews with the actors and privileged observers aimed to gather the perceptions of and reactions to the patterns observed in the desk research on the other.

With regard to sub-cases a and c, the analysis began with data management, during which the interviews were transcribed. The data was organised in two layers: actors (party leaders, civil society actors, church leaders, traditional leaders, secretaries, local traders, permanent secretaries of the ministerial, provincial and district level) and privileged observers (journalists and academics). The initial understanding of the phenomena gained from media perusal and key facts established in the documents (e.g., laws and official reports) helped to establish the chronology of the processes at hand, which smoothed the second stage of the data analysis, that of reducing the data through the generation of initial codes which consisted of the identification of recurrent issues in relation to the research question.

At this stage, it was asking what messages the interviewees were conveying in relation to the topic and which catchy and recurrent words or phrases they used. With this done, the next step was to search for themes. This was done mainly by inquiring how the enlisted catchy and recurrent words or phrases could be grouped to form over-reaching themes. This exercise was facilitated by the previously established chronology of the processes gained from laws and the media perusal. With these themes, it was returned to the data (interviews) for the identification of the most salient perceptions and reactions from interviewees.

This resulted in descriptive drafts of papers which led to the next stage of analysis. These descriptive draft papers were examined against the major research question in a search for underlying features and patterns and their sequence in relation to the research problem. This helped to go beyond the initial impressions gained from the contact with the data and from the pre-understanding gained from the media perusal but it also helped. It was only then that the citations that best explained each of the patterns and features described were identified.

The next step was to analyse the sub-cases on the weakness of opposition parties (sub-case b) and the economic instruments of party control of society (sub-case d). In the case of sub-case d, some of the key themes
that helped structure the data from the datasets were acquired from informal discussions with those privileged to be involved in the processes being researched. The formal interviews provided more information, with the perceptions and responses of the actors to the questions based on the patterns drawn from the datasets.

As far as the analysis is concerned, after transcripts were made and/or the interview notes were organised, the illustrative portions of the data were identified, following the major categories generated from the datasets. While the datasets were static, the interviews and informal conversations with insiders provided the perceptions and reactions that helped to put in context the patterns and features described. This led not only to the unearthing of the patterns described in the paper but also to the meaning they are given by actors in the context of the functioning of the state.

With regard to the sub-case on the weakness of opposition parties (sub-case b), the key themes were established from the party institutionalisation index. Although a significant portion of the data was collected through desk research, the interviews with participants (party leaders and officials of political parties) and observers (political journalists, academics, civil society activists/church leaders) were the key method for data collection. A first descriptive draft was generated from the combination of the desk research within the Ministry of Justice and CNE the archives of political parties. This gave the information for the understanding of the landscape of political parties in Mozambique.

The next step was the analysis of the data from the bulk of the participants and observers, following the themes established from the dimensions of party institutionalisation index. While the data from the official of political parties was more factual the data party leaders and other actors was more explanatory, in that it gave more explanations of why political parties perform or behave in a particular manner. However the analysis of this part of the data was somehow statistical in that it followed the ‘how many respondents said it’ format, but qualitative aspects related to ‘how much energy and enthusiasm a particular topic earned from interviewees’ were considered. This resulted in the analytical narrative of party institutionalization in Mozambique which tried to give as much as possible a nuanced reading of what party institutionalization would mean in the context of Mozambique.
With this done, the perceptions of the observers were brought into the analysis to balance the views of the actors, which, in most cases, tended to be self-defensive. Once the majority of the patterns were established the assumptions underlying the argument about the weakness of the opposition parties were brought into the analysis, which helped to move it from the descriptive and static party institutionalisation index to a more analytical context, demonstrating the extent of the weakness.

With the analysis of the four sub-cases concluded, the following step of the research design was to examine the findings and conclusions from each of sub-cases in light of the overall research question of the case study. This resulted in the concluding chapter of the thesis. After the conclusions were established, there were examined in light of the existing knowledge of dominant-party systems. This is analytic generalisation which, according to Meyer (2001), allows for questions about which elements are similar, which contradictory and, most importantly, why this is so. This is presented in the second part of the concluding chapter.

4.5 Limitations of the Study

The first major limitation of this thesis relates to the scope and the object of study. There are three types of questions orbiting the study of dominant-party systems (Bogaards & Boucek 2010). These are: (i) what is a dominant party and what makes a party dominant? (ii) how should dominant parties be analysed? This is split into two lines of enquiry: one focusing on the party system using the framework of party systems typologies, the other focusing on dominant parties per se, that is, in isolation from the party system in which they compete; and (iii) what is the nature of the relationship between dominant party and democracy? This thesis only partly covers the first two. Although through the party institutionalisation index it covers the relevant parties, which include the dominant Frelimo, it is still not an in-depth study of Frelimo as a dominant party, particularly its internal workings. In addition, it does not probe how the findings of the case study speak to the quality of democracy; rather it looks indirectly at how the ‘partly free’ status of Mozambique’s democratic development contributed to the political developments in question.

The second limitation of the study results from the research design, which focuses on unearthing the peculiar features of the case at hand,
which, although it is highly relevant given the uniqueness of the case, is limited with regard to the possibilities of generalisation to the wider population, e.g. African of countries with dominant-party systems. The analytical generalisation compares the findings and conclusions in this case to scholarly literature on dominant-party systems, questioning the similarities and contradictions. Although this is an important exercise it also does not contribute to a more generalised picture of dominant-party systems.

The third and fourth limitations are of a methodological nature. First, data collection: data was collected for each of the sub-cases. The major problem with this strategy is that although it produces the evidence for the broader case – consistent with the research design – not all interviewees responded to the same questions. The implication is that different interviewees contributed to different parts of the thesis, which, in the end, weakens the conclusions. Second, while the option for a qualitative study using the data gathered from key actors and privileged observers was the most suitable for a contextualised understanding of the case at hand, it also posed a limitation in that, in the end, only the elites were interviewed. Thus the findings and conclusions of the thesis reflect, in a sense, the perceptions of the elites and not of the wider population, which would, perhaps, have expressed different views.

The fifth limitation is related to the fact that the researcher is well known for his anti-corruption activism and is therefore, to some extent, placed at the centre of political processes in Mozambique. This has, in certain instances, not only interfered with the role of the researcher as an external observer but also potentially with the type of responses elicited from the interviewees, mainly in Maputo city, where the researcher is more publicly known amongst politicians, civil society actors, journalists and senior civil servants. However, this has also brought some unexpected benefits in terms of greater familiarity with the political context.

Notes

1. The Ministry of Justice is the entity that registers and keeps the files/archives of political parties.
2. The CNE is the entity that receives the application for legislative elections.
Established in 1996, the Confederation for Business Association (CTA) is a platform for dialogue between the government and the private sector and works to improve the business environment in Mozambique, promoting and protecting business opportunities through economic policy and regulatory reform (http://www.cta.org.mz/).

The independent weekly, Savana; the independent daily, CanalMoz; the Mozambique Political Process Bulletin and the Independent daily, Opais, during the campaign for the 2013 municipal elections, between 4 and 18 November 2013.

The (village) secretaries were created by Frelimo and during the one-party state era. They had both party and state functions and now they are part of the institution of community leaders (see chapter 6).
Party Dominance and Electoral Institutions: Framing Frelimo’s Dominance in the Context of an Electoral Governance Deficit

Adriano Nuvunga and M.A. Mohamed Salih
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Abstract

Focusing on Frelimo’s dominance over party politics and state institutions, this article analyses the issues pertaining to the role of electoral institutions in the consolidation of this dominant position. The authors argue that in order to understand party dominance in Mozambique, it is necessary that there should be an historical perspective linking the present (that is, the constitutional reforms since the 1990s) to the past. These reforms paved the way for ‘democratisation from above’, which has continued ever since. Rather than resolving differences over electoral processes through democratic governance norms and regulatory frameworks, Frelimo has intimidated existing and emerging political parties through its control of electoral governance institutions.

Frelimo’s electoral success in the first democracy-founding election became an intermittent strategy of choice facilitating its manoeuvring for winning subsequent elections, thus controlling and dominating political life. One outcome of this process is that political horse-trading has generated skewed ‘incentive structures’ that have compromised the role of opposition political parties and electoral governance institutions.

Keywords: political institutions, electoral governance, democratisation, democratic transition, constitutional reform, electoral law, party dominance.
5.1 Introduction

The Front for the Liberation of Mozambique, the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Frelimo), has been in power since independence in 1975. Frelimo is an African political party that has managed not only to survive the political transition from a one-party system to multiparty competition, but also to become the dominant party and remain in power for almost two decades (see Harrison 1996; Mohamed Salih 2003; 2007; De Tollenaere 2004, 238; Carbone 2005; Orre 2010; Rosário 2012, 326; Forquilha and Orre 2012, 336). To be sure, although the dominant party system and the one-party system may exhibit some similarities, they are not the same: that is, dominant parties come to power under a competitive democratic system, whilst one-party regimes are the creation of authoritarian regimes under non-competitive electoral systems (Sartori 1976).

A dominant party system is competitive in the sense that a number of parties compete for power in regular and popular elections, but a single major party enjoys a prolonged period in power (see Sartori 1976; Mohamed Salih 2003, 2007; Bogaards 2004, 177; Van Cranenburgh and Kopecky 2004, ). A ruling party passes the dominance threshold when it achieves more than 60 percent of the vote in two consecutive elections (Van de Walle and Butler 1999).

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Frelimo has won all multiparty elections since the 1994 democracy-founding elections (see table 1 and 2). After a vibrant electoral performance in 1994 and 1999, opposition parties, RENAMO shrank to a
mere residual force in Parliament after the 2009 general elections. Table 1 in chapter I and table 2 below show a critical juncture (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007) in RENAMO’s electoral trajectory in the second round of general elections held in 1999.

Scholarly literature (De Tollenaere 2004; Orre 2010; Rosário 2012; Forquilha and Orre 2012) considers Frelimo’s breach of the dominance threshold to be due partly to its umbilical ties to Mozambique’s electoral governance institutions. After independence, and in terms of the country’s Constitution, Frelimo had been the driving force in state and society, with the result that the party guided the basic political direction of the state as well as the actions of state institutions.

Moreover, Frelimo’s victory in the decade-long liberation struggle and, in particular, the declaration of independence in 1975, shaped the party’s leading role in society, casting and moulding it in the narrative of liberating ‘the land’ and ‘the people’ from colonial rule. However, the subsequent 16-year-long civil war not only ruined much of Frelimo’s connection to society, but also led to political reforms that resulted in the collapse of the First Republic (1975-1990) and initiating the Second Republic with the 1990 approval and promulgation of the country’s first multiparty Constitution.

This article is an analysis of Frelimo’s current dominance over electoral institutions, and it attempts to show how this dominance had sustained its prolonged rule, continuing uninterrupted since the first competitive elections in 1994. It primarily explicates and elucidates the nature of the political institutions that emerged out of the post-1990s political transition. Nevertheless, there should be an understanding that the institutional legacies of the old regime, which influenced the political institutions that emerged during transition, also shaped Frelimo’s dominance through what Jörg Sydow, Georg Schreyögg and Jochen Koch (2005) calls “path dependency”.

Concomitantly, these institutions also shaped the possibilities for democratic consolidation (see Haggard and Kaufman 1995, 368; Diamond and Plattner 1999; Capoccia and Kelemen 2007) in favour of Frelimo, the governing party. Given the key role of elections in democratic transitions (see Linz and Stepan 1996; Reynolds and Reilly 1997, 7; Schedler 2003,3), and the challenge of establishing electoral rules that all parties can accept and respect (Pastor 1999), the focus of this article is mainly on electoral governance. To put it differently, the article focuses
on the broader set of activities that create and maintain an overall institutional framework in which voting and electoral competition take place. At this point, it is also important to note that electoral governance operates at three levels: rule-making, rule-application, and rule-adjudication (Mozaffar and Schedler 2002, 7; Schedler 2003, 5).

The interest in electoral governance also derives from the fact that, although scholarly literature acknowledges a broad international trend of institutional diffusion (Pastor 1999), there are major variations in constitutional, legal and organisational structures, resource endowment, actual performance, and the professional reputation of electoral governance institutions, all having a major impact on multiparty politics. Thus, this analysis is particularly directed towards understanding the positioning of the institutions of electoral governance within the broader machinery of government in Mozambique --- that is, their political (institutional and functional) independence, internal motivation, and transparency.

5.2 Framing Party Dominance in Democratic Transition

The Portuguese coup d'état of 25 April 1974 opened the way for negotiations on the political independence of Mozambique. Some four months later, on 7 September 1974, the Lusaka Agreement was signed between the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) and the Portuguese government, an agreement that included the establishment of a transitional government under the leadership of FRELIMO, taking the country to independence. FRELIMO was a broad national liberation front formed out of the fusion of three movements; but in the period between the coup in Portugal and the installation of a transitional government, other political groups appeared which also wanted to get ‘a slice of the cake’ in the national independence process. This, however, was a belated attempt as independence came on 25 June 1975 with FRELIMO as the sole representative of the Mozambican people (see Serra 1993; Jossias 2007; De Brito 2009).

In 1977, the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) reconstituted itself into a Marxist-Leninist, vanguard political party. In the same year, it held its Third Congress and established party cells in all neighbourhoods and workplaces. The grupos dinamizadores (dynamising groups), previously existing in the ‘liberated’ areas, continued in the new neighbourhoods only as local, grassroots administrative bodies (De Brito
2009). In addition, the reconstruction of the Frelimo party and the Mozambican state proscribed all autonomous forms of political and social organisation. Democratic mass organisations became satellite institutions of the party. To mention a few (see Poppe 2009; Adalima 2009): the Organisation of Mozambican Women (Organização da Mulher Moçambicana, OMM), the Mozambican Youth Organisation (Organização da Juventude Moçambicana, OJM), the Mozambican Workers Organisation (Organização dos Trabalhadores Moçambicanos, OTM), the National Teachers Organisation (Organização Nacional dos Professores, ONP), and the National Organisation of Journalists (Organização Nacional dos Jornalistas, ONJ).

Almost two years after independence, the rebel movement RENAMO started a brutal and bloody civil war that would last for 16 years. Initially, RENAMO received support from the former Rhodesian regime; then, after Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980, the South African apartheid regime gave it much more vigorous support. The near collapse of the Mozambican state (Zartman 2005), due to the intensity of civil war and a severe recurrent drought, compelled the Marxist-Leninist regime to turn to the Bretton Woods institutions, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), for assistance and Mozambique duly subscribed to structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) in 1987. Despite the oft-levelled criticism of the SAPs, they provided the incentive for the Mozambican government to enter, in tandem with economic reforms, into negotiations with RENAMO in order to end the long drawn-out civil war. These negotiations produced some initial positive results.

Earlier, in March 1984, the Mozambican government signed the Nkomati Accord with the South African apartheid regime as a quid pro quo for it to stop providing material support to RENAMO in exchange for Maputo’s neutrality towards the African National Congress (ANC), which until then Frelimo had supported logistically. Although this did not happen immediately (Della Rocca 1998), the interruption in the apartheid regime’s military aid to RENAMO helped transform a conflict with aggressive external dimensions into a full-blown civil war (De Brito 2009, 21). During the Joaquim Chissano era, following the death of Samora Machel, the Mozambican government, on various occasions, offered amnesty to RENAMO guerrillas to abandon their armed struggle and surrender to the authorities. However, these had minimal effects and the civil war continued unabated. To some extent, the Nkomati Accord did reflect the Mozambican government’s difficulty in recognising
RENAMEO as a relevant actor in the Mozambican political process, and not just an instrument of externally supported political and economic destabilisation (Mazula 1995). So, signing the Nkomati Accord with the South African apartheid regime meant, in part, establishing a pact with the leaders of the rebel movement as a way of ‘destroying the root cause of the evil’ from within. Along the same lines, the amnesty granted to RENAMO guerrillas by the Mozambican authorities would be a way of integrating RENAMO into state structures, but without recognising the rebel movement as representing the aspirations of, at least, part of the Mozambican population.

Economic reforms were followed by the 1990 democratic transition, with the then People’s Assembly enacting the country’s first multiparty Constitution although it was technically still at war. Constitutional reform was preceded by a political opening (Przeworski 1992), with Frelimo announcing at its Fifth Party Congress in 1989 that it was abandoning its Marxist-Leninist ideology. Unlike many countries in Africa that had experienced democracy from below, leading to so-called ‘national conferences’ (Benin, Niger, the Congo, Togo), in Mozambique there was no popular demand, or a push from a broad civil society coalition, for an end to the one-party system. Essentially, the initiative for this came from within Frelimo, the ruling party. Frelimo launched the 1989 political reform process with the intent to sound out opinions on, and the possibilities for, initiating a multiparty system. The congress delegates, fearing that a multiparty system would divide the country, apparently responded negatively (Carrilho 1995).

So, the Mozambican democratisation process commenced with a constitutional reform that paved the way for introducing “a ruling party”. In a typology of the end of authoritarian regimes, Julio Valenzuela (1992, 77) argues that ‘reform’ is problematic because “transition occurs without breaking the rules of the old regime”. And Przeworski (1992) points out that in a context in which there is a large coalition of forces in society demanding an end to authoritarian rule, the fight for democratisation takes on the character of a struggle by ‘society’ against ‘the state’, which could not have been the case in Mozambique given the transition modality.

By promoting a transition to democracy through the 1990 Constitution before the end of the civil war, Frelimo broke the backbone of the former rebel movement by removing the crux of its civil war demands,
the establishment of a democratic system of government.\textsuperscript{5} The 1990 Constitution promoted political liberalisation (lifting the ban on the formation and membership of political parties, guaranteeing political and civil rights and, in particular, establishing elections as the mechanism for winning and legitimising political power), but this did not end the war. Negotiations between RENAMO and the Frelimo government, therefore, became an absolute necessity.

The positional and institutional foresight of Frelimo not only structured the nature and substance of peace negotiations, but also removed, to its advantage, any inherent uncertainty about the democratisation process, and mapped out the institutional and functional trajectory of the institutions that emerged from this process. The political process that followed the adoption of the 1990 Constitution had to deal with two tensions: the process of democratisation, and managing an end to the armed conflict (De Tollenaere 2004, 226). As happened in the country's transition to independence in 1974-75, following approval of the 1990 Constitution a number of political parties started to appear on the scene;\textsuperscript{6} these were called 'emerging' or 'unarmed' opposition parties to distinguish them from RENAMO.

After initiating the democratisation process through the 1990 Constitution and with unarmed opposition political parties stirring up the political equation, Frelimo worked assiduously on finding a formula to end the civil war, while simultaneously defending the political and state power it had been consolidating since independence. This had been the principal tone of the Fifth Frelimo Congress that had again proposed an amnesty for RENAMO guerrillas, and an integration of ex-guerrillas into society. In preparing for negotiations in the Kenyan capital, Nairobi in 1990, Frelimo presented what it called a “basis to assist positive dialogue with the armed bandits” [emphasis added]. The negotiations resulted in agreeing on a 12-point Protocol which essentially stated that RENAMO should recognise the state (created and) governed by Frelimo, its organisational structures and legality, and that there should be an immediate ceasefire. Point 11 of the Protocol was clear that RENAMO should (Della Rocca 1998, 77):

\begin{quote}
\ldots return to normal life and the integration of elements to date involved in violent destabilisation [which] implies, in general, their participation in economic and social life in ways that are more adaptable, agreed by them and guaranteed by the government.
\end{quote}
The construction of this point makes it clear that Frelimo’s political strategy hinged on accommodating RENAMO in the economic and social spheres, but weakening it politically, thus, keeping its own political power intact.

RENAMO, in turn, needed official government recognition to enable it to operate as a legitimate political party. In another 16-point Protocol on what the peace negotiations should comprise, it stated (in Point 5) that “RENAMO is an active political force in the Mozambican political scene and any peaceful resolution must take into account this reality” (Della Rocca 1998, 78). The gist of this wording, albeit rather ambiguously, is that while RENAMO did not recognise the legitimacy and sovereignty of the government of Mozambique, likewise the government did not recognise RENAMO’s status as a political movement. Indeed, the Frelimo government needed the recognition of RENAMO, and the words of Armando Guebuza are quite instructive (Della Rocca 1998, 152):

The government of Mozambique is a Frelimo government, the party that achieved independence. This state organised itself and we are an internationally recognised state. This … state … [does exist and] has institutions and laws. The negotiations underline an abnormal moment in the country, but they cannot call into question the state or the legitimacy of its institutions and laws. The laws that we are handing to RENAMO cannot be … [negotiated] because they are legitimate.

During the two years of negotiations in Rome from 1990 to 1992, the Frelimo government wanted to establish peace and exact recognition from the former rebel movement, while RENAMO wanted the introduction of a system of democratic governance. To put it differently, the negotiation process had to take place between equals, and an eventual agreement had to supersede existing legislation in Mozambique, including the 1990 Constitution. Consequently, the Mozambican government accepted and recognised that RENAMO had to be an important actor in the process, and signed a General Peace Agreement (GPA, the Acordo Geral de Paz).

Prior to this, however, it had skilfully managed to impose an official agenda (Della Rocca 1998) on the Rome negotiations process that favoured its position and, in particular, the formal establishment of ‘democratisation from above’ (Nwokedi 1995). In line with constitutional
reform as a way of ending the single-party system, this conferred on it the privilege of remaining in power (Della Rocca 1998) and, thus, implementing the various protocols that included RENAMO’s integration into society and its transformation into a political party.

The adoption of Law 13/92 of 14 October 1992 by the then (single-party) People’s Assembly providing legal status to the GPA, and the subsequent promulgation and signing of this document into law by the President of the Republic, enabled the government of Mozambique to manoeuvre itself into a position superior to that of RENAMO. More importantly, it removed from the Mozambican democratisation process the uncertainty that, in theory at least, characterises democratisation processes generally (Przeworski 1992). It also strengthened the notion of ‘democratisation from above’, as well as the idea that democratisation in Mozambique was a reform process that was limited to elections only. This set the course and ‘structural incentives’ for the political institutions that emerged from the democratic transition, especially the electoral governance institutions.

5.3 Prelude to Party Dominance

The General Peace Agreement (GPA) consisted of several protocols with many interlinked components, but all revolved around the establishment of institutions for sustaining peace and the democratisation process. These two processes were to culminate with democracy-founding elections initially scheduled for October 1993, one year after the signing of the GPA. The establishment of electoral governance institutions was, therefore, an integral part of the peace process. Moreover, in terms of Protocol I of the GPA, the two warring parties agreed to involve the United Nations (UN) in supervising the final Accord. Perhaps fearing the fiasco that marked the Angolan peace process, the UN Security Council established the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (Onumoz) with a budget of US$331mn and a force of more than 8 000 troops, almost 15 times the number deployed in Angola (Nuvunga 2007, 8).

In addition to the profound distrust on both sides (Della Rocca 1998), the GPA implementation process was marked by a struggle for power by RENAMO and a fight to retain power by Frelimo (Mazula 1995, 27). This fight was a feature of the genesis of three political institu-
tions of the Second Republic and, in particular, the electoral governance institutions. Renamo used its military capabilities and its control of some 25 percent of the countryside to impose itself on national politics, and for many years demanded a dual administrative system for all areas, whether controlled by the Frelimo government or the rebel movement. For its part, the Frelimo-dominated government of Mozambique thought RENAMO was questioning its sincerity in upholding the provisions of the 1990 Constitution, amended to accommodate relevant stipulations in the GPA.

For example, there were amendments guaranteeing one person-one vote in presidential and legislative elections; increasing from 5,000 to 10,000 the minimum number of supporters required for nominating each presidential candidate; and opening the way for the electoral process to be conducted by the Comissão Nacional de Eleições (CNE; the National Elections Commission), in this capacity replacing the Constitutional Council (Carrilho 1995). The 1990 Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique did not envisage the creation of electoral governance institutions independent of state power, but rather the use of existing institutions (the judiciary) that had to be re-modelled to accommodate the necessary attributes of electoral bodies. Furthermore, despite the fact that the 1990 Constitution envisaged the establishment of a Constitutional Council, this did not happen by the time the transition was set in motion.

Through Protocol III, ‘Principles of the Electoral Law’, the GPA amended Article 129 (1/2) of the 1990 Constitution on the electoral system by replacing majority representation with a proportional representation system. In order to accommodate these provisions and as the then People’s Assembly had approved the GPA through an ordinary legal process, the 1990 Constitution was in fact the country’s de facto and de jure legal framework (Carrilho 1995, 134). The Mozambican government’s staunch defence of the 1990 Constitution is understandable as it gave Frelimo sole political power. Nevertheless, the political liberalisation of the 1990 Constitution broke with the one-party system, but it provided continuity for important features of this system.

For example, its Preamble stated that the pillars of democracy could not jeopardise national unity and that Frelimo, which had fought for national independence and had “brought together all patriotic sectors of Mozambican society in a single ideal of liberty, unity, justice and progress” (Article 31 of the 1990 Constitution), was the guarantor of this
national unity. This implied, as Mazula (1995, 35) points out “… that the unitary state and the country’s sovereignty corresponded to [the] hegemony … [of] the Frelimo party”. Thus, although the 1990 Constitution launched the process of democratisation, it put Frelimo at the apex of a vertical hierarchy, over and above all the other parties.

Frelimo was the governing party in Mozambique, and it acted as such throughout the democratic transition process, also presenting a similar demonstration of authority to Onumoz. Indeed, the Mozambican government needed to show that the country was neither a collapsed nor a collapsing state, and that it was a state with a functioning government. Senior ministers and members of the then single-party Parliament made it clear that “we are not a protectorate of the UN Security Council; we are a member [state] of the United Nations”, and a senior official stated that the “… UN is here as an observer, not as a peace-keeping force”. This latter statement marked the shift of power nationally and internationally towards Frelimo as a democratic ‘party in waiting’, in control of government, as well as its bureaucracy and resources.

5.4 Crafting The Electoral Institutions For Party Dominance

For the Mozambican government (and Frelimo, as the governing party) the democracy-founding elections arose from the 1990 Constitution that had introduced pluralism into the Mozambican political system, that is, before the adoption of the GPA. This meant that in terms of GPA Protocol III, the government of Mozambique took the responsibility for drafting the Electoral Law. The Mozambican government asserted that it opted for multiparty democracy, it was its initiative and, therefore, “RENAMO and other parties must … [simply] adapt to it” (Mazula 1995, 38). Thus, Frelimo’s view that it took ownership of democracy seem to have been at the centre of deadlocks experienced in the implementation of the GPA, as Renamo also claimed to have been the initiator of democracy in Mozambique (Mazula 1995).

Ironically, although there was yet no National Elections Commission (CNE), according to Protocol V of the GPA setting out peace guarantees, such a body should have been established within 60 days of the signing of the Accord. However, the Mozambican government did establish an Election Technical Unit (ETU) that started to prepare for elec-
tions prior to the formulation of the Electoral Act according to the provisions of Protocol III of the GPA in October 1991, that is, even before the formal signing of the Accord. Subsequently, the ETU was legitimised by the GPA, stating in an article of the Accord that “… the government shall draft the Electoral Act in consultation with RENAMO and other parties”; also that the “… government shall set up a National Elections Commission, one third of whose members shall be appointed by RENAMO” (Mazula 1995, 45).

However, RENAMO was a very fragile organisation, still had to transform itself into a political party, lacked properly trained political staff and, therefore, found it extremely difficult to appoint representatives to the various GPA commissions (Ajello 1995). For instance, RENAMO failed to appoint representatives to the National Police Affairs Commission (Compol), to the Re-integration Commission (Core; for the reintegration of former guerrillas into society), and to the National Information Commission (Cominfo; tasked to supervise the security services).

The National Elections Commission’s internal weaknesses notwithstanding, it was felt that RENAMO’s constant delays in appointing commission members was a political ploy to extract funding from the international community; in fact, RENAMO was demanding financial support from both the Mozambican government and international donors in order to transform from a liberation movement into a fully-fledged political party. This had already been evident during the peace negotiations (Della Rocca 1998). Nevertheless, the key mediators (the Sant’ Egidio Catholic community and the Italian government) seemed to have understood that the idea of peace had to be made attractive to the rebels, and this subsequently became known as “the price of peace” (Nuvunga 2007, 7).

However, more than the price of peace, Vines (1996, 145) has suggested that “… it was also an astute reading of probably the greatest interest RENAMO had, namely to extract maximum material rather than political benefits from the peace process”. Renamo signed the GPA based on firm pledges of financial support, and RENAMO leader Afonso Dhlakama made it clear that they would participate in the peace commissions only if the international community made good on its promises of financial support. RENAMO’s negotiator, Raul Domingos,
summed it up in a statement on 16 June 1992, declaring that there is “no democracy without money” (Nuvunga 2007, 7).

Thus, after securing the pledged US$15mn channelled through an UN-managed trust fund for the transformation of RENAMO into a political party, and with several but not all aspects of the GPA more or less settled, the Mozambican government’s Multiparty Consultative Conference with opposition parties, debating electoral legislation, could convene. Crucially, this was the first meeting that brought together all existing political parties, Frelimo and RENAMO included (CNE 1995). The Frelimo government tabled its draft Electoral Law; but, soon after convening the opposition parties decided to boycott the conference, demanding office space for their political work and calling for a transitional government to rule until elections took place.

Earlier, during the peace negotiations in Rome, Frelimo rejected the idea of a transitional government after RENAMO raised it. The Mozambican government was not prepared to contemplate any such thing, the then Minister of Justice Aly Ossumane Dauto declaring that “after all-out efforts to end the war and committing ourselves to pluralism, in no way can we accept a government formed by anything other than [by] a popular decision”. However, influenced by ‘post-Angola thinking’ and the establishment of a government of national unity (GNU) in post-apartheid South Africa, most international donors and Onumoz favoured a pre-election deal between Frelimo and RENAMO, although not necessarily a transitional government. Their argument was that in African countries ravished by poverty, political power is one of the only ways to achieve some form of economic security: “So when losers have nothing to start with, there is nothing to stop them fighting for power.”

RENAMO continued to demand more funding from the donor community, which fuelled the suspicion that it had become greedy and asked for more money whenever it encountered financial difficulties. As reported in the *Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin* (5, 8.1993, 4):

Indeed, some Renamo officials seem to have assumed that there was an aid “cake” that was going to Frelimo. Now [that] RENAMO had won the right to “eat” (that is, to get its share of the spoils of government), and by holding out long enough, it would be possible to negotiate a larger slice of the cake.
This caused key members of the diplomatic community to argue that RENAMO’s real need seemed to be economic, rather than political power-sharing. People started to believe that “Renamo’s main interest is money and security rather than political power, and the final deal need not involve political power-sharing.” As there was neither a transitional government nor a pre-election deal for some sort of government of national unity in a ‘winner-takes-all’ situation, all parties embarked on the electoral process hoping to win the elections outright and take control of the state.

Following amendments to the Constitution, the institutions of electoral governance were established, formally located outside the government bureaucracy in the form of independent, specialised bodies: the Comissão Nacional de Eleições (CNE, National Elections Commission) and the Secretariado Técnico de Administração Eleitoral (STAE, the Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration), a centralised, hierarchical structure, with provincial and district branches. From the beginning, the composition of the CNE (Mazula 1995) was a divisive and controversial issue. RENAMO proposed a CNE of 21 members --- 7 from RENAMO (the number established by the GPA), 8 from Frelimo (the government of Mozambique), and 6 from other opposition parties. However, the Mozambican government wanted a CNE in which RENAMO and the other opposition parties would not have a majority vote, especially prior to and during elections.

