Multi-Stakeholder Platform Contribution to Value Chain Development

The Edible Oil and Oilseeds Value Chain in Ethiopia

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Final Case Study Report
Table of Contents

Abstract ................................................................................................................................................ 4
Acknowledgments .................................................................................................................................. 5
Abbreviations and acronyms ............................................................................................................. 6
1. Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 7
   1.1 Research objective and aims ................................................................................................. 7
   1.2 Theoretical framework .......................................................................................................... 8
   1.3 Methodology ......................................................................................................................... 11
   1.4 Outline of the report ............................................................................................................ 13
2. Context of the case study .......................................................................................................... 14
   2.1 The Oilseeds Sector ............................................................................................................. 14
   2.2 The Edible Oil and Oilseeds Coordination Group ....................................................... 22
3. Oilseeds Coordination Group Dynamics............................................................................... 25
   3.1 Basic Collaboration Requirements ................................................................................... 25
      3.1.1 Level of engagement .................................................................................................... 26
      3.1.2 Jointness ......................................................................................................................... 30
      3.1.3 Transparency ................................................................................................................. 38
      3.1.4 Goal alignment .............................................................................................................. 39
   3.2 Embeddedness ...................................................................................................................... 41
   3.3 Involvement .......................................................................................................................... 43
4. Institutional change ................................................................................................................... 48
   4.1 Access to knowledge ........................................................................................................... 48
   4.2 Access to capital ................................................................................................................... 49
   4.3 Access to markets ............................................................................................................... 50
   4.4 Access to organisation ........................................................................................................ 53
5. The future of the oilseeds CG .................................................................................................. 53
6. Conclusions .................................................................................................................................. 54
7. Limitations ................................................................................................................................... 58
8. References .................................................................................................................................... 59
9. Appendices ................................................................................................................................... 61
   Appendix 1: Theoretical model ............................................................................................... 62
   Appendix 2: Roles of various stakeholders ........................................................................... 62
   Appendix 3: Interview schedule/ List of Interviewees for Oilseeds Value Chain ........ 63
   Appendix 4: Questionnaire ....................................................................................................... 67
Appendix 5: Course ratio oilseeds CG ................................................................. 74
Appendix 6: Betweenness centrality oilseeds CG ............................................... 75

Cover page picture (safflower): Derived from the Minutes of the 10th Edible Oil and Oilseeds CG Meeting
Abstract
This report investigates the dynamics of a multi-stakeholder platform (named: Coordination Group, or CG) for stakeholders of the oilseeds and edible oil value chains in Ethiopia. The CG was initiated by the Dutch development organisation SNV in 2005 as part of a broader programme to improve market access for farmers/producers and small- and medium-sized edible oil processing companies. To examine the MSP, both its internal, organisational dynamics and its external dynamics, i.e. the changes brought about in key areas of the institutional business environment, were analysed. A mixed-method design was used for the data collection and -analysis, including in-depth interviews with 18 key representative edible oil and oilseeds stakeholders participating in the CG meetings, document analysis, and a social network analysis.

Ethiopia has a considerable potential for oilseeds production resulting from its diverse and favourable climate conditions as well as the existing large size of uncultivated land. Common and speciality Ethiopian oilseeds (safflower, castor beans and rapeseeds) are under high international demand due to their organic nature. Despite its potential and high international demands, the oilseeds sector in Ethiopia is constrained by several factors that can be grouped into production, processing and marketing problems. The CG was established to address these major problems.

The dominant impression is that the CG has played a key role in bringing stakeholders from the three societal sectors (public, private and civil society) together to participate in a new, loose governance structure that reasonably meets the majority of collaboration requirements. Assessments of the success factors in collaboration demonstrate mixed results that range from low-high. Generally, the CG has performed better in the areas of its internal dynamics than in its external dynamics. Despite the fact that oilseeds CG lacks an active nucleus-group; it has introduced and maintained a fairly horizontal discussion structure where each member is free and equal—although related to capacity differences—to influence and contribute to its internal and external dynamics. Lack of active participation of key decision and policy makers in the CG meetings is a limitation of the CG to effectively influence the policy arena.

Assessments revealed that the CG was less successful in terms of its external dynamics. Except for its role in creating access to knowledge, the CG performed low in terms of creating favourable institutional business environments for small and medium sized agri-business players. The CG did not influence access to financing mechanisms. Despite its efforts to create international market opportunities, there are few alternative market opportunities created for the oilseeds’ value chain actors in general and for the farmers in particular.
Acknowledgments
The authors acknowledge the contributions of Jakomijn van Wijk of the Sustainable Development Centre of Maastricht School of Management and Ralph Besselink of Tien Vazen Consultancy. Their work was indispensable in the questionnaire preparation and database analysis. The researchers have benefited greatly from the discussions with Marc Steen and Piet Visser of SNV Ethiopia during the research design process. The field research in Ethiopia was also efficiently facilitated by SNV BOAM staff and value chain advisors. Finally, we thank all interviewees, who kindly provided us with their insights and who made this case study possible.
Abbreviations and acronyms

B2B Business to Business
BCaD Consulting Management Business Creation and Development Services
BDS Business Development Services
BOAM Business Organisations and their Access to Markets (programme)
CG Coordination Group
ECCSA Ethiopian Chamber of Commerce and Sectoral Association
DSA Daily Subsistence Allowance
EPOSPEA Ethiopian Pulses, Oilseeds, and Spices Processors and Exporters Association
FBO Farmer Based Organisation
MFI Micro Finance Institution
MoA Ministry of Agriculture
MoTI Ministry of Trade and Industry
MoU Memorandum of Understanding
MSM Maastricht School of Management
MSP Multi-Stakeholder Platform
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
PrC Partnerships Resource Centre
R&D Research & Development
RTA Round Table Africa
SDC Sustainable Development Centre
SIP Strategic Intervention Plan
SME Small and Medium Enterprises
SNNP Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples
SNV Netherlands Development Organisation
VC Value Chain
VCD Value Chain Development
VCF Value Chain Financing

Exchange Rate
Exchange rate of January 24, 2011:
1 Euro(s) = 22.59 Ethiopian Birr (ETB)
1. Introduction

Multi-stakeholder platforms (MSPs) are increasingly recognized by researchers and practitioners as promising mechanisms for stimulating economies in developing countries. The so-called chain platforms can help to bring actors, operating directly or indirectly in the chain, together and realise common objectives through dialogue and cooperation (Vermeulen et al., 2008). An increasing number of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and private enterprises are participating in such platforms, however systematic research on their effectiveness and impact is scarce. Therefore, Maastricht School of Management (MSM)/Partnerships Resource Centre (PrC) and SNV Business Organisations and their Access to Markets (BOAM)-Ethiopia have embarked on a collaborative effort to evaluate a number of MSPs which SNV BOAM initiated with the aim of developing value chains for the Ethiopian edible oil and oilseeds, honey and beeswax, dairy, and pineapple sectors. SNV is a non-profit, international development organisation, with extensive hands-on experience in their value chain approach. MSM’s Sustainable Development Centre stands for expertise on sustainable economic development in emerging markets. MSM is partner in the Partnerships Resource Centre, an open centre where academics, practitioners and students can create, retrieve and share knowledge on cross sector partnerships for sustainable development.

1.1 Research objective and aims

This edible oil and oilseeds case study assesses the effects of the multi-stakeholder platform that was established by SNV BOAM to improve access to (quality) markets for stakeholders in the edible oil and oilseeds value chain in Ethiopia. The core of SNV BOAM’s approach is to bring primary and secondary value chain actors and other stakeholders together to find solutions for identified bottlenecks in the value chain. These actors join forces in the so-called Coordinating Groups (CGs), which have a multi-stakeholder nature.

The overall objective of the study is to gain insight and generate knowledge on how, and under which conditions multi-stakeholder platforms contribute to the development of value chains, with a focus on SNV BOAM’s programme (agriculture, horticulture) value chains in Ethiopia. Critical success factors and main bottlenecks of MSPs for value chain development in Ethiopia are to be identified. In terms of contribution the synthesis report of the overall study has three aims. First, the study should contribute to the learning process of MSP members and other local Ethiopian stakeholders through verification of results and knowledge dissemination. Second, the synthesis report should end with recommendations on how SNV BOAM can improve its multi-stakeholder processes to increase their contribution to value chain development.

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1 Comprising of dialogues, policy making, and implementation, the term ‘multi-stakeholder’ is often attached to, platforms, processes, and partnerships (Warner, 2006). In this research we refer to multi-stakeholder platforms when discussing MSPs.
2 SNV BOAM Ethiopia: www.SNV BOAMworld.org/en/countries/ethiopia/Pages/default.aspx
3 MSM - SDC: www.msm.nl/1/1/uk/research/sustainable_development_center/
4 PrC: www.erin.eur.nl/ERIM/Research/Centres/SCOPE/Partnerships_Resource_Centre/About
5 Website SNV BOAM & Annual Report 2008
Finally, the study should contribute to the academic debate on how value chain partnerships can facilitate sustainable competitiveness in developing countries. This edible oil and oilseeds case study provides input for all three aims, however, reports only on the first aim.

1.2 Theoretical framework

Multi-stakeholder initiatives are generally characterised as horizontally organised, with a greater degree of flexibility and openness as traditional forms of governance. In policy-related documents, MSPs are often considered as highly promising alternative forms of governance. They are based on the “recognition of the importance of achieving equity and accountability”, involving equitable representation of stakeholder views, and are “based on democratic principles of transparency and participation” aiming to develop “partnerships and strengthened networks among stakeholders” (Hemmati, 2002:2).

Institutional theory, social network theory and collaboration literature has been explored to gain insight and generate knowledge on how, and under which conditions partnerships (including MSPs) can contribute to changing institutional business environments to facilitate the inclusion of small and medium agribusiness players into value chains. The effects of the MSPs are examined in terms of their a) internal dynamics (basic collaboration, embeddedness and involvement) including a social network analysis, and b) external dynamics (the changes in key areas of the institutional business environment). The theoretical model is visualized in appendix 1.

(a) Internal dynamics
From the collaboration literature, the level of engagement of partners, formalized goal alignment, shared (decision making) processes and activities, and transparency are among the main basic requirements for successful collaboration (Kolk et al. 2008). A high level of engagement of stakeholders, proper goal alignment, formalisation, risk- and resource-sharing, trust and transparency, shared learning, and joint decision making are critical factors for successful multi-stakeholder platforms, particularly when these deal with more ambitious and complex issues (Ansell & Gash 2008; Springer-Heinze 2007, Bitzer et al. 2010, Kolk et al. 2008).

Collaboration presents the highest strategic level of engagement and implies that the partners share risks, resources and rewards (Austin 2007). This also entails a formalisation of governance structures, including contractual arrangements to specify objectives, activities and responsibilities. Moreover, the relationship between actors refers to the range of actors actually participating in the partnership. The value of partnerships lies in the potential to create win-win situations if all stakeholders are willing and able to contribute to the achievement of goals (Bitzer et al. 2010a). Trust,
risk- and resource-sharing and transparency are indispensable in here, as well as notions on power distributions in the value chain MSPs.

In a four-year study of the collaborative activities of as small NGO in Palestine, Lawrence et al. (2002) found that inter-organisational collaboration leads to the development of new institutions (new practices, technologies and rules). Collaborations that are both highly embedded and have highly involved partners, are the most likely to generate “proto-institutions”. New rules, technologies and practices arise and are diffused beyond the boundaries of the specific MSP contexts, and adopted by other organisations in the field: they become proto-institutions. These proto-institutions “represent important first steps in the process of institution creation, thus potentially forming the basis for broader, field-level change” (Lawrence et al. 2002: 283). They may become new institutions if they diffuse sufficiently. Embeddedness describes the degree to which a collaboration is enmeshed in inter-organisational relationships (Dacin et al. 1999; Granovetter 1985). Highly embedded collaborations involve (1) interactions with third parties, (2) representation arrangements, and (3) multidirectional information flows (Lawrence et al. 2002). In order to examine whether the oilseeds CG has brought about changes in institutional fields we investigate not only the relations among collaborating MSP members, but also how the collaboration embeds them in the wider institutional field.

Involvement focuses on the way in which participating organisations relate to each other. According to Lawrence et al. (2002), high levels of involvement entail “deep interactions among participants, partnership arrangements, and bilateral information flows”. A high level of involvement among participants is necessary for institution creation. The internal dimension of partnerships is also explored in terms of the intensity of actor involvement. If the involvement of an actor is vital for the functioning of the partnership, from design to monitoring, we speak of a high degree of involvement. A medium degree of involvement occurs when an actor only participates during the implementation stages and fulfils particular tasks. If an actor only participates sporadically or not at all, we can speak of ‘no involvement’ (Bitzer et al. 2010b).

The internal dynamics are verified and complemented with a social network analysis. The network approach “allows researchers to capture the interactions of any individual unit within the larger field of activity to which the unit belongs” (Kilduff & Tsai, 2003: 13). A social network analysis describes network characteristics and concepts such as embeddedness, social capital, and network centrality. Moreover, a social network analysis has the ability to address important aspects of the social structure of a network: the sources and distribution of power (Hanneman & Riddle 2005).
In the MSP research, the network analysis enabled the researchers to gain insight on:

- The main (core) organisations, stakeholder groups and sectors participating and brokering in the MSPs (betweenness centrality);
- The proportion and types of organisations in the three societal sectors: public and private sector and civil society;
- Visitor patterns (core visitor, regular visitor, irregular visitor, at random visitor);
- The proportion of visitors that left the MSP series early (exits);

The centrality analysis helps us to understand the overall social structure of the MSP networks. Those organizations having the highest scores on betweenness centralities (the highest number of ties) in the network are the most central players in the MSP networks (Kilduff & Tsai, 2003). Moreover, more connections often mean that individuals are exposed to more diverse information. The more connected actors in the network are, the higher the likelihood that they are able to mobilize their resources and to bring diverse and multiple perspectives to solve problems. The number and kinds of ties actors have determine the range of opportunities, influence and power they have (Hanneman & Riddle 2005). “Actors who have more ties have greater opportunities because they have choices. This autonomy makes them less dependent on any specific other actor, and hence more powerful” (Hanneman & Riddle 2005: 61).

Apart from a measure to identify the most central actors, betweenness centrality is a measure for the degree that actors connect two other actors that do not have a direct link themselves. In our study it refers to the following illustrative situation: actor A is present at CG meeting 1 and actor B at meeting 2. If attending both meetings, actor C connects A with B. The hypothesis is that C is able to facilitate a flow of information from A to B and vice versa. If actors cannot reach each other, or cannot be reached by another actor, learning, support or influence between the two is restrained (Hanneman & Riddle 2005). Therefore, the higher the number of network players that have a high betweenness centrality, the more horizontal the network. Information can be diffused through multiple paths, through network ‘brokers’ that are in between other network players. The more network brokers there are, the more likely that actors have alternative ways of connection to other actors and can by-pass a given (dominant) actor (Hanneman & Riddle 2005). With smaller numbers of players with a high centrality, the network becomes more hierarchical as fewer players control intermediary information diffusion.

(b) External dynamics
The external dynamics refer to the perceived changes in institutional business environment that facilitate inclusion of small and medium sized agri-business players into the edible oil and oilseeds value chains. The fragmented nature of Africa’s agricultural sector is one of the limiting factors to its development. The majority of farmers and SMEs face huge barriers to link themselves to national and global markets, while access to these markets is considered critical to growth in developing countries (OECD, 2006; World Bank, 2008). The most important institutional challenges to
inclusion in commercial value chains concern those formal rules, inter-organisational arrangements, and informal customs that prevent farmers and SMEs from having access to knowledge & technology, credit, markets, and farmer-based organisations (Bitzer et al. 2010b; Van Wijk and Kwakkenbos, 2011).

Lack of access to capital or credit is a major constraint for many smallholders (Altenburg, 2007; Kaplinsky and Morris, 2001). Broader access to financial services would expand their opportunities for technology adoption and resource allocation (World Bank, 2008). The lack of access to knowledge often hampers agri-food enterprises to adopt new practices that build trust and confidence of buyers in the quality and safety assurance mechanisms for their produce (Henson and Jaffee 2006; Garcia Martinez and Poole 2004). Farmers are exposed to highly volatile markets, which hinder investments in the agricultural sector. A more stable market for suppliers through buyer commitment and price stability would motivate farmers and SMEs to invest in production capacity and quality improvement (Gibbon and Ponte, 2005). Finally, chain actors, particularly farmers need to be organized to develop capacity in terms of supplying volumes and quality, and guaranteeing regular supply. Access to organisations facilitates risk sharing, the pooling of resources, enable collective learning, and developing market power (KIT et al., 2006).

1.3 Methodology
Several methods were used for the data collection process: analysis of existing documents (field documents), in-depth interviews and group discussions with SNV BOAM in Ethiopia. Both qualitative and quantitative data were gathered. All primary data were collected in Ethiopia from August to November 2010, both in the Oromia and Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples’ (SNNP) Regional States. The research was executed in collaboration with a team of local consultants that was especially responsible for the interviews and write up of this oilseeds value chain CG report. A sample of 18 CG stakeholders was drawn for the interviews in the following manner. We selected candidates from participant lists of five Coordination Meetings (begin, end and middle) who played specific roles in the edible oil and oilseeds value chain, such as chain actors, chain supporters, chain influencers, and chain facilitators. Some critical and reluctant stakeholders were explicitly included. Eventually, interviews were held with all relevant value chain stakeholders (Table 1). For a complete overview of the interviewees and interview schedule, see appendix 3. For confidentiality reasons, they are made anonymous in the report.

