Border Governance in Mozambique:

The Intersection of International Border Controls, Regional Integration and Cross-border Regions

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Border Governance in Mozambique:
The Intersection of International Border Controls, Regional Integration and Cross-border Regions

Grensbewaking in Mozambique:
Het snijvlak van internationale grenscontroles, regionale integratie en de grensregio’s

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Acronyms

AEC – African Economic Community
AIM – The Mozambique Information Agency
AU – African Union
AUBP – African Union Border Programme
AVSEC – Aviation Safety and Security measures
CAR – Central African Republic
CDA – Critical Discourse Analysis
COMAF – Commission for the Sea and Borders
COMESA – Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CPLP – Community of Portuguese Language Countries
CPM – Mozambique Police Board
CS – Copenhagen School
DA – Discourse Analysis
DRC – Democratic Republic of Congo
EAC – Eastern African Community
ECOWAS – Economic Community of West African States
ECSC – European Coal and Steel Community
ENP – European Neighbourhood Policy
EU – European Union
FADM – Mozambique Armed Defence Forces
FGDs – Focus Group Discussions
FLM – Forças de Libertação de Moçambique (Mozambique Liberation Forces)
FRELIMO – Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Mozambique Liberation Front)
FRONTEX – Frontières Extérieures (External Borders)
FTA – Free Trade Area
GATT – General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GPA – General Peace Agreement
HSS – Homeland Security Strategy
ICAO – International Civil Aviation Organisation
IACM – National Institute of Civil Aviation of Mozambique
IDENT – Automated Biometric Identification System
IGAD – Intergovernmental Authority on Development
ILO – International Organisation for Labour
IMAF – Institute of the sea and borders
INTERPOL – The International Criminal Police Organisation
IOM – International Organisation for Migration
IRP – Interior Repatriation Programme
ISPS – International Ship and Port Facility Security
LAM – Mozambique Airlines
MBP – Mozambique Border Police
MDP – Mutual Defence Pact
MID – Mozambique Immigration Department
MINT – Ministry of Interior
MMB – Mozambique-Malawi Border
MPDC – Maputo Port Development Company
MRD – Mozambique Revenue Department
MRTDs – Machine Readable Travel Documents
MRZ – Machine Readable Zone
MZB – Mozambique-Zimbabwe Border
NAFTA – The North American Trade Agreements
NDM – National Department of Migration
OPDS – The Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security
PARPA – Poverty Reduction Action Plan
PFMPs – Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons
PKD – Public Key Directorate
PKI – Public Key Infrastructure
PPF – Peace Parks Foundation
PPM – People’s Police of Mozambique
PPDSC – Protocol on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation
PRM – Police of Republic of Mozambique
PTA – Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa
RECs – Regional Economic Communities
SSR – Security Sector Reform
RENAMO – Mozambique National Resistance
RM – Republic of Mozambique
SADC – Southern Africa Development Community
SADCC – South African Development Coordination Conference
SAMP – Southern Africa Migration Programme
SARPCCO – Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Coordination
SDI – Spatial Development Initiatives
SNASP – National Service for Public Security
SOLAS – International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
SSA – Sub-Saharan Africa
TCGs – Transnational Criminal Groups
TBNRMAs – Transboundary Natural Resource Management Areas
TFCAs – Transfrontier Conservation Areas
UMA – Arab Maghreb Union
US – United States
USAID – United States Agency for International Development
VAT – Value Added Tax
WB – World Bank
WCO – World Customs Organisation
WTTC – World Travel and Tourism Council
WENELA – Witwatersrand Native Labour Association
ZANU-PF – Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front
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Institute of the Sea and Borders, and the respondents in Ressano Garcia, Machipanda and Mandimba border regions.
Abstract

A tension exists between the interests of states in protecting national security through border controls and those of communities in cross-border regions, to whom frequent border crossing is part of daily life – a necessary part of achieving their own wellbeing. The interplay between these two sets of interests has shaped particular ‘border regimes’ with varying degrees of selectivity in measures of the control of movements of people. In Mozambique, the securing of borders since the early 1990s in order to tackle unauthorised migration and organised crime has revealed a tension with border communities – the manifestation of which is regionally specific elements related to commuters (those crossing the border for shopping, schooling or medical care). This thesis applies qualitative research methods to a study of this multilevel (social, economic, cultural, security and political) problem of border governance in Mozambique. Empirical data, drawing on the interpretations and meanings of those who live in cross-border areas, as well as of government officials, are drawn on to reach a deeper understanding of the types of cross-border interactions and challenges that exist. Opportunities and constraints emanating from the demands of regional integration and international models of border governance are also analysed, in terms of their implications for those responsible for border control. By contrasting the national security orientation of border control and examining some of the localised cross-border consequences of its practices on communities living in cross-border regions, the study aims to contribute to a growing body of knowledge on the impact of border control practices on
communities in cross-border regions. In order to achieve this, three regions were selected as cases studies, each representing a regional case: the Mozambique-Malawi border (Mandimba); the Mozambique-Zimbabwe border (Machipanda); and the Mozambique-South Africa border (Ressano Garcia). Key findings indicate that, despite some similarities (ethnic, language, religious), each border region is unique in the way that it contains specific aspects of crossing which demand a contextualised approach to border and security. These specific elements include the use of transboundary resources and access to socio-economic facilities (schools, hospitals, mills, markets, jobs). These elements have persisted since colonial times to post-independence and post-war Mozambique. They neither fit into a truncated view of constructivism on security and borders nor into a sovereign-oriented border governance. Drawing on these findings, the study concludes by proposing a human development (or human security) approach to border controls, giving due attention to people’s experiences and needs in daily life.
Grensbewaking in Mozambique: Het snijvlak van internationale grenscontroles, regionale integratie en de grensregio’s

Samenvatting

Er bestaat een spanningsveld tussen enerzijds de belangen van staten om de nationale veiligheid te beschermen door middel van grenscontroles, en anderzijds de belangen van bewoners van grensregio’s die in het dagelijks leven geregeld de grens oversteken – wat onlosmakelijk verbonden is met hun welbevinden. De wisselwerking tussen deze verschillende belangen heeft geleid tot bepaalde ‘grensregimes’ die verschillen in de mate waarin de bewegingen van mensen worden gecontroleerd. In Mozambique worden de grenzen sinds begin jaren 90 bewaakt om ongeoorloofde migratie en georganiseerde misdaad tegen te gaan. Dit heeft nadelen voor bewoners van de grensregio’s, die tot uitdrukking komen in regiospecifieke aspecten van het forenzen (de grens oversteken om inkopen te doen, onderwijs te genieten of medische zorg te ontvangen).

In dit onderzoek wordt het meerlagige (sociale, economische, culturele, veiligheids- en politieke) probleem van grensbewaking in Mozambique met kwalitatieve onderzoeksmethoden bestudeerd. Om de verschillende soorten grensoverschrijdende interacties en uitdagingen beter te kunnen begrijpen, zijn empirische data verzameld met betrekking tot de interpretaties en belangen van zowel degenen die in de grensregio’s wonen als overheidsfunctionarissen. Ook zijn de mogelijkheden en beperkingen die voorvloeien uit de eisen die regionale integratie stelt en uit internationale modellen van grensbewaking geanalyseerd om de implicaties voor degenen die verantwoordelijk zijn voor de grenscontroles vast te stellen.
In het onderzoek wordt de op de nationale veiligheid gerichte grensbewaking gecontrasteerd en wordt gekeken naar een aantal lokale grensoverschrijdende gevolgen van de manier waarop grenscontroles in de praktijk worden uitgevoerd voor bewoners van de grensregio’s. Het doel hiervan is om een bijdrage te leveren aan de groeiende hoeveelheid kennis over wat de praktijk van grenscontroles betekent voor bewoners van de grensregio’s. Voor het onderzoek zijn drie verschillende regio’s geselecteerd als cases: de grens tussen Mozambique en Malawi (Mandimba); de grens tussen Mozambique en Zimbabwe (Machipanda) en de grens tussen Mozambique en Zuid-Afrika (Ressano Garcia).

Uit de resultaten blijkt dat er weliswaar overeenkomsten zijn (in etniciteit, taal, religie), maar dat iedere grensregio uniek is wat betreft de specifieke aspecten van het passeren van de grens. Dit vereist een gecontextualiseerde benadering van grenzen en veiligheid. Deze specifieke aspecten zijn onder meer het gebruik van grensoverschrijdende hulppbronnen en toegang tot socio-economische faciliteiten (scholen, ziekenhuizen, fabrieken, markten, banen). Deze elementen waren altijd al aanwezig in Mozambique, van de koloniale tijd tot na de onafhankelijkheid en na de oorlog. Ze passen niet in een puur constructivistische kijk op veiligheid en grenzen, noch in een op soevereiniteit georiënteerde grensbewaking. Op grond van deze resultaten wordt een op menselijke ontwikkeling (of menselijke veiligheid) gerichte benadering van grenscontroles voorgesteld, waarin voldoende aandacht is voor wat mensen in het dagelijks leven ervaren en waaraan ze behoefte hebben.
Introduction

1.1 The research problem

As a country that has emerged from a protracted and violent anti-colonial struggle, post-colonial Mozambique’s borders have been plagued by tension between the Mozambican border authorities and local communities, particularly those in the cross-border regions. Since the early 1990s, the Mozambican government has been more concerned with a regime border controls focused on national security and aimed at preserving territorial sovereignty. This has seen an increase in training and deployment of patrol units on the border. In part, these arrangements have been implemented in response to high immigration flows from Sub-Saharan Africa and beyond following the end of the war in 1992. More precisely, these arrangements have been implemented as a result of the association of the country’s extensive, porous and weakly patrolled borders with transnational crime in the Southern Africa region (Gastrow and Mosse 2011; Alar, 2010; Raimundo, 2009; Lalá, 2003; Gastrow and Mosse, 2002; Gastrow, 2001). An overemphasis on the control of immigration flows has overlooked local patterns of cross-border movement among local communities living along the border, to whom daily border crossing is vital to their access to markets, health treatment, work on cultivated land, the gathering of firewood and other resources essential to their livelihoods.

Mozambique’s approach to security, built on the Westphalian model of state sovereignty, tends to see borders primarily as spaces for criminality
and its practices of control have had dire consequences for the establishment of border control strategies that could meet the needs of post-colonial countries in the Southern African region. Currently, each state in this region is concerned with making borders more patrolled rather than turning them into spaces complementary to rapid integration and economic development (Lunegelo and Mbilinyi, 2009).

While the different national regimes of border control in this region have been strengthened, there is no forum to negotiate the human aspects of security in border areas. Communities and their needs in these areas are characterised by historically rooted social ties that defy the Westphalian notion of territorial sovereignty. As far as the literature on border studies is concerned, at the local, regional, or international levels, borders are characterized by conflicts and opportunities that are exploited differently by different actors, collective and individuals alike (Rodrigues and Tomás, 2012). Therefore, in order to protect the human security needs of these border communities, new complementary spaces are needed to ensure that practices of border control do not threaten the human security of border communities in the name of national security.

One way to overcome the current tension would be to create a forum through which local communities can discuss ‘security’ issues with state officials. This would help to shift the key concerns from a state-centred regime of security to a human-centred regime that recognises the actual meanings of ‘security’ and ‘border’ in the day-to-day lives of communities in the cross-border regions of Mozambique. An interaction between states and local communities on the meaning of borders could challenge the dominant trends in practices of the securitisation of borders.

