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**POLICY MODES FOR CLIMATE CHANGE**  
**THE ROLE OF TRIPARTITE PARTNERSHIPS**

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# **POLICY MODES FOR CLIMATE CHANGE**

## **THE ROLE OF TRIPARTITE PARTNERSHIPS**

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### **Abstract**

This position paper provides an initial overview of the role of tripartite partnerships for climate change in the broader framework of policy options available to address the issue. First, we will position partnerships in relation to other policy modes for climate change, including emissions trading schemes, voluntary agreements and individual corporate self-regulation. Next, partnerships for climate change will be explored empirically, taking two existing databases for their tripartite initiatives into account and the extent to which they focus on development. Suggestions for further work on tripartite partnerships for climate change and development will be indicated.

## Policy modes for climate change

Considerable attention has been paid recently to climate change, most notably when linked to ongoing attempts to re-alise a successor to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. While policy-making efforts are still underway, the past decade has seen a wave of voluntary initiatives at the local, national and international levels in an attempt to start addressing the issue and build knowledge about possible solutions. This applies not only to those countries that supported the Kyoto Protocol from the beginning, but also, and in some respects even more (if we consider state-level actions), to countries whose governments have traditionally been less enthusiastic about international climate change policy such as the US and, until recently, Australia. In the continuum between regulation and self-regulation, a variety of policy instruments and voluntary initiatives that address climate change can be observed.

One approach looked at so-called policy modes that were categorised as (I) command and control; (II) market based; (III) mandatory information disclosures for companies; (IV) business-government partnerships; and (V) private voluntary codes (“private regulation”) (Prakash & Kollman, 2004). Although this distinction was made in an attempt to list (perceived) costs and benefits for companies, it is interesting to note that tripartite partnerships, i.e. those with other partners than government and business, are missing from this classification. The categorisation also seems to be a little more intertwined than a clean distinction like this suggests. Voluntary initiatives by companies, such as corporate emissions reduction programmes and internal emissions trading, have often been important in helping shape government policies, such as national/regional emissions trading schemes, and in influencing public opinion on the desirability and/or feasibility of government action other than command and control. This applies more generally to corporate political activities for climate change, including information-based strategies and various forms of self-regulation (Kolk & Pinkse, 2007). A final aspect relevant to the field of climate change is that mandatory/voluntary disclosures often do not originate from environmental policy considerations but rather from investor demands.

Taking these additional factors into account, the current range of policy modes for climate change seem to be market-based policies on the one hand (as command and control is not really prevalent) and individual corporate initiatives on the other. In between there are voluntary agreements between business and government, and partnerships involving business, NGOs and government (Mazurkiewicz, 2005; OECD, 1999). The main difference between these two is that in voluntary agreements, responsibility for implementation of climate change measures mainly rests with the companies involved under the aegis of the government, while in partnerships it is assumed that this responsibility is shared equally between participants (Mazurkiewicz, 2005). We will first outline the market-based approaches; in particular emissions trading as this is the policy option that has received most attention (Kolk & Pinkse, 2008; Pinkse & Kolk, 2007, 2009). The others will be dealt with later in the paper.

### Market-based approaches for climate change: emissions trading

Although the Kyoto Protocol established the possibility for emissions trading between countries, it does not require the participating countries to implement a domestic emissions trading scheme applicable to companies. After ratifying the Protocol, countries had to draw up a plan specifying how they intended to meet their Kyoto target. This plan could contain a domestic emissions trading scheme as one of the options. In recent years this has emerged as the most frequently mentioned road taken, as is reflected in the wide range of initiatives and plans put forward. However, it is important to recognise that several non-European industrialised countries that ratified the Kyoto Protocol, like Japan and Canada, have not yet implemented trading schemes. Companies from these countries can use the other Kyoto market mechanisms – Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI) – to offset their emissions via reduction projects in developing countries or economies in transition.

