Title
Conflicts about the Extension of the Rhine Economy
The case of the port expansion by Maasvlakte II (1969-2008).

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Abstract
The port land reclamation project - Maasvlakte II of the Port of Rotterdam - is probably, the most literal extension of the Economic Rhine Region, enhancing it in size and length. In the 1970s and the 1990s, attempts was made by Rotterdam to construct this port expansion. Whereas, in the 1970s the proposal for Maasvlakte II was rejected because of popular resistance, in the 1990s all former opponents began to support Maasvlakte II resulting in its 2008 construction. The reason behind this disparity is the subject of this paper. Firstly, it is concluded that, in contrast to the 1970s, broad support was cultivated as opponents and supporters were part of the same discourse coalition, which supported economic development parallel to the creation of new nature reserve. Within this context resistance and delays were instrumental in fostering a dialogue and reducing conflicts. Finally, within this context it is concluded that plans for port expansions are only effective if they are in line with national policy or the dominant discourse coalition.

Keywords
Port development; port expansion; government; pressure groups; discourse coalition; megaproject

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1 Introduction

In the 1990s, Rotterdam, the largest port in the world, tried to profit from the growing flow of containers from Asia. After 2000, the resisting nature preservation and environmental pressure groups did not only accept the port expansion, but also began to support it. This differed considerably from the period twenty year previous to this decision-making process, during which the proposed expansion by Maasvlakte II was rejected by the government as a result of public resistance. The main question of this paper is: Why did, in contrast to the 1970s, fierce resistance from the nature preservation and environmental pressure groups against the construction of Maasvlakte II change into structural support during the 1990s?

Figure 1: Botlek (purple), Europoort (blue), Maasvlakte I (green) and Maasvlakte II (yellow)

Maasvlakte II is a port expansion on the Dutch coast (Figure 1), which is located near the port expansion Maasvlakte I, build in the 1960s. The 1970s goal of Maasvlakte II was the establishment of a blast furnace and, the 1990s goal the creation of container terminals and petro-chemical industry. In both periods resistance arose, firstly, because of the location and, secondly, because of expected activities on the port expansion. For example, an expansion to the south, along the coast, was less expensive, as the water was shallower. As a result, the Municipality of Rotterdam, the owner of the port, favoured this option. However, local citizens and nature
preservation organization were against this cheaper option as the dunes on that coast had unique vegetation. As a result, they demanded - if the government would accept Maasvlakte II - a northern variant, which was less harmful to nature. Also the expected activities on the port expansion caused resistance. In the 1970s, local citizens, but also general public pressure groups feared the increase pollution of the blast furnace and other industry. In the 1990s, resistance arose as it was feared that the traffic generated by the transhipment of containers would increase the air pollution by trucks.

In both periods, the Municipal Port Management of Rotterdam (hereinafter: the Port Management) created the proposals for port expansions. Until 2004, the Port Management was a department of the Municipality of Rotterdam, which implied that major decisions were made in the city council of Rotterdam. Therefore, in this paper the term Rotterdam applies to the Municipality including the Port Management. Rotterdam was financially dependent on the national government, as the dike around the new harbour plots, which was seen as a public good, was approximately 1/3 of the total cost of the project.

The discourse coalition approach is used to explain the difference in outcome of the proposed port expansions. A discourse coalition is not a group of organisations with shared ‘normative and causal believes’ or opponents and supporters of a project, but a group of organisations which have shared terms and concepts.¹ For example, a group that believes in the concept that prosperity is depended on economic growth. Sociologist Maarten Hajer concluded that, the 1970s dominant discourse coalition, which consisted of most public and private sector, was primarily in favour of stimulating the economy. They were, however, confronted with a new coalition of pressure groups who were against economic growth. This differed from the 1980s and 1990s during which the public and private sector and the most dominant pressure groups were part of the same discourse coalition, which was in favour of economic growth and the improvement of the liveability. In this paper liveability is the decrease of air, water and noise pollution and creation of new nature reserves. This discourse coalition approach is very useful to clarify why opponents and supporters began to accept the expansion of the Port of Rotterdam.