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* For a complete overview of stakeholder roles in the value chain, see appendix 2.
Table 1. Interviewees by stakeholder group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stakeholder Group</th>
<th>Interviewees</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chain actors</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>Input supplier, exporters, cooperative unions, and processing companies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chain supporters</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Agricultural Research Centre and BDS providers (CG Facilitators and Local Capacity Builder).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chain influencers</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Ministries, government implementing agencies, consumer protection association, business representative associations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chain facilitators</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>An NGO and a multi-stakeholder forum (Office for Public-Private Partnership on Oilseeds)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>18</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A database was constructed that scores the participation of each organisation in each Coordination Group meeting (17 in total), the type and subtype of the organisation and its role in the value chain. Finally, the Coordination Group meeting was attended to a) have an idea of the working of the CG in practice, and b) to introduce the researchers to the relevant stakeholders in order to promote interview response. The questionnaire can be found in appendix 4.

On the basis of the database, a social network analysis was executed with the program UCINET 6.303 which is a comprehensive program for the analysis of social networks and other proximity data. The program contains dozens of network analytic routines (e.g. centrality measures, dyadic cohesion measures, positional analysis algorithms, clique finders, etc.). A social network analysis allows for linking micro and

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7 The Office of Public-Private Partnership on Oilseeds (PPPO) is a multi-stakeholder platform established by public and private actors: The Royal Netherlands Embassy; the Ministry of Agriculture; the Ethiopian Pulse, Oilseeds, and Spice Processors Exporters Association; and the Dutch Product Board for Margarine, Fats and Oils (a MVO). The partners signed a memorandum of understanding on March 5, 2008 and the Office started its activities in early 2009. The partnership is usually referred to as the Ethiopia-Netherlands Public Private Partnership on Oilseeds (interview 18). PPPO is engaged in high level policy interventions, which are believed to complement the efforts of the CG in implementing the five SIPs it had indorsed (Minutes of the 13th Oilseeds CG Meeting, March 12, 2009).

8 The classification of organizations in type (private sector, public sector, civil society and education), subtype (e.g. processing company, producer, consultant, research institute etc.) and value chain role (chain actor, supporter, influencer and facilitator) has to be regarded as an analytical tool. In reality, there is not such strict distinction, as for example many producer cooperatives (now classified as a business representative body in the private sector) are also involved in civil society activities. However, their main aim is to represent an economically active producer group and most of the time, the cooperatives engage in chain actor activities (e.g. seed production and distribution and buying and selling of oilseeds). This is the reason to classify them under the private sector. Another example is a university (classified under Education) that acts as a BDS provider as well.
macro levels, and an integration between qualitative, quantitative and graphical data. In this research, the social network analysis is mainly used to verify the qualitative data. In the report, qualitative descriptions are presented, and -if applicable- followed by a quantitative check resulting from the network analysis.

Not all interview questions were propounded to all 18 interviewees. Since we were interested in the social mechanisms at work rather than in statistical realities, only those having expertise or being knowledgeable on a certain subject were asked on that subject. For example, a financial institute might be less knowledgeable on the (technical) varieties that exist in the value chain product, or a research institute that has no expertise on the contractual agreements that exist between suppliers and buyers. In other cases, the respondent had only attended one CG meeting and therefore lacked knowledge of CG internal processes over time. Moreover, time pressure indicated by the respondent was taken into account during the interviews that lasted on average 1.5 hours. Although effort was made to propose as many questions as possible to all stakeholder groups, conclusions are often based on the views of less than the 18 respondents.

The secondary data included content analysis of the BOAM programme, with relevant documentation including all Coordination Group meeting minutes and impact data on production, income and employment areas provided by SNV BOAM Ethiopia. Furthermore, the secondary data include descriptions of the edible oil and oilseeds value chain markets, the oilseeds sub-sector in Ethiopia, and relevant aspects of collaboration literature and institutional change theory.

All interviews were summarized and data were analysed with the qualitative analysis software program MAXQDA. Network analysis has been executed for the two-mode database containing organisations which have attended the oilseeds CG meetings in Ethiopia.

Finally, all outcomes are cross checked, compared to and extended with information provided by several key informants to ensure triangulation (e.g. SNV BOAM staff, experts, Chain Lead Advisor and Chain CG Leader).

1.4 Outline of the report
The report is structured as follows: chapter 2 clarifies the context of this study by providing a short background on the oilseeds market and sector, its main constraints and SNV BOAM’s strategy of establishing the Oilseeds Coordination Group. In chapter 3, the internal dynamics of the oilseeds CG are presented. Chapter 4 analyzes the perceived changes in the institutional business environment of the edible oil and oilseeds value chain, as a result of the MSP (external dynamics). Chapter 5 hints at the future outlook of the MSP and the value chain, while chapter 6 and 7 respectively conclude with a discussion of results and limitations of the study.
2. Context of the case study

2.1 The Oilseeds Sector
This section describes a) the international market for edible oil and oilseeds, b) the Ethiopian edible oil and oilseeds market, c) the Ethiopian oilseeds value chain map, d) the main constraints in the oilseeds sector and e) SNV BOAM’s strategy to tackle these problems.

(a) International edible oil and oilseeds market
Edible oil and oil crops are among the widely traded commodities in the world. Production and export of oilseeds are however, dominated by a group of producing countries. The United States, China, Brazil, India, Argentina, the EU, and Canada are the world’s largest producers, which account for about 70 percent of global oilseeds output (Hoffman et al., 1999). For example, in 2008-09, EU-27 total oilseeds production stood at 27.2 million metric tons while estimated production for 2009-10 stood at 29.6 million metric tons9 whereas China’s annual total oilseeds production for 2010-11 was estimated to be 54.6 million metric tons10. Despite increasing production, erratic climatic conditions in many countries in general, and throughout the South American continent in particular, have been affecting oilseeds production11. The United States, Brazil, Argentina and the EU dominate export market, which account for over 80 percent of the world oilseeds exports. Despite substantial growth in oilseeds production in the past 25 years, and recent gains in export volume, both exporters and importers have been engaged in trade distorting policies –such as deferential export taxes and production subsidies. As a result, many attempts have been made to favour domestic oilseeds production at the expense of imports or to encourage domestic processing of imported oilseeds versus imports of oilseeds products. Of course, several major initiatives have been undertaken to reduce trade barriers and other trade-distorting practices affecting oilseed trade (Hoffman et al., 1999). There are different varieties of oilseeds produced by different countries. Commodities’ share of world oilseed production shows that soybeans alone account 53.3 percent followed by rapeseed and cottonseed each accounting 12.1 percent while peanut and sunflower seed account 10 and 8.7 percent respectively. Other types of oilseeds account only 3.8 percent (Hoffman et al., 1999).

Demand for vegetable/edible12 oil has consistently been moving up due to consistent increase in consumption, which is in turn caused by the increasing population as well as increase in disposable income in developing economies. For example, world’s vegetable oil production and consumption for 2008-09 stood at around 133 and 130 million tons respectively. Forecast for 2010-11 shows 145 million tons of production and 144 million tons of consumption. China is the largest consumer (around 25 million

9 http://www.agricommodityprices.com/futures_prices.php?id=154
11 http://www.oilworld.biz/app.php?fid=1090&dpar=0&isSSL=0&aps=0&blub=99d5d461ae78dfc5f261cudd4f1a5
12 Edible and vegetable oil are used interchangeably
tons in 2008-09) in the world followed by India. The EU, United States, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brazil are the other large consumers. The international demand for edible oil in 2008-09 was 56 million tons, which is forecasted to grow up to 60 million tons in 2010-11. Indonesia and Malaysia are the leading exporters of vegetable oil. Argentina, Ukraine, Canada, United States and Brazil are other suppliers to the world market. Palm oil is the major export for Asian nations while soybean, sunflower and canola (rapeseed) oils are major exports for American countries.

China is the world's biggest importer of vegetable oil followed by India; EU-27, United States and Asian countries are other major buyers. Commodities' share of the world's edible oil trade shows that palm oil is the internationally most traded vegetable oil with more than 60% world market share followed by soybean oil. Sunflower, rapeseed and coconut oil are other oils traded in world market.

(b) Ethiopian edible oil and oilseeds market
Ethiopia consists of different climate zones and a range of altitudes from below sea level up to more than 4,500 metres above sea level. This enables it to grow a wide range of oilseeds, in which it has a long tradition (Wijnands et al., 2007). Oil crops are the third major crops grown with an estimated total cropped area of 740,000 hectares involving more than three million smallholder farmers. Linseed, Niger seed, soybeans, cotton seed, sesame, groundnuts, safflower seed, castor beans, and rapeseed are important types of oilseeds grown in Ethiopia (Hailegiorgis, 2011). Production is characterized by labour intensive, low-input and rain-fed cultivation that results in low yield. For most oil crops, except for soybeans, yields are below one ton/ha. Total annual oilseeds production is estimated to be only 500,000 - 600,000 tons (Wijnands et al., 2007). There is however, high potential for improvement; for most oilseeds productivity per ha can be doubled through the use of improved farm practices at smallholder level. The existence of large areas of uncultivated and fertile lands offers good opportunities for organic and sustainable oilseeds production. Demand for oilseeds is not a problem since opportunities for oilseeds export are not fully exploited yet because of inefficient marketing, improper cleaning and sometimes poor contract discipline (Wijnands et al., 2007). Nor have domestic demands been sufficiently met.

Oilseeds constitute an important mainstay of the rural economy. The sector plays a significant role not only for the rural economy, but also for the national economy at large as it represents the second largest export earner next to coffee. Table 2 below shows the increasing volume of oilseeds exports and the earnings thereof.

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13 http://www.agricommodityprices.com/futures_prices.php?id=244
14 http://www.agricommodityprices.com/futures_prices.php?id=244
15 SNV BOAM Annual Report, 2009
16 The Oilseeds CG has no special interest in a specific type of oilseed; it facilitates improvement in the production and processing of all types of oilseeds (clarification interview with SNV BOAM Lead Advisor for Oilseeds Value Chain, 15 March 2011)
Table 2: Total volume of oilseeds exports and value of exports (2005-2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Export (in metric tons)</th>
<th>Value of exports (000's Birr)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>170,796</td>
<td>1,082,215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>265,649</td>
<td>1,835,270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>234,976</td>
<td>1,654,707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>152,091</td>
<td>2,037,090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>286,987</td>
<td>3,819,429</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hailegiorgis (2011:7)

Exports actually consist of sesame seed and Niger seed (Wijnands et al., 2007). Ethiopia is the third exporter of sesame seed in the world next to India and Sudan. Ethiopian sesame seed, which accounts for 75 percent of its total oilseed exports, is well known in the world market. Other oilseeds however, have not yet penetrated the international market. For example, Ethiopia is the fifth world producer of linseed, but is negligible as exporter on the world market. Nevertheless, it has high potential since linseed and other oilseeds production in Ethiopia are close to organic standards (Wijnands et al., 2007). This is expected to have a positive impact on Ethiopian oilseeds to the European market.

Moreover, Ethiopia has an attractive portfolio of high value specialty oilseeds such as safflower seed and castor beans. The growing demand for Ethiopian specialty oilseeds in the world market and the potential capacity to expand production could turn oilseeds into one of the engines of economic growth of Ethiopia. As mentioned earlier, soybeans, cottonseed and rapeseed are also important oilseeds grown in Ethiopia. However, due to relatively low volumes, low quality and high handling and transport costs, it would not be easy for Ethiopia to export these oilseeds and compete on the world market. Nonetheless, these oilseeds are important for local consumption.

Increasing interest in and attention to the oilseeds value chain by the Ethiopian government offers another opportunity for the sub-sector to grow. The interest of the government is reflected by its intensified efforts to come up with a master plan for the development of the sub-sector. Such attentions are due to the sector’s contribution to the growing export earnings, sources of food, energy and ingredients of animal feed. Generally, the edible oil and oilseeds value chain has a major role in the Ethiopian economy with links to agriculture, agro industry, trade (import and export) and is interlinked to the service economy.

In terms of edible oil, Ethiopia is highly dependent on foreign sources; either from aid or import. Palm oil from Malaysia, Singapore and the United Arab Emirates dominates import markets (Wijnands et al., 2007). Edible oil supply from Ethiopia's oil

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17 SNV BOAM Annual Report, 2009
18 SNV BOAM Annual Report, 2009
19 SNV BOAM Annual Report, 2009
20 SNV BOAM2 Program Proposal, 2009
21 SNV BOAM2 Program Proposal, 2009
factories is less than 20 percent of the total consumption of the country. The domestic edible oil production is characterized by backward technology where most of the oilseeds are crushed locally without any refining. More than 1,000 small crushers (mostly with Chinese/Indian machines) are operational on village level. These local crushers have limited capacity with low hygiene standards. Only a few larger crushing or refining companies seem to have adequate safety and hygiene standards compared to European industry standards (Wijnands et al., 2007). Therefore, there exists a huge potential to work on import substitute activities.

(c) Oilseeds value chain map

Figure 1 shows the Ethiopian part of the global oil crops value chain, with indicated intervention areas, as visualized by SNV BOAM. SNV BOAM identified four major interventions areas that include Seed Supply, Seed Cleaning and “True-to-Type”, Milling Technology, and Coordination between Oil Millers and Exporters. These intervention areas were presented to and adopted by the participants of the first Oilseeds CG meeting. From the view point of value chain analysis, the interventions are comprehensive and cover input, production, processing, and marketing aspects. The intervention areas mainly address the exporters, processors and farmers’ organisations with the aim of improving linkages between mid-chain buyers and producers. The value chain map visualizes options for individual farmers to sell oilseeds directly to retailers, local (traditional) oil millers, producers’ cooperatives, wholesalers, and even to exporters.

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22 SNV BOAM2 Program Proposal, 2009
23 SNV BOAM2 Program Proposal, 2009
24 Minutes of the 1st Oilseeds CG Meeting, 30 September 2005
25 Minutes of the 1st Oilseeds CG Meeting, 30 September 2005
Figure 1. Edible Oil and Oilseeds products value chain map with indicated intervention areas

(d) Constraints in the Ethiopian edible oil and oilseeds sector
Despite the vast opportunities and a number of comparative advantages, the edible oil and oilseeds sector has several constraints to its growth. The constraints are related to production, processing and marketing issues. Oilseeds production is limited by several problems that are related to backward agricultural practices; lack of awareness, high costs and limited accessibility of inputs (particularly improved and variety seeds)\(^26\); lack of credit facilities; and uncertainty about economic returns. The fragmented landholding system is also a critical problem; there are a limited number of large commercial farmers (> 100 ha) whose share is less than two percent (Wijnands et al., 2007).

As discussed earlier, processing is dominated by traditional and small crushers characterized by very inadequate capacity and low hygiene and safety standards (Wijnands et al., 2007). They are engaged in crude (unrefined) oil production. The paradox is that oil mills and refining plants are heavily under-utilized; only 30 to 40 percent of their full capacity is used due to the lack of sufficient oilseeds (Wijnands et al., 2007). Chronic shortages in supply of oilseeds have been known to limit the operations of the edible oil industry\(^27\). The supply of oilseeds is seasonal and hence, processors are required to procure high stock of oilseeds during peak production season and store for year round operation. This results in high working capital and makes the edible oil business expensive\(^28\). Moreover, the edible oil industry is confronted with high

\(^{26}\) SNV BOAM Annual Report 2009  
\(^{27}\) SNV BOAM\(^2\) Program Proposal, 2009  
\(^{28}\) SNV BOAM Annual Report 2009
competition from imported vegetable oils in general and palm oil in particular (Wijnands et al., 2007).

Market information is not widely available and infrastructure is generally weak in Ethiopia. The situation for the oilseeds sector, however, is critical. Sixty percent of the oilseeds is traded by 10 percent of the largest traders and 80 percent of the small traders have a share of 20 percent (Wijnands et al., 2007). On top of this monopoly by a few traders, the market is concentrated in Addis Ababa which undermines accessibility of the market to producers. In 2006, a survey conducted by SNV BOAM in 10 oilseeds market cities indicated that 50 percent of the major market for oilseeds is in Addis Ababa, with approximately 50 main traders and over 300 wholesalers. This is three to four times higher than those in the other nine cities. Many smallholder producers are located far from Addis Ababa and hence, they depend on brokers to sell their produce (Wijnands et al., 2007). Adulteration of oilseeds is another constraint that has affected both edible oil processing companies and exporters.

Primary data collected from the edible oil and oilseeds value chain stakeholders revealed multiple constraints, which include those discussed above. Table 3 presents a summary of the main constraints identified by interviewed stakeholders. The constraints are categorized as general, production related, and processing related issues. According to the interviewees (Table 3) lack of direct linkage/contractual agreement and mistrust between producers and processors/exporters is a key constraint. As a result, the oilseeds’ market is dominated by brokers who deliberately distort prices, which lead to volatile and unpredictable price structures. Twelve of our interviewees indicated that producers and processors have insufficient access to affordable capital due to rigid collateral requirements. This has undermined the opportunities for improving production and processing technologies. According to the interviewees, low quality concern among producers and processors is widely prevalent and has affected the development of the sector. This is aggravated by lack of sufficient attention from government policy makers. There is general lack of regulatory standards for edible oil and oilseeds. This has encouraged adulteration of edible oils and oilseeds. Moreover, lack of policy attention is reflected by the fact that, unlike cereals and other crops, there is no sufficient research effort to improve the productivity and quality of oil crops except for sesame that received attention due to its long standing contribution to foreign earnings (interviews 5, 6, 13, 14, and 16). The government’s policy of duty and VAT free import of vegetable oil (palm oil) is also considered as a bottleneck for the development of local edible oil processing companies/millers (e.g. interviews 9, 11, 14, and 17). An expert from the Consumers’ Protection Association however, indicated that the government has to regulate high price of local edible oil through such policy because of the limited capacity of local processors to meet domestic demands (interview 8).

