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Social consequences of CEE migration

Country report the Netherlands

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Contents

1 Introduction

1.1 Points of departure

Migration from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) to the Netherlands did not just start with the EU-enlargements of 2004 and 2007[1]. However, after the EU-enlargements in 2004 and 2007, the number of (officially registered) residents from CEE countries in the Netherlands increased rapidly. In the late 1990s, there were about 50,000 CEE residents while in 2003, shortly before the EU-enlargement of 2004, this number grew to 62,000 CEE residents. In 2013, this number increased to almost 180,000 – nearly three times more than in 2003. By far the largest subcategory in the Netherlands is the group of **Poles**. Their numbers more than tripled between 2004 and 2013 (from almost 36,000 to 111,000). Particularly after 2007, when the Netherlands lifted the transitional restrictions for Poles and residents from the other new member states of 2004, the number of Polish residents in the Netherlands increased rapidly. The other three main CEE migrant categories in the Netherlands are **Bulgarians** (almost 21,000 persons in 2013), **Hungarians** (almost 19,500 persons) and **Romanians** (almost 18,000 persons). The number of Bulgarians in the Netherlands in 2013 was almost five times higher than in 2007, when Bulgaria acceded the EU. Hungary joined the EU in 2004 and one third of the current Hungarian residents in the Netherlands arrived since 2004. The number of Romanians in the Netherlands almost doubled since Romania acceded the EU in 2007. However, all these figures relate to the number of officially registered CEE migrants in the Netherlands. As many CEE migrants in the Netherlands appear not to register formally, the actual number of CEE migrants is much larger. According to estimations of Van der Heijden, Cruijff, and Van Gils (2011; 2013), there were about 340,000 CEE nationals actually present in the Netherlands in 2010 – almost twice as many as the number of officially registered CEE migrants in the same year. This clearly indicates a 'grey zone' between registered and estimated stock data.

Based on the current information on CEE migrants, the research project IMAGINATION does not start with a primarily focussed differentiation on nationality or ethnicity. Instead, our project starts with two basic alternative assumptions. First of all, based on the studies of Engbersen et al. (2011; 2013) we assume that there is more heterogeneity among CEE labour migrants. Although many CEE labour migrants in the Netherlands work in low-qualified and low-paid jobs, there are also medium-skilled and highly skilled migrants working at, for instance, Dutch universities or in the business industry. Next to this, the temporariness of stay is an important indicator of the socioeconomic status of migrants which also differs. This assumption is studied in our project by differentiating CEE migrants in types of migrants **'knowledge workers', 'entrepreneurs', 'manual workers', persons working in private households', 'sex workers, trafficked persons', 'students', 'non-working spouses/partners and children' and 'beggars and homeless people'.**

Besides this socio-economic differentiation, this research presumes that CEE migration is spatially 'unevenly distributed' (Gijsberts & Lubbers, 2013; 25). This implies that most CEE migrant populations are concentrated in specific rural and urban areas in the Netherlands. In our research we therefore will not only pay attention to the socio-economic differentiation but also to the socio-spatial differentiation of CEE migration in the Netherlands.

[1] In 2004, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia joined the EU. In 2007, Bulgaria and Romania acceded the EU.

In order to study the socio-spatial differentiation, we focus in the Dutch case on the urban regions of The Hague and Rotterdam. Research shows that the core cities of The Hague and Rotterdam maintain the largest CEE populations in the Netherlands (Statistics Netherlands, 2013). Within their urban regions, The Hague and Rotterdam have an important labour but also housing function for the broader region. And within this spatial differentiation, the diversity in types of migrants is an important part of the research focus. Earlier research (Van Ostaijen et al., 2014) showed the spatial concentration of certain types of migrants in specific Dutch areas. Not only in terms of labour, but especially also in terms of housing, the spatial concentration of certain types of migrants contains local consequences. These housing consequences are not only displayed within the larger cities, but also in the more rural areas, the types of housing differ. Consequentially, this implies different consequences for specific types of labour for new workers, but also on different sorts of housing for new citizens. With different spatial concentrations, this implies spatially different housing facilities. In this report we examine the implications of the presence of different types of migrants for the urban regions of The Hague and Rotterdam.

1.2 Methodology

New in this research is that the Dutch social implications of CEE migration are not studied by CEE migrants themselves, but through the eyes of stakeholders, who are professionally involved in this topic[2]. This multiple stakeholder analysis is done by a stepwise research methodology, which consists of an online survey, expert interviews and a so-called Urban Living Lab. In total, 54 unique stakeholders participated in our research.

1.2.1 Stakeholder background

The stakeholders of the online survey are selected on the base of two levels: (1) the professional domain and (2) the geographical dimension. Initially, the stakeholders are partly selected by using the network of the researchers involved in the IMAGINATION project. Other stakeholders were selected by using participation lists of several conferences concerning CEE migration in the Netherlands, which represented their engagement in the topic and professional affiliation. We developed two lists (a primary and secondary, back-up list) of both fifty potential respondents for the online survey. We contacted most stakeholders by e-mail and telephone. In case we could not contact a certain stakeholder, we switched to a comparable stakeholder from the second list, in order to increase the chance meeting the required N of 50 stakeholders. After reaching the stakeholders, we sent them the link to the online survey by email. The online survey is issued between 1st of April to 15th of May. Three weeks after sending the initial email, we sent a reminder.

In total 46 respondents completed the online questionnaire. This is a response rate of about 80% to 90%. The reason behind this relatively high response rate is that sometimes a stakeholder on the initial list redirected us to a colleague who, in his/her eyes, was more suitable than him-/her selves. We did not count this as nonresponse. Additionally, during the process we sometimes changed the initial list by adding or removing someone. We did not added this in calculating the response rate.

[2] We are aware of the implicit bias in our research since we studied the perception of experts on social implications. This makes it inevitable that we focussed in our research more on the perceived problems, implications and consequences. We are aware of this methodological bias.

Because of the proximity of the cities of The Hague and Rotterdam, some stakeholders state to focus in their professional activities on both cities. Therefore, we were unable to indicate them in one of the two cities. To do right on the geographical area of our respondents we needed to 'add' another geographical area that transcends the level of both urban regions, 'the Netherlands'. In all cases we initially had an equal distribution of respondents per professional domain (public, private, NGO), but some respondents reported themselves in another professional domain. In Table 1, the distribution of the respondents per self-reported type of stakeholder and geographical area is shown. Most public stakeholders were civil servants by local or national governments involved in the topic of CEE migration. Respondents of semi-public or private agencies were small entrepreneurs and representatives of temporary employment agencies and housing agencies. Respondents of NGOs were mainly actors of organisations concerning language facilities, schools and (semi-voluntary) organisations regarding cultural, supportive or informative services.

Table 1: Type of stakeholders per geographical area

	The Hague	Rotterdam	National	Total
Public stakeholders	7	6	3	16
Semi-public or private agencies	2	3	9	14
NGOs	6	6	4	16
Total	15	15	16	46

1.2.2 Expert interviews

The online survey was followed by a series of expert interviews. Almost all 12 interviews are conducted in the months August and September 2014. For the expert selection, we used the same criteria as with the online survey. We tried to find a balance between the professional domain of stakeholders (private, semi-public or NGO's) and their geographical area (5 interviews with regard to the urban region The Hague, 5 interviews with regard to the urban region of Rotterdam and 2 with regard to the larger urban region/national level). Next to this, we also selected some stakeholders based on their presumed knowledge on vulnerable groups like sex workers, trafficked persons and homeless people.

The interviews were conducted by two researchers, who both completed six semi-structured interviews along pre-structured interview guidelines. First, we approached the potential interviewees by e-mail and phone, asking them if they were up for an interview. Most of the interviews took place at the working location of the expert. In some cases, when the expert found it more convenient, the interview took place at the Erasmus University. All experts agreed with recording the interview. A couple of experts explicitly asked to get insight in the report before it will be published.

The recordings are transcribed in Word by the two researchers themselves. Thereafter, the different transcriptions are transposed to the programme ATLAS.ti, a computer programme often used for analysing qualitative data. We analysed our data by first constructing several subcodes, which can be placed along five main codes: (1) labour market, (2) housing and neighbourhood consequences, (3) registration, social security, social and political participation, (4) education and language and (5) Image construction. The (sub)codes are constructed based on the interview grid and the interview experience of the interviewers, therefore between inductive and deductive reasoning: abductive research (Yanow, 2014). By back-and-forth reasoning (Berg & Lune, 2004) some subcodes were added during the coding process. To enlarge the intercoder reliability, transcripts were exchanged and the coding process was discussed several times. In the end, by grouping the subcodes and aggregating them to the five main codes by several rounds of qualitative reading sessions, qualitative patterns within all the data became

visible. These patterns were then described with citations in a word document, which became more and more condense after several rounds of study.

1.2.3 Urban Living Lab

The Dutch Urban Living Lab (ULL) took place on Friday December 16th 2014, at the Erasmus University Rotterdam. Sixteen stakeholders participated in this expert meeting. The participants were selected based on four different criteria. First we invited all the members of the Dutch professional advisory board to participate in the ULL. Secondly, respondents were selected by geographical distribution. Again, we strived for a balance between stakeholders from both urban regions and the national level. Thirdly, stakeholders were selected based on their professional affiliation. We tried to select those experts who we thought could contribute to the discussion on one or more of the four central domains (labour market; housing and neighbourhood consequences; registration, social security and participation; and education and language). Some people we already spoke to during the expert interviews were invited because we had the feeling that they could provide us with more information than the interview gave room for. Others only completed the online questionnaire, so we did not spoke to them yet. And almost half of the respondents we did not spoke until the moment of the ULL, so there was room to invite new respondents. Fourthly, the progressive insight of the researchers played a role: a couple of the invited stakeholders came in sight on references by others after the questionnaire and interviews were finished. The ULL was also recorded, after approval of the participating experts. An external agency (Dlux) transcribed the discussions of the expert meeting. The data was analysed by the same codes and subcodes used in the interview analysis and was added to the data of the interviews. On the basis of this multiple data collection, data analysis on the patterns in the selected domains has been executed.

2 Implications of CEE migration in The Hague

2.1 CEE migration in The Hague

In 2014, 16,831 registered CEE migrants reside in The Hague: 8464 Poles, 4600 Bulgarians, 1035 Hungarians and 847 Romanians. This is a growth of seven per cent from 2013 and a doubling from 2009 (Municipality The Hague, 2014). But, the annual growth of the CEE population in The Hague was plus twenty per cent between 2009 and 2012, while this growth decreased to seven per cent this year. And since many CEE migrants do not register, the municipality estimated that it hosts about 33,000 CEE residents in 2014. The male-female ration of CEE residents in The Hague is almost even (48% male, 52% female) and more than one third (36%) of the CEE residents in The Hague is younger than 25 years.

2.2 General observations on CEE migration

Before we go into detail on the different urban implications of CEE migration reported by stakeholders in The Hague, we start by briefly outlining some more general observations on the stakeholders in The Hague.

In the survey, we asked the stakeholders about how they, in their professional capacity, consider the presence of CEE migrants in the urban regions. Most stakeholders (9 out of 15) are

positive (7 stakeholders) or even very positive (2 stakeholders) about the presence of CEE migrants. The other six stakeholders have a neutral professional opinion about the presence of CEE migrants. Stakeholders working in NGO's are slightly more positive compared to public stakeholders. Surprisingly, none of the stakeholders report a negative professional opinion on the presence of CEE migrants in the urban regions. Maybe social desirability plays a role here.

We also asked the stakeholders about the most important CEE sending countries related to their field of activity, which only **partly reflects** the size of the population in the official statistics. As mentioned in the first paragraph (1.1 Point of departure), most CEE migrants in the Netherlands come from Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. This is only partly reflected by stakeholders in the survey. As importing CEE sending country, Poland (11 out of 15 stakeholders) is mentioned, while Bulgaria (9 out of 15) and Romania (8 out of 15) follow. However, while paragraph 1.1 showed that Hungary is the third CEE sending country, it is remarkable that Hungary (and also Slovakia) is reported as important CEE sending country by only three stakeholders.

To get more insight in how often stakeholders are working on tasks related to CEE migrants, we asked them how much time they are active with these tasks. Most stakeholders work **very often** on their tasks related to CEE migrants: 11 out of 15 stakeholders are active with these tasks for three or more days a week.

Table 2: Relevance of different types of migrants (TOM) for stakeholders' work, The Hague

Type of migrant	(very) relevant	Relevance
Knowledge workers	1/15	Low
Entrepreneurs	3/15	Low
Manual workers	11/15	High
Persons working in private households	2/15	Low
Sex workers, trafficked persons	2/15	Low
Students	4/15	Low
Non-working spouses/partners and children	8/15	Medium
Beggars and homeless people	7/15	Medium

Source: Online survey.

Finally, we asked stakeholders in The Hague how relevant different types of migrants (TOM) are in their daily work. Table 2 shows that in The Hague, manual workers are of highest relevance in the stakeholders' work. While most of the CEE migrants in the Netherlands are migrated to the Netherlands in order to work, and most of them end up in lower-paid jobs, this makes sense (Currie, 2007; Weltevrede et al., 2009; Voitchovsky, 2014). Additionally, beggars and homeless people and non-working spouses/partners and children are relevant in the work of more than half of the stakeholders. Other types of migrants are of lower relevance to stakeholders in The Hague.