2 From general support to rising resistance (1960-mid-1970s)

Between 1950 and 1970 the Port of Rotterdam became five times larger, by constructing the Botlek, Europoort and Maasvlak I (see figure 1). The main reason for this fast growth was the rapid increase of transhipment, from 30 million tonnes in 1950, to 83 million in 1960 and 226 million in 1970. To put it differently, within twenty years the transhipment of goods almost tripled. Besides the growth of transhipment, ships also began to grow in size. The 1956 Suez-crisis made the passage of oil tankers through the Suez Canal impossible, forcing them to take the long route via South-Africa. In order to compensate, larger oil tankers were constructed. The maximum capacity to pass the Suez Canal was 33.000 dead weight metric tonnes (dwt). However, due to the Suez-crisis Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCC) and Ultra Large Crude Carriers (ULCC) would be constructed, which were between 180 000 and 550 000 dwt., having a length of 300 to 415 meters. As Rotterdam wanted to be able to welcome any company or ship, large-scale port expansion was needed.

The fast expansion of the Port of Rotterdam was, however, only possible because of broad public and political support for the development of the Port of Rotterdam. After the Second World War the public and the government saw the Port of Rotterdam as an important generator of new jobs and, subsequently, prosperity. This support was, historically embedded as the Dutch citizens had witnessed the high unemployment of the 1930s and underwent the ruination of the Second World War. The increase of industrial production was seen as a precondition to become less dependent on Germany, which had occupied the Netherlands between 1940 and 1945. Moreover, it was seen as an insurance against high unemployment. In reaction to the question, if there was never any critique on the 1950s and 1960s port expansions, former-Director of the Port Management, Frans Posthuma answered in an interview in a Dutch newspaper: “You know, we lived in a time of rebuilding and the horrors of

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5 R. Woodman, The history of the ship. The comprehensive story of seafaring from the earliest times to the present day (London 1997) 217-219.
the unemployment in the 1930s were still very much alive." All in all, the politicians and the public accepted that the port had to expand in order to create more employment. Not only, the support for port development was high, but also the public united behind the ruling politicians. A. Lijphard described the citizens as passive masses, who accepted the decisions that were made. Since the government was in favour of the industrialization of the Port of Rotterdam, critique was minimal, despite the fact that villages of 600 inhabitants had to be relocated. All in all, there was a general acceptance that economic growth was strongly linked to prosperity.

Between 1954 and 1960 Rotterdam created the Botlek and Europoort expansion and already during the execution of the latter expansion it was decided to plan for new port expansions along the Dutch coast. The reason for this expansion was to create an area for a blast furnace and petrochemical industry. Between 1960 and 1967 the decision-making process of the next expansion, Maasvlakte I, began. Although the first resistance arose during the construction of this port expansion, as a whole nature reserve was destroyed, it was especially during the planning of Maasvlakte II that fierce resistance arose (see Figure 2).

**Figure 2: Plans for expansion to the Southwest: Maasvlakte II (1967).**


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The resistance that arose showed that a new discourse coalition had arisen. The main reason was that welfare caught up with politics, which pushed the politicians to improve liveability and take care of nature. According to Historian C.J.M. Schuyt and Ed Taverne the babyboom generation that was raised after the Second World War was allergic to growth and progress. Triggered by influential works such as The Affluent Society (1958), Cities, Roads and Space - Steden, Wegen ruimte: op weg naar de berm beschaving (1971) - and The limits to growth (1972), public pressure groups began to arise. All such books underlined that the current use of resources and pollution of the earth would soon result in the destruction of society. In the Netherlands it was especially during the early 1970s that the number of pressure groups grew fast with no less than 600-700 in number. In Rotterdam, for instance, resistance arose in fear of losing more nature reserves. In 1968, an influential work Breakers on Voorne, scientists showed the uniqueness of the ecological diversity around the dunes of Voorne (Figure 2). The goal was to give a counter-argument against Rotterdam’s economic arguments.

Figure 3: the influence of the 1964 demarcationline

Source: Port of Rotterdam (2013)

9 Ibidem, 29
11 M. J. Adriani and E. Van der Maarel, Voorne in de branding. Een beschouwing over de natuurwetenschappelijke betekenis van het kustgebied van Voorne in verband met mogelijke technische werken in dit gebied. [Oostvoorne 1968].
12Ibidem, 3-4. Original quote: ‘Aanleiding tot het samenstellen van deze brochure zijn de plannen tot verdere uitbreiding van de Maasvlakte-werken ten behoeve van havenfaciliteiten en industrialisatie.’
In addition, the government began to question the unlimited port expansion of Rotterdam. Firstly, in fear for the fast growth of the population in areas such as the Port Region and subsequent expected decrease of liveability, it began to support the spreading of the population over the whole of the Netherlands, including less populated areas in the North and East of the Netherlands. Moreover, the government began to underline the need for the protection of recreation and nature areas such as the Dunes of Voorne. As a result, on 21st July 1964, it had already accepted the creation of a demarcation line, which separated on the one side an area for the establishment of industry and other port activities (north) and on the other side an area for recreation and nature (south), the Government officially agreed with the identified demarcation line (see Figure 3).\textsuperscript{13}