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29 Brokers are those traders who buy oilseeds from collectors (those buying form farmers) and sell to big traders and processors
30 SNV BOAM Annual Report 2009
31 Duty is a tax imposed on import and export of commodities while VAT is a tax imposed on any value added transaction in the production and commodity exchange processes
On the production side, the sector is dominated by smallholder farmers who suffer from low yield/productivity and volatile prices. As a result, oilseeds are considered as secondary crops among smallholder farmers. Moreover, there is limited technological support, training and input supply to improve productivity and interests of the farmers in oilseeds production. Lack of differential farm gate price\(^{32}\) is another constraint that undermined the need for and effort in improving the quality of oilseeds. In fact, absence of differential price encourages adulteration of oilseeds (interviews 5 and 16).

Regarding issues related to processing, backward processing technology, duty and VAT free import of palm oil, shortage and seasonal supply of oilseeds, adulteration of edible oil, and insufficient training to oil mill workers are the main problems. The use of backward processing technology has resulted in inefficient production and sub-standard products/crude oil. Oilseeds are usually available in the market during harvest season and hence, in non-harvest season processing companies are forced to operate below capacity.

\textbf{Table 3. Main constraints in the oilseeds sector in Ethiopia per stakeholder’s group and number of times indicated by the interviewees (frequency)}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constraints in oilseeds sector</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>General</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of direct linkages/contractual agreements between producers and processors/exporters</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of access to sufficient capital</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low quality concern among producersprocessors and lack of regulatory standards for edible oil and oilseeds</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of sufficient attention by policy makers (except for sesame)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient research efforts</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient infrastructure</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of awareness among consumers about quality of edible oil</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Production related issues</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oilseeds not a primary crop</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volatile and low prices paid to farmers due to broker dominated markets</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor quality and adulteration of oilseeds</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of technology and input supply</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient training</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor agronomy practices</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited commercial farming</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of price differentiation at farm gate (quality is not rewarded)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor linkages between seed providers and seed producers</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of attention by investors</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Processing related issues</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Backward processing technologies</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duty and VAT free import of vegetable oil (palm oil)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{32}\) Farmers are paid the same price regardless of the differences in the quality of the oilseeds they have, hence, they are not encouraged to invest in quality improvement.
(d) SNV BOAM strategy in the BOAM framework
To tackle these problems in the oilseeds sector, SNV BOAM developed the ‘Support to Business Organisations and their Access to Markets’ (BOAM) programme. Under this programme, a Value Chain Development (VCD) approach was developed that is “characterized by (i) a combined sector and business to business (B2B) orientation” (IOB Inception Report, 2009: 27), (ii) a focus on ‘pull’ factors; working from the middle of the value chain at both ‘up-stream’ and ‘down-stream’ levels (pers. comm. SNV BOAM, February 2011), (iii) “a firm direction towards the private sector (private businesses) as the entry point, (iv) the use of multi stakeholder processes in the form of Coordination Groups as the platform for decision making and anchoring of the local ownership, (v) the use of local consultants or capacity builders to increase outreach, sustainability and ownership and (vi) the use of leverage and innovation funds” (IOB Inception Report, 2009: 27). Therefore, the MSP approach is only one part of the whole ‘holistic’ SNV BOAM value chain approach.

The BOAM programme is based on the idea that change can only be induced if it builds on knowledge and experience already present in the concerning sectors. 29 agricultural value chains were surveyed on the basis of ‘what was already there in the sector’. On the basis of a set of criteria, eventually six priority chains were chosen out of these 29, including the oilseeds and edible oil; dairy; honey and beeswax; and pineapple, mango and apple value chains. Establishing the CG was only a logical step in the process of bringing together all the relevant knowledge and experience of stakeholders in the concerning value chains.

SNV BOAM sees the CG as the main organ for governance and coordination of chain activities and stresses the importance of ownership through the formation of stakeholders’ own network.

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33 SNV BOAM’s programme, financed by the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Addis Ababa and until the end of 2009 by the Irish Embassy, contributes to sustainable poverty reduction in rural Ethiopia through value chain development. The overall BOAM programme period is five years, and started from September 2005. The programme aims at improving the access to markets for small and medium agribusiness players along selected value adding chains (SNV BOAM programme proposal 2005-2010). In 2009 a transformation process of the BOAM programme into a centre of excellence for value chain development has started in the form of BOAM2 scaling up phase. Some key chances are the emphasis on Business to Business (B2B) value chain development and the up-scaling of both production as well as a new fund structure. The additional target of the BOAM program up-scaling phase is to develop, test and introduce innovative approaches that aim to improve business to business relations in selected value chains (SNV BOAM annual report 2009). A one-year extension of the BOAM programme was requested and approved, until August 31, 2011, to maximize the results to be obtained from the BOAM programme (BOAM 2 programme proposal 2010-2011).

34 Clarification meeting SNV BOAM, 8 November 2010
Apart from BOAM, SNV runs 2 other value chain programmes (PSNP plus & RAIN). Finally, the four case studies under study are only part of the impact areas, (sub) sectors and programs of SNV BOAM Ethiopia.

2.2 The Edible Oil and Oilseeds Coordination Group

Ethiopia has considerable potential for oilseeds production for which there are steady international and domestic demands. The sector, however, suffers from proper steering mechanisms and key stakeholders operate in an isolated manner. In 2005, the SNV BOAM program established a forum called the Edible Oil and Oilseeds Coordination Group aiming at addressing the gap in the governance of the sector.

From the network analysis we found that in total 101 different organisations attended the oilseeds CG meetings 1-17 from 2005-2010.

The CG consists of representatives of key actors in the edible oil and oilseeds value chain (regional, national and sporadically international), including:

- Farmers’ cooperative unions such as the Didea Farmers’ Cooperative Union, Rayawakena Farmers’ Cooperative Union, Ambo

Characterising the CG

The Oilseeds CG is primarily appreciated for bringing together multiple actors (producers, processors, exporters, government agencies, consumer protection association, chambers of commerce, consultants, and experts) representing multiple interests and sectors (public, private and civil society).

The majority of the interviewees describe the oilseeds CG as a centre/platform of learning and communication/networking between participating stakeholders without which they could hardly meet and engage in common agendas –identifying problems and seeking solutions for the oilseeds sector problems. Members learned not only from the exchange of their experiences but also from presentations of research findings that consist of new and innovative ideas. For example, members are exposed to a totally new idea of growing olive trees and producing olive oil (interviews 8, 12, 16, and 17). Members have exchanged contact addresses and established networks to facilitate the search for inputs and market. For example, cooperative unions have been able to sell their produce directly to processors through contacts they established at the CG (interview 5). Interviewees generally, believe that the oilseeds CG has substantially reduced unilateral operations of key stakeholders and fostered synergetic relations.

Interviewees are, however critical on the type and commitment of participants in the CG meeting. They believe that key government decision makers are not attending CG meetings and hence, its policy impact remained low. Moreover, frequent rotation of participants is common that demanded CG meeting facilitators to make long briefing before starting new agendas of the day so that new participants are on board; such a practice is however, boring for those who attended previous meetings (interview 8).

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55 SNV BOAM Annual Report 2009
56 By the end of 2010, already 19 meetings took place for the oilseeds value chain CG. Nevertheless, the social network analysis was based on 17 meetings due to the participation lists in the meeting minutes that were made available to the researchers at start of the research project in June 2010.
Farmers’ Cooperative Union, and Biftu Selallie Farmers’ Cooperative Union;
• Processors’ Association that include the Addis Ababa Oil Millers’ Association;
• Private processing companies for example, Addis Mojo Edible Oil Complex S.C, Kana Industry PLC, Samirawit Oil Mill Factory, and Bezu Edible Oil;
• Consumers’ Association that includes the Ethiopian Consumers’ Protection Association;
• Federal Government authorities, including the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) and Ministry of Trade and Industry (MoTI);
• Regional Government agencies for example, the Oromia Cooperative Promotion Bureau and Oromia Seed Enterprise;
• Research institutions such as Holletta Agricultural Research Centre;
• Local Capacity Builders and other BDS providers like Edge Consult and Agonafir Consult;
• Representatives of private business associations, for instance, the Ethiopian Chamber of Commerce and Sectoral Association (ECCSA); Addis Ababa Chamber of Commerce (AACC); Adama Chamber of Commerce; and the Ethiopian Pulses, Oilseeds, and Spices Processors and Exporters Association (EPOSPEA);
• Banks and Micro finance institutes (MFIs), for example, Abyssinia and Awash International Banks and the Dynamic MFI; and
• NGOs such as SNV, Growing Ethiopian Market, Facilitator for Change Ethiopia, Volunteers in Overseas Cooperative Assistance.

Under its BOAM programme, a *Value Chain Leader* and a *Value Chain Facilitator* is selected for each value chain CG. The Value Chain Leader is chosen by the CG and acts as the focal person who should guarantee the local ownership of the CG and who is representing the CG. Ideally for SNV BOAM, a Chain Leader represents a key private sector organisation in the chain. The managing director of Agro Prom International PLC and ex-President of the EPOSPEA was elected as a leader of the edible oil and oilseeds CG in 2005 at its first meeting. Until the time of data collection for this research, he was in this CG leadership position. The Chain Leader is supported by *value chain development advisors or coaches*, who add distinct expertise to the program (agro-processing, organisational strengthening, women entrepreneurship/gender and monitoring and evaluation). In addition, SNV BOAM makes available a Value Chain Facilitator to facilitate and activate communication amongst CG members and to disseminate information. From CG meeting 2-14, the owner and the manager of the organisation Consulting Management Business Creation and Development Services (BCaD) served as Chain Facilitators in the oilseeds value chain, next to their facilitation activities in the honey and pineapple value chain CGs. From meeting 15 onwards, this role has been taken over by the managing director of Edge Consult. BCaD was replaced by Edge Consult, among others due to complaints from the Oilseeds Value Chain Advisor on missing files in the chaos of an overflow in funding applications.\(^{37}\)

\(^{37}\) Interview BCaD, August, 2010
The Oilseeds CG conducted its first meeting on September 30, 2005 and since then the CG has been conducting its meetings on quarterly basis (four times a year). In general, the meetings have the following pattern: the CG Facilitator and Leader open the meeting with a recap of the previous meetings, participants introduce themselves, fund utilization reports are discussed, experts present about new researches and technologies related to the oilseeds sector and Question and Answer Rounds are held in between. The first CG meeting started in English, but currently Amharic is the main language used in the meetings. The Facilitator translates when necessary. A representative of the Addis Ababa Oil Millers Association however, argues otherwise; the Facilitators are keen to give attention to foreign participants. They encourage discussions in English and try to translate into Amharic, which is not in the best interest of many stakeholders in general and those representing unions in particular (interview 9).

Following the recommendations of the Mid Term Review (Aleme et al. 2008) an Executive Committee for the evaluation of concept notes/funding proposals for the BOAM designated funds was established. Next to this, SNV BOAM has assignment contracts indicating capacity building interventions with all clients (i.e. processors, farmer organisations, business associations, and government). Finally, a new funding structure was introduced.
3. Oilseeds Coordination Group Dynamics

This chapter is meant to present the main findings regarding the internal dynamics that took place within the oilseeds CG meetings 1-17 (2005-2010). The oilseeds CG is assessed on the basis of basic collaboration requirements, and the levels of embeddedness and involvement.

3.1 Basic Collaboration Requirements

The extent to which the oilseeds CG meets basic collaboration requirements is examined by assessing so-called success factors. An overview of all these factors is provided in Table 4 below.

Table 4. Basic collaboration requirements and their success factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basis collaboration requirements</th>
<th>Success factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.1.1 Level of engagement</td>
<td>(a) Commitment</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(b) Motivations</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(c) Roles and contributions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(d) Shared resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.2 Jointness</td>
<td>(a) Decision making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(b) Selection of stakeholders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(c) Agenda setting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(d) Distribution of benefits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(e) Risk sharing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.3 Transparency</td>
<td>(a) Accountability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(b) Trust building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.4 Goal alignment</td>
<td>(a) Clear objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(b) Win-win opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(c) Compelling case</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compilation based on Kolk et al. (2008), Van Tulder & Pfisterer (2008) and Bitzer et al. (2010).
3.1.1 Level of engagement

Success factors identified in the research for the level of engagement are fourfold: (a) a high level of commitment, (b) intrinsic motivation, (c) clarity of roles and contributions, and (d) resource sharing.

(a) Commitment

Establishing the edible oil and oilseeds multi-stakeholder platform is a core component of SNV BOAM’s program in which SNV BOAM plays a facilitating role. SNV BOAM promoted and facilitated the establishment of the oilseeds CG to enable stakeholders to take the lead in the sector in such a way that internal commitment can be generated for sustainable development of the sector (interview 17). Table 5 below presents the degree of commitment of CG members as evaluated by the interviewees.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commitment</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: interview data

The database shows that, from the sampled interviewees, only SNV BOAM has attended all the 17 oilseeds CG meetings. A public sector agency was classified as ‘regular’ as it participated in 15 of the 17 CG meetings. Eleven of the sampled interviewees were classified as ‘irregulars’ (present in at least three meetings with a maximum presence of 12 meetings) and four as ‘at random visitor’ (participating in 1, 2, or 3 meetings).

An overwhelming majority rated the degree of commitment of the CG members as ‘modest’ (92%) while only one interview rated it as ‘low’ (8%) and none of them rated as ‘high’. This reveals that there is not even a small group of members who is highly committed; hence, the CG suffers from absence of an active nucleus group. This problem is attributed to different factors. Absence of a strong and committed private sector company like that of Beza Mar in the honey CG is a core problem. Unlike Beza Mar that invested its time and resources in a synergetic effect in the CG’s activities, members of the oilseeds CG expect a great deal from SNV BOAM. Another factor is SNV BOAM’s insufficient attention and support to the oilseeds CG. Low resource allocation and delays in fund release procedures are indicators of this. Usually, funds allocated to the oilseeds value chain are lower than funds allocated for other value chains such as the honey CG, nonetheless, this is also related to different capacities among members to articulate their needs (see also section 3.1.2.e). Fund release

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58 Minutes of the 1st Oilseeds CG Meeting, 30 September 2005
59 Clarification interview with SNV BOAM’s Lead Advisor for Oilseeds Value Chain, 22/03/2011
40 Clarification interview with SNV BOAM’s Lead Advisor for Oilseeds Value Chain, 22/03/2011
procedures are characterized by an inordinate delay. For example, there were cases where stakeholders were only able to receive their funds two years after the concept papers were approved. This has created discontent among the CG members that affected their interest and commitment to the CG.\textsuperscript{41} Notwithstanding the satisfaction of the majority of the respondents with the agenda setting processes, SNV BOAM’s lack of interest to include agendas other than those stipulated in its programme is another factor that affected the emergence of highly committed nucleus-group.\textsuperscript{42} A representative of processors association stated that an “active nucleus-group cannot surface in a situation where agendas are confined within a pre-defined program that was designed by a donor –SNV”.\textsuperscript{43} Moreover, SNV BOAM’s heavy influence in decision making processes is considered a disincentive for other members in the front to play the role of an active nucleus-group.\textsuperscript{44} Two of our respondents to this question indicated that in relative terms, producers, consultants and Chain Lead Advisors are more committed than exporters, processors and government agencies (interview 10 and 17). Another interviewee stated that processors are also well committed (interview 4). “In general, members do not equally value the importance of the CG to the development of the sector” (interview 18).

According to the overwhelming majority of the interviewees, participation of members in the CG is characterized by frequent rotation and irregular attendance, which is an indication of lack of high commitment. This corresponds with the database analysis which shows that the oilseeds sector scores highest on the number of exits (71.2 percent). “The oilseeds CG cannot be successful with participants who attend the CG meeting only once” (interview 16). Many of the oilseeds CG members neither regularly attend CG meetings nor effectively carry out assigned tasks (interviews, 6, 7, 8, 12 and 18). Several stakeholders, particularly government organizations, usually send different persons to attend the different CG meetings, which hardly ensure continuity of ideas and common understanding. Every new participant raises issues that have been discussed in the previous CG meetings. The briefings absorbs time and ultimately crowds out the agenda of the day (interviews 6 and 7). The oilseeds CG Leader stated that the CG is forced to unduly deal with similar unfinished business in every meeting as a result of lack of commitment among CG members to carryout assigned tasks (interview 12). Members of the Policy Issues Ad hoc Committee -who have been assigned to study the impact of VAT and duty free import of palm oil, are good examples in this regard. The issue has remained a subject of discussion in every CG meeting since the Committee is not working effectively (interviews 11, 12, and 15). A business association representative who rated CG members’ commitment as ‘low’ stated that members are active simply in discussing the problems, but are not active and committed to seek solutions (interview 9). In the meeting room, members pretend to be committed; most of them however, do not look back to their assignments after they have left the meeting room. As result, the CG could not effectively implement its decisions.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \footnotesize\textsuperscript{41} Clarification interview with SNV BOAM’s Lead Advisor for Oilseeds Value Chain, 22/03/2011
\item \footnotesize\textsuperscript{42} Clarification interview with a representatives of a processors association , 23/03/2011
\item \footnotesize\textsuperscript{43} Clarification interview with a representative of a processors association , 23/03/2011
\item \footnotesize\textsuperscript{44} Clarification interview with a representative of a private company, 23/03/2011
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
and plans (interviews 9, 11 and 15). A representative of a private company is in fact, of the opinion that most of the members do not care about the success of the CG (interview 14). Generally, considerable effort remains necessary from all stakeholders to have the CG effectively play its role in addressing the problems of the oilseeds sector (interview 4).