To be more specific, this thesis is built on the assumption that a focus on sovereignty-oriented border control has led to a fragmentation of migration research and a failure to produce a fundamental body of knowledge in the field of border control (Castles, 2015; 2002). In this sense, the thesis could be regarded as an invitation to the Mozambican state, its border divisions and the general stakeholders to revisit and reflect once more on current practices of border control and their import in relation
Introduction

1.2 Contextualising border and its meanings in Mozambique

Given the growing perception of the different roles and meanings of borders (Guillaume and Huysmans, 2013; Balzacq, 2010; Houtum, 2005), I define border as a power-relation reality in which national, regional, and international interests are encountered. While in the international and regional domains the meaning of border tends to be the result of articulation between international actors such as states and international institutions through conventions, agreements, and other international legal instruments, in the national dimension, border represents the aspirations and views of state authorities rather than those of local communities. This understanding is recognised in the literature: “models of analysis of migration have tended to favour the interests of states over people” (Truong, Gasper and Handmaker, 2014:5). Not only have these models been detrimental to people on the move, they have also had a negative impact on people living in the cross-border regions, whose day-to-day life depends on crossing ‘securitised borders’.

In the context of Mozambique, the meanings and roles of borders in the post-colonial and post-conflict period are extremely fragmented, an issue that is returned to in Chapter 3.

From the geographical standpoint, Mozambique has a coastline of 4330 km and land border of 2515 km, making their protection a challenging if not impossible task, given the current lack of human and technological capacity to protect these borders physically (Mosse, 2011; Alar, 2010; Gastrow, 2002). Historically, these borders, inherited from colonial rule, became a concern following independence, the legacy of a post-independence war with Renamo, supported by the then-apartheid regime in South Africa. In the face of threats posed by penetration by apartheid-supported guerrilla fighters, various contemporary border control
practices were developed during the civil war period, including back checks, arrests and detention of (especially armed) illegal immigrants suspected of having sympathies with Renamo (Emerson, 2014; Davies, 1987);

In the case of post-apartheid South Africa, earlier internal segregation policies in relation to migration have been replaced by control strategies at the external border crossings into South Africa. This has happened simultaneously with the reconnection of South Africa to global chains of investment, and capital and trade transactions, resulting in migration reforms at national level that have penalised less skilled labour immigrants from neighbouring states (Crush and Dodson, 2007).

More recently, the meanings and roles of borders have also shifted from a physical representation to political and virtual interpretations, especially in the case of transnational migration and organised crime (Cerny, 2009; Rumford, 2006). For example, the Mozambican media has several times reported cases of unauthorised immigrants found in containers on long-distance transport vehicles, the intention of whom it is to enter South Africa. In most cases, these unauthorised immigrants are Ethiopians, Pakistanis, Bengalis, Indians, Nigerians or Chinese (Raimundo, 2009). As a result, neighbouring states, particularly South Africa, Namibia and Botswana, have considered Mozambique a transit corridor for unauthorised immigrants, which has profoundly altered the foundation and implementation of the Protocol on free movement of persons within SADC, leading to the consolidation of different regimes of border control in the region (Oucho, 2014; Oucho and Crush, 2001).

The Mozambican government has responded to cross-border related crime by focusing on the training and deployment of greater numbers of patrol forces at the border, legal reforms aimed at allowing better control of entry, stay and departure of immigrants, as well as reforms such as the reaffirmation and delimitation of borders. In conjunction with these initiatives, Mozambique has established the National Institute of the Sea and Borders (IMAF²), which is the state’s coordinating body responsible for implementing technical and methodological activities in the
reaffirmation and delimitation of national borders. Through IMAF, Mozambique has finalised the delimitation of its borders with Tanzania, Comoros, Malawi and Mauritius. In addition, the Mozambican government has established an Inter-ministerial Commission for the Sea and Borders (COMAF) – a multi-sector institution responsible for coordinating all border-related activities (national defence, health, police, customs, immigration, mining, agriculture and other relevant sectors). In relation to this multi-sector border network, the president of IMAF has observed that “border management is a multilateral task which demands a permanent coordination and sharing of fundamental information between different sectors”. He considers that such multi-sector institutions can better coordinate their activities for better control of unauthorised migration, trafficking, smuggling and other transnational criminal activities threatening ‘global’ stability.

Besides internal institutions’ arrangements for better management of border-related issues, the Mozambican government has passed and ratified several legal instruments aimed at reinforcing the security and safety of travellers crossing the country’s borders. These instruments range from the Decree 55/2003 of 28 December on facilitation and security of passengers travelling on aeroplanes; Decree 13/2008 on biometric passports; Resolution 21/2001 on visa abolition on passports among the community of Portuguese language countries (CPLP); the Southern African Community for Development (SADC) Protocol on facilitation of movement of people approved by heads of states of the region on 13/07/2005; Resolution 25/2004, of 14 July on the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS); Resolution 26/2004, which adopts the International Code for Security of Ships and of Port Facilities; the Protocol of the Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime, which came into force on 20 September 2006; Decree 10/2006 of 5 April, which adopted electronic checks on luggage and passengers; Law 21/2009 of 28 September, which defines the general principles for civil aviation for safe and efficient air transportation
operations; Annex to the Decree 34/2009, which defines a list of goods prohibited for import and export.

While these legal instruments have made Mozambique a receiver of an international model of border governance, they have also reinforced internal security through security practices at the border, which has in turn consolidated the conflicting role of the border for the state and for communities in cross-border regions. Based on this persistent contradiction, particularly a lack of analysis of the impact of state-centred border controls on communities in cross-border regions, this study set out to bring an alternative approach to border controls that might minimise the tensions between state models and those of border dwellers on the issues of border security and the function of borders. What remains as yet unanswered is the question of how security resulting from international border governance intersects with regional regimes of border control, national interests and local cross-border communities.

1.3 Border governance in a dynamic context

Border governance is a practice on the one hand, and a concept on the other. As a practice, border governance involves the ability of government officials to enforce rules and to deliver services such as national defence and public security (Fukuyama, 2013). It involves the protection of state sovereignty against both external and internal security threats posed by vulnerability or an inability to defend the border. As a concept, border governance entails both ‘border’ and ‘governance’. In the field of border and migration studies, governance involves other actors aside from government such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), the World Customs Organisation (WCO) and other international security agencies that are involved in regulating the movement of persons and trade across international borders. Border governance is thus a process that involves several actors as a result of various security interests over time. For example, the end of the Cold War has led to an intersection of different actors in the national, regional and
international domains. Regional and international dimensions of border governance will be discussed at a later point in this chapter.

From the perspective of national interests, borders are simply defined as fixed lines in a given territorial space dividing sovereign states (Mbembé and Rendall, 2000). Thus, the Chicago Convention (1944) defines a border as the limit of a state’s power; a line on the terrestrial and aquatic surfaces as well as on their vertical planes which determines the air boundary and the subsoil. The IOM defines a border as the line separating the land territory or maritime zones of one state from those of another. Among geographers, however, borders can be defined as more than the physical lines separating states in the international system; they can be defined more broadly as zones of transition between different societies and centres of power (Medeiros, 2015; Bartlett and Mackay, cited in Anderson and O’Dowd, 1999; Newman, 2006a).

From the Westphalian perspective of territorial sovereignty, borders are understood as strategic lines where the presence of military apparatus is used to protect the state against external military threats (Adamson, 2008; Adamson, 2006; Andreas, 2003a). In the following subsection, the Westphalan regime is discussed in the context of border governance.

1.3.1 Border governance under the Westphalian regime of sovereignty

The Westphalian system is founded on two key principles, (1) the government of each country is sovereign within its territorial jurisdiction, and (2) no country shall interfere in another’s domestic affairs (Osiander, 2001: 261). These principles legitimise the national security logic of border control and qualify the state as an ‘autonomous’ and ‘independent’ entity with the right and ‘capacity’ to impose authority within its territorial boundaries (Chung, 2014; Krasner, 2001; de Benoist, 1999; Doty, 1998; Krasner, 1995). Autonomy and independence are grounded in the idea that a state is a single super power authority with legitimacy to maintain domestic affairs and justice within its territorial boundaries (Krasner, 2001).
Building on the realist’s assumption that the international system is characterised by anarchy with a permanent environment of war in the background (Newman, 2009; Mearsheimer, 1995), states under the gaze of a Westphalian regime have focused on the military apparatus aimed at protecting territorial integrity.

However, the growing interest in global networks of transactions (since the early 1990s) has given rise to tensions in the maximisation of domestic sovereignty of states under the Westphalian system (Anderson, 2013; Rudolph, 2005). Essentially, the Westphalian model of sovereignty has been compromised by four categories of interference (conventions, contracts, coercion and imposition) through which hegemonic states have been able to influence a third state’s domestic affairs (Finnemore and Goldstein, 2013; Anderson, 2013; Krasner, 1995). Some of these conventions range from a) the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings of 1997; b) the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1998; c) the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism of 1999; and d) the Convention against Organised Transnational Crime of 2004. As far as imposition is concerned, this is a situation in which the referent states are so weak that they have no choice other than to accept the policies of their rulers (Finnemore and Goldstein, 2013; Krasner, 1995). An example of imposition is the 2011 banning by the ICAO of several airline companies from flying into the EU, including Mozambique Air Lines.

Another sort of interference that has challenged the traditional essence of the Westphalian regime is the concept of ‘contingent sovereignty’ – the entitlement of concerned states to enter a third state’s domestic nation to take actions of self-defence, particularly around issues of production of weapons of mass destruction (Donnelly, 2014; Elden, 2006). Since then, Westphalian borders have become eroded and people’s movements have been severely restricted. This is the complex reality in which border controls operate in the contemporary global system, and this presents an
interesting paradox in this study, one which is investigated in more depth in Chapter 2.

1.3.2 Globalisation and the crisis of Westphalian borders

While the previous section focused on the concept of border from the perspective of national security, the present subsection analyses border in regional and international contexts. In the case of the SADC region, the Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons (PFMP) defines border as a common land space between any two member states, or any airport used for flights within the region, or seaport used for transhipment connections exclusively within the region. With the intersection between national interests and the international model of border governance, and the liberalisation of global markets in trade and capital, borders have shifted from fortified military lines to open spaces for commercial transactions (Andreas, 2003a).

As this intersection has created different interests among role-players (international agents, states, private companies such as technology providers), migration has come to be regarded as a security problem and borders have thus become bastions for the deterrence of unwanted immigrants (Donzelli, 2013; Huysmans and Squire, 2009; Dauvergne, 2008; Munck, 2008). In other words, the opening of international frontiers in order to ease global trade and capital has led to a new political approach to border governance, one which proclaims the movements of people as a major security threat to a borderless world (Fassin, 2011; Huysmans and Squire, 2009; Bosworth and Guild, 2008; Adamson, 2006; Andreas, 2003a; Walters, 2002). This has shifted the perspective of protection of borders against external invasion to one of the protection of borders against infiltration by suspected persons (Léonard, 2010; Shamir, 2005; Flynn, 2000). In retrospect, the majority of states have become more concerned with the movement of so-called disparate immigrants, which has led to restrictive border control responses (Castles, 2015; 2002). From the perspective of those responsible for border controls, globalisation has led to the establishment of a global human migration regime – one that
segregates and excludes people on the move on the basis of profiling categories ranging from race, nationality to country/region, which in turn has deepened the divide between countries and regions of the world (Shamir, 2005).