In a sense, Frelimo sought to use the CNE as an institution for confirming its political legitimacy, and an instrument for securing electoral dominance ‘by other means’. After tough negotiations, it was agreed that the CNE should comprise 20 members: 10 from the Frelimo government, 7 from Renamo, and 3 from the other opposition parties. Therefore, although the composition of the CNE was technically bipartisan, the balance of power was slightly in favour of Frelimo. Furthermore, the STAE --- the body that had to do the practical work of organising elections --- turned out not to be a purely technical body, as the Mozambican government initially proposed. It became highly politicised, with representation from both Frelimo and RENAMO.

The President of the Republic appointed the STAE Director-General and he had two deputies, one representing the Frelimo government and the other RENAMO. At a national level, the STAE had 50 technical staff members: 25 appointed by the Frelimo government, 13 by
RENAMO, and 12 by Onumoz. The Mozambican government appointed the directors of provincial and district electoral commissions, in each case assisted by two deputies, one each from Frelimo and RENAMO (CNE 1995).

An Election Technical Committee had existed since 1991, and its members gained experience by participating in missions to Angola and the United States (US) to observe elections taking place there. This committee drafted most of the electoral procedures, including the electoral legislation, and its members eventually formed the core STAE staff. As these committee members were Mozambican government employees, this proved to be to Frelimo’s strategic advantage, as most people did not yet understand the work of the STAE and, thus, their focus was more on the CNE. The founding nucleus of the national STAE was located in the Ministry of Public Administration (Ministério de Administração Estatal, MAE), at the time led by Aguiar Mazula, a senior member of the Frelimo government delegation to the Rome peace negotiations. Although subordinated to the CNE, the STAE was legally and functionally part of the MAE, a ministry in a government where the party in power, Frelimo, was standing in elections that the STAE had to organise.

Moreover, the first TSAE officials were seconded from national ministries and provincial and district directorates. Naturally, these officials retained their ties with their previous employers, who also paid their salaries. Article 31 of Decree 6/94 of 9 March 1994, operationalising the work of the TSAE, affirmed that “the posts considered necessary for [the] STAE's functions will be filled in accordance with the law; staff are bound to [the] STAE full-time”; and then continues: “STAE personnel who came from the civil service and state companies are not transferred, released, … [nor are] the rights inherent to their … [employment] in their original workplace in any way harmed”.

The CNE’s concern about neutrality created tensions in its relationship with the STAE at all levels, but especially at the national level. Indeed, “... this was also because [the] STAE had another, stronger line of command than the one it had with the NEC”. In its final report, the CNE (1995, 21) recognised that:

… at the beginning it was not easy to establish a functional articulation between [the] NEC and [the] STAE due to lack of experience in organising
activities. After working together [for some time, and] with discussions to clarify the competence of each body, the situation gradually improved.

In fact, on many occasions the STAE blatantly flouted the CNE’s instructions; for example, the CNE directed that national trainers (for the training of people to staff polling stations) had to appointed after going through a public tender process. However, “the Directorate-General of [the] STAE replaced some of the approved candidates by others who had not been selected through … [any] tender [process]” (CNE 1995, 56). These national trainers had to train 900 provincial trainers who had, in turn, to train 47 320 polling station workers from 6 670 polling stations. During the provincial training programme, there were many incidents in a number of provinces with RENAMO alleging that the STAE had chosen the 900 provincial trainers based on party affiliation. Nevertheless, it is true that there was no public tender to select provincial trainers; difficulties in finding people with the required educational qualifications (initially Grade 11, and later Grade 9) meant that the Ministry of Public Administration and the Ministry of Education in the end provided their own staff members as provincial trainers.

Despite concerted efforts to demonstrate its neutrality, the power exerted by state bodies was quite evident within the CNE, where Mozambican government representatives were in the majority. More importantly, whereas CNE members appointed by RENAMO and the other opposition movements were representatives of political parties, the 10 Frelimo CNE members doubled up as Mozambican government representatives. Essentially, therefore, the CNE was comprised of representatives from the government of Mozambique and the opposition parties. Similarly, the Minister of Justice, who co-ordinated the Inter-Ministerial Commission to support the CNE, often attempted to speak on behalf of the CNE, giving not only the impression, but also providing a clear indication, that the Mozambican government was influencing and interfering in the workings of the CNE (Mazula 1995).

At the conclusion of the electoral process, the CNE report presented a number of recommendations that was a reflection of the problems encountered in its relations with the Mozambican government and the STAE. As far as relations with the government of Mozambique were concerned, it recommended that “... it is important that the NEC be professionalised, independent of the other bodies of state power [emphasis added] and permanent ...”. As far as the STAE is concerned, it recommended
that the “… NEC should have [the] STAE as a support body, headed by a Director-General. The secretariat … [should] be professional and permanently dependent on the NEC. It… [should] not be integrated into any Ministry [emphasis added]” (CNE 1995, 118).

All this points to the fact that ‘democratisation from above’ enabled the government of Mozambique, the Frelimo party, and the Mozambican state to be collapsed into one. On this issue, the weekly Semanário Savana (27 May 1994, 5) reported that “… once again the government and Frelimo --- one and the same thing --- were able to get approval for electoral legislation favourable to itself” (emphasis added). Quite pointedly, Mazula (1995, 44) refers to an understanding that the “… government must ensure, at the very least, conditions for a Frelimo victory in the elections”. So, although RENAMO fought hard to rein in the hegemony of Frelimo, the origins of the institutions of electoral governance were reflected in their structures, their organisation and their operations, as well as in the Frelimo party’s control over government and the state apparatus.

5.5 Frelimo Dominance: Electoral Governance Institutions at Work

In studies of electoral governance, scholarly literature adopted either a functional or an institutional approach (see López-Pintor 1999; Pastor 1999; Elklit and Reynolds 2000; Schedler 2003): here these two approaches collapsed into one because, in only two decades of activity and in a context of a weak institutional environment, institutional and functional aspects may tend to overlap. Also informed by a social-conflict theoretical approach, this section will deal with the structures of power and interests accounting for the institutional and functional features of the institutions of electoral governance.

Following Andreas Schedler (2003), the notion of independence covers mainly two questions: first, how constrained are the institutions of electoral governance in fulfilling their tasks?; and second, how free are they from external interference? Rafael López-Pintor (1999) classified contemporary election authorities according to the institutional location for the conduct and oversight of elections. He identified three different situations: first, government-run elections; second, government-run elec-
tions supervised by an independent agency; and third, one or more specialised bodies assuming full responsibility for managing elections.

Frelimo and its presidential candidate won, what was seen at the time, the “best ever election held in Africa”. 30 RENAMO acknowledged defeat, but this would also be the only time RENAMO accepted the official electoral results; and all subsequent elections were disputed, mainly on the grounds of non-transparent election registration procedures, or the partisan nature of electoral institutions, or allegations of electoral fraud, necessitating the rejection of the electoral outcome. Indeed, the second general election, held in 1999, proved to be the most problematic. As the places of Onumoz representatives on the STAE were now filled by Mozambican government appointees, this was the first general election to be run entirely by the Mozambican authorities. Table 3 below provides a clear indication of the closeness of the results of the presidential election; RENAMO contested these results alleging fraud, and following failed negotiations with the Mozambican government to resolve the electoral impasse, it called for demonstrations throughout the country that resulted in hundreds of deaths.

Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>1994 millions (percentage)</th>
<th>1999 millions (percentage)</th>
<th>2004 millions (percentage)</th>
<th>2009 millions (percentage)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chissano</td>
<td>2.6 (53%)</td>
<td>2.3 (52%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guebuza</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.0 (64%)</td>
<td>3.0 (75%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dhlakama</td>
<td>1.7 (34%)</td>
<td>2.1 (48%)</td>
<td>1.0 (32%)</td>
<td>0.6 (16%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domingos</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.1 (3%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simango</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.3 (9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>0.6 (13%)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.1 (2%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In institutional and functional terms, the legacies of the 1994 elections have influ-
enced the independence and integrity of government electoral institutions. The first of these legacies concerns their institutional nature, especially that of the CNE which from the very begin-
ing had been a temporary body. Invariably, the CNE has to be constituted on the eve of an election when Parliament approves a new law setting out the terms of its creation, terms that include the contentious issue of its composition and the mechanism for appointing its members. Moreover, since 1994 there had been a constant variation in the number of CNE members, its exact composition, and the procedure by which members are appointed. The second legacy concerns the abuse of the legal and regulatory framework of electoral governance institutions, in particular the CNE’s legal mandate. This mandate involves three levels of electoral governance: establishing the rules, applying the rules, and adjudicating on the rules (Mozaffar and Schedler 2002, 7; Schedler 2003, 5). By law, the CNE is located in the “application of the rules” of the electoral legislation approved by Parliament.

However, since 1994, the Electoral Law has given the CNE the power to deliberate (rule-making) on operational aspects of the organisation of the electoral process that may have an impact on electoral competition. For example, among other aspects, the CNE decides on the electoral timetable, procedures for the candidature of parties and presidential candidates, and drawing lots for the location (positioning) of the parties and presidential candidates on the ballot paper. The 2009 elections brought many problems to the fore, with the candidate lists of some opposition parties either partially or totally rejected because of apparent procedural failings.

Regarding the legal and regulatory framework, the drafting of electoral legislation was marred by wrangling and political instability (De Brito 2009; Forquilha and Orre 2012). The 1994 Electoral Law was an interim measure and conceived merely to regulate the elections that introduced democracy (Carrilho 1995, 138), which means that Parliament has to legislate the electoral law for each election cycle. In addition to political instability, this has generated a profusion of laws, which confused observers, the media and opposition political parties alike; for example, in 2009 there were at least four different laws regulating the electoral process. On many occasions, it was impossible to determine
which parts of the law were applicable, especially when this was prejudi-
cial to opposition parties.

On the rules governing the appointment of members of the CNE
(Schedler 2003), Frelimo accepted that it would have to comprise mainly
members of civil society. This was after much criticism of partisanship of
electoral governance institutions in the 1998 and 2003 municipal elec-
tions, and the 1999 and 2004 general elections, resulting in the promulga-
CNE, in practice the government dominated the electoral governance
institutions. Those parties with seats in Parliament, on a proportional
basis, appointed members to the CNE; then, the President of the Repub-
lic appointed the chairperson of the CNE from a list of three nominees
put forward by that body and, in both these cases, Frelimo in any event
had a majority.

However, Law 8/2007 not only reduced party influence but also and,
in particular, introduced a new trend in the functional nature of electoral
governance institutions, namely civil society predominance. Now, the
CNE was composed of 13 members: 8 from civil society, and 5 from the
two parliamentary parties, Frelimo and RENAMO, on a proportional
basis (Frelimo had 3 and RENAMO had 2 members). But through skil-
ful engineering, Frelimo parliamentary representatives managed to influ-
ce the law-making process so that it resulted in an Electoral Law vague
on the mechanisms governing the appointment of civil society members.
The law merely stated that civil society representatives on the CNE had
to be co-opted by members appointed by political parties – and here,
Frelimo had the advantage. With the opposition apparently unaware of
Frelimo tactics, the law was adopted by consensus, but when the reality
of this deception dawned on the opposition, it made any future co-
operation with the government on the electoral law even more difficult,
if not impossible.

Considering the 50 “important elements” Elklit and Reynolds (2000)
listed for a meaningful judgement on the quality of elections, the loose
appointment procedures were problematic, as they potentially could have
had an impact on the objectiveness of the selected members. The result
was that some of the eight civil society members were co-opted from
organisations that during the era of the one-party state were known as
democratic mass organisations, the National Teachers Organisation be-
ing a case in point. These were all organisations close to the Frelimo par-
ty (Guiliche 2011), such as the Association for Human Rights and Development, and the Electoral Observatory, who both elected two members, and the Association for Youth Development.

According to the law, a majority of civil society members now dominated the CNE. They also appointed the chairman (a real *primus inter pares*) as he or she was a member of the Commission at the behest of civil society. This gave the impression that a formula had been found for a CNE that was more independent of the state. In reality, however, it was a Commission in which government (Frelimo) members predominated:

The Chairmen of the National and Provincial Electoral Commissions for the 2003 and 2004 elections were nominated by civil society and intended to be independent ... but in practice they were nominated by civil society organisations close to Frelimo and have been seen as, in fact, a Frelimo choice.33

Not surprisingly, RENAMO president Afonso Dhlakama recently made removing civil society members from the CNE a condition for approving new electoral legislation.

Although there have been improvements over two decades of election management, with polling stations well organised and new, computerised electoral rolls introduced, there are still some doubts about the CNE’s integrity and neutrality. First, several electoral observation missions asked the question: whose interests is the CNE really serving? Consider, for example, the lack of transparency and the secrecy around computerised counting in Maputo, where the “NEC is more open, but secrecy remains”.34 Such electoral management suggests that the “NEC keeps its computer system secret because it has something to hide”.35 Second, a new trend became apparent in the 2004 and 2009 general elections regarding non-transparency in the interpretation of the law or, more seriously, lack of clarity in the application of the law.

On the one hand, there is the issue of the electoral law with many ‘grey areas’ around vote-counting and tallying, especially as far as transparency is concerned. Such glaring shortcomings give the impression that Frelimo is reluctant to address these controversial issues. Since 1999, there have been various proposals for international consultancies on this matter, including funding offers by international donor agencies, but Parliament gives the subject minimal attention and are slow to consider proposals for improving transparency. On the other hand, according to
what transpired from interviews, members of the CNE themselves have contributed to the difficulty of making the Commission's work more transparent. In 2004, the law required the CNE to tally electoral results per district, but it failed to do so.

Addressing criticism by observation missions in the media, the then CNE spokesperson, Filipe Mandlate, quite disingenuously asserted that “… it was considered unnecessary [to tally electoral results per district] because these omissions did not have any effect on the result” 36. In 2009, the CNE again came in for severe criticism when, in a totally non-transparent manner, it created obstacles aimed at excluding parties from participating in the general election. An outcry against these practices in the independent media (and in civil society) produced newspaper headlines such as (see Nuvunga and Mohamed Salih, 2010): “Unlawful Decisions by NEC May Provoke Bloodshed”, “NEC Transformed into a Frelimo Political Cell”, “Political Earthquake in Mozambique”, “A High Tension Week in Maputo between NEC and Parties”, “Signs of Danger from NEC”, “NEC Jumped Important Steps of the Law”, and “Fraudulent and Technological Stalinism at NEC”.37

The STAE falls under the jurisdiction of the CNE and is, in essence, its technical arm. Its main aim should be to produce ‘credible’ election results; and it is a permanent body, headed by a director-general appointed by the Prime Minister. However, in functional terms, and quite revealingly, the STAE has retained its links with the Ministry of State Administration. It employs temporary workers at election time, mainly primary and secondary school teachers, for activities such as civic education and voter registration. Its permanent staff (directors, in particular) were originally transferred or seconded from various public administration institutions, but over time there have been public tenders to hire people with more specific skills.

Interviews conducted for this study revealed that the relationship between the CNE and the STAE, in order to achieve greater clarity of functions and responsibilities, has not been formalised since 1994. Apparently, the STAE has shown signs of acting on its own volition or initiative and completely outside the framework of instructions received from the CNE, so much so that “… in some cases, one has to ask: so, who is managing the elections?” 38 Since all post-1994 voting has been orderly, election observation missions have always praised the STAE.
Nevertheless, some controversial issues need to be resolved: voter registration is but one of them.

It has never been possible to determine the total number of voters with any certainty. In 2004, chaos surrounded the number of voters, which ranged from a total of 11mn to 6.4mn. The CNE Chairman at the time estimated the number of voters at 8mn, while the Director-General of the STAE put the figure at 7.6mn; for its part, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)\textsuperscript{39} estimated a high voter number of 10.1mn, while Frelimo put the figure at a low 6.4mn.\textsuperscript{40} In fact, voter registration determines the number of parliamentary seats per constituency in a proportional representation electoral system, and this is important in a context where the 1994 electoral map had already shown areas of clear Frelimo and/or opposition support. Linked to this is the issue of the number of polling stations per constituency that may change from election to election and, more importantly, their geographical location. The number of polling stations and their distance from outlying residential and rural areas clearly affects the motivation of people to go and vote.

Quite perceptibly, Pastor (1999) has argued that governments who intend to rig the outcome of elections usually lay the foundations for electoral fraud long before the start of the formal election campaign. However, it took some time for opposition political parties to understand the technical importance of the STAE in all stages of the electoral process, including its non-transparent links to the Ministry of State Administration. The lack of professional integrity by STAE personnel, being unaccountable, uncooperative and sometimes even blatantly obstructing the work of electoral personnel (Nuvunga 2006), was confirmed in interviews. These also left the perception that staff misconduct was openly tolerated, and arrogance was a self-defence mechanism to conceal blatant mistakes, last-minute planning, and rank incompetence. Astonishingly, however, these were the very same people who, since 1999, in election after election were guilty of the same transgressions and acts of misconduct.

The interviews brought to the fore another legacy of the electoral governance institutions that organised the 1994 elections: the former heads of the CNE and the STAE were rewarded with important government positions. For example, the first two chairmen of the CNE were appointed rectors of the country’s two largest public universities, and other former CNE chairmen with legal qualifications became Supreme
Court and Administrative Court judges. The former Director-General of the STAE was appointed assistant director-general of an institution of higher learning and does consultancies on electoral affairs for the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) in Angola, a party with close ties to Frelimo. All this has an impact on the ‘incentive structures’ of the institutions of electoral governance, in particular for CNE members and STAE officials.

The interviews suggest that, in addition to the Mozambican government’s control over electoral governance institutions, their members unquestioningly serve the Frelimo party, which controls the main avenues for social mobility. This assertion is vindicated in the light of the photo-opportunity appearance of current CNE Chairman Leopoldo da Costa (who was elevated to the Commission through a civil society nomination), wearing a Frelimo T-shirt and cap during a meeting of Frelimo cadres in April 2012.

In 2004, the CNE went so far as not only to ignore, but also to reject the criticism of the Constitutional Council, a sovereign body with competence to decide on electoral matters. In its ruling on the 1 and 2 December 2004 election, the Constitutional Council strongly criticised the CNE for several violations of the electoral law and declared that “its institutionalisation and professional competence were incomplete and unsatisfactory”. The CNE spokesperson at the time, Filipe Mandlate, simply retorted that the “NEC will ignore the criticism and take no action …. nothing will happen if we do not [take any action]. When nothing is done there is no punishment.” It appears that the CNE is motivated by ‘the same incentives’, dispensed by party and government, that allows STAE officials to commit election after election what amounts to electoral fraud, but nonetheless keep their jobs.

Electoral governance is much broader than just electoral institutions, as it also involves electoral competition. One has to look, therefore, at other factors that facilitate an understanding of the motivations and ‘incentive structures’ of electoral governance institutions. First, the widespread invalidation of opposition votes: ballot papers that correctly express support for the opposition are rendered invalid by polling station staff by smudging them with ink. Second, ‘ballot box stuffing’ is another phenomenon that has been occurring since 1999. This is evident, in part, when a polling station submits a ballot box for counting, containing
more ballot papers than the maximum number of voters (say, 500) registered on that particular electoral roll.

The apathy of, and lack of interest shown by, justice administration institutions (especially the Attorney General’s Office and the Police) on these matters, also point to much broader governance issues involving the relationship between the Frelimo party and the state. Salvador Cadete Forquilha and Aslak Orre (2012) observe that towards the end of the civil war, when Frelimo gained complete control over the state, it assiduously worked on revitalising its party structures in rural areas, building and consolidating party-political alliances with communities previously favourably disposed towards RENAMO. These included, for example, traditional chiefs. Noteworthy was, to quote Forquilha and Orre (2012, 4):

Frelimo’s use of the state bureaucracy and resources for party purposes, implying a state that is increasingly at the service of the party in government .... [the] state captured by Frelimo is facilitated by implanting and/or revitalising party cells in public institutions, in a context where active militancy in workplaces has become obligatory for members, especially those in leadership positions in state institutions at all levels.

5.6 Conclusion

An attempt has been made here to explain how and why the dominance of political institutions by Frelimo through the control of electoral governance institutions can be described as ‘path dependent’. Having taken the initiative to end its own one-party rule by promoting the transition to democracy through the 1990 constitutional reforms, before the end of the civil war, the Frelimo government gained a privileged constitutional position in relation to RENAMO. However, RENAMO has also taken a political stance that, in effect, bolstered Frelimo’s institutionalisation of a process of ‘democratisation from above’. In a sense, ironically this facilitated Frelimo’s remaining in power throughout the period of democratic transition and beyond.

Democratisation through constitutional reform and a process of ‘democratisation from above’ not only marked the trajectory of political institutions emerging from this process (which form the foundations of the Second Republic in Mozambique), but also opened the path to a
greater and ever-increasing proximity between national political institutions and a dominant Frelimo party. This came about mainly because transition occurred without breaking the shackles of the old regime. Therefore, generally speaking, the traits and patterns exhibited by political institutions are mirror images of the avenues chosen in the past (path dependency), particularly the timing and modality of democratic transition.

The implication is that the dynamics, traits and ‘incentive structures’ exhibited by electoral governance institutions not only mirror the broader context of Frelimo’s dominance over political institutions, but also reflect the path chosen at the time of institutional design that led to the democracy-founding elections in 1994. The politics and context surrounding the electoral governance institutions at the time of the first multiparty elections has played an important part in setting the path that, at present, impacts on the ‘incentive structures’ of electoral governance institutions.

As the electoral law stands, electoral governance institutions are institutionally and functionally independent from the party in government but, as has been shown, the ‘incentive structures’ that move electoral governance institutions are more responsive to Frelimo party interests than to the principles of democratic electoral governance. It has been pointed out that CNE members and STAE officials tend to prejudice electoral transparency in order to serve the interests of Frelimo, not only in the hope of some reward but also convinced that no disciplinary action for any misconduct will be taken against them. While not suggesting that Frelimo, as a party, has benefitted from all these actions, it has to be concluded that, unfortunately, since 1999 both human error and deliberate action have been prejudicial to opposition parties which, in turn, undermine sound and healthy political and electoral competition.

Simultaneously, the political process of democratic transition, involving negotiations to end the civil war, formalised the approach of ‘democratisation from above’ which gave Frelimo not only an advantaged position but also assisted it to remain in power during the interim period between the signing of the GPA and the establishment of the first democratically elected government. This process, not only tilted the balance of power in Frelimo’s favour, it also consummated RENAMO’s de facto integration into the political institutions created and controlled by Frelimo since independence in 1975. Thus, a two-fold negative impact
on political institutions becomes apparent. First, the political process limited democratisation to the electoral sphere; and second, rather than acting as arbiters in political disputes, electoral institutions ended up being the main focal points of political struggle between Frelimo and RENAMO: the former wanting to retaining power at all cost, and the latter striving to bring an end to that power.

Victory in the elections that established democracy produced the winner in the battle for the control of state institutions. Sadly, this included the electoral governance institutions that are, in theory, tasked to structure and provide the legal and administrative framework for the democratisation process. Thus, the institutional and functional framework of electoral governance institutions, particularly their ‘structural incentives’, reflect Frelimo’s 1994 election victory, seen as also having renewed the legitimacy of the mandate achieved when it proclaimed the country’s independence in 1975. The political process of democratic transition, therefore, produced institutions that are working to the advantage of Frelimo, but to the detriment of the opposition, particularly RENAMO. Earlier, RENAMO not only questioned Frelimo’s hegemony when it set itself up as a rebel movement and later as a political party, but also claimed to have initiated democracy, something Frelimo felt it had the sole ‘bragging rights’ to.

This does not suggest that the electoral governance institutions were responsible for Frelimo’s victories in the four general elections until now. It merely suggests that the ‘incentive structures’ that move electoral governance institutions tend to be more accountable to Frelimo party interests than to the principles of democratic electoral governance. This study has shown that CNE members and STAE officials tend to prejudice electoral transparency in order to serve (although not always directly requested) the interests of the Frelimo party, not only in the hope of some rewards to be had, but also convinced that they will suffer adverse consequences for any misconduct. Tragically, this scenario also hides the sheer incompetence and inadequacies of STAE officials. While this study does not suggest that electoral institutions are the only instruments used by Frelimo to retain political power, it does conclude that, unfortunately, since 1999 both human error and deliberate action by these institutions have been prejudicial to the ability of opposition parties to compete for political power through the ballot box.
Notes

1 In parts of this text, the acronym Frelimo is rendered in capital letters, FRELIMO, and in other parts in lower case, Frelimo. This is intended to differentiate between FRELIMO (the acronym of the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique, the broad movement that led the armed liberation struggle) and Frelimo (the political party created in 1977, two years after the independence of Mozambique).

2 The Mozambican African National Union (MANU), the National Democratic Union of Mozambique (Udenamo), and the National African Union of Independent Mozambique (Unami).

3 The Grupo Unido de Moçambique (Gumo), the Comité Revolucionário de Moçambique (Coremo), as well as others that existed underground during the struggle for independence (Adalima 2009).

4 Valenzuela (1992) considers three main forms of transition from authoritarian rule to democracy: (1) collapse, defeat, or withdrawal, where the rules of the authoritarian regime are abandoned; (2) extrication, where the rules of the authoritarian regime are abandoned, but the rulers negotiate relinquishing power; and (3) introducing a process of reform.

5 The rebel movement, the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO), alleged that it started the war because it disagreed with the Marxist-Leninist regime, its one-party state philosophy, and the absence of guarantees for civil liberties.

6 The Mozambique National Union (Unamo); the Mozambican People's Progress Party (PPPM); the Mozambique Nationalist Movement (Monamo); the Mozambique United Front (Fumo); the Liberal and Democratic Party (Palm); the Mozambique Democratic Party (Pademo); the National Democratic Party (Panade); the Party for Liberal Progress of Mozambique (PPLM); the National Mozambique Party (Pano); and the United Congress of Democrats (CDU).

7 At the time, Armando Guebuza was the head of the Mozambican delegation to the 1990-92 Rome peace negotiations.

8 The official agenda, approved in Rome in May 1991, was as follows: (1) Law on Parties; (2) Electoral Law; (3) Military Issues; (4) Ceasefire; (5) Guarantees; (6) Donor Conference; and (7) Signing the Agreed Documents and the Final Protocol.

9 The distinctive feature of ‘democratisation from above’ is that the authoritarian regime, or the military dictatorship, in question undertakes the democratisation process, albeit under sustained pressure from its opponents in civil society. The emphasis is normally on reform of the Constitution and the existing institutions of government through a normal reform process. The opposition may or may not make an input into the reform measures embarked upon.
In one of the meetings that preceded the signing of the Acordo Geral de Paz (AGP), held in Gaborone on 4 July 1992, the President of RENAMO, Afonso Dhlakama, stated that he accepted that the Frelimo government would remain in power until the 1994 elections.

The mandate entrusted to the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (Onumoz) by Security Council Resolution 797 of 16 October 1992 was to verify and monitor implementation of the General Peace Agreement (GPA).

See amendments to Articles 30; 107 (2); 108 (1); and 134 (1) of the 1990 constitutional by-law 12/92 of 9 October.

In the rest of the text, the National Elections Commission (Comissão Nacional de Eleições) will be referred to by its Portuguese acronym, CNE, except in those cases where the English acronym, NEC, appear in a quotation.

Law 13/92 of 14 October.


This was the committee overseeing the police, as the GPA had no protocol on the police force.

The Re-Integration Committee was one of the four peace committees chaired by the UN.

This was the committee overseeing the state security services, as the GPA had no protocol on state security services. However, if there ever was a misnomer, Cominfo must be it!

Some of the unresolved issues were the existence of arms caches in the countryside (RENAMO, in particular, never allowed the UN to visit some of its arms depositories), the incomplete integration of territorial administration (in violation of the GPA, RENAMO never permitted the government access to some of the areas it controlled), the continued presence of landmines throughout the country, and inadequate training and equipping of the new Army and national Police Force.

A total of 17 political parties attended the meeting.


In the rest of the text, the Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration (Secretariado Técnico de Administração Eleitoral) will be referred to by its Portuguese acronym, STAE.
The initial Mozambican government proposal was a CNE comprised of a Supreme Court Judge; a Supreme Administrative Court Judge, both elected by the Supreme Council of Judges; a representative of the Supreme Council for the Media elected by that body; a Ministry of Foreign Affairs representative; the Director-General of the STAE; two representatives of each political party; and three citizens appointed by the President of the Republic.


An interview with one of the former directors-general of STAE, held on the July, 15. 2011

Aldo Ajello, the then UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Onumoz. Elections in the Republic of Mozambique, 27-29 October 1994. Statement by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 19 November 1994.


The Electoral Observatory is a coalition of civil society organisations led by Brazão Mazula, who was the first CNE Chairman in 1994 that observed the electoral processes and did Parallel Vote Counting (PVC).


See Semanário Magazine Independente (Maputo), 9 September 2009; Semanário Zambeze Independente (Maputo), 10 September 2009; Semanário Savana (Maputo), 11 November 2009; Semanário Magazine Independente (Maputo), and Semanário Magazine Independente (Maputo), 16 September 2009; Jornal Diário Independente (Maputo), 17 September 2009; and Semanário Zambeze (Maputo), 17 September 2009.

An interview with a former CNE chairman on 12 June 2012.

The UNDP has been supporting the institutions of electoral governance in Mozambique since 1994 and, especially, since the 1999 elections.

41 CanalMoz, no 682, 6 April 2012.
Abstract

The academic debate over party dominance has focused on the national level, giving meagre if any attention to dynamics and political processes taking place at the local level. This chapter responds to this critique and probes issues pertaining to the shift in electoral support from RENAMO to Frelimo in constituencies once dominated by RENAMO. Using a multiple case research design covering two previously dominated districts, namely Angoche and Nicoadala, the paper argues that a stay away by RENAMO voters had an impact on the party’s share of the vote, which resulted from Frelimo conceiving and implementing a governance strategy to reduce the political space available for opposition parties, particularly RENAMO. All in all the Frelimo victory in constituencies formerly controlled by RENAMO is the result of Frelimo’s use of state apparatus to revive its organisation and put in place instruments to entrench itself within the state resulting in an unlevel playing field for electoral competition.

Key words: Frelimo, RENAMO, Angoche, Nicoadala, Playing field.
6.1 Introduction

Following a head to head competition in the 1994 and the 1999 elections, RENAMO was defeated in its former strongholds namely Nampula, Zambézia, Tete, Manica and Sofala in the 2004 and 2009 elections. This chapter probes these electoral defeats which have paved the way for the early end of the then vibrant two-party system and its replacement by the enduring dominant party system. It departs from the viewpoint that “failures from the opposition parties may themselves be structurally induced” (Boucek & Bogaards 2010: 1), arguably by the party in power.

Probing the ‘machine politics’ of dominant parties, Greene’s (2010a, 2010b, 2013) resource theory of single-party dominance posits that “dominant parties win consistently because their advantages skew the partisan playing field in their favour and make even genuine elections substantially unfair” (Greene 2010a: 258). Similarly, Sauger (2010: 68) interprets one-party dominance in terms of an evolutionary model, “as the outcome of a virtuous cycle in which self-enforcing processes enable a party to achieve and secure dominance”.

Expanding on these points, Dunleavy (2010) argues that dominant parties are able to create mechanisms which work to their advantage. These include the opportunity to use public policies to influence voter behaviour; to be partisan in the implementation of policy and the delivery of public services; to give services to supporters and deny them to opponents in order to disadvantage those living in opposition strongholds and to control key institutional processes such as the voting system, constituency boundaries and the shaping of agendas. Indeed, for Greene (2010a: 156) “dominance means the ability to dictate social choice”. Analysing the effects of party dominance at the district level, Sauger (2010: 68) argues that dominance may weaken confidence in democracy and may also reduce voter turnout – which appears to be the key factor in RENAMO’s loss of votes.