(b) Motivations

Responses from interviewees indicate that members were triggered to join the CG either by one or a combination of the following factors: i) the business opportunities it provides, such as meeting new buyers and suppliers (interviews 4, 5 and 11); ii) the incentives provided by SNV BOAM as it has been inviting participants and offers technical and financial assistance (interviews 4, 7, 9, 10, 11, and 14); iii) the learning opportunities the platform offers and its overall role in promoting the oilseeds sector (interviews 4, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 16); and iv) personal interest (interviews 6, 12, and 16). An interviewee representing a public-private forum indicated that his organization was motivated to join the oilseeds CG since the CG’s objectives coincide with its own objectives (interview 18). The Chain Advisors, the Local Capacity Builder and the CG Facilitators were contracted by SNV BOAM and their motivations to join were linked to job opportunity creation (interviews 6, 15 and 17). The Local Capacity Builder however, indicated that, as a professional, he has always been aspiring for a change in the oilseeds sector; therefore, he was enthusiastic to join the CG since he believed it would offer him an opportunity to contribute his best to the sector’s development (interview 6). Some of the interviewed members pointed out that other organisations have tipped them to join the oilseeds CG (interviews 4, 7, 10, 14, and 16).

Most of the interviewees were clearly asked whether the DSA paid by SNV BOAM to CG participants had an influence on their motivation to participate. They did not consider DSA as a motivational factor. Nevertheless, a couple of interviewees did not want to rule out its impact on some of the participants (e.g. interview 5). According to SNV BOAM’s Oilseeds Value Chain Lead Advisor, DSA is an important factor to ensure participation. Without DSA, members from remote areas will not be able to attend the CG meetings as they require compensation for transportation and accommodation costs. He believes that DSA might be crucial not only for those travelling from remote areas but also for others. For example, after SNV BOAM’s announcement in the 18th oilseeds CG meeting that it will end DSA contribution (Birr 60) to each participant, the number of participants has sharply declined. The 19th oilseeds CG meeting was attended by 25 participants (including the first author), which is less than half of the participants of the previous meeting (54 participants) (interview 17). However, this is probably not related to decrease in DSA but to bad planning of the meeting.

Generally, motivations of the members to participate are related to both intrinsic and extrinsic factors, but mainly extrinsic related to SNV BOAM’s invitation to attend

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45 About 66% of the interviewees learned about the CG from SNV BOAM’s invitation to attend
and aspirations for business opportunities and incentives provided by SNV BOAM. The
dominant perception is that the DSA could be considered as precondition to sustain
participation, but not a fundamental triggering factor for members to join the oilseeds
CG.

c) Roles and contributions
The CG has defined its roles and contributions to the oilseeds sector in its first meeting,
based on the first Strategic Intervention Plans (SIPs) presented by SNV BOAM. The
CG however, did not clearly define the roles and responsibilities of each and every
individual member. Moreover, the CG suffers from absence of accountability
mechanisms (see section 3.1.3). Besides, due to the high number of participating
organisations (101 organisations in total in all oilseeds CG meetings) and the high
rotation of members and organisations, operational plans agreed in several CG meetings
are not representing all participating parties. A representative of a private company
argued that operational plans do not represent the interests of all parties not merely
because of large number of participants but also due to the dominance of SNV BOAM in
the planning process. No matter how actively stakeholders participate, “key decisions
are in the hands of SNV BOAM” (interview 14).

d) Shared resources
It can be concluded that resources are shared in the sense that each CG member has an
equal opportunity to have access to financial and technical support delivered through
the SNV BOAM funding programme. However, the benefits to be obtained from this
support are not equal (see next section).

The oilseeds CG represents multiple sector (public, private and civil society)
actors whose degree of engagement to the CG appears to be homogenous. As discussed
earlier, an overwhelming majority (92%) of the interviewees indicated that members are
only ‘modestly’ committed while the remaining interviewees rated it as ‘low’; hence, the
oilseeds CG lacks an active nucleus- group (for reasons discussed in section 3.1.1./a) to
play a ‘steering role’. Participation of the members in the CG can be attributed to both
intrinsic and extrinsic factors, but largely to the latter. DSA is not a decisive
motivational factor for members to join the CG, but necessary precondition for poorly
capacitated regional organisations.

In the network analyses on course ratio these findings on stakeholder engagement were
verified. To analyse the course ratio of the oilseeds CG participation database four
categories of visiting frequency of organisations have been determined (core visitor,
regular visitor, irregular visitor, random visitor) as well as four categories of entry and
exit behaviour of the organisations (present & stay, present & exit, entry & stay, and

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46 Minutes of the 1st Oilseeds CG Meeting, 30 September 2005
47 In the beginning of the SNV BOAM programme (2005) the three types of funds accessible were the
leverage fund, the research and study fund, and the financial intermediation fund. In line with the
recommendations of the Mid-Term Review in 2008, the three new types of funds are the Sector
Development Fund, the Pilot B2B Fund, and the Up-scaling Support Fund.
entry and exit). The descriptive statistics of both categories are calculated for the oilseeds CG participation database and displayed in Appendix 5. A legend is attached. In Table 6, the visitor frequency in the oilseeds CG is presented. In Table 7 the total of exits from the oilseeds CG is demonstrated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Core visitors</th>
<th>Regular visitors</th>
<th>Irregular visitors</th>
<th>At random visitors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oilseeds</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>52.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The social network analysis confirms that:

- There is irregular attendance of organisations in the oilseeds CG meetings (Table 6). The proportion of core visitors (present at all meetings) and regular visitors (present at 14, 15 or 16 meetings) is modest. Only SNV BOAM represents a genuine core visitor (present at all 17 meetings);
- There is high rotation of organisations in the oilseeds CG meetings. With 71.2 percent, the oilseeds sector scores highest on the number of exits compared to the other CGs (Table 7 and synthesis report);
- In the oilseeds CG, the percentage of at random visitors (present at 0, 1, or 2 meetings) is high (52.5 percent) (Table 6). Rotation of organisations and participants was especially underlined by the interviewees in the oilseeds value chain CG.

### 3.1.2 Jointness

The success factors identified in this case study to measure the level of ‘jointness’ in the CG meetings are: (a) decision making, (b) leadership, (c) selection of stakeholders, (d) agenda setting, (e) distribution of benefits, and (f) risk sharing.

(a) Decision making

The degree to which decisions are jointly made in the oilseeds CG was difficult to measure, as formal decisions are rarely made in the CG (see also section 3.1.3). Only a few moments of more formal decision making could be identified, and all were related to electing the nominees for certain positions in established committees. Examples are the election of the CG Leader in meeting one, the election of members of the Ad hoc Committee for Policy Issues in meeting 8, and the elections of members for the Oilseeds CG Executive Committee in meeting 12. All interviewees pointed out that every CG member has a free and equal vote in such decisions.

Interviewees were asked whether all members have an ‘equal say’ not only in the committee election processes, but also in all discussions in the CG, or whether some members are ‘more equal than others’? All of them (Table 8) stated that every member has an equal chance and is free to express his/her opinion in the CG meetings, ensured

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48 Total exits = present & exit + entry & exit (see also Appendix 5)
by the proper steering activities of the Facilitators. Nor is there any entry barrier to join the CG (*interview 12*). A representative of a processing company described the CG as “the most democratic forum where each and every member is free and equal” (*interview 11*). Nonetheless, interviewees revealed that participants with profound knowledge and expertise capture larger shares of the discussions time in the CG meeting. For example, quite often, researchers, advisors, consultants, and experts take more time from which other members learn (*interview 17*). None of the interviewees has complained about such practices as the learning processes benefit all.

All interviewees except one believed that planning and other issues that involve decision making are based on ‘consensuses’. A representative of a private company who had different view in this regard stated that though every member has an equal chance to speak out in the CG, “decisions are influenced by the ideas of SNV BOAM” (*interview 14*).

**Table 8. Equal say**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equal say</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: interview data

SNV BOAM has made attempts to share some of its own responsibilities in respect of the edible oil and oilseeds value chains to create more ‘ownership’ of the CG process with stakeholders. Such an initiative emanated from the Midterm Review of the SNV BOAM Program (Aleme et al., 2008). Its main initiatives were the establishment of the Executive Committee for the evaluation of concept notes regarding BOAM designated funds and the assignment of contracts between SNV BOAM and its clients (including CG members) on capacity building interventions. In the meetings, joint Strategic Intervention Plans\(^49\) and operational plans were formulated. According to what was recommended in the MTR the CG’s Executive Committee should empower the sector in general and the CG in particular by giving stakeholders a say in the allocation of its oilseeds sector related funding. Moreover, the establishment of the Executive Committee helps to strengthen the relationship between the various stakeholders within the sector, and also serves as a phasing out strategy for SNV BOAM\(^50\).

\(^{49}\)The following Strategic Intervention Plans were agreed with the oilseeds CG members in meeting 12: 1) improved seed multiplication for planting material at farmers’ level; 2) training on good agricultural practice in oil crops (GAP) and food oil processing; 3) promoting value addition on local processing industries with refining, bottling and processing of more valuable products like shortenings and margarine; 4) improving market information system through networking; 5) and fight adulteration of oilseed from inert materials

\(^{50}\) Minutes of the 12\(^{th}\) CG Meeting, 9 December 2008
Financial ownership was created, to variable degree, in the following ways. First, the Executive Committee has full authority to evaluate, approve or reject funding proposals where SNV BOAM’s role would be limited to give technical advice on concept notes that have been accepted by the executive body. Second, the SIPs and operational plans were adjusted in response to CG members at least two times, but that was already prepared in a preliminary stakeholder workshop with oilseeds value chain representatives identified by SNV BOAM. A representative of a private company is of the opinion that SNV BOAM is less ready to compromise the contents of its programs; therefore, the role of CG members in the formulation of SIPs and other operational planning is mainly limited to an act of endorsement. Third, the oilseeds Executive Committee was effective only for a very limited time period (only since 2009). Fourth, SNV BOAM itself remains modest about the ownership that was created in this way. “Having the Executive Committee decide on fund proposals was only a ‘cosmetic measure’: a small shift of ownership” (pers. comm. SNV BOAM, August 2010). Finally, as the CG meetings were not formally required under the MSP, there was no formal joint decision making on financial issues.

In sum, although it was always SNV BOAM that decided on the final budget spending, decisions made in the CG or by its Executive Committee were never bypassed by SNV BOAM (pers. comm. SNV BOAM, January 2011). After the Mid-Term Review in 2009, SIPs were revised and oilseeds stakeholders were slowly able to change the SIPs in the direction they preferred.

b) Leadership
The majority of our interviewees believe that the CG Leader is strong and visionary. He is acquainted with the sector both as a professional and as a businessman. The CG Leader confirmed that he has both professional and business interest and knowledge to lead the CG. “Without the CG Leader who volunteered and committed himself to lead the CG ever since its establishment in 2005, the oilseeds CG would not have reached the stage where it is now.” The CG Leader however, was not able to direct the sector towards modernization compared to that of the honey CG Leader. In spite of his professional and business interest, he did not invest sufficient time and resources to explore alternatives for the development of the sector other than SNV BOAM’s support. The honey CG Leader had exerted efforts to explore possibilities for support beyond the SNV BOAM program. For example, the establishment of Ethiopian Apiculture Board and EU accreditation of Ethiopian honey are primarily his own initiatives to which he had invested his time and resources. The oilseeds CG Leader stated that neither CG members are highly committed to carry out assigned responsibilities effectively, nor are EPOSPEA and the Oil Millers’ Association strong and active to support the CG. For him, these are disincentives to exert extra efforts. Many of the respondents shared the view that these associations are weak to provide leverage to the CG.

51 Minutes of the 12th CG Meeting, 9 December 2008
52 Clarification interview with SNV BOAM Lead Advisor for Oilseeds Value Chain, 22/03/2011
(c) Selection of stakeholders

Except for the beginning, stakeholders are not randomly selected. Their profession (processor, producer, exporter, researcher, BDS provider, etc.) and their possible contributions (e.g. input supply, processors with good relations with farmers etc.) to the CG are important criteria in the selection procedure (interview 17). Participants are mainly selected and invited by SNV BOAM in collaboration with the Chain CG Leader and Facilitator. The CG Facilitator is mostly active in facilitating the selection processes (correspondence) than in actual selection (identification of participants) as the latter is mostly performed by the SNV BAOM Chain Lead Advisor (interview 13). The SNV BOAM Chain Lead Advisor however, discusses and decides with the CG Leader or at least the Chain Lead Advisor informs the CG Leader about newly identified participants before the invitation is sent (interview 12). Most of the interviewees indicated that they learned about the CG from SNV BOAM, who invited them to participate through the CG Facilitator (e.g. interviews 2, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, and 13). Organizations tipped by other organizations on the CG, were able to secure their invitation after a discussion on their interests with the SNV BAOM Chain Lead Advisor (interviews 4, 7, 10 and 14). The invitation database builds on the previous meetings attendances (interview 15).

Almost all interviewees indicated that the CG Facilitator sends invitations to members at least one week in advance of the next CG meeting (next meeting date is usually fixed by CG members in the previous meeting) via e-mail, fax or telephone. The CG Facilitator sends out a package per email or fax (no regular post mail) to each participant that includes the invitation letter, the agenda of the meeting, and a summary of about two pages on the previous meeting (not the full meeting minutes). Though the CG Facilitator reminds participants by telephone on the meeting dates, participants that have no email or fax addresses to receive the meeting agenda in advance miss the opportunity to anticipate and prepare on the meetings’ agenda. This is quite common for producers’ cooperative unions, which have neither easy access to e-mail nor to fax services (interviews 4 and 5). An interviewee missed one meeting as a change in the CG meeting date was not well communicated to every participant (interview 9).

Changes in the SNV BOAM programme coordinating staff considerably influenced the new CGs invitation policy. “The first CG was developed from scratch and it was SNV BOAM who gathered all relevant stakeholders together”\(^{53}\), and the first BOAM coordinator insisted the number of participants should not exceed 30-35. However, from meeting nine (end of 2007/beginning of 2008) the value chain Lead Advisors -headed by the second BOAM coordinator- started inviting many participants (often over 60 participants), aiming at broad based information dissemination. This prompted SNV BOAM to look more critical at the engagement processes within the coordination group\(^{54}\). Invitation became more regulated with only one participant from each organisation receiving DSA. Less relevant and non-motivated participants were

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\(^{53}\) Discussion group SNV BOAM, August 12, 2010.

\(^{54}\) SNV BOAM Annual Report 2009
removed from the participation lists, although this did not happen often according to the CG Facilitators.

(d) Agenda setting
The SNV BOAM Chain Lead Advisor, the Chain CG Leader and Facilitator are key players in the agenda setting processes. Most agendas are drawn from the previous CG meeting agendas. According to the Chain CG Leader and Facilitator, members can incorporate issues in the CG meeting agendas only if supported by the majority of the CG members. This is, however, not explicitly stated in the invitation letter nor is there any practical exercise that could be referred to in this regard (interviews 12 and 15). A representative of a business association has his reservations; organizers (Chain Lead Advisor, Chain CG Leader and Facilitator) do not include agendas other than those stipulated in the SNV BOAM programme. For example, access to large investment capital (foreign loans) and technological support to the processing industry (modern oil refinery) were important agendas his organization brought in, but were not accepted by organizers. This was merely because the agendas were considered to be beyond the SNV BOAM program. In his opinion, the CG has only addressed issues that fall within the SNV BOAM framework (interview 9). Another interviewee had another concern related to the agenda; often discussions are pre-occupied with one of the agenda items and moderators are incapable to cover the whole agenda (interview 18).

Table 9. Agenda setting evaluated

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Satisfaction</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modest</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: interview data

Interviewees’ overall evaluation of the agenda setting processes shows that an overwhelming majority (86%) is highly satisfied. Insufficient capacity of the CG Facilitator to guide though agenda items and lack of interest from organizers to include agenda items that go beyond the SNV BOAM framework were critical limitations identified by interviewees (interviews 9 and 18).

(e) Distribution of benefits
In its first meeting, the oilseeds CG explicitly identified the benefits expected from the joint forum and efforts. The benefits are streamlined into five key result areas from which the main stakeholders (producers, processors and exporters) would directly and

55 The key result areas include the quality of the existing supply is improved; yield potential of oil seed crops under production improved; oil extraction and refining process is improved; the use of edible oil at rural level improved through small micro oil extraction enterprises; and coordination within the value chain is improved
indirectly benefit\textsuperscript{56}. All respondents to this question indicated that, in principle, every CG member has equal access to all types of benefits (the benefits interviewees are referring to are mainly related to SNV BOAM’s financial and technical supports). Nevertheless, interviewees’ overall assessments of benefits and the way they are distributed among CG members show that none of them believe that benefits are distributed equally (\textit{Table 10}). Practical benefits depend predominantly on the capacity of each CG member to bring forward a concept paper or funding proposal that meets the requirements of the SNV BOAM program (\textit{e.g. interviews 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 15}). Members who actively participate in the CG meetings create fertile grounds for enhanced benefits (\textit{interviews 6}). The majority of the interviewees believed that members with greater capacity and an active participation attitude have benefited to greater extent whereas members with frail capacity have benefited little or none.

An interviewee—who is member of the Executive Committee—argued that available funds were not optimally utilized due to low capacity of the majority of the CG members to prepare proposals that could meet with SNV BOAM’s criteria (\textit{interview 16}). Other interviewees confirmed that available funds were not fully utilized. This is however not only due to weak capacity of the CG members, but also due to rigid and slow bureaucratic fund release procedures of SNV BOAM (\textit{interviews 12, 14 and 18}). One interviewee for example, stated that “it is close to one year that the proposal submitted by his company was approved by the Executive Committee of the CG, the fund however, has not yet been released” (\textit{interview 14}). SNV BOAM’s Chain Lead Advisor confirmed that delays are common (up to two years)\textsuperscript{57}.