2.3 Implications of different types of migrants in central domains

In this paragraph, we will elaborate on the implications of different types of migrants (TOM) in the four central domains we distinguished. We take into account the results from the online survey, expert interviews and the Urban Living Lab.

2.3.1 Labour market

Table 3 shows to what extent issues on the labour market are considered relevant by stakeholders. Labour market issues are reported to be very important for manual workers (11 out of 13) and entrepreneurs (4 out of 7). To knowledge workers, non-working spouses/partners and children and beggars and homeless people, labour market issues are reported to be of medium relevance.

Table 3: Relevance of labour market implications for different types of migrants, The Hague (N=15)

Type of migrant	(very) relevant	No. of stakeholders who answered for TOM[3]
Knowledge workers	4	9
Entrepreneurs	5	7
Manual workers	11	13
Persons working in private households	2	4
Sex workers, trafficked persons	1	2
Students	1	5
Non-working spouses/partners and children	4	9
Beggars and homeless people	4	8

Source: Online survey.

On the basis of a considerate analysis of the survey, interviews and Urban Living Lab (ULL) two main issues stand out regarding the labour market in The Hague.

Limited upward social mobility

In The Hague, the presence of dequalification and the underutilization of human capital are mentioned by respondents as important themes. It seems that socio-economic development is hampered by social-cultural development (language), which limits upward social mobility. Sometimes employers even directly contribute to socio-economic dequalification by limiting the possibilities to learn the language. Some employers have an interest in employees who are *non-Dutch speaking* and **discourage language training**, indicated by one representative of a temporary employment agency: "*Most of those people speak the language. Formerly, that was an advantage. Now this is for some customers a disadvantage. Because with the knowledge of language they begin to talk too much and too fast with other people, comparing, salaries. And they are not busy with their work. But only with living, let's say it like that. Formerly, someone needed to speak English or German. Now this doesn't make any difference. The most important factor is motivation. If he comes to me and he wants good labour: I don't give a shit. Get your norms and you don't need to talk. That is reversed, because formerly, the issue was language. The first people needed to be able to communicate with other people. But at every company there are at least one or two Polish people now who can mediate*" [NLDH_09]. The respondent continues this argument: "*Two or three years ago I was really busy with selling Polish personnel well. Customers are more open for this kind of temporary workers. Now, we have a bit the same problem as back then. I hear from my customers: those Polish people are a bit too experienced with the work here, the conditions, rules... maybe it is time for a new Pole!*" [NLDH_09]. This does not only prevent employers and labour migrants from investing in language proficiency, but also hinders CEE migrants empowering themselves for upward social mobility. This points out to **socio-economic dequalification due to socio-cultural limitations**.

[3] Total no. of stakeholders who indicated that specific TOM would be 'very relevant', 'relevant' or 'less relevant' in their daily work.

Besides, like reported by respondents in the survey, labour market issues are mostly related to manual workers and entrepreneurs. Respondents (NLDH_01) indicate that CEE migrants start their careers at low-skilled jobs or *'minimal jobs'*. Therefore, they have to develop stronger – in comparison with their Dutch fellows– to climb upon the career ladder. These arrears makes it hard for upward social mobility as one representative of a temporary labour agency (NLDH_09) indicates: "*All colleagues of mine, Polish friends...They returned to Poland 10-8 years ago, I'm the last man standing here. They are succesfull over there, own company, top functions in management. Learned of the school of life. They have used the chance to live here and they have seen very fast that in the Netherlands there is a certain position for me and that it is very hard to make that last step. From an average worker, to someone who controls. For a Polish person, 1% can make that step*." Therefore, on labour market issues in The Hague respondents indicated forms of limited social mobility, due to language arrears. This limited social mobility seems to be mostly applicable to 'temporary workers' such as entrepreneurs and manual workers. Possibly this could also be applicable to persons working in private households or perhaps to students, but our respondents did not indicate that. It is very likely that the theme of limited social mobility is not applicable to knowledge workers, because they mostly already start with a good socio-economic position.

Urban regional differentiation in flexibility

Many CEE migrants, and especially manual workers and entrepreneurs in The Hague, have flexible labour contracts. Or like one representative of temporary employment agencies (NLNL_18) generally stated it: "*Flexibility is a sustainable thing*", so "*we need to steer on predictable flexibility*." However, the matter of flexibility is dependent on the region. One respondent (NLDH_09) indicated that in another region outside the urban regions of The Hague and Rotterdam, in Oostland (Bleiswijk, Pijnacker, Berkel en Rodenrijs) labour contracts are more stable, since employees hold jobs for a couple of years. While in Westland (Monster, de Lier, Hoek van Holland), part of the urban region of The Hague, **flexibility and competition between companies is much stronger**. One respondent of a temporary employment agency in The Hague (NLDH_09) indicates: "*Our customers are more open. Competition between temporary employment agencies in The Hague is also bigger and the demands towards people in terms of efficiency are also higher. Less on language demands, but more on the working process. And it is more ad hoc business. Today 20 people, tomorrow nobody. [...] Already on such a short distance a lot of difference.*" Therefore, the urban region of The Hague seems to be an important region for flexible labour contracts. Within this demand of labour, the city of The Hague functions as an important hub of labour supply and demand, by competing temporary employment agencies.

2.3.2 Housing and neighbourhood consequences

Table 4 presents how stakeholders in The Hague report on housing and neighbourhood implications per type of migrant. Almost all stakeholders (to which entrepreneurs and non-working spouses/partners and children are relevant in their daily work) report that housing implications are of high relevance (respectively 6 out of 7 and 8 out of 9). But when we look at the results regarding neighbourhood consequences, we see another pattern concerning these two types of migrants. Neighbourhood consequences do not seem to be considered very relevant for entrepreneurs and non-working spouses/partners and children according to stakeholders in The Hague. Additionally, 10 out of 13 stakeholders state that housing issues are (very) relevant for manual workers, which is more than the relevancy of neighbourhood consequences (8 out of 13) for CEE manual workers in The Hague. In

general, for all types of migrants, neighbourhood consequences are perceived as less relevant than housing implications.

Table 4: Relevance of housing and neighbourhood implications for different types of migrants, The Hague (N=15)

Housing implications		
Type of migrant	**(very) relevant**	**No. of stakeholders who answered for TOM[4]**
Knowledge workers	5	9
Entrepreneurs	6	7
Manual workers	10	13
Persons working in private households	3	4
Sex workers, trafficked persons	2	2
Students	3	5
Non-working spouses/partners and children	8	9
Beggars and homeless people	6	8
Neighbourhood implications		
Type of migrant	**(very) relevant**	**No. of stakeholders who answered for TOM**
Knowledge workers	2	9
Entrepreneurs	3	7
Manual workers	8	13
Persons working in private households	3	4
Sex workers, trafficked persons	1	2
Students	3	5
Non-working spouses/partners and children	2	9
Beggars and homeless people	6	8

Source: Online survey.

On the basis of the analysis of the survey, interviews and Urban Living Lab (ULL) four main issues stand out regarding the housing and neighbourhood consequences in The Hague.

Accesibility of housing

The variety of housing in The Hague makes the housing stock very accessible. But because of several reasons, such as institutional deadlocks, certain forms of housing are inaccessible. Some CEE migrants, mostly temporary workers (such as manual workers or entrepreneurs), find housing in the informal sphere, by privately owned housing. But since the domain of housing is often related to registration, the type of housing migrants have is related to their formal (socio-economic) status and their temporariness of stay. Like one NGO representative (NLDH_02) stated: "*Because, quite often, when you want to rent something, you need to pay the rent three months in advance. And that is a much too large amount for these people. And sometimes they are forced to make arrangements with family or friends, so that they can get shelter somewehere. A very small room, where already people live, for too much money which is not worth what they get for it, but affordable. So they stay there in a vicious circle. Because they can't get legal work without a citizen service number* (in Dutch: BSN)*. But if they want a citizen service number, they need an address, which they don't have because they can't afford this*." This points at the perverse effects of institutional deadlocks related to registration and housing

[4] Total no. of stakeholders who indicated that specific TOM would be 'very relevant', 'relevant' or 'less relevant' in their daily work.

in The Hague which has consequences for the **inaccessibility of social housing** and the demand for privately-owned housing.

Increasing demand for mid-stay housing

The amount of short-term and long-term housing seem not to be an urgent problem. Short-term housing solutions are mainly covered by temporary employment agencies, evolving in multiple dependencies. Like one respondent of the social housing corporation (NLDH_07) indicated: "*At this moment we have forty to fifty houses rented to labour migrants. Well, to mediators, who on their turn rent it to labour agencies…who need to put these labour migrants there. With a clustered contract regarding their labour contract*." Especially in Westland, CEE migrants are housed in so-called short-stay facilities ('Polish Hotels') within 'packages deals'. Like one NGO representative (NLDH_01) indicated: "*In Westland it is, I think, more at greenhouses, but here in the city it is less I think. Yes, in The Hague it isn't.*" For long-term housing, the "*accessibility to a corporation house is very dependent on region and city. In The Hague it is not a problem, when you register, after one and a half, two years to get a house of the corporation. In Amsterdam this is harder*", like one representative of social housing organisation (NLDH_07) stated.

Instead, it seems that the **demand for single-family homes grows**, since the categories of midstay and longstay migrants seem to increase. As one police representative (NLDH_03) stated: "*Because of an increase of youngsters, family unification occurs more and more. Therefore, the demand to single-family homes increases. Not a hotel anymore.*" This is reflected by the respondents of the survey mainly applied to non-working spouses/partners and children for which housing implications have high relevance. It is applicable to other types of migrants where it is about the shifting permanence of their stay: from more temporary towards midterm or even long-term settlement.

Neighbourhood consequences depends on housing and control

Housing is considered more relevant than neighbourhood consequences within the survey, which is only partly reflected in the interviews. It seems that **neigbourhood consequences depend on the type of migrant, but also on the type of housing**. In the specific case of The Hague, CEE migrants, especially temporary workers, mostly find housing in the informal sphere with privately owned housing, and than, neighbourhood consequences are in line with that. In The Hague, respondents indicate that there are 'parking problems', 'garbage insufficiency', 'overcrowding', 'slumlandlords' and incidents concerning nuisance and alcohol. Some neighbourhood consequences (like overcrowding) can be part of uncontrolled 'middle managers mechanisms'. Some landlords put the responsability of housing to one CEE migrant, who gets positive rewards to control the inflow of residents. Since overcrowding can be economic profitable, some unwanted social circumstances could evolve, like one police officer (NLDH_03) stated: "*What we often see is that an employer says: you work here as Pole, you will be my coordinator, you control the housing, who gets in. Within the hierarchy of Polish people this can develop well or very badly. Pure informal agreement. This is about the total package and housing is a very manipulative factor within this*."

At the apartments owned by the temporary employment agency, nuisance is controlled by neighbours and disciplined by the agency, indicated by one representative of a temporary employment agency (NLDH_09): "*Most people are happier with seperate housing, more privacy, not so many people in your room. Hotels are a solution for temporary workers, housing by customers is for fixed employees. [..] we have a fixed telephone number, when we come somewhere, we always give a letter to the neighbours with the anouncement that temporary workers will come at that address. If one experiences*

nuisance or problems, they can call us anytime." At these apartments, there are also less parking problems, because the temporary employment agency provide employees with transport (sometimes even with bicycles to reduce costs for commuting). In The Hague, the social housing corporation rents a lot of corporation houses to temporary employment agencies, stated (NLDH_07) as: "*One consideration was that if you spread individual houses across neighbourhoods, that integration with the neighbourhood is easier than a building with a lot of people who are more connected with each other instead of having relationships with their neighbours.*" They concluded: "*Where people come together, we expected more nuisance, which is less manageable than places where people live more small-scaled […] this were the images – more parties, hanging on the street in groups. This happens sooner when you have larger amounts of people together*." By this approach, the social housing corporation facilitated mixed housing in The Hague which involved a spreading of this population. This can be applied to all residing types of migrants.

The (in)visibility of vulnerable groups in The Hague

An important aspect on vulnerable groups is their (in)visibility which has been problematised by many respondents. This (in)visibility makes it hard to grasp the issue, stated by a police officer (NLDH_03): "*We were in a nice neighboorhood in The Hague. In a not so cheap apartment we found three Bulgarian prostitutes. One was working there longer time. The other ones were friends. Those girls earn there enough income so that they can get finances and pay their studies. […] This is in the whole sector the case, thus also with new Europeans. […] I think that it is for Nigerian, Antillean, dark girls, it is harder to do this in an existing apartment, than for well-groomed white… the context accepts this much easier*." Next to this, it is indicated by a NGO representative (NLDH_02) that housing for sex workers is a problem, because: "*It is a problem for sex workers to get a legal housing facility. Because at the moment they tell where they work, they are not welcome. And nobody wants this kind of people*." This shows the **importance in the (in)visibility** of these groups and their related problems.

Regarding homeless people, NGO representatives (NLRD_17) indicated that The Hague is "*for people who don't know what they want. Who are searching, without any fixed references*." Maybe this explains why it is said that there are more Polish homeless people in The Hague, because: "*Homeless people go through to whole country. No, in The Hague they could get more help. In The Hague the problem is bigger, because it is a smaller city with more Polish people, but they also have more organisation for help*."