Despite the fact that the US and, until recently, Australia, rejected the Kyoto Protocol, some trading schemes have emerged in both countries over the years, particularly at state level. These can be seen as a clear sign of divergence between the various levels of government. A considerable number of US states are preparing to begin emissions trading. These include the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) of the North-eastern states, the Western Regional Climate Action Initiative (WCI) and the Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord (MGGRA). A private trading scheme, the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) was created in 2003, in which international and local companies, governments and NGOs participated. In Australia in early 2003, the New South Wales state government launched the New South Wales Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme and 2007 saw the launch of the Australia Climate Exchange (ACX), the first emissions trading platform in the country. Emissions trading as a viable route to meeting the Kyoto targets has received increased support at the federal level, and the previous prime minister announced his intention to move to a nation-wide system by 2012. This will be implemented with New Zealand. Although Australia ratified the Kyoto Protocol in December 2007, further progress has been limited by the domestic political situation. Moreover, international negotiations on the successor to the Kyoto Protocol have not, as yet, been successful, and the future of emissions trading and the JI and CDM seems uncertain. All this will have serious implications for developing countries if progress is not achieved soon.

## Voluntary agreements

Before emissions trading became an accepted route to meeting the Kyoto targets, governments in a number of countries set up voluntary agreements targeted at climate-related issues. As these voluntary agreements were relatively flexible, they formed an ideal platform from which governments could develop policy on climate change. There were two types of voluntary agreements: negotiated agreements and public voluntary programmes (OECD, 1999).

A negotiated agreement (or covenant) is a contract between the government and an industry or individual company, which usually involves a target and a timetable for meeting the target (Thalmann & Baranzini, 2004). Failure to meet the conditions laid down in the agreement usually means that stricter policies will be implemented later. Negotiated agreements come in two forms. They are either an alternative to a (more binding) regulation or a supplement to an existing one. The former type is usually negotiated as a collective agreement with an industry association, as it is usually beneficial to the entire industry. The supplementary negotiated agreements on the other hand, are created to give companies more flexibility in complying with already existing regulations. They make it easier for companies to reach their targets and on more favourable terms. This type is therefore usually negotiated with individual companies instead of industry associations because the increased flexibility is beneficial to each company individually. (Delmas & Terlaak, 2002).

Public voluntary programmes are set up by the government and companies take part in them on a voluntary basis. Participating companies agree to maintain certain standards, to implement certain technologies or reduce emissions to a particular level. In return for this, they receive benefits such as technical assistance or subsidies (OECD, 1999).

Both forms of voluntary agreements, although undertaken with the government, also imply some form of cooperation between the various participating companies. This is usually no more than a shared basic 'best practice' on how best to reduce emissions. Real cooperative efforts to reduce environmental impact do not generally develop as part of an agreement as companies tend to keep their competitive position in mind (Thalmann & Baranzini, 2004).

The role played by voluntary agreements in the overall climate policy mix has been very different across the world; so have the motives and means used by governments to introduce them. Whether voluntary initiatives were launched to gain experience with this 'new' environmental issue or used as an alternative after (or possible future) failure to launch stricter climate policies (Morgenstern & Pizer, 2007), has depended to a considerable extent on the way in which the national public debate on climate change unfolded. This has led to the implementation of different kinds of agreements which vary in their objectives as well as in the benefits companies can gain from them. In some countries, voluntary agreements play an important role in the climate policy mix (Thalmann & Baranzini, 2004) and essentially operate as a substitute to mandatory climate change regulations (Khanna & Ramirez, 2004). In these situations, they appear to have been introduced because there was simply too much resistance to stricter policy instruments such as a carbon tax (Lyon & Maxwell, 2004) and not merely to pre-empt stricter regulations. Voluntary agreements were the primary component of national climate policy in the countries that either did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol (the US), were very late in ratifying (Australia) or where there was substantial internal resistance to the target set under Kyoto (Canada). These countries appear to have used public programmes that were entirely voluntary and non participation had little or no real consequences for a company (Price, 2005), except perhaps in public image.