Inconsistent proposal assessment procedures are other bottlenecks for an equal distribution of the benefits. The Chain Leader had received complaints from several members that requirements or conditions for the SNV BOAM capacity building support proposal are not uniformly applied, i.e. some proposals have been accepted on the basis of a bare minimum requirements while others have been required to fulfil all the requirements stringently (\textit{interview 12}). Another interviewee shared the CG Leader’s observations. He stated that the Executive Committee and SNV BOAM did not apply uniform standards/requirements for accepting or rejecting funding proposals. Members that have good relationships with SNV BOAM have been able to easily secure grants no matter what the quality of the proposals was (\textit{interview 18}).

According to the Chain Lead Advisor, the CG cannot be responsible or credited for ensuring ‘equal distributions of benefits’. It was only recently that the CG, through its Executive Committee, began to exercise decision making that involves allocation of benefits (appraising and deciding on funding proposals). Before the Executive Committee, such decisions were under SNV BAOM’s mandate. Hence, so far, the CG’s role in distribution of benefits was marginal. For the Lead Advisor, in the context of SNV BAOM, distribution of benefits does not depend on the decision making body but on the capacity of the beneficiary. The program is basically demand driven; hence, the

\textsuperscript{56} Minutes of the 1\textsuperscript{st} Oilseeds CG Meeting, 30 September, 2005

\textsuperscript{57} Clarification interview with SNV BOAM’s Lead Advisor for Oilseeds Value Chain, 22/03/2011
benefits depend on the capacity to demand and to meet clearly stipulated requirements (interview 17).

Table 10. Equal benefits

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equal benefit</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 14 100

Source: interview data

(f) Risk sharing
The last indicator of jointness in the CG, the extent to which risks are shared between CG members in the meeting, appeared not very relevant, as resources are mainly brought in by SNV BOAM. CG members risk little in the meetings except their own time. In the edible oil and oilseeds value chain, uncertainties and transaction costs in production and marketing that members have to endure due to lack of information might have been diminished as a result of relationships created in the CG (see also next section).

The degree of jointness of the CG members and the mutual independence among them are important measures for the level of ‘jointness’ in the MSP. Despite an interviewee’s criticism on SNV BAOM’s dominance in decision making, the overall data gave the impression that the CG leadership at least intends to let the MSP function in a horizontal manner. In the meetings, members have an equal chance to speak out. Except for one interviewee the remaining interviewees are satisfied with CG governance. The majority of the respondents believe that decision making is on the basis of consensus. Nonetheless, not all stakeholders have the ability to articulate their needs/demand; only those who push their issues through in previous meetings can influence the CG agenda and the benefits thereof. The CG’s centre of gravity remains with the leading trio including the Chain CG Leader, CG Facilitator and the SNV BOAM Lead Chain Advisor, with the sitting SNV BOAM programme coordinator as a significant influencer at the background. Findings revealed that not only the CG’s centre of gravity remains with the leading trio, but also prevalence of unequal power distribution. The fact that some agenda points forwarded by members were not accepted, and that proposal requirements were not uniformly and equally applied demonstrate lack of unequal power distribution.

In the social network analysis, betweenness centrality was among others used to identify the most central actors in the network. As stated before, those organizations having the highest scores on betweenness centralities in the network are the most central players in the MSP networks. In Appendix 6, the top-10 central network players of the oilseeds CG are presented in tables. Their organisational type (private sector, public sector, civil society, or education), subtype (i.e. processor, producer, financial institute, business association, implementing agency etc.) and their stakeholder role
(actor, supporter, influencer and facilitator) in the value chains were taken into account. The following regarding jointness was confirmed in the social network analysis:

- SNV BOAM is a central network player in the oilseeds CG (*Appendix 6*). This corresponds with their leading role as an initiator of the whole program and the oilseeds CG; their involvement in agenda setting and selection of stakeholders, and their final decision in financial affairs;

- The oilseeds Chain Leader is visible as a central player in the oilseeds CG (*Appendix 6*). This confirms his active position in the oilseeds network;

- The Chain Facilitator is visible as a central player in the oilseeds CG (*Appendix 6*);

- In the first nine meetings (till January 2008), about 25–35 participants can be observed in each meeting (*participation databases*), corresponding with the invitation policy of the first BOAM coordinator. After meeting nine, often over 50 participants -including several members of the same organisation- can be observed (*participation databases*). This corresponds with the invitation policy of the value chain Lead Advisors headed by the second BOAM coordinator.

To identify and compare the genuine ‘information brokers’ –who are in between other network players and control information diffusion- in the oilseeds network, only those organisations with a normalized betweenness centrality higher than 2, 3 and 4 were taken into account in this part of the analysis. In *Appendix 6* the central players with a betweenness centrality higher than 2, 3 and 4 are presented.

Regarding ‘information brokerage’, the network analysis confirms and complements that:

- SNV BOAM plays the role of information broker in the oilseeds CG, confirming its dominant position as MSPs initiator (*Appendix 6*);

- Differences in the absolute and relative numbers of ‘information brokers’ are not spectacular, nevertheless, we can derive that the oilseeds network is relatively more horizontal compared to the other CGs as relatively more participants control information diffusion (*synthesis report*);

- Measuring a betweenness centrality higher than 2, the oilseeds CG is most horizontal compared to the other CG’s; information is diffused through ten identified information brokers, almost 10 percent of all participating organisations (*synthesis report*);

- Measuring a betweenness centrality higher than 4, both SNV BOAM and the Quality Standard Authority of Ethiopia are central network players in the oilseeds network (*Appendix 6*).

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58 The cut-points 2, 3 and 4 are arbitrary
3.1.3 Transparency

The degree of transparency of the CG in undertaking its activities is modestly high, as reflected by the views of our interviewees. The meetings are open to public (although more restricted towards the 18th meeting), and meeting summaries, agendas and other documents are shared with stakeholders. All CG documents could be downloaded from the former SNV BOAM website, although several links appeared to be dead and not all documents were available. Not only its current activities but also the future of the CG is openly discussed. The issue of succession or handing over the CG from SNV BOAM to stakeholders has been discussed since meeting 14. In this meeting, four candidates –the Ethiopian Pulse, Oilseed and Spice Exporters Association; Addis Ababa Oil Millers Association; Oil Board; and Ethiopian Chamber of Commerce and Sectoral Association– were nominated by the CG meeting participants to take over the responsibility. The Oil Board did not exist at that time and hence, was eliminated from the candidacy. The three remaining candidates were assessed based on a matrix of criteria identified by the CG meeting participants. The evaluation revealed that ECCSA fulfilled most of the criteria and was selected to take over the responsibility. The ECCSA accepted this role and declared its commitment and readiness. Though SNV BOAM planned to handover the responsibility from the 15th CG meeting, no concrete steps have so far been taken by the ECCSA towards assuming its role. A representative of the ECCSA indicated that his organization is still willing to take over and has started the necessary preparations.

Success factors assessed under transparency were (a) accountability, and (b) trust building.

(a) Accountability

Formal accountability mechanisms are absent in the oilseeds CG. Except for the Chain Leader, Chain CG Facilitator and other contractors with SNV BOAM (i.e. Local Capacity Builders and other BDS providers) none of the stakeholders participating in the CG has been assigned formal duties and responsibilities. Due to the lack of formal task assignments and accountability mechanisms, the majority of members working in different committees of the CG did not carry out their responsibilities effectively. After they left the CG meeting, they 'forget' on their assignments; consequently, the next CG meeting is preoccupied with the same issue. Therefore, the CG could not move forward in discussing new agendas (interviews 11, 12, and 15).

Nevertheless, several forms of informal accountability are present (pers. comm. SNV BOAM, February 2011). For example CG members only receive SNV BOAM funds if their proposals are in line with the SIPs identified by stakeholders in the oilseeds value chain. In addition, members need to present their fund utilization reports in the CG meetings, in front of all other critical and reflecting stakeholders.

(b) Trust building

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59 Minutes of the 14th Oilseeds CG Meeting, 11 June 2009
60 Minutes of the 14th Oilseeds CG Meeting, 11 June 2009
61 Minutes of the 16th Oilseeds CG Meeting, 17 December 2009
Without the oilseeds CG, the multiple stakeholders (processors, producers, exporters, experts, consultants, and researchers) brought together would experience difficulties to discuss the oilseeds’ problems and search for solutions. On top of the plenary discussions, the CG organizes and facilitates working groups (e.g. meeting 1, 3 and 12) and bilateral discussion forums to improve stakeholders’ involvement and to foster communication and networking. Working groups were assigned to discuss on specific issues (how to promote value addition, market information and networking, fight adulteration of oilseeds and edible oil, etc.) and to present plenary on their results. CG members are also deliberately encouraged by the Facilitators and Chain Advisors to have bilateral discussions and to exchange contact addresses (e.g. between producers and processors, producers and exporters, producers and experts, processors and experts, etc.) during lunch and coffee breaks. Interviewees appreciated the role of these interactive processes in promoting trust and a ‘sense of complementarities’ between stakeholders (e.g. interviews 5, 9, 10, and 12).

Only occasionally exchange of contact addresses and the network thereof have resulted in direct transactions between producers and processors (interviews 5 and 9). Nevertheless, the degree of trust is no yet sufficient for efficient transactions between the chain actors. Cooperative unions, processors and exporters are not comfortable yet with farmers. They are of the opinion that farmers are not loyal to buyers (interviews 4, 5 and 14). “Though the Union is trying its best to help farmers through the provision of inputs (improved seeds), farmers scarcely remain trustworthy to the Union” (interview 5).

3.1.4 Goal alignment

Goal alignment by stakeholders is considered to contribute to the effectiveness of collective goal-setting processes, which, in turn, positively influences the success of the MSP. Strong goal alignment and goal visibility allows for more effective execution of the SIPs identified in the process. Goal alignment is measured by assessing the success factors (a) ‘clear objectives’, (b) ‘win-win opportunities’, and (c) a ‘compelling case’ as driver of the MSP.

(a) Clear objectives

The primary objective of the CG is to serve as a platform for discussion, dialogue, capacity building, information exchange, and knowledge transfer between stakeholders in the edible oil and oilseeds value chain. SNV BOAM has broadly defined the formal objective of the CG as promoting efficient and equitable linkages for the economically active poor along the agricultural value chain. On top of this, the CG helps participants to identify needs and with formulating requests for support from SNV BOAM. Based on the experiences gained during the pilot phase, SNV BOAM identified the following

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62 Minutes of the 1st Oilseeds CG Meeting, 30 September, 2005
63 An observation out of the secondary data is that the aim has gradually been shifting from ‘creating linkages’ towards ‘creating ownership in the sector’. The third BOAM program coordinator endorses this strategy towards a long term vision for the CG.
important SIPs for the scaling up phase\textsuperscript{64}: improved seed multiplication for planting material at farmers’ level; training on good agricultural practice in oil crops and food oil processing; promoting value addition on local processing industries with refining, bottling and processing of more valuable products like shortenings and margarine; improving market information system through networking; and fight adulteration of oilseeds from inert materials. In order to promote the shared objective and as well as to create ownership, SNV BOAM presented these SIPs to members at the 12\textsuperscript{th} CG meeting for approval\textsuperscript{65}. Though members had little input into the SIPs, they had indorsed them and expressed their commitment to effective implementation (\textit{interview 17}). With the above SIPs, SNV BOAM fine-tuned its program and the CG’s overall focus on improving the scarcity of improved seeds and supply of oilseed for oil extraction and export business\textsuperscript{66}.

(b) Win-win opportunities
Do the members feel that the CG facilitates a win-win situation for all? Previous discussions (in the section on risk sharing) revealed that CG members risk little except their time whereas opportunities in principle (in the section distribution of benefits) are equal for every member. Actual benefits however, depend on the capacity of each member and those members with limited capacity have less chance to benefit from SNV BOAM’s capacity building support. Previous discussions however, revealed that benefits depend not only on the capacity of members, but also on the nature of their relationships with SNV BAOM, i.e. members who have good relationships with SNV BOAM are said to have had secured benefits despite the quality of their funding proposals. Nevertheless, the win-win opportunity of participation in the oilseeds CG is not restricted to SNV BOAM’s support; learning and networking are also important objectives from which every member could benefit.

(c) Compelling case
Is the edible oil and oilseeds CG driven by a ‘compelling case’, i.e. an important need that can be best fulfilled through an MSP and that is recognized and accepted by all members?

Almost all interviewees indicated that the edible oil and oilseeds sector was in complete ‘disarray’ before the establishment of the CG. It was characterized by fragmented and backward production, processing and marketing systems. A representative of a government implementing agency stated that “change in the performance of the oilseeds sector is only possible through multi-stakeholder process that assembles all relevant actors” (\textit{interview 16}). One of the greatest contributions of the CG recognized and appreciated by all interviewees is the opportunity it has created for stakeholders in the sector to unite and identify, discuss and seek solutions for the problems that have been affecting the development of the sector (\textit{e.g. interviews, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 15, and 17}). “The CG created an opportunity of which I dreamed for long, both as

\textsuperscript{64} SNV BOAM2 Program Proposal, 2009
\textsuperscript{65} Minutes of the 12\textsuperscript{th} Oilseeds CG Meeting, December 9, 2008
\textsuperscript{66} SNV BOAM2 Program Proposal, 2009
a professional (agronomist) and as a businessman (exporter)” (interview 12). “Before the CG, many of our research results were shelved as there was little or no forum to share and disseminate the results. Indeed, forums like the CG are indispensable in disseminating research results to organized farmer representatives and the farming community at large” (interview 13).

Therefore, stakeholders in the oilseeds sector were eager to have access to forums like the CG. Nonetheless, the CG by itself can barely address the substantial problems of the sector and the high expectations of the stakeholders. Processors for example, expect the CG to play a key role in technological transfer (financial support to buy a modern edible oil refinery) while producers expect the CG to create sufficient access to improved seeds and market opportunities (domestic and international). Paradoxically, CG members do have neither sufficient resources nor commitment to improve the performance of the CG in meeting their expectations67.

3.2 Embeddedness
To assess the degree to which the oilseeds MSP is enmeshed in third organisations, we assessed its inter-organisational relationships through (a) the origin of the participants’ link with the CG (was the motivation to join brought about by another organisation?), (b) the extent to which the MSP contributed to new professional organisations’ memberships, (c) the involvement of participants in multiple MSPs, (d) relations with the government, and (e) SNV BOAM’s inter-organisational embeddedness as a result of its MSP activities.

(a) The original link to the oilseeds CG
About one third of the interviewees identified that inter-organisational relationships have been supportive in linking and motivating them to become a member of the CG for the oilseeds value chain (interviews 4, 7, 10, 14, and 16). The following examples illustrate the role of inter-organizational relationships in linking members with the CG. Rayawakena Farmers’ Cooperative Union was motivated to join the CG through the information it obtained from the Ambo and Didea Farmers’ Cooperative Unions (interview 4). Addis Alem Trading learned about the CG from the Women’s Exporters Forum (interview 10) while ERA Agrolink PLC joined the CG through information obtained from another organization, i.e., the Office of Public Private Partnership on Oilseeds (interview 14). The Oromia Cooperative Promotion Bureau was linked to the CG through a consultant who had worked with SNV BOAM (interview 7).

(b) Access to new professional organisations’ memberships
The majority of the interviewed participants believed the CG did not support members to access new professional organisations (e.g. interviews 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, and 11). Two of the interviewees however, pointed out the active role of the CG in the establishment of the Office of PPPO in which several CG members (such as ECCSA, MoTI, EPOSPEA, and MoA) are participating (interviews 2 and 18).

67 Clarification interview with SNV BOAM’s Lead Advisor for Oilseeds Value Chain, 22/03/2011
(c) Involvement in multiple MSPs
Several organisations are active in multiple MSPs. They are members of the four value chain CGs (honey, dairy, oilseeds, and pineapple). The Chamber of Commerce and Sectoral Association, Bank of Abyssinia, Consulting Management Business Creation and Development Services, Ministry of Trade and Industry, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, and the Quality Standard Authority of Ethiopia are good examples. The actors involved in multiple MSPs transfer information and contacts from one MSP to the other to the benefit of the members, and enhance the general networking opportunities for them. In this way they contribute to the effects of each MSP.

(d) Relations with the government
In spite of the fact that oilseeds are the third major crops grown in Ethiopia and constitute the second most important source of foreign earnings, the sector did not receive sufficient policy attention. Unlike cereal crops, there has been no sufficient research in the sector (interviews 13). The CG however, has promoted and demonstrated the role of the sector in the fight against poverty and in ensuring sustainable development. This encouraged policy makers to increase interest and attention to the sector (interviews 1 and 3). The PPPO has improved the interest in and attention given to the oilseeds sector as well (interview 18). MoTI and MoA for example, have shown their keen interests to support the sector through market promotion and research respectively. MoTI’s primary attention is however, directed towards export than the overall development of the sector (interview 3). Due to an increasing interest in and attention to the oilseeds sector created by the CG and the PPPO, the Ethiopian Government has come up with a master plan (covering the period 2008-2015) for the development of the sub-sector68.

(e) SNV BOAM’s network
SNV BOAM is not the sole donor involved in the VCD approach, but is embedded in a broader international development network. The most prominent organisations with value chain development programmes are the German GTZ, Oxfam GB, and the Royal Netherlands Embassy (RNE), which support the dissemination of best practices among donors, government institutions and practitioners. The Government of Ethiopia has also adopted the sectoral and value chain approach. Growing Ethiopian Market, Facilitator for Change Ethiopia, and Volunteers in Overseas Cooperative Assistance are other NGOs which are linked with SNV BOAM through the CG. These links of SNV BOAM embed the CG members in the wider institutional field.

Discussions in this section revealed that the oilseeds CG is fairly embedded in inter-organisational relationships. Interactions with third parties are evident, resulting in multidirectional information flows facilitated through the identified brokers of the network. Moreover, the oilseeds CG has played an important role in the establishment

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68 SNV BOAM Annual Report, 2009
of a parallel MSP – PPPO, which is involving multiple organizations. This enhances public-private partnerships in the oilseeds sector.