2.3.3 Registration, social security and welfare, societal and political participation

Table 5 shows the results of how stakeholders report on the social implications on registration, social security and participation, both societal and political. Registration implications are seen as (very) relevant for manual workers (9 out of 13), to entrepreneurs (6 out of 7) and to non-working partners/spouses and children (7 out of 9). Regarding the implications on social security (middle part of Table 5), The Hague stakeholders are not really distinct in their report on the relevance for the different types of migrants. Only for the beggars and homeless people, stakeholders are clear: 6 out of 8 stakeholders find social security implications (very) relevant for this group, which probably can be related that this group is regarded as relevant type for social services and assistance in different aspects.

The survey shows that registration in the Netherlands is seen as very important, which is also reflected by recent developments. In the Netherlands, registration starts with a distinction between inhabitants and non-inhabitants. Non-inhabitants are those who are staying less than 4 months in a

row within the Netherlands. All basic registration is covered by the BRP (Basis Registration Persons) to which inhabitants and non-inhabitants (registered by RNI: Registration Non-Inhabitants) are registered. As such, the law BRP is a merging of the former GBA with RNI. In both registrations, in BRP or RNI, people receive a BSN (Citizen Services Number), which people need to get in contact with official authorities. This BSN is required for starting a formal job in the Netherlands, opening a bank account, using the health care system, applying for benefits and announcing a change of address. To get access to social security benefits, people need this BSN and therefore need to be registered, but all social benefit arangements are linked with specific criteria people need to cover to be able to claim. But basically, people need to register to be able to get access to the social security system. For RNI registration, there are at this moment 18 (pilot) municipalities to which RNI registration can be applied, mainly to get temporary migrants better in sight and to connect better with the flexibility and temporariness of certain migrants. This is, because RNI is a system where 'non-inhabitants' are registered which had relationships with one or more official Dutch institutions. RNI is therefore a solution to register temporary and circular migrants better, but is not that accurate and precize about the residential situation of people. However, as a pilot, The Hague and Rotterdam also register the residence address for those registering in the RNI, which is called REVA (Registration First Adress of Residence). Figures on 2014 show that Polish people are more than half of the registered population of RNI. Registration in BRP is mainly aimed for governments to control the actual address of residence (to get insight in where people reside and how many people reside in the municipality).

Table 5: Relevance of registration implications, social security implications and participation implications for different types of migration, The Hague (N=15)

Registration implications		
Type of migrant	**(very) relevant**	**No. of stakeholders who answered for TOM[5]**
Knowledge workers	5	9
Entrepreneurs	6	7
Manual workers	9	13
Persons working in private households	3	4
Sex workers, trafficked persons	1	2
Students	3	5
Non-working spouses/partners and children	7	9
Beggars and homeless people	5	8

Social security implications		
Type of migrant	**(very) relevant**	**No. of stakeholders who answered for TOM**
Knowledge workers	5	9
Entrepreneurs	4	7
Manual workers	8	13
Persons working in private households	2	4
Sex workers, trafficked persons	1	2
Students	1	5
Non-working spouses/partners and children	6	9
Beggars and homeless people	6	8

[5] Total no. of stakeholders who indicated that specific TOM would be 'very relevant', 'relevant' or 'less relevant' in their daily work.

Table 5: ***continued***

Participation implications		
Type of migrant	**(very) relevant**	**No. of stakeholders who answered for TOM**
Knowledge workers	4	9
Entrepreneurs	4	7
Manual workers	6	13
Persons working in private households	2	4
Sex workers, trafficked persons	1	2
Students	0	5
Non-working spouses/partners and children	7	9
Beggars and homeless people	2	8

Source: Online survey.

The last part of Table 5 shows that none of the stakeholders perceive participation implications as (very) relevant for students. Moreover, we can observe that a large share of stakeholders do not think participation is (very) relevant for the different types of migrants. Except for the group of non-working spouses/partners and children from CEE countries (7 out of 9 stakeholders). Overall, we can observe for all types of migrants that stakeholders perceive registration more relevant than social security and social security more relevant than participation. This relevancy or importance is only partly reflected by the interviews and Urban Living Lab (ULL). We discerned three main issues regarding registration, social security and participation in The Hague.

Registration: cultural, rational and economic causes of non-registration

First of all, the registration regulations are explained above. In line with these new efforts, especially non-registration is sometimes strongly problematised. Non-registration in The Hague has its own dynamics, indicated by three elements:

1. Distrust

Some respondents indicate that CEE migrants come from a culture of state avoidance, and therefore easily distrust Dutch state officials as well, indicated by NGO representatives (NLDH_01): "*Government in Eastern-Europe has a different position towards citizens, especially in the eighties, than in Western-Europe is the case. Here, government is something we do with each other, but there it is, you have a government to which you have to obey as slave.* [A government] *which oppresses you, not understands and makes your life hard. And this image is hard to change*." This points at a **cultural argument of non-registration**;

2. Disadvantages

Registration could imply some advantages for the state and maybe also for particular migrants. But is it important to inform migrants about 'what's in it for us?'. Most respondents indicate they stimulate CEE migrants to register themselves. However, they also state that CEE migrants perceive socio-cultural and socio-economic disadvantages of registration. It could be a rational cost-benefit analysis to stay out of the state registers. And if the function of registration is not always known: "*They don't see the profit. They say: 'Oh, at the moment we register ourselves we get all kind of letters, all kind of taxes, and nothing remains'. That is the image*", stated by NGO representatives (NLDH_01). This point at a **rational argument of non-registration**;

3. Strategic practices

Some respondents indicate that some CEE migrants are not obliged to register or even are discouraged to do so by their employer: "*You also have people who do not would like to register themselves, because their boss tells them: 'otherwise I don't pay you anymore'. Because than they are obliged to pay minimum wages. [...] and than they are out on the street*", NGO representatives (NLDH_01) indicated. Next to this, some employers do not register their employees at the municipalities of residence, but at that municipality where efficiency for registration is the highest. Stated by one representative of temporary employment agencies (NLNL_18): "*We see that employers just go to the most efficient registration proces. And he registers his employees on places where it is actually not intended, or just to the RNI, where the procedures are equal.*" This kind of strategic practices for the sake of employers efficiency could also add to non-registration or insufficient registration of employees. This points at an **economic argument of non-registration.**

The above mentioned dynamics of non-registration can be applied to all types of migrants, but are mainly applicable to temporary migrants, since long-term migrants have a stronger intention to register.

Social security: rights are connected with information infrastructure

Linked with the domain of registration, respondents in The Hague indicate that CEE migrants generally are not aware of their rights and duties, and to what extent they build up premiums (unemployment, pension funds). To overcome these information gaps, mainly regarding registration and social security for CEE migrants, the municipality of Westland opened an Information Point Temporary labour migrants (IPA). At this service point CEE migrants can get information about all social issues in their own language. Next to this, the municipality of The Hague opened an information desk at the City Hall. Organised and managed by a NGO, they hold desk office hours to address all questions, information and support also for CEE migrants. EU migrants can get a welcome package, booklets (for instance 'New in The Hague') with guidance about laws, regulations and information about language and registration. Despite its good intentions, the special desk office for Romanian and Bulgarian migrants is closed by January 1st 2015. The desk faced several problems. First, migrants perceived the desk to be part of the municipality and the administrative system. Secondly, the amount of people passing by was lower than expected and thirdly, the questions CEE migrants posed were different than expected (more on complaints on the municipality than on getting aid in certain issues). However, a general desk with consultation hours for all EU migrants will continue. All types of migrants are depending on good information infrastructures for their access to social security matters. Therefore, social security and the accessibility of information are directly related to each other.

Participation: more societal than political participation

Active political participation in The Hague is very low, comparable to the low participation amongst Dutch native citizens. However, most CEE migrants have local voting rights and during the last local elections in The Hague (March 2014), the Christen-Democrat Party selected five Polish candidates for the local elections. Unfortunately, no one had enough votes for a seat in the local Council. Respondents indicate that, like some Dutch voters, most CEE migrants have not much confidence in politics in general, and are not really interested in local politics. Societal participation seem to be mostly visible in the own communities of CEE migrants, *mediated* by churches, by children, by sports (there are specific Polish and Slowakian football teams in The Hague) and to a lesser extent by politics. One education representative (NLDH_05) stated about the local football club: "*At ADO Den Haag stadium*

I already see a lot of Polish supporters! […] If I walk through the stadium I hear the Polish language. …] There are big groups there. They also want something different than working."

2.3.4 Education and language

Because we assumed that education implications are mainly applicable to students and non-working spouses/partners and children, we asked the stakeholders to report for only those two specific types of migrants. In the first part of Table 6 almost all stakeholders report that for non-working spouses/partners and – probably particularly – children, education implications are (very) relevant.
This relevancy is also indicated by stakeholders for language implications for non-working spouses/partners and children (all stakeholders) and persons working in private households (all stakeholders), manual workers (11 out of 13 stakeholders) and entrepreneurs (6 out of 7 stakeholders). In general it seems to be perceived as a very relevant implication for most types of migrants.

Table 6: Relevance of education implications for students and non-working spouses/partners and children and language implications for different types of migration, The Hague (N=15)

Education implications		
Type of migrant	**(Very) relevant**	**No. of stakeholders who answered for TOM[6]**
Students	3	5
Non-working spouses/partners and children	8	9

Language implications		
Type of migrant	**(Very) relevant**	**No. of stakeholders who answered for TOM**
Knowledge workers	4	9
Entrepreneurs	6	7
Manual workers	11	13
Persons working in private households	4	4
Sex workers, trafficked persons	1	2
Students	2	5
Non-working spouses/partners, children	9	9
Beggars and homeless people	4	8

Source: Online survey

Differentiated language accesibility

In The Hague, respondents indicate that the motivation of CEE migrants to learn the Dutch language is very high and that the accessibility and entrance towards language courses is well organised. The municipality of The Hague subsidises several organisations that offer language courses in different levels and also with different intensities (1 or 2 times a week) specified on specific target groups. Mostly for a very low fee (or for free), as a civil servant (NLDH_06) explains because "*I think for The Hague for instance, language is a very important element for people to integrate and participate.*" Most respondents also note the importance of non-segregated and mixed groups of language trajectories so that migrants are forced to talk – also during non-class sessions – Dutch with each other.

However, not all types of migrants have easily access to a language course or are stimulated to learn the language. Instead, learning the language is sometimes even destimulated by employers. As earlier remarks on the discouragement of language proficiency showed, certain types of migrants

[6] Total no. of stakeholders who indicated that specific TOM would be 'very relevant', 'relevant' or 'less relevant' in their daily work.

(such as manual workers) are more destimulated to learn the Dutch language than others, since for for instance **knowledge workers and students** it is mostly accepted that they only speak the English language. It seems that multilinguality (whether one speaks English or Dutch) is only problematised for certain types of migrants, such as manual workers or non-working spouses and children. This makes language a very pivotal point in the dependency, vulnerability and empowerment of CEE migrants towards their employer.

Vulnarable position of children

Connected with the increasing demand of mid-term housing, more and more families of CEE migrants are residing in the area of The Hague. This puts attention to the role of children in families and schools, because most respondents indicate that 'when eventually children are present' most migrants make a definite choice to settle and learn about the language and culture. Because of this growing amount of children, some respondents refer to the **vulnarable situation of children**: some stay at home during the whole day, for several reasons, without going to school. Some parents do not know that their children are obliged to go to school in the Netherlands at the age of four years[7] or because of other reasons, indicated by NGO representatives (NLDH_01): "*We have heard that especially children from Bulgarian parents are kept at home. There is no after school care. Parents are working and children sit alone, that is a problem. […] care within the family is in Bulgaria stronger than in the Netherlands. Society functions a bit different over there […] aunts, the whole family is the after school daycare, or the children with each other, or the neighbours, everybody helps, but no structural after school daycare. So they are not used to this…*." Therefore, children have a vulnarable but also pivotal position in the language proficiency of their parents.

3 Implications of CEE migration in Rotterdam

3.1 CEE migration in Rotterdam

At the end of 2013, 13,639 registered CEE migrants reside in **Rotterdam**: 6195 Poles, 2530 Bulgarians, 1188 Hungarians and 936 Romanians. This is a growth of 6.5 per cent from the beginning of 2013 but this growth decreased since 2011, when many CEE migrants registered themselves in one year (Municipality Rotterdam, 2014). Since many CEE migrants do not register, the municipality of Rotterdam estimated that it hosts between 31,000 and 50,000 CEE residents in 2013 in total and between 18,000 and 38,000 non-registered CEE migrants (Municipality Rotterdam, 2014). The male-female ration of CEE residents in Rotterdam is almost even (47% male, 53% female) and the population of CEE migrants is relatively young, since babies and persons of medium age (20-39 years) are overrepresented in the population.

3.2 General observations on CEE migration

In this chapter, we present the results of the online survey, the expert interviews and the Urban Living Lab with stakeholders from the urban region Rotterdam. Most stakeholders in Rotterdam consider, in their professional affiliation, the presence of CEE migrants positive (9 stakeholders) or very positive

[7] In most CEE countries the obligatory age for children to go to school is mostly higher than four years old.