In other countries, voluntary agreements have been implemented as part of a broader climate policy mix. They contain mandatory policy instruments like a tax or emissions trading scheme (Price, 2005). In all EU Member States, voluntary agreements currently operate along with the European emissions trading scheme (EU ETS). The EU ETS only started in 2005 and many voluntary agreements were already in place years before that. The situation in Europe was initially similar to the current situation in the US and Australia where voluntary agreements were launched in the mid-1990s in response to a failure to implement an EU-wide carbon tax (Khanna & Ramirez, 2004) and not in an attempt to pre-empt it. Nevertheless, one important difference is that most (although not all) European voluntary agreements on climate change are negotiated agreements and not public voluntary agreements. Participation in these agreements is less voluntary because the agreements are usually negotiated with business associations representing whole industries and once negotiated the terms are binding. In other words, it appears that European governments have more political will to come up with a climate policy mix that puts substantial pressure on companies to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and voluntary agreements are one means to achieve this. Another important aspect of voluntary agreements is that they are very dynamic and tend to be of a temporary nature. They are eventually replaced by other forms of regulation or become partnerships.

It should be noted that there is no evidence to prove their effectiveness as an instrument. This is clear from a recent state-of-the-art overview of existing literature and a broad-scale empirical study (Dijkgraaf et al., 2009). There are some indications that the promise of a reward like a subsidy or the threat of a fine or tax, if targets were or were not met, might prove effective. The report recommends clear, integral targets be set to avoid substitution effects, that free-riders are kept out by formulating and measuring objectives at the individual level, and that explicit reporting requirements

are imposed on participants. Interestingly, the researchers also clearly indicate that it would be more effective to leave the initiative for voluntary agreements to non-state actors. This type of arrangement would, in some respects, resemble a partnership.

The existing policy instruments in which the government has an active facilitating role and the prevalent market-based approach (emissions trading) do not appear to have been sufficient to address the issue of climate change so far. Another aspect worth considering is that some people appear to see voluntary agreements as a variant form of business-government partnerships (like Prakash & Kollman, 2004), although the agreements frequently lack the non-hierarchical nature, shared responsibility and partner regulation found in the partnership concept (Mazurkiewicz, 2005; Van Huijstee et al., 2007). For this reason, we do not include existing voluntary agreements under the partnership heading.

## Individual corporate initiatives

Another deviation from the ideas set out by Prakash and Kollman (2004) can be seen in the matter of (mandatory) information disclosure. This is applicable to climate change regulation not as an environmental policy instrument but for financial regulation with an eye to risk reduction or for reputational purposes.

The US Securities and Exchange Commission stipulates that public listed companies report all information that could affect the financial condition or operational results of their company. It could be argued that climate change is something that should be included under this heading. Although some companies do include reports on climate change, a recent study that systematically analysed over 6,000 filings by S&P 500 companies since 1995, found “an alarming pattern of non-disclosure by corporations regarding climate risk” (Doran et al., 2009, p. 1). Moreover, more than 75% of the 2008 annual reports of the same companies did not refer to climate change at all, with only 5% having a strategy for managing climate-related risks. There was very limited disclosure in the reports of 100 global companies in five sectors who are thought to play a key role in a low-carbon economy (Young et al., 2009). The limited disclosure of material related to climate change risks over the years (Pinkse & Kolk, 2009) has given rise to consistent requests for stricter regulations. This has led to the establishment of new SEC guidelines which were issued in January 2010. These stipulate that public traded companies disclose all climate related material that has an effect on their business. This is likely to have an impact in the coming years, although it remains to be seen to what extent companies will use different interpretations of risks and opportunities, as they have done before.