Concomitantly, the migration-security nexus in the global era has become the preferred risk-management system of border governance, with different regimes of control ranging from (1) labour migration regimes distinguishing qualified/skilled immigrants from asylum seekers and refugees; (2) distinctions between legal and high risk nationalities or sub-groups of migrants; (3) militarisation of borders and the establishment of detention centres; (4) externalisation of border control and the establishment of buffer zones; and (e) the establishment of transnational visa regimes and biometric border control technology on a global scale (Weber and Grewcock, 2011; Bosworth and Guild, 2008; Shamir, 2005). These regimes make it evident that

there is a clear choice to characterise immigrants as threatening, one that is often communicated by political leaders to domestic constituents and one that seems to justify emergency measures and the suspension of the normal rules of the game (McDonald, 2008:8).

The choice that characterises ‘migrants’ as primary security threats has become the dominant approach to border control since the end of the Cold War. It is worth mentioning that as a result of the increasing association of migrants with security, migration management can better be understood from two typologies of regime: admission and integration (Boucher and Gest, 2014). In the next subsection an analysis is provided of both regimes from the perspective of securitisation theory, which has posed tremendous challenges to Westphalian sovereignty in relation to border control as an international concern.

1.3.3 Securitisation and the crisis of people’s movement across borders

Securitisation theory emerged during the 1990s. Barry Buzan and Ole Waever at the Copenhagen School of Security made the theory famous by
arguing that security is a social construction and not something that is given or obvious (McDonald, 2008). By counteracting the traditional definition of security (objectively defined), securitisation is grounded in an “intersubjective and social construct process by which a threat to a particular referent object is acknowledged and deemed worth protecting” (Charrett, 2009:13). It occurs when a particular issue (which has traditionally never been treated as such) is transformed into a security threat through a linguistic representation/speech act (McDonald, 2008).

Securitisation involves its speech act (communication tool) and its associated practices. Through a speech act, political leaders persuade the audience/constituency to agree on the existence of a survival threat that needs states’ interventions (including military power) in dealing with it (McDonald, 2008). In so doing, “an issue becomes a security issue not because something constitutes an objective threat to the state […] but rather because an actor has defined something as [an] existential threat to some object’s survival” (Diskaya, 2013:1). Securitisation occurs when: (1) it is claimed that there is an objective existential threat; (2) the referent object of security is seen as morally legitimate or vulnerable; and (3) the security response is viewed as appropriate to the capabilities of the threat concerned (Latawski, 2014; Floyd, 2011; Buzan, Wæver and Wilde, 1998).

The power of speech acts (used to construct security threats) can be illustrated through elite and public discourses that associate asylum seekers and refugees, for example, with crime, drugs and terrorism rather than focusing on the lack of human security that underpins or explains their movements (Walters, 2002). As Hanson and Spilimbergo (2001:613) point out, “the official position of most advanced countries is that controlling national borders against illegal entry is a central goal of immigration policy”. However, securitisation has resulted in rhetoric and anti-immigration policies that are dissonant with the real security threats endured by people on the move, displaced by wars, and lacking livelihoods. Put differently, generalised securitisation has resulted in the reclosing of states’ borders because of the general construction of fear imparted by political leaders. Political leaders instil in the public the belief
that crime and unauthorised immigration are inextricably linked to the abolition of international frontiers and that stronger control of these borders is an imperative (Guillaume and Huysmans, 2013: 4–5; Huysmans, 2002).

Apart from political leaders, other sources of securitisation include media displays (of images representing security threats such as bombings by terrorists groups); visual representations of security threats (through canvas, symbols, and artefacts); categorisation of travellers by citizenship for passport checks; and standardisation of (in)secure responses through mandatory recommended security measures.

As far as securitising practices are concerned, states have been trying to match discourse with actions ranging from increased budgets for new admissions and training of staff, research and investment in high technology for border surveillance, increased numbers of detention centres, and militarisation of borders (Nessel, 2008; Munck, 2008; Bosworth and Guild, 2008). As Léonard (2010) argues, the deployment of troops and military equipment to prevent the entry of asylum seekers and refugees through the EU border is a socially constructed practice that criminalises these categories of immigrants. At the training level, securitisation has become a dominant strategy of border control, through which border authorities and networks of other professionals are trained and indoctrinated in institutional values that have blurred the distinction between the military and the police role at the border (Guillaume and Huysmans, 2013; Munck, 2008; Huysmans and Squire, 2009). Indoctrination in the belief of socially constructed threats creates a structure determining how border patrols should secure the border, and what they have to see and not see at the border (Gubrium and Koroljungberg, 2005).

1.3.3.1 Critiques of securitisation

Based on securitising practices, the concept of securitisation has been extensively criticised. From the perspective of border governance, it has been recognised by several scholars that the linking of immigrants with
crime has resulted in negative securitisation. In this context, negative securitisation has led to the removal of human security needs from national security agendas (McDonald, 2008; Munck, 2008).

In terms of language and speech acts, securitisation has been criticised for prioritising powerful and influential voices (of political leaders, the media, and artists), who are able to achieve a wide audience while neglecting the less influential and thereby deflecting focus from security (McDonald, 2008). Language has turned migration into a security problem through the social mobilisation of the general society and government institutions (police, customs, the army, and other sectors) regarding the advantages and dangers from contacts with different social groups (Huysmans, 2002; Munck, 2008). For example, global policing has embodied a transformation in such a way that the training of police officers to fight trafficking, terrorism and other organised crime has to follow standardised practices of communication, particularly in the use of specific language and telecommunications (Bowling, 2009). Critiques of securitising practice make it evident that the articulation of discourse about security threats and the training of professionals, as well as the technology adopted, is detrimental to the human security aspects of border control (Huysmans and Squire, 2009).

Therefore, securitisation and its results in the (re)militarisation of borders has not yet become a sustainable solution for migration management; surveillance operations do not provide a response to the safety and well-being of people who move and the leading forces for their relocation (Axworthy, 2001).

Whilst there are many studies that consider the negative impact of border securitisation on people on the move, this study considers how ‘hard’ border regimes can affect local settled communities living in cross-border areas. As Table 1.1 in the next section shows, a less securitised or more ‘simplified’ set of border controls is applied by the Mozambican government in areas where local cross-border movements are considered ‘normal’ and non-threatening to national sovereignty. Simplified border arrangements can also be introduced in emergencies, for instance when
natural disasters, droughts or floods necessitate the rapid movement of people across borders. By the same token, simplified border regimes are reversible, as when neighbouring countries decide to close border crossings and construct fences, as has been the case between Mozambique and South Africa. In such cases, a single border crossing point may become official, or may even be closed in some instances, for temporary security reasons. In such cases, the key challenge for states, and for the Mozambican government in particular in its migration governance, is to (re)configure a security model that combines defence of the state with that of individuals, recognising that a state cannot be secure while it has insecure people – citizens and others – living within (and moving across) its borders (Oberleitner, 2002: 10). The three local cross-border case study areas selected for special focus in this study are briefly introduced in the following section.

1.4 Selection of research sites: different modes of border governance

This study includes three cross-border research areas in Mozambique where regional and local, rather than international migration governance regimes apply. These are Ressano Garcia (Chapter 4), Machipanda (Chapter 5) and Mandimba (Chapter 6). All three cross-border regions are neighbours to different countries in the Southern Africa region. The first case, the Ressano Garcia border in Maputo Province in South Mozambique has rapidly become the busiest crossing point of the Mozambique-South Africa border. The second research area, Machipanda border region in Manica Province in Central Mozambique, borders on Zimbabwe. The third research area, Mandimba border, in Niassa Province in northern Mozambique, borders on Malawi.

In the case of Ressano Garcia, border controls are confined to the official crossing point itself, which is characterised by a strong military presence and can be defined as ‘securitised’. The land border is not porous, as is the case in some regions, but is fully fenced and patrolled so that the border can be crossed only at a single official crossing point. The second
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case study area, Machipanda, is located on the busy Beira corridor and forms the crossing point in an economic zone that involves trade between Zimbabwe and the hinterland and the port of Beira on the Indian Ocean. As well as being an informal economic trading area, Machipanda is the crossing in an important economic zone. On the road itself, official controls apply, and can be classified as strong. However, around Machipanda in the outlying areas the border is more porous and is considered a ‘simplified’ border with a special regime specified by the national Mozambican Border Police. Map 1.1 and Table 1.1 show both the locations of the cross-border case studies and some basic characteristics of migration governance in the three cases.

Map 1.1

The selected border regions for data collection
In the case of Ressano Garcia, researchers have argued that, for Mozambican migrant workers (and also those from Swaziland and Lesotho), being able to pass through the border crossing to South Africa
is vital for their livelihood strategies. However, the diminishing interest in mine workers’ welfare, which has been perceived as related to irregular forms of border crossing, has in turn led states to increase border surveillance (Melde, Anich, Crush et al., 2014; Vigneswaran, 2013; Adepouju, 2006; Gastrow and Mosse, 2002). In this scenario, the Ressano Garcia border has become contentious as local communities face restrictions when crossing the border as both the Mozambican and the South African authorities have increased border control levels in disregard of human security concerns among the local populace.

The second case, Machipanda, has been characterised over the last three decades by reversal patterns of migration intertwined with political and economic dynamics in Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Given these dynamics, this research study was concerned with understanding government approaches to border control and migration management in response to the change in migration patterns across the Mozambique-Zimbabwe border.

The third case, Mandimba, is characterised by land disputes between local communities and Malawian citizens on the Mozambican side of the border. In this particular context, it is increasingly difficult to distinguish people by their identity, as both Malawian and Mozambican citizens struggle to find land, firewood and timber for construction (Raimundo, 2009). This suggests that populations from border regions are concerned with food security and other socio-economic matters regardless of legal lines establishing the limit of state sovereignty. Moreover, the Mozambique-Malawi border has been affected by the return of Mozambican citizens since the war, which has given rise to a different scenario of human migration across the border, particularly in cases of ‘one household on two sides of the border’.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Similarities</th>
<th>Differences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethnicity and language</strong></td>
<td><strong>Socio-economic needs</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ressano Garcia</td>
<td>Tsonga; Changana; Zulus Apartheid regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machipanda Shona; Manhyka cross-border identity</td>
<td>Informal trading; access to basic consumer goods; job opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandimba Emacua; Chichewa; cross-border identity</td>
<td>Informal trading; casual jobs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This table reflects similarities and differences in the three cross-border case studies. Language and cultural proximity is a common factor in all three border regions, as shown in the second column of the table. Similarly, in all three border regions, there are strong cross-border interactions in terms of socio-economic factors. What differs are the specific goods and services being traded and taken across the border. In Ressano Garcia most cross-border movement involves trade in consumer goods or labour movement towards South Africa, mainly in mining and construction. In Machipanda, most economic activities centre on construction, food items and clothing, whilst in Mandimba most of the cross-border migration relates to land use and agricultural goods. However, for the government, the dominant discourse is one of ‘security’, and a concern under this umbrella with protecting national resources, raising revenues, fighting crime and other transnational threats, and ultimately securing sovereignty. There are, however, as the table shows, moderate forms of security that are practised at borders that are not considered to be under pressure from transnational threats.