(1). Four stakeholders have a neutral opinion on the presence of CEE migrants and one stakeholder considers the presence of CEE migrants as a negative phenomenon.

The stakeholders' answers to the question which the most important CEE sending countries related to their field of activity do not totally correspond with the size of the population distribution in the Netherlands (see paragraph 1.1. Point of departure). Both Bulgaria and Poland are reported by 14 out of 15 stakeholders as an important CEE sending country. For ten stakeholders, Romanian migrants are important in their field of activity, while only seven stakeholders mention Hungary as an important CEE sending country.

Almost half of the stakeholders in Rotterdam are active with tasks related to CEE migrants every day. Four stakeholders work on these tasks for one to two days a week. For three stakeholders in Rotterdam the tasks related to CEE migrants are not very time-consuming, they are active with these tasks less than one day week (2 stakeholders) or only monthly (1 stakeholder).

Table 7 shows that stakeholders indicate manual workers to be (very) relevant in their daily work. Also non-working spouses/partners and children and entrepreneurs are of high relevance according to these stakeholders. Less relevant seem to be sex workers, trafficked persons and students.

Table 7: Relevance of different types of migrants for stakeholders' work, Rotterdam

Type of migrant	(very) relevant	Relevance
Knowledge workers	7/15	Medium
Entrepreneurs	11/15	High
Manual workers	15/15	High
Persons working in private households	5/15	Medium
Sex workers, trafficked persons	4/15	Low
Students	3/15	Low
Non-working spouses/partners and children	13/15	High
Beggars and homeless people	5/15	Medium

Source: Online survey

3.3 Implications of different types of migrants in central domains

In the following sections, we take into account both the results from the online survey as well as the conducted in-depth stakeholder interviews and the ULL.

3.3.1 Labour market

Labour market implications are perceived to be very relevant for manual workers, knowledge workers and entrepreneurs in Rotterdam (Table 8). According to half of the stakeholders, implications in the field of the labour market are of high relevance to non-working spouses/partners and children. Less stakeholders state that labour market implications are (very) relevant for sex workers and trafficked persons.

Table 8: Relevance of labour market implications for different types of migrants, Rotterdam (N=15)

Type of migrant	(very) relevant	No. of stakeholders who answered for TOM[8]
Knowledge workers	9	12
Entrepreneurs	8	11
Manual workers	12	15
Persons working in private households	6	9
Sex workers, trafficked persons	4	7
Students	2	5
Non-working spouses/partners and children	6	14
Beggars and homeless people	3	6

Source: Online survey

Acknowledgement of dequalification and repression

Dequalification and underutilisation of human capital are indicated by Rotterdam stakeholders, like one educational representative (NLRD_15) noted: "*I really see parents who, as academics, work in greenhouses. […] But families who are staying longer in The Netherlands get better payed jobs after a while*." Dequalification is also seen by a representative of a temporary employment agency (NLRD_16): "*Of course there is dequalification or underutilisation among manual workers. But not only by manual workers. All those eight groups we just saw: I think it is applicable to them all*." This corresponds with the survey results. **Manual workers** are prioritised, but almost all (or at least some other) types of migrants are perceived as important in this topic. Next to dequalification and underutilisation, repression is seen in Rotterdam as a relevant aspect. Like a civil servant (NLRD_14) noticed: "*There is something complex in the system, which you could call 'repression'. […] And I would like to have a discussion about that [..] about an equal playing field. Because I honoustly find it very strange that this system has grown. We have allowed this with each other*." Besides its general acknowledgment, dequalification and repression seem to be mostly attributed towards manual workers, entrepreneurs and sometimes towards students (conducting a small job next to their studies).

Rotterdam harbour and flexibility

Next to these general elements on dequalification and repression which are comparable to the results in The Hague, in Rotterdam there is a specific niche market for harbour related professions, ranking from knowledge workers, manual workers to entrepreneurs. This is a labour market for specialised experts, professionals that operate like expats flying from harbour to harbour and work from Barcelona, Hamburg to Rotterdam. Indicated by one representative of temporary employment agencies (NLNL_18): "*I see a growing group of people who work for three months in Germany, four months in the Netherlands, three months in... And, we see that already. European employment agencies who now have a job in the harbour of Gdansk, afterwards a job in the harbour of Antwerp and than in the harbour of Barcelona.*" This is also seen by the temporary employment agency in The Hague (NLDH_09), stated: "*That is actually a story on its own. There are companies located for years, with the same names. That market is already divided and no-one is entering that. Is really a closed world. And also work of specialists. There you will find people of any country. That is not my market. I'm more focussed on the hands. For the bigger amounts...*" This shows an element that defines the specificity of the Rotterdam labour market. And more generally respondents indicate that 'flexibility'

[8] Total no. of stakeholders who indicated that specific TOM would be 'very relevant', 'relevant' or 'less relevant' in their daily work.

is getting more and more flexible on the labour market in Rotterdam, illustrated by one NGO representative (NLRD_17): "*Have you ever heard of weekly contracts? In your first weekly contract states that if your labour activities will start again in one week, than your agreement is valid for that week, on the same conditions. We know one man by which his medical care, even his housing is connected to that agreement. So one doesn't know at Friday if one has work and is secured on Monday*." This illustration shows that **flexibility is an important labour market feature** regarding CEE migrants in Rotterdam. This is of course especially applicable regarding temporary migrants, but also for persons working in private households. Despite that this type of migrant is not mentioned a lot by respondents, this type mostly holds informal, temporary or flexibel contracts.

3.3.2 Housing and neighbourhood consequences

Table 9 shows that housing implications seem to be perceived as important for many types of migrants. Only for knowledge workers and students, housing implications seem to be considered as less relevant. In the second part of Table 9, on neighbourhood implications, we can see that those implications are considered less relevant to the more highly-skilled migrant groups: knowledge workers (4 out of 12 stakeholders) and students (1 out 5 stakeholders). In contrast, for manual workers (13 out of 15 stakeholders) and beggars and homeless people (5 out of 6 stakeholders), neighbourhood implications are considered (very) relevant, according to stakeholders in Rotterdam. But overall for all types of migrants, housing implications seemed to be considered as more relevant than neighbourhood consequences.

Table 9: Relevance of housing and neighbourhood implications for different types of migrants, Rotterdam (N=15)

Housing implications		
Type of migrant	**(very) relevant**	**No. of stakeholders who answered for TOM[9]**
Knowledge workers	8	12
Entrepreneurs	10	11
Manual workers	13	15
Persons working in private households	7	9
Sex workers, trafficked persons	6	7
Students	2	5
Non-working spouses/partners and children	12	14
Beggars and homeless people	5	6
Neighbourhood implications		
Type of migrant	**(very) relevant**	**No. of stakeholders who answered for TOM**
Knowledge workers	4	12
Entrepreneurs	8	11
Manual workers	13	15
Persons working in private households	5	9
Sex workers, trafficked persons	3	7
Students	1	5
Non-working spouses/partners and children	9	14
Beggars and homeless people	5	6

Source: Online survey

[9] Total no. of stakeholders who indicated that specific TOM would be 'very relevant', 'relevant' or 'less relevant' in their daily work.

Housing as cause for social segregation

Since the housing market in The Hague is comparable to Rotterdam, most of the observations about the accessibility of housing, institutional deadlocks and mid-term housing demand are also applicable to the housing situation in Rotterdam. However, what respondents in Rotterdam also indicated as spatially relevant is to what extent social segregation occurs. Several years ago, the municipality of Rotterdam developed an instrument to refuse certain low socio-economic newcomers in deprived areas. This instrument was developed to 'spare' these deprived areas, in order to spread newcomers over other areas of the city. This instrument is approved by the Dutch national government, as national law[10] also known as the 'Rotterdam Law'. This law is also used to refuse CEE migrants from certain areas, stated by one educational representative (NLRD_15): "*I know that the municipality is busy with social mixing […]. I can understand that, because the autochtonous families in that neighbourhoods, that composition has changed tremendously in five years time, that families leave that neighbourhood, because they think: the concentration of EU migrants is getting too large*." Furthermore, **social segregation is problematised** by some respondents in Rotterdam, especially regarding issues of participation and integration. As a NGO representative (NLRD_11) state: "*In Rotterdam in the Oude Westen or Delfshaven and Charlois, there are a lot of Bulgarians*", and "*No, this does not contribute to anything, this living together. No. It is getting drunk with each other. That doesn't work. But anyways, this is related to any population I think. If you are in a different country, and you start living together this does not really work, I think*." Housing is termed as an important variable causing certain forms of social clustering or mixing.

Comparable neighbourhood consequences

In Rotterdam, most respondents refer to nuisance and exploitation as important neighbourhood consequences. One language representative (NLRD_10) even related the specific quality of the housing to matters of exploitation: "*Yes, there are here some streets [...] there you just can see it when there are blankets covering the window, than you know it isn't right. Well, and there are whole streets with blankets covering the windows. And that is not only Eastern-European solely, but there are nevertheless people who are exploited*."

Most issues regarding neighbourhood consequences are comparable with The Hague, since a large share of CEE migrants in Rotterdam also rely on privately owned housing. Comparable neigbourhood issues like overcrowding and domestic violence are mentioned by the stakeholders. However, like this is not so much the case in the more rural parts of the The Hague urban region, this is also not so much the case in Lansingerland (part of the Rotterdam urban region). Yet, a NGO representative of Schiedam (also part of the Rotterdam urban region), (NLRD_12) stated: "*Well, Schiedam is liquor. And Dutch people drink more than Polish, but the Polish people drink more on the street. They sit in front of the house with a beer, but Dutch people... they do it in their houses. There is a lot of alcoholism here*."

The (in)visibility of vulnarable groups: homeless people, beggars and sex workers

In Rotterdam, homeless people can get access to three places, De Sluis and the Pauluskerk for day and/or night care and to the 'sisters of charity' for supper. De Sluis (part of the Army of Salvation) is the only organisation in Rotterdam where people from CEE countries can get shelter. However, sometimes "*the care workers do not know that CEE people have rights*" indicated by one NGO

[10] called 'Wet bijzondere maatregelen grootstedelijke problematiek'.

representative (NLRD_17). The amount of homeless people depend on which sources one relies, since NGO's point at around 100 people, while civil servants double this amount up to 200 people. There remains a large ambiguity about the size of this type of migrant.

Next to this, since begging is officially prohibited in Rotterdam, beggars are almost non-visible in the street image. And like begging, legal prostitution is also prohibited in Rotterdam, since Rotterdam does not have, in contrast with The Hague, places for legal prostitution. One NGO representative in Schiedam indicated (NLRD_12): "*Beautiful neighbourhood right? But don't open up any front door. Because it rolls out of the house. Prostitution, there have been three houses rounded-up. And that is also human trafficking*." The (in)visibility of these types of migrants has been problematized by several respondents.

3.3.3 Registration, social security and welfare, societal and political participation

According to the first part of Table 10, registration is considered especially relevant for non-working spouses/partners and children (13 out of 14 stakeholders), entrepreneurs (10 out of 11), persons working in private households (8 out of 9) and manual workers (13 out of 15). Stakeholders have mixed opinions about the relevance of registration implications for knowledge workers.

The second part of Table 10 shows the social security implications for different types of migrants. For manual workers, somewhat more stakeholders think social security implications are (very) relevant (11 out of 15 stakeholders). The same goes for entrepreneurs (7 out of 11) and non-working spouses/partners and children (9 out of 14).

Table 10: Relevance of registration implications, social security implications and participation implications for different types of migration, Rotterdam (N=15)

Registration implications		
Type of migrant	**(very) relevant**	**No. of stakeholders who answered for TOM[11]**
Knowledge workers	6	12
Entrepreneurs	10	11
Manual workers	13	15
Persons working in private households	8	9
Sex workers, trafficked persons	4	7
Students	3	5
Non-working spouses/partners and children	13	14
Beggars and homeless people	3	6

Social security implications		
Type of migrant	**(very) relevant**	**No. of stakeholders who answered for TOM**
Knowledge workers	5	12
Entrepreneurs	7	11
Manual workers	11	15
Persons working in private households	4	9
Sex workers, trafficked persons	2	7
Students	2	5
Non-working spouses/partners and children	9	14
Beggars and homeless people	3	6

[11] Total no. of stakeholders who indicated that specific TOM would be 'very relevant', 'relevant' or 'less relevant' in their daily work.

Table 10: ***continued***

Participation implications		
Type of migrant	**(very) relevant**	**No. of stakeholders who answered for TOM**
Knowledge workers	4	12
Entrepreneurs	9	11
Manual workers	10	15
Persons working in private households	3	9
Sex workers, trafficked persons	2	7
Students	1	5
Non-working spouses/partners and children	9	14
Beggars and homeless people	2	6

Source: Online survey

Finally, the last part of Table 10 reports the relevance of participation implications. According to these stakeholders, for several types of migrants such as knowledge workers, persons working in private households, sex workers and trafficked persons, students and beggars and homeless workers, issues around participation (both social and political) are not that relevant. Surprisingly, most stakeholders in Rotterdam indicate that participation is (very) relevant for entrepreneurs and one third of the stakeholders report the (very) relevance of participation implications for manual workers. In general, comparable with the findings in The Hague, stakeholders indicate that registration is more relevant than social security, and social security implications are more relevant than participation implications.