Pressure from investors has been most prominent in the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP). From 2003 onwards, it sent out questionnaires to a large number of companies – initially only to the Financial Times 500, but currently to other lists including around 6,500 additional companies. The questions cover aspects like the perceived opportunities and risks of climate change, the amount of greenhouse gas emitted, the emissions reduction targets and programmes, and their approach to emissions trading. The questionnaire has changed considerably over time. For example, while the first three versions only asked about opportunities and risks in general, from the fourth questionnaire onwards a clear distinction was made between regulatory and physical risks of climate change. From the second questionnaire onwards, a recurring topic became the issue of how responsibility for climate change was allocated within the company. At its core, CDP represents an effort to develop standardised reporting procedures for companies concerning their climate-related activities. It is put in a form intended to complement annual financial accounts and provide information relevant to investors on the business risks and opportunities from climate change. Growing response rates (for example, 82% of the FT500 filled in the questionnaire in 2009) show that companies have become more aware of the need to disclose climate change issues, and also that they have started to collect information on this matter.

While there are many questions about the quality and comparability of the data, and thus also its value to investors (Kolk, Levy & Pinkse, 2008), the very trend towards carbon disclosure has also had implications for the other individual corporate activities that in a sense underlie it, i.e. emissions measurement, emissions inventories and target setting. Although a range of difficulties and managerial choices about the types and levels of targets, the scope of emissions, the organisational boundaries and methodology (Pinkse & Kolk, 2009), an emissions inventory has become rather common nowadays (Cogan, 2006). In the case of European Union Member States, this is because compliance with the EU emissions trading scheme is mandatory, whereas in most other situations it is of a voluntary nature. In these cases it covers activities that may frequently be linked to (or form a precondition for) all types of policy modes in which companies have chosen to participate, which we outlined above, except for partnerships, to which we will now turn.

## Partnerships

Partnerships represent what Austin (2000) called the “collaboration paradigm of the 21st century” needed to solve “increasingly complex challenges” that “exceed the capabilities of any single sector”. Partnerships have become increasingly interesting implementation mechanism for sustainable development since they were listed as the eighth of the Millennium Development Goals at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD). They were recognised one of the most feasible suggestions to have risen from the many ideas launched a decade earlier at the Rio conference that had failed to be translated into concrete measures. Partnerships in a sense aim to address different forms of ‘governance’ failure in a situation where governments, companies and NGOs are unable to unilaterally achieve the desired public objectives, especially when dealing with complex global problems such as the protection of the environment (Bäckstrand, 2008; Biermann et al., 2007; Kolk, Van Tulder & Kostwinder, 2008; Van Tulder & Fortanier, 2009). They can also be seen as sources for new global rule setting involving non-state actors where ‘old’ public governance has failed and regulatory voids need to be filled (Braithwaite & Drahos, 2000; Fransen & Kolk, 2007).

One of the more recent definitions of partnerships is “collaborative arrangements in which actors from two or more spheres of society (state, market and civil society) are involved in a non-hierarchical process, and through which these actors strive for a sustainability goal” (Van Huijstee et al., 2007, p. 77). The idea behind this is older though. In the 1990s, partnerships were more broadly conceptualized as “the voluntary collaborative efforts of actors from organizations in two or more economic sectors in a forum in which they cooperatively attempt to solve a problem or issue of mutual concern that is in some way identified with a public policy agenda item” (Waddock, 1991, pp. 481-482). Both definitions highlight the fact that partnerships cut across sectors and involve non-hierarchical processes, which means that partnerships are based on the idea of shared responsibility (Mazurkiewicz, 2005) in which no single actor – for example, the government – regulates the behaviour of the others. Mutual cooperation is necessary as one actor cannot operate on his own. (Selsky & Parker, 2005; Witte et al., 2003). Another characteristic of this kind of partnership is that it aims to provide a collective good and is linked to a public-policy agenda item e.g. climate change and/or development (Schäferhoff, Campe & Kaan, 2009; Waddock, 1991). It is interesting to note that the policy modes discussed in the previous section on climate change have mostly covered developed countries whereas there seems ample opportunity for partnerships to (potentially) play a role in helping developing countries address climate change issues.