The fourth and fifth cases examined in this study are the international crossing points into Mozambique, specifically the airport of Mavalane in Maputo and the port of Maputo, where an international model of border control and migration governance applies. In the main airport and port of Mozambique, for instance, electronic checks are routine for persons and for luggage. High-tech instruments are used for collecting data, many provided by private companies. At the airport, controls are carried out by immigration police and customs officials, whilst a private company secures the airport building. In the port, government officials also work with private security companies.

As this range of cases shows, within Mozambican domestic migration governance, there are some differences in how border controls are applied; the kind of technology and procedures used at the airport and seaport are not used at every border crossing with neighbouring countries. What the three local cross-border cases illustrate is the diversity of migration governance systems in the country. Chapter 7 explores this problem at
international level. In Chapter 8, the problem of the lack of agreement on how border regimes are decided is illustrated in the context of SADC. If stronger countries within SADC can unilaterally take action to close borders and to tighten controls, what are the implications for cooperation within SADC. Chapter 8 also considers how SADC might improve communications about such decision-making, leading to conflict avoidance and improved coordination of border governance within the Southern African region.

Each of these cases was selected in order to provide a comparative picture of cross-border interaction and migration patterns in these three regions of the country.

1.5 Research objectives and questions

1.5.1 Objectives

By examining the conflict between national security-driven border controls and local needs regarding border crossing, this thesis pursues four objectives. First, it seeks to explore the existing academic literature on the concept of security, its transformation, and its impact on border controls. The thesis does this by focusing on security dynamics since the end of the Cold War and the inter-state relations between Western and Eastern European countries regarding the nature of security threats.

Secondly, the thesis examines migration policies and border control responses following the end of the war in Mozambique and the collapse of apartheid in South Africa. The foundation of this objective is that the end of the Cold War affected international relations profoundly, with the collapse of apartheid being one of the illustrations of this in the Southern African region. Moreover, South Africa and Mozambique have a long historical cross-border migration relationship tied to the mining sector in which cyclical and long-term labour migration has always been a survival strategy for many migrants in the Southern African region. Based on this background, the thesis investigates the effects of evolving border governance and control strategies since the end of the war in 1992.
Thirdly, the thesis seeks to explore and compare some life experiences of communities living in and moving through the three selected border regions in Mozambique. In order to pursue this objective, the thesis compares socio-economic and ethno-cultural factors of interaction between Mozambican citizens and their counterparts in the border regions of neighbouring countries.

Fourthly, the thesis seeks to examine the domestic impact of regional and international interests of border control in Mozambique. This objective arises from the fact that since the end of the war in Mozambique, combined factors (ranging from the return of refugees from neighbouring countries, the search for arable land and access to livelihoods across the border) have shaped a new context of border, which demands substantial analysis, particularly in the face of regional integration and international models of border governance. The study ends by exploring how SADC and official Mozambican concepts of security can be rethought, by focusing less on conflict resolution and more on human development.

1.5.2 Research question

How do the Mozambican state and communities in the cross-border regions understand ‘borders’ and ‘security’? How can these understandings be reconciled or balanced within Mozambican and regional border governance arrangements and principles?

Sub-questions

- How have the end of the Cold War and of apartheid influenced border governance, both at national and international levels, as well as realities of cross-border movements in the Southern African region and more specifically in post-war Mozambique?

- On the basis of three local case studies, how do communities in the border regions experience day-to-day border controls; what kinds of border controls can be identified, and in what
way do these accommodate – or not – such localised understandings of cross-border interactions?

- What impact have the international norms and migration governance standards had on the Mozambique borders (seaports and airports)?

- To what extent are human development aspects in cross-border regions taken into consideration in the ongoing process of regional integration in SADC?

1.6 The research methodology

The thesis applies qualitative research methods to study a multilevel (social, economic, cultural, security and political) problem of border interaction, crossing and control by the state authorities in Mozambique. It focuses on descriptions, human interpretation and meanings of the border, aiming to build a deeper understanding of cross-border interaction and the challenges emanating from regional integration demands and international models of border governance. As Andrade (2009:43) points out, qualitative research refers to “a study process that investigates a social human problem […] and builds a whole and complex representation by a rich description and explanation as well as careful examination of informants’ words and views”.

As qualitative research, this thesis uses three border regions as case studies to examine meanings of the border elicited from government actors and local communities. In each case, a range of information was collected through informal discussions, analysis of documents and reports, and through more in-depth interviews, Focus Group Discussions and key informants (Creswell, Hanson, Plano *et al.*, 2007; Walsham, 1995; George and Bennett, 2005. All this was complemented by a thorough review of relevant academic literature. By using a collective case study, this thesis seeks to explore and compare the concept of border from national, regional and international perspectives of control, and in the context of the different priorities of governance and socio-economic survival. Addressing the
central research question of the different understandings of border, the study suggests that a border is not only the geographical lines separating sovereign states, but can indeed also be thought of as product of local, national and even international social construction. To this end, the thesis uses the three local case studies, and also the international border crossing regimes at the airport and main seaport of the country, to investigate how the border is understood within various real-life contexts, and from the perspective of different stakeholders. These stakeholders range from politicians who were interviewed or who made statements, to border police with whom informal discussions were held, to customs officers who were interviewed, immigration officials and others (Yin, 2013). In the case of local communities living in border regions between Mozambique and the three adjacent neighbouring countries, the researcher was mainly interested in hearing of their day-to-day experiences – and the key challenges – of living in a border region.

1.6.1 Interviews, Focus Group Discussions (FGDs), and limitations

In-depth interviews and FGDS are widely used as data collection techniques in qualitative cases studies (Creswell et al., 2007; Yin, 2013). In-depth interviews provide the researcher with primary data through which he can best access participants’ interpretations, views, and aspirations about given real-life events (Walsham, 1995; Yin, 2013). According to Gubrium and Koro-Ljungberg (2005:694), “qualitative interviews have traditionally been framed as explorations or discoveries of the perceptions of an individual subject to better understand his or her world”. In the context of this study, in-depth interviews were conducted with a purposeful selected sample of respondents from the National Assembly in Maputo (parliamentary members), border police officers, immigration officers, customs officers, and technicians at the National Institute of the Sea and Borders. I interviewed three to four respondents from each sector.

In addition, primary data was collected through FGDs with local communities in three border regions. I first contacted the District Administrator, who informed local leaders about my study. Discussions
were organised in advance, and the local leaders also provided a person to facilitate the FGDs and lead the discussion, and to guide me. Where people did not speak Portuguese, the research was conducted with the assistance of an interpreter from the local community. Once the FGDs had been completed, the individual interpreters sometimes explained the context more fully in a more informal setting, in their home or over lunch.

Initially, the study ruled out FGDs as a data gathering technique with borders authorities, immigration and customs officials since it was believed that their internal hierarchical structure might negatively affect any discussion on sensitive matters such as smuggling and unauthorised migration networks. However, during the fieldwork it became apparent that the border police did not want to engage in individual interviews without the commander being present. For this reason, it was decided to conduct FGDs with border police in each local cross-border region, rather than to interview them individually. This may well have prevented low-ranking officers from openly expressing their opinions during the discussions, or from actively participating. Regardless of such constraints, between three and four FGDs were organised in each selected border area (Ressano Garcia, Machipanda, and Mandimba). Occasionally, following group discussions, individuals would confide some further details over a bottle of beer. Informal contacts with officials in each area were therefore also very important to the researcher.

In order to ensure data triangulation, apart from interviews and FGDs, the study gathered secondary data from annual reports from immigration and customs departments, and from the border police. This data was combined with wider, more general academic literature on migration governance, border and cross-border studies. Initially, the study was intended to compare annual data of migration into and out of Mozambique, between 1992 and 2012. However, it proved impossible to find enough reports to construct meaningful comparative data. One difficulty was the absence of any consistent system for recording and storing such data, which tended to vary from period to period. Two archives were consulted, stored respectively at the National Department of Immigration and at the National
Command of Border Police of Mozambique. In consulting these archives, it emerged, for example, that some immigrants had been recorded at provincial level but that the numbers indicated did not correspond to numbers provided in the national reports. With regard to border police, finding reliable data was complicated by the fact that much of the information related to immigrants who were considered to be unauthorised, and who may not have been detected or recorded officially when crossing the borders. This lack of reliable and consistent data made it difficult to use such quantitative information in this study. Some tables have been elaborated, however, to show rough numbers of cross-border movements from different countries, where appropriate.

1.6.2 Data analysis

In qualitative research, since both researcher and participants are involved in the process of data collection and analysis (Yin, 2013; Creswell et al., 2007), data gathered through interviews and FGDs is analysed using interpretive case study analysis. Interpretive case study analysis demands that researchers access and judge people’s interpretations and meanings of their day-to-day practices (Andrade, 2009; George and Bennett, 2005; Walsham; 1995). In this study, the analysis process consisted of exploring and comparing the significance of borders for the populations in the selected regions, their aspirations and the challenges facing them. This information was compared with the significance of borders from the perspective of state authorities (border police, customs and immigration sectors) and their difficulties in complying with regional interests and international border security priorities.

1.7 Significance of the study

In questioning national security-oriented border controls in Mozambique, this thesis has found that border governance in Mozambique is as yet not influenced by livelihood dynamics in cross-border regions, which makes evident the prevalence of the state’s security interests over the local populations. Suffice it to say that, in the Mozambican context, the existing
literature (Gastrow and Mosse, 2011; Raimundo, 2009; Lalá, 2003) places great emphasis on the role of the border as a stronghold from which to fight criminals and stresses that the state needs to reinforce more patrol operations. This discourse is predominant among state officials and politicians. Their view that strong borders are essential is based on (1) legacies of the war and mutual mistrust between countries, and (2) the discovery of mineral resources in Mozambique, which has led to the need for strict control of borders for the protection and better use of resources.

Despite these state security-driven discourses, each of the three cross-border areas discussed in this thesis are characterised by unique socio-economic and ethno-cultural dynamics that run counter to international and regional perceptions of individuals on the move as security threats. These three case studies suggest that different dynamics of interaction in cross-border regions need to be included in the debate on regional integration in the context of human development, which could help Mozambique and other post-colonial states to better articulate international models of border governance with local security needs.

1.8 Structure of the thesis

This thesis is arranged into eight chapters. The first chapter introduces the research problem and some theoretical foundations of the transformation of the concept of security and its consequences for the movement of people, particularly into Western countries. The second and third chapters are interrelated in the sense that both respond to the first two objectives and the first sub-question. In the second chapter, the thesis explores the theoretical debate on transformation of security threats from state military attacks to threats posed by individuals (particularly in the post-Cold War period, when the opening of international frontiers for global trade transactions has been perceived as a conduit for transnational organised crime). Building on this, the third chapter examines some of the consequences of the end of the Cold War for the Southern African region; of these, the end of the war in Mozambique and the collapse of apartheid in South Africa are pivotal turning points.
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Chapters 4, 5 and 6 are firmly grounded in empirical data collected during fieldwork in three different cross-border regions of Mozambique, in the period from September 2012 to April 2013, and from January to April 2014. These chapters respond to the second sub-questions of the thesis and by so doing meet the second objective. Border controls at Ressano Garcia (Chapter 4) have been readjusted to respond to migration patterns following the end of the war in Mozambique and of apartheid in South Africa, which has transformed the border into the busiest crossing point from Mozambique to South Africa.