The idea of an uneven playing field for electoral competition links these theoretical propositions with political and electoral developments in Mozambique. An uneven or skewed playing field is defined as one in which “incumbent abuse of the state generates such disparities in access to resources, media, or state institutions that opposition parties’ ability to organize and compete for national office is seriously impaired” (Levitsky & Way 2010: 57). While scholars (Levitsky & Way 2002, 2010; Diamond
2002; Schedler 2002a, 2002b) argue that many established democracies do not have a truly level playing field since “governing parties or executives enjoy advantages of incumbency ... No system is a perfect democracy, all require constant vigilance, and scattered violations do not negate the overall democratic character of elections” (Levitsky & Way 2010: 28). How do these theoretical considerations speak to the case of RENAMO’s defeat in its former strongholds?

Although local idiosyncrasies may affect voter behaviour, the case study is the appropriate method of providing a nuanced understanding of the abrupt reduction in RENAMO’s share of the vote in the constituencies it previously controlled and which sustained the two-party system. Strategically the research design was framed as a multiple case study in order to assemble evidence from more than one case and, in so doing, to give more solidity to the argument.

Of the five constituencies previously controlled by RENAMO, two – Nampula and Zambézia – are of particular interest: they are the largest and they voted massively for RENAMO in 1994 and 1999 but swung to Frelimo in 2004 and 2009. As provinces are too large for a case study analysis the study was done at district level. In addition, districts are appropriate administrative units for such analysis as they are at the centre of policy implementation and service delivery. “[T]he district is the main territorial unit for the organization and functioning of the state local administration and the basis for planning the economic, social and cultural development of the Republic of Mozambique” (article 12(1) of Law 8/2003).

In terms of Law 8/2003, districts are organised in administrative posts (which consist of localities) and localities (which consist of villages and other settlements). The district is headed by an administrator who is appointed by the minister of state administration in consultation with the provincial governor (article 34(1) Law 8/2003). The heads of administrative posts are appointed in the same way as the administrator (article 46(5, Law 8/2003). The next layer consists of the locality, headed by a chief of the locality, who is appointed by the provincial governor. Beneath this are the villages and other forms of settlements, on which the law is silent in terms of administration and the appointment of chiefs. Interestingly it is in these villages that the rural population lives.

This gap is filled by Decree 15/2000, which defines the ‘community authorities’ and their relationship with the hierarchical state administra-
tion. This decree sets out three categories of authorities. Category 1 comprises régulos (senior traditional leaders, chiefs) and the village secretaries, who are mainly the former secretaries of Grupos Dinamizadores; category 2 comprises the traditional leaders below the régulos, including mambos and fumos, and the neighbourhood and the secretarios de circulos; and category 3, which consists of the chefe de 10 casas. From the first category, while the traditional authorities (régulos) supported RENAMO throughout and after the civil war, the village secretaries (the former secretaries of Grupos Dinamizadores) were not only created by Frelimo but also, and importantly, have been its grassroots structure, which, during the one-party-state era, had both party and state functions. It is at this level that this chapter is focused.

Only two districts were covered, one in each province, namely Angoche (Nampula province) and Nicoadala (Zambézia province), selected by qualitative rather than quantitative sampling. Qualitative sampling “seeks information richness and selects the cases purposefully rather than randomly” (Meyer 2001: 333). The districts selected are dissimilar in some ways (language, religion) and similar in others (former RENAMO strongholds that swung to Frelimo, rural districts, poverty level). In political terms the two districts are representative of former RENAMO strongholds in which it lost to Frelimo, implying that the conclusions derived from this multiple case research design can be generalised to all the provinces that were controlled by RENAMO but swung to Frelimo as of the 2004 election. Chapter IV, details the data collection and analysis.

Having departed from the proposition that opposition failures may be structurally induced by an uneven playing field for electoral competition put in place by those in power, this multiple case study argues that the stay away by RENAMO’s own voters which resulted in its poor performance in the elections was the outcome of Frelimo’s strategy to narrow the political space available for opposition parties, and for RENAMO in particular. This strategy included co-opting the traditional authority, which had been the support base of RENAMO at the local level, reasserting effective control of the national territory by the government following the devastating civil war and the switch of RENAMO voters to Frelimo to gain access to state services such as loans for income generation purposes.
Although RENAMO claimed to have fathered democracy it had no power to ameliorate the living conditions of its rural supporters. It also did not have the resources with which to grease its electoral machinery, which, in time, collapsed, resulting in an ineffectual election campaign. All in all the Frelimo victory in former RENAMO constituencies reflect the impact of Armando Guebuza, who revived Frelimo’s party organisation and put in place instruments for the entrenchment of Frelimo within the state. This chapter is organised as follows: an introduction, a section on the creation of an uneven playing field for electoral competition, the third and main section that presents the key explanations of the research matter at hand and the conclusion.

6.2 Local Governance: An Uneven Playing Field for Political And Electoral Competition

When the civil war ended RENAMO controlled significant parts of the national territory (Nuvunga & Mohamed Salih 2013) and attempted to impose a double administration, demanding government recognition of its right to rule the territory it occupied. The Frelimo government, on the other hand, worked to recover the areas controlled by RENAMO.

Since the onset of the civil war RENAMO’s members had been labelled bandits (Cahen 1998). Indeed, for most of the world, the perception of RENAMO was based on its grotesque campaign of terror against Mozambican civilians (Manning 1998) and its status as an army of captives. This may have encouraged the then Frelimo-dominated single-party People’s Assembly prior to the democracy-founding elections to approve one of the country’s most reformist laws, Law 3/94, which contemplated the transformation of the country’s 128 districts into local entities with democratically elected governments that would, perhaps democratically, oust RENAMO from the zones it occupied. However, RENAMO’s outstanding results in the 1994 elections alerted Frelimo to the fact that such a law could result in it losing a substantial amount of power to RENAMO and was thus a political blunder (De Brito 2008).

Frelimo backtracked and, using its narrow parliamentary majority, ruled Law 3/94 to be unconstitutional. Astutely, since it did not have the majority required to amend the Constitution, Frelimo made changes to titles III and IV of the 1990 Constitution. It introduced the notion of ‘Local Power’, asserting one of the structuring principles for the organi-
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sation and operation of Mozambique’s Public Administration: the combination of devolution, descentralização, through local governments with democratically elected mayors and the decentralisation, desconcentração, of the administration through state local authorities (provinces, districts, administrative posts, localities and villages) subordinated to the central government, in a strict hierarchical vertical structure from the capital city of Maputo to the most remote village.

Of the two parallel processes Frelimo preferred desconcentração (De Britto 2008, 2010; Nuvunga 2005, 2012) because appointments were made through cadre deployment and not through a risky election process. Indeed, considering the existing limitations, the desconcentração moved swiftly, enabling the government to re-establish the institutional foundations of a state that, as a result of the devastating civil war, did not exist in much of the country.

The desconcentração was a gradual process, both in terms of the creation of new local governments (at the beginning in 1997, only 33 were created and only in urban areas) and in terms of responsibilities and resources. Through the desconcentração the government effectively expanded its control after the civil war to cover the entire country, giving Frelimo offices and a functional organisation in all administrative post and locality headquarters. The process was similar to that which took place immediately after independence in 1975, when the construction of the state – out of the ashes of the Portuguese colonial system – was accompanied by the institutional development of Frelimo, which was then the only party. An example was the creation of party cells in residential areas and workplaces (De Britto 2008).

As a result, throughout the country, there is always a Frelimo branch a few metres from the administrative post and/or locality headquarters. However, according to Alexander (1997: 4) the establishment of the local party structure has led to power struggles, as “party positions became part and parcel of local struggles over state patronage, access to land and over authority between youth and elders and among lineage elders … Provincial, never mind central, structures had little knowledge of who constituted the rural party structure.”

The deployment of staff and budget allocations for administrative posts and the inclusion, under Law 8/2003, of the chiefs of the locality in the budgets of the administrative post, enabled these state local authorities to be staffed by people who, according to respondents, are de-
ployed by Frelimo, not selected on merit and are thus responsible for assisting the party. In this way Frelimo transformed the state from a neutral actor into its constituency. Three arenas that have an impact on local governance illustrate this.

Co-Option of Traditional Authority: Frelimo’s Strategy to Pre-Empt Renamo’s Social Base

The results of the first democratic election, in 1994, as well as those of the second election, made it clear that the traditional authorities had been the social base and the key mechanism for election mobilisation of RENAMO voters, especially in rural areas (Forquilha 2006; Buur & Kyed 2005). In an effort to co-opt traditional authorities Frelimo, after widespread public debate over the role of traditional authorities in governance, held under the auspices of the Ministry of State Administration (Lundin & Machava 1995; Lundin 1995) approved Decree 15/2000 from the Council of Ministers governing the links between state local authorities and community authorities. This decree allowed the Frelimo government to legislate on the links between the institution of traditional authorities and state local authorities before the legal structure of the state local authorities was clearly defined. This would only happen (albeit partially) three years later, through Law 8/2003.

By using a Council of Ministers decree rather than a law passed by Parliament to legislate on such an important matter as the role of the institution of traditional authority in governance, the Frelimo government appeared to want to avoid any input from RENAMO, which not only had strong representation in Parliament but also had a vested interest in the matter (Forquilha 2006; Buur & Kyed 2005). Since Frelimo had fought against the institution of traditional authority throughout the 1980s in the context of the one-party state, the decree avoided the term ‘traditional authority’, instead calling these bodies ‘community authorities’. In terms of the decree, in order to become a ‘community authority’ a traditional leader had to be ‘legitimised’ (elected by a show of hands) and then ‘recognised’ by the state.

These processes were organised by the state administration at the local level (for instance, state officials at local level assembled the adult population, informed the traditional leaders interested in standing and organised the meetings at which the leader would be elected). With this
protocol observed, the legitimated leaders received uniforms, state insignia, including the national flag, and were entitled to a state salary as ‘community authorities’. According to Buur & Kyed (2005) as of 2002 more than 2 000 people who had been ‘traditional leaders’ and ‘secretaries of suburban quarters or villages’ in semi-rural and rural areas of the country had been recognised as ‘community authorities’. This proved to be the basis for co-option of the institutions of traditional authority, although not before Frelimo had established in the decree the foundations for controlling and diluting this authority.

In addition to changing the title of the traditional authority to ‘community authority’ the decree enabled Frelimo’s former Grupos Dinamizadores and other party-state secretaries to acquire the status of ‘community authority’ in a context in which, since independence, Frelimo had adopted and implemented a policy of replacing traditional authorities with Grupos Dinamizadores, arguably because the former were corrupt and had served colonial interests before independence (Coelho 1998). According to interviews with traditional leaders in Angoche and Nicosala, this not only ‘tarnished’ the institution of traditional authority but also confused people and diluted the identity of traditional authority in the eyes of the population. In practice, according to interviews with traditional leaders in Angoche and Nicosala, it made each level of the old traditional authority equivalent to the Frelimo party political structures that were originally intended to control them.

Secondly, according to the same traditional leaders, the legitimisation and recognition issue weakened the traditional authority structure in relation to state local authorities that, at the local level, were synonymous with/or at the service of Frelimo party political structures. “[I]n the recognition meeting, Frelimo told us its expectations in terms of support to mobilise the masses for public gatherings organised by the state and by Frelimo … without this, salary and other state benefits would stop flowing”

Nationwide, this process was instrumental in co-opting and integrating the institution of traditional authority into local political-administrative structures together with local Frelimo party representatives (Forquilha 2006; Forquilha & Orre 2012). As it stands now, all levels of community authority are part of the state machinery and front runners in mobilising the population for state activities. Forquilha (2006) documents cases of important former RENAMO traditional leaders who
switched their allegiance to Frelimo following their integration into the political and administrative system.

The Politicisation of Public Funds: The Case of the District Development Fund

Following calls for financial decentralisation to the districts, the state budget provides for several decentralised funds: the District Development Fund, the District Infrastructure Fund, the Direct School Support Fund and the Roads Fund. In parallel with the creation of these funds, Law 8/2003 established a participatory democracy model of local governance with hierarchical Community Consultative and Participation Institutions (Instituição de Participação e Consulta Comunitária – IPCC) from local to administrative posts and from there to the district level. Studies have shown that

as spaces for community participation and consultation, the IPCC were established and developed in a political context profoundly marked by the dominant party system … This context has implications for the expansion of the local participation base as it is highly circumscribed by the dynamics of the implantation of the dominant party’s bases. (Forquilha & Orre 2012: 337)

This section elaborates on the District Development Fund (Fundo de Desenvolvimento Distrital – FDD), a public institution with a legal persona and administrative and financial autonomy. It was created by Council of Ministers Decree 90/2010 to replace the Local Initiative Investment Budget (Orcamento de Initiativa de Investimento Local – OIIL). Under the FDD, since 2006 each of the 128 (141 as of 2013) districts has been allocated at least 7-million Meticalis (about US$256 000), initially meant for infrastructure development but later for food security and job creation projects under a kind of microcredit scheme. The FDD process involves several stages after the submission of projects by potential beneficiaries. Projects are submitted to the local consultative councils where the first selection takes place. The selected projects are approved and then forwarded to the administrative post consultative councils for further short-listing and approval. The short-listed projects are then submitted to the District Consultative Councils for final appraisal and approval.

Findings in Angoche and Nicoadala revealed that the OIIL, and later the FDD, were never regarded as microcredit scheme but rather as a
presidential perk for the small boys at the rural level. Most people regard the fund as an instrument for political clientelism at district level (Forquilha & Orre 2012). The chairperson of the Mozambican National African Peer Review Mechanism Forum, Professor Lourenço do Rosário, for instance, has said that although this was not Guebuza’s original idea, much of the money is used to pay for political favours (O País 24 March, 2011). By the same token, a 2010 study of 15 districts by the Centre for Public Integrity (CIP)7 showed that on average 40% of the funds went to civil servants, 30% to civil servants’ families, 10% to associations, including Frelimo, and 20% to individual beneficiaries.

Studying the FDD and the consequences for governance in Mozambique in three districts in two provinces, Orre & Forquilha (2012) document the link between the FDD and the Frelimo party base. The authors argue that whereas in Zavala district (Inhambane province) and Monapo district (Nampula province) the opposition party and other people felt that OIIL funds systematically favoured Frelimo people, the link between the party and FDD finance was clearest in Gorongosa district (Sofala province).

The authors reviewed all 69 funded projects and, through key informants, concluded that 11 beneficiaries were members of Frelimo organisations or Frelimo social organisations such as liberation struggle veterans, Mozambican Youth Organisation (Organização da Juventude Moçambicana – OJM) and the Mozambican Women’s Organisation (Organização da Mulher Moçambicana – OMM). The remaining beneficiaries included various kinds of Frelimo members: local and district secretaries for mobilisation and propaganda, a party cell secretary, an administrative post head of general office and the secretary of one Frelimo circle (various cells). “In the interviews many of these beneficiaries confirmed that they observed that their party connection appeared to have a positive influence on the possibility of their receiving finance” (Orre & Forquilha 2012: 192).

Nevertheless, some successful businesses have resulted from this funding scheme. When interviewed by TV and other media, owners of successful projects thank Frelimo. So, as an element of political clientelism and rent-seeking for consumption, the FDD is helping Frelimo build a local business class with a vested interest in Frelimo continuing in power. For instance, the author observed that the overwhelming majority of big and medium-sized shops in Angoche and Nicoadala had boxes for donations in support of Frelimo’s 10th Congress. The important local
political elite become the local business elite or use their family members to own income-generating activities or micro businesses through the FDD.

There is no evidence that the projects submitted by opposition members or alleged opposition members are not selected on political grounds. But the various layers of short-listing, starting from the lower level of the state administrative unit, are seen as a mechanism to ensure that the funds will not end up in the wrong hands “[O]ur informant said that of just four RENAMO members on the list of approved projects, two had in fact not received funds” (Orre & Forquilha 2012: 193).

Celebration of State Commemorative Dates and the Open Presidency

The state commemorative dates of political interest are: 3 February (National Heroes Day, the date on which the architect of national unity, Dr Eduardo Chivambo Mondlane, died); 7 April (Day of the Mozambican Women’s Organization, the former Mass Democratic Organisation, the date that the national heroine, Josina Machel, died during the national liberation struggle); 25 June (Independence Day); 7 September (Victory Day, marking the signing of the Lusaka Agreement that opened the way to independence) and 25 September (Armed Forces Day, marking the start of the armed national liberation struggle). There are also state political events linked to visits by senior central government leaders to state local authorities, in particular the Open Presidency. The celebration of state political events is a mass movement that starts with laying a wreath on the monument to national heroes and ends with a rally addressed by the head of state in the case of the Open Presidency and by the senior state official at each territorial level for other political state celebrations.

The rallies begin with the national anthem, followed by repeated declarations of “Viva Frelimo” and the introduction of senior party members by the senior state leader attending the event. The size of the crowd is the indicator of the success of either the Open Presidency or other state political event. Ever since the first Republic (1975-1990) the organisation and mobilisation of the masses for these events has been the responsibility of the former democratic mass organisations, especially the OMM and the OJM. At the height of the First Republic the former Grupos Dinamizadores were the forerunners in this role. With the introduc-
tion of the multiparty system and the resultant need to separate state and party, the Grupos Dinamizadores were abolished and their leaders moved to leadership positions in Frelimo party structures at the different territorial levels. The OMM and OJM became Frelimo party social organisations.

Although the OMM and OJM are Frelimo party organisations they are the core instruments for mobilising the population for state celebrations at the provincial, district and lower levels. According to the permanent secretaries, as indicated in note 11, without the OMM and the OJM the state would be unable to get the masses out for political events and/or celebrations other than those during which teachers take students in primary and secondary schools out of classrooms to attend and when permanent secretaries of ministries and other state local authorities mobilise public officials to participate.

The implication is that there is a direct association between state celebration events and Frelimo social organisations. Indeed, both observations and interviews suggest that the Frelimo social organisations are the de facto material content of the state in the district lower state local authorities and instruments for organising (e.g., by providing access to FDD funds) and mobilising the masses. For instance, the author has observed OMM and OJM groups bringing masses from neighbouring districts in huge trucks to attend Open Presidency gatherings in different locations in the two years of field work.

This section has put forward arguments and examples showing that the Frelimo government’s administrative reforms have been conceived, sequenced and implemented in order to dominate local politics while eliminating all elements of electoral uncertainty, in other words, creating an uneven playing field for electoral competition. This has not only led to Frelimo dominating national and local politics but, more importantly, it has been the core of Frelimo’s ‘machine politics’ that secures electoral triumphs. This is the departure point for the following chapter, which probes factors that caused the voter swing from RENAMO to Frelimo in Nicoadala and Angoche districts.

6.3 The Uneven Playing Field: Dynamics of Electoral Competition

This section gives a brief explanation for the abrupt erosion of RENAMO’s vote in Nicoadala and Angoche.
The graph above is consistent with the national trend, confirming the declining voter turnout but a surprising slight increase in Frelimo’s share of the vote. In the 2009 election in Nicoadala, in a context of growing abstention, Frelimo obtained 45% more of the vote than it had in 2004, whereas RENAMO lost 25%. Indeed, the RENAMO vote has been in decline since the 1994 election, with a sharp fall in 2004, when it lost 50% of the vote it obtained in 1999. In Angoche, while the Frelimo vote is on the increase the vote for RENAMO is falling sharply. In 2009 Frelimo obtained 40% more than in 2004 while the RENAMO vote declined by 30%.

Consistent with the national results, graph 1 shows that the 2004 election marked a turning point for RENAMO. However, the statistics do not suggest that Frelimo captured this entire vote – the number of votes lost by RENAMO is higher than those gained by Frelimo between 1999 and 2004. So the key aspect in the apparent shift in the two districts is that the RENAMO voters – who did not migrate to other provinces – stayed away from the polling stations but not before registering, as evidenced by the higher stay away figures. It is interesting that unsophisti-
cated voters (e.g., those in rural areas with lower levels of education) would have the incentive to register but not to vote – a strategy that might be expected from more sophisticated voters.

The Mozambique Political Process Bulletin (29 December 2004, page 2) reported that a small percentage of voters was unable to vote in 2004 for logistical reasons such as polling stations failing to open or opening late, and missing or switched voters’ lists. However, these factors were not an issue in either of the two districts under review.

What happened is that adults used the opportunity to apply for registration cards in order to use them as a means of identification for purposes other than the elections. Régulos in both districts alleged that village secretaries told people the card was required in order to access public services, particularly water, so all adults should register. As a result there was a massive registration.

According to many respondents the switch of allegiance by the régulos from RENAMO to the government was the main reason for RENAMO’s losses. One régulo said,

we were the leaders of these masses throughout the civil war and we played that role in elections, telling the masses to support the party that protected us during the civil war and valued us: RENAMO. But there were changes as Frelimo started to recognise us, giving us a role as part of the state.11

While the village secretaries deny this, claiming that RENAMO voters voluntarily switched allegiance to the government, local traders and religious leaders said that once they were recognised, traditional authorities, particularly the régulos, not only carried state insignia but also appeared at public state ceremonies side by side with the state elites, which are the Frelimo elites.

Findings in the two cases show that the government’s recognition of régulos had a structural impact on RENAMO voters. First, it changed the political geography at the local level, mainly because the régulos had to replace the RENAMO flags at their homes (which symbolised identification with and support for RENAMO) with state flags, showing a break with RENAMO and, correspondingly, an allegiance to the government. Secondly, régulos had to mingle with Frelimo leaders at public events. “Not all régulos stopped supporting RENAMO but of course it cannot be in public, things have changed here,” said one.12 It can only be concluded
that once co-opted and controlled by the state apparatus the régulos and the traditional authorities more generally stopped mobilising RENAMO voters for electoral purposes. So, while adults in the two districts had an individual incentive to obtain a voter card there was no incentive for them to vote as they had in the 1994 and 1999 elections.

The result appears to have been that the former village secretaries (who are the former grupos dinamizadores) and neighbourhood secretaries took the opportunity to mobilise the masses in favour of Frelimo, without competition from the régulos who once supported RENAMO. The findings in the two districts show that while this did not substantially boost the Frelimo vote the switch of allegiance of the régulos held back RENAMO voters, who, in previous elections, had been “guided by the régulos in groups from their communities to the polling stations as there is intimidation by the grupos dinamizadores against those communities known to support RENAMO”.

Nine of the 10 régulos interviewed in Nicoadala district confirmed that they had stayed at home and had not mobilised voters (for RENAMO), first, arguably because they were constantly watched by village secretaries and secondly, because they were afraid of being excluded from government meetings and activities such as the distribution of mosquito nets if they were suspected of continued support for RENAMO.

It is this type of pressure Greene (2010: 156) refers to when he writes that “dominance means the ability to dictate social choice”, implying that traditional leaders, knowing that they were under the scrutiny of the village secretaries, had to behave or risk losing their access to government perks. While in Angoche all 10 régulos interviewed claimed they had not encouraged voters in order to counter the pressure by the village secretaries to mobilise them to vote for Frelimo, Forquilha (2006) has documented a shift in the allegiance of traditional authorities from RENAMO to Frelimo following state recognition.

Another reason for the declining support for RENAMO is the reassertion by the government of effective control of the national territory. With the exception of the village secretaries all groups of respondents, including the permanent secretaries in both Angoche and Nicoadala, acknowledged this as major cause of the stay away of RENAMO voters. The 1994 and 1999 elections took place at a time when the government did not have full control of the national territory or, to put it differently, the state’s monopoly of power was still not completely implanted (the
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post-war period) and it had insufficient control over the territory and the population.

So the local RENAMO support base (mainly the traditional authorities, particularly the régulos before they were co-opted) had ample political space to mobilise voters, in many cases without competition from Frelimo. However, the village secretaries in the two districts and the ministerial and provincial permanent secretaries alleged that as RENAMO controlled almost 25% of the country after the civil war this enabled it to engineer fraud (mainly through ballot box stuffing) in the 1994 and 1999 elections, thus presenting RENAMO as a party with a strong social base and electoral support when, in reality, this was not the case.

This is a problematic argument since, on the one hand, no independent source (journalist and/or academic observer) has ever presented this hypothesis and, on the other, both in 1994 and 1999 no observer mission reported ballot box stuffing in general and in RENAMO controlled areas in particular. In fact, the first ever reports of ballot box stuffing emerged in the 2004 election in Tete province and was orchestrated by Frelimo war veterans (Mozambique Political Process Bulletin 29 December 2004).

This implies that, although the administrative reforms envisaged the separation of party and state, Frelimo mounted a state that served its interests at local level, as argued elsewhere in this chapter. Key to this is that Frelimo used former RENAMO social bases and structures of political and electoral mobilisation as part of its strategy to expand its control over the state. In doing so, it succeeded in turning the weakly implanted state administration – Zartman (2005) labelled Mozambique as a collapsing state at the time of events – into a Frelimo-dominated state. Decree 15/2000 and Law 8/2003 not only changed the political geography of many areas, they also resulted in the reassertion of control over the state by the government, from Maputo to the smallest remote rural village. This process not only revitalised Frelimo, it blurred the boundary between the state and the party’s branches.

Law 8/2003 and, more recently, Law 11/2012 state that the lowest state territorial unit is the localidade (locality), which is below the administrative post. However, below the locality there are several settlements with administrative structures that include the aldeia (village), círculo (circle), quarteirão and bloco. These settlements have administrative structures
with real power to mobilise and control the population as they were inherited from the one-party state. However, not only there is no legislation governing their legality and activities, there is no clarity about their appointment and accountability mechanisms. Accordingly, in the two districts, religious leaders and local traders were unanimous that the level below the locality is where the de facto control of the population and mechanisms to thwart opposition political activities lies. “The information on who is who in the village, in terms of political affiliation, is prepared by the heads of bloco, quarteirão, circulo and sent to the heads of aldeais” and is used either to co-opt, exclude or demonise.

The findings in both Angoche and Nicoadala show that the reforms resulted in demoralising RENAMO voters, especially in rural areas where there are high rates of illiteracy, apparently because people feared real or imaginary reprisals (perhaps based on their memories of the authoritarian one-party state era).

People supported RENAMO throughout the civil war because they felt protected from Frelimo repression and expected to help RENAMO win elections but things now changed with Frelimo controlling everything again, so the masses have to behave and pull back from politics.

This meant that with the effective implantation of the state authority, being an opposition supporter and/or voter had its price. In this regard, Greene (2010: 171) is right in saying that “dominant party advantages thwart standard competitive dynamics” by laying down an uneven playing field.

The findings in both cases also suggested that RENAMO’s weak electoral campaign played an important role in its loss of votes. Respondents in both Nicoadala and Angoche agreed that the party’s campaigns had lost momentum since 2004. In the two districts the party had only started campaigning about 10 days after the formal start of the electoral campaign and, unlike in 1994 and 1999, no high ranking cadres were deployed to these districts, no T-shirts and caps were distributed to the masses and there were no organised motorcades. “Unlike the past, local business people did not help RENAMO with cars and money, so everything did not go well here.” These failures are an indication of the fact that RENAMO structures at the local level were collapsing – that local party leaders were failing to mobilise voters.
Fear of losing out on government favours was an important reason for RENAMO’s lack of support in the two districts studied. Respondents in both districts pointed out that in order to obtain state benefits, especially loans from the District Development Fund (Fundo de Desenvolvimento Distrital – FDD) and fishing nets voters had to show allegiance to Frelimo. The village secretaries in both districts alleged that RENAMO’s successive election defeats were the result of voters changing to what was obviously the winning side in an effort to improve their personal circumstances.

According to régulo Naikulu Mucrua of Angoche district, “whatever is done (for example, water sources, roads, and so on), is done in the name of the Frelimo party, not the Mozambican state so one has to align to Frelimo.” In both Ncoadala and Angoche, traders say that Frelimo changed its strategy in the 2009 elections, financing régulos and relatives of religious leaders through the FDD, instead of making promises. In this respect, régulo Makhotone Said in Angoche said that in the past, when they [Frelimo] came here, they said that they wanted votes, promising to give us money, but after the elections they only give it to some people and the rest of us continued to die of hunger … then, in 2009, contrary to what happened in previous elections, Frelimo started to offer gifts, and to finance the small projects of our children and relatives, including religious leaders, through the FDD.

Religious leaders differed from régulos and other community leaders on some aspects. However, they agreed that RENAMO’s presence in communities has fallen dramatically. Findings from these groups of respondents show that they felt that government support for communities has increased over the years, increasing the population’s positive feelings: “People vote for those from whom they can obtain benefits,” and those benefits come from the Frelimo government. This finding is consistent with scholarly research in other dominant-party states. For instance, Crouch (1996: 240) posits that “identification with the opposition meant denial of the benefits associated with the patronage networks”. Similarly, Greene’s observation (2010: 171) that “disadvantaged opposition parties can only attract anti-status quo outsiders who are willing to reap low instrumental benefits for their activism”, is fundamental to a deeper understanding of this situation.
Religious leaders in both districts say that the decline in RENAMO’s mobilisation and activities does not necessarily mean that there is greater militancy in Frelimo, they believe adherence to Frelimo is a survival strategy that does not necessarily mean RENAMO’s ideals have been abandoned. Rather, its supporters recognised that “RENAMO was no longer able to combine electoral mobilisation with material incentives for the population: bales of clothing, food and seeds that no longer happened”.20

Local traders and religious leaders in both districts believe that RENAMO’s contention that it would constantly be defrauded by Frelimo of an election victory exacerbated the abstention of potential RENAMO voters. This argument was categorically refuted by régulos in Angoche, who pointed out that such claims were necessary to give voters an idea of how uneven the playing field was. Régulos in Nicoadala dismissed the argument, saying that it was meaningless for the masses, arguably because they knew and trusted RENAMO.

However, the negative discourse argument is consistent with arguments in other research. For instance, Chichava (2007) considers that RENAMO is responsible for the failure of voters to go to the polls because of its excessive claims of electoral fraud by Frelimo, and this is also consistent with the argument of the Mozambique Political Process Bulletin (29 December 2004: 7) which blames RENAMO’s lack of organisation and its negative campaigning and “defeatist strategy”. All these arguments show that specific local idiosyncrasies21 did not explain the drop in the RENAMO vote in these two districts in 2004 and 2009, the real reasons are to be found in the dynamics of local governance put into motion by reforms and policies implemented by the government.

**Frelimo Party Organisation And Entrenchment Within The State**

The problem, however, is how to explain the fact that Frelimo’s vote grew in a context of high voter abstention and persistent poverty in the country.22 As stated above, Frelimo’s percentage of new voters is not consistent with the recovery in national voter turnout between 2004 and 2009. Fieldwork did not uncover any extraordinary factor that might explain the results in Angoche and Nicoadala. Part of the explanation lies in the fact that, after his designation as Frelimo’s presidential candidate in 2002, Armando Guebuza spent the following two years travelling to
every district to improve the party’s organisation and that, after his election as president, and particularly after the 2006 IX Congress in Quelimane, Zambézia province, the functional separation of party and state was blurred, with the latter subordinate to the former. Frelimo also improved the status of its party cadres by increasing salaries in the local administration and allowing for patronage in the management of decentralised funds.