In the social network analysis, the following regarding relations established with the government were confirmed:

- The Ministry of Trade and Industry is among the central network players in the oilseeds CG (Appendix 6), confirming MoTI’s interests to support the sector (through market promotion and research);

3.3 Involvement
In this case study, the intensity of actor involvement was assessed through (a) individual/sector representation in the CG and (b) participation in CG-related committees. The findings were verified in the social network analysis.

(a) Representation
The question whether all relevant stakeholders are represented in the oilseeds CG was forwarded to 15 of the 18 interviewees. The majority of them (87%) believed that representation in the edible oil and oilseeds CG was incomplete (Table 11).

Three of the interviewees (interviews 5, 14 and 11) indicated that regional and federal research institutions are not sufficiently represented; only recently (2009) one research institute - Holleta Agricultural Research Centre - has started participating in the CG. In addition, Federal Cooperative Unions and brokers are important stakeholders that have not been included (interviewees 8 and 17).

Eight out of the 15 interviewees replied yes and no to the question (interviews 6, 7, 10, 13, 15, 16, and 18). Yes, because, institutionally, all relevant stakeholders are represented in the CG. No, because government agencies are represented by frequently rotating experts who do have little or no leverage in government decision making and policy processes. Their overall assessment is that the CG is not complete in the real sense of representation.

The lack of government involvement is a specific issue that SNV BOAM considered from the outset. The Mid Term Review (Aleme et al. 2008) states: “involvement and commitment from the public sector is crucial in order to achieve the strategic objectives of the BOAM programme. The public sector is already involved and experienced the positive effects of the BOAM approach and is interested to continue with the practical relation. The rejection of the public development program however, hinders the development of better and more structural relationships. More importantly, the connection with the higher forums and senior management of relevant public agencies and departments needs to be structured for which new arrangements are necessary.” Discussions in section 3.2(d) revealed that the Ethiopian Government has started to develop an interest in the oilseeds sector due to the CG’s efforts to

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69 The public component of the BOAM program (to be implemented by the Bureaus of Finance and Economic Development) never took off (source: Mid Term Review, 2008)
demonstrate the role of the sector in the overall economic development in general and in poverty reduction in particular.

**Table 11. Representation oilseeds CG**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Representation</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Complete</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not complete</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: interview data

(b) Participation in CG related committees
The establishment, membership and participation in (steering, ad hoc) committees and working groups are indicators of actors’ involvement. The participants of the oilseeds CG have established several spontaneous working groups on several issues in the meetings (meetings 1, 3 and 12) (see also section 3.1.3 b). The CG has also established the Policy Issues Ad hoc Committee (meeting 8) and an Executive Committee (meeting 12). The two committees have created opportunities for members to engage in the CG activities. Despite serious limitations in achieving its objectives, the Policy Issues Ad hoc Committee consists of public, private and civil society sector representatives, including MoTI, MoA, the Bankers’ Association, ECCSA, the Oil Consortium, and SNV BOAM. The Oilseeds CG Executive Committee also involves a number of participants. Three of the members represent federal and regional government agencies while four of them represent private organizations and business associations.

The social network analyses on sector representation and central network players generally support these findings (derived from Appendices 5 and 6). In Table 12 and 13 respectively the sector representation in the oilseeds CG and the number of central network players from each sector are represented. Finally, in Table 14, the central network players per stakeholder role in the oilseeds value chain are displayed.

**Table 12. Sector representation in the oilseeds CG in percentages (%)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Private sector</th>
<th>Public sector</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Civil society</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oilseeds</td>
<td>60,4</td>
<td>17,8</td>
<td>6,9</td>
<td>14,9</td>
<td>0,0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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70 Minutes of the 8th Oilseeds CG Meeting, 13 July 2007
71 Minutes of the 12th Oilseeds CG Meeting, 9 December 2008
Table 13. Top-10 central network players in the oilseeds CG per societal sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Societal Sector</th>
<th>Oilseeds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>10</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 14 Top-10 central network players per stakeholder role in the oilseeds value chain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stakeholder Role</th>
<th>Oilseeds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Actor</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporter</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influencer</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitator</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>10</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the network analysis, the following was confirmed:

- SNV BOAM’s private sector approach is evident; the majority of the participants in the oilseeds value chain CG represent private sector organisations (Table 12). Moreover, half of the central network players are representatives of the private sector (Table 13).
- All stakeholders’ roles in the value chains are represented in the lists of central network players of the oilseeds CG (Table 14). This indicates that value chain roles (chain actors, -supporters, -influencers and -facilitators) of the whole chain approach are represented in the networks;
- Financial organisations (i.e. banks, MFIs) are absent as central network players in the oilseeds CG (Appendix 6).
- The Quality Standard Authority of Ethiopia is among the central network players in the oilseeds CG (see also section 4.3).
### Internal dynamics

#### I. Collaboration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1.1 Engagement</th>
<th>Homogenous group of medium committed members. Absence of active nucleus- group to ‘steer the wheel’ is a critical problem. There is no strong private company to take the lead nor do members invest sufficient time and resources to effectively carry out their tasks in the CG. Critique that SNV BOAM’s low resource allocation to the oilseeds value chain, inordinate delays in fund release procedures, influence in the CG decision making, and lack of interest to include agendas other than those in the BAOM framework have affected members’ interest and commitment to play a role of active nucleus-group. High exit and rotation.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Jointness</td>
<td>Joint, to variable degrees. Stakeholders can adapt SIPs. For a limited period, stakeholders had a say in oilseeds allocated funding. Nevertheless, SNV BOAM influential in decision making. Equal opportunity to speak out for all, but more knowledgeable and well informed participants take advantages in the CG meetings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 Transparency</td>
<td>Formal accountability mechanisms absent. Nevertheless, several forms of informal accountability are present.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 Goal alignment</td>
<td>Yes; regular and direct communication and dialogue between stakeholders in the CG meetings have generally improved trust among stakeholder in and along the chain. More information on who does what and how to create business between chain actors. However, processors and exporters still distrust farmers. The CG had only little influence in this regard.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Motivation

Fourfold: 1) the business opportunities it provides, such as meeting new buyers and suppliers (extrinsic); 2) the incentives provided by SNV BOAM as it has been inviting participants and offers technical and financial assistance (extrinsic); 3) the learning opportunities the platform offers and its overall role in promoting the oilseeds sector (both extrinsic and intrinsic ); and 4) personal interests (intrinsic). DSA not objective in itself, but necessary precondition for poorly capacitated regional organisations.

#### Roles & Contrib.

No. Except for those contracted by SNV BAOM, formal duties and responsibilities of each CG member not specified.

#### Shared resources

No, but equal access to third (SNV BOAM) funds.

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**Table 15. Oilseeds CG Ethiopia: internal and external dynamics**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objectives clear</th>
<th>Yes, CG members have commonly shared objectives on promoting linkages between stakeholders in the oilseeds value chain. Objectives initially drafted by SNV BAOM.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Win-win</td>
<td>In principle. Win-win opportunities are equal but members need capabilities to gain from the MSP, and some are more capable than others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compelling case</td>
<td>Yes. The sector was in complete disarray due to lack of policy attention and disorganized chain actors. NGO successfully facilitated tri-sector approach.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

II. Embeddedness

| Link to CG | Yes, pre-existing inter-organizational links have also helped to find new participants. Most of the participants however, were invited to the CG through SNV BAOM. |
| Membership to new organization | No, the majority believed that the CG did not play any role in this regard. A few emphasised the role of the CG in establishing a complementary public-private partnership on oilseeds. |
| Multiple MSPs | Yes, several members involved in other (BOAM) MSPs and PPPO. This improves network opportunities for CG members. |
| Relations with government | Yes, though key decision and policy makers are not yet attending the CG meetings, the CG has generally increased government’s interest in and attention to oilseeds sector. |
| SNV BOAM embeddedness | Yes, SNV BOAM embedded into several international development networks that also linked the CG members in a wider institutional field. |

III. Involvement

| Representation | Incomplete. Not all key stakeholders are represented. Government institutions are represented by frequent rotating experts; key decision and policy makers are not participating in the CG meetings. |
| Participation CG sub committees | Yes, notwithstanding the limitations in carrying out assigned responsibilities, several members are participating in different committees (spontaneous, ad hoc and standing). |

External dynamics

IV. Institutions

| Access to knowledge | Yes, in respect of training, information and access to improved seeds, awareness on quality issues. No, in respect of making available new means of production and processing technology. |
| Access to capital | No, no changes achieved. Commercial Banks offer no accessible loans while MFIs charge exorbitant rate. Major limitation of CG. Increased attention to oilseeds sector (and government interest) may improve creditworthiness oilseeds chain actors. |
| Access to markets | Limited. Few direct linkages between producers and processors; domestic market is still broker dominated. Efforts of CG and PPPO to promote Ethiopian oils in Europe and Middle East, but no concrete result. |
| Access to (third) organisations | Limited. CG helped establishment of parallel public private partnership forum on oilseeds. |
4. Institutional change
This chapter elaborates on the CG’s external dynamics, the institutional changes in the value chain’s business environment brought about by the CG. We address the question to what extent the CG has been effective in improving the conditions for upgrading for farmers and SMEs in the oilseeds and edible oil value chain, in the perception of the interviewees. The focus is on opportunities for value chain actors to acquire knowledge and technology, capital or credit, opportunities to stabilize markets, and to become part of professional associations. *Table 16* below presents an overview of perceptions by knowledgeable interviewees.

*Table 16. Perceived changes in the institutional environment, in % and number of interviewees
*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4.1 Access to knowledge and technology</th>
<th>-</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>+/-</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>+</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Training in good agricultural &amp; manufacturing practices</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers’ awareness on quality</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil millers’ awareness on quality</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Availability of improved seeds</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Availability of new technology</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduction in adulteration (oilseeds and edible oil)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4.2 Access to capital</th>
<th>-</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>+/-</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>+</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Willingness of banks/MFI’s to finance</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4.3 Access to markets</th>
<th>-</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>+/-</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>+</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increased prices paid by buyers</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advance payment</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4.3 Access to organisation</th>
<th>-</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>+/-</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>+</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Access to new organisation</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key: - No effect of CG, +/- Limited positive effect of CG, + Considerable positive effect of CG

4.1 Access to knowledge
Access to knowledge refers to market, technical, and/or organisational information that value chain actors can acquire either by themselves or by hiring affordable service suppliers. To what extent have the CG meetings facilitated oilseeds chain actors in their access to such knowledge? Has the CG been indispensible in this respect?

The CG has created access to technical, market and organizational information in several ways. All interviewees pointed out that the CG has facilitated training opportunities for farmers and oil mill workers to some extent. Farmers have been trained in good farming practices as well as on product diversification. Good farming
practices included trainings on land preparation, sowing, weeding, harvesting, and store management aimed at improving quality and productivity of oilseeds cultivation (interviews 4, 5, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 17). The introduction and training of 5,000 farmers in growing olive trees and producing olive oil was the first set of activities related to product diversification (interviews 12, 16 and 17). The training of farmers in growing and collecting petal from safflower is another important activity in this regard. Safflower’s petal is a high value export product from which farmers can make a proper living. Farmers who grow safflowers benefit not only from the petal but also from the seeds (interviews 10, 12, and 17). Training of oil mill workers in improved manufacturing practices is another opportunity the CG has created (interviews 9, 11, 12, and 17). Interviewees however, have emphasized the limited scale of the trainings provided and hence, its limited impact on quality and productivity of oilseeds and edible oil. For example, a representative of a farmers’ cooperative union stated that only 2,400 out of the 19,000 members of a Farmers’ Cooperative Union, had a chance to be trained (interview 5).

The CG has also been criticised for its weak effort in facilitating technological transfer to the processing industries (interview 9). On the production side however, it has facilitated access to improved seeds. Farmers’ cooperative unions are provided with information where and how to obtain improved seeds for their members. Training opportunities for farmers on informal seed multiplications is another important role of the CG (interviews 4, 5, 6, 7, 16, and 17). Exchange of contact addresses between CG members has also facilitated access to technical information. For example, the Local Capacity Builder contracted by SNV BOAM has provided technical advisory services to cooperative unions whom he met in the CG meetings (interview 6).

On top of these, presentations of research findings and good practices have played important roles in creating access to technical and organizational information (e.g. interviews 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, and 13). For example, Addis Mojo Edible Oil Complex S.C presented on how to produce different varieties of edible oil using different processing technologies (interview 11). Reviews of the minutes of the oilseeds CG meetings generally indicate that presentations on research findings and sharing of good (agricultural and manufacturing) practices are among the most important agenda items of the CG meetings. These items were absent in just two of the seventeen meetings.

4.2 Access to capital
Access to capital involves the possibilities for oilseeds value chain actors to acquire credit, loan or budget for their commercial activities. Access to capital was assessed through interest rates, duration, collateral requirements, pay-back conditions, and characteristics of the funding organisation. It was also verified whether the CG was indispensable in influencing the stakeholders’ opportunities to access capital/credit.

Almost all interviewees pointed out lack of access to capital or credit services as a major bottleneck to the development of the oilseeds’ sector. Neither producers nor processors have enough collateral to secure loans from the Banks. In fact, most farmers do not have the collateral Banks require; hence, they heavily depend on MFIs (interview

72 Informal seed multiplication refers the non-laboratory based multiplication of seeds by farmers
Interviewees specified that farmers’ cooperative unions have better access to credit than individual farmers. Cooperative unions in Oromia for example, can borrow from the Oromia Cooperative Bank without collateral since they are shareholders of the Bank. Unions borrow from the Bank at the rate of 7.5 percent per annum and lend to their members (farmers) at the rate of 8.5 percent (1 percent administrative cost). Interviewees however, believe that unions receive insufficient credits from the Cooperative Bank to meet the demands of their members. Hence, both individual farmers as well as cooperative members are exposed to exorbitant interest rates (16–20 percent) charged by MFIs (*interviews 4 and 5*). A representative of the processors’ association stated that processors are in quest of large investment capital to upgrade the backward processing technologies, but Bank credit services are inaccessible due to collateral requirements. In addition, MFIs refuse to provide large amounts of credits (*interview 9*).

Reviews of minutes of the oilseeds CG meetings show that Banks and MFIs have been participating since meeting 7 and 13 respectively. This shows that the CG members have been aware of the problem and the need for facilitating access to credit services. Generally, interviewees are very critical of the CG’s role in this regard. Many agree that the issue has been raised and discussed several times, but the CG’s role did not go beyond “talking”. Neither Banks nor MFIs have changed their polices and conditions for acquiring loans. The overall evaluation shows that eleven out of the fourteen interviewees with whom the issue was discussed said the CG did not positively affect the willingness of Banks and MFIs in Ethiopia to lend any money to stakeholders in the oilseeds value chain (*Table 16*).

### 4.3 Access to markets

Access to markets was examined by gathering information on (alternative) market opportunities, prices, and buyer and farmer commitments (advance payments, contractual arrangements, and quality standards).

In terms of creating (alternative) market opportunities and B2B relationships, the CG has facilitated access to market and business information by creating opportunities for exchange of contact and communication between producers and processors/exporters. For example, Didea Farmers’ Cooperative Union has been able to establish direct connections with processors through the contact it established with the Addis Ababa Oil Millers’ Association. Didea was also able to establish linkages with an international company (based in London) to export linseed. The relationship however, did not materialize into concrete business due to the high local prices and low

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73 Cooperative unions provide the loan to farmers in kind (seeds)
international prices for linseed\textsuperscript{74}. The provision of technical advisory services to unions by the Local Capacity Builders is another good example of the role of the CG in creating business relations (\textit{interview 5 and 6}). On top of creating a contact platform, the CG has also facilitated international market access. An attempt was made to link Ethiopian companies with Dutch companies operating in the oilseeds value chain to facilitate access to market and technology information (\textit{interviews 16 and 17}). The CG’s effort in exploring and securing markets (in China) for rapeseeds bi-products (cake) is worth mentioning as well. Samirawit Oil Mill Factory has already started exporting rapeseed cake to China (\textit{interview 17}). The CG and the PPPO are closely collaborating with the Ethiopian Commodity Exchange Agency in promoting Ethiopian oilseeds to foreign markets (e.g. Europe and Middle East) (\textit{interview 12}). Regardless of these efforts, many of our interviewees believe that the CG’s role in influencing prices through improved market information is minor (\textit{Table 16}). The facilitation of access to market information is limited in scope and hence, direct exchange of market information and contact between producers and processors/exports is not yet effective; the oilseeds market is still dominated by brokers. Therefore, farmers have limited alternative markets (\textit{interviews 5, 6, 7, and 10}). “Generally, the CG focused more on the production side, but little on the marketing aspects” (\textit{interview 11}). Interviewees’ evaluate the impact of the CG on prices paid to farmers as minimal (\textit{Table 16}).

The oilseeds market is characterized by a high degree of price fluctuation (e.g. \textit{interviews 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, and 12}, see also textbox). Seasonal supply of oilseeds, extended supply chains characterised by few direct linkages between producers and processors/exporters, and speculative and dominant brokers are the main causes of price fluctuations. Lack of infrastructure to reach producers/farmers also causes a major problem (\textit{interview 12}). Speculative brokers cause artificial (not dictated by actual demand and supply) price fluctuations. Almost all interviewees

\textbf{Prices in the oilseeds sector} are defined by seasons and brokers. Usually, price diminishes during peak production season (November – March) and tends to increase in the months of April – June. It increases sharply in the months of July-October (\textit{interview 4, 5 and 9}). In spite of these general trends, brokers cause an increase in price by hording oilseeds (\textit{interviews 4, 5, 9, 11, 12, and 14}). They also use new economic or policy measures as pretext to increase price above the real impact of the measures taken. For example, in August 2010, the value of the US $ has increased up to 22 percent due to the devaluation of the Ethiopian Currency (Birr). Immediately, the price for oilseeds increased up to 40 percent (\textit{interview 12}). Brokers can also cause a decline in price. They usually collide to fix the farm gate price at low levels (particularly during peak production season) (\textit{interviews 4 and 5}). In 2009, a cooperative union bought a quintal of rapeseed for Birr 470 which declined to Birr 370/quintal in one month time. This forced the union to store its products until prices reach at least the buying level (\textit{interview 4}). More than competitive market forces, such ups and downs are caused by brokers (\textit{interviews 4 and 12}). Of course, price generally increases from year to year due to inflation as well (\textit{interviews 11 and 12}).