Registration: 'couleur locale'

Every municipality can organise registration in the BRP (local administration) differently with different foci. For instance in Westland, part of the The Hague urban region, registration is developed in close cooperation with employers and at housing locations of CEE migrants. This specific Westland Model of registration is even exported to other municipalities (such as Rotterdam) supported by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Next to this, The Hague and Rotterdam register by national procedures of RNI[12] next to BRP (see paragraph 2.3.3 on the Dutch registration specificities). As such, the matter of tone, and the information infrastructure around registration can differ slightly.

In Rotterdam there is no special desk for CEE migrants in the City Hall, but several neighbourhood officers are active in the local areas. One Rotterdam civil servant (NLRD_14) explains: "*Where we differ, or where we put the focus, is the point of independency. Because we do not organise distant facilities, but all facilities are there for all 176 nationalities. And not for several groups exclusively*." One civil servant in The Hague (NLDH_06) confirms: "*It depends on which aldermen there is*." Thus, "*the themes do not change, but the focus on several things changes*." In Rotterdam no distinction is made on the basis of nationality. For instance, in Rotterdam the supply of information is only in Dutch. Only in special cases, interpreters can be facilitated. This is indicated as the **specific local focus** regarding information infrastructure and registration in Rotterdam. Much attention on

[12] To get temporary migrants better in sight and to connect with the flexibility and temporariness of CEE migrants better, in the Netherlands this BRP is recently complemented by a national system of RNI. At BRP residents register their home adress. RNI is a system where 'non-residents' are registered which are not an inhabitant of the Netherlands but had relationships with one or more of official Dutch institutions. RNI is therefore a solution to register temporary and circular migrants better, but however does not register precisely where migrants reside.

registration is dedicated to registration of temporary workers, such as entrepreneurs and manual workers, but also to non-working spouses and their children.

Social security: burdens for social rights and medical care

Like The Hague respondents, Rotterdam respondents indicate that CEE migrants (but also Dutch professionals) are not always aware of the rights CEE migrants have regarding social security. Next to this, there are also some **economic burdens** that CEE migrants face since they sometimes do not have the money to pay medical care assistance. So CEE migrants sometimes return to Bulgaria or Poland in order to visit the doctor or dentist. In Schiedam, there are free neigbourhood nurses in case CEE migrants cannot afford health care. Like one NGO representative (NLRD_12) indicated: "*People can go freely to the neighboorhood nurses. And we have three doctors here in Schiedam, who give free consults. And they have subsidies from Europe. So that these people can get the help [… for those who, red.] do not have the money*[13]."

Participation: more societal than political participation

In Rotterdam, some respondents indicate that for very specific types of migrants, such as temporary migrants (manual workers or entrepreneurs), societal participation is very difficult. It is already even uneasy for parents to get in touch with schools about the progress of their children. Like one director of a primary school (NLRD_15) indicated: "*Well, I deal with parents who are making such long working hours that it is impossible for us to speak to the parents. […] Or very sad cases that children sleep in classrooms because they awoke at four o'clock in the morning, at the time parents have to work.*" This makes societal participation for these migrants in Rotterdam very difficult, because: "*I think they would like to participate, but they are mainly unable to do so*." Consequently, if there are large **burdens for societal participation**, the incentives for political participation are even lower. In Rotterdam, unlike The Hague, there were no local representatives of CEE migrants present in the local elections.

3.3.4 Education and language

We asked stakeholders about the implications on the level of education for students and non-working spouses/partners and children. Table 11 shows that education implications are considered especially (very) relevant to non-working spouses and children.

Concerning implications in the field of language, stakeholders in Rotterdam report them to be especially (very) relevant for entrepreneurs (10 out of 11), non-working spouses/partners and children (12 out of 14), and manual workers (12 out of 15). With regard to the more highly skilled types of migrants (knowledge workers and students), language seems to be less relevant.

[13] Despite of welfare state chauvinism, and legislative incentives to secure social security and medical assistance by the national government, it is interesting that European subsidies do give the opportunity to CEE migrants to get medical assistance they need.

Table 11: Relevance of education implications for students and non-working spouses/partners and children; language implications for different types of migration, Rotterdam (N=15)

Education implications		
Type of migrant	**(Very) relevant**	**No. of stakeholders who answered for TOM[14]**
Students	3	5
Non-working spouses/partners and children	14	14

Language implications		
Type of migrant	**(Very) relevant**	**No. of stakeholders who answered for TOM**
Knowledge workers	6	12
Entrepreneurs	10	11
Manual workers	12	15
Persons working in private households	6	9
Sex workers, trafficked persons	3	7
Students	1	5
Non-working spouses/partners, children	12	14
Beggars and homeless people	3	6

Source: Online survey

Differentiated language supply

In Rotterdam, the accessibility of language and education is well organised by tendering in which also private organisations can participate. This slightly differs from the approach in The Hague, criticised by one educational representative (NLDH_05) in The Hague: "*And well… this could also give good results, but it is questionable if this is… attractive to the group like how we do it (in The Hague, red.). Therefore, I think that for the longer term, The Hague invests more in its inhabitants than Rotterdam maybe, by keeping it publicly*."

Yet, Rotterdam facilitates **different language courses leading to a very well accessible**, pluriform and varied language **course supply**. It can be noted that some types of migrants are targeted specifically, and even more than others. There are general courses ('Taal Dichtbij'), for people in the social assistance (Taal Dichtbij Werkt), for mothers (Alzare) and illiterates to which CEE migrants could apply. There are several alternatives (such as 'WEB' trajectories) for CEE migrants to apply for language courses for a low fee. There are even speed courses in Schiedam (part of urban area Rotterdam) with varied rates in terms of fees and contributions. This corresponds with the survey results regarding relevancy put by stakeholders of language and education for non-working spouses/partners and children. Especially those groups get special attention for language courses or trajectories, also because most problems arise with regard to non-working spouses/partners and children, indicated by an educational representative (NLRD_15), working at a school in Rotterdam-South consisting of a lot of (temporary) CEE migrant children: "*We often have families out of sight. Which is unworkable for the learning difficulties for those children. […] I have to deal with extreme movements within one school year. I have 250 movements annually, which are 250 pupils who flow in and out. […] In some classes this is 70 per cent*." These difficulties makes attention for non-working spouses/partners and children relevant regarding language and education. It seems that especially regarding language these types of migrants already get special attention in the differentiated course supply.

[14] Total no. of stakeholders who indicated that specific TOM would be 'very relevant', 'relevant' or 'less relevant' in their daily work.

4 Implications of CEE migration on the national level

4.1 CEE migration in the Netherlands

The most elementary general observations on the Dutch national level are mentioned in part 1.1 (points of departure). In this chapter we therefore directly zoom in on the specificities.

4.2 General observations on CEE migration

Of our respondents, 16 of our 46 stakeholders were not focused on one of the two urban regions in their field of activity, but work with a focus on both urban regions, or on the national level in general. For instance in national government or in an organisation in the larger urban region, the so-called Randstad. In this last empirical chapter, we will focus on the urban implications of CEE migrants reported by these stakeholders.

Ten of the 16 stakeholders are, in their professional capacity, positive or very positive about the presence of CEE migrants in the urban regions. Five stakeholders have a more neutral opinion. One stakeholder refused to give an answer to this question.

Almost all stakeholders (15 out of 16 stakeholders) see Poland as an important CEE sending country to the Netherlands and the urban regions in particular. To a lesser extent Bulgaria and Romania are mentioned (both by 7 stakeholders), while Hungary is mentioned by only 5 stakeholders and Croatia, Estonia and Slovenia are not at all perceived as important sending CEE countries. Interestingly, and comparable with the findings in The Hague and Rotterdam, the size of Hungarian migrants is not reflected in the importance of Hungary as important sending country.

Table 12 shows the results regarding the relevance of different types of migrants for national stakeholders' work. Almost all stakeholders (15) report that manual workers are relevant or very relevant in their daily work. Besides, seven stakeholders work every day on tasks related to CEE migration, five one to four days a week, while two only once a month. Next to this, knowledge workers, entrepreneurs, sex workers and trafficked persons, non-working spouses/partners and children and beggars and homeless people are of medium relevance.

Table 12: Relevance of different types of migrants for stakeholders' work, national level

Type of migrant	(very) relevant	Relevance
Knowledge workers	12/16	High
Entrepreneurs	9/16	Medium
Manual workers	15/16	High
Persons working in private households	4/16	Low
Sex workers, trafficked persons	7/16	Medium
Students	5/16	Low
Non-working spouses/partners and children	7/15	Medium
Beggars and homeless people	6/15	Medium

Source: Online survey

4.3 Implications of different types of migrants in central domains

In this second paragraph of the chapter on implications of CEE migration on the national level, we will again elaborate on the implications of different types of migrants in the four domains: (1) labour market, (2) housing and neighbourhood consequences, (3) registration, social security, societal and political participation and (4) education and languages issues. We take into account the results from the online survey, the conducted interviews and the ULL.

4.3.1 Labour market

Concerning the implications on the labour market, these seem to be very relevant for manual workers (14 out of 15 stakeholders), knowledge workers (12 out of 13) and entrepreneurs (11 out of 12) (Table 13). According to national stakeholders, the implications on the labour market are less relevant to students and non-working spouses/partners and children (both 3 out of 8). This is not surprising while these types of migrants are often inactive on the labour market.

Table 13: Relevance of labour market implications for different types of migrants, national level (N=16)

Type of migrant	(very) relevant	No. of stakeholders who answered for TOM[15]
Knowledge workers	12	13
Entrepreneurs	11	12
Manual workers	14	15
Persons working in private households	6	8
Sex workers, trafficked persons	4	7
Students	3	8
Non-working spouses/partners and children	3	8
Beggars and homeless people	3	7

Source: Online survey

Contestation on dequalification and repression

Like the presence of repression, also dequalification and the underutilisation of human capital are mentioned by respondents as important themes. However, it seems that it is depending on the professional background of respondents, the related interests and perceptions how 'dequalification' and 'repression' are perceived. It seems a **matter of perspective**. For instance, on 'dequalification' some respondents pragmatically argue that people just want to earn more money, so they – temporarily – take it for granted that they underutilize their competencies and skills. By doing that, CEE migrants are dequalified in terms of socio-economic status but they are also able to qualify themselves in terms of tacit skills, international experience, network and portfolio building. Like one representative of a temporary employment agency (NLDH_09) argues: "*They use that experience, like okay, I've seen how this was in the Netherlands or Germany and that was good for the money, experience, portfolio, network and I will now try that to use this in Poland*." Therefore, 'dequalification' seems to be a matter of perspective, illustrated by a representative of temporary employment agencies (NLNL_18): "*If you can say this is dequalification? Than I think yes and no. Look, could these people do more? Yes, because they are educated for that. Is that highly skilled job there? That is question two*."

[15] Total no. of stakeholders who indicated that specific TOM would be 'very relevant', 'relevant' or 'less relevant' in their daily work.

These contested perspectives, or diverging interests are also seen within the aspect of 'repression'. Some indicate that an image of repression exists, but if one looks closer, these jobs cannot be fulfilled by Dutch employees. This points at a **difference between *subjective repression*** (feeling of being repressed) and ***objective repression*** (formal crowding out of Dutch people by migrants). This tension is mentioned by a representative of temporary employment agencies (NLNL_18): "*To what extent can a Dutch citizen do the work of a labour migrant, than the discussion at this moment is very much about the labour migrant and what he does here. But the discussion is not about the unemployed and the system in the Netherlands on how we help the unemployed. And that is an element which you need to take along. But, than we need to put a mirror for ourselves. An it is easier to point at the other*."

It seems that this merely points out to socio-cultural mismatches of Dutch people not wanting to do the 'minimal jobs' (as one respondent indicated these jobs), instead of socio-economic mismatches. However, on the contrary, a director of a large vocational school (NLDH_05) indicates: "*For a small employer in the construction work it is more profitable to hire a self-employed person from Eastern-Europe, than a parttime student […]. They are not only competing with employees with a collective agreement, but also competing with people who need to get a chance as 17 or 18 years old in education in a company with a labour contract and parttime study. Despite all subsidies on this. […] This consequentially leads to less educated specialists.*" This respondent indicates repression as problem for starting employees on the labour market competing with CEE labour migrants in construction work. This can be complemented by respondents indicating a large amount of black work. Because while the requirement of needing work permits are lifted for Polish, Hungarian, Bulgarian and Romanian workers in the Netherlands, black work still seems to be very attractive, which could cause repression. It seems that on this point there exist some **contested perspectives, or diverging interests**. It is worth considering that the perception of dequalification, repression and nostrification depends on the professional background, interests and perspectives of professionals.

Clustered contractual relationships could lead to…

…multiple dependencies

Temporary employment agencies have, with the best intends, an interest to manage and control more than just the employment of temporary workers. For them it is beneficial to manage and control, next to employment, the wages, security issues but also travel costs and housing. Like a representative of temporary employment agencies (NLNL_18) indicates: "*Yes, it was just a package-deal [...]. So, recruitment, selection, transport, housing, labour, labour-housing transport, this was all within that package. And what we see now is that all the different parts, it becomes more a model of choice. [...] This makes it a bit, unmanageable. And also a bit less comprehensible*." This indicates the strong incentives for employers to cluster contracts to a large extent. This can become problematic since it enlarges the possibility for employment agencies "*to do something wrong*", like a representative of a temporary employment agency (NLDH_09) indicated which limits the possibilities for employees to 'vote with your feet'. Since "*housing is a labour condition for this group [of CEE migrants red.]*", indicated by a representative of a temporary employment agency (NLDH_09), this adds up to the point of 'clustered contractual relationships' and to the **vulnerability and multiple dependencies** of CEE migrants.