More importantly, Frelimo constricted the hierarchical structure from the central committee down to its lowest structure – the party cell – and at all levels (central, provincial, district and the administrative post) made government officials accountable to the party leadership. Frelimo secretaries attending provincial and district government meetings to make sure that

Frelimo’s political objectives in each province, district and administrative post are on top of the government agenda. For instance, a mere distribution of humanitarian assistance for people affected by floods has to be sanctioned by the Frelimo leadership and make sure that distribution is handed out by or in the presence of the Frelimo party leadership at that particular administrative level.23

Frelimo revised its statutes and, through article 76, included a mechanism to ‘capture’ the state. This article deals with the political responsibility of elected and non-elected high-ranking state officials with article 76(1) stating that such officials “will coordinate their activities with Frelimo party organs at their respective level and are personally and collectively answerable for the exercise of their functions within the state to these party organs”24 (our translation). Article 76(2) states that those in national posts, such as those of ministers and national directors, are responsible to the central committee of the Frelimo party.25

In doing this Frelimo has not only put the state apparatus at its own service, it has ensured that the apparatus is oriented towards the political priorities of the party. In the meantime it has tightened its vertical political control: each member of the Political Committee is responsible for supervising one province; senior members of provincial committee are assigned districts for political support and supervision; senior members of district committee are assigned administrative posts for political support and supervision and so on down to the cell level. Provincial governors and district administrators are released from administrative func-
tions to focus on politics while the permanent secretaries (from ministries to districts) are responsible for administrative functions.

The reorganisation also covers Frelimo’s own social organisations, namely the OMM and the OJM, the status of whose chairs – from the lowest to the highest structures – was considerably improved. Findings from the interviews with permanent secretaries indicate that since then these organisations have not only dealt with party political mobilisation but also mobilised the population for state activities and celebrations, in the process becoming *de facto* state instruments. District permanent secretaries highlighted that another fundamental role of Frelimo’s social organisations is to improve the organisation (and identification) of the population for access to state services such as FDD funds and mosquito nets. This resembles Boucek’s (1998) accounts of dominant parties using state resources and control of the policy agenda to mobilise and transform their electoral base, rewarding loyal supporters, attracting new ones and keeping internal factions under control.

In both districts, the findings, largely from the interviews with the religious leaders and local traders, suggest that Frelimo’s social organisations are also crucial players in issuing residence certificates, the possession of which is an important condition for a person to obtain civil documentation at village, locality and administrative level. The findings show that the issuing of residence certificates begins in the *quarteirões*, where there is no clear separation between the state and Frelimo. The revitalisation of the party and the placing of politics in control of governance have enhanced the motivation of Frelimo cadres. According to district permanent secretaries “it has improved control over the linkage between the population’s access to state services and support for Frelimo, at least in terms of attendance at Frelimo gatherings.” All in all, these developments show that the state apparatus is being used for partisan gain.

### 6.4 Conclusion

This chapter probed RENAMO’s defeat in its previously controlled constituencies. It departed from scholarly literature arguing that it is not only opposition failures but also decreased voter turnout that may be structurally induced by an uneven playing field for electoral competition. The explanations are grounded in the findings from two districts formerly
controlled by RENAMO. Although the two districts selected for this case study are not statistically representative of all the districts formerly controlled by RENAMO they give a clear idea of what might have happened in other such districts, particularly because in neither district were local idiosyncrasies found to be relevant to the loss of votes, the problems lay with broader governance-related aspects.

The chapter began by outlining post-war administrative reforms introduced by Decree 15/2000 and Law 8/2003, finding that they enabled the creation of an uneven playing field for political competition at the local level, which, with time has proved to be a prelude to electoral success. As a preliminary aspect the fieldwork established that a stay away by RENAMO voters upset the party’s electoral performance.

Several explanations for this emerged from the findings in the two districts studied. The first is that traditional leaders, particularly the régulos, switched their allegiance from RENAMO to the government, which resulted in the collapse of RENAMO’s political and electoral activities. In fact, the traditional authorities, particularly the régulos, had long been co-opted by government in terms of Decree 15/2000, which made them a part of the government establishment, not only abandoning RENAMO but also failing to mobilise the party’s supporters.

The second explanation is the government’s reassertion of its effective control of the national territory. The 1994 and 1999 elections took place in a context where, following the devastating civil war, the government did not yet hold a monopoly on power and thus did not have control over the masses in significant parts of the country. In time, though, the government began to assert tighter control at the local level and this was the context in which the 2004 and 2009 elections took place. While the administrative reforms were aimed at further disentangling the party from the state, Frelimo found ways of blurring the boundary between state and party while making the state subordinate to the party machinery.

The third explanation is RENAMO’s weak electoral campaigns, which showed that it had lost the momentum it had had in previous elections. This aspect was linked to a lack of internal democracy and the power of the party’s leader. Although this is an important finding, however, it is more an indicator of the collapsing local structures of RENAMO than an explanation of its electoral losses, a consideration that is consistent with the finding that the RENAMO electoral cam-
paings in 1994 and 1999 were led by local elites rather than by cadres from Maputo or the party’s provincial headquarters. Linked to this is ‘negative RENAMO discourse’, the notion that it would never win an election because of fraud perpetrated by Frelimo – a negativity that demoralised its voters, who felt there was no point in voting if their vote would make no difference.

The fourth explanation has to do with the adherence of RENAMO voters to Frelimo. This is apparently a strategic shift as, according to common wisdom and parlance, access to state benefits, especially loans from the FDD and fishing nets, were dependent on allegiance to Frelimo, a factor that dissuaded many voters from supporting RENAMO. While RENAMO claims the fatherhood of democracy it lacks the material base to provide services or benefits for its supporters. Metaphorically speaking, RENAMO no longer has the wherewithal to grease its political machinery.

More work is needed to gauge the relative weight of the explanatory factors presented here but it is clear that Frelimo’s governance strategy has made pluralistic competition difficult – a situation that can be ascribed to the impact of the leadership of President Armando Guebuza, who, prior to his election as president of the Republic revived the Frelimo party organisation, putting in place instruments for entrenching the party within the state and undermining the state for the benefit of the party.

Notes

1 The article was originally published as Nuvunga, A. 2013. ‘Política de Eleições em Moçambique: As Experiências de Angoche e Nicolela’ in De Brito, L., Castel-Branco, C., Chichava, S., Forquilha, S., Francisco, A. orgs. Desafios para Moçambique 2013. Maputo. IESE, 23 – 39

2 Nampula has a population of 3.9-million; Zambézia has 3.8-million. (III Recenseamento Geral da População e Habitação 2007, Resultados Definitivos, INE). The mean for all 11 provinces is 1.8-million.

3 The GDs were groups of eight to ten people, chosen by a show of hands during public meetings of urban neighbourhoods, workplaces, or local communities throughout the country. All of those accused of collaborating with the colonial regime were, in principle, excluded. Headed by a secretary, the GDs came to take on a wide range of functions that partially took over those which had until then
been carried out by the traditional authorities: addressing social issues, legal questions, policing, security, administration and regulation. In a more general way it was hoped that the GDs would introduce the political history and political priorities of the new government to the citizens of Mozambique (Meneses 2005).

4 Number 1 of Article 30, of Law 3/94 of 13 September.

5 One ministerial, two provincial and two district permanent secretaries agreed to be interviewed on condition that their identity would not be revealed.


7 Centro de Integridade Pública, 'O Distrito Como Polo de Desenvolvimento: Um Olhar da Sociedade Civil', Agosto de 2012.

8 The Open Presidency (Presidencia Aberta) is a visit by the president to provinces, districts and administrative posts to monitor the implementation of the government’s annual plan and assess political developments through meetings with relevant stakeholders. It includes a presidential address to the people, organised by local authorities.

9 Who have been monopolised by Frelimo as they were heroes of the national liberation struggle led by what was at the time a broad Mozambique Liberation Front, with the abbreviation FRELIMO, that, in 1977, was transformed into the party that now uses it as its name

10 Meaning ‘Long live’ Frelimo, a slogan inherited from the liberation struggle and popularised during the one-party state era.

11 Interview with régulo Sande Canda, Marrongane locality, Ncoadala district, July, 19, 2012.

12 Régulo Mohamed Salimo, Naikulu village, Angoche district, June, 19, 2012.

13 Interview with Priest Sande Sana, Church leader in Maquival-sede, Ncoadala district, July, 26, 2012.

14 Interview with a leader at the main Assembleia de Deus church, Marrongane locality, Ncoadala district, July, 11, 2012.

15 Interview with a shop owner, Ionge locality, Ncoadala district, July, 13, 2012.

16 Interview with régulo Régulo Aly Nalua, Madal locality, Ncoadala district, August, 2, 2012.

17 Interview with régulo Naikulu Mucrua, comunidade de Nacala – Luazi, Angoche district, June, 4, 2012.

18 Interview with régulo Régulo Makhotone Said, Muluku village, Angoche district, June, 15, 2012.

19 Interview with a leader at the Baptista Union Church, Ionge locality, Ncoadala district, August, 2, 2012.
Interview with Sheik Assane Sage, Muslim church leader, Muluku village, An-гоche district, June, 29, 2012.

In Nicoadala it was argued that between the first and second elections there was a massive immigration of young people from Maputo due to the lack of jobs and these people would be RENAMO voters. Although the notion of poverty in Zambézia province is consistent with other research (Lundin 2005), the 1997 and 2007 censuses show a growing population and the difference between registered voters and those who voted suggests that although the migration argument could have symbolic value it is statistically irrelevant in explaining RENAMO’s electoral performance in Nicoadala.

It should be pointed out that all people linked to Frelimo feel that it does not make sense to speak about growing poverty when there are schools, health centres, electricity, standpipes, and so on.

Interview with a provincial permanent secretary, held on the June, 1, 2012

Os eleitos e os executivos coordenam a sua ação com os órgãos do Partido do respectivo escalão e são perante este pessoal e coletivamente responsáveis pelo exercício de funções que desempenham nos órgãos do Estado ou autárquicos (article 76, 1).

Quando se trata de cargos de âmbito nacional, os eleitos e os executivos serão responsáveis perante a Comissão Política (article 76, 1).

Interview with a district permanent secretary, held on 27, June 2012.

Interview with a district permanent secretary, held on 29 August, 2012.
Abstract
The chapter probes party institutionalisation in Mozambique as an entry point to discuss the weakness of the opposition parties. It argues that of the more than 50 registered political parties there are only three ‘effective’, namely Frelimo, which is highly institutionalised; RENAMO, which is organisationally collapsing but yet with high level of social rootedness and an institutionalizing MDM. Finally, the chapter concludes that although the opposition parties are partly to blame for their misfortunes, the nature of Frelimo’s relations with society which results in the shrinkage of political space for the opposition bears the main responsibility for the impoverishment of the opposition parties.

Key words: party institutionalization, Frelimo, RENAM, MDM, parties.
7.1 Introduction

There are few published studies on Mozambican political parties and those there are focus on elections. Studies of political parties have covered the following: the Frelimo party ideology (Brito 1988); building opposition (Manning 1998); strengths and weaknesses of multiparty democracy (Nuvunga 2005); the Frelimo-RENAMO two-party system (Carbone 2005); the Renamo-UE coalition (Kadima & Matsimbe 2006); The Movimento Democrático de Moçambique (Mozambique Democratic Movement – MDM) as a new force (Chichava 2010a) and the MDM as a new opposition party (Nuvunga & Adalima 2011). With their study ‘Parties and Political Development in Mozambique, Sitoe, Matsimbe & Pereira (2005) have, perhaps, thus far done the most systematic study of political parties in the country but with a narrow focus on the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo), Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) and the Independent Party of Mozambique (Pimo).

This suggests little scholarly interest in political parties in Mozambique, which may not be anything new on the African continent as the overwhelming majority of post-independence African polities – that of Mozambique included – embraced the path of the one-party state. Scholarly interest in African political parties and party systems only resumed in the wake of the third wave of democratisation, early in the 1990s, as many African states lifted their bans on political activity, paving the way for the mushrooming of political parties. However, many of the early studies on the continent focused on the democratisation process itself (Mainwaring, et al 1992; Diamond 1994; Nwokedi 1995; Diamond & Plattner 1999; Mohamed Salih 2001).

Nevertheless, back in the 1980s there were some systematic studies by Randall (1988) of Third World parties more generally and African political parties in particular. Randall’s concern was demarcating and characterising Third World political parties and, importantly, she initiated a trend of studies on political party institutionalisation in this part of the globe. This trend was further developed by Randall & Svåsand (2002); Mohamed Salih (2003) and Randall (2008). This chapter probes party institutionalisation in Mozambique, filling an important gap in the study of political parties and the party system in that country.
7.2 Conceptual Framework and Approach

There are several scholarly definitions of political parties (Duverger 1985; Randall, 1988; LaPalombara & Weiner 1996; Moreira 2001; Heywood 2002; Smith 2009) but a more nuanced definition is found in Mohamed Salih (2003), who defines political parties as instruments of collective human action and creatures of political elites – either politicians trying to control governments or government elites trying to control the masses. Mohamed Salih’s definition explicitly highlights the role of elites – which is essential for the present chapter and is possibly well placed to encapsulate the colourful realities of African politics.

Political parties are an integral part of party systems (Lindberg 2007), in other words, they are a central feature of pluralist polities. The implication is that the level of party institutionalisation matters most for the institutionalisation of party systems. While pointing out that institutionalised parties are not necessarily democratic – as this concept is more concerned with order and stability than democracy – Randall (2006) argues that party institutionalisation is key to the performance of citizen-related roles and to the provision of an effective opposition, the fundamental contribution parties can make to democratic consolidation.

In order better to understand party institutionalisation and its prospects in the African context, it is worth starting by looking at the origins of parties. In principle, political parties reflect the historical circumstances that contributed to their emergence. In other words, the substance of political parties mirrors the social, economic and political relations in society (Smith 2009). For instance, whereas political parties in the West emerged from parliamentary institutions, suffrage, ideological movements, unions and churches as well as civil society and social movements (Duverger 1985), most parties in the African context were created by a small political elite to contest elections in preparation for independence or were formed soon after independence, when former liberation movements turned into political parties, and, more recently, in the context of constitutional reforms in the wake of the wave of democratisation in the 1990s (Mohamed Salih 2003).

Mohamed Salih (2003), however, claims that once founded and contesting elections, African political parties have assimilated some of the institutional norms and behaviour of their Western counterparts. He points to the difference between the formalist and the substantive defini-
tion of the functions of political parties. The formalist definition allows for a generalisation of some universally assumed functions of political parties whereas the substantive approach allows for the peculiarity of African political parties – as products of the socio-economic and political culture of their respective countries – to be teased out.

Scholarly literature (Randall 1988; LaPalombara & Weiner 1996; Monga 1999; Moreira 2001; Randall & Svåsand 2002; Heywood 2002; Mohamed Salih 2003) has summarised the following formalist functions of parties in a democratic polity: representation, conflict resolution, making government accountable, institutionalising democracy and lending legitimacy to the regime. This delineation of a party’s functions corroborates the view that political parties are instrumental organisations for modern politics (Croty 1993; Lipset 2000; Randall & Svåsand 2002; Mohamed Salih 2003; Burnell 2004; Mozaffar & Scarritt 2005; Kuenzi & Lambright 2005), but, to be able to play such a role, they need to be institutionalised: firstly as organisations and secondly, in relation to society.

From a formalist viewpoint, however, African political parties are generally considered to be a weak link in the chain of elements that together make for a democratic state. Van de Walle & Butler (1999) argue that African political parties are plagued by weak organisation and weak links with the society they are supposed to represent. Randall & Svåsand (2002) take the argument further, arguing that this ‘weakness’ means that parties fail to contribute to the consolidation of democracy.

Scholarly literature (Randall & Svåsand 2002; Kopecký & Mair 2003; Mohamed Salih 2003) presents several competing explanations for the weakness of African political parties. These include their dependence on direct or indirect government resources, poverty, a background of colonialism and political authoritarianism, the tiny African private sector, which is unable to support a strong and vibrant civil society that is autonomous of the state, control of the state’s resources and personnel as a source of elite enrichment and parties as vehicles for the elite to access state resources.

The chapter is anchored in the concept of party institutionalisation. Randall (2006) notes that this concept has sometimes been used as a virtual synonym for ‘organised’. She asserts, however, that organisations are not necessarily institutions, although they may institutionalise over time and institutions can have organisational aspects and develop within organisational contexts. Huntington (1968) originated the concept as the
process whereby organisations and procedures acquire value and stability. Randall & Svåsand (2002), who have provided the most sophisticated theoretical discussion of party institutionalisation, have defined it as ‘the process by which the party becomes established in terms of both integrated patterns of behaviour and attitudes, or culture’ (p 3).

Randall & Svåsand (2002) suggest the need to distinguish internal and externally-related aspects of this process. Internal aspects refer to developments within the party itself and external aspects refer to the party’s relationship with the society in which it is embedded, including other institutions. They make it clear that party institutionalisation is a complex process and that different dimensions of institutionalisation might not be developing simultaneously or to the same extent. Building on Randall & Svåsand (2002), Basedau & Stroh (2008), who define party institutionalisation as a process in which individual political parties that participate in elections experience rising organisational stability and value, have developed an index for measuring party institutionalisation.

The above definition offers good criteria for selecting the sample, as it explicitly limits the concept to the parties contesting elections. The chapter borrows from the framework of the Index of Institutionalisation of Parties (IIP) to qualitatively assess party institutionalisation in Mozambique. The IIP is an insightful framework to build the narrative of party institutionalisation, in a context of democratisation, as it puts parties at the crossroads of the political and social spheres in society while probing critical organisational aspects of political parties and therefore offering a substantive account of the landscape of political parties as integral parts of party systems.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Dimensions of Party Institutionalisation</strong></td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Stability</th>
<th>Value-infusion</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>External</td>
<td>Roots in society</td>
<td>Autonomy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal</td>
<td>Level of organisation</td>
<td>Coherence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Basedau & Stroh (2008: 9)
For each of the IIP sub-indices, that is, roots in society, autonomy, organisational level and coherence, there are specific indicators (see table 5). Recognising that party institutionalisation is a complex process in which different dimensions of institutionalisation might not be developing simultaneously and also taking into consideration that Mozambique’s multiparty system is only 20 year old, the authors focus more on the ‘stability’ dimension of party institutionalisation both internally (level of organisation) and externally (roots in society), with the ‘level of organisation’ carrying the greater weight in relation to the conclusions presented in the chapter.

### Table 5

**Dimensions and Indicators of the Index of Party Institutionalisation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Indicators</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Roots in society</td>
<td>Party age relative to independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Party age relative to the start of the multiparty period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Changes in electoral support between last and second elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Links to civil society organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy</td>
<td>Number of alternations in party leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Changes in electoral support after alternation in party leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Decision-making autonomy from individuals and groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Popular appreciation of a particular party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation</td>
<td>Membership strength</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regular party congresses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Material and personal resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nationwide organisational presence, activities beyond electoral campaigns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coherence</td>
<td>Coherence of parliamentary group (no defection or floor crossing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moderate relations between interparty groupings (no dysfunctional factionalism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tolerance vis-à-vis intraparty dissidence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Basedau & Stroh 2008

So in the context of Mozambique with a legacy of one-party state rule which lasted for almost two decades, of widespread illiteracy in rural are-
as where most people live and widespread political intimidation in electoral epochs, it is of significant political importance that opposition political parties are at least able to achieve meaningful levels of organisation, that is to maintain operational offices and gains support from the population in the form of votes and financial means while in behavioural terms – considering that the country experienced 16-year civil war – no political party attempts to use non-democratic (respect of the Constitution) means to obtain their political goal.

The political landscape in Mozambique is dominated by Frelimo and RENAMO, both of which have military origins. Apart from these two, the landscape is also home to dozens of parties with no such origins. If, by 1994, the year of the democracy-founding elections, there were only 10 officially registered parties, rising to 26 just before the second general elections, held in September 1999, there are now about 50 political parties. Using the definition of ‘effective parties’ used by Sartori (1976), that is, main parties as well as those with coalition leverage, or the Index of the Effective Number of Parties (N) devised by Laakso & Taagepera (1979), which focuses on seat share, this chapter focuses on the ‘relevant’ parties, those with seats in Parliament, namely Frelimo, the former rebel movement, RENAMO, and the party that broke away from RENAMO, the MDM.

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frelimo</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RENAMO</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UD</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDM</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s compilation from official results published by CNE/STAE

The data was collected from desk research within political parties and the perusal of media reports and interviews, mainly with party leaders,
officials of political parties, political journalists, civil society actors, church leaders, academics. Semi-structured interviews took place mainly in Maputo city, with a few interviews held in Beira and Nampula, respectively the second and third cities of the country, between July and December 2011. While the desk research focused only on the effective political parties, namely, the ruling Frelimo, the former rebel movement, RENAMO, and the RENAMO breakaway, the MDM, the interviews covered a broader range of political parties. Analysis was detailed in the chapter IV.

7.3 Elements of Frelimo-Society Relation

The liberation struggle, and later the proclamation of independence, gave FRELIMO a source of legitimacy to claim the leadership of the country and its political project of state construction and modernisation as a Socialist People’s Republic (Lundin, 1995; Brito, 1988, 2009; Sitoe 2004; Carbone 2005; Sitoe, 2011). This Estado Novo (new state) was depicted by the historian, Newitt (1995), as having epitomised an unquestionable power over the masses and as acting according to its own reasoning. The ‘state’s reason’ and its representatives, institutions, symbols, public holidays and so on, were portrayed as virtually sacred.

Responding to grievances related to the liberation struggle and importantly informed by its Marxist-Leninist ideology, Frelimo banned the formation and activity of political parties. Frelimo’s leading role in society was shaped by its victory in the 10-year liberation struggle and particularly by the proclamation of independence in 1975 (Lundin 1995; Brito 1988; Sitoe 2004; Carbone 2005; Brito 2009). However, the emergency of RENAMO as a rebel movement spoiled the Frelimo’s historic mission in relation to the masses. Without a military victory, Frelimo had to negotiate with RENAMO which represented a major crisis within Frelimo and in relation to the masses, as it meant to admit the existence of other political groups.

Frelimo has recognised the former rebel movement as part of the Mozambican political process but more towards the international community rather than in relation to the Mozambican society as in its “rhetoric and above all, in its political practices and habitus, it accorded RENAMO no political legitimacy whatsoever (...) RENAMO remained a group of fringe elements, illiterates, assassins, and monkeys” (Cahen
1998:5) which resembles what Dorman (2006:1092) suggests to be an “exclusionary language of (former) liberation movements”. Similar to other former liberation movements, Frelimo never looked at itself as a mere political party but rather as – Schrire (2010) would say referring to the South Africa’s ANC – the ‘embodiment of the national will’.

Frelimo’s victory in the 1994 democracy-founding elections gave it the privilege of not only using history (Brito 2009) but also re-writing and appropriating the history of the liberation struggle as its own. So the FRELIMO (liberation movement) founding myths, its heroes and symbols were not only appropriated by Frelimo (political party) but were also made those of the state. Moreover, one of the key party founders and ideologists, Marcelino dos Santos, made a telling statement about Frelimo-society relations when he said ‘the history of Mozambique is Frelimo’s history’ (Noticas, 19 June 2007) and that ‘whoever stands in an election on the Frelimo ticket will be elected’ (STV May 2005). These statements reveal Frelimo’s claim to ‘own’ Mozambique’s history and society.

In a context of an embryonic and state dependent private sector, Frelimo commands the economic instruments of party control which serve to starve the opposition. So Frelimo not only has difficulties in accepting that other political groups mainly the former rebel movement, RENAMO, can mobilise support among ‘the people’ and the ‘land’ it liberated from colonial rule but also Frelimo is in control of instruments of power that makes the relationship between the opposition parties and society generally difficult.

7.4 The Landscape of Opposition Parties in Mozambique

The notion of ‘political party’ is novel in Mozambique. It entered the political vocabulary only in 1977 when FRELIMO transformed itself into a political party two years after independence. After the political abertura and the 1990 Constitution, which lifted the ban on political activity, dozens of non-armed parties emerged. They were dubbed emerging or non-armed opposition political parties, to distinguish them from the rebel movement, RENAMO, which became a political party in 1993 in the context of the 1992 General Peace Agreement (Nuvunga 2005).

Interestingly, the most outspoken parties that emerged between the introduction of the Constitution in 1990 and the first multiparty election
in 1994 were formed by or linked to personalities who had either deserted or were expelled from FRELIMO before independence. They included the Mozambique Nationalist Movement (Monamo)\(^3\), the Mozambique United Front (Fumo)\(^4\), the National Democratic Party (Panade)\(^5\) and the National Convention Party (PCN)\(^6\). Monamo and Fumo were also linked to political groups that appeared throughout the transitional government that preceded Mozambique’s independence.

The remaining parties were formed by individuals who deserted Frelimo in the 1980s for various reasons (table 7), including marginalisation and/or failure to progress in the hierarchy (Sitoe, Matsimbe & Pereira 2005); parties formed by leaders who split from RENAMO during the civil war (Unamo/Udemo); parties resulting from breakaways\(^7\) within the newly formed non-armed opposition parties (table 8) and parties set up by political entrepreneurs pursuing individual fortunes or increased personal prestige in the run-up to the 1994 elections and mainly motivated by the financial support provided by the 1994 UN Trust Fund to support parties and candidates contesting national elections\(^8\) (table 9). There has also been a strong trend towards coalitions in party structuring activity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party name</th>
<th>Founders/history</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique People’s Progress Party (PPPM)</td>
<td>Padimbe Kamate, exiled in Lisbon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique Democratic Party (Pademo)</td>
<td>Wehia Ripua, a Frelimo commander during the liberation struggle in the 1960s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique Liberal Party (Palmo)</td>
<td>Martins Bilal, a Frelimo commander in the 1960s</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ compilation
Table 8
Parties formed as breakaways within the non-armed opposition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party name</th>
<th>Founders/history</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social-Liberal Democratic Party (SOL)</td>
<td>Casimiro Nyamitambo, a breakaway from Palmo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Congress Party (Pacode)</td>
<td>Vasco Campiro Momboya, a breakaway from the PCN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist Federalist Party (Panafe, later Panamo)</td>
<td>Marcos Juma, a breakaway from Pademo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique National Union (Unamo)</td>
<td>Initiated by Gimo Phiri, a former RENAMO commander, who broke away in 1986. He disagreed with Carlos Reis and left the party, which Reis took over.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique Democratic Union (Udemo)</td>
<td>Gimo Phiri founded Udemo in April 1992 as a breakaway from Unamo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour Party (PT)</td>
<td>Miguel Mabote, a breakaway from Padimbe Kamati’s Mozambique People’s Progress Party (PPPM)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ compilation

Table 9
Parties formed by political entrepreneurs in pursuit of personal fortunes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party name</th>
<th>Founders/history</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Patriotic Action Front (FAP)</td>
<td>Jose Palaço. Founded in February 1991 by students and former students of Eduardo Mondlane University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique Independent Congress (Coinmo)</td>
<td>Victor Marcos Saene. Coinmo became the second opposition party to hold its founding congress inside the country, but there were only five delegates plus Saene’s wife and the man in whose house the couple was living.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique Independent Party (Pimo)</td>
<td>Yaqub Sibindy. Claims to be a former soldier and his deputy claims to be a RENAMO dissident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiefs and Peasants of Mozambique (Recamo)</td>
<td>Arone Fijamo in Zambézia province. Fijamo wants to restore traditional authority.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Federal Progressive Party of Mozambican Religious Communities (PPLFCRM, later PPLM)</td>
<td>Neves Serrano. He claims he previously held a senior post in the Criminal Investigation Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party for the Liberation of Mozambique</td>
<td>Joaquim Jose Nyota</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique Federal party (Pafemo)</td>
<td>Manuel Palange and President Mariano Janeiro Pordina. They claimed to have had an army, the Mozambican Federal Army, (Exefemo), in 1991, although it has never been seen.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ compilation
Ministry of Justice records suggest that there are more than 50 registered political parties but the reality of party activity is very different. As it stands, the mapping of the non-armed opposition parties suggests five major trends:

- parties that faded away after the death of their founders;\(^9\)
- ‘suitcase parties’ that retired altogether with their founders;\(^10\)
- parties that disappeared after merging with other parties;\(^11\)
- parties that succumbed to/or were co-opted by Frelimo, particularly after the 2009 general elections, with some of their leaders being granted positions as board members in public companies;\(^12\)
- party breakaways that gave birth to parties with substantial mobilisation capacity.\(^13\)

At present, there are no reliable data on how many non-armed opposition parties are still in existence, but realistically very few meet the minimum criteria for a political party.

With the exception of Frelimo, RENAMO and the MDM, The Labour Party (PT) is the most consistent as it has contested all four legislative elections to date, but with inconsequential electoral support (Annexure 6). It is followed by Pimo and SOL, with three elections each and Pademo, PAZS, PVM, Parena, PDD, Palmo, Panaoc and PECMT, with two elections each, all with negligible electoral support. Appendix 1 also shows that most of the political parties established between 1990 and 1994 did not make it to the second and third general elections. Although most had articulate leaders they were no more than platforms for political elites – mainly returning to the country from exile after it opened up politically – to participate in the political arena. Most of these elites established their parties to resolve past grievances relating to their expulsion from or marginalisation within FRELIMO/Frelimo, thus the parties did not outlast their founders.

In the early 1990s most of the non-armed opposition parties appeared to have nationwide coverage, as their leaders could move quickly across the country, but in reality they were only based in Maputo. Over time, and without any kind of financial support, the non-effective parties, with the exception of PDD and PANADE, closed their offices. They exist mainly as virtual organisations expressed in the person of the leader. Par-
ty leaders confirmed that the addresses they provide are their own homes in the outlying neighbourhoods of Maputo City.

With the exception of Pasomo, the Ecologist Party, UDF, PAREDE, PSDM and PLDM, which have supported the newly formed MDM, the overwhelming majority of non-effective parties have succumbed to co-option by Frelimo (Nuvunga & Mohamed Salih 2010).

Following their exclusion from the 2009 legislative elections the PT, PIMO, Parena, Panamo, MPD, ADACD, SOL, and PECMT declared their unconditional support for Frelimo and its presidential candidate, Armando Guebuza. In both cases, however, this support was essentially symbolic, as they are tiny parties with an inconsequential share of the vote (Nuvunga & Mohamed Salih 2010). For instance, in the 2004 general election, the PT won 0.47% of the parliamentary vote and the Ecologist Party did even worse, with 0.4%.

In 2007 the PT, PIMO, Parena, Panamo, MPD, ADACD, SOL and PECMT established the Constructive Opposition Bloc. Although the concept of a ‘loyal opposition’ is not novel to parliamentary systems, the Constructive Opposition Bloc is an odd Mozambican innovation. Since it was established, its leaders, Pimo’s Yaqub Sibindy,14 the PT’s Miguel Mabote15 and PEC-MT’s João Massango16 have been frequent guests at presidential banquets and important invitees to official state and Frelimo events, including the Tenth Frelimo Congress held in September 2012. In 2006 Pimo made a public financial contribution to the Ninth Frelimo Congress but two years later the party was evicted from its offices for non-payment of rent. With tickets provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs leaders of the Constructive Opposition Bloc toured Zimbabwe, Malawi, Zambia, China, Brazil and Sweden to explain their new model of party activity.

Overall, of the non-effective parties only the PDD conforms to the above concept of a political party. It was formed in 2004 as a breakaway from RENAMO by Raul Domingos, who had headed the RENAMO delegation to the peace negotiations in Rome and also the RENAMO parliamentary group in the first multiparty parliament. The PDD appeared on the national political chessboard displaying capacity and resources that are rare among opposition parties. It was luxuriously put together throughout the country, rivalled the two main parties and had the advantage of a leader with political management experience. Over time, however, it became clear that it was merely an instrument for its
leader to attain power. Unfortunately, its electoral failure in 2004 and the drying up of its funds withered the party’s dynamics and it is now reduced to its leader.