While there are also public/private and private/non-profit partnerships, our main focus is on tripartite partnerships that involve business, government and non-profit partners. These are often characterised as the best way to tackle the numerous multifaceted problems at present. Complex issues like these, including the ones dealt with in this paper, require cooperation across sectors (and countries) in which all partners are equally dedicated as they share a common goal. Multi-stakeholder approaches are said to have specific advantages as all parties relevant to a specific issue have a say in the matter (Bäckstrand & Lövbrand, 2006; Boström, 2006; Forsyth, 2007; Schäferhoff et al., 2009). This also ensures that criticism to choices and approach are heard and can be taken into account, which increases credibility and quality (Fransen & Kolk, 2007).

The involvement of groups from various backgrounds enables parties to learn from one another (Zadek, 2001) as they bring in different knowledge and expertise which can be beneficial for all. Although reality is often more complex, as can be seen in multi-stakeholder standard-setting initiatives (Fransen & Kolk, 2007), tripartite partnerships for development have demonstrated a clear division of roles between the partners. The different companies provide specific knowledge and expertise, the NGOs provide local embeddedness, contacts and support like training and capacity building, and governments supply funding, usually to reduce risks, and facilitate the activities (Kolk, Van Tulder & Kostwinder, 2008). Although the advantages of tripartite partnerships for solving complex problems such as climate change have been proven, they have not been studied in relation to developing countries. Below we will explore tripartite partnerships for climate change empirically, considering two existing databases; one introduced alongside the WSSD, and one we developed ourselves, focused on the Global 500 companies (Kolk et al., 2010), to see to what extent they relate to developing countries.

## WSSD

The WSSD database of 348 partnerships shows that overall, most partnerships are either led by intergovernmental organisations (often UN-related), international NGOs based in Western countries, or OECD-country governments (Bäckstrand, 2006). Before they can be registered, the partnerships are asked to identify linkages with one or several of 35 themes which they list as primary or secondary. These include issues like biodiversity, climate change, desertification, drought and energy for sustainable development. Although 38 WSSD partnerships registered climate change as their primary theme and 65 as their secondary, there is limited corporate involvement in these climate-specific projects. Only two of the WSSD partnerships that list climate change as a primary theme indicate that one of their lead partners is a

company. These are the Competence Platform on Energy Crop and Agroforestry Systems for Arid and Semi-arid Ecosystems – Africa with WIP Renewable Energies as a lead partner and Refrigerants Naturally Initiative with the Coca-Cola Company, McDonald's, and Unilever as lead partners (see Box I).

*Box I. WSSD partnerships with companies as lead partners*

**Competence Platform on Energy Crop and Agroforestry Systems for Arid and Semi-arid Ecosystems – Africa**

This partnership is led by Germany-based WIP Renewable Energies, a company specialised in renewable energy technology. The main goal of the partnership is to stimulate bio-energy implementation in Africa. It forms a platform through which policy dialogue and capacity building is stimulated.

**The Refrigerants Naturally Initiative**

This partnership is led by Coca Cola, McDonalds and Unilever. The main goal is to replace F-gases, such as CFCs, HCFCs and HFCs, by natural refrigerants that are used to cool products at the point where they are sold to the end customer. Since major climate policy instruments, including the EU emissions trading scheme, do not take care of reducing GHG emissions other than CO<sub>2</sub>, it can be argued that these initiatives that focus on methane and F-gases do fill a regulatory gap and thus have added value as a complement to existing climate policy. However, the focus of this partnership is not exclusively on developing countries.