Chapter 5 (Machipanda-Mutare cross-border region) presents a case study of migration flows led mainly by socio-economic forces, less influenced by the end of the Cold War. Rather, these movements have been influenced mainly by the economic crisis in Zimbabwe, reversing trends of migration across the Mozambique-Zimbabwe border along the Beira Corridor. In Chapter 6 (Mandimba-Mangochi border region), the thesis presents a different typology of cross-border region, one driven by questions of access to land, mainly by Malawians on the Mozambican side of the border. The centrality of land makes this particular border region distinct from both Ressano Garcia and Machipanda. What these three chapters illustrate is the sheer diversity of cross-border controls and migration governance arrangements in different kinds of cross-border areas of the country.

Based on these differences, Chapter 7 examines the impact of international models of border governance on Mozambique. The chapter responds to the third sub-question and partially addresses the fourth objective of the thesis. By examining the impact of prevailing international models of border governance, Chapter 7 focuses on international security standards for border controls, with reference to the control of sea borders and airports in Mozambique. Chapter 8 responds directly to the fourth sub-question and to the last objective of the thesis. This chapter attempts to explore how SADC approaches border governance reform in Southern Africa, and how this might be better reconciled with an appreciation of
different life experiences in cross-border regions, using the example of Mozambique. In doing so, this penultimate chapter brings together and synthesises debates around border governance at three important and interconnected levels: international, regional and local.

Notes
Introduction

1 Border regions are defined as contiguous spaces across national states with homogeneous features and functional interdependences (Perkman, 2003). More technically, a border region is defined as “an area immediately beside a state’s external border or straddling it, and also administrative regions abutting a border whose centres are physically and socially distant from that border” (Anderson and O’ Dowd, 1999: 595). The homogeneous features of border regions entail socio-economic and cultural communalities on the one hand, and political and social institutions cooperating for development, on the other hand (Perkman, 2003). While the geographical proximity is raised as a fundamental element for understanding transformation of border regions (Hansen, 1977), a strong political orientation of states’ borders to territorial sovereignty has constrained interaction and cooperation as well as the consolidation of transition zones, even in areas where populations enjoy strong interdependence.

2 IMAF was established through the decree 18/2001 of 3 July.

3 COMAF is composed of 10 Ministries: Foreign affairs and International Cooperation; Interior; National Defence; State’s Administration; Agriculture; Fisheries; Transport and Communications; Mineral Resources; Coordination of Environmental Action; Finance. This commission is competent to inter alia, coordinate multilateral surveillance activities of airspace, sea and land borders; promote national policies and legislation for the protection and conservation of the marine environment and its resources; and to propose measures for the maintenance of infrastructure of border demarcation, particularly fencing and milestones.

4 Interviewed on 30 October, 2012 in Maputo City.

5 The Republic of Mozambique (RM) is located in South-Eastern Africa between the parallels 10º 27’ and 26º 52’ South Latitude and meridians 30º 12’ and 40º 51’ East Longitude. It covers a total area of 799,380 km² including 13,000 km² of inland waters. The country is bordered by the Indian Ocean to the east, Tanzania to the north, Malawi and Zambia to the northwest, Zimbabwe to the west, and South Africa and Swaziland to southwest. It is separated from Madagascar by the Mozambique Channel to the east.
Given the sensitivity of the topic, I decided not to disclose personal information of respondents (local communities, state authorities, and parliamentary members). However, in the text, each respondent’s activity, place, and day of interview are specified.

The triangulation model is used in qualitative studies; it is used to find agreement in the construction of valid data by applying different methods or different sources of information about the same phenomenon (Guion et al., 2011). Moreover, each region is shaped by peculiar specification values that are essential to compare in order to establish an objective national security policy (Baldwin, 1997).
2 Post-Cold War security threats and border control reconfigurations

2.1 Introduction

The previous chapter outlined the central research problem and pointed to some theoretical concerns that may have informed the national security-driven approach that followed the end of the war in Mozambique. Whilst contending political ideologies of the Western and Eastern blocks helped determine border control strategies during the Cold War, the question addressed in this chapter is what has changed since then. According to Andreas (2003a:100), “during the Cold War, the borderlines dividing Western and Eastern Europe were intensively patrolled and marked by barbed wire fencing, watchtowers, land mines, and automatic weapons”. This chapter therefore takes a further step to examine key security transformations since the end of the Cold War and to identify some key actors who may be driving the introduction of new models of border control in present-day Mozambique. The chapter traces the dynamics of sovereignty from its traditional role of protecting national borders to the policing of international borders based on the expansion of international models of border control by Western countries. As the previous chapter has pointed out, the traditional role of border control is internally driven and relies on military capacity, traditional intelligence service and criminal policing aimed at responding to internal security (see for example Bigo, 2007; Herz, 1950). However, this chapter moves away from the theoretical dimension of securitisation to day-to-day practices of human interaction around the globe. As the review of the literature suggests, there has been a growing fear of the dangers posed by desperate people across
international borders, which has led to the reconceptualisation of security threats, national sovereignty, and how border governance is conceived worldwide.

2.2 From a focus on national sovereignty to the construction of transnational security threats

National sovereignty and border control have been very important issues for states since the signing of the Westphalia Treaty in 1648. This treaty introduced a regime of sovereignty embracing the view that nation-states are independent and the main actors in international relations bounded by principles and institutions that govern their behaviour in inter-state relations (Chung, 2014; Krasner, 2001; de Benoist, 1999). In order to protect national sovereignty, states have transformed themselves into fortresses against outside threats to national interests, ranging from ideological identity to economic production sectors (Charrett, 2009; Andreas, 2003a; Behnke, 2000; Buzan, 1997). Based on these assumptions, the major concern of states has been to build up military apparatus capable of protecting their borders – a strategy that dominated border governance during the Cold War (Morgenthau, 2014; Krasner, 2001; Mearsheimer, 1995).

Military-oriented border control during the Cold War can better be described from the perspective of the realists’ conception of the international system, which they perceive as grounded in conflicts among states (Morgenthau, 2014). Realist scholars understand individual states as fearful of being exploited by other states, and such fears keep states in constant tension and largely dependent on military power for their sense of national security (Morgenthau, 2014; Jervis, 1978). From the perspective of the Hobbesian ‘state of nature’, military competition between states has divided the world into competing units, in which stability and independence can be measured according to a state’s capacity to maintain its sovereignty in relation to other states (Sorensen, 2006).

However, the end of the Cold War shifted the focus of security theories and practices from states back to individuals and communities, including
‘suspect’ communities involved in transnational criminal and ‘terrorist’ networks. This has led to the perception, not for the first time, but to an unprecedented extent, that the transnational movement of people poses a significant threat to the self-determination of states. Firstly, people on the move, particularly asylum seekers, refugees and less skilled economic migrants are now considered the main source of insecurity in the receiving countries (Fassin, 2011; Léonard, 2010; Nessel, 2008; Bigo, 2007). As far as the literature is concerned, the growing number of human beings in the Third World coupled with poverty, disease, environmental change as well as the depletion of resources has raised awareness of human migration, which has reinforced restrictive border control by rich countries (Heusgen, 2006; Buzan, 1997). As Ullman (1983:142) points out, “the gap in living standards between populations in rich and poor countries is likely to continue to widen and that gives pressures for migration”, something confirmed by recent studies of migrants’ lives in the Global North (Lewis, Dwyer, Hodkinson et al., 2014). Moreover, in dealing with interconnectedness with the developing world, Western countries have shifted their focus from development and humanitarianism to management of risk, fear, and danger as key components of state security (Abrahamsen, 2005).

Secondly, the movement of people across borders has led to the general securitisation of borders against danger and pervasive insecurity as well as violence associated with transnational crime such as terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, resulting in substantial remilitarisation of borders to deter these threats (Morgenthau, 2014; Ashley, 1981). According to Seiple (2002:264), “military force came to be viewed as a panacea for all sorts of concerns deemed vital to national security, ranging from nation-building to refugee control”. As a result, Western societies have grown more concerned with controlling immigration from East Europe and North Africa, which has led to the merging of internal and external security strategies as the rationale for more expansive border control cooperation (Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006; Andreas, 2003a; Grabbe, 2000).
In retrospect, Western countries have undertaken several cooperation initiatives with third countries in the form of agreements, support, and joint border patrols against so-called common security threats, including terrorism. For example, the British have extended their migration management through international cooperation, particularly in law enforcement regarding drug control, international large-scale traffickers and possible links between drug trafficking and professional organised crime groups. (Dorn et al. cited in Carrabin et al., 2009).

Besides these cooperative initiatives, Western countries have also boosted securitisation of their borders, particularly after the 9/11 attacks, the London and the Madrid bombings. In the case of the US, securitisation has been developed under the Homeland Security Act aimed at fighting terrorism on a global scale.

2.3 Securitisation and externalisation of border control strategies by Western countries

2.3.1 US Homeland security

Following the 9/11 attacks, the US government focused its attention on homeland security and adapted border control strategies from drug control to the war on terror (Andreas, 2003a). The American government believed that the war on terror would not be effective without strongly controlled borders (Andreas, 2003b). As Flynn (2000:58) points out, “stopping a threat at the frontier is better than trying to cope with them once inside the country…” As a result, the US government has responded to terrorist attacks with several border control operations and training programmes such as operation ‘Hold the Line’ (a high technology system aimed at making borders tighter); prevention through deterrence in action; the Interior Repatriation Programme; and Integrated Border Enforcement Teams aimed at sharing intelligence and enforcement resources between the US, Canadian and Mexican authorities. Moreover, at the US/Mexico border, the number of border patrollers has increased from 334 prior to 9/11 to over 9000 since (Andreas, 2003a). From a financial perspective,
the US government has increased its budget from $1.06 billion in fiscal year (FY) 2000 to 3.50 billion in FY 2009 (Nunez-Neto, 2008).

From the perspective of legal reforms, the US government has enacted several legal instruments ranging from the Patriotic Act of 2001 (which dissolved the Immigration and Naturalisation Service and placed the United States Border Patrol within Homeland Service), the Homeland Security Act of 2002, and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Ramirez, 2009). Among all the legal reform instruments implemented in the war on terror, the Homeland Security Act has introduced the most profound reforms to the national security strategy by (1) widening the scope of terrorism-related threats, and (2) expanding the war from third countries. As President Bush pointed out, “we will disrupt and destroy terrorist organisations by defending United States’ interests at home and abroad by identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches our borders” (Bush, 2002:6). Since then, the United States has implemented several counter-terrorism programmes. The next section comprises an analysis of homeland security since its inception, partnerships that have been established and their consequences for border management and migration control on a global level.