7.5 Analytical Narrative Of Party Institutionalisation

Using the concept of ‘effective parties’ defined by Sartori (1976), or the Index of Effective Number of Parties (N) devised by Laakso & Taagepera (1979), which focuses on the share of seats, this section looks at the ‘relevant’ parties, that is, those with seats in parliament, namely Frelimo, RENAMO and the RENAMO breakaway, the MDM. With reference to the IIP framework, these parties are analysed in both their internal (‘level of organisation’ and ‘coherence’) and external (‘roots in society’ and ‘autonomy’) dimensions of institutionalisation in light of the relations between Frelimo and society. This section uses the data from the interviews to analyse the three parties according to the various sub-indicators in each of the four dimensions of party institutionalisation.

Roots in society

Frelimo is the oldest party in the country. It was formed in 1977 as a result of the transformation of the former liberation movement – FRELIMO – into a political party. RENAMO is the former rebel movement that began fighting the Frelimo government a few years after independence in 1975 and is the second oldest party. The, formed in 2009, is the newest party. Although formally it is a RENAMO breakaway party, the MDM is also linked to the Partido de Convenção Nacional (National Convention Party – PCN) founded in 1992 by young intellectuals, including Lutero Simango, one of Uria Simango’s sons. Formally, only Frelimo existed prior to the multi-party system but RENAMO also existed substantively at that time and transformed itself into a political party to contest the democratic elections. The MDM only appeared on the eve of the country’s fourth general elections, held in 2009.

In the context of a declining voter turnout, Figure 1 shows a failing RENAMO, while Frelimo not only managed to maintain but actually increased its electoral support. Frelimo claims to have three million members, which is consistent with its average electoral support in the four elections to date. However, there have been procedural irregularities, including ballot box stuffing, orchestrated by Frelimo groups in all
elections except the first democratic elections in 1994 (Nuvunga & Mohamed Salih 2010).

Senior Frelimo figures have acknowledged the difficulty of mobilising all the party’s members and supporters to vote. For instance, in the 2011 by-election in Quelimane Frelimo won only 13 000 votes despite its claim to have 40 000 members in the town ‘… just because people felt obliged to join the party and as such they do not vote … so there are many people in the party who are not of the party’.18

As the former single party Frelimo has influence in almost all spheres of society, from the private sector and businesses to segments of civil society organisations. Frelimo is creating civil society organisations (Ronning 2010) and in some cases it co-opts leaders of civil society organisations by giving them positions in government (Guliche 2011). There are also, however, cases of leaders who use civil society organisations as platforms to project themselves publicly in order to achieve space within Frelimo.

At the time of the 1994 and 1999 elections RENAMO not only still controlled parts of the national territory it also had alliances with traditional authorities and so had a substantial electoral support base. How-
ever, with the government’s use of Decree 15/200 to co-opt traditional authorities (Forquilha 2009; Forquilha & Orre 2012) and the arrival of Armando Guebuza as the president of Frelimo and his revitalisation of the party’s grass roots, much of RENAMO’s political and electoral support base fell away (Brito 2009).

When it emerged from the bush in 1992 after the General Peace Agreement, RENAMO distrusted all cities, and Maputo, the capital, in particular, because they were allegedly Frelimo strongholds (Manning 1998; Nuvunga 2005; Carbone 2005). The distrust between RENAMO and Frelimo was such that RENAMO was unable to establish constructive relations with civil society groups. ‘RENAMO always behaved like an organisation under siege’.

While RENAMO is correct in saying that Frelimo exercises influence over civil society organisations, mainly those involved in electoral activities (Mozambique Political Process Bulletin, July 2005, p 9), its own pitiful relationship with civil society organisations is partly due to its poor strategic vision, arguably because the most vocal civil society organisations (for example, the Centro de Integridade Publica – CIP; the Observatorio do Meio Rural; the Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Economicos – IESE) are independent organisations which are labelled as pro-opposition by the government but RENAMO has failed to build on that and establish plausible relationships with them.

For most scholars (De Tollenaere 2013; Forquilha and Orre 2012; Rønning 2010, 2011; Nuvunga & Mohamed Salih 2010; Pereira 2008) this is an indication of RENAMO’s failure to make an institutional transformation from a military movement to a political party. Consequently, in the two decades of Mozambique’s democracy RENAMO has never abandoned military language. Through its attitude and behaviour, as well as constitutionally, RENAMO, as a political organisation, has always had two distinct faces: that of a legal political party with seats in Parliament and a seat on the council of state for the leader of the parliamentary party, but, at the same time, it is an armed group that claims to have hundreds of armed men at its former central military base at Gorongosa Mountain (Sofala province) and which has several times resorted to non-democratic means to achieve its goals.

In the past two years there have been press reports about RENAMO attacks on police officers. For instance, on 22 April 2011 there was a clash between the riot police (FIR) and RENAMO fighters in Maringwe,
which resulted in the death of 13 FIR officers (Da Silva 2011). On April 4, 2013 RENAMO attacked a FIR camp in Muxungue killing four FIR officers. The MDM, in turn, emerged at a time when RENAMO’s electoral performance was in sharp decline. Its leader, Daviz Simango, inflicted two local election defeats on Frelimo candidates in Beira, the country’s second city and the ‘capital’ of anti-Frelimo sentiment, and in so doing galvanised sympathy among various social groups (Nuvunga & Adalima 2011; Chichava 2010b).

The MDM’s partial exclusion from the 2009 elections agitated the country and generated waves of support within civil society. This gave the impression that the party had strong roots/relations with civil society (Nuvunga & Mohamed Salih 2010). However, the interviewees suggest that civil society organisations were against the MDM’s partial exclusion from the electoral process (Nuvunga & Mohamed Salih 2010) although people sympathised with the MDM because, in the context of a desire for political change, it had the potential to challenge Frelimo. As the MDM has only participated in one general election it is not yet possible to assess its electoral support although it did obtain an overwhelming victory in the Quelimane town local elections (see below).

In summary, as a former single party that has been in power since independence, Frelimo has roots in all segments of society in both rural and urban areas. However, it is nevertheless interesting that in a country of 10-million voters it only wins three million votes. This suggests that its roots in society have much to do with the fact that it controls the political economy of the country, which, in the case of Mozambique, means the power to determine ‘who gets what’ and is less related to party identification on the basis of ideology.

Although RENAMO has lost many of its electoral social bases, mainly the traditional authorities, it is still deeply rooted in society, mainly in rural communities. However, as the next section shows, it is approaching institutional and organisational failure, which makes it impossible for it to mobilise its voters. The MDM is growing rapidly. In its first general election, in 2009, it obtained two seats in Parliament, representing Maputo city. No other party in Mozambique has ever done this, which is telling evidence of the growing level of its support.
Organisation

Frelimo has a long tradition of holding congresses. Since it was founded in 1962 it has held 10 – the tenth being in September 2012. The party spent $8-million on the logistics of its Tenth Congress, for which it built a town. In the Mozambican context Frelimo is a wealthy party. It has a company, SPI – Gestão e Investimentos, Lda, as its financial arm. Through this company Frelimo controls important economic and financial sectors in the country (Nuvunga & Hout forthcoming). But it is mainly by controlling the state that Frelimo maintains high levels of wealth (AfriMAP 2009; MARP 2010). The state is clearly at the service of Frelimo (Forquilha & Orre 2012): many events, from congresses to election activities, take place with the help of state resources (Nuvunga 2012). With the arrival of President Guebuza in the party leadership, Frelimo has significantly improved its organisational structure along the lines of democratic centralism. From the grassroots to the top, a cell system ensures that Frelimo is highly organised and hierarchical.

With the support of the United Nations Operations in Mozambique (Onumoz), which *inter alia* had to establish a US$15-million UN-managed Trust Fund for the transformation of the former guerrilla movement into a political party, RENAMO has also built a hierarchically functional party structure, from its headquarters in Maputo to remote villages in the rural areas, mainly benefiting from its massive presence in the rural areas. Moreover, it had strong links with the international community based in Maputo. However, the internal erosion of the party from 2004 onwards, due in part to the authoritarianism of the party leadership (Forquilha & Orre 2012) and the reduction in funding because of its declining share of seats in Parliament, dictated the closure of almost all local party offices, with most of its provincial and district leaders joining the RENAMO breakaway, MDM. The only RENAMO offices that are active are those in Quelimane, Beira and Nampula, although RENAMO flags are still massively visible in the homes of their local leaders in the central and northern provinces of Sofala, Manica, Tete, Zambezia and Nampula.

… there have never been decisions ordering the closure of RENAMO provincial and district offices in the country, but in practice many of them are no longer functioning, mainly the ones in the southern region (Gaza, Inhambane, Maputo city and Maputo province). There is a logistical fac-
tor, because the reduction of the number of seats in parliament resulted in a reduction of funds for the maintenance of offices. Therefore members had to look for other alternatives instead of devoting themselves to the party. Membership contributions are not enough to maintain party offices.

RENAMO has no tradition of holding party congresses. After several postponements it held its third congress in October 2001 and for the first time it seemed that the party leader was being elected. However, what happened there had nothing to do with what is understood as internal party democracy. Three candidates ran for election: Dhlakama, Manuel Pereira and Agostinho Murrial. Whilst Pereira was best known for his threat to expel the Changana people (originally from the south) from the central and northern regions of the country, he was then not yet one of the party stalwarts. Murrial was unknown to most of the public at large (Lalá & Ostheimer 2003). This led observers to say that the internal party presidential election was a democratic façade.

This situation substantiated the suspicion that Dhlakama does not tolerate competition within the party. The expulsion of Raul Domingos in 2000 on grounds of dubious allegations was seen as an indication that Dhlakama wanted to manage the party his way. Many others were expelled from the party after revealing thinking that differed from that of the president. Lalá & Ostheimer (2003: 26), who have worked with RENAMO, argue that RENAMO’s internal party democracy frustrated most of the senior party members, mainly those who thought differently but remained silent, fearing vengeance ‘… in the long run, this stagnation of the party will cause more people [with political ambitions] to leave the party or it may lead to an internal party uprising’.

Ten years later, members abandoning the party and expulsions are a key institutional pattern within RENAMO. The victims include Daviz Simango (elected mayor of Beira on a RENAMO ticket in 2003); Maria Moreno (former head of the RENAMO parliamentary group); Luís Boavida (former senior RENAMO MP, 1994 to 2009); Manuel de Araújo (former senior RENAMO MP).

With the exception of Raul Domingos, all these people were potential key MDM leaders. This pattern has weakened RENAMO internally and externally. Internally, it has destroyed the technical capacity and cohesion to counter overwhelming Frelimo dominance and externally it has ena-
bled the creation of strong breakaway parties – firstly, the Party for Development and Democracy (PDD) and, more recently, the MDM – which have taken away much of RENAMO’s electoral and popular support, as shown in its dramatic loss of votes.

Without regular congresses important decisions (for example, the replacement of the party’s secretary general) are taken at meetings of the political committee. This was the case with the replacement of Manuel Ossufo by Momade Bissopo at a meeting held on 17 July 2012 and the replacement of Viana Magalhaes by Ossufo Momade in 2005. In its heyday, RENAMO tried to institutionalise internal structures in a form of a shadow government, consisting of 15 shadow ministers, but ten years later only the military side, namely defence and security, led by Hermínio Morais, who had been a RENAMO general during the civil war, and the ministry for veterans, led by Ossufo Momade, a RENAMO veteran of the civil war, are active. The remaining shadow ministries disappeared without delivering anything substantial: ‘... the very centralised management of the party does not allow other figures to surface ... thus the existence of a Shadow Government does not make any sense because it never holds meeting nor is it referred to,’ 23.

This situation is not new to RENAMO. Its political structure during the war was little more than an off-shoot of its military command structure (Vines 1996). It was supposedly formalised as the ‘National Council’ at RENAMO’s first Congress in May 1982. This Council was described in September 1982 as an ‘Executive Council’ comprised of 12 men with specific portfolios (op.cit). However, it was described in early 1984 as a ‘very basic structure’ (Vines 1996) in which members did not have portfolios, but were given specific tasks by the president from time to time.

The post of general secretary was abolished at the party’s second Congress in 1989, with its functions absorbed into the previously unknown presidential cabinet. In March 1983 another RENAMO structure was set up following a meeting held in Geneva. This was the ‘government in exile’, otherwise called the ‘shadow cabinet’. This structure was said to be distinct from the National Council (Vines 1996) but appears to have had little impact as it was never heard, even during the peace talks in Rome. This depiction suggests a continual moving of the goalposts, the abolition and creation of new ones, changes in the composition, and so on. While there is nothing wrong with innovating organisational struc-
tures, the more it happens the more it appears to suggest a lack of organisational consistency.

Organisationally, RENAMO is nearing paralysis. At the end of 2011 Afonso Dhakama left the capital, Maputo, going firstly to Nampula and more recently returning to RENAMO’s old main military base at Gorongosa Mountain, from where he calls for direct negotiations with the government for power sharing, ignoring the party’s representation in Parliament. While Dhlakama claimed to be in full control of the party, recent public statements of high ranking party leaders reveal that his authority is systematically disregarded in key party decisions, with the military wing prevailing over the party leader. An example is Dhakama’s return to Gorongosa. In an interview, Herminio Morais said the decision that Dhlakama should return to Gorongosa was a military, not a political one.24

In another interview, Ossufo Momade stated that ‘... RENAMO’s glorious military force will attack the capital city Maputo without authorisation of its leader, Dhlakama’25. While this may be a political and tactical strategy, it is a politically and structurally bizarre statement as it reveals a lack of internal cohesion.

In 2005 and 2009 RENAMO MPs publicly flouted Dhlakama’s authority when they took up their seats in Parliament, despite his public decision to boycott parliamentary activity, alleging electoral fraud. While Dhakama intended to show he had control over the party he shocked the public when, at a press conference in Gorongosa, he claimed to have ordered an attack on the FIR camp that had killed four policemen on 4 April 2013.

RENAMO is failing to live up to one of the key elements of the notion of a political party: contestation of elections. It has either boycotted or failed to put up candidates in recent elections. After boycotting the first local government elections in 1998, it also boycotted the by-elections in Pemba, Quelimane and Cuamba in 2011 and the by-election in Inhambane in 2012. It has also declined to take up its seats on the National Electoral Commission because of its objections to the results of the 2013 local government elections.

The MDM held its first congress in December 2012. It was well organised, with delegates coming from across the country, in an attempt to show that the party is national not regional. Although there was only one
candidate for party president, with the incumbent standing unopposed, the party held an election for its leaders, which could establish a precedent. However, the extent of internal democracy is still to be demonstrated because, as recently as 2010, its leader, Daviz Simango, usurped the powers of the congress when he dissolved the party’s political commission on the grounds that he wanted to instil new dynamism in the way the party worked, although the real objective was ‘... to remove Ivete Fernandes’...’ (Chichava 2010a: 19). At the time it was felt that Simango was using the same methods as Dhlakama.

Recent developments within the MDM following its first congress suggest a rapidly growing organisational structure. The president is the centre of power, but both the secretary general and the provincial delegates have formal positions and power. It has operational offices all over the country and holds regular press conferences. Its actions conform to the Constitution and ordinary laws, even when faced with extreme cases of political intolerance, apparently on the part of Frelimo members, such as setting fire to its offices and partisan behaviour of state institutions, including the police. For instance, after the 2012 by-elections in Inhambane MDM members were charged with political disorder and sentenced to a year in jail. Since the accused were not present at the trial the MDM, instead of hiding its members, handed them over to the court to be imprisoned.

**Autonomy**

Frelimo has had three changes of leadership in its history, but the most significant in terms of the institutionalisation of the party occurred in 2005 when Joaquim Chissano stood down and Armando Guebuza became the party leader. The significance is that the other changes followed the death of an incumbent leader so this was the first democratic leadership change within the party. RENAMO was created by André Matsangaça as a guerrilla movement. It has not held elections for its leaders and the leader has continued to ward off anyone who might oppose him.

After the leadership change Frelimo’s percentage of electoral support increased substantially, albeit with a small absolute decline in the 2004 elections (table 1, chapter I). In 2009 Frelimo received three million votes. All respondents expressed the opinion that the party had shown marked improvements in its organisation in terms of democratic central-
ism following the rise to power of President Guebuza, giving examples of such internal procedures as internal elections serving the interests of the leadership.

Former freedom fighters have veto power within the party but the leadership has decision-making autonomy. By contrast, RENAMO leader Afonso Dhlakama, with his authoritarian style, has shown that the party is as he conceived it, but he is increasingly losing power to RENAMO's growing military arm. The MDM has received considerable support from the so-called donor community based in Maputo, although they have never interfered in party affairs (Nuvunga & Adalima 2011).

The independent media, mainly the Mozambique Political Process Bulletin, have, since the first democratic elections, documented several instances of electoral intimidation by both Frelimo and RENAMO social organisations and supporters, but increasingly by Frelimo social groups and supporters (Nuvunga 2012).

RENAMO is best known to most of the world for its grotesque campaign of terror against Mozambican civilians (Manning 1998), for its status as an army of captives, and of guerrillas-turned-into-party members. It carries the stigma of the massacre of innocent people, of thwarting the consolidation of independence, of destruction of economic and social infrastructure throughout the civil war and the fact that to this day its leaders are members of the former rebel group (MARP 2010). However, it is still well regarded in the central region of the country where it originated, with its roots in the representation of anti-Frelimo sentiment (Lundin 1995; Brito 1995; Manning 1998; Tollenaere 2004; Nuvunga 2005; Carbone 2005).

However, although RENAMO projects itself as the party that fought for democracy, thus claiming the fatherhood of democracy, the loss by 1999 of the territories it controlled, the emergence of the MDM — as a breakaway from RENAMO — and the recent militarisation of the party have eroded much of its popular support, as shown clearly by its loss of vote and its political isolation. So, while Frelimo tends to attract supporters in urban areas and in the provinces in the north (Niassa and Cabo Delgado) and south (Inhambane, Gaza and Maputo), RENAMO's dwindling popular support is related to regional politics and the areas it controlled as a result of the civil war. The burgeoning MDM is expanding its party activity nationwide, but it was originally a Beira phenomenon (Nuvunga & Adalima 2011).
Coherence

The proportional electoral system based on closed lists gives primacy to political parties over members of Parliament as individuals (Nuvunga 2005; Sitoe, Matsimbe & Pereira 2005; Brito 2009). Parliamentary candidates are more concerned about pleasing party leaders than potential voters. This is reflected in the behaviour of members of Parliament who remain faithful to the party in the name of party discipline. The problem is exacerbated by the internal regulations of the Assembly of the Republic, whereby floor crossing is punished by losing one’s seat. In order to remain in Parliament the member who abandons his/her party must not join another party. This results in a high degree of coherence on the parliamentary benches, albeit with more discipline in Frelimo as it controls the country’s political economy.

Mozambican political parties never admit to the existence of internal factions. Following the departure of Joaquim Chissano and the arrival of Armando Guebuza it was clear that there were at least two factions within Frelimo, but these were never acknowledged publicly. There were instances of tension within Frelimo that gave the impression that there could be a political break, but it all ended well and the tenth congress provided a demonstration of party cohesion. This can be explained by the fact that there are no opportunities to accumulate wealth outside the party, or even to defend wealth already acquired. So it is in everyone’s interest to maintain party cohesion at all costs.

Frelimo uses its control of the economy and international employment to accommodate the various groups and thus weaken internal tensions (MARP 2010). RENAMO and the MDM do not have this facility and, in a context where the only source of revenue is the state funding for parties with parliamentary seats and the only source of patronage is the eligible places in lists for Parliament, this triggers internal conflicts in the form of disputes for scarce resources.

Dissidence and expulsions marked the formation of Frelimo. There was no tolerance in these processes, which in some cases culminated in the loss of lives (Nuvunga & Adalima 2011). But in the multiparty context, Frelimo has accepted and lives with political parties formed by former dissidents. As observed above, recent history has shown that no-one leaves Frelimo. Intolerance and power struggles led to two party-shaking expulsions from RENAMO, those of Raul Domingos and Daviz Siman-
go, which produced two opposition parties, namely the PDD and the MDM. RENAMO does not accept invitations to attend ceremonies held by other parties and does not participate in public state ceremonies, claiming that they are partisan events. In RENAMO’s language members of the other parties are ‘thieves’ (Frelimo) and ‘traitors’ (MDM) (RENAMO 2013). The MDM’s relationship with the other parties has, thus far, been cordial, for example, it invited and welcomed Frelimo party members to its first congress, held in Beira.

7.6 Conclusion

This chapter has probed party institutionalisation in Mozambique. Its starting points were, on the one hand, the theoretical understanding that the institutionalisation of parties is fundamental for them to perform citizen-related roles and provide effective opposition, the primary contribution parties can make to democratic consolidation. On the other hand, it was the empirical demonstration that African political parties are plagued by weak organisation and weak links with the society they are supposed to represent. The chapter found that the notion of ‘political party’ is something new in Mozambique, with the first party arising from the transformation of FRELIMO, the former liberation movement, into a political party.

The second wave of party formation was enabled by the constitutional reform in the wake of the democratisation process that arrived on the African continent in the early 1990s, giving birth to myriad political parties, including the transformation of the former rebel movement, RENAMO, into a political party.

The chapter also argues that the landscape of the effective parties shows a highly institutionalised Frelimo; a collapsing RENAMO, after 10 years of considerable institutionalisation; and an institutionalising MDM. Although Frelimo performs well at all levels of party institutionalisation, it is much more highly regarded as a solidly organised party in organisational terms. It is coherent and has deep roots in society, but it is not yet clear to what extent these roots would resist the test of a term in the opposition, arguably because these roots are dependent on Frelimo commanding the heights, and on the fact that it still has the state machinery at its service. RENAMO, once a serious contender for political power, has collapsed in organisational terms, but keeps considerable roots in
society, in the rural areas of the central provinces of the country. Nevertheless, it is incoherent and it is taking an unconstitutional route to reach its political goals. The MDM has proven to have strong organisational leadership and signs of considerable roots in society.

Finally, the chapter concludes that although the opposition parties are partly to blame for their misfortunes, the nature of Frelimo’s relations with society bears the main responsibility for the impoverishment of the opposition parties. Shaped by its victory in the 10-year liberation struggle and, in particular, by the proclamation of independence in 1975; moulded in the context of liberating the ‘land’ and ‘the people’ from colonial rule; commanding the heights of the political economy, enabled by economic liberalisation and politically controlled privatisation, and having recaptured the state due to democratisation from above, Frelimo’s relationship with society makes it difficult for newcomers to break in and challenge its control over the state.

Frelimo has difficulty in accepting that other political groups can mobilise support among ‘the people’ and the ‘land’ it liberated from colonial rule. Hence its efforts to thwart the ascendancy of the opposition – mainly RENAMO, but lately also the MDM. So its relationship with society makes it difficult for the opposition parties to develop.

Notes

1 Understood as the difference between the second and the most recent elections
2 A Portuguese term that has entered comparative political discourse as a description of Brazil’s gradual transition from military to elected government (Joseph 1999).
3 Monamo was founded by Maximo Dias in the then Rhodesia in 1979. Before returning to Mozambique after the approval of the Constitution in 1990 Dias lived in Portugal for many.
4 Fumo was founded by Domingos Arouca, a lawyer arrested by the Portuguese colonial authorities in the 1960s for allegedly having radio contact with FRELIMO in Tanzania. He went into exile in Portugal and said he formed Fumo in 1976. He dropped out for health reasons in 1980 years (Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin October 1993)
5 Panade was founded by Jose Massinga who had been a member of Frelimo during the independence war but became a dissident while studying abroad. He returned to Mozambique soon after independence and was appointed director of
research and personnel in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but was arrested in a crackdown on alleged CIA operations and, at an international news conference in Maputo in 1981, confessed to having been recruited by the CIA in 1975. He was never publicly tried but spent some years in jail before receiving amnesty and going into exile again years (Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin October 1993).

6 The PCN was formed by a group of intellectuals (Vasco Campira, Inacio Chire, Abel Mabunda, Bernabe Nkomo) including Lutero and Deviz Simango, the sons of Uria Simango, who was FRELIMO’s vice-president in the 1960s, was disgraced and expelled in 1970, arrested just before independence in 1975 and secretly executed some years later (Nuvunga & Adalima 2011). The abbreviation PCN was first used by Uriah Simango for a party he created in 1974 after the overthrow of Marcelo Caetano in Portugal and which was essentially challenged by the Lusaka Accord, which recognised and legitimised Frelimo as the only representative of the Mozambican people (Lundin 1995; Chichava 2010 b).

7 A breakaway group or party can be defined as one where, due to irreconcilable differences between the party’s leaders and some of its officials or members, the latter decide to resign and form another group or party. In many instances those perceived to be a threat to party leadership are purged, forcing them to form parties of their own to settle old scores. However, the circumstances that lead to breakaway groups can often be found in the nature of the African parties themselves, in particular the entrenched authoritarian and undemocratic tendencies of most parties in the region (Simutanyi 2009, p 6).

8 As part of the peace process, the United Nations Operations for Mozambique (Onumoz) established a Trust Fund to support the non-armed parties and candidates contesting the first multiparty elections. The trust provided about US$3.5-million, a little over US$200 000 for each for the 17 parties involved (Nuvunga 2007).

9 Mozambique National Union (Unamo); Mozambique United Front (Fumo); Mozambique Democratic Party (Pademo), Mozambican People’s Progress Party (PPPM); Social-Liberal Party (SOL).

10 The most notable are the Democratic Liberal Party of Mozambique (Pademil); United Congress of Democrats (CDU); Party for Liberal Progress of Mozambique (PPLM); Mozambique Nationalist Movement (Monamo).

11The PCN did not formally merge but its founding leaders left the party moribund and joined the MDM.

12The most visible are the following: the Independent Party of Mozambique (Pimo); Labour Party (PT); Ecological Party-Land Movement (PECMT) and the Mozambique Nationalist Party (Panamo).
CHAPTER 7

13 The Party for Peace, Democracy and Development (PDD) and the Mozambique Democratic Movement (MDM), both breakaways from RENAMO.

14 Yaqub Sibindy was made a member of the National Commission for Honorary Titles and Decorations and is on the payroll of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as an adviser to the minister.

15 Miguel Mabote, the leader of PT, was made a member of the board of the Maputo Transport Company (TPM) and confirmed his allegiance to Frelimo in an interview with TVM on 4 October 2012.

16 João Massango, the leader of PEC-MT, was appointed to the board of STEMA, a public company.

17 The abbreviation PCN was first used by Uriah Simango for a party he created in 1974 after the overthrow of Marcelo Caetano in Portugal. It was challenged by the Lusaka Agreement which recognised and legitimised Frelimo as the only representative of the Mozambican people (Lundin 1995; Chichava, 2010 b).

18 Interview with Professor Lourenço do Rosario, Rector of the A Politécnica University and President of the African Peer Review Mechanism, Mozambique, November, 8, 2011.

19 Interview with Reverend Dinis Matsolo, General Secretary of the Mozambique Christian Council of Mozambique, Maputo, October, 6, 2011.

20 SPI – Gestão e Investimentos, Lda was created in December 1992. According to the online news service, Canal de Moçambique, SPI has 35 entries in the company register and corporate objects that include commerce and industry through direct investment, shareholding management and financial intermediation. Canal de Moçambique also reports that SPI has partnerships with groups in Hong Kong, Kuwait, South Africa, Brazil, Portugal, China and Canada. According to the same source, SPI also has partnerships with state companies.

21 Interview with António Muchanga, former MP, Member of the Council of the State and current Spokesperson of RENAMO, August 23, 2011.

22 Interview with Eduardo Namburete, former RENAMO MP, adviser to the President of RENAMO, August 25, 2011.

23 Interview with Eduardo Namburete, former RENAMO MP, adviser to the President of RENAMO, August 25, 2011.

24 Interview with Herminio Morais, General of RENAMO during the 16-years civil war, September 26, 2011.


26 Ivo Fernandes is a former RENAMO general secretary who left the party to participate in the MDM’s formation (Chichava, 2010).
Abstract

This chapter discusses the use by Frelimo of economic instruments of party control in society. The paper argues that while privatisation in the mid-1980s enabled Frelimo members to emerge as “born again private sector entrepreneurs”, key Frelimo elites assertively entered the business sphere in the context of the power-threatening 1999 elections. This move resulted in an almost complete fusion of the state and the business sector. This mechanism is central to state capture for the enrichment of the Frelimo elites and for the partisan gain of the Frelimo party. The economic mechanisms of party control do not consist only of the capturing of lucrative business opportunities by the Frelimo party but also take the form of spoils of patronage amongst various Frelimo factions, on the one hand, and the denial of opportunities to opposition parties, on the other. While this order is problematic for broader long-term developmental goals, it is instrumentally profitable for the Frelimo elites.

Key words: Frelimo elites, Political elites, business elites, Mozambique.
8.1 Introduction

The issue of one-party dominance within otherwise (partly) democratic systems has been central to the work of various generations of political scientists (Doorenspleet & Nijzink 2013; De Jager & Du Toit 2013; Bogaards & Boucek 2010; Greene 2010a; 2010b; Bogaards 2004; Mohamed Salih 2003; Arian & Barnes 1974; Sartori 1976). In their work, themes such as historical legacy, social cleavages and fragmentation, institutional architecture of electoral systems and arrangements for executive-legislative relations, political culture have dominated the explanation of the genesis and endurance of dominant-party rule.

Looking at a prime example of contemporary one-party dominance, the Republic of Mozambique, the factors mentioned in the literature on dominant-party systems are not able to explain fully the role of the ruling Frelimo party. Frelimo has rather been exploiting its access to state and economic resources to strengthen its power base in an almost dialectical way. Faced by a deteriorating absolute electoral power base since the national elections of 1999, the party has increasingly used economic resources, which it could access due to its capture of the Mozambican state apparatus, to maintain – and, we argue, enhance – its hold on power. Frelimo’s extra parliamentary strategy has thus been a necessary complement to the political instruments that were available to it as a party holding government office, as the absence of such a strategy would have left the party almost empty handed in terms of control over society and the economy.

The history of Mozambique in the 1980s and early 1990s was witness to the implementation of a set of economic reforms and the inauguration of multiparty politics, which aimed initially to provide a strategic response to the crisis that Frelimo had been facing since, roughly, 1983, and resulted eventually in being economic instruments of Frelimo party control of society. The major challenge faced by Frelimo was the abandonment of its socialist roots and the ensuing implementation of a Structural Adjustment Programme as a starting point for economic liberalisation and particularly the privatisation of state assets. Frelimo’s 4th Congress, held in April 1983, acknowledged some of the elements of the crisis facing the regime, such as failing state intervention in the economy and the devastating civil war (De Brito 2009).
The Structural Adjustment Programme, implemented as of 1987 under the aegis of the Bretton Woods institutions, emphasised privatisation and reduction of state intervention in the economy, including the sale of state-owned enterprises. Although it represented a major crisis in Frelimo’s project of building a socialist state (Weimer, Macuane & Buur 2012), economic liberalisation, and privatisation in particular, had domestic support as well, as offering “an investment opportunity for capital accumulated during the war through corruption and the extraction of a war tax” (Castel-Branco, Cramer & Hailu 2001: 3).

The process of privatisation in Mozambique contained the potential for enhancing political control of society. In the first place, Frelimo used privatisation to accommodate inner circle groups, in particular military leaders from the 16-year civil war and former freedom fighters from the liberation struggle who had made personal sacrifices (República de Moçambique 2010; Hanlon 2004). Frelimo offered property to these people who might otherwise have blocked the ongoing reforms, including the peace process (República de Moçambique 2010; Hanlon 2004) and made them into “born again private sector entrepreneurs” (Bowen 1992: 270). In the second place, the state retained an active role in the economy, first and foremost by entering into joint ventures with international capital (Castel-Branco 2010; Pitcher 1996). To date the state owns or has a stake in about 150 enterprises, with the Institute for the Management of State Shareholdings (IGEPE)3 as the key institutional arm managing these business interests. Moreover, the state is active in the economy through oligopolistic public companies in strategic areas, for example, telecommunications, transport, electricity and water distribution, most recently manifested in the setting up of the state oil company, Empresa Nacional de Hidrocarbonetos (ENH).