\textsuperscript{74} Clarification interview with the SNV BOAM Lead Advisor for Oilseeds Value Chain, 15 March 2011
indicated that brokers, who muddle between producers and processors/exporters, are price makers at all times. The CG had played a limited role in addressing considerable constraints such as limited direct market information and absence of linkages between producers and processors/exporters. Processors and exporters heavily depend on brokers since they still distrust smallholder producers and cooperative unions in ensuring predictable and regular supply of oilseeds (interviews 4, 9, 11, and 12).

As stated above, the CG in collaboration with the PPPO is exerting its effort to ensure that the oilseeds pass through the Ethiopian Commodity Exchange market system, which is believed to improve the prices paid to farmers by improving market information as the Ethiopian Commodity Exchange Agency provides daily updated information via television and radio. Sesame has already started going through such a market system (interviews 12 and 18).

In terms of contractual agreement, the majority of the interviews pointed out that the issue has been raised and discussed in the CG meetings, but no concrete result has so far been achieved. The Lead Chain Advisor stated that there was an initiative of a formal contractual agreement between the Ambo Farmers’ Cooperative Union and the Samrawit Oil Factory, but it did not materialize due to the Union’s failure to supply the required amount of oilseeds (interview 17). Buyers generally distrust suppliers since the latter have no capacity to ensure predictable and regular supply (interviews 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, and 16). Three of our interviewees pointed out the existence of contractual agreements between farmers and seed suppliers, but not attributed to the CG. Cooperative unions supply improved seeds to farmers and the latter pay back the equivalent value in kind (seed) during harvest season (interviews 4 and 5). ERA Agrolink PLC has also been engaged in similar arrangements (interview 14). Nevertheless, the contracts are challenging since numerous farmers break the contract (they do not supply as per the agreement) and it is difficult to enforce the contracts (legal procedures endure endlessly) (interviews 4, 5 and 14). Despite the challenges, the majority of our respondents believe that direct linkages and contractual agreements between producers and processors/exporters “are the only way out” in improving broker dominated oilseeds markets. The paradox is that farmers/suppliers receive insufficient payments in a situation where there is critical shortage of supply. Processors pointed at inadequate amounts of oilseeds supply throughout the year. As a consequence, they procure large stocks of oilseeds during the peak harvest season resulting in high holding costs. Even with this strategy, numerous processors still suffer from critical shortages and some “have been forced to engage in commercial oilseeds farming while others are forced to operate below their capacity” (interviews 10 and 11). Processors’ engagements into commercial farming would stretch their resources and capacity which in turn would undermine their capacity to invest and specialise in processing.

Processors and exporters suffer from poor quality of oilseeds. Nor are there efficient quality standards to control quality (interviews 9, 10, 11 and 12). Although the QSAE was identified as a top-10 central player in the social network analysis, interviewees did not recognize the indispensability of QSAE, nor did SNV BOAM. Quality problems are not limited to oilseeds but also to vegetable/edible oils. Most of the local oil millers produce crude oil and on top of this, adulteration is a common
practice (interview 8). Therefore, the processing industry is less competent in the
domestic market let alone to the export market. The CG has been promoting the
concept and practice of quality for a better market share. Related to the limited capacity
of domestic processors, no concrete results were booked yet in an attempt to create
linkages with Dutch Processing Companies from whose experiences local producers
could benefit (interviews 16 and 17). The CG has also promoted consumers’ awareness on
the quality of edible oils through the involvement of an active Consumers’ Protection
Association (interview 17).

4.4 Access to organisation
As already discussed in section 3.2(b), most of the interviewed participants indicated that
the CG did not contribute to members’ access to new professional/sectoral
organisations. Few believed that the CG has played an active role in establishing a
parallel public private partnership on oilseeds. Eighty five percent of the interviewees
believe that the CG has no contribution in this regard (Table 16).

5. The future of the oilseeds CG
The interviewees believe that the CG has been effective in bringing multi-stakeholders
together and to identify and discuss major problems and policy gaps in the oilseeds
value chain. As discussed in section 3.1.3, the issue of succession or handing over the CG
from SNV BOAM to stakeholders has been discussed since meeting 14. Accordingly,
though no practical activity can be observed so far, ECCSA had been assigned to take
over responsibility. The majority of the interviewees however, are doubtful on ECCSA’s
capacity to effectively perform this responsibility. Hence, the CG is unlikely to sustain
its functions without SNV BAOM support (interviews 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, and 15).
The SNV BOAM’s Chain Lead Advisor confirmed these statements. He doubts whether
the CG has a chance to continuation without SNV BOAM’s support. For example, many
CG members from remote areas will not be able to attend the CG meeting as they do
not have financial capacity to cover transportation and accommodation costs nor is the
ECCSA capable of covering their costs (interview 17).
6. Conclusions
Ethiopia has a considerable potential for growing different types of oilseeds, including linseed, Niger seed, soybeans, cotton seed, sesame, groundnuts, safflower seed, castor beans, and rapeseed. Most of these general and speciality oilseeds (safflower, castor beans and rapeseeds) have high international demand due to their organic nature. The oilseeds sector in Ethiopia is however, constrained by several factors which could be grouped into three (production, processing and marketing) areas. First, production is dominated by smallholder farmers who suffer from lack of inputs and low yields; hence, they have low economic incentives to invest in oil crops. Nor is there sufficient government attention and interest in the oilseeds sector to support farmers through research and supply of inputs. Second, the processing industry suffers from backward technologies and critical shortages of supplies (oilseeds). The majority of the local edible oil processing companies have no refinery systems and are predominantly characterized by inefficient and poor quality (crude oil) production. Regrettably, many of the local oil millers operate below 40 percent of their capacity due to the critical shortage of oilseeds. Next to quality problems, domestic production covers only 20 percent of the total domestic demand for edible oil. As a result, the local market is dominated by imported palm oil, which further undermines the competitiveness of the local processing companies. Third, the oilseeds markets in Ethiopia are characterized by absent competitive environments resulting in prices being determined by speculative brokers rather than by buyers and suppliers (producers). Absence of direct linkages and communication between buyers and suppliers (producers) due to lack of efficient market information and trust are key problems.

The oilseeds CG, which involved actors from the three different societal sectors (public, private and civil society), was established in 2005 by the NGO –SNV to address the above constraints through joint efforts. This case study assessed the effects of the oilseeds CG in improving the situation related to major problems in production, processing and marketing. Up to 101 organisations participated in at least one of the 17 CG meetings that were held in the period of 2005-2010. To examine the MSP’s success, the researchers analysed both its internal, organisational dynamics and its external dynamics, i.e. the changes brought about in key areas of the institutional business environment.

Establishing the oilseeds Coordination Group under SNV’s Support to Business Organisations and their Access to Markets’ (BOAM) programme was a timely and relevant response to pressing issues in the oilseeds sector. There was a need for an instrument that could facilitate public-private dialogue and strengthen the capacity of the sector. Contact building and networking among chain stakeholders is a necessary condition for a value chain to develop. The CG under study served as a new, horizontal platform and has played a significant role in creating opportunities for stakeholders in the edible oil and oilseeds value chains to unite and discuss on problems in the sector.

The process of setting up the multi-stakeholder platforms was thoroughly considered: SNV BOAM has specified a vision on why and how private sector development can stimulate economic growth that reduces poverty; the oilseeds CGs
devoted proper attention to a collective goal setting process and CG participants could adjust common objectives, strategic intervention- and operational plans; the CGs are horizontally organised and from 2009, stakeholders had a say in the sector allocated funding through the CG Executive Committees. Moreover, a number of SNV BOAM initiatives have been supportive in ‘levelling the playing field’ for stakeholders. First, the meetings are currently in Amharic, the language that all stakeholders understand. Therefore, all stakeholders, including farmers, had a (equal) say in the meetings. Second, the DSA reimbursement has been functional in ensuring participation of poorer organisations and actors from remote areas for whom travel and accommodation costs were a real barrier to participation. Finally, in principle, every stakeholder is welcome to participate in the open and transparent CG meetings.

In-depth analyses on the internal dynamics of the oilseeds CG demonstrate mixed results in the areas of important collaboration requirements and success factors. Motivations to engage in the CG are diverse, nonetheless, often related to financial and technical incentives (extrinsic) provided by the SNV BOAM’s broader programme. DSA coverage (transport and accommodation) is a necessary precondition to sustain participation from less capacitated organisations, but is not considered to be a motivational factor in itself.

The general level of engagement of the CG members was rated modest. Except for those contracted by SNV BAOM, participants do not have clearly defined roles nor are they highly committed. An active and highly committed nucleus-group of participants is absent in the oilseeds CG. Absence of strong private company to take the lead is one of the factors that affected the emergence of an active nucleus-group. The CG members’ lack of interest and effort to invest sufficient time and resources as revealed by high exit and rotation of participants and weak performance of assigned tasks is another problem. SNV BOAM’s low resource allocation to the oilseeds value chain, inordinate delays in releasing funds to beneficiaries, influence in the CG decision making, and its refusing to include agendas other than those in the BAOM framework have affected members interest and commitment to play the role of an active nucleus-group.

Most of the respondents believe that decisions made are based on consensus. Nevertheless, one interviewee disagrees. Despite this, the CG has emerged as a democratic platform that basically functions on the principles of lateral relationships where each member is free and equal to participate. The CG operates under the leadership of a trio consisting of the CG Leader, the SNV BOAM Chain Lead Advisor and the CG Facilitator. They play a key role in identifying and inviting new participants, agenda setting and overall facilitation of the CG activities. But findings also revealed a prevalence of unequal power relationships. The fact that some agenda points forwarded by members were not accepted, and that proposal requirements were not uniformly and equally applied reflect unequal power relationships. A representative of a processors association believes that SNV BAOM has the upper hand in setting agendas while other members are mainly on the ‘receiving end’. Such experiences undermine a sense of ownership. In terms of distributions of benefits, information from
most of our respondents reflected that benefits are related to the capacity of each member to articulate its needs. This has affected equitable distribution of benefits resulting in marginal benefits for incapacitated members. Moreover, some of the respondents revealed lack of consistency in reviewing and approving funding applications, which could have had an effect on the equitable distribution of funds.

Assessments showed that the degree of transparency in the oilseeds CG is modestly to high. Members are clearly informed in advance of every meeting about agendas to be discussed. Moreover, meeting summaries and other documents of the CG (presentation materials and research findings) are shared with stakeholders. Formal accountability mechanisms however, are missing as there are no formal duties and responsibilities assigned to members. Nonetheless, informal forms of accountability were apparent. The CG has created an important opportunity for the multiple stakeholders to meet and discuss on common interests for improving the performance of the oilseeds sector. In addition to discussions in the meeting, CG members also have opportunities for bilateral discussions (e.g. between producers and processors, producers and exporters, producers and experts, processors and experts, etc.). Such interactive opportunities promoted trust and a ‘sense of complementarities’ between stakeholders, which were previously operating in a state of complete disarray. Next to this, processors and exporters do not yet have sufficient trust in the producers (farmers) due to the latter’s inability to ensure reliable and regular supply of oilseeds.

There was a compelling cases for the oilseeds CG on the basis of which its objectives were defined. Win-win opportunities for all exist only in theory. Practically, members have different capabilities upon which benefits depend; some are more capable than others. Lack of uniform assessment of funding applications is another factor, which could undermine the win-win scenario. If members who invested less time and resources have the chance to qualify for the SNV BAOM’s support (due to their good relationships) compared to those who invested more time and resources in the preparation of concept proposals, the latter are on the ‘losing side’.

In the social network analysis the major rotation in the oilseeds CG (70.2 % exits), the central roles of the leading trio (SNV BOAM, CG Leader, and CG Facilitator), the active involvement of the government and SNV BOAM’s private sector approach was confirmed.

Regarding external dynamics, a considerable contribution of the CG is that it enabled the creation of linkages between organisations that did not exchange information before the start of the meetings. SNV BOAM played the role of independent ‘network broker’ and facilitated the establishment of Business to Business relations between stakeholders in the Ethiopian context. Moreover, it created a learning platform generating general and sector specific technical- and market information. The oilseeds CG was mainly credited for this role in creating access to knowledge. The training opportunities (for farmers and oil mill workers) and facilitation of access to improved seeds are among the most important contributions of the CG. Impact on productivity and quality however, is not evident yet due to the limited scope of the training opportunities.
Lack of access to capital or credit services is one of the major bottlenecks for producers, processors and exporters of oilseeds. Farmers and small scale producers do not have easy access to Banks due to rigid collateral requirements; therefore, MFIs are the only options resulting in dependence on the exorbitant interest rates they charge. The CG has achieved little or none to change the situation. Studies and discussions between participants of the oilseeds CG demonstrated the role of the oilseeds sector in the national economic development in general and poverty reduction in particular. This has generated increased government attention to and interest in the sector. This may in the future create opportunities for devising a new financing strategy to the sector. As regards to market opportunities, overall evaluations of the interviewees pointed out that the CG’s effort in improving access to alternative markets was insufficient. Effective linkages and contractual agreements between producers and processors/exporters do not exist yet. The market is still dominated by speculative brokers who deliberately distort prices in favour of them; producers are not paid yet sufficiently and hence, incentives to invest in quality and productivity are absent.

Generally, the success of the oilseeds CG in providing practical solutions to the problems that called for its establishment is not yet satisfactory. Nevertheless, institutional change has to be seen in terms of larger and longer term transition processes and interviewees have clearly indicated that the CG is a vital platform to address the multiple constraints of the oilseeds sector and hence, has to continue. However, interviewees expressed their concerns on the oilseeds CG future without SNV BOAM’s support since there is neither an active nucleus-group nor is the stakeholder ECCSA –that was assigned to take over- seen as an organisation that possess the requisite capacity.
7. Limitations

As is the inherent problem with any investigation of short duration into a complex subject, choices had to be made regarding **what to take on board and what not**. We experienced a challenge to separate the impact of the multi-stakeholder platform on any changes in the institutional business environment, apart from the SNV BOAM programme as a whole or from any other (policy) interventions. Especially when organisations already have established long term relationships with SNV BOAM, the clear cut distinction between services provided by SNV BOAM or through the CG is not easy. This *'attribution problem'* is a limitation. It was crucial that we remained conscious on this challenge during all the interviews by probing and making assumptions explicit; however—as expected- some interviewees remained having troubles in making this distinction. In addition, it was questioned whether, for example, the acquired technology services or credit services were being made available from ‘inside the chain’ (by chain actors) or ‘outside the chain’ (e.g. chain supporters).

Second, during the field work the researchers operated in close collaboration with SNV BOAM and were partly dependent on SNV BOAM for their selection of interviewees. Though this substantially facilitated logistics and minimized non-response, such embeddedness holds the risk of **losing independency** in the eyes of interviewees. Organisations might shy away from reflecting critically on the oilseeds CG as they fear the continuity of their good relationship with SNV BOAM. To avoid bias, a stakeholder exiting the CG as a result of a conflict was explicitly incorporated in the interview sample. Furthermore, the researchers constructed a list of relevant stakeholders in advance to ensure independent sampling. Finally, in the beginning of each interview the independent status of the researchers was emphasized.

Finally, the **political context** of Ethiopia was not explicitly taken into account in the primary (interviews) and secondary data collection (desk review), despite its importance in understanding how MSPs are organised and functioning. Secondary source indicate that there is no genuine multi-party democracy and tensions and pressures in Ethiopia’s polities are growing (International Crisis Group report, 2009). Furthermore, Human Rights Watch research (2010: 4) reports that “development aid flows through, and directly supports, a virtual one-party state with a deplorable human rights record” and that “the government has used donor-supported programs, salaries, and training opportunities as political weapons to control the population, punish dissent, and undermine political opponents—both real and perceived. Local officials deny these people’s access to seeds and fertilizer, agricultural land, credit, food aid, and other resources for development”. The researchers however, have not researched whether such political situations exist or not, and as well as the impact of the prevailing political situation on the data found.
8. References


SNV BOAM Annual reports 2005-2009
SNV BOAM programme proposal 2005-2010
SNV BOAM 2 programme proposal. Up-scaling phase extension 2010-2011
SNV BOAM Coordination Group minutes 1-17 of oilseeds
SNV BOAM report ‘Value Chains Identification for Intervention’ 2005


Wijnands, J. et al.(2007) Oilseeds business opportunities in Ethiopia

9. Appendices
Appendix 1: Theoretical model

Appendix 2: Roles of various stakeholders

Source: (based on) Hans Posthumus Consultancy, 2008
In general we distinguish four types of stakeholders:

1) Chain actors

Chain actors are the prime stakeholders who, at some point in the chain, own the product that is being created. They commonly buy a semi-finished product from chain actors upstream, add a certain value to it, and sell the enhanced product to buyers downstream. In the research farmers, producer firms, cooperatives, processing firms, collectors, traders, exporters etc. are included.

2) Chain supporters

Chain supporters are those that are outside the chain. They supply goods or services to the chain actors, often they are distinguished as either financial providers (e.g. banks providing loans) or non-financial service providers (e.g. accountants or transporters). In the research consultants, BDS providers, quality and standard institutes, microfinance, banks, funds (IMF), and agricultural research centers (not only temporary, but years of input, extension services, seed inputs etc.) are included.