The US Homeland Security Strategy (HSS) was launched by President Bush in October 2001 and was passed as the Homeland Security Act in 2002. The HSS originated from the concept of national security (developed between the world wars), which was understood as “the ability of a nation to protect internal values from external threats” (Relyea, 2002:214). This concept integrates four key elements: nation, ability, internal values, and external threats. Accordingly, in the context of the fight against terrorism, the American government’s concept of a nation ranges from Federal States, local governments, the private sector, international partners/coalitions, to individuals (Bellavita, 2011; 2008). The ability to combat terrorism encompasses several requirements such as military and policy capacity, technology, intelligence agencies’ information sharing and collaboration, threat recognition, intervention, and risk management (Bellavita, 2011; 2008; Relyea, 2002). As far as internal values
are concerned, through the HSS the US government seeks to defend its citizens, protect its sovereignty, territory and critical infrastructure, and preserve the freedom and democracy to its people. The latter ranges from protection of human rights, freedom of speech, thought, and religion, freedom to choose their governors, rights to own property, to educate their children and enjoy the benefits of their work (Ramirez, 2009; Bellavita, 2008; Seiple, 2002). The perception among American politicians is that these values are threatened by the varied nature of terrorist threats, ranging from chemical and biological terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, small arms, and man-made hazards.

Based on this analysis, the HSS was conceived fundamentally as an instrument for combating terrorism with a diversified modus operandi by adopting different counterterrorism responses in different sectors, such as transportation networks, health, environment, and other sectors vulnerable to organised crime activities (Bellavita, 2007; Seiple, 2002; Bryan and Flynn, 2002). As part of the implementation of the HSS, the US government has been making efforts to fight terrorism both domestically and overseas\(^2\) by unifying intelligence strategies and operational planning divisions (Ramirez, 2009). This approach has had wide ramifications for border control policies in different parts of the world.

### 2.3.2 Securitisation at EU external borders

While the externalisation of the European model of border control has prevailed since the late 1990s (Boswell, 2003), the issue has dominated the EU debate on integration and security, particularly with the rise of terrorist activities. More specifically, the US – EU commitment to closer cooperation in fighting terrorism has resulted in the implementation of several initiatives such as the trans-Atlantic law enforcement cooperation; expanded freezing of terrorist asset operations; development of more secure procedures for container shipping; introduction of official electronic travel documents; patrol of the EU external borders; and coordination of foreign policies, especially regarding the Middle East
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The EU has also begun implementing counter-terrorism initiatives aimed at boosting security within the Schengen Zone, while keeping its external borders strongly securitised.

In 2004, the council of the EU established *Frontières Extérieures* (FRONTEX) – an agency responsible for coordinating intelligence and operational actions for better management of external borders by restricting access to foreigners while maintaining the logic of free movement of people in the EU (Neal, 2009; Nessel, 2008). As a border management board, FRONTEX coordinates initiatives with neighbouring countries in different areas aimed at improving border control, ranging from training of national border guards from member states and the establishment of common standards; undertaking risk analyses; conducting research on control and surveillance of external borders; technical assistance to member states in external border operations; and assisting member states in organising repatriation operations (Neal, 2009; Wolf, 2008; Guild and Bigo, 2010).

As far as the externalisation of EU border control methods is concerned, reliable and faster cooperation requires member states to comply on their external borders with (1) the Schengen information system; (2) a common list of countries whose nationals require visas; (3) a common format and rules of issue for short-stay visas; (4) a visa information system; and (5) carrier sanctions and passenger data transmission (Guild cited in Neal, 2009:345). Apart from direct intervention in the countries on its external borders, since 2002 the EU has been expanding the limits of border control by admitting new members into the Union through the European Neighbourhood Policy.

In the following section, conditions under which the EU has been admitting new members into the Union and the implications of this for border governance are discussed, particularly dynamic migration factors in the new member states.

The EU’s efforts to cooperate with countries on its external borders have resulted in the inclusion (in 2004) of new member states through the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Under the ENP, new members are from Central and Eastern Europe as well as from North Africa,
ranging from Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine. Russia did not enter the Union, but it has committed to close cooperation with the EU in combating organised crime (Rees, 2008).

The establishment of the ENP can be contextualised from three different prims: political, economic, and security. From a political point of view, ENP is an EU mechanism for sharing with neighbouring countries common values such as sustainable democracy, rule of law, human rights and good governance and thereby fostering international norms for multilateral cooperation (Smith, 2005; Berg and Ehin, 2006; Rees, 2008).

In terms of economic values, the ENP was designed to influence economic reforms that would promote economic prosperity and sustainable development in Central and Eastern European countries (Bosse, 2009; Rees, 2008). In terms of security, the EU has been concerned with extending border control strategies further afield on the assumption that security threats in neighbouring countries will have a detrimental effect on security in the Union (Heusgen, 2006).

Despite these efforts, the relationship between the EU and ENP has elicited some criticism. For instance, the ENP is viewed as an expansion of EU borders and a promotion of EU foreign policies beyond its borders while maintaining those supranational bodies with which the incoming member states lack previous relationships (Smith, 2005; Lynch, 2004). Not only has the externalisation of border control resulted in interference in domestic security policies in third countries (Nessel, 2008), but standardised border control measures have also imposed several restrictions on the movement of persons, particularly asylum seekers, refugees, and other categories of migrants (Léonard, 2010). The following section analyses the securitisation of borders vis-à-vis the right to migration.
2.4 Securitisation of borders and the right to migration

Article 13(2) of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights states that, every person has the right to leave any country, including his or her own, and to return to this country at a later date. However, as a result of security practices, people on the move (particularly non-citizens) have faced tremendous difficulties in enjoying the right to migration (Bosworth and Guild, 2008). As Nessel (2008) points out, “the global focus on securitisation and enforcement has weakened the refugee protection regime…”. In this context, securitisation has resulted in the lumping of organised crime together with desperate immigrants (Fassin, 2011; Bosworth, Guild, 2008, Andreas, 2003a). As a result, responses to terrorist attacks in the US and Europe have brought about the remilitarisation of borders against asylum seekers, refugees and unauthorised immigrants (Léonard, 2010; Nessel, 2008; Bigo, 2002). Apart from limiting the right to migration, securitised practices have resulted in the violation of human rights, particularly in arrest and repatriation operations, and even deaths as the result of electrified borders (Walters, 2006).

In the context of FRONTEX, “intensification of external borders has not decreased the number of irregular migrants, but rather has led irregular migrants to using alternative, and increasingly dangerous routes” (Spijkerboer, 2007:127). In retrospect, FRONTEX’s standardised military operations on border control have been depicted by human rights organisations as death traps to asylum seekers and refugees since all the persons who were arrested were returned to their countries of origin or prevented from reaching any European Union country (Léonard, 2010: 240). In relation to refugees and asylum seekers, the concern of human rights organisations lies with the EU’s respect for the non-refoulement principle (stated in the Geneva Convention 1951, article 31) related to the status of refugees.

While human rights organisations in the EU have raised concerns about FRONTEX’s acts of brutality, in the US the problem is related to the implementation of the zero-tolerance immigration law against asylum seekers and refugees and the establishment of more detention centres.
which has resulted in an end to the favourable treatment of Muslims that allowed them to enter the US prior to state clearance (Miller, 2005). For example, following the 9/11 attacks, persons coming from countries where al-Qaeda groups were operating were suspected of belonging to terrorist groups and were automatically detained for investigation (Messina, 2014; Miller, 2005). The US government has also introduced harsh punitive measures against all non-US citizens, which has resulted in mass incarceration (pending investigation) and draconian criminal convictions (for less serious offences) aimed at incapacitating terrorists and their sympathisers (Nunes-Neto, 2008; Miller, 2005). Moreover, academic, vocational as well as therapeutic programmes that were implemented in prisons and intended to rehabilitate offenders no longer produce the required effects, but incapacitate inmates based on their risk classification (Messina, 2014; Miller, 2005).

As far as death rates at borders are concerned, the US policy of prevention through deterrence has resulted in several deaths in the post-9/11 period. In 2003, 19 immigrants were found dead in an airless truck trailer in Texas (Nunez-Neto, 2008) and in 2009 another 11 were discovered dead in a railway car in Iowa. The mortality rate across US borders has increased from 1.6 deaths in FY 1999 to 5.5 deaths in FY 2008 (out of 10 000 apprehensions), which has roused increased criticism from human rights organisations (Nunes-Neto, 2008).

At the level of labour law, US response to global transnational migration with strong barriers aimed at combating unauthorised immigration has not had positive results as American farmers and traders continue to attract unauthorised Mexican migrants to fill jobs that are normally undesirable to local citizens (Dauvergne, 2008). Researchers argue that countries fail to prevent unauthorised immigration because of the conflicting interests of groups who demand the availability of cheaper labour versus those elites who favour more restrictive immigration controls (Lewis et al., 2014; Hanson and Spilimbergo, 2001).

Not only has the securitisation of borders affected the movement of cheaper labour, but developed countries now have to cope with huge
2.5 The security-economy dilemma of securitised borders

As far as the modern scholar is concerned, the growth of the global economic network has facilitated international transactions, but rapid movements of people across borders are now considered a risk to supply/demand chains as a result of the insecurity embedded in Transnational Criminal Groups (TCGs) (Nessel, 2008; Bigo, 2007), particularly in Western countries. In view of this, Western countries have tightened their borders on the grounds that global flows of capital and commodities will intensify movements of TCGs (Andreas, 2003a; Fassin, 2011). For example, the US-Canadian border has become difficult to cross owing to securitisation practices aimed at preventing the infiltration of terror activities into the US (Newman, 2006b). At the same time, the US and Canadian governments have urged immigration officials, border patrollers and customs officers to pay maximum attention to potential risk travellers and goods (Sparke, 2006). Moreover, the US government has adopted antiterrorism operations in the in-depth inspection of individuals and private vehicles, trucks and buses moving across the US-Mexico border and from Canada to Michigan and New York (Sparke, 2006).

The response to these operations has had a hugely negative impact on market functions. For example, following the 9/11 attacks, some firms dependent on the supply-chain from the US to Canada and vice versa announced the termination of their services because of the long wait at the border (Flynn cited in Sparke, 2006). In the case of the US-Canada border, in the days following the attacks, waiting time for trucks increased from less than 10 minutes to about 15 hours, which resulted in long queues of waiting trucks (Andreas, 2003a). Long delays have put pressure on the American government to counterbalance its fight against terrorism with the need to speed shipping times across the border. The US has thus decided to adopt a border management system that could fulfil dual objectives: expanding trade while protecting internal borders from threats posed by terrorist delays in trade transactions caused by the need to preserve the security-economy nexus at the border.
activities, irregular immigrants, smuggling and human trafficking (Ackleson, 2005).

Western countries have coordinated their efforts to patrol their external borders more effectively, but the question of the meaning of such border control remains contentious, with a great deal of opposition even within Western countries (Leonard, 2010; Bosworth and Guild, 2008). Moreover, the overriding of Western methods of border control across the globe has suppressed the logic of debate on migration in different locations. In the context of the Southern African region, migration is rooted in political legacies of wars in the regions, mining in South Africa, and the demise of apartheid, but none of these factors have been integrated in the contemporary trends of border control in the region. In the next chapter, the thesis analyses some border control reforms undertaken in post-war Mozambique and post-apartheid South Africa, and how these can be reconciled with global demands for standardised methods.

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the transformation of the concept and practice of security since the end of the Cold War and its influence on the contemporary strategies of border control on a global scale. In this context, the end of the Cold War signalled a different approach to border controls, one aimed at a more coordinated response to global economic transactions and the transnational movement of people and resources across international frontiers, a paradox mentioned in Chapter 1. From the review of the academic literature it was evident that the opening of international borders and the establishment of integrated regions has demanded a security community bound to common border control strategies at a time of growing liberalisation of capital and trade (Andreas, 2003a).