It was not until 1999, in the aftermath of the power-threatening elections, that the economic instruments were adroitly put to work. This operated both at the level of Frelimo elites, who used their political positions to promote their business interests, and at that of the Frelimo party, which had set up its own holding for business, the SPI Gestão e Investimentos Lda (SPI), in 1992.

The objective of this chapter is to analyse how state power in Mozambique has been used for both the self-enrichment of Frelimo’s political elites and for Frelimo’s political gain. In so doing it focuses on the Frelimo elites, for example, the key families of the liberation struggle
and those in government, including past governments. The next section focuses on the theoretical framework on state capture and instrumentalisation of the state apparatus that informs the analysis. The third section discusses the methods used to collect the data used in the chapter. The following section contains an empirical analysis of the ways in which Mozambican political elites have started acting as business elites. The fifth, sixth and seventh sections provide an interpretation of the main strategies used by the political elites. The final section contains the conclusions of the analysis.

Instrumentalisation of the State

Sub-Saharan African states have often been analysed in terms of neopatrimonialism (Bayart 2010; Chabal & Daloz 1999; Hyden 1980). Metaphorical notions like “the politics of the belly” (Bayart 2010) and “it is our turn to eat” (Wrong 2009) present features that are relevant, but unable to account fully for the far-reaching shift from the highly principled leadership of Mozambique’s first post-independence President, Samora Machel, who argued that ‘power holders should be the first in consenting sacrifices and the last in enjoying benefits’4 to the practices of the state elites who profited from privatisation (Weimer, Macuane & Buur 2012; Sumich & Honwana, 2007; Hanlon 2004; Castel-Branco 2001; Pitcher 1996; Bowen 1992) and particularly the behaviour of Frelimo elites. Post-1999 elite practices are captured well in the statement of one of Frelimo’s founding fathers, Alberto Chipande, who claimed that “we fought for liberty and thus we have the right to become rich”5 (Weimer, Macuane & Buur 2012: 32).

State capture in Mozambique has taken the shape of instrumentalising the state apparatus, serving the interests of elites, whose practices led to the dispossession of the state for their personal enrichment (Castel-Branco 2010, 2013), and strengthening the Frelimo party machine (Weimer, Macuane & Buur 2012) while at the same time denying opposition groups access to opportunities for patronage. The concept of instrumentalisation of the state apparatus, grounded in, among others, the work of Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz (1999), refers to the intentional use of state power to undermine the formation of “Weberian”, “rational-legal” or “developmental” administrative and institutional frameworks in order to create opportunities for advancing the interests of elite groups. The concept relates to the notion of the instrumentalisation of disorder,
which emphasises the maximisation of returns for political actors in a state of confusion, uncertainty and sometimes even chaos rather than the adoption of development policies.

Apart from helping in an understanding of the behaviour of Frelimo elites in terms of the short-term incentives related to private enrichment, their strategy needs to be related to more structural considerations. The interests of the elites are connected to the fate of the Frelimo party in the sense that, in case of a weakening of the party’s grip on political power, their entrenchment in the economy would provide them with sufficient economic and financial resources to fight elections with a chance of returning to power.

Methods

As indicated in chapter IV, the analysis of the patterns of Frelimo elite behaviour towards the economy takes a two-pronged approach to data collection. In the first place, this chapter is based on information obtained from three main data sets:

- the computer-based database of the Centre for Public Integrity (Centro de Integridade Publica), an anti-corruption civil society watchdog organisation, which investigates the business interests of the political elite in search of conflict of interests and corruption;
- the ATNEIA database, which is an electronic register containing all official company registrations; and
- the (confidential) data set of business concessions awarded by the Council of Ministers (CM) between 2002 and 2012.

In order to complement the information obtained from the above-mentioned data sets, qualitative data were collected using semi-structured interviews. The analyses of the main mechanisms of elite practices of state capture in sections 5-7 take the form of case studies. We have opted for case study analysis as such a research approach allows for a detailed explanation of the multiple, and interlinked, strategies Frelimo elites have adopted in their attempts to make use of political power to establish their dominance over the economy and society. The cases that are discussed are all typical cases (cf. Gerring 2007) that have been selected as they represent, as partes pro tuto, the main practices adopted by
the Frelimo elites. The studies have been grouped in various dominant patterns of state capture that characterise the contemporary Mozambican political and economic system.

8.2 Political Elites As Business Elites

Frelimo’s political elites hold different opinions about privatisation: at least three conflicting perspectives can be distinguished. A first group of hardliners opposes privatisation on ideological grounds. Technocrats in government genuinely believe in the results of the reformist agenda: for instance, former Minister of Economic and Social Affairs, Eneas Comiche, commented in an interview that “privatization is part of the government’s defined policy for conferring greater efficiency on our companies. The state’s role is to regulate the system. The state should not be managing companies” (Pitcher 1996: 50). In contrast, a third group within Frelimo tends to perceive privatisation and corruption as offering opportunities for property accumulation. Regardless of the different opinions on the merits of privatisation within Frelimo, the reality is the people with the power to take decisions, who were at one stage wholehearted proponents of Marxist-Leninist socialist principles, have become the kings of Mozambique’s ‘jungle capitalism’ (Bowen 1992) or ‘savage capitalism’ (Hanlon 2009).

The realities of Mozambican government reflect the position put forward by Sumich & Honwana (2007: 19) that “while many members of the Frelimo elite were suspicious of elements of the transformation, it was felt that the adoption of a liberal project was the only way to end the war and retain power”. The watershed in political developments in Mozambique was brought about by the elections of 1999, which exposed Frelimo’s potential weakness and led to a fusion of political and economic spheres, with Frelimo’s political elites laying their hands on a variety of businesses. While this is not unique to Mozambique (see, e.g., Chingaipe & Leftwich 2008 on Malawi), recent dynamics show that the overlap between ‘state’ and ‘business’ – with political elites setting up firms that are licensed to do everything from civil construction to banking, using business opportunities for joint ventures in public procurement and for the exploration of natural resources – is assuming quite extreme proportions (Centro de Integridade Pública, Serviço de Partilha de Informação 10, October 2012). The database of the Centre for the Public Integrity shows that
the entire political elite of Frelimo is directly or indirectly involved in commercial activities. Interestingly, literally all interviewees failed to condemn elite involvement in such activities, because they claimed the practices did not contravene any laws.

The fusion of the state and the business sector in Mozambique has become so obvious that public debates in recent years have not been about whether Frelimo elites are involved in commercial activities but how they behave once they have access to wealth. Hanlon & Mosse (2009) have argued that Mozambique has taken on features of a developmental model, underpinned by a shift from unproductive to productive rent-seeking of the type that occurred in Brazil and Mexico from the 1940s to the 1960s. Castel-Branco (2010: 61), however, emphasises the political dominance of a small elite that has captured the state and forged an alliance with providers of foreign aid and investment. This has led to the currently prevailing pattern of accumulation in Mozambique that is predominantly extractive and characterised by “primitive non-productive accumulation based on privileged access by national elites to natural resources to form alliances with the multinationals that have interests in these”.

This web of groups, interests and levels of activity operates in a pyramidal fashion where the top of the pyramid is formed by the leadership of the country and the key families linked to the liberation struggle. Lower down are more people, who are less powerful and less influential, as is their stake. Ministers, ex-ministers and top-level public officers establish companies in their sectors of activity. The conflict of interests and the traffic of influence are the most sophisticated and committed forms of utilisation of public positions for private benefit. Examples of conflicts of interest start within the presidential family, which is known as a business family. The current President of the Republic, Armando Guebuza, was described as ‘Mr Guebusiness’ in a newspaper article published in 2012 (Mail & Guardian, 5-12 January).

Apart from the fact that Guebuza draws on his family members for the management of his commercial interests, his business empire is managed through two key holdings: INTELECT, headed by Salimo Abdula, a business partner of President Guebuza, and INSITEC, led by Celso Correia, one of the president’s main protégés (Hanlon 2009). Hanlon (2009) give a detailed account of the business interests of INTELECT Holdings and they include the following: electricity trans-
mission and equipment, telecommunications, gas, consulting, cement, tourism, construction, the sale of Tata vehicles and fisheries and shares in 10 major companies in the country and two sub-holdings, namely In telvisa, which owns four companies in the energy sector, and SF Holdings, S.A., which owns five companies including a newly created commercial bank, Banco Único. The same source indicates that INTELECT Holdings has a partnership with the state in the Mozambican Hydrocarbons Company (CMH) owning 5% of the shares, while the state owns 70%.

INSITEC is a holding company headed by Celso Correia, who, according to Hanlon (2009), used family contacts to reach the president and get his go-ahead to engineer the Mozambican government’s takeover of the Cahora Bassa Dam (Hidro-Electrica de Cahora Bassa, HCB) from the Portuguese Government. Celso Correia was elected as a member of the Central Committee of the Frelimo party during the 10th Congress in 2012. In 2007, as part of the Cahora Bassa deal, INSITEC was allowed to take over the 18% local share of the second-largest Mozambican bank, BCI-Fomento. When a US company abandoned its management interest in the northern railway in 2008, INSITEC and BCI took this over (Hanlon 2009). INSITEC’s interests include Intéllica and I-Tec, which specialise in computers and information technology. Insitec-Constroi works in construction, and Energia Capital is involved in the energy sector and bio fuels (Hanlon 2009). INSITEC won the tender for the construction of the Mpanda Nkhua hydroelectric dam (in Tete province) and has won less than transparent tenders to manage the liquidity of HCB, PETROMOC, ministries and state institutions, as well as for the construction of state buildings and airports and for road repair projects (Centro de Integridade Pública, Newsletter 16, August 2012).

Like the presidential family, the main families linked to the national liberation struggle established holdings which, in their turn, control companies that try to obtain rents in a variety of ways. An important example is the Machel family, led by Graça Machel, widow of the late President Samora Machel, and member of the Central Committee of Frelimo. The family’s key holding is the Whatana Investment Group, established in 2005, which has interests in telecommunications, logistics, the financial sector, real estate, mineral resources and the generation and distribution of electricity. Its business portfolio includes Whatana Auto (in the motor sector); the Moatize thermal power station that intends to pro-
duce and distribute electricity in partnership with the Mozambican public enterprise Electricidade de Moçambique (EDM); Whatana Fuels, which is involved in distributing liquid fuel and gas condensate in partnership with the public enterprise Petromoc E.P.\textsuperscript{11}; Vodacom Mozambique, the second mobile telephone operator in Mozambique; insurance broker Skyddo Corretora de Suguros; Whasintelec, which partnered with INTELECT Holdings for the tender to produce new car number plates for the National Vehicle Institute (Instituto Nacional de Viação, INAV). Whasintelec was created in 2009, two years after the Government Decree approving the introduction of a new type of number plate.\textsuperscript{12} More recently, Jovita Sumbana Machel, wife of Samora Machel Jr., older son of the late president, created the company Nyezi, which is active in the import, storage and distribution of petroleum products in Mozambique (Centro de Integridade Pública, \textit{Serviço de Partilha de Informação} 13, August 2013).

Ministers and senior civil servants operate in ways similar to those described above. Powerful ministers have established holdings, which, in their turn, created companies for rent-seeking activities in many sectors of the national economy. The extractive industries, and natural gas in particular, offer the best illustration of these practices. The exploration of offshore natural gas requires huge investments; optimistic estimates indicate that the production of liquefied gas may start in 2020. Frelimo political elites know that now there are no opportunities for the extraction of rents, but have been positioning themselves for the future by establishing supplier companies, which aim to provide services to the gas sector, including storage and transport of liquefied gas. Frelimo elites are preparing to enter into joint ventures with foreign companies that have capital and knowledge in this area. In exchange, political elites offer their political capital to influence decision-making.

For example, Alcinda Abreu, Minister of Environment and a member of the Frelimo party's Political Committee, has two companies in the sector: Vindigo, SA, which provides services to the mining, petroleum and natural gas sectors; and South Oriente, SA, which has interests in the extractive sector and aims to establish Orient Africa Resources Co., Limited in partnership with a Chinese company to create Orient Africa Resources Co., Ltd. (Centro de Integridade Pública, \textit{Serviço de Partilha de Informação} 13, August 2013). This is a clear conflict of interest, since the ministry is responsible for issuing licences relating to environmental im-
pact that are prerequisites for starting gas exploration operations. Further, the Sumbana family – involving Fernando Sumbana, Jr., Minister of Youth and Sports, former minister of Tourism and former Director of the Centro de Promoção de Investimentos and António Fernandes Sumbana, Minister in the President’s office – created Galana Distribution Moçambique, SA which is active in the production, refining and distribution of petroleum and in chemical products.

In 2013 a group of top Frelimo cadres established Quionga Energia, SA, which is actively involved in the storage and transportation of gas. Among these officials are Alberto Chipande, a veteran of the party, who fired the first shot in the national liberation struggle, former Minister of Defence, member of the Frelimo Party Political Commission and member of the Standing Committee of the Assembly of the Republic; Raimundo Pachinuapa, veteran of the armed struggle and member of the Political Committee of Frelimo and main advisor to the President of the Republic; Lagos Lidimo, former Chief of the Armed Forces of Mozambique; Abdul Magid Osman, former Minister of Finance; and lawyer Abdul Carimo Mohamed Issá, former judge and Member of Parliament (África Confidencial 2013:8). Another such example is the company Conjane, Limitada, the owners of which are Frelimo’s Political Committee member and Minister of Agriculture, José Pacheco, Maputo mayor David Simango, and former minister of Public Works and Housing, Felício Zacarias. Conjane increased its interests in the extractive sector through the constitution of Regius Diamonds, Limited and Mavui Diamonds, Limited, which added to the company’s prior interests in Afriminerals and Mozvest Mining (Centro de Integridade Pública, Serviço de Partilha de Informação 13, August 2013).

Conflicts of interest related to rent-seeking opportunities are not limited to extractive industries but are characteristic of the domains of state activity. For example, Tobias Dai, ex-Minister of National Defence and brother-in-law to the President of the Republic, established Necochaminas, Limited in 2011. The firm’s main activities are various forms of anti-mining activities, including the procurement and sale of demining equipment and the outsourcing of demining activities within and outside the country. Filipe Nyussi, Minister of Defence from 2005 to 2014 and the current Frelimo presidential candidate, together with a group of partners established SOMOESTIVA (Sociedade Moçambicana de Estiva, S.A.R.L.) for handling cargo onboard and outside vessels while he
served as CEO of the public company Portos e Caminhos de Ferro de Moçambique that is responsible for railways and sea transportation (Centro de Integridade Pública, Serviço de Partilha de Informação 13, August 2013). Other examples include the company Faumil, Lda established by generals in the Ministry of Defence, for the supply of military uniforms and other equipment to the Mozambican army. Moreover, INUPOL, Ltd., run by generals in the Ministry of Home Affairs, supplies uniforms and other equipment to the Mozambican police.

Apart from the aforementioned groups, civil servants in top positions in the public sector operate as businessmen along with their public function. IH - Investimentos and Hidrocarbonetos, Limitada and Sociedade de Desenvolvimento e Hidrocarbonetos, S.A.R.L (SDH) link senior-level civil servants and former ministers of the three institutions of the extractive industry sector, namely the Ministry for Mineral Resources (MIREM), the National Hydrocarbons Company (ENH) and the Mozambican Hydrocarbons Company (CMH). IH was founded in 2007 by top officials from ENH\(^1\)\(^4\), top officials of MIREM\(^1\)\(^5\) and two former ministers\(^1\)\(^6\) with strong links to the CMH. SDH was established in 2004 by the same ENH staff who founded IH in 2007.

The pattern described above is not only present at the national level but is replicated at the level of the provinces. Going back to the early 1990s, the time of the state-owned companies, managers created private companies which were active in the very domain that was part of their professional mandate. For example, the Sociedade Milamor, Limitada was established in Tete Province in 1991, by the then Director-General\(^1\)\(^7\) of the state-owned National Coal Company (Companhia Nacional de Carvão de Moçambique, CARBOMOC). In 1998 this Director-General was charged with the responsibility of leading the clearing committee of CARBOMOC, which, among other powers, had full powers to sell its assets.

This section has shown that instead of promoting a private sector which is distinct from the state, Frelimo political elites have taken over the economic realm as “born again entrepreneurs”. This practice has reduced their incentive to strengthen the state machinery in order to have it perform its regulatory and oversight functions. The current state of affairs is instrumentally profitable to the Frelimo elites but problematic for broader developmental goals, as the same group of people needs to serve both public and private interests. Moreover, this situation restrains
access of opposition political parties to economic opportunities. Ultimately, the overlapping membership of the political and the business elites is an instrument of political control, and perpetuates the existence of the uneven playing field that renders access for opposition groups to economic opportunities virtually impossible.

8.3 ‘Dispossession of the State for Private Gain’

The Frelimo party is organically entrenched in the state to the point that one of its founders even claimed “ownership of the state” (Weimer, Macuane & Buur 2012). As argued above, instead of making reducing the state’s grip on the economy, Frelimo strengthened the role of the state in the economic sphere. This section discusses various cases in which state capture led to the dispossession of the state for private gain by Frelimo political elites with commercial interests. These cases go beyond corruption – which is usually defined as the abuse of public office for private gain (Klitgaard 1988) – as they demonstrate a systematic transfer of public assets to the holdings or companies that are owned by Frelimo political elites or in which these elites participate. It is not about traffic of influence in public tenders but rather about a carefully elaborated way of transferring public property into private hands.

In the case of Mozambique, state capture for distributional purposes is facilitated by the lack of transparency and absence of strong accountability mechanisms in a context where power is concentrated in the executive branch of government, headed by a president who, apart from his presidential duties, is also a businessman (Mail & Guardian, 5-12 January 2012; Mosca 2009, 2011). This section presents four cases of the dispossession of the state for private gain. These are so-called typical cases (Gerring 2007: 91), which were selected because they represent a broad set of methods of dispossession of the state. They were selected from the dataset of the Centre for Public Integrity and from the dataset of the Council of Ministers. The cases provide the opportunity to generalise analytically in that the practices found in each are likely to be found irrespective of the sector.

Case 1: Investment for the manufacturing of Matchedje vehicles

In 2011 a group of Chinese investors initiated contact with the government of Mozambique (GoM) for the establishment of an assembling
company in Mozambique of the Matchedje vehicle brand. Their plan was received enthusiastically by the GoM, which immediately established a multi-sector technical team\textsuperscript{20} to provide institutional assistance to the consortium,\textsuperscript{21} (Matchedje Motor L\textit{d}a),\textsuperscript{22} which pledged to invest approximately $200-million. According to the business registration certificate of the consortium it appeared to have capital of no more than 20,000 meticais (about $800). The certificate for the implementation of the project was awarded by the Special Economic Zones Office (Gabinete das Zonas Económicas Especiais, GAZEDA) on 23 December 2011, in the form of an isolated free zone.

While it failed to meet the basic criteria for the approval of investment (i.e., the availability of an industrial and business project, a single tax identification number; a single number for the legal entity, and certification of financial availability and an environmental impact assessment study) the project was approved by the Mozambican authorities,\textsuperscript{23} who claimed that it was in the state’s interest to do so. Investors formulated two important demands. The first was a concession to the shipyard of the Mozambican Railway Company (\textit{Caminhos de Ferro de Moçambique}, CFM), a public company, located at Machava Administrative Post (Maputo Province), for the establishment of the factory. Interviewees indicated that ‘by higher order’, CFM accepted the request, at no cost. In exchange for the concession, Matchedje Motor L\textit{d}a agreed to build a plant in the adjacent area, where CFM could store its machinery and other equipment, which until then had been installed in its pavilions.

The second condition was that the brand would be adopted as the official vehicle of the state. Interviews indicated that an agreement was reached on this issue. The company imported some materials, but nothing else was seen or heard about these investors. At the time of writing, CFM is still without its shipyard and its equipment is left outside, exposed to the weather. Interviewees were unable to explain why the investors did not use the adjacent place to construct their own facilities. There is no clear indication of who the Mozambican shareholders of Matchedje Motor L\textit{d}a are, as the official registration of the joint venture omitted this information. Interviews at the Ministry of Industry and Trade suggest, however, that they are “high level” links to former Prime Minister Aires Aly, who was removed from office in 2012.
Case 2: The Portos do Norte

The Nacala Corridor in northern Mozambique provides the railway link between the strategic Nacala Port to Tete and Niassa provinces and the neighbouring country of Malawi. This is strategic infrastructure both for the shipment of Tete coal and for serving the billion-dollar natural gas projects at the Rovuma Basin. In 2000 the government of Mozambique (GoM) established the Northern Development Corridor (Corredor de Desenvolvimento do Norte, CDN) and registered an investment of about $61-million at the Investment Promotion Centre (Centro de Promoção de Investimentos, CPI) for the management of the Nacala Port and Railway. At the time, the CFM, as a public company, held shares worth 51% of the capital, while the remaining 49% was held by the Nacala Development Society (Sociedade de Desenvolvimento de Nacala, SDN), a foreign investment company. SDN sold its shares in 2008 to the Commercial and Investment Bank (Banco Comercial e Investimento, BCI) and to INSITEC, which were both owned by Celso Correia (see the previous section; cf. Weimer, Macuane & Buur 2012; Hanlon 2009).

In 2012 CDN sold the management of Nacala International Port to a consortium, Portos do Norte, only to retain the railway. CFM and a group of Mozambicans own 15% of Portos do Norte. It is not only unclear how CFM was reduced from being a majority shareholder in CDN to a minority shareholder in Portos do Norte, but also how CFM could simultaneously act as a seller (as at the date of the events it held 51% of CDN) and as a buyer (Portos do Norte). Moreover, the identity of the group of Mozambican shareholders (individual shareholders and small consortiums) in Portos do Norte is not known, as they have been omitted from the Portos do Norte’s registry in the Republic’s Official Gazette, Boletim da República. Interviews with civil servants at the Office of the Prime Minister produced two observations that substantiate that the shareholders were powerful members of the Frelimo political elite. First, the Portos do Norte consortium was established in October 2012 in the form of a public-private partnership within the Council of Ministers to take over management of the strategic activities, which are worth billions of dollars, while the terms of the takeover were kept secret. In addition, only top political elites have the power to ensure that the Boletim da República is printed without the names of Mozambican shareholders.
Case 3: Sale of the Textile Factory Riopele Mozambique

The textile factory Riopele Mozambique, located in Maputo Province, which was out of business for many years, has recently been sold by the Instituto de Gestão das Participações do Estado (IGEPE) to INTELEC Holdings, which is headed by a business partner of the president, Salimo Abdula (see above). Talking to journalists after the signing of the “sale” agreement, the CEO of IGEPE refused to disclose the sum involved in the deal, although he stated that it was a symbolic amount. In addition, the GoM awarded Riopele the status of free zone, in particular giving it a special regime of fiscal and customs exemptions. The example illustrates how state propriety is “sold” at a symbolic price, and in addition, a “subsidy” is given through the concession of the statute of free zone to a company linked to the presidential family. This is de facto expropriation of state property, which leads to the sacrifice of public interests by undermining areas for taxation in favour of private business interests.

Case 4: The Estradas do Zambeze Public-Private Partnership

In 2010, following the construction of the strategic bridge named after the late President Samora Machel over the Zambezi River, linking the provinces of Sofala and Zambézia in central to for build another bridge over the Zambezi River and the adjacent roads for the company Estradas do Zambeze, SA. It was claimed that this concession would involve no cost for the state, as all work would be done for the account of the operator. This company would cover its investment basically from the toll levied at the Samora Machel Bridge, which started charging on 1 August 2012.

As part of the Estradas do Zambeze, SA joint venture, the company Infra Engineering Mozambique, S.A.R.L. harbours the interests of several members of the political elite. Among those involved are: Fernando Sumbana, former Minister of Tourism and current holder of the position of Minister of Youth and Sports; Fernando Sumbana Júnior, who occupied the position of Director of the Investment Promotion Centre in the 1990s; the former Minister of Defence and brother-in-law of the President of the Republic, Tobias Dai; and General Raimundo Pachinuapa, veteran of the national liberation struggle, member of the Frelimo Political Committee and main advisor to the President of the Republic (Centro de Integridade Pública, Newsletter 16, August, 2012).
Interviewees at the Roads Fund (the state department responsible for road financing) were unanimous in their view that the toll gate on the Samora Machel Bridge, which was transferred to Estradas do Zambeze, SA, was the one that brought in the most revenue to the Roads Fund. A senior staff member of the Roads Fund said the government had transferred into private hands its “chicken with the golden eggs.” This transaction is an example of how public-private partnerships are increasingly being used by the national political elite as an instrument to transfer the property and sources of state revenue to private businesses in an apparently “legal” way, that is, without any corruption (Centro de Integridade Pública, Serviço de Partilha de Informação 15, Setembro de 2013).

The four cases have succinctly presented the elements of different instruments used by Frelimo elites for the dispossession of the state to the benefit of private actors. The ill-functioning mechanisms for checks and balances make it possible for public companies such as CFM not too publish their accounts or submit their financial statements to the National Assembly. Moreover, the Frelimo-dominated Assembly lacks the incentive to insist on meaningful accountability from the executive (CIP, Newsletter 1, 2007). In this context, public companies are easily used as the ‘piggy banks’ of Frelimo elites. The common element of the four cases is that they lay bare the inbuilt economic instruments for party control and show that patronage gains through these mechanisms are only given to Frelimo comrades and are denied to opposition groups. Perhaps more indirectly, the economic instruments foster Frelimo party unity: while in the past there were different factions, with some supporting and others opposing privatisation, nowadays almost all Frelimo elites are linked by a complex set of business connections and these tend to reduce the risk of split-offs from the party that could threaten its internal cohesion.

8.4 ‘The State As A Hunting Dog’

Previous sections have shown that Frelimo political elites have been transformed into business elites and that state property is being dispossessed for private gain in multiple ways. The state is not, however, only dispossessed, it is used as a broker for the businesses of the Frelimo elites (Castel-Branco 2013). The evocative title of this section was noted in several informal conversations with a former prime minister and two
former CEOs of public companies, who metaphorically compared the role of the state in promoting the business of the political elite to that of a “hunting dog” for a hunter. This pattern was observed in the institutional set up of the state involvement in the oil and gas sector. While in the mining sector Frelimo elites are seeking to play a direct role through owning mineral and coal licences, their focus in the oil and gas sector – given the scale of financial resources required – is on logistics and supply, or, in other words, the creation of a supportive infrastructure sector.

For a developing country such as Mozambique, which had an aid economy for a long time (Hofmann 2013; Weimer, Macuane & Buur 2012; Castel-Branco 2010; Nuvunga 2007; De Renzio & Hanlon 2009), the discovery of natural resources enables it to gradually reduce its aid dependence by drawing revenue from the extractive industry. Yet, in view of the cases discussed above overall management of the oil and gas sector is problematic. Governance issues include a lack of transparency as contracts are not publicly available and the state oil company, Empresa Nacional de Hidrocarbonetos (ENH) neither makes its accounts public nor submits them to Parliament. Moreover, Parliament is not informed about the developments in the sector, the regulatory entity and the business arm of the government are under the control of the same ministry, excessively generous contracts are concluded with multinational companies (Centro de Integridade Pública, Serviço de Partilha de Informação 7, May 2013), and fiscal incentives (Centro de Integridade Pública, Serviço de Partilha de Informação Edição Fevereiro 2013; Castel-Branco 2010) that are given to multinational companies are withheld from local medium and small companies (Castel-Branco 2013).

This section aims to show that the state is strategically positioned as a business facilitator and retains a direct involvement in businesses, which makes it possible for it to transfer state assets into private hands in a non-transparent manner. At the centre of the architecture is the state oil company, ENH, amidst a conglomerate of public business firms. One of ENH’s subsidiaries, the Empresa Nacional de Hidrocarbonetos-Logistics (ENH-L) has surfaced as the key mechanism for problematic and non-transparent transactions. ENH-L aims to (i) establish national companies delivering specialised logistic services; (ii) promote sustainable growth of logistic operations through the establishment of long-term contracts with operators; and (iii) become the main logistics vehicle for the operations
of the petroleum industry, representing the various stakeholders in the service delivery process.

These objectives are to be realised in the context of the Petroleum Act, article 19.2 of which determines, with a view to maintaining ‘local content’,\textsuperscript{32} that “foreign or non-resident individual or corporate entities delivering petroleum-related services should be associated to or establish joint-ventures with Mozambican individuals or corporate entities, in line with the regulation”. While the Act has this abstract character, interviews with two high officials at the Ministry of Mineral Resources indicated that the Act has established the monopoly of ENH-L so that it is able, as part of its objectives specified in article 19.2, to facilitate contact between the national business sector and foreign suppliers. While the argument behind “local content” would seem to emphasise the development of local businesses, the monopolistic position of ENH-L has turned out to be problematic and a prelude to the transfer of public assets to private hands because of the lack of transparency and effective accountability mechanisms.

Two important examples suggest that the positioning of the ENH-L is intended to facilitate the transfer of state assets into the private property of the political elites. The first case is the award without a public tendering procedure of the contract to build and manage Pemba’s port infrastructure for the liquefaction of natural gas in the northern Cabo Delgado province by the Sociedade Portos de Cabo Delgado, SA (PCD) to ENH Integrated Logistics Services, SA (ENHILS).\textsuperscript{33} The ENHILS consortium consisted of the following shareholders: ENH Logistics, ENH Rovuma Area 1 (also a subsidiary of the ENH)\textsuperscript{34} and Nigerian Orlean Invest Holding Lda\textsuperscript{35}. Ownership of PCD is shared between ENH and Mozambique Railways, which both have 50 per cent of the shares. This implies that PCD, which was created by resolution 18/2013 of the Council of Ministers, and is partly owned by ENH, awarded a contract worth $150 million to the ENHILS consortium, which is partly owned by ENH-L, a full subsidiary of ENH.

ENHILS was a tailor-made consortium established in March 2014 only to take over this project in April 2014. ENHILS clearly follows the Angolan footsteps, in that the consortium is the Mozambican version of Angolan SONILS (Sonangol Integrated Logistics Services), in which the Nigerian Orlean Invest Holding Ltd also participated through its subsidiary INTELS (CIP, Transparencia 3/2014, April). Regardless of the poor
record of the Nigerian Orlean Invest Holding Ltd (Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 2010), the problematic aspect is that 20 percentage points of the 51% owned by ENH-L in the ENHILS will be sold to nationals once the Pemba Port Infrastructure Logistics is completed (CIP, Transparencia 3/2014, April). The developmental objective of this intended action may easily be frustrated by the lack of transparency, as many previous transactions of this kind make clear.

The second example of the potential transfer of state assets into the hands of the elites is the acquisition of land tenure, in the form of a Right of Utilization of Land (DUAT) by a subsidiary of the ENH, the Rovuma Basin LNG Land, Limitada, which was later passed on to the private company, Anadarko. The 2006 licensing round for the Rovuma Basin concessions contained four main areas, which were awarded to four petroleum firms: American Anadarko, Norwegian Statoil, Malaysian PETRONAS and Italian ENI. As far as equity is concerned, Mozambique’s state oil company owns a 15% share in the area awarded to Anadarko and 10% in the other three areas. In order to start the offshore natural gas liquefaction project onshore facilities will be needed in the form of a DUAT. Currently, an area of about 7,000 hectares, used by 733 households, is being claimed by Anadarko.