3) Chain influencers

Chain influencers are those that influence the performance of the sub sector, its actors and their supporters. They influence the entire sub sector (and beyond) without performing an actor or supporters role: influencers (such as the ministry of commerce) determine (partly) the factors (such as investment climate). In the research business representative associations, Ministries, Chamber of Commerce, media, government implementing agencies (e.g. Cooperative Bureau, BoFED etc.) are included.

4) Chain facilitators

A temporary (catalyst) role by an organisation (often a donor funded project) to “grease” the chain machinery, either between the actors at the various levels or between the actors and their supporters, with objective to improve the performance of the entire chain and its actors (also commercially). Often NGOs with donor funding that finance a diversity of capacity building activities. In the research SNV BOAM, NGOs, University, and multilateral agencies (UN, WB) are included.

CODING FOR EXCEL

1=chain actor, 2 = chain supporter, 3 = chain influencer, 4 = chain facilitator

Appendix 3: Interview schedule/ List of Interviewees for Oilseeds Value Chain
General

June 9 & 10, 2010  **Orientation visit**\(^5\): Mr. Marc Steen, National Portfolio Coordinator and Head Value Chain Development, Mr. Piet Visser, learning coordinator for VCD and Mr. Mugessie Fikri, Monitoring & Evaluation and Documentation, SNV BOAM Ethiopia, Addis Ababa

August 12, 2010  **Discussion Group**\(^6\): SNV BOAM Ethiopia staff: presentation research and discussion with Mr. Piet Visser, learning coordinator for VCD and Lead Advisor pineapple chain, Mr. Carlo Kuepers, Lead Advisor honey chain & Senior Advisor Market Linkages & Value Chain Development, Mr. Mugessie Fikri, Monitoring and Evaluation, Mr. Yohannes Agonafir, Lead Advisor oil seeds chain, Mrs. Mahlet Yohannes, Lead Advisor dairy chain, Nicholas Nyathi, program coordinator PSNP Plus program, Meskerem Shifera, BDS Development and Elenie Abraham, junior advisor, oil seeds and VCF

September 9, 2010  **Short progress discussion** with SNV BOAM staff: Mr. Piet Visser, learning coordinator for VCD, Mr. Juergen Greiling, Senior Advisor Agroprocessing, Mr. Mugessie Fikri, Monitoring and Evaluation, Mr. Yohannes Agonafir, Lead Advisor oil seeds chain, and Meskerem Shifera, BDS Development

November 8, 2010  **Clarification** meeting and feedback from Mr. Piet Visser, learning coordinator for VCD and Lead Advisor pineapple chain

March 15 and 22, 2011  **Clarification** meeting with Mr. Yohannes Agonafir, Lead Advisor oil seeds chain

March 23, 2011  **Clarification** interview with a representative of processors association (anonymous)

March 23, 2011  **Clarification** interview with a representative of a private company (anonymous)

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\(^5\) By Mr. Jeroen van Wijk (MSM) at SNV BOAM head office (Addis Ababa).

\(^6\) By Ms. Sarah Drost (MSM) & Mr. Fenta Mandefro Abate (Addis Ababa University) at SNV BOAM’s head office (Addis Ababa) (continuing for all interviews).
Interviews

Mr. Yohannes Agonafir, Lead Oilseed Value Chain Advisor, SNV BOAM Ethiopia, November 5, 2010

Mr. Dereje Chanie, Program Coordinator, Public Private Partnership on Oilseeds, November 5, 2010

Mr. Dendena Chemeda, Head of the Agro-Processing Industry Development Department and Mr. Zergaw Zeleke, Team Coordinator of the Agro-Processing Industry Development Department, the Ministry of Industry and Trade (MOTI), August 30, 2010

Mr. Abreham Dagne, Operation manager, Addis Mojo Edible Oil Complex S.C, October 21, 2010

Mr. Lemma Gebeyehu, Private Consultant/ SNV BOAM Local Capacity Builder, October 18, 2010

Mr. Tefera Geletu, Training Officer, Oromia Cooperation Promotion Bureau, October 18, 2010

Mr. Elias Geneti, Managing Director, Agro prom International PLC, and CG leader, OS VC, October 22, 2010

Mr. Kassa Getu, General Manager, ERA Agrolink PLC, October 22, 2010

Dr. Girma G/Medhin, Managing Director, EDGE Consult, and CG facilitator, OS VC, October 25, 2010

Mr. Kedir Neffo, General Manager, Oromia Seed Enterprise, November 4, 2010

Mr. Kebede Seifu, General Manager, Didea Farmers’ Cooperative Union, September 28, 2010

Mrs. Addisalem Shitaye, Owner, Addisalem Trading, October 20, 2010

Mr. Gezahegn Tadesse, Senior Apiculturist and Livestock Expert of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural
Mr. Mulugeta Tegegn, Secretary, Addis Ababa Oil Millers’ Association, October 20, 2010

Mr. Endale Tekalign, Food Safety Expert, Ethiopian Consumers’ Protection Association, October 19, 2010

Dr. Bulcha Woyessa, Highland Oil Crops Coordinator Holleta Agricultural Research Centre, October 22, 2010

Mr. Tamiru Wubie, Research and Advocacy Specialist, Ethiopian Chamber of Commerce Sectoral Association (ECCSA), August 19, 2010

Mr. Mohammed Yousuf, General Manager, Raya Wakena Farmers’ Cooperative Union, September 28, 2010

Note: MOTI, MoA and ECCSA were interviewed for all value chains under study (oilseeds, pineapple, dairy and honey)
Appendix 4: Questionnaire

Context
Multi-stakeholder platforms (MSPs) are increasingly recognized by researchers and practitioners as promising mechanisms for stimulating economies in developing countries. The so-called chain platforms can help to bring actors, operating directly or indirectly in the chain, together and realise common objectives through dialogue and cooperation. However, systematic research on their effectiveness and impact is scarce. Therefore, SNV BOAM Ethiopia and the Maastricht School of Management (MSM) / Partnerships Resource Centre (PrC) have embarked on a collaborative effort to evaluate a number of MSPs in which SNV BOAM Ethiopia is involved. MSM carries the responsibility for the research and final report.

SNV is a non-profit, international development organisation, with extensive hands-on experience in their value chain approach. MSM’s Sustainable Development Center stands for expertise on sustainable economic development in emerging markets. MSM is partner in the Partnerships Resource Centre, an open centre where academics, practitioners and students can create, retrieve and share knowledge on cross sector partnerships for sustainable development.

Interview objectives
This questionnaire serves to structure a series of interviews that will be conducted with actors in a selection of value chain Coordination Groups (CGs) in Ethiopia. Selected are CGs in four chains: honey & beeswax, dairy, oilseeds, and pineapple. The interview results will serve as the main input for an evaluation report that is due for 1st of February 2011. The results will be presented and discussed during a workshop in spring 2011.

About the questionnaire
The interview consists of three parts. Section A focuses on the (meetings of the) Coordination Group itself. Section B concentrates on the institutional changes brought about by the CG, whereas the last section C asks about your overall opinion of the CG.

Contact:
For questions and additional information please contact
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Sustainable Development Center
Maastricht School of Management
Email: drost@msm.nl

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77 SNV BOAM Ethiopia: www.SNV BOAMworld.org/en/countries/ethiopia/Pages/default.aspx
78 MSM - SDC: www.msm.nl/1/1/uk/research/sustainable_development_center/
79 PrC: www.erim.eur.nl/ERIM/Research/Centres/SCOPE/Partnerships_Resource_Centre/About
Identification

Name interviewee(s):
Organisation:
Position:
Location:

_interviewer:
Date of interview:
Place of interview:

What are the main activities of your organisation in this value chain?
A Coordination Group (CG)

A1. General introduction
1. What is the main problem in the apiculture/dairy/fruit/oilseeds sector, according to you?

A2. Engagement
2. In what way are you/is your organisation engaged in the CG? (describe activities and roles: e.g., Facilitator, Leader, advisor, member of committee/working group)

3. Since when are you involved in the CG meetings? (reasons for prolonged stay or exit)

4. What motivated your organisation to join the CG? (e.g. daily allowance, influence, networking opportunities?)

5. Do you feel all relevant stakeholders are represented in the CG? Why?

6. How would you evaluate the level of commitment of CG members?
   A. Low
   B. Modest
   C. High
   Please explain

A3. CG Governance
7. Do you feel all CG members have an equal say during the CG meetings?
   A. Yes
   B. No. Who are the dominant members?)

8. Do you feel that all members benefit equally of the CG interventions? (win-win situation or not?  
   A. Yes
   B. No. Who gains most?).

9. Are you generally satisfied with the way the CG meetings are being governed?
   A. No
   B. Yes, but only modestly
   C. Yes, significantly
   Please explain. What should change?

[Honey]
H.1 What is your opinion about the Ethiopian Apiculture Board (EAB) and its regional chapters?
What is your opinion about the Ethiopian Milk and Milk Products Association (EMMPA)?

What is your opinion about the Dairy Business Hub Model established in meeting 16?

What is your opinion about the Ethiopian Pulses, Oilseeds, and Spices Processors Exporters Association (EPOSPEA)?

B Issues addressed by the CG

Did you exchange contact information with other CG members? Has this lead to concrete actions/funding/other opportunities in your field of activities?

Access to services

Do you require specific information, technology or organisational services, for example to meet quality standards, to increase productivity, or to improve your management skills?

Access to capital/credit

How difficult is it for you to acquire a loan/credit/budget for making investments in your organisation (e.g. through financial institute or through B2B relations).

Did the CG improve the availability of these services to you?

Did the CG influence your opportunities to obtain a loan, credit, or additional budget?
B3. Access to markets

(a) Prices
15. How would you evaluate prices paid to the producers in the last 3 years (stability, highness, pre-harvest price set)?

16. Did the CG influence prices (stability and level) paid to farmers?
A. No or almost not
B. Yes but only modestly
C. Yes, significantly
Please explain.

(b) Buyer / producer commitment
17. Do buyers commit themselves to producers to buy their produce in advance of the production cycle (provided that quality conditions are met)?
A. No
B. Yes
Please explain.

18. In case of a contractual arrangement, do you think producers perform well in responding to buyer’s requirements in terms of: delivery, punctuality of delivery, quality, and flexibility?
A. No or almost not
B. Yes but only modestly
C. Yes, significantly
Please explain.

19. Do producers have alternative market opportunities? Which ones?
If yes, what are the benefits of these alternatives for producers?

20. Did the CG contribute to improvement of contractual arrangements between producers and buyers?
A. No or almost not
B. Yes but only modestly
C. Yes, significantly
Please explain.

B4. Access to organisation
21. Are you a member of a professional organisation/platform? If yes, which?

22. Did the CG contribute to the formation of this professional organisation?
A. No or almost not
B. Yes but only modestly
C. Yes, significantly
Please explain.
23. Did the CG contribute to your access to your professional organisation?
A. No or almost not
B. Yes but only modestly
C. Yes, significantly
Please explain.

B5. Institutional environment (legal, government policy)

24. Which are the (three) main legal/policy constraints that you have to cope with in the supply chain?

25. Did the CG contribute to solve these constraints?
A. No or almost not
B. Yes but only modestly
C. Yes, significantly
Please explain.

C. Future and overall opinion of the CG

26. In your opinion, has the CG, overall, been a success?
A. No or almost not
B. Yes but only modestly
C. Yes, significantly
Please explain (which are the main successes, failures, weaknesses, strengths)?

27. How could the CG play a bigger role for you? (i.e. really addressing their issue?/partnerships possibilities).

28. Do you feel that CG is recognized as an important governance mechanism by the stakeholders in this value chain?
A. No or almost not
B. Yes but only modestly
C. Yes, significantly
Please explain

29. Future scenario: What are, in your opinion, the future prospects of the CG after the BOAM programme has finished?

30. What would be necessary, apart from the CG, to tackle the problems in your sector?

Thank you for your time and collaboration.
Appendix Questionnaire: Conditions for upgrading (scored by the respondent)

- No effect of CG
-/+ Limited positive effect of CG
+ Considerable positive effect of CG

Access to knowledge & technology
- Training in good agricultural & manufacturing practices
- Farmers’ awareness on quality
- Oil millers’ awareness on quality
- Availability of improved seeds
- Availability of new technology
- Reduction in adulteration (oilseeds and edible oil)
- Other (please fill in)

Access to affordable credit
- Willingness of banks/MFI’s to finance
- Buyer firms (B2B) are more willing to lend
- Other institutes more willing to lend
- Other (please fill in)

Access to markets
- Increased prices paid by buyers
- Advance payment/contractual agreement
- Other (please fill in)

Access to organisation
- Access to organisation (e.g. FBO, forum, representative agency)
- Other (please fill in)
### Appendix 5: Course ratio oilseeds CG

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category &amp; Frequency of Meeting Visits</th>
<th>Type of Organisation</th>
<th>Present &amp; Stay</th>
<th>Present &amp; Exit</th>
<th>Entry &amp; Stay</th>
<th>Entry &amp; Exit</th>
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</thead>
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<td>number</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>number</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>number</td>
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<td><strong>Total Core Visitors</strong></td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>6.9</td>
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</table>

### Oil Seeds: Category Frequency of Meeting Visits

- **Core Visitor**: Present at all meetings (17)
- **Regular Visitor**: Present at 14, 15 or 16 meetings
- **Irregular Visitor**: Present at least at 3 meetings with maximum presence of 13 meetings
- **At Random Visitor**: Present at 0, 1 or 2 meetings
### Appendix 6: Betweenness centrality oilseeds CG

**Table 1** Top-10 central players in the oilseeds CG

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Normalised Betweenness Centrality</th>
<th>Type of Organisation</th>
<th>Subtype</th>
<th>Stakeholder role within VC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(96) SNV BOAM</td>
<td>4.626</td>
<td>Civil society</td>
<td>NGO / NGO network</td>
<td>Facilitator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(89) Quality Standard Authority of Ethiopia (QSAE)</td>
<td>4.453</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Implementing agency</td>
<td>Supporter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(74) Ministry of Trade and Industry (MOTI)</td>
<td>3.994</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>National government / Ministry</td>
<td>Influencer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) Addis Ababa Oil Processing Mill Owners Association</td>
<td>2.744</td>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>Business representative body / Association</td>
<td>Influencer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(79) Oromia Cooperative Promotion Commission (OCPC)</td>
<td>2.652</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Regional / Local government</td>
<td>Influencer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(48) FFARM Organic PLC</td>
<td>2.589</td>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>Consultant / Consultancy</td>
<td>Supporter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(34) Didea Farmers' Cooperative Union</td>
<td>2.581</td>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>Business representative body / Cooperative</td>
<td>Actor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(23) BCaD (Chain Facilitators)</td>
<td>2.505</td>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>Consultant / Consultancy</td>
<td>Supporter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Addis Ababa Chamber of Commerce Sectoral Association (AACCSA)</td>
<td>2.484</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Chamber of commerce</td>
<td>Influencer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(15) Agro Prom. International PLC</td>
<td>2.409</td>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>Commercial enterprise</td>
<td>Actor</td>
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Table 2 Central players in oil seeds CG with betweenness centrality > 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Normalised Betweenness Centrality</th>
<th>Type of Organisation</th>
<th>Subtype</th>
<th>Stakeholder role within VC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>(96) SNV BOAM</td>
<td>4.626</td>
<td>Civil society</td>
<td>NGO / NGO network</td>
<td>Facilitator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(89) Quality Standard Authority of Ethiopia (QSAE)</td>
<td>4.453</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Implementing agency</td>
<td>Supporter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(74) Ministry of Trade and Industry (MOTI)</td>
<td>3.994</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>National government / Ministry</td>
<td>Influencer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) Addis Ababa Oil Processing Mill Owners Association</td>
<td>2.744</td>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>Business representative body / Association</td>
<td>Influencer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(79) Oromia Cooperative Promotion Commission (OCPC)</td>
<td>2.652</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Regional / Local government</td>
<td>Influencer</td>
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<tr>
<td>(48) FFARM Organic PLC</td>
<td>2.589</td>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>Consultant / Consultancy</td>
<td>Supporter</td>
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<tr>
<td>(34) Didea Farmers' Cooperative Union</td>
<td>2.581</td>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>Business representative body / Cooperative</td>
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<tr>
<td>(23) BCaD (Chain Facilitators)</td>
<td>2.505</td>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>Consultant / Consultancy</td>
<td>Supporter</td>
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<tr>
<td>(5) Addis Ababa Chamber of Commerce Sectoral Association (AACCSA)</td>
<td>2.484</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Chamber of commerce</td>
<td>Influencer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(15) Agro Prom. International PLC (Chain Leader)</td>
<td>2.409</td>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>Commercial enterprise</td>
<td>Actor</td>
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Table 3 Central players in oilseeds CG with betweenness centrality > 3

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Normalised Betweenness</th>
<th>Type of Organisation</th>
<th>Subtype</th>
<th>Stakeholder role</th>
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<td>(Chain Leader)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Normalised Betweenness Centrality</td>
<td>Type of Organisation</td>
<td>Subtype</td>
<td>Stakeholder role within VC</td>
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<td>(96) SNV BOAM</td>
<td>4.626</td>
<td>Civil society</td>
<td>NGO / NGO network</td>
<td>Facilitator</td>
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<td>(89) Quality Standard Authority of Ethiopia (QSAE)</td>
<td>4.453</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Implementing agency</td>
<td>Supporter</td>
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<tr>
<td>(74) Ministry of Trade and Industry (MOTI)</td>
<td>3.994</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>National government / Ministry</td>
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*Table 4* Central players in oilseeds CG with betweenness centrality > 4