\textbf{Figure 4: The Plan 2000+ (1969) (square: Maasvlakte II)}


In 1969, the Rotterdam reaction to the rising discourse coalition, including the government and nature preservation and environmental pressure groups, was the creation of the Plan 2000+, which included Maasvlakte II (see figure 4).\textsuperscript{14} The


\textsuperscript{14} GA 232.02 30, Plan 2000+ 1969.
publication of this plan resulted in the stiffening of resistance. It was not an ordinary port plan, but a spatial plan for the whole region around Rotterdam. It gave the instruments necessary to the municipalities and the province to make a coherent vision on recreation and industrialization.\textsuperscript{15} The plan covered seven different developments within in the region shown on 16 full-colour high scale maps. The most important plan to be mentioned was the expansion of the Maasvlakte with 2 500 hectares (Maasvlakte II). The total port expansion desired for was over 10 000 hectares or a doubling of the then present port. Moreover, the creation of a city of 500 000 inhabitants in a then agricultural area was considered.\textsuperscript{16} Citizens and the press reacted furiously. Nonetheless, Rotterdam kept on lobbying the government for at least the expansion by Maasvlakte II.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{l|c|c|c|c|c|c|c}
\hline
\hline
Complaints & 2,432 & 7,706 & 17,653 & 27,726 & 15,163 & 19,432 & 13,218 \\
Index (1968=100) & 100 & 317 & 726 & 1,140 & 623 & 799 & 544 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Complaints of citizens in the Rhine Estuary Region about environmental pollution between 1968 and 1974}
\end{table}

Source: Kees Boenders, Milieuprotest in Rijnmond (1985), 139. Index numbers: own calculation)

In October 1970 and September 1971, the Municipality of Vlaardingen, located next to the port, was confronted with thick smog, changing the public opinion.\textsuperscript{17} Although in the 1960s smog was previously encountered, never before was it that severe. For instance, in 1970 some schools even had to send their pupils home. Both periods of smog only lasted for two days, but this resulted in an enormous increase in complaints in the region around the port (Table 1). The smog also made the inhabitants more aware of noise and water pollution. The resistance of the local population fuelled the efforts of pressure groups. Moreover, it received more political attention.\textsuperscript{18} As a

\textsuperscript{15}C. J. M. Schuyt, Welvaart in zwart-wit, 168
\textsuperscript{16}GA 232.02 30, Plan 2000+ 1969.
\textsuperscript{18}See for an extensive description: F. De Goey, Ruimte voor industrie. Rotterdam en de vestiging van industrie in de haven 1945-1975, 245
result, in the early 1970s, although transhipment still increased fast, the government officially refused to finance Maasvlakte II. In other words, the protest against pollution and harm to nature resulted in the end of port expansion. Moreover, until the mid-1990s due to the oil crises (1973 and 1979) the plots of the last expansion would stay largely empty.

All in all, the reason for the failed effort to rally support for the construction Maasvlakte II was the rise of a new discourse coalition, which opposed economic development and port expansions. As this new discourse coalition directly opposed the dominant discourse coalition, no compromise was possible. That is the reason why conflict led to the stiffening of resistance.

3 From rising resistance to general support (1990s-2008)

During the late 1980s and early 1990s there was no clear indication of the impending increase in transhipment. Moreover, still half of the last expansion, Maasvlakte I, was empty. Nonetheless, in 1991, Rotterdam published the Port Plan 2010, showing the need for Maasvlakte II. In other words, this plan was in contrast to the 1970s based on vision and not, as in the 1970s, on the growth of transhipment.

The government marked, in contrast to the 1970s, Maasvlakte II as a project of essential economic importance. The reason that the government was in favour of port development was the economic downturn after the oil crises and the subsequent fast growth of unemployment. Late-1980s Dutch Cabinet Lubbers III decided to write policy documents in which large spatial plans were outlined for the future of the Netherlands. In contrast to earlier spatial plans, these documents had a strong economic focus. The choice was made that the Port of Rotterdam and airport Schiphol would become the spearheads of Dutch economic policy. As a result, projects to improve their competitiveness were added to the policy document. Specifically, for the Port of Rotterdam the construction of a dedicated goods train track and the construction of a port expansion were included.