The issuance of a DUAT requires an Environmental Impact Assessment Study (EIAS) as a condition sine qua non. Anadarko commissioned an EIAS and, with the draft in hand, organised the required public consultation in Maputo in September 2013. Anadarko’s EIAS was criticised on methodological grounds and it was in the heat of the public debate that Anadarko stated that it had had the DUAT even before the EIAS was completed (Notícia SEK, September 2013). Anadarko claimed that it had obtained the DUAT through ENH’s subsidiary, the Rovuma Basin LNG Land, Limitada, established in November 2012. The Rovuma Basin LNG Land, Limitada is alleged to have held the DUAT since 2012 leased it to Anadarko (Notícia SEK, September 2013).

Legal issues were raised not only in relation to this operation, but also about the claims made by the Rovuma Basin LNG Land, Limitada that it had obtained a DUAT, while it was unable to present any supporting documentation of the process (Notícia SEK, September 2013). Clearly the company was set up as a state company to cover up the problematical transactions surrounding the issuance of the DUAT for Anadarko.
These two cases suggest that instead being empowered to perform its regulatory function, the state is not only being expropriated in favour of the elites and their private interests, it is also brought in to intervene with its authority to deal with the adversaries encountered in business transactions. It is doubtful that this is a developmental model, rather it is an order that benefits Frelimo elites at the present moment. With this happening, there is no clear incentive to set the governance of the sector right for broader development of the country in the future. In the “short-term view” and “micro-perspective” of the Frelimo elites such practices may nevertheless is “justifiable and instrumentally profitable” (Chabal & Daloz 1999: 147) as, apart from their self-enrichment, it serves to keep the opposition at bay and maintain party unity.

8.5 ‘But Never Forget the Party’

The strategies adopted by Frelimo that were discussed in earlier sections proved effective because the party controls the state on the basis of its electoral victories and those of its presidential candidates. In addition, Frelimo is strengthened financially by engaging in commercial business. Although Frelimo established its holding, the SPI Gestão e Investimentos Lda (hereafter ‘SPI’), as the financial arm of the party in 1992, it was only after the 1999 election that it was thoroughly involved in business, as part of a triumvirate consisting of the party, Frelimo elites and the state. Frelimo elites wanted to establish a situation where the party would be able to survive financially even if it lost its grip on power. Even more importantly, the elites wanted Frelimo to maintain a position of strength from which to contest the following elections with a chance of returning to power. The examples presented in this section show how the Frelimo party is brought into its business activity. The choice of cases for this section was dictated by pragmatic reasons, among them the availability of data.

The main pattern of Frelimo activity is to provide opportunities to the companies associated with the SPI. In 2008 the SPI joined forces with foreign capital to set up Maguezi Power, S.A., which sells electricity and provides services to the public company Electricidade de Moçambique. In December 2010 the SPI joined a consortium with Vietel, a Vietnamese company, to form Movitel, which submitted a bid that won the tender for the country’s third mobile phone licence alt-
In a similar vein, the Council of Ministers’ Committee for External Economic Relations decided to approve, by Decision no. 4/2008 of 11 June 2008, the construction of 1,600 mechanical boreholes in the provinces of Nampula and Zambézia, for a contract of $20-million granted to Africa Drilling Company, Lda. The shareholders of this company include Frelimo’s SPI, Frelimo veteran Alberto Joaquim Chipande through Agro-Indústria de Cabo Delgado, Limited, as well as the companies Faumil, Limited and INUPOI, both linked to high-level military and police generals.

Similarly, public-private partnerships for the construction, operation and maintenance of the Tchobanne Railway Road and the construction and maintenance of the Coal Harbor Terminal – approved by Resolutions no. 53/2011 and no. 54/2011 of 4 November of the Council of Ministers – turned out to be in favour of the company Bela Vista Holdings, SA, with the SPI holding 15% of the shares in the joint venture. Earlier, in 2005, the Mozambican government had awarded, through an international public joint venture, the non-intrusive inspection service in the country’s harbours and borders, resorting to scanners which belonged to a private company, Kudumba Investments Ltda. At the time it was shown that the awarding of the business to Kudumba was influenced by business interests linked to the political elite (Centro de Integridade Pública, Newsletter, Edição nº 2, September-December 2007).

Kudumba was not eligible for the tender because it had a clear conflict of interest due to its importation of commercial goods and because it did not present a competitive financial offer. The fact that the SPI is one of the major shareholders in Kudumba meant a lot at the final decision-making stage (Centro de Integridade Pública, Newsletter, Edição nº 2, September-December 2007). The vast list of SPI businesses extends to the extractive industry, where, according to Mozambique’s mining cadastre, it holds at least about seven mining prospection and exploration licences. The list includes interests or shares in important public companies (Petróleos de Moçambique, which imports oil products; Hidroelétrica de Cahora Bassa, which produces electricity from the Zambezi power dam; and the Empresa Moçambicana de Seguros, the state insurance company) as well as companies with a state participation.

This implies that Frelimo’s SPI is entrenched in lucrative businesses. While this is not unique to Mozambique, the case of the Frelimo party is stark and it is part of an order which is “justifiable and instrumentally
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profitable” (Chabal & Daloz 1999: 147) for the Frelimo elites. The background to this is that the Frelimo government is reluctant to promote a broad-based policy for the funding of political parties. The current situation is quite restrictive since it provides only electoral and party funding to those political parties with parliamentary representation – this is a situation that favours Frelimo as it has more than a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly.

8.6 Conclusion

This chapter has argued that the crises facing Frelimo rule in Mozambique have stimulated the party to use economic instruments to strengthen its control of society. A major instrument that was described was the use of privatisation for the accommodation of Frelimo inner circle groups that could otherwise have blocked the reforms – this privatisation has enabled senior Frelimo leaders to emerge as “born again entrepreneurs”. Though this, the nascent private sector was organically linked to Frelimo. Another instrument was the maintenance of the active role of the Mozambican state in the economy, through using joint ventures with international capital and through oligopolistic public companies in strategic areas.

The crucial elections of 1999, which displayed Frelimo’s vulnerability, not only spurred on the vigorous use of these instruments, they also facilitated the grafting of a new modus operandi involving key Frelimo elites. After this watershed, not only did Frelimo elites actively use their political power to promote their businesses for self-enrichment, they also gave lucrative opportunities to the Frelimo party machinery. They did this in order to anticipate a potential weakening of Frelimo’s grip on political power, so that they would have sufficient economic and financial capacity to fight elections with a chance of returning to power.

Regardless of the initial divergences within Frelimo over privatisation, the entire political elite of Frelimo is currently directly or indirectly involved in commercial activities. Rather than promoting a private sector distinct from the state, with the latter empowered to perform its regulatory function, Frelimo political elites have virtually taken over the economic realm. Although this may be justifiable and instrumentally profitable for the short-term objectives of the Frelimo elites, this pattern is not only problematic for broader developmental goals, it is also detrimental
in political terms as it results in severely limited access of opposition political parties to economic opportunities.

The above implies that not only is there an overlap between “state” and “business”, leading to a competition between public and private interests, but also that government office has been instrumentalised, resulting in the dispossession of the state for private gain. Four typical cases were used to unpack these instruments. The cases showed the economic instruments for party control of society. It was argued that patronage opportunities offered by these mechanisms were not only denied to opposition groups, they were used to promote Frelimo party unity as they have an impact on the possibility of party breakaways or dissidence that would weaken the party.

This chapter has indicated that the Mozambican state is not only dispossessed, it is also used to serve the businesses interests of the Frelimo elites. By focusing on the case of the Empresa Nacional de Hidrocarbonetos (ENH), the chapter showed that the state is strategically positioned as business facilitator and has become directly involved in business transactions, which facilitates a lack of transparency in the transfer of state assets into private hands. What this shows is that the state is not only being expropriated in favour of the elites, it is also brought in to use its authority to deal with the problems encountered by business leaders. We raised serious questions about whether this can be understood as a development model, as it is, rather, an order that is profitable for the Frelimo elites at the present moment. The practices highlighted in the chapter illustrate the ‘short-term view’ and ‘micro-perspective’ of the Frelimo elites, which also lead to their reluctance to address the issues of funding of other political parties and, broadly, the functioning of Mozambique’s party system. The approach adopted by the Frelimo party seems to be oriented mainly to maintaining access to financial resources to continue winning elections.

Notes

1 This is a revised version of a paper that was presented at the Social Science for Development Conference, Stellenbosch University, 28 October-1 November 2013. We thank the participants in the conference for their constructive comments.

2 Law 5/87 of 19 January and Decree 10/87 of 30 January 1987 established a framework of incentives to Mozambican private investors, followed by the Regu-
lations on Direct Foreign Investment, approved by Decree 8/87 of 30 January 1987.

3 IGEPE was created by Decree 46/2001 of 21 December, with its own legal personality and autonomous management, budget and assets.

4 In Portuguese, “Os dirigentes devem ser os primeiros nos sacrifícios e os últimos no benefício” (our translation).

5 In Portuguese, “lutamos pela liberdade e portanto temos o direito a enriquecer” (our translation).


7 Valentina, Armando, Ndambi, Norah and Mussumbuluko, nephews Miguel and Daude, brother-in-law and former defence minister Tobias Dai, Dai’s cousin José Eduardo Dai and sister-in-law Maria da Luz Guebuza.

8 Described as ‘One of Guebuza’s business front men’ (Mail & Guardian 6 January 2012), Salimo Abdula was a member of Parliament at the time when Armando Guebuza was the head of Frelimo’s bench in Parliament. In an interview with the Frelimo-linked weekly, SAVANA (23 October 2009), he stated that he was proud of being the business partner of Mr. Armando Guebuza, not of the President of the Republic.


11 Canal de Moçambique, 3 August 2011, pp. 4-5.

12 Canal de Moçambique, 3 August 2011: 4-5.

13 The CPI is subordinated to the Ministry of Planning and Development and aims to attract and retain direct domestic and foreign investment to boost economic growth and wealth creation, including the promotion of public-private partnerships for economic and infrastructure development in order to foster inclusive social and economic development in Mozambique (http://www.mpd.gov.mz/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=63:cpi-centro-de-promoção-de-investimento&catid=48:instituições-tuteladas&Itemid=79&lang=en, accessed when on the 10 of June 2013).

14 Administrator Paulino Gregório, former Administrator Victor Julien, Petroleum engineer (technical advisor) Guilhermino Fortes and current Head of the Legal Department Iolanda Matsinhe, who, for many years, was Secretary of the General Assembly of CMH, a company dominated by ENH and by the Mozambican State. Another figure less linked to the ENH and associated to private companies, IH and SDH, is Issufo Dauto Anuar Abdula. Issufo Abdulá is former CEO of ENH and also former Administrator of the Companhia Moçambicana de
Hidrocarbonetos (CMH), a limited company under private law, 70% of which is owned by ENH and 20% by the Mozambican state.

15. Afonso Samuel Sansão Mabica, Inspector-General of MIREM, Marta Vieira Jacob Pecado, Head of MIREM’s Human Resources Department, and Benjamim José de Samussone Chilenge, National Director of Planning and Development at MIREM. Benjamin Chilenge is Coordinator of the Coordination Committee of the Transparency Initiative at the Extractive Industry in Mozambique (ITIEM). From 2007 to 2009, he was CMH Administrator and one of the SDH partners, together with a number of his sector colleagues at ENH. Afonso Mabica and Marta Pecado are, respectively, member of the Supervisory Board and Secretary of the Assembly General of CMH.

16. These are John William Kachamila, former combatant in the National Liberation War and also former Minister of Mineral Resources (from 1987 to 1994) and Minister for the Coordination of Environmental Action (2000 to 2004) and currently CEO of CMH, and Ussumane Aly Dauto, former Minister of Justice, former MP of the Assembly of the Republic and current President of the Fiscal Council of CMH.

17. Luís Jossene, a member of the staff of MIREM for over 30 years and also one of the partners and founders of MIMOC (Minerais Industriais de Moçambique, Limitada), established in 2004.

18. This title is a quote from an interview with someone who served as Minister for Transport and Communications in the last decade. He was explaining the logic behind the attitudes of the state elites of putting state property into private (foreign) hands in exchange for positions on the boards of foreign companies and small stakes in private investment projects. The interview was held on 25 September 2013.


20. Composed of technical staff from the ministries of industry and trade, science and technology, GAZEDA, CPI, Transport and Communications. Later, technical staff from CFM as well as those from Machava District Administration were also integrated.


24 Celso Correia was elected member of the Central Committee of the Frelimo party at its 10th Congress in 2012 (Savana, 18 May 2007).
26 Decree no. 25/2010, of 14 July 2010 of the Council of Ministers.
27 Interview with senior civil servant at the Roads Fund, held on the 7 March 2013.
28 This title was taken from an interview with a former prime minister, held on 26 July 2013.
29 The Gas Master Plan estimates that there are 124tcf of reserves in the Rovuma Basin of which 75tcf are technically and commercially “recoverable” (Centro de Integridade Pública, Serviço de Partilha de Informação, issue 7, May 2013).
30 The Ministry of Mineral Resources has tutelage power over the National Petroleum Institute (INP, which is the regulatory entity) and the Companhia Nacional de Hidrocarbonetos (ENH, which is a business entity).
32 Local Content is the commitment to build on the capacity and capability of local people and businesses to support the long-term development of an emerging sector (http://www.tullowoil.com/supplier_centre/index.asp?pageid=23, accessed 18 December 2013.
33 BR no. 26, 3rd series, 28 March 2014, p. 858.
34 BR no. 12, 3rd series, supplement, 10 February 2014, p. 402 (34 -35)
35 A subsidiary of the Nigerian ORLEAN, based in the British Virgin Islands which is a tax heaven (CIP, Transparencia, 3, April 2014).
36 BR no. 46, 3rd series, 14 November 2012, p. 1379 - 1382.
37 This title was derived from informal conversations with journalists and researchers held throughout 2012 at the Centre for Public Integrity.
39 Of the three competitors, Unitel, headed by Isabel dos Santos, daughter of Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, submitted the highest bid for the license (US$ 32 million). Movitel made the second highest bid at US$ 28.2 million, while TMN’s bid was US$ 25 million.
This chapter presents the main conclusions of the thesis in light of the overall research question. Thereafter it presents the conceptual and theoretical implications of the conclusions and, finally, it suggests areas for future research.

The general aim of the thesis is to contribute to the understanding of the mechanisms underlying the development and endurance of the dominant-party system in Mozambique. The research questioned the political developments accounting for the abrupt end of Mozambique’s two-party system and its replacement with a one-party-dominant system. It was expected that two theories could be used to answer the questions raised. These were social conflict theory, explaining the research matter through changes and transformations in the society, and the institutional legacies of the past, as anticipated by historical institutionalism. The thesis focuses on the explanation of the loss by RENAMO of a significant amount of the vote, which paved the way for the shift in the party system. Frelimo, it is revealed, made the breakthrough to party dominance despite the fact that it has retained an almost consistent share of the vote (about one-third of registered voters) since the democracy-founding elections in 1994.

The theorising led to four units of analysis: the workings of the electoral institutions, the weakness of opposition parties, the playing field for electoral competition and the economic instruments of party control of society. As the research design was framed as a single-case study with embedded cases, these units of analysis were researched as sub-cases. The findings in each of the sub-cases elicit the political use of the state apparatus for partisan gain, implying that none of the underlying aspects in each of these sub-cases relates to the state as the site of struggle between Frelimo and its opponents, mainly RENAMO, but rather to the
role the state itself plays in this struggle. So how do these underlying aspects link to the subject matter at hand?

The first aspect relates to the workings of the electoral institutions. The findings in this sub-case show that although, according to the law, the National Electoral Commission (CNE) and the Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration (STAE) are to be institutionally and functionally independent from the party of government – Frelimo – their actual incentive structures have been more responsive to Frelimo party interests than to the principles of democratic governance. It was found that while the institutional positioning of the STAE under the executive branch of government – which has a vested interest in the election results – is problematic and has contributed significantly to its poor handling of the logistics of the electoral processes, it is the operations of the CNE that had a significant impact on Frelimo’s election victories.

In the problematic election of 1999 complex and opaque procedures were employed in the tabulation of votes, particularly the requalification of votes within CNE.¹ This resulted in the exclusion of tally sheets accounting for 300,000 votes in the presidential election – exactly the same number as the difference between the number of votes cast for Frelimo’s Joaquin Chissano, which allowed him to defeat RENAMO’s candidate, Afonso Dhlakama. The CNE was never able to explain the grounds on which the tally sheets were excluded and despite nationwide demonstrations by RENAMO supporters the results were confirmed and Frelimo and its presidential candidate retained the victory. This victory was the beginning of the end of the then vibrant two-party system and its replacement by a dominant-party system, paving the way for a ‘circle of dominance’ which allowed Frelimo to use the state apparatus to ensure victory in subsequent elections.

It was also found that while there were problems with the 2004 election it was in the 2009 election that the electoral institutions were again blatantly used to protect Frelimo’s rule. While this time RENAMO was organisationally in decline, the new threat to Frelimo’s power came from the Mozambique Democratic Movement (MDM), which had broken away from RENAMO. The party had won two consecutive victories over Frelimo candidates in the municipality of Beira, the second-largest city in the country, proving that the party carried considerable electoral weight. As a result, the CNE, in preparation for the 2009 election, partially prevented the MDM from participating, allowing it to stand in only
Conclusion

four of the country’s 11 constituencies. Despite this, eight members of the party were elected. The CNE never explained satisfactorily the grounds on which the MDM had been excluded.

Although the type of constraints that had an impact on the 2004 election may be seen as the result of the advantages incumbency allows, the events that shaped the 1999 and 2009 elections not only fundamentally undermined the substantive uncertainty which, in theory, characterises democratic elections, it also, and more importantly, undermined one of the key features of a democratic regime: the possibility of meaningful electoral competition and contestation by opposition groups.

Two distinctions are worth making. From an historical institutionalism standpoint, the political use of the state apparatus in the 1999 case was enabled not only by the fact that Frelimo controlled the government but also by the fact that the democratic transition did not break the rules of the previous regime and, with it, the acquiescence of political institutions to Frelimo. In 2009, the findings suggest, the events were embedded in the context of a politicised civil service resulting from the entrenchment of the Frelimo party within the state, particularly after President Guebuza took over the leadership of both party and state.

The second aspect relates to the issue of whether or not the playing field for political and electoral competition is level. The findings in this sub-case show that the events in 1999 that enabled Frelimo to retain control of the state also set a pattern for the use of state apparatus for political gain, mainly to dilute RENAMO’s electoral strength in its strongholds. Although initiated under the leadership of President Joaquim Chissano in the aftermath of the threat to Frelimo’s power in the 1999 elections, it was only after Guebuza took over leadership of the party that the state was adroitly put to work to limit the space available to RENAMO.

The political use of the state was epitomised by the government’s failure to put into place the full devolution of power to the country’s then 128 districts; its adoption of dual reform: full administrative decentralisation to all 128 districts on the one hand and a partial and gradual devolution of power only to the urban areas, on the other, as the 1994 electoral results showed that full devolution of power to all 128 districts would be a political blunder, since it would result in most districts being governed by RENAMO.
The government used both reforms, but particularly administrative decentralisation to rebuild the collapsed state following the devastating civil war and, as a result, it reasserted its effective control over the entire territory, using this control simultaneously to expand the state (appointing administrators, deploying personnel, providing services such as water, education, health and loans for income-generating activities) and to spread and strengthen the Frelimo’s party machinery.

The effective control of territory by the state accompanied by some service delivery has weakened RENAMO’s grip on constituencies it formerly controlled. Frelimo further turned the situation to its advantage by using its incumbency to co-opt the institution of traditional authority, formerly the key structure for mobilising RENAMO voters. Accordingly, the government designed and implemented reforms for the participation of traditional leaders in governance, with the result that traditional leaders changed their allegiance from RENAMO to the government, mobilising their constituencies to participate in state activities and thereby ensuring themselves access to patronage and state benefits. These factors resulted in the shrinking of the political space available to RENAMO, which manifested itself in the 2004 election in the form of a massive stay away that resulted in RENAMO losing the advantage in its former strongholds.

From the above it emerged that the state’s administrative reforms were conceived, sequenced and implemented in order to dominate the local political systems (districts) and make support for the opposition costly – in other words, to create an uneven playing field that favoured Frelimo. So, although RENAMO’s problematic intra-party governance negatively affected the party’s organisational capacity and resulted in important party cadres leaving the party, it is safe to argue that the abrupt erosion of the RENAMO vote is part and parcel of Frelimo’s governance strategy.

As of 2004, as a result of the strong mandate received by Frelimo, it was able to further entrench itself by using its social organisations – the Organisation of Mozambican Women (Organização da Mulher Moçambicana – OMM) and the Mozambican Youth Organisation (Organização da Juventude Moçambicana – OJM) to mobilise the population for the celebration of public events. As a result, despite moves to disentangle the party from the state, at the local level there is still a considerable overlap.
The politicisation of public funds also enabled Frelimo to exercise patronage-based political control at the local level.

The third aspect is the weakness of the opposition. The findings in this sub-case show that opposition political parties are weakly institutionalised, mainly in organisational terms, but with roots in society. The research found a political landscape of a highly institutionalised Frelimo, a collapsing RENAMO and an institutionalising MDM. The control of territorially bounded areas of electoral influence is crucial for party institutionalisation in Mozambique, so Frelimo, through its political use of the state, is firmly institutionalised. RENAMO, which relinquished its control of significant parts of the national territory to Frelimo between 1999 and 2004 has no capacity to link up with its roots, which are mainly in rural areas. With a different trajectory, the MDM, which emerged from the control of the Beira municipality, has extended its growth to other municipalities, which gives it a considerable support base.

The research found that the control of a territorial constituency provides a basis for mobilising voters and thus gaining parliamentary representation. This, in turn, results in access to state financial resources which potentially enable parties to continue to function. Because RENAMO has relinquished control of its strongholds, its electoral base has shrunk and with it the size of parliamentary representation and state funding. But its decline relates more to the fact that its organisational capacity and mobilisation abilities have dried up – mainly because of the lack of resources for extending patronage to its supporters and its local elites – and less to the aspect of roots within society. The MDM is still developing, but its leader is the mayor of Beira, which gives him and the party the basis for patronage. So, the party is growing in power but not sufficiently to take over power from Frelimo.

The fourth aspect relates to the economic instruments of party control of society. The findings in this sub-case show that politically controlled privatisation has enabled Frelimo on the one hand to meet its objectives of building a politically acquiescent private sector while meeting the reform objectives and on the other to embed the state in the economy rather than withdraw it. These instruments, however, were only put to work after the 1999 elections threatened Frelimo’s power base, after which the party’s political elites took over businesses to the point where there was almost an overlap between ‘state’ and ‘business’, which put public and private interests in competition. In this way the state was dis-
possessed and used to promote the business interests not only of the Frelimo elites, but also to give lucrative businesses to the Frelimo party so that if its grip on political power was weakened it would be sufficiently entrenched in the economy, with considerable economic and financial capacity to fight elections while starving the opposition parties.

These turned out to be important economic instruments for party control of society, denying patronage to opposition groups. This not only starves those already in the opposition camp, it also serves as a warning to those who may want to support the opposition. More importantly, it contributes to unity within Frelimo and puts in place a complex set of business connections and networks that link various groups and counters any possibility of party breakaways or dissidence since almost everyone is connected to someone else through businesses and patronage.

From the findings and conclusions in the four sub-cases it emerges that the shift in Mozambique’s party system from a two-party to a dominant-party system was neither enabled by structural factors such as social cleavages and legacies of the past nor, as social theory posits, by changes and transformations within society. On the contrary, the underlying mechanisms were strategic factors related to the use of the state apparatus to protect Frelimo’s power. From an historical institutionalism viewpoint, the use of the state to protect Frelimo’s power was neither new, nor did it come naturally.

In response to major crises Frelimo elites astutely sculpted the political processes to favour the political objectives of the party. Examples are the implementation of democratisation from above and of economic reforms at a time when RENAMO had no influence and, importantly, the exclusion of RENAMO from participation in government after the signing of the 1992 General Peace Agreements that led to the democracy-founding elections in 1994. So, ‘history matters’, but only to the extent that Mozambique’s peace and democratic processes prepared the terrain for Frelimo to recover control of political institutions, which had been seriously weakened by the civil war, and with it to recover the aura of liberator of the country and state builder.

Since 2002 when he took over leadership of the party President Guebuza has revived the glorious history of Frelimo, around which was built the legitimating discourse of Frelimo’s right to govern. While this was instrumental in tightening the party in organisational terms, it was not a decisive factor in its successive electoral victories, as its share of the
vote has remained almost constant throughout the four elections only with slight increase in the most recent election, 2009. Although Frelimo enjoys a two-thirds majority in Parliament, it is only supported by about one-third of registered voters. It is the entrenchment of the party within the state which has resulted in the shrinking of the political space available for opposition groups that sustains Frelimo’s prolonged rule.

Considering the limitations outlined in chapter IV, on methods, these conclusions underscore the role played by the state in protecting Frelimo’s rule. Looking back at the interviews with respondents with ties to Frelimo as well as the public discourse of Frelimo leaders it emerges that the use of the state apparatus is not an opportunistic use of the power of office for political gain but rather something more deeply related to the character of Frelimo, as evidenced by its founding fathers, who claim to own the state. So in response to the research question, it can only be concluded that Frelimo’s domination of Mozambique’s party system is embedded in the political use of the state apparatus to make it difficult for opposition groups to challenge its grip on control of the state while using its liberation credentials to legitimate its right to govern. All in all, these conclusions underscore the capture of state and also of society that is used as political resource for party dominance.

9.1 Conceptual and Theoretical Implications

Although this case study concentrated on investigating the particular circumstances pertaining in Mozambique and there was no intention to broaden it to encompass the situation of other African democracies with dominant-party systems, at this point it uses the main conclusions to engage with the concept and theory of dominant-party systems. Through analytic generalisation this entails questioning how the conclusions speak to the concept and theory of dominant-party systems, which involves “asking what it is similar to, what it contradicts, and why” (Meyer 2001: 343).

As discussed in chapter II, the concept of dominant-party systems is concerned with procedural aspects in that it refers to procedurally democratic regimes dominated by one political party for prolonged periods (Doorenspleet & Nijzink 2013; De Jager & Du Toit 2013; Du Pisani 2013; Boucek & Bogaards 2010; Dunleavy 2010; Greene 2010a, 2010b; De Jager 2009) with the proviso that the government must have been
legitimated by popular vote in a reasonably free and competitive election and that opposition parties are allowed to form and canvass freely for electoral support.

The features of Mozambique’s party system are consistent with the concept of a dominant-party system. Indeed, the country has held regular elections with relative degree of freeness and fairness, although both national and international observer missions have expressed reservations. It is significant that the major opposition parties have taken up their seats in Parliament, the Assembleia da Republica, following each of the four elections thus far held, regardless of the fact that these parties, particularly RENAMO, have either rejected the outcome of almost every election or have boycotted the election entirely.

In terms of the theory of dominant-party systems, the conclusions significantly challenge the extent to which the situation in Mozambique can be regarded as a democratic dominant-party system. Contrary to the concept, which is oriented towards procedural aspects, the theory of dominant-party systems is concerned with the extent of democracy during the elections in which the breakthrough for party dominance occurs. An important definitional aspect of a democratic regime is free competition and/or contestation of elections by opposition groups (Lindberg 2006; Mainwaring 2001; Dahl 1998; Bartolini 1999; Alvarez, Cheibub, Limongi & Przeworski 1996; Schmitter & Karl 1991; Przeworski 1986). This freedom extends beyond merely being allowed legally to exist – many countries have lifted the ban on party formation and activity following the third wave of democratisation that swept the African continent early in the 1990s.

This study has underscored the role of the state not as the neutral site of struggle between Frelimo and its opponents but as a vehicle for skewing the playing field between elections which benefits the party of government, Frelimo, as well as manipulating election results or partially excluding opposition parties from contesting elections in certain constituencies. The evidence shows that the nature of Mozambique’s dominant-party system is at odds with the theory of dominant-party systems because the mechanisms that underpin it have an impact on the electoral playing field. With the free contestation of elections by opposition groups constrained in the manner described above the conclusions of the case study are that it is questionable whether Mozambique can be regarded as democratic.
Mozambique’s uneven playing field does not ensure the democratic uncertainty which is a defining feature of competitive and meaningful elections (Levitsky & Way 2002, 2010; Diamond 2002; Schedler 2002; Elklit & Reynolds 2002; Schedler & Moazzafar 2002; Pastor 1999; Przeworski 1986). This depiction is consistent not only with the persistent classification by the Freedom House Index since 1999 of Mozambique as ‘partly free’ but with the empirically grounded view that since President Armando Guebuza came to power the political system has moved from a relative openness to democratic closure, hence the suggestion that it should be located somewhere between minimal democracy and competitive authoritarianism.

Although in conceptual terms the polity meets the procedural requirements to be classified as a dominant-party system featuring Frelimo as the ruling party, in substantive terms, that is, when measured against the elements underpinning the theory of dominant-party systems, Mozambique is a dominant-power regime in which contestation by opposition groups is institutionalised and allowed in both law and practice, but the playing field is fundamentally uneven to the point of resembling a polity with a governing party carried by the state competing with opposition parties. Although it is still possible for opposition groups to win pockets of power and Frelimo concedes their victory, to date such victories have not threatened Frelimo’s firm control of the state.

These conclusions show that Mozambique’s dominant-party system is similar to many others in sub-Saharan Africa (Doorenspleet & Nijzink 2013; De Jager & Du Toit 2013; Du Pisani 2013), particularly in the fusion between the state and the ruling party. Three aspects, however, contradict the patterns found in the literature review. First, the significant role played by the electoral institutions in protecting Frelimo’s rule. Second, while it may be important for Frelimo intra-party mobilisation, the history and the credentials of the liberation struggle are not salient features of Mozambique’s dominant-party system. Third, the weakness of the opposition parties is a consequence of the political use of the state apparatus rather than of the fact that the parties are fragilely rooted in society.

The analytic generalisation also requires an explanation of why these contradictions occur. The findings of the sub-cases suggest that the dissimilarities are embedded in two considerable caveats. First, Mozambique experienced 15 years of one-party authoritarian rule, which was
later aggravated by the modality of democratisation – democratisation from above, or constitutional reform – which allowed Frelimo to retain power throughout the democratic transition. This has given Frelimo the opportunity to sculpt nascent political institutions driven by its liberation movement roots and its Marxist-Leninist tradition. Second, Mozambique experienced a devastating 16-year civil war which entrenched a political group with a military background within society along the lines of the cleavages inherited from the liberation struggle (see chapter I). It is this group – RENAMO – that went head-to-head with Frelimo in the period covered by the first and the second election. The results of the 1994 and the 1999 elections reflect the entrenchment of these two political groups, both with military backgrounds.

9.2 Contribution

The choice of the topic was motivated by the lack of research in this field in Mozambique, and particularly by the uniqueness of Mozambique’s dominant-party system (chapter I). Apart from filling this research gap, the thesis made an important empirical contribution in unearthing the systematic role the state plays in protecting Frelimo’s rule. In so doing and through analytic generalisation the thesis has contributed to building a theory of dominant-party systems in that it shows that the debate on dominant party systems should take more serious note of how power can be used as an instrument to capture the state economically and politically, thus paving the way for the cycle of dominance. Having suggested that although it meets the procedural requirements for classification as a dominant-party system, Mozambique should, based on the underlying mechanisms that keep it going, be looked at as a dominant power regime, the thesis has also attempted to make conceptual contribution.