The end of the Cold War brought the long divided Western and Eastern blocks onto a more cooperative footing aimed at stopping the movement of people from developing countries to developed Western societies, under the gaze of the fight against terrorism, trafficking and
other transnational ‘threats’. In retrospect, it is clear that this has led to large scale restrictive border controls such as militarised borders and smart borders that have moved to the top of the political agenda in many Western countries, especially following terrorist attacks in New York, London, Madrid and elsewhere. US Homeland Security Strategy and the EU FRONTEX are two of these new approaches to border control that have made considerable progress towards a global regime of border control, with which the rest of the world has been challenged to comply. Importantly, with these models, Western countries have been able to expand their fight against terrorism into third countries, either by direct support in border control operations in neighbouring countries or by reliance on international standards that are gradually adopted by the rest of the world. However, far from being a contribution to new security dynamics caused by changes in the environment, depletion of resources, and other push/pull factors of migration, international models of border control have posed challenges to developing countries in their struggle to address local problems of border crossing.

Notes

1 The Patriotic Act: its key objective is to allow the government to obtain warrants to monitor and search suspects without meeting previous probable cause requirements and also to allow sharing of information between police and counter-terrorist officials (Ramirez, 2009).

2 Further, the US has been expanding its coalitions and collaborations to fighting terrorism with African countries by offering military training to cope with terrorist threats, protection of land borders and coastline security; training programmes to control the movement of people and goods across borders; general police training programmes; and assistance in regional anti-terrorism initiatives (Ramirez, 2009).
In order to operationalise its tasks, FRONTEX is divided into six units entailing risk analysis; joint operations at air, land, and sea external borders; border guards, training and research and development. The training unit focuses on developing a core curriculum for border guards from the member states through assessment of deficiencies and loopholes in security, aimed at the development and spread of best practices (Neal, 2009). Training programmes focus on a broad array of issues as they emerge, such as the detection of forged documents, stolen vehicles, dog handling, and other relevant security issues (Léonard, 2010).

The EU external borders are with Czech Republic; Estonia; Finland; France; Germany; Netherlands; Norway; Portugal; Spain, and Switzerland.

The refoulement principle under article 31 of the Geneva Convention 1951 states that: (1) “no contracting State shall expel or return (refouler) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened”. The Contracting States shall allow such refugees a reasonable period and all the necessary facilities to obtain admission into another country; and (2) the Contracting States shall not apply to the movements of such refugees restrictions other than those which are necessary and such restrictions shall only be applied until their status in the country is regularised or they obtain admission into another country.

The merging of hard borders and anti-immigration policies has led to the creation of detention centres and refugee centres, both in Africa and in Europe, where migrants can be received, processed and returned to their countries of origin (Johnson, 2008). However, detention or refugee centres are places were “law is suspended, rights are denied and migrants held in a static temporariness that concretises exclusion into permanent state” (Johnson, 2008:6).

While The North American Trade Agreements (NAFTA) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) are some examples of how globalisation has promoted a borderless approach among states and created new forms of legality to facilitate capital flows, the crackdown on extra-legal migration has intensified worldwide in response to transnational threats reinforced by the internationalisation of production, the liberalisation of
trade, the mobility of finance, and advances in transportation and communication technology (Andreas, 2003a).
3 The political context of intra-Southern African migration: reflections on post-war Mozambique and post-apartheid South Africa

3.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, patterns of security threats since the end of the Cold War and their influence on global migration policies and border control strategies were examined. As was suggested, the perception of inter-state military threats diminished while perceptions of threats from individuals-on-the move increased; the latter has come to be identified as a major security threat, reviving the militarisation of borders as well as the deployment of a whole range of biometric technologies for the purpose of internal and external border control. The result has been to strengthen cooperation between Western and Eastern countries in seeking to deter ‘undesirable’ non-citizens from crossing into ‘heartlands’ from the peripheries (Fassin, 2011; Adamson, 2008; Nessel, 2008; Bigo, 2007; Adamson, 2006; Andreas, 2003a). Individuals on the move have come more and more to be associated with transnational organised crime, especially following international treaties concerning smuggling and trafficking, and anti-terrorism legislation. This perception has increasingly reinforced the implementation of restrictive immigration policies and tighter border controls around and within Western countries. These assumptions are accompanied by what was referred to in Chapter 1 as the ‘securitisation’ of migration and borders. As Western and Eastern
countries have become more concerned with the need to fight transnational crime and terrorism, and to support border control operations, they increasingly involve and require the participation of countries in the global South, as the ‘remote control’ border control regimes extend their reach globally, in particular through a range of international security agreements.

While Western countries were tightening their borders in a bid to prevent transnational security threats from non-citizens, the Southern African region was facing its own significant political challenges. The end of the war in Mozambique and the end of apartheid in South Africa constituted two major events that converged to produce new patterns of migration in the Southern Africa region (Trimikliniotis, Gordon and Zondo, 2008). In response to the first sub-question of this study, this chapter examines border control strategies implemented by the Mozambican and South African governments since the early 1990s, and considers their impact on the socio-economic integration of immigrants in both countries. There are some similarities between the responses to security in post-war Mozambique and post-apartheid South Africa’s migration policies and border control strategies. Despite the reconnection of both countries with global markets and trade relations, however, there are some significant differences in respect of migration reforms, especially the more marked exclusion of less skilled labour immigrants from neighbouring states.

3.2 Transnational and international patterns of migration in post-war Mozambique

Migration patterns across Mozambique are closely related to the end of the war in the country, the end of the apartheid regime in South Africa and to the effects of the end of the Cold War (Emerson, 2014). With the end of the war in Mozambique and the demise of the apartheid regime in South Africa, the Southern African region has been fully reconnected to the circuits of the global economy. At the same time, more attention than ever has been given to controlling the movements of people across intra-
regional borders, giving rise to a sharp distinction between regular and irregular forms of migration, the latter being defined mainly in response to the powerful attraction for regional migrants of the South African economy (Crush, Williams and Peberdy, 2005; Raimundo, 2009; Gastrow and Mosse, 2002; Andreas, 2003a; Adamson, 2006). In the case of Mozambique, the dominant discourse among academics is that soon after the end of the armed conflict, borders became more permeable to the trafficking of drugs and human beings, to smuggling and to other crimes such as money laundering, homicides, vehicle theft and bank robbery (Chachiua, 2000; Gastrow and Mosse, 2002). Press reports constantly point to the Mavalane Airport in Maputo as a transit point for cocaine shipped en route from Colombia and Brazil to Europe and East Asia, or for heroin and hashish shipped from Pakistan to Dubai, for example (Gastrow and Mosse, 2011; 2002).

Concomitantly, post-war Mozambique has been marked by the ‘feminisation’ of migration patterns, amidst reports that women migrants have been involved in transnational crime across the Mozambican-South African border, for example (Ama, Mangadi, and Ama., 2014; Peberdy, 2000). According to some sources, circuits of transnational crime involve both Mozambican and South African men and women trafficking migrants and refugees from other, third countries across the Mozambican border into South Africa (Crush, 2005:79).

From a socio-economic standpoint, the appearance of women in international migration flows is not a new phenomenon. Women traders constitute perhaps the majority of traders crossing the Mozambican-South African border, and studies have shown that these women’s economic activities often support the housing, food and schooling costs of their families, including not only their spouses and children, but also siblings (Peberdy, 2014; 2000). As contemporary cross-border migration has become more gender-balanced, the active economic roles of women have become more evident. Thus the flow of women in international migration demands a shift to a migration structure based on their historical and live participation in household decisions all over the world. Although more
women migrate than in the past, in the context of the Southern African region the problem is that labour contracts remain male-oriented, particularly in the mining industry in South Africa, which has always diminished the presence of women in the labour market (Posel and Marx, 2013; Posel, 2004). Notwithstanding the increase in socio-economic-led migration, Mozambique and other states in the region have prioritised national security-driven migration and border control arrangements.

3.3 Preparation for border control responses

During the war, the Frelimo government was concerned with counteracting the infiltration of apartheid's elements into Mozambican territory. These elements were engaged in supplying Renamo guerrillas with weapons, ammunition systems, uniforms, financial assistance, intelligence support and training. In addition, South African troops were involved in insurgency operations in Mozambique (Emerson, 2014; Robinson, 2009; Davies, 1987). As Emerson (2009:64) points out, “to assist in the infiltration and exfiltration of guerrillas across the Rhodesian Mozambican border, [in 1979] the South Africans supplied some seven vehicles, including heavy duty tracks”. Based on these facts, the Mozambican government’s major priority was to establish a modernised and professionalised army at a level at which it would be capable of responding to conventional attacks from apartheid South Africa and Rhodesia (Chachiua, 2000:55). Internally, the government introduced the systematic control of movement of people, based on four security divisions that were acting within the Immigration Department: economic, ideological, military and counter-intelligence affairs. As a result of these reforms, the immigration department was renamed the National Department for Migration (NDM) and subordinated to the Ministry of the Interior. At a later point, the NDM was integrated into the State Intelligence Information Bureau (Serviços de Informação Secreta do Estado SISE). As these reforms were taking place, the Mozambican government created the Border Patrol Unit (BPU) subordinated to the army. These parallel security sectors were established to protect territorial sovereignty,
to stop cross-border criminal activities and to prevent populations in the border regions and state-owned properties from the most serious external threats (NDM Report, 1999).

While the government perspective of border control was projected to fight external security threats (including cross-border crime), the new democratic dispensation began to pressurise the country to implement security and legal reforms that would contribute to sustainable democracy, good governance, rule of law, respect for human rights and protection of the most vulnerable (Lalá, 2003). As part of the response to these demands, the National Assembly passed an anti-trafficking law in 2008 aimed at protecting women and children against sexual and labour exploitation. At the level of border management, since 1992, the Mozambican government has given priority to reaffirmation and delimitation of the country’s borders. In doing so, the government gave the responsibility for the reaffirmation process to the Institute of the Sea and Borders (IMAF), which coordinates activities with other sectors such as the Ministries of Defence, Interior, Agriculture and Health. According to the Mozambican President of the Institute of the Sea and Borders,

the rise in mineral resources discovery has attracted international firms to invest in the country, which requires clearly delimited borders in order to prevent resources-driven conflicts with neighbouring states, ensure better control of immigration flows, and better protection of state’s sovereignty.

It is thus evident that borders can perform different roles based on the position one takes. For example, as the above discussion suggests, delimited borders can establish the legal possession of natural resources to the extent that no other state can make a claim to these resources. From the perspective of national sovereignty, borders of neighbouring states can now be regarded as international rather than transnational, which in turn underpins the tension between border authorities and communities in cross-border regions.
3.4 The establishment of the Mozambique Border Police

Following the signing of the General Peace Agreement (GPA) in 1992, the Mozambican government created the Police of the Republic of Mozambique (PRM), which replaced the People’s Police of Mozambique (Polícia Popular de Moçambique). With these reforms, the PRM created the Mozambique Border Police (MBP) as a special division assigned to control the border, particularly to prevent cross-border crime and to preserve territorial sovereignty. In 1997, government implemented major reforms in the security sector, in which the erstwhile National Service Public Security (SNASP) was (re)named to SISE and the Armed Forces for the Liberation of Mozambique (FLM) was (re)named the Mozambique Armed Defence Forces (FADM).