In addition to these two, the Methane to Markets partnership is the only other one with a broad company representation. Of the 65 WSSD partnerships that list climate change as a secondary theme, not one has an individual company as lead partner. There are, however, three partnerships in this category that have clear company representation, i.e. The Cement Sustainability Initiative, the Global Gas Flaring Reduction Partnership, and the U.S. Energy Association/U.S. Agency for International Development Energy Partnership Program, where the official lead partners include the World Business Council for Sustainable Development, the World Bank and the U.S. Energy Association.

Companies do not appear to see the need to become involved in the climate change arena and cooperate in partnerships that have a relation with the WSSD or the UN. In other words, this route towards 'private governance' (Pattberg, 2005) does not work the way it was supposed to. It is still dominated by the powerful actors that were already involved in the intergovernmental arena, namely international organisations, governments, and large international NGOs (Biermann et al., 2007). It is interesting to note that the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate used to be included in the WSSD database and although one of its goals is to stimulate private sector technology development, its lead partners merely consist of national governments, not companies. On the other hand, it is also not that surprising because the WSSD focuses specifically on sustainability in a developing-country context. Although there is a developmental component to climate change activities (see for example, the Clean Development Mechanism) many multinationals regard the reduction of GHG emissions as an activity primarily to be conducted in western countries where they are located and are subject to pressure from governments and NGOs.

## Global 500

In view of the lack of tripartite partnerships for climate change present in the WSSD database, we decided to have a look at those undertaken by the Global 500. We analysed the partnership activities of Global 500 companies which had reported their climate change activities to the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP). We took the fourth CDP survey which was released in September 2006, as our starting point. Although information about participation in partnerships had not been explicitly requested by CDP, we noticed that an overwhelming number of companies indicated they had entered into partnerships of this kind. We obtained and verified information about the responding companies from annual and sustainability reports, websites, press coverage and other independent publications in the period July-November 2007. In this way, we were able to identify 183 companies (81 US, 81 European and 21 Asian-Pacific companies; covering a range of industries) that were involved in a total of 222 different climate change partnerships (Kolk et al., 2010).

Table 1 lists the partnerships in terms of their participants: business, government, NGOs and universities. The latter category was included as universities turned out to be important in a considerable number of cases. In our initial selection, we also considered companies if business-business partnerships were very different from the more traditional strategic alliances (i.e. linked to a public-policy goal). Whether these activities can be accurately classified as 'partnerships' in the original meaning of the definition is worthy of discussion. Egels-Zandén and Wahllqvist (2007) label them as 'post-partnerships' based on the observation that companies tend to prefer cooperating with other business partners after similar



efforts in conjunction with NGOs had failed. Nevertheless, we thought it worthwhile to list them separately initially, because partnerships between companies account for a substantial amount of activity and may represent a new trend. When companies work with other companies as partners in this way, this is often mediated by a business association, such as the World Business Council for Sustainable Development, to prevent potential allegations of collusive behaviour.

Table 1. Types of partners and focus of partnerships

Type of partners	Number	%
Business	28	12.6
Business, government	65	29.3
Business, government, NGO	17	7.7
Business, government, NGO, university	16	7.2
Business, government, university	15	6.8
Business, NGO	35	15.8
Business, NGO, university	8	3.6
Business, university	38	17.1
Total	222	100.1

\*Percentages do not add up to 100.0 due to rounding

ership Platform” which strives to set targets and transfer best practices. The World Economic Forum has initiated a GHG registry to stimulate business to voluntarily disclose emissions; and the UNEP set up the Partnership for Clean Fuels and Vehicles (PCFV).