9.3 Prospects For Future Research

Mozambique’s democratic experiment is relatively young – there have only been four general elections, which is not a sufficient sample from which to draw clearly traceable patterns. This thesis has revealed the underlying mechanisms that account for the development and endurance of the country’s dominant-party system but more research is needed to fur-
ther the understanding of this phenomenon. In this respect, three lines of research are proposed:

First, the impact of the architecture of the political system as it concentrates power with a president, who is directly elected by the people, needs appropriate research. In the analytical chapter it was understood that the role of a powerful president in relation to the development and endurance of the dominant-party system was embedded in the workings of the governing party. However, the underlying aspects unearthed in each of the sub-cases suggest that the role of the presidency deserves appropriate attention. The observation is that the president is not part of the parliamentary disputes among those with seats in Parliament.

In these circumstances, the president sets the political agenda of the country from outside Parliament. Indeed, in terms of the Constitution, the president dominates the political institutions, which – given the fact that the country is still in the early stage of democratisation – results in a fusion between government and public administration, paving the way for the politicisation of the state machinery. The result is that the civil service aligns with the political agenda of the government at the expense of the common good. So, regardless of the character of the president, the institutional setup of the machinery of government is prepared for instrumentalisation for partisan gain. These issues need thorough research.

The second line of research is the fact that the political system in the country, is, by default, a winner-takes-all system. Although it purports to be a proportional representation system, the share of the vote for each political party does not allow for participation by all parties in either the executive or the public administration, it merely results in the election of members of Parliament. While this representation is crucial as it results in state funding for the parties, it does not offer the opportunities for patronage that are needed to maintain networks of political and electoral support at the constituency level.

This is what happened to RENAMO in the five constituencies it controlled in the 1994 and the 1999 elections, namely, Nampula, Zambézia, Tete, Manica and Sofala. Control of these constituencies enabled RENAMO to go head-to-head with Frelimo, resulting in the vibrant two-party system which ended in 2004. With time, RENAMO proved not to have the means to maintain the support it had received both from the masses and from the local elites. As a result, its support mechanisms
dried up and the party failed to mobilise its supporters. These issues need thorough research.

This thesis has probed Mozambique’s dominant-party system from a governance perspective, focusing on the actions of the government and/or Frelimo. A thorough study of the dynamics within the opposition parties, particularly RENAMO’s internal governance and the extent to which it had an impact on its organisational structure, would add value to the current knowledge of the subject.

Notes

1 This is the result of the two-layer tabulation system. The first takes place at district level, after which all nullified, contested votes are sent to the CNE in Maputo for requalification – a process during which CNE members re-examine every vote to ascertain whether it has been correctly considered null or should be considered valid.
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Annexures

Annexure 1
Questions for Data Collection on Sub-Case A

Core questions for party leaders

- What aspects of the democratic reforms influenced the current political developments?
- What aspects of the General Peace Agreement influenced the development of multiparty politics?
- Are there any factors that in the past had influenced the set up of the CNE and STAE?
- Do the workings of the CNE and STAE have a bearing in the development of multiparty politics?
- What influenced the workings of CNE and STAE in the most recent elections?
- Have the workings of the CNE and STAE influenced the fairness of electoral results and how?
- It is said that the CNE and STAE have umbilical ties with the governing party, Frelimo. If so, what links are these and how do they impact on the fairness of the electoral results?

Core questions for political journalists

- What aspects of the democratic reforms influenced the current political developments?
- What aspects of the General Peace Agreement influenced the development of multiparty politics?
Are there any factors that in the past influenced the set up of the CNE and STAE?

Do the workings of the CNE and STAE have a bearing in the development of multiparty politics?

The 1999 elections were problematic. What happened and how was it significant for Mozambique’s multiparty politics?

The 2009 elections were problematic. What happened and how was it significant to Mozambique’s multiparty politics?

Have the workings of the CNE and STAE influenced the fairness of electoral results and how?

It is said that the CNE and STAE have umbilical ties with the governing party, Frelimo. What links are these and how do they impact on the fairness of the electoral results?

Core questions for the academics

What influences the workings of the CNE and STAE?

Which legacies of the democratic reforms have a bearing on the workings of the CNE and STAE and in what way?

What enables the CNE and STAE to keep working the way you have described?

The 1999 elections were problematic. What happened and how was it significant for Mozambique’s multiparty politics?

The 2009 elections were problematic. What happened and with how was it significant for Mozambique’s multiparty politics?

Have the workings of the CNE and STAE influenced the fairness of electoral results and how?

It is said that the CNE and STAE have umbilical ties with the governing party, Frelimo. What are these and how do they impact on the fairness of the electoral results?

Core questions for civil society actors/ church leaders

How do you view the workings of the CNE and STAE?

What influences the workings of the CNE and STAE?

The 1999 elections were problematic. What happened and how was it significant for Mozambique’s multiparty politics?
The 2009 elections were problematic. What happened and how was it significant for Mozambique’s multiparty politics?

Have the workings of the CNE and STAE influenced the fairness of electoral results and how?

Would you say elections are free and fair in Mozambique?

It is said that the CNE and STAE have umbilical ties with the governing party, Frelimo. What are these and how do they impact on the fairness of the electoral results?

Core questions for CNE current and former high ranking officials / STAE current and former high ranking officials

With the exception of the 1994 election, all electoral events to date have been problematic in that they were either boycotted or the results were disputed by the opposition forces, mainly RENAMO. Why is that so?

Domestic and international electoral observation missions to different elections thus far held have qualified the electoral results. Are these qualifications fair?

It is said that the CNE and STAE have umbilical ties with the governing party, Frelimo. What are these and how do they impact on the fairness of the electoral results?

It is said that the CNE and STAE have changed the electoral results in 1999 and more recently in 2004 have excluded opposition parties from contesting the elections on non transparent grounds. What was the significance of these events for Mozambique’s multiparty politics?

Have the workings of the CNE and STAE influenced the fairness of electoral results and how?

Would you say elections are free and fair in Mozambique?

List of respondents per group of interviewees

Party Leaders

- **Afonso Dhlakama**, President of RENAMO, November 23, 2011
- **André José Balate**, President of Mozambique Social Reconciliation Party (PARENA) August 10, 2011
Armando Gil Sueia, President of National Workers and Peasants Party (PANAOC), August 26, 2011
Armando José Nyota, President of Democratic Liberal Party of Mozambique (PADELIMO) September 5, 2011
Armando Sapemba, President of Mozambique Green Party (PVM), August 15, 2011
Carlos Inácio Coelho, President of Party of Freedom and Solidarity (PAZS), August 12, 2011
Carlos Reis, President of the United Front for Change and Good Governance (MBG), August 31, 2011
Daviz Simango, President of Democratic Movement of Mozambique (MDM) August 30, 2011;
Francisco Maindane Muariva, President of Union for Change (UM) August 22, 2011
Francisco Campira, President of Social Broadening Party of Mozambique (PASOMO), August 18, 2011
Janeiro Mariano, President of United Democratic Front (UDF), August 17, 2011
João da Rosa Likalamba, President of Mozambique Socialist Party (PSM), September 2, 2011
João Massango, President of the Ecological Party-Land Movement (PECMT), July 28, 2011
Jose Palaço, President of Patriotic Action Front (FAP), August 4, 2011
Júlio J. Nimeine, President of Democratic Alliance and Social Renewal Party (PADRES), August 22, 2011
Khalid Sidat, President of the Independent Alliance of Mozambique (ALIMO), August 25, 2011
Manuel Tomé, General Secretary of the Frelimo Party, November 24, 2011
Marciano Rodrigo Fijamo, President of Popular Democratic Party (PPD), August 23, 2011
Marcos Juma, President of National Party of Mozambique (PANAMO), August 9, 2011;
Máximo Dias, President of Mozambique Nationalist Movement (MONAMO), September 2, 2011
Miguel Mabote, President of the Labour Party, November 21, 2011

Mussagy Abdul, President of Party for All Nationalists of Mozambique (PARTONAMO) August 30, 2011

Neves Serrano, President of Progressive Liberal Party, (PPLM), September 1, 2011

Raul Domingos, President of the Party for Peace, Democracy and Development (PDD), July 29, 2011

Yaqub Sibindy, President of Independent Party of Mozambique (PIMO), August 2, 2011

Academics

Professor Lourenço do Rosario, Rector of the A Politécnica University and President of the African Peer Review Mechanism, Mozambique, November 8, 2011;

Professor Óscar Monteiro, old combatant, senior Frelimo member, former Minister and former Rector of the Higher Institute for Public Administration, November 9, 2011;

Dr. Marengane Leonardo, lecturer, Faculty of Arts and Social Science, Eduardo Mondlane University, November 8, 2011;

Dr. Luis Dava, Senior lecturer, Higher Institute for International Relations; November 17, 2011

Dr. Egídio Rego, Senior lecturer, Technical University of Mozambique; November 18, 2011

Dr. Ermelindo França, Senior lecturer, Faculty of Arts and Social Science, Eduardo Mondlane University, November, 15, 2011;

Professora Margarida Ernesto João, Faculty of Law, Eduardo Mondlane University, November, 14, 2011.

Civil society actors/church leaders

Reverend Lucas Amosse, former General Secretary of the Mozambique Christian Council of Mozambique, Maputo, October 3, 2011;

Sheik Abdul Carimo, General Secretary of the Islamic Council of Mozambique and the Executive Director of the Electoral Observatory, Maputo, October 3, 2011;
References

- Reverend Dinis Matsolo, General Secretary of the Mozambique Christian Council of Mozambique, Maputo, October 6, 2011;
- Reverend Moises Bila, Religious Leader, Igreja Apostolica de Mocambique, Maputo, Maxaquene community, October 7, 2011;
- Dr. Amaro Maciene, Civil Society leader, Centre for Governance Monitoring, Maputo, October 4, 2011;
- Mr. Carlos Mula, Civil society leader, Mozambique Democracy Association, Maputo, October 13, 2011;
- Dr. Armando Ali, Executive Director, Facilidade, Nampula, October 10, 2011;
- Mr. António Lourenço Mutoua, Executive Director, Solidariedade Moçambique, Nampula, October 11, 2011;
- Ms. António Guiliche, Civil society leader, Mozambique Democracy Association, Beira, October 12, 2011;
- Ms. Benilde Nhavelilo, Civil Society leader, Forum of Community Radios, Maputo; October 13, 2011;
- Interview with a civil society leader from the Human Rights League, Maputo, October 14, 2011.

Journalists

- Salomão Mayana, Editor and Director of the weekly independent ‘Magazine Independente’, September 12, 2011
- Rogério Sitoe, Director of the Daily Pro-government ‘Noticias’, September 13, 2011
- Jorge Matine, Director of the weekly pro-Frelimo ‘Domingo’, September 13, 2011
- Fernando Gonçalves, Editor of the weekly independente ‘Savana’, September 14, 2011
- Gustavo Mavie, Director of the Mozambique News Agency, AIM, September 19, 2011
- Simão Anguilaze, Information Director of the Mozambique Television, TVM, public broadcasting station, September 20, 2011
- Augusto de Carvalho, Senior and retired Journalist and academic, September 20, 2011
Ericino Salema, Senior and Independente Journalist, September 21, 2011

Borges Nhamire, Senior Journalist, daily investigative ‘Canalmoz’, September 23, 2011

Luis Nhachote, Senior and Independente Journalist, September 23, 2011

CNE/STAE

Interview with a former STAE high official, July 15, 2011;
Interview with CNE high ranking official, July 29, 2011;
Interview with former CNE high ranking official, August 22, 2011;
Interview with STAE high ranking official, September 19, 2011.
Annexure 2

Questions for Data Collection on Sub-Case B

Core Questions for the leadership of the effective parties (Frelimo, RENAMO and MDM)

(Continuation from the questions for sub-case a)

- Are there any constraints hindering the development of political parties in Mozambique? If so, of what nature and in what ways do they influence this process?
- Does the party have working organizational structures?
- Do you think that your party has roots in the society? What are these?
- Have the numbers of popular support changed between the 2004 and the 2009 election?
- Does your party have links with civil society organizations? How does this work and what is the purpose with this process?
- Are there any individuals and groups within and outside the party that limit your decision-making autonomy?
- What are the indicators of your party’s popular appreciation?
- Do you tolerate internal factionalisms and party dissidence?
- Describe the relationship between the party leadership and the parliamentary bench?

Core Questions for political journalists

(Continuation from the questions for sub-case a)

- Are there any constraints hindering the development of political parties in Mozambique? If so, of what nature and in what ways do they influence this process?
- Do you think that Frelimo, RENAMO and the MDM have working organizational structures?
- Do you think that Frelimo, RENAMO and the MDM have roots in the society?
- Have there been changes in the electoral support (of Frelimo, RENAMO and the MDM) between the 2004 and the 2009 elections?
Have there been changes in electoral support after the departure of President Joaquim Chissano and entrance of President Armando Guebuza to the leadership of Frelimo?

Do you think that parties have links with civil society organizations and how does this process work?

Do you think that party leaders have constraints in exercising their decision-making autonomy (imposed by individuals and/or groups within or outside the parties)?

Is internal factionalism and party dissidence tolerated?

Core Questions for academics

Are there any constraints hindering the development of political parties in Mozambique? If so, of what nature and in what ways do they influence this process?

Do you think that Frelimo, RENAMO and the MDM have working organizational structures?

Do you think that Frelimo, RENAMO and the MDM have roots in the society?

Have there been changes in the electoral support (of Frelimo, RENAMO and the MDM) between the 2004 and the 2009 elections?

Have there been changes in electoral support after the departure of President Joaquim Chissano and entrance of President Armando Guebuza to the leadership of Frelimo?

Do political parties in general and Frelimo, RENAMO and the MDM in particular have links with civil society organizations?

Do you think that party leaders have constraints in exercising their decision-making autonomy (imposed by individuals and/or groups within or outside the parties)?

Is internal factionalism and party dissidence tolerated?

Core Questions for civil society actors/church leaders

(Continuation from the questions for sub-case a)
Are there any constraints hindering the development of political parties in Mozambique? If so, of what nature and in what ways do they influence this process?

Do you think that Frelimo, RENAMO and the MDM have working organizational structures?

Do you think that Frelimo, RENAMO and the MDM have roots in this society?

Do political parties in general and Frelimo, RENAMO and the MDM in particular have links with civil society organizations? If so, how does this work and in what domains?

Do you think that party leaders have constraints in exercising their decision-making autonomy (imposed by individuals and/or groups within or outside the parties)?

Is internal factionalism and party dissidence tolerated?

**Questionnaire for the structured interviews with officials of political parties**

- How many staff member work here at the National headquarters of the party?
- Are all the staff members working here paid?
- How many members does the party have?
- Have there been changes in the number of members in the past 5 years?
- Have there been leadership (of the presidency) changes in the party?
- Have there been party congresses? How often? Are the minutes available for consultation?
- What are the sources of revenue of the party?
- Does the party have assets?
- What activities does the party perform in-between elections?
- What is the organizational set-up of the party? How functional is it?
- Are there regular reports from the branches to the headquarters and are these available for consultation?
- Do the party statutes allow for the floor crossing of Parliamentarians?
List of respondents (same as sub-case a)

Officials of political parties

- **Manuel Tomé**, General Secretary, Frelimo, August 11, 2011
- **Dr. Carlos Malate**, head of Administration, Frelimo, Maputo-Province Office, August 12, 2011
- **Eduardo Namburete**, Eduardo Namburete, former RENAMO MP, adviser to the President of RENAMO, August 25, 2011.
- **António Muchanga**, former MP, Member of the Council of the State and current Spokesperson of RENAMO, August 23, 2011.
- **Herminio Morais**, General of RENAMO during the 16-years civil war, September 26, 2011
- **Ismael Mussá**, General Secretary, MDM, Maputo head Office, August 26, 2011.
Annexure 3
Core Questions for Data Collection on the Sub-Case C

Core questions for village secretaries

- What are your activities as village secretaries?
- What is your role in political and electoral realms?
- Do you mobilize population for political and electoral activities? For what political party?
- Whom do you report to?
- It appears that in the last two elections, people did not turn out to vote. Is that true? What happened?
- In the past, in this village, the people voted for RENAMO but now vote for FRELIMO. Is this true? If so, what happened?
- Are there poverty alleviation programs here? How do they work and who benefits?

Core questions for traditional authorities (régulos)

- For how long have you been régulo?
- What does the government give to you? Since when?
- What is your role in political and electoral realms?
- Do you mobilize population for political and electoral activities? For what political party?
- Whom do you report to?
- It appears that in the last two elections, people did not turn out to vote. What happened?
- In the past, in this village, the people voted for RENAMO but now vote for FRELIMO. Is this true? If so what happened?

Core Questions for religious leaders

- For how long have you been a religious leader here?
- What changed in the administrative structure of this locality? Who ruled in the past and who rules now?
• Have there been any changes in the relationship between the church and the local administrative structure over time?
• Do the state programs for poverty alleviation cover this locality? If so, as of when?
• Who benefits from the state programs for poverty alleviation in this locality?
• It appears that in the last two elections, people did not turn out to vote. What happened?
• In the past, in this village, the people voted for RENAMO but now vote for FRELIMO. Is this true? If so, what happened?
• Which party do you support?

Core questions for local traders

• For how long have you been here?
• What changed in the administrative structure of this locality? Who ruled in the past and who rules now?
• Have there been changes in the relationship between local traders and the local administrative structure over time?
• Are there state programs aimed to support local traders coming for this locality? If so, as of when?
• Who are the local traders that benefit from the state programs in this locality, if any?
• It appears that in the last two elections, people did not turn out to vote. What happened?
• In the past, in this village, the people voted for RENAMO but now vote for FRELIMO. Is this true? If so, what happened?
• Which party do you support?

Core questions for civil servants (same questions to ministerial, provincial and district permanent secretaries)

• What changed in the structure of local governance since the 1994 elections to the 2009 elections;
• How have these changes impacted the actual functioning of local governments in relation to the population?
What do the village secretaries do in the field of politics and elections?
What do the traditional authorities (régulos) do in the field of politics and elections?
What is the actual relationship between the village secretaries and the local administrative structures?
How do the local administrative structure relate with political parties at the local level?
Why is it that the offices of the local branch of the Frelimo party are always close to the headquarters of the state local administrative structure?
Are there programs for poverty alleviation implemented in these districts? How are the beneficiaries selected?
It appears that in the last two elections, people did not turn out to vote. What happened?
In the past, in this village, the people voted for RENAMO but now vote for FRELIMO. Is this true? If so what happened?

List of respondents, per category, per district

ANGOCHE District

Village Secretaries

- **António Said**, Secretary of comunidade de Nacala – Luazi, June 5, 2012;
- **Suleimane Juma**, Secretary in Angoche – sede, June 20, 2012
- **Rachid Abdala**, Secretary of Boila village, June 14, 2012;
- **Salimo Sangage**, Secretary of Sangage village, June 13, 2012;
- **Issufo Saide**, Secretary of Nampete village, June 12, 2012;
- **Abdulremane Momad**, Secretary of Nametoria village, June 12, 2012;
- **Momad Abdala**, Secretary of Makhotone village, June 11, 2012;
- **Salimo Sana**, Secretary of Naikulu village, June 8, 2012;
- **Alfredo Sana**, Secretary of Namizope village, June 6, 2012;
- **Saide Musa**, Secretary of Muluku village, June 5, 2012;
Traditional Authorities (régulos)

- Régulo Juma Abdulremane, Angoche – sede, June 29, 2012;
- Régulo Alfeu Jamaldine, of Boila village, June 28, 2012;
- Régulo Saide Sangage, of Sangage village, June 27, 2012;
- Régulo Juma Idrisse, of Makhotone village June 26, 2012;
- Régulo Chamussidine Saide, of Nampete village, June 25, 2012;
- Régulo Saide Nacala, of Nametoria village, June 22, 2012;
- Régulo Mohamed Salimo, Naikulu village, June 19, 2012;
- Régulo Said Mahange, Namizope village, June 18, 2012;
- Régulo Makhotone Said, Muluku village, June 15, 2012;
- Régulo Naikulu Mucrua, comunidade de Nacala – Luazi, June 4, 2012

Religious Leaders

- Sheik Assane Sage, Muslim church leader, Muluku village, June 29, 2012;
- Sheik Momade Juma, Mesquita of Boila village, July 2, 2012;
- Felizardo Rachica, President of mesquite at comunidade de Nacala – Luazi, July 3, 2012;
- Interview with a Sheik in Nampete village, July 3, 2012;
- Interview with a Sheik in Namizope village, July 4, 2012

Local Traders

- Charamadane Momade, shop owner in Nampete village, July 5, 2012;
- Sualehe Sualé, owner of fishing business in Namizope village, July 5, 2012;
- Edizai Sulemane owner of fishing business in Boila village, July 6, 2012;
- Interview with a owner of local restaurant in Muluku village, July 6, 2012;
- Interview with a owner of fishing business in Makhotone village, July 7, 2012;
NICOADALA District

Village Secretaries

- José Janeiro, Secretary in Munhonha locality, August 15, 2012;
- António Canivete, Secretary in Naamacate locality, July 13, 2012;
- Manuel Sande, Secretary in Nhafuba locality, August 20, 2012;
- Ibrahimo Alface, Secretary in Ionge locality, August 21, 2012;
- Ismaldine Canda, Secretary in Madal locality, August 21, 2012;
- Mateus Boananiça, Secretary in Marrongane locality, August 23, 2012;
- Araújo António, Secretary in Nhangoela locality, August 23, 2012;
- Alfredo Mote, Secretary in Nicoadala-Sede, August 24, 2012;
- Manuel Capaina, Secretary in Maquival-sede, August 24, 2012;
- Jamaldine Ribeiro, Secretary in Nicoadala-Sede, August 25, 2012;

Traditional Authorities (régulos)

- Régulo Sande Canda, Marrongane locality, July 19, 2012;
- Régulo Aly Nalua, Madal locality, August 2, 2012;
- Régulo Madal Bié, Munhonha locality, August 15, 2012;
- Régulo Saide Ndonga, Naamacate locality, July 13, 2012;
- Mambo Capaina Nacwe, Nhafuba locality July 14, 2012;
- Régulo Namacate Capaina, Ionge locality, July 16, 2012;
- Régulo Manuel Dufindiua, Nicoadala-Sede, July 17, 2012;
- Régulo Alfeu Nantuto, Marrongane locality, July 28, 2012;
- Régulo Matos Pandzane, Maquival-sede, July 31, 2012;
- Régulo Ribeiro Nanguenha, Nicoadala-Sede, July 30, 2012;

Religious Leaders

- Leader at the main Assembleia de Deus church, Marrongane locality, July 11, 2012;
- Priest Sande Sana, Church leader in Maquival-sede, July 26, 2012;
LAND TENURE REFORM AND CUSTOMARY CLAIMS NEGOTIABILITY IN RURAL GHANA

- Leader at the Baptista Union Church, Ionge locality, August 2, 2012;
- Interview the local catholic church leader, Nhafuba locality, July 27, 2012;
- Interview the Zion church leader, Nhafuba locality, August 20, 2012;

Local Traders

- Interview with a shop owner, Ionge locality, July 13, 2012;
- Interview with a shop owner a restaurant owner, Marrongane locality, August 4, 2012;
- Saide Manjangue, owner of a local construction company, Munhonha locality, August 7, 2012;
- Isabel Tocole, shop owner, Nhafuba locality, August 20, 2012;
- Calisto Munia, owner of road transportation company, Nicoadala-Sede, August 9, 2012;

Permanent Secretaries

- Interview with a provincial permanent secretary, June 1, 2012
- Interview with a district permanent secretary, June 27, 2012,
- Interview with a district permanent secretary, August 29, 2012
- Interview with a provincial permanent secretary, August 30, 2012
- Interview with a ministerial permanent secretary, May 14, 2012
Annexure 4
Core Questions for Data Collection on Sub-Case D

Core questions for Frelimo elites owning businesses

- For how long have you been in politics within Frelimo?
- For how long have you been in business?
- Do you consider yourself a politician, businessman or both?
- What comes first and how the two are related?
- Is it not problematic to simultaneously be in politics and business?
- Is it about business or about extraction of rents from the state?
- Can the opposition people have these opportunities that you have?
- Why did you have to turn to business activity?
- Do you fear Frelimo loosing the political power?
- Why is the Frelimo party involved in businesses?

Core questions for senior officers at the secretariat of the Prime Minister’s office, Ministry of Industry and Commerce and at the Roads Fund

- How do concessions of state contracts work?
- How are the state concessions actually made?
- Who benefits from the state concessions?

Core questions for business people

- It is claimed that people need the Frelimo membership card to win state contracts. Is this so?
- Is the procurement law followed in the state concessions?
- Are there transparent businesses here, in Mozambique?
- Are the business people identified with Frelimo or do they align with Frelimo to gain businesses?
- Do you give money to Frelimo as a payback for business?
- Why have politicians vehemently entered business?
- Do you fear Frelimo losing the political power will have an impact on your business?
- Would you support the opposition parties financially?
List of Respondents

_Frelimo elites owning businesses_

- **Mariano Matsinhe**, several ministerial positions, linked to several businesses, February 11, 2013;
- **Mário Machungo**, former Prime-minister, CEO of Millennium BIM (bank), February 12, 2013;
- **Teodoro Waty**, member of the Political Committee of Frelimo, senior MP, President of PILARCOOP - Sociedade Cooperativa de Construção, S.A.R.L., March 4, 2013
- **Almeida Matos**, member of the Central Committee and linked to Moza Banco Group, February 11, 2013;
- **Agostinho Vuma**, member of the Central Committee, Member of Parliament, Deputy President of the Confederation for Economic Associations, CTA, owner of several businesses, February 13, 2013;
- **António Infante**, member of the Central Committee, owner of Civil Construction Company, February 20, 2013;
- **Alfredo Chichava**, member of the Central Committee, owns touristic resorts in Inhambane and Gaza provinces, February 28, 2013;
- **Mateus Chande**, member of the Central Committee, linked to mining sector, February 25, 2013;
- **Interview**, member of the political committee, minister, owns 8 companies in mining, petroleum and civil construction sector, February 26, 2013;
- **Interview**, former senior member of the political committee, owns logging company, February 27, 2013;

_Business People_

- **Luís Magaço**, Director Geral at Austral Cowi, May 29, 2013;
- **Hipólito Hamela**, Senior Economist, Confederation of the Economic Associations (CTA), March 8, 2013;
References

- **Salimo Abdula**, President of the INTELECT Holdings and CEO of VODACOM MOÇAMBIQUE, March 11, 2013;
- **Zaide Aly**, Hotel Moçambicano, March 13, 2013;
- **Celso Correia**, President of INSITEC Holdings, March 22, 2013;
- **Hugo Morais**, Director JOMOFI Construções, Maputo, April 1, 2013;
- **António Macome**, Macome mining enterprise, Maputo, April 3, 2013;
- **Isabel Macamo**, Director General at PROFILE, Lda. Maputo, April 5, 2013;
- **Dulce Alfazema**, Director at INVALCO, Lda, Maputo, April 9, 2013;
- **Álvaro Massingue**, President of the Technical University of Mozambique, Maputo, April 12, 2013;
- **Castigo Cassamo**, Somacal, SARL, Maputo, April 15, 2013;
- **Sandra Chichongue**, Chichongue Catering, Namaacha, Maputo, April 17, 2013;
- **Jerónimo Matavel**, Caminhos de Ferro de Moçambique, SARL, Maputo, April 19, 2013;
- **Hussein Khayat**, Director, Electropluz, Lda, Maputo, April 29, 2013;
- **João Silva**, Director at A&I Construções Lda, Maputo, May 2, 2013;
- Interview with a Senior staff member at Quirimbas Mining, Lda, Maputo, May 13, 2013;
- Interview with a senior staff member at Minas do Zambeze, Lda, Maputo, May 16, 2013;
- Interview with a top manager at Lalgy Transportes, SARL, Maputo, May 17, 2013;

*Interviews with senior civil servants*

- Interview with a senior staff member at Roads Fund of the Ministry of Public Works and Housing, March 7, 2013;
• Interview with a senior staff member at Ministry of Industry and Commerce, May 20, 2013;
• Interview with a senior staff member at Ministry of Industry and Commerce, June 3, 2013;
• Interview with a senior staff member at Prime Minister’s office June 5, 2013;
• Interview with a senior staff member at Prime Minister’s office June 6, 2013;
• Interview with a senior staff member at Roads Fund of the Ministry of Public Works and Housing, June 17, 2013;
• Interview with a former CEO at Roads Fund of the Ministry of Public Works and Housing June 19, 2013.
Assunto: Declaração de Confidencialidade

Eu, Adriano Alfredo Nuvunga, docente no Departamento de Ciência Política, Faculdade de Letras e Ciências Sociais, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, neste momento, estudante de doutoramento no Institute of Social Studies, Erasmus Rotterdam University, Haia, Holanda, sobre o tema: Do Sistema de Dois Partidos para o Sistema de Partido Dominante, fiz uma entrevista com

___________________________________________________________
_______, no dia _____________________, em ___________________________________________. Antes da entrevista, concordei que toda a informação prestada será usada única e exclusivamente para o propósito acima indicado e não será partilhada com outras pessoas, sem consentimento do (a) entrevistado (a).

Adriano Alfredo Nuvunga

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nuvunga@iss.nal
+258 82 4875710
## Annexure 6


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<td>26,656</td>
<td>0.71</td>
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<td>Mozambican Social Union and Democratic Party (SUC)</td>
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<td>1.67</td>
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<td>Democratic Union, a coalition of Panjama, Pario and Panjake</td>
<td>264,785</td>
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<td>61,276</td>
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<td>Mozambican Liberal Democratic Party (LDMC)</td>
<td>32,247</td>
<td>0.70</td>
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<td>National Union and Peoples Party (Panac)</td>
<td>26,816</td>
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<td>Mozambican United Front and Mozambican Democratic Convergence Party (UNIDF)</td>
<td>61,027</td>
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</table>
Adriano Nuvunga

Before entering ISS-EUR for this PhD project in September 2010, Adriano Nuvunga worked as a lecturer of ‘The History of Political Thought’ at the Department of Political Sciences and Public Administration in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at Eduardo Mondlane University. Meanwhile, Adriano Nuvunga was also the National Team Leader of the ‘Consolidation of Good Governance and Public Administration in Mozambique’ (GGPAPII) project, known by the acronym of NPT/MOZ/285 funded by the Netherlands Programme for Institutional Strengthening of Post-secondary Education and Training Capacity (NPT).

As an anti-corruption activist, Adriano Nuvunga is one of the key founding members of the Centre for Public Integrity, an anti-corruption civil society organisation, affiliated to the Transparency International. Nuvunga has been following Mozambique’s politics since the first local government elections in 1997, as the deputy editor of the Mozambique Political Process Bulletin which is a specialised regular publication on Mozambique politics and elections. Adriano Nuvunga has also worked closely with important international organisations in the field of ‘Democracy Promotion’ such as the Western Parliamentarians for Africa (AWEPA) and the Fredrick Ebert Foundation (FES).

While the academic life at the Department of Political Sciences and Public Administration motivated him to pursue doctoral studies, it is the exposure to Mozambique politics that influenced the choice of the theme of his PhD research. His research interests include politics, elections, political parties, governance, aid, and oil & gas. With his doctoral degree, Nuvunga will continue with his academic career, engaged in teaching and research activities, as well as in those activities related to the issues of governance and anti-corruption.

The above candidate was admitted to the PhD programme of the International Institute of Social Studies of Erasmus University Rotterdam in The Hague in September 2010 on the basis of:

MA in Development Studies (Major in Governance & Democracy), Institute of Social Studies (ISS) the Hague, the Netherlands, 2006.

This thesis has not been submitted to any university for a degree or any other award.