…multiple forms of discrimination

By clustered contractual relationships (and thus multiple dependencies) forms of discrimination and intimidation could become more likely. Different respondents indicated 'multiple forms of

discrimination' on the basis of ethnicity and nationality. For instance wage discrimination and labour discrimination and intimidation by fines on deviant housing behaviour, by threatening to quit labour contracts if employees speak up about improper labour conditions. This is especially problematic in multiple contracts and clustered dependencies, stated by a NGO representative (NLRD_17): "*Clustered dependency is very large. And when people sign a contract in a foreign language, you don't know. People eagerly want to work. You can sign here and now, or not and than no work. People are naive, but they also want to improve. People are not stupid, but they cherish the hope to improve their welfare. And employment agencies are like vultures on the naivity of these people*." In this regard, some respondents indicate that underpayment on the basis of nationality or ethnicity occurs, such as an NGO representative (NLRD_11) indicated: "*Because these Poles, they are also getting much wiser, you know. They say: we are not doing it for that wage anymore. But now it is the turn for Bulgarians and Romanians, to become the victim*." It can be understood that for CEE migrants, it is not always quite clear-cut where to rely on and how to give voice to their arrears. Like a representative of a temporary employment agency (NLDH_09) putted it: "*We only need to regulate that stuff according to the law. Everything above that is depending on the customer to pay*."

…information assymetries

The problem of 'multiple dependencies', discrimination or intimidation can be stimulated by 'information assymetries'. Respondents indicate that CEE migrants are generally not well prepared when they travel to the Netherlands, and are not well aware of their rights and duties. They are not well informed about their rights within the collective agreement, on working conditions, labour hours, laws, regulations and housing certificates. Like a representative of a temporary employment agency (NLNL_18) putted: "*The chance that a labour migrant knows of all things shouted about them in the media , I consider a lot bigger than that one reads the booklet of collective agreements from cover to cover*." Continued by: "*Euuh, I don't know if he knows. I think that he on a certain moment knows...[…]. If he knows his collective agreement, he knows that he has the right [...] to a certain kind of housing facility [..] But if he knows, I don't know. The right is there*." Especially for temporary (circular) migrants such as entrepreneurs or manual workers, they can become victim of an **underdeveloped informational position**. Several institutions could empower these groups with good and customised information, but this is not always the case. For instance, temporary employment agencies need to provide employees with a booklet consisting information about work and the collective agreement (in Dutch 'CAO'), but because of the temporariness of certain labour contracts, the coverage of this distribution can be debateable. Next to this, some respondents complained about the **low information demand** by migrants. Maybe because of (an ex-communist) culture of state avoidance, CEE migrants seem to search for help, guidance and support on all kinds of issues (labour, housing language) by their peer groups, families and friends first. Only when its is 'too late' or 'when the need is high', CEE migrants develop the demand for formal information and formal support.

4.3.2 Housing and neighbourhood consequences

Table 14 shows the results of how national stakeholders report on housing and neighbourhood consequences per type of migrant. All stakeholders perceive housing implications (first part of the table) as (very) relevant (15 out of 15) to CEE manual workers in the urban regions. Also for non-working spouses/partners and children housing implications are indicated as (very) relevant (7 out of 8). Overall, housing implications seemed to be perceived as very relevant for all the types of migrants.

Table 14: Relevance of housing and neighbourhood implications for different types of migrants, national level (N=16)

Housing implications		
Type of migrant	**(very) relevant**	**No. of stakeholders who answered for TOM[16]**
Knowledge workers	9	13
Entrepreneurs	9	12
Manual workers	15	15
Persons working in private households	5	8
Sex workers, trafficked persons	5	7
Students	5	8
Non-working spouses/partners and children	7	8
Beggars and homeless people	4	7

Neighbourhood implications		
Type of migrant	**(very) relevant**	**No. of stakeholders who answered for TOM**
Knowledge workers	4	13
Entrepreneurs	8	12
Manual workers	11	15
Persons working in private households	3	8
Sex workers, trafficked persons	3	7
Students	2	8
Non-working spouses/partners and children	4	8
Beggars and homeless people	7	7

Source: Online survey

In the second part of Table 14 the results regarding the neighbourhood implications are presented. For manual workers (11 out of 15) and beggars and homeless people (7 out of 7) neighbourhood implications are of high relevance, according to national stakeholders. On the other hand, these implications are of low relevance for students (2 out of 8), persons working in private households (3 out of 7) and knowledge workers (4 out of 12). Generally, for almost all types (except for beggars and homeless people, which seem legitimate since this type mostly does not have any housing) housing implications are perceived as more relevant than neighbourhood consequences for all types of migrants. Within this domain, on the national scale, one element can be complemented on the basis of the interviews and ULL.

Shortage of mid-term housing

On the national Dutch scale, it seems that most problems around housing are focussed not so much on short-term (for instance Polish Hotels) or long-term (corporation) housing, but are mainly **related to the mid-term segment** of the housing stock. Some respondents indicate that employers are less and less investing in short-term housing because of a decrease of demand and because corporations rent it to temporary labour agencies. Therefore, problems arise around the more mid-term segment of the housing market, since most social housing corporations "*are afraid of this, and don't know how to act upon this*", like one expert on housing (NLNL_21) indicated. This is important since "*this middle area is not only relevant but also growing*" stated by one representative of temporary labour agencies

[16] Total no. of stakeholders who indicated that specific TOM would be 'very relevant', 'relevant' or 'less relevant' in their daily work.

(NLRD_16). Long-term housing is covered by the existing Dutch infrastructure in social housing by corporations, but more and more demand is growing towards midterm housing for families.

4.3.3 Registration, social security and welfare, societal and political participation

The relevance of registration implications according to national stakeholders show that these implications are particularly relevant or very relevant for non-working spouses/partner and children (7 out of 8), manual workers (12 out of 15) and entrepreneurs (9 out of 12) (Table 15). Of lesser relevance are registration implications for sex workers and trafficked persons and beggars and homeless people (both 3 out of 7), according to national stakeholders.

Table 15: Relevance of registration implications, social security implications and participation implications for different types of migration, national level (N=16)

Registration implications		
Type of migrant	**(very) relevant**	**No. of stakeholders who answered for TOM[17]**
Knowledge workers	8	13
Entrepreneurs	9	12
Manual workers	12	15
Persons working in private households	6	8
Sex workers, trafficked persons	3	7
Students	4	8
Non-working spouses/partners and children	7	8
Beggars and homeless people	3	7

Social security implications		
Type of migrant	**(very) relevant**	**No. of stakeholders who answered for TOM**
Knowledge workers	5	13
Entrepreneurs	3	12
Manual workers	11	15
Persons working in private households	3	8
Sex workers, trafficked persons	3	7
Students	3	8
Non-working spouses/partners and children	6	8
Beggars and homeless people	5	7

Participation implications		
Type of migrant	**(very) relevant**	**No. of stakeholders who answered for TOM**
Knowledge workers	5	13
Entrepreneurs	3	12
Manual workers	4	15
Persons working in private households	2	8
Sex workers, trafficked persons	2	7
Students	3	8
Non-working spouses/partners and children	5	8
Beggars and homeless people	3	7

Source: Online survey

[17] Total no. of stakeholders who indicated that specific TOM would be 'very relevant', 'relevant' or 'less relevant' in their daily work.

The middle part of Table 15 shows how national stakeholders indicate the relevance of social security implications of CEE migration. For manual workers these implications seem to be very relevant (11 out of 15). For knowledge workers and entrepreneurs, most stakeholders state that social security implications are not (very) relevant (respectively only 5 out of 13 and 3 out of 12 stakeholders).

The last part of Table 15 shows the results regarding (both societal and political) participation. Generally, not much national stakeholders perceive participation consequences of (high) relevance for CEE migrants. Only for non-working spouses/partners and children more than half of the concerning stakeholders state that participation implications are (very) relevant. On the basis of the surveys, interviews and ULL the following four elements can be added.

Perverse registration logics

In the Netherlands, registration (in BRP or RNI) is needed to get a BSN (Citizen Service Number) and access to all sorts of assistance and benefits and to be indicated as tax payer. Like explained in earlier sections, new registration systems are recently developed (the national system of RNI- Registration Non-Inhabitants-) next to the municipal registration system (BRP). The existence of several registration systems has as a consequence: "*That an employer goes to the most efficient process. And he registers [his migrant employers, red.] in the system (BRP) on places where this is not intended. Or he goes to the RNI (national registration system) where these procedures are relatively equal. That is what you see*", indicated by a representative of temporary employment agencies (NLNL_18). Moreover, respondents note that unsubscribing in the BRP is hard, thus employers prefer therefore registration in the RNI, because of efficiency. Therefore, **new registration solutions (such as RNI) seem to cause new problems**.

Ignorance and unawareness of social rights

Respondents indicate the **ignorance or unawareness concerning social security rights** by both Dutch professionals as well as CEE migrants themselves. For instance professionals who work in the field of social assitance and insertion do not always know that CEE migrants have rights for shelter. Or do not know how certain regulations work nowadays in Europe, for instance regarding medical assistance and care. One NGO representative (NLRD_11) states: "*One is mostly socially secured in Bulgaria. […] But if you have medical security in Bulgaria you are not obliged to be secured in the Netherlands. That is Europe. [..] I've had discussions with ministries, until the minister Kamp. Unbelievable, they keep believing that they need to be secured here, but this is totally not the case. […] We still need to learn this.*" Respondents indicated that this ignorance by professionals is considered as a conscious or unconsious act towards CEE migrants. Sometimes because of the complexity of new European rules and legislation. As indicated by a civil servant (NLRD_14) in Rotterdam: "*We in Rotterdam try to educate all our street-level-bureaucrats, the neigbourhood teams, the intervention teams, but also the people working with welfare benefits to educate them how it works*." So the element of unawareness seems to be aknowledged.

No lack of societal but political participation

While societal participation merely displays itself at the local level and therefore is not a national issue, instead political participation can be. Because of the **lack of voting rights** for temporary CEE migrants for the national parliament (one has to attain Dutch citizenship), national political participation is absent. For the time being, political participation is locally organised (see chapters The Hague and Rotterdam).

Problems of debts

Several respondents indicated that some CEE migrants are **struggling with debts**. Sometimes these debts are the reason for initially leaving the home country, looking for prosperity somewhere else. Sometimes these debts occured during their time in the Netherlands when gaining more money. One NGO representative (NLRD_12) indicates: "*The biggest problem at this moment with Bulgarians is debts. [...] The debts support system works overtime. So, there are a lot of debts.*" Or one local employer stated*:* "*Some do not want to register, because they are than able to avoid collection agencies*"*,* while a temporary employment agency (NLDH_09) noted*:* "*We have 300 to 400 distraints on wages. [..] Per week two or three new distraints on wages. Because someone didn't paid his telephone bill or the housing rental or this or that... That is a lot, almost ten per cent. [...] this grows. In the past, we had less. Since the moment Polish people become really Dutch, they also make Dutch mistakes.*" Ironically, one could state with the last quote that CEE migrants show to be very well socio-economic integrated, since this seems also a growing problem for Dutch employees.

4.3.4 Education and language

Because education implications are probably mainly applicable to CEE students and CEE non-working spouses/partners and – especially – children, we only asked stakeholders to report on these implications for these two groups. In Table 16, we observe that for both students and non-working spouses/partners and children, education implications are (very) relevant.

Table 16: Relevance of education implications for students and non-working spouses/partners and children; language implications for different types of migration, national level (N=16)

Education implications		
Type of migrant	**(Very) relevant**	**No. of stakeholders who answered for TOM[18]**
Students	7	8
Non-working spouses/partners and children	7	8

Language implications		
Type of migrant	**(Very) relevant**	**No. of stakeholders who answered for TOM**
Knowledge workers	4	13
Entrepreneurs	7	12
Manual workers	10	15
Persons working in private households	4	8
Sex workers, trafficked persons	3	7
Students	5	8
Non-working spouses/partners, children	7	8
Beggars and homeless people	2	7

Source: Online survey

The second part of Table 16 shows that almost all stakeholders (7 out of 8) indicate that language implications are (very) relevant for non-working spouses/partners and children. Also one third of the stakeholders indicate the high relevance of language implications for manual workers. For other types of migrants, like beggars and homeless people (2 out of 7) and knowledge workers (4 out of 13), language implications seem to have less relevance.

[18] Total no. of stakeholders who indicated that specific TOM would be 'very relevant', 'relevant' or 'less relevant' in their daily work.

On the basis of the interviews, surveys and ULL, respondents on the national level indicate language as very important. Especially since it contributes to the empowerment, positioning and functioning of CEE migrants in Dutch society. However the large acknowledgment of the importance of language and education, all aspects on this domain have been considered on the local level.