This paper focuses on tripartite partnerships and we see that 47 of the 222 partnerships in this study could be classified as such (see Table 2 for an overview). These tripartite partnerships reflect different partner combinations, i.e. business-government-NGO, business-government-university, and business-government-university-NGO partnerships. Universities are considered as part of the non-profit category, as their main objective is neither profitability (as in the case of companies) nor regulation, the predominant function of government targeted in the partnership literature. The partnerships aim at different activities. These include research, where governments and business cooperate with universities, (mostly to develop climate friendly technologies); policy development and raising awareness of the issue; measures to reduce GHG emissions and joint efforts to set emissions targets and launching new products. In one of the partnerships that forms part of the UN Global Compact, business and civil society organizations have launched the “Caring for Climate, The Business Lead-

Table 2. Tripartite climate partnerships: an overview

	Types of actors		
Focus, number and illustrative example	Business-government-NGO	Business-government-NGO	Business-govern ment-NGO-university
Emission reduction # Example	6 World Economic Forum GHG Registry	2 Refrigerants Naturally Initiative	2 Methane to Markets Partnership
Policy influence # Example	6 The Climate Group	2 UK Corporate Leaders Group on Climate Change	6 Global Roundtable on Climate Change
Research # Example	0	11 Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum	7 CO <sup>2</sup> Capture Project
Product launch # Example	2 United Nations Partnership for Clean Fuels and Vehicles	0	1 Chicago Climate Exchange
Public Education # Example	2 National Energy Education Development Project	0	0
Total #	16	15	16

On the whole, however, it is difficult to define the exact role played by each of the various partners in these tripartite partnerships and to what extent they are explicitly aimed at tackling climate change (Kolk et al., 2010). But more importantly in the context of this position paper, only a few actually claim to include development as one the aims of the partnership. While there are some tripartite partnerships in the database which hint at development or poverty reduction as one of the co-benefits, e.g. the Global Gas Flaring Reduction Partnership, Methane to Markets Partnership, PCFV, Clinton Climate Initiative, and the HSBC Climate Partnerships, only very few indicate that development can be seen as one of their goals besides climate change.

## Concluding remarks

A wide array of policy modes has been investigated to tackle climate changes. Of these, market-based instruments and voluntary agreements have received a large amount of attention. However, none has proved very effective so far. This has created space for the development of new approaches, most notably partnerships and voluntary agreements. However, if we consider the most visible sets of partnerships currently in existence, we see that the number of tripartite partnerships for climate change is limited, as is the linkage with development in this setting. This can be concluded from both the WSSD and Global 500 partnership databases that we studied. On the whole, the large eye-catching tripartite climate partnerships have not (yet) targeted the specific problems of developing countries in the climate change arena. Many multinationals still concentrate their activities for the reduction of GHG emissions in the western countries where they are predominantly located and subject to governmental and societal pressure.

Nevertheless, there is unmistakably a developmental component to climate change activities. This has been brought to the fore in the international climate change negotiations, and laid down in instruments such as the Clean Development Mechanism and the efforts to reduce emissions from tropical deforestation and forest degradation (REDD). While an international agreement to succeed the Kyoto Protocol is not yet in sight, one thing that has become increasingly obvious is the necessity to include emissions reductions targets for developing/emerging countries, coupled with the further transfer of funds and technology to less-developed countries in particular. These seem most promising for follow-up studies on tripartite partnerships for climate change and development as does the consideration of linkages (synergies and trade-offs) between these issues.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup>For the complete WSSD database on partnerships, see  
 <<http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/partnerships/partnerships.htm>>

<sup>2</sup>In the set of partnerships with climate change as primary or secondary theme, actors that occur most frequently are: Government of Italy (8 times), United Nations Development Programme (6 times), Government of Japan (5 times), International Union for Conservation of Nature (5 times), United Nations Environment Programme (4 times), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (4 times), Government of Australia (3 times) and International Atomic Energy Agency (2 times).

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<sup>1</sup>For the complete WSSD database on partnerships, see  
<<http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/partnerships/partnerships.htm>>

<sup>2</sup>In the set of partnerships with climate change as primary or secondary theme, actors that occur most frequently are: Government of Italy (8 times), United Nations Development Programme (6 times), Government of Japan (5 times), International Union for Conservation of Nature (5 times), United Nations Environment Programme (4 times), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (4 times), Government of Australia (3 times) and International Atomic Energy Agency (2 times).