In 1993, in contrast to the 1970s, the government actively tried to increase the public backing for port expansion. As a result, Maasvlakte II was linked to the

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creation of 750 hectares of new nature reserve in order to improve the liveability. In the densely populated area around the port, a nature reserve of more than 750 hectares was rare. Besides this attempt to raise public support, in 1996 the cabinet started a national usefulness and necessity discussion, which could be attended by all citizens in the Netherlands, during different sessions in all parts of the Netherlands. The goal was to have a balanced discussion about the usefulness and necessity of the project. This idea was a reaction to the advice of the Scientific Council for Government Policies -Wetenschappelijke Raad voor Regeringsbeleid (WRR)- which argued that more input from the public should be allowed in the first part of the decision-making process of megaprojects in order to avoid delays in the last phase. In 1996, as a result a national discussion of a year was added to the decision-making process. Nonetheless, in 1997, in the final phase of the national discussion, resistance against Maasvlakte II stiffened. The main opponents were the nature preservation and environmental pressure groups.

In order to understand the rise of this resistance, it is important to describe how between the 1970s and 1990s these pressure groups evolved. In that period the nature preservation and environmental pressure groups increased in terms of members and size. Between 1989 and 2001, the number of members of the largest and most influential nature preservation organization – Naturemonumenten - grew in just twelve year from a quarter of a million to a million. With less than 7 million households in the Netherlands, this means that 1 in 7 households was a member of this organization. Moreover, this was just one of the many nature preservation and environmental pressure groups that grew in size. In 1999, there were six nature preservation and environmental pressure groups with 120 000 to a million members.

This increase in size had several effects. It required more professional organisations, as the members had to be informed and the financial means were available. Furthermore, as the organisations became financially more dependent on their members, these organisations became less radical and more practical. In other words, the larger the organizations grew, the less radical they became. As a result, in

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22 Hein-Anton v. d. Heijden, Tussen aanpassing en verzet. Milieubeweging en milieudiscours, 69
23 Ibidem, 66-67.
1997, the two largest nature preservation groups decided to change the strategy from activism towards cooperation.\textsuperscript{24}

This cooperation was also possible as these pressure groups became more broadly oriented. For example, the late 1980s high unemployment under the Dutch population made the organization aware that decrease of pollution and the development of nature had to go hand-in-hand with economic development. As a result, they underlined the dual mandate of the national government for economic development and the creation of nature reserves, such as the one in the Port Region. As a result, they were part of the same discourse coalition as the government and Rotterdam. This did, however, not mean they fully agreed with the decision-making process of Maasvlakte II.

In 1997, in the final phase of the national discussion, nature preservation and environmental pressure groups showed their discontent with the decision-making process of Maasvlakte II. According to the pressure groups, Rotterdam was biased towards Maasvlakte II, as it refused to discuss the more efficient use of current harbour plots or a less harmful Northern variant of Maasvlakte II (read: further away from the coast of Voorne). Moreover, the pressure groups wanted to have a say in the location of the 750 hectares of new nature. Rotterdam presumed that the nature area should be located directly next to Maasvlakte II, whereas the pressure groups argued that it should be located near to the more densely populated region of the city of Rotterdam. However, no influence was given to the pressure groups, concerning the location.

It was the 1997 report of the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Bureau Policy Analysis –Centraal Planbureau – the most influential policy advisor in the Netherlands, which gave the pressure groups extra support to demand more influence. In the report it was concluded that the construction of Maasvlakte II was at this time unnecessary. According to the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Bureau Policy Analysis the discussion about Maasvlakte II could be postponed for at least ten years.

Rotterdam was however, unwilling to change its stance towards Maasvlakte. It viewed the short-term need for Maasvlakte II as clear-cut. Although the pressure groups were willing to agree with this argument, they wanted to have a thorough

\textsuperscript{24} http://assets.wnf.nl/downloads/veters.pdf (15-10-2014).
investigation into an alternative to Maasvlakte II. As Rotterdam refused to give in, the nature preservation and environmental pressure groups lobbied Parliament and in 1999 this resulted in the broad acceptance of a motion, which underlined the need for an inquiry into alternatives to Maasvlakte II.25

In the late 1990s, based on the passing of the motion and the report of the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, Rotterdam concluded that it was impossible to execute Maasvlakte II without the support of the nature preservation and environmental pressure groups. As a result, in 1999, aldermen of Rotterdam and the Municipal Port Management started talks with an organized group of nature preservation and environmental pressure groups, including a representative of the large nature preservation group *Natuurmonumenten*. The pressure groups accepted to leave the discussion about the usefulness and necessity to the government. This gave them the opportunity to discuss the location and possible compensation projects.