5 Conclusion: Implications of CEE migration – comparison

In this last chapter we conclude on the specified case study material of the urban regions of The Hague and Rotterdam and the national perspective. What are the most relevant, important and significant social consequences regarding CEE migration in the studied Dutch urban regions? We will elaborate on this by the four central domains of labour market (1), housing and neighbourhood consequences (2), registration, social security and participation (3) and finally language and education (4).

5.1 Labour market

By comparing the findings of the urban regions The Hague and Rotterdam on labour market issues, we firstly state clear that especially issues regarding labour market are most likely to overextent the scale of the urban region. Since labour market issues are closely related to laws, regulations and conditions on national or regional level, large differences between the urban regions on this aspect are not likely to be found. However, we will describe some insights regarding both urban regions, and conclude on the (dis)similarities further on. Generally, we would like to highlight three issues regarding labour market issues in The Hague and Rotterdam.

Contested perceptions on dequalification, underpayment and repression

How both 'dequalification' and 'repression' are perceived seem to depend on the professional background of respondents, their related (political) interests and their perceptions. These diverging perceptions can be noted in The Hague as well as in Rotterdam. Some stakeholders indicate that an image of repression exists, but if one really looks closer, it seems that not all ('minimal') jobs can be fulfilled by Dutch employees.

Limited upward social mobility

It turns out that dequalification and the underutilisation of human capital are limited by a discouragement of language training. This is particularly mentioned by The Hague stakeholders, so dissimilar compared to Rotterdam, but therefore not least interesting. This sheds a new light on dequalification as a (socio-economic) labour market issue, turning it into a language, integration and therefore socio-cultural issue. By hampering language proficiency, dequalification could occur (migrants cannot develop themselves) which could **limit forms of upward social mobility**. Some employers seem to have an interest in employees who are *non-Dutch speaking* and actively **discourage language training**. This hinders CEE migrants to empower themselves. Since it is indicated that CEE migrants start their careers at low-skilled or '*minimal jobs'*, therefore they have to develop more – in comparison with their Dutch fellows–to climb upon the career ladder and to be socially mobile. To conclude, several issues regarding limited upward social mobility arise, mainly observed in The Hague.

Clustered contractual relationships' causing 'information assymetries'

In both The Hague and Rotterdam, respondents indicated the existence of 'clustered contractual relationships'. This means a clustering of contracts on employment, housing, transport, social security, mostly executed by temporary employment agencies. Generally, this is an important theme in both urban regions, although these 'clustered contractual relationships' are mostly the case in rural areas such as Westland than in the core cities of The Hague and Rotterdam.

'Clustered contractual relationships' could cause 'multiple dependencies', which can imply that employees are in a vulnerable position towards their employers. This vulnarable position cause 'multiple forms of discrimination'. Discrimination or intimidation could lead to employees who do not dare to speak up about their rights and conditions, or do not dare to empower themselves. This can be mainly attributed towards the power position of employers ('employers' also understood as the temporary employment agencies), but also towards the information assymetries between employers and employees. This information assymetries exists because employees mostly are not well aware of their rights and their duties. Two additional explanations contributing to information (and power) assymetries in The Hague and Rotterdam exist.

One explanation lies in the existing **gap between the current existing *formal information supply* versus an *informal information demand*.** Respondents indicated that the information supply is very well organised. On the national level but also in Rotterdam and especially in The Hague varied governmental brochures, booklets and websites are developed to inform migrants about their rights and duties in the Netherlands. But despite all these well-organised formal information channels, some respondents complained about the low information demand by migrants. CEE migrants seem to search for help, guidance and support on all kinds of issues (labour, housing language) by their peer groups, families and friends first. Only when its is 'too late' or 'when the need is high', CEE migrants develop the demand for formal information and formal support.

A second explanation for the 'information assymetries' and why CEE migrants rely heavily on their own peer groups forms a (ex-communist) **culture of state avoidance** and neglecting authorities in CEE countries. Respondents indicate that for some CEE migrants, government is something you need to avoid anytime, something you need to distrust, you need to fear. CEE migrants therefore do not easily accept autoritised information, but rather search for information in informal networks.

On the basis of our research there are no clear indications that there are large differences on this regard between The Hague and Rotterdam.

5.2 Housing and neigbourhood consequences

Neigbourhood consequences are related to housing

The differentiation of housing accomodations in the urban regions is very high. Short-term, mid-term and long-term demands are competing with each other, while our study shows a growing demand for more mid-term housing facilities in both The Hague and Rotterdam exists. This growing demand is however not found in Westland, Delft and Lansingerland, rural areas of both urban regions. Still, all sorts of facilities need to be arranged, which could cause a variety of neighbourhood consequences. The variety of housing can be related to two main axes:

1. the extent of the availability of certain types of housing
2. the extent of (labour and housing) multiple contracts ('clustered contractual relationships')

The availability of type of housing focuses on the instanteneity of available and affordable housing for the specific (short-term or long-term) demand. Social housing and private apartments are not so easily accessible as spaces in short-term apartments (such as 'Polish Hotels') or privately owned housing. The latter type of housing mostly directly correspond with existing demands from the market, while for social housing migrants and non-migrants need to subscribe for waiting lists, which sometimes last for several months or years. However, private apartments are not that uneasy accessible as social housing, but places for private apartments (with more privacy than a 'Polish Hotel') are limited. Therefore, migrants also need to queue for this type of housing as well.

On the extent of multiple contracts, the focus is to what extent housing contracts are dependent on labour contracts. Clustered dependency does not always have to be a negative element, since migrants can also profit of the conditional services that employers offer on housing. It becomes negative, when their autonomy and 'private' behaviour is disciplined by labour conditions. But these positive or negative side effects can be displayed in all types of housing. Based on our findings in The Hague and Rotterdam, we state that there are large differences between the housing facilities for CEE migrants in terms of the availability and in terms of the clustering of contracts, relating labour and housing. All variants are present in both urban regions.

The two-by-two table (Figure 1) shows four housing types in the urban regions in The Hague and Rotterdam, where labour migrants can live in. It shows firstly the variety in accessibility, which mainly corresponds with the **temporariness** of stay. Short-term, flexible and temporary housing is easier accessible than for instance long-term housing. It shows secondly the degree of clustered contracts, so to what extent employees are dependent on employers for labour and housing. Since for most groups, "*housing is a labour condition*", as a representative of temporary employment agencies (NLNL_18) indicated, housing and labour can depend on each other.

Figure 1: Four types of housing



This table shows the characteristics of certain types of housing, without pretending these types are exclusionary. The only intention is to show that these characteristics structure the choice of migrants for a certain type of housing. And this type of housing influences the neighbourhood consequences. The **type of neighbourhood consequences is depending on the type of housing**, while the **type of housing is mostly depending on the temporariness** of CEE migrants. And this temporariness guides the availability of housing accommodations and the clustering of contracts. For instance, a strong

clustered contractual and available short term housing facility such as a 'Polish Hotel' is also very strictly managed. Private behaviour is strictly disciplined by labour and housing conditions. Therefore, nuisance, domestic violence and over-occupation are not likely to occur, indicated by a NGO representative (NLRD_10) as: "*I know from that Polish Hotel on the Dordtselaan [Rotterdam, red.], the whole neighbourhood was against its settlement, and oh, oh, oh what bad. There has never happened anything. This is really... nobody has experienced any nuisance of it*."

While the autonomy of a migrant's private behaviour is lower in a 'Polish hotel', the chances on deviancies are smaller. By less regulated housing facilities, over-occupation, domestic voilence and nuisance could appear more often. Although the autonomy of the migrant is higher, the chance on deviancies is bigger, indicated by a representative of a temporary employment agency (NLDH_09): "*Nuisance, slum landlords, over-occupation… when the employer has no commitment, it is not that it will always become better. Probably it becomes a lot cheaper for the labour migrant, you know, that is possible. But the question is if the quality of housing diminishes or increases by this.*"

Social, cultural and ethnic segregation is possible in all four types of housing, but most likely to be present in a 'Polish Hotel'. Likewise, the chance on exploitation, slum landlording and discrimination is also possible in all housing types, but most likely in the privately owned housing. In this manner, **all housing types have their own positive and negative neighbourhood consequences,** which need carefull consideration. Additionally, in all four variants, many of the neighbourhood consequences are dependent on the extent of (over)concentration of people. Therefore, the characteristics of the types of housing in the two-by-two table are *ceteris paribus* for all other variables which could influence the social conditions of the accommodation.

In the urban regions of The Hague and Rotterdam, all four housing variants are present. There are a few 'Polish Hotels' in both cities, but most housing is arranged by privately owned landlords. Whereas in Westland, (which contains a lot of short-term housing), a lot of housing is arrenged by temporary employment agencies. The different housing types (because of the clustered dependency and instant availability) in the cities and rural areas influence directly the variety in neighboorhoud consequences. For instance, the variety of neighbourhood consequences in the cities of The Hague and Rotterdam (nuisance, garbage timing, overcrowding, alcohol on the street) is different than in Westland or Lansingerland. One representative of temporary employment agencies (NLNL_18) indicated: "*We do things in the whole country. But what we do see is that the more urban... this is again an extra ladle on the urban misery which is already there... you know... too much people, too less houses, nuisance, social complexities with living too close to each other. This makes the... these are problems of it's own. And which is incomparable to other parts of the Netherlands. But, the problems of Rotterdam and The Hague are a bit more heavier*." Our study shows that neighbourhood consequences spatially differ.

The (in)visibility of vulnerable groups

Beggars/homeless people and sex workers/trafficked persons are both types of migrants which are present in The Hague and Rotterdam. Since Rotterdam does not have legal street prostitution spots, most practices are moved or displayed illegally. The Hague maintains two legal street prostitution spots, this however does not mean that illegal prostitution in The Hague is out of sight.

The Hague and Rotterdam have comparable issues regarding homelessness. The amount of homeless people in Rotterdam seems lower than in The Hague, but 'objective' registrations are not available. Both cities work together with the organisation Barka as an instrument of local remigration Barka tries to convince homeless CEE migrants to return to their home country. Beggars are almost

non-visible in The Hague and Rotterdam, mainly because begging is officially illegal. Or, as one civil servant (NLRD_14) stated: "*We have a very strict policy in Rotterdam. Begging is not allowed, we do not want to see that in the street scene*." On the basis of the interviews, two additional observations can be made.

Firstly, especially 'homelessness' is sometimes a **too heavy** loaden concept. People move from day to day to various arrangements: in housing, on the street, with friends, to family and back again in ordinary housing. With the increasing flexibilisation of labour contracts, housing becomes flexible, and as a result being homeless is flexible. Consequently, the traditional usage of the term 'homelessness' is a too fixed or rigid concept for most CEE migrants in this fluid category. Some CEE migrants consider sleeping at the nightcare as cheap housing. Others are taking food from the 'Soupbus' perceiving it as accessible dinner spot, without being really homeless. Therefore, we think this type of migrant needs to be nuanced.

Secondly, homelessness and prostitution have their own dynamics in cities like The Hague and Rotterdam. But homeless people and sex workers and their issues seem to have **no clear specificities** regarding its CEE character. The amount and CEE origin of homeless people and sex workers contains no significant differences with other migrant groups.

5.2 Registration, social security, societal and political participation

Strong relationship (non-)registration and social security

Each municipality arranges its registration system differently, so are clear differences in focus exist between Westland, The Hague and Rotterdam for instance. However, in general, registration and social security are directly related to each other in both urban regions. The same applies to **non-registration and problems regarding social security**. Three arguments regarding non-registration can be mentioned: a cultural argument (distrust of state officials), a rational argument (disadvantages of registration), and an economic argument (strategy of employers searching for efficient registration procedures). All arguments contribute to non-registration and lead to further complications regarding the possibilities of CEE migrants using social benefits. Overall, this study shows that there is a lot of ignorance and discussion about the advantages of registration and to what extent CEE migrants really profit from certain rights and duties also regarding social security issues, also noticed during our Dutch Urban Living Lab.

More economic than societal and more societal than political participation

In both The Hague and Rotterdam, for CEE migrants holds clearly that **socio-economic participation is higher than socio-cultural participation but socio-cultural participation is higher than political participation**. One could even argue that a very dedicated socio-economic participation could be a strong *hindrance* for socio-cultural participation. Like one NGO representative stated, if one wants to increase the socio-cultural participation "*they have to stop working that hard*" (NLRD_10). In The Hague and in Rotterdam, there are strong indications of social participation (in private businesses, in sports clubs, churches and politics), but small indications of political participation.

5.3 Education and language

Importance of children

In both urban regions, respondents indicate that the willingness to learn the Dutch language is very high among CEE migrants. Moreover, 'when eventually children are present', CEE migrants are making choices regarding their (permanent) settlement, which will consequently lead up to more education and/or language proficiency. Also when children are raised in the Netherlands, parents get in touch with different Dutch institutions, to which they need to communicate and relate, for the improvement of their children. This again points at the **importance of language**. Finally, children take friends at home and function as interpreters for their parents in the usage of their language, this contains no clear specificities regarding its CEE character.

Differentiated expectations

Finally, language seems to be considered as a minimal threshold for good integration and participation. But not all types of migrants have easily access or are stimulated to learn the language. Instead, as studied, for certain types (such as manual workers and entrepreneurs) it is sometimes discouraged to learn the Dutch language, whereas for knowledge workers it is mostly accepted that they only speak the English language. It seems that **multi-linguality is only problematised for certain types** of migrants.