During the meetings, Rotterdam and the pressure groups became aware that they did agree upon the need for economic development as well as the improvement of the liveability through the reduction of pollution and the creation of new nature reserves. One of the chairmen of the pressure groups – *Milieudefederatie Zuid-Holland* – argued later that the pressure groups and Rotterdam agreed on 80 to 90 percent of the issues, but only began to understand this after active cooperation.26 In other words, they were part of the same discourse coalition.

Besides this general agreement with the parties, it was possible to employ a mutual gains approach.27 In other words, an approach in which all parties won. For example, it was decided to redevelop the old ports near the city centre into residential areas. As a result, no new expensive residential areas had to be created outside of the city and, moreover, companies could be moved away from the city towards other parts of the port including Maasvlakte II. Also the pressure groups won as the Port Management left the option of constructing a cheaper version of Maasvlakte II along the coast of Voorne. Furthermore, it was agreed upon that 750 hectares of new nature would be created around the city instead of directly next to Maasvlakte II. Besides

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25 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Motion Jaap Jelle Feenstra, 24691, nr. 7 (December 18th 1997). Interview Matthijs van Muijen, employee umbrella organization of nature preservation and environmental pressure groups ConSpHet and political assistant to Jaap Jelle Feenstra, April 15th 2014.

26 Interview Ellen verkoelen, former-director of Milieudefederatie Zuid-Holland, March 18th 2013.

27 Interview Frans Evers, former director of Natuurmonumenten, August 7th 2014.
these linked projects, compensation measures were added to the plan, including measures to decrease pollution and a 25 000 hectare sea reserve. In May 2000, all of these different projects became part of a package deal.

Between 2000 and 2008, the project was further developed and, eventually all former-opponents choose to sign agreements with Rotterdam. In 2008, the whole package deal of Maasvlakte II consisted of a total of 35 projects to improve the liveability in the city of Rotterdam and around the port. The costs were paid for by the local, regional and national government, on the one hand from previously reserved funds for nature development and on the other hand with extra capital. In total the government reserved 1605 million euro (prices 2004) for the project, of which 57 percent for Maasvlakte II (1 119 million) and 43 percent for all additional projects (486 million euro). In other words, generating support had its price.

Conclusion

In the 1970s and the 1990s attempts were made by Rotterdam to construct the port expansion Maasvlakte II. Whereas, in the 1970s this plan resulted in the stiffening of resistance and the rejection of the plan, in the 1990s the resistance was overcome and general support was cultivated, resulting in the construction of Maasvlakte II. The main question of this paper was: why did in contrast to the 1970s, fierce resistance from the nature preservation and environmental pressure groups against the construction of Maasvlakte II, change into structural support during the 1990s?

The discourse coalition approach shows that the character of the resistance can explain the outcome of a decision-making process. Whereas in the 1970s, the Municipality of Rotterdam was confronted with the rise of an opposing discourse coalition, in the 1990s, the Municipality of Rotterdam was part of the same discourse coalition as the opponents. For example, during the 1970s the nature preservation and environmental pressure groups opposed further industrialization and port expansions, whereas in the 1990s these groups participated in the formal discussions about the economic stimulation of the port region. As in the 1990s, the public and private sector
and the nature preservation and environmental pressure groups were part of the same discourse coalition; resistance did not result in escalation, but into more cooperation.

Still the question is why paradoxically the 1970s expansion stopped, although the transhipment grew fast, and why the 1990s plan for expansion was put on the national agenda, despite the low growth of transhipment. This can be explained by the fact that the rise and fall of discourse coalitions is strongly influenced by socio-economic developments, which precede it. For example, during the early 1990s and 1950s there was general support for economic growth, because of the periods of unemployment during the 1930s and 1980s. In the 1970s, in the absence of a period of high unemployment, a discourse coalition arose which did not focus on employment, but the negative externalities of economic growth. In other words, the local mentality towards a project, as a result of preceding socio-economic tendencies, is of essential importance.

A few conclusions can be drawn about the generation of support in the case of the existence of a broad discourse coalition supporting economic growth. Firstly, conflicts and delays are of essential importance to mutually resolve and cultivate support. It were, for instance, the conflicts and delays which stimulated Rotterdam to start cooperating with the nature preservation and environmental pressure groups. Secondly, visionary port plans can be useful to create support among the public, but they should be in line with governmental policy. For example, in this specific case the vision for a port expansion perfectly intertwined with the integral development of the Port Region. Thirdly, generating broad support has its price. Eventually 43 percent of total governmental spending on the whole package deal was reserved for additional projects.
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