5.4 Implications of CEE migration – urban regions of The Hague and Rotterdam compared

On the basis of all presented findings, we now conclude to what extent this data sheds new light on our defined basic assumptions, presented in the introduction of this report. First of all, based on the studies of Engbersen et al. (2011; 2013) we assumed that there is more heterogeneity among CEE labour migrants than often is assumed. Not only can CEE migrants be differentiated by their temporariness of stay but also by their socio-economic status. This assumption is studied by differentiating CEE migrants in types of migrants such as 'knowledge workers', 'entrepreneurs', 'manual workers', 'persons working in private households', 'sex workers, trafficked persons', 'students', 'non-working spouses/partners and children' and 'beggars and homeless people'. Let us now reflect to what extent this contributes to this first assumption.

5.4.1 Socio-economic differentiation

Labour market

This study shows that the differentiation of types of migrants is especially applicable to the labour market. The survey, expert interviews and Urban Living Lab data shows very clearly that labour market issues are considered very relevant for specific types of migrants. Moreover, it is important that different types of migrants are confronted with different labour market implications. And generally, in the Netherlands most issues are applicable to working CEE migrants, and especially *temporary* working CEE migrants. Dequalification and the underutilisation of human capital are mainly applicable to **manual workers and entrepreneurs**. Those types of migrants are predominantly working in low-skilled jobs, therefore most dependent on contractors and vulnerable for getting dequalified. In general, many labour market implications can be related to the dependency of CEE migrants towards their employer. The types of migrants which are not dependent on an employer (**students, homeless people, knowledge migrants, non-working spouses**) are less vulnerable for socio-economic

exploitation, (wage) discrimination and dequalification. A certain socio-economic position could involve the likeliness of multiple dependencies (clustered contracts of labour, housing, transport, social security), multiple forms of discrimination and information asymmetries. This socio-economic position differs for all types of migrants studied in this research. The domain of the labour market therefore clearly shows the variety of implications for all types of migrants. But concerning all domains, not only labour market issues, implications for temporary migrants (such as manual workers or entrepreneurs) are mostly mentioned by stakeholders.

Housing and neighbourhood consequences

Housing and neighbourhood consequences are closely related to each other. The type of neighbourhood consequences is depending on the type of housing, while the type of housing is mostly depending on the temporariness of CEE migrants. Within this temporariness, especially mid-term housing seems to be a problem, in the accessibility of affordable housing. This is mainly related **to spouses/partners and children** and to a certain extent **manual workers and entrepreneurs**. Next to this, there seems to be a problem in the accessibility of housing for **sex workers**. Finally, neighbourhood consequences seem to be mostly applicable for **beggars and homeless people**. They mainly do not have (permanent) residency, so therefore could cause implications in certain neighbourhoods.

Registration, social security and participation

In terms of registration, social security and participation, there are large differences between the types of migrants. Social security and (non-)registration are linked, which is applicable to most types of migrants. On the one hand, stakeholders do not problematize non-registration for CEE migrants with a high socio-economic status, such as **knowledge workers**. While it is mainly problematised for **entrepreneurs** and **manual workers** (with a lower socio-economic status). Most CEE migrants are not aware of their rights and duties related to registration, such as **entrepreneurs** and **partners/spouses**, especially regarding the registration of their children. Other types benefit a certain degree of invisibility (since non-registration contains more benefits than burdens) such as **homeless people, sex workers and persons working in private households**.

With regard to participation implications, especially **entrepreneurs** and **manual workers** seem to carry the heaviest burden on time spent on labour. Because this lack of time, they are unable to participate in more broad societal issues such as schooling of their children, language courses or sport activities.

Language, education

On the domain of language and education, differentiation can be observed between all types of migrants. This differentiation is not only already applied in the local supply of language courses since they offer a wide variety of courses (for instance for mothers, illiteracy people, CEE migrants, children), but also regarding the expectancies of society of their degree of learning the Dutch language for certain types of migrants. **Students and knowledge workers** seem to have dispensation for Dutch language proficiency, they can mainly help themselves with speaking English. However, especially **children, non-working spouses/partners** and to some extent **entrepreneurs and manual workers** are expected to learn the Dutch language.

On the other hand, for some types of migrants, multilingualism is also problematized. For some **manual workers and entrepreneurs**, we indicated that multilingualism (learning the Dutch language

next to their mother tongue) is destimulated by employers, since it does not contribute to a more efficient working process. To conclude, our study on language and education shows that there are different expectations towards different types of migrants.

Conclusion

All the above shows the relevance of differentiating CEE migration by varied types of migrants in order to better understand the social implications of CEE migration in the urban regions of The Hague and Rotterdam. In the Dutch case we can clearly see an overemphasis on implications related to temporary workers such as manual workers and entrepreneurs. While knowledge workers can also be temporary employed, it seems that regarding issues on CEE migration, our stakeholders are biased towards the more circular, temporary and lower socio-economic types of CEE migrants. By this focus we were not able to dig too much into detail on issues regarding for instance knowledge workers and students, persons working in private households and sex workers or trafficked persons. It does not mean that these types of migrants are absent in the Netherlands, but that these types of migrants did not receive the same amount of relevance by the stakeholders. We are aware of this bias. Because we are depending on the perceived relevance of our stakeholders in this report we were not able to add as much information on these types of migrants than on, in the Dutch case, the more temporary working types of migrants.

Next to this, we must take notice of the implicit bias in our research since we studied the perception of experts on social implications. This makes it inevitable that we, in our research, focussed more on the perceived *problems* than on the positive contributions of CEE migration. We are fully aware of this bias. However, by focussing on perceived problems of respondents we can state that certain types of migrants get more attention than others. This study shows the over-attention towards **manual workers**, **homeless people and beggars** and the under-attention towards **students and knowledge workers**. It shows the vulnerability of certain types of migrants, such as **manual workers and entrepreneurs** regarding social security, multiple dependencies of certain types on the labour market (**manual workers and entrepreneurs**), the importance of certain types for increasing new demands on the housing market (**partners, spouses and children**) and the deviating expectancies on language issues (**partners, spouses and children, manual workers and knowledge workers**.). By any means it shows the importance of differentiation along the axe of temporariness and along the axe of socio-economic status, instead of indexing migrants primarily on the basis of their nationality or ethnicity for instance. This socio-economic differentiation makes it possible to position certain consequences in a much more sensitive and susceptible way, applicable to the domains that we have studied.

5.4.2 Socio-spatial differentiation

Next to the socio-economic differentiation, this research presumes that CEE migration is spatially 'unevenly distributed' (Gijsberts & Lubbers, 2013: 25). This 'unevenly distribution' implies that certain social consequences are geographically concentrated and clustered. Since most CEE migrant populations are concentrated in specific rural and urban areas in the Netherlands, most social consequences are related and therefore are also 'unevenly distributed' within the country. We question to what extent differences and similarities exist in the social implications of CEE migration between the urban regions of The Hague and Rotterdam.

Labour market

Many comparative elements have been studied with regard to labour market issues since a lot of European and national laws and regulations are applied at the local level. The main differences of CEE migration regarding social consequences on the labour market are visible within the **socio-economic profile** of the different municipalities, which causes different labour populations and therefore, for instance, different housing issues. For example, the socio-economic profile of Westland (part of the The Hague urban area), with a large horticultural sector and a large share of manual workers, holds very different housing consequences compared to Rotterdam with a harbour related niche but with a more differentiated labour market. And because of the more monocultural socio-economic profile of Westland and the existence of 'package deals', we indicate that **clustered contractual relationships**, multiple dependencies and multiple forms of discrimination could relatively be more likely to occur in rural areas like in Westland than in other areas. However, this does not mean that these matters do not occur in cities like The Hague and Rotterdam, but in Westland the relative size of multiple dependencies (by contractual linkage of labour, wage, housing and social security) could occur easier. On other elements found within the domain of the labour market (dequalification, repression) spatial differences are minimally present.

Housing and neighbourhood consequences

Within housing issues, spatial differences occur since every municipality has its **own agenda**. Next, it can be stated that the housing supply in The Hague and Rotterdam is very comparable, since the social housing corporations work in a comparable manner with a certain supply for especially long-term housing stocks. Especially **mid-term housing** seem to be most pressing in both cities, because of a rise of families, partners and children in both cities. This differs from the situation in Westland, where mostly short-term housing is supplied ('short-stay facilities' or 'Polish Hotels'). The types of neighbourhood consequences depend on the types of housing, while the types of housing are mostly depending on the temporariness of stay of CEE migrants. And this temporariness of stay differs spatially, therefore the neighbourhood consequences differ. Since both the cities of The Hague and Rotterdam hold a very wide variety of housing types, both cities are comparable in their housing situation and neighbourhood consequences but differences occur with the rural parts of the regions. Finally, the official and formal situation of vulnerable groups, such as sex workers, is a bit different in both cities but comparable issues occur on homelessness. Since the larger cities attract more vulnerable groups, they also face more issues concerning their (in)visibility compared with the rural areas.

Registration, social security and participation

Regarding registration, local municipalities can differ in their procedural approach. In Westland, registration is in BRP (local administration system) and the procedure is more tailor-made in cooperation with local employers. On the other hand, registration in The Hague and Rotterdam is applied in both BRP and RNI (municipal and national registration systems) to differentiate between temporary and non-temporary citizens. There is a standard approach but municipalities can apply their own foci. Since social security is mainly related to national laws and regulations, most consequences are comparable in all geographical areas. With regard to participation, in both the The Hague and Rotterdam region CEE migrants show more socio-economic than socio-cultural participation and more socio-cultural than political participation. Only in The Hague some Polish citizens were eligible in the local elections.

Language

Finally, consequences on language and education issues spatially differ. Most municipalities vary in their ways of subsidizing and supply of language courses. The municipality of Rotterdam holds a language approach mainly by tendering, with a special focus on certain target groups and with an approach in Dutch. The Hague, on the other hand, holds a more multilingual approach with a desk office in the city hall and with targeted language courses by public expenditures. Schiedam (part of Rotterdam region) also puts attention to this, while in Westland (part of the urban region of The Hague) there is minimal attention for language issues. This minimal attention also occurs in Lansingerland (part of Rotterdam urban area) and Delft (part of the The Hague area). Summarizing, there are some local differences on the specific level of municipalities and on the level of the urban region, **differences occur in terms of specific target groups, ways of subsidizing and ways of organizing**.

Conclusion

In general, this study shows that the dissimilarities between the urban regions of The Hague and Rotterdam are not large. Both regions have, as *urban* regions, a lot in common. This can be attributed to the fact that The Hague and Rotterdam, as urban regions, are most-likely cases, since they contain a similar population size and are in close proximity of each other. Therefore the case study selection, as a most similar case study approach, already made it likely that more similarities than dissimilarities would occur.

Interestingly, there is **more similarity *between* the urban regions of The Hague and Rotterdam, than *within* the urban regions**. Within the urban regions, there are large differences between the more urban cases (The Hague and Rotterdam) and the more rural cases (Lansingerland and Westland). Within most domains, but especially regarding housing and neighbourhood issues, registration and language and education **large differences occurred between these urban and rural cases**. Since in the urban cases seem to hold more socio-economic variety, this consequentially leads to more differentiated housing and neighbourhood consequences. In Westland and Lansingerland most CEE migrants are housed within 'Polish Hotels' or 'short-stay' accommodations by employers or reside in the neighbouring cities, therefore these housing and neighbourhood consequences are mainly not present. On registration, especially between Westland and other cases differences occur, since Westland is able to organize this in their own tailor-made way. And finally on language and education, the urban cases show more attention for linguistic and educational issues than the rural cases show.

This all adds up to the conclusion that the spatial differences of the urban consequences of CEE migration occur **mainly *within* than *between* the urban regions** of The Hague and Rotterdam. This shows the importance of future research towards the spatial specificity of CEE migration in urban and rural areas.

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Respondent list

Code	Urban region	Affiliation	Expert interviews	ULL
NLDH_01	The Hague	Representatives of a NGO	X	
NLDH_02	The Hague	Representative of a NGO		X
NLDH_03	The Hague	Street-level bureaucrat, police officer	X	
NLDH_04	The Hague	Representative of a NGO	X	
NLDH_05	The Hague	Education representative	X	
NLDH_06	The Hague	Policy maker		X
NLDH_07	The Hague	Representative of housing agency		X
NLDH_08	The Hague	Representatives of a NGO		X
NLDH_09	The Hague	Representative temporary employment agency	X	X
NLRD_10	Rotterdam	Language representative	X	
NLRD_11	Rotterdam	Representative of a NGO	X	
NLRD_12	Rotterdam	Street-level bureaucrat	X	
NLRD_13	Rotterdam	Local entrepreneur	X	X
NLRD_14	Rotterdam	Policy maker		X
NLRD_15	Rotterdam	Education representative		X
NLRD_16	Rotterdam	Representative temporary employment agency		X
NLNL_17	Rotterdam	Representatives of a NGO	X	X
NLNL_18	NL	Representative temporary employment agencies	X	X
NLNL_19	NL	Representative interest organisation	X	
NLNL_20	NL	Policy maker ministry		X
NLNL_21	NL	Representative housing agency		X