The FADM are entrusted with preserving national independence, state sovereignty, and the protection of territorial integrity from external threats including armed aggression. For example, during the celebration of the 48th anniversary of the FADM, those holding office reaffirmed their commitment and readiness to preserve state sovereignty and territorial integrity towards sustainable development, to promote national unity and patriotism, which are believed to be fundamental factors in bringing about cohesion among Mozambican citizens (Jornal Notícias, September 20, 2012).

Although the government has constantly implemented reforms in the security sector, the country has not yet achieved visible change since the police are poorly trained and under-resourced and thus unable to effectively provide public security in this new transforming environment (Alar, 2010; Gastrow and Mosse, 2002). In part, Mozambique has been relying on joint border patrol operations with neighbouring states aimed to address what are believed to be common problems, ranging from clandestine migration and smuggling to poaching. At the same time, the Mozambican border authorities have established simplified crossing points aimed at facilitating socio-economic interaction between communities in restricted border zones of Mozambique and neighbouring countries. For the Mozambique border police, as discussed
in Chapter 1, these simplified borders are not characterised by the same stringent controls as official crossing points, where a passport regime is supposed to be enforced. In principle, a simplified border regime allows communities who live in the border areas to cross the border regularly for socio-economic reasons, without being checked automatically. Such reasons may range from family visits, to medical treatment and attendance of ceremonies such as marriages or burials. These individuals should carry ID cards and simply sign a register when moving back and forth across the border.

However, Mozambique did not receive any cooperation from neighbouring states since they continued to rely on bilateral agreements aimed at fighting crime (Crush and Dodson, 2007). This has resulted in different regimes of border control and migration management regardless of their inadequacy in the post-colonial African context of border regions. In pursuance of regime-based border control, the Mozambican border police tend to pay little attention to socio-economic convergence factors across border regions.

3.5 The Mozambique Border Police border controls priority

With the primary interest lying in fighting cross-border crime, the MBP have become more concerned with the modus operandi of the perpetrators and the categories into which they fall. As the National Commander of the MBP explained in an interview, “border violators can be divided into simple violators and criminal-related immigrants”. From his perspective, and for the MBP generally, a ‘simple violator’ refers to any immigrant from a neighbouring state who enters Mozambique through a non-official crossing point in search of casual work, medical assistance, a family visit or any other socio-economic need; in other words, for any non-criminal purpose. The ‘criminal-related immigrant’ referred to as an unauthorised immigrant, often coming from beyond the borders of neighbouring states who is involved or suspected of criminal-related activity. These immigrants are defined in categories that range from smugglers, counterfeiters, traffickers to thieves.
Since the MBP are concerned with understanding the *modus operandi* of those involved in cross-border crime, they have established an internal intelligence division, which is tasked with conducting a deep trial process with intercepted border violators. In the same interview quoted above, the National Commander of the MBP observes: “among asylum seekers, refugees, and deported immigrants, we are always concerned with potential spies, which is why we need more detention centres so that the trial process can be conducted in a more detailed manner”. As well as reflecting a generally hostile attitude towards foreigners, something which is also evident in approaches to border control in the European Union, this remark suggests that the civil war and the apartheid era has left its mark on the MBP today. As is reflected in the establishment of FRONTEX, which was aimed at stopping asylum seekers and refugees, a further legacy of the era of apartheid has been a heightened suspicion of infiltrators from South Africa (Léonard, 2010). The distinction between unauthorised border violators without criminal intent and those whose aims are criminal in the context of the Southern African region is summarised in Table 3.1 below. The distinguishing categories range from nationality, destination, used routes and reasons for relocation.

### Table 3.1

*Categories used by the MBP to classify immigrants crossing Mozambique borders*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trial categories</th>
<th>National citizens and foreigners from neighbouring states</th>
<th>Foreigners from other parts of the region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nationality</td>
<td>Simple border violators; spies</td>
<td>Illegal immigrants; drug traffickers; spies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destination</td>
<td>Neighbouring countries; livelihoods; firewood; arable land</td>
<td>Economic reasons; transit country; trafficking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Used routes</td>
<td>Porosity; common borders; cross-border communities</td>
<td>Porosity; international borders</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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| Reasons for relocation | Hospital treatment; traditional ceremonies; family visits; informal cross-border trading; smuggling; facilitation of clandestine migration; unsustainable extraction of resources | Spying; terrorism; asylum seekers; refugees; illegal extraction of natural resources; political instability: ethnic or religious conflicts; family reunification |

Source: Author’s table based on interviews conducted with Mozambique border officials.

In line with the categories presented in the table above, the MBP understands that immigrants from neighbouring states such as Tanzania, Malawi and Zimbabwe, particularly those who live in the border regions, mostly cross the border for socio-economic reasons. Regardless of such socio-economically driven border crossing, the MBP believes that immigrants from neighbouring states can be involved in spying, which is why they urge local communities to be vigilant. With regard to immigrants from outside the neighbouring states, the MBP believes that these are mostly economically driven and are closely linked to criminal activities such as trafficking and smuggling. On many occasions, such immigrants try to find a transit country (with less secure borders) to reach their destination. As far as the literature is concerned, Africa is characterised by permanent interaction of people across border regions, but the continent has negative connotations as a relatively safe migratory route to Europe as a result of the permeability and weak monitoring of borders, as well as the ease with which false documents can be acquired (Melde et al., 2014; Ramirez, 2009; Ratha and Shaw, 2007). In the context of Mozambique, a senior border police officer in Maputo claims that:

Country of origin is a fundamental element to take into account to the extent that most immigrants who are involved in trafficking and exploitation of natural resources are from non-neighbouring states. Therefore, information on country of origin allows accurate decisions about real reasons leading to the relocation of the immigrant concerned.

Based on the above, the distinction between simple border violators (from neighbouring states) and unauthorised immigrants (from outside neighbouring states) provides the field of migration studies with an alternative discourse that can better differentiate the context of border regions in post-colonial African states from those in Europe. It can also
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be seen as an emerging discourse in migration studies that can help to distinguish undocumented from unauthorised migrants in the context of intra-Southern African migration. For example, South African authorities understand undocumented immigrants as those from neighbouring states, including Mozambique. Similarly, unauthorised immigrants are generally defined in South Africa as being those from the rest of Africa, Asia, Europe and America, more often expected to use illegal routes to reach their destinations (Sablonnière, Auger, Taylor et al., 2013; Crush and McDonald, 2000).

On the subject of illegal immigration routes, the MBP accepts that immigrants from beyond the borders of neighbouring states use illegal routes either to reach Mozambique or to enter South Africa (the main destination for immigrants from Sub-Saharan Africa). The map below indicates routes used frequently by unauthorised immigrants (across land and borders), as classified by the MBP over the last few years.

**Map 3.1**

*Illegal immigration routes across Mozambique by land and sea borders*

Note. This route map was drawn using information for 2012/2013, provided by the Mozambican Border Police.
The MBP is aware that two inter-related factors have made these routes the most accessible to unauthorised immigration; these are firstly, immigrants’ country of origin and secondly, language similarity. With regard to country of origin, the bulk of unauthorised immigrants who are arrested by border patrollers are from Ethiopia, Somalia, Congo and Burundi, reaching Mozambique through Cabo Delgado province (by crossing the Rovuma river). These immigrants can easily reach Pemba and Nampula by flying to Ethiopia or Kenya on scheduled flights. According to the National Commander of the MBP\textsuperscript{12},
Mozambique has been targeted by immigrants from the democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria and Rwanda as a final destination while South Africa (often via Mozambique) is the final destination sought by immigrants from Ethiopia and Somalia.

He explains that unauthorised immigrants reach Mozambique predominantly across the northern and the central borders. The northern border comprises three provinces, namely Cabo Delgado, Niassa and Nampula. The central border includes four provinces, namely Tete, Manica, Zambézia and Sofala. The northern Cabo Delgado Province has become a point of easy entry for unauthorised immigrants into the country, particularly Tanzanians and those who come from the Great Lakes. According to the Mozambique Information Agency (AIM), fishermen in Cabo Delgado make illegal crossings of the Rovuma River, using their small boats at night and unloading them in the coastal districts of Palma, Mocimboa da Praia, Quissanga and Macomia. From there, immigrants are directed to other points where they either make their way to other parts of Mozambique on long distance trucks or head to South Africa (AIM, 2012). Although unauthorised Tanzanian immigrants are referred to as simple border violators (since they come from a neighbouring state), the Mozambican border authorities believe that they are involved in illegal exploitation of natural resources, particularly in very remote areas where local authorities are unable to access current patrolling capabilities.

As for language similarity, most immigrants from the countries of the Great Lakes speak Kiswahili, which facilitates their communication and rapid informal integration in the Northern provinces of Mozambique. On many occasions, immigrants are hosted and integrated in local communities by their relatives while preparing to migrate to South Africa, a preferred destination for various categories of migrants because of its attractive economy and the relatively easy border crossing from Mozambique (Raimundo, 2009).

The political stability since the end of the war in Mozambique has also turned the country into a destination for asylum seekers and refugees,
especially the Marratane Refugee Centre in Nampula Province in the Northern part of the country. With regard to refugee centres, some members of parliament from the Frelimo and Renamo political parties claim that Mozambique has been unable to control the flow of refugees from the perspective of both economic and security factors, which has become a burden to the country. For example, a member of parliament from Frelimo observes that “with more detention centres, refugees would not be able to mingle with Mozambicans and compete for access to basic services”. As section 3.3 highlights, border can be interpreted from different perspectives. For example, some members of parliament in Mozambique are of the opinion that strong border control or detention centres can prevent desperate immigrants from entering Mozambique. A similar response occurred in post-apartheid South Africa as a way of discouraging the proliferation of refugees and asylum seekers. In this case, the South Africa Department of Home affairs proposed the establishment of a Detention Centre to host asylum seekers while their applications were being processed (Truong et al., 2014; Handmaker, 2001). As the following section argues, in implementing immigration reforms, the post-apartheid South African government has been reinforcing anti-immigration policies, the impact of which ranges from human rights abuse, incitement of violence to xenophobia.

3.6 Post-apartheid South African migration management

As noted in previous sections, the end of apartheid in South Africa and the end of armed conflict in Mozambique resulted in the intensification of both regular and irregular forms of migration across the borders of neighbouring states. Accordingly, the Mozambique border authorities have given priority to the control of entry by unauthorised immigrants and cross-border crime. By the same token, the post-apartheid South African government has adopted cross-border management policies guided by national migration and refugee legislation (Crush and Tawodzera, 2014; Oucho, 2014; Crush et al., 2005). This section looks at policy reforms,
institutional reforms, and border control arrangements aimed at responding to immigration in post-apartheid South Africa.

### 3.6.1 Legacies of the past

Prior to 1994, South Africa had very restrictive security-oriented migration policies. As Handmaker and Parsley (2001:42) point out, “the security and control oriented approach was evident in the focus on deterring undocumented migrants and bogus asylum seekers”. By implementing contract-based employment and the Aliens Control Act of 1991, apartheid South Africa was able to control the movements of people (inside the country and from other African countries). In order to limit permanent employment for immigrants and to restrict movement of people from rural to urban centres, immigrants were contracted for a maximum period of two years, after which they could be repatriated (Posel and Marx, 2013; Posel, 2004).

Restrictive migration policies under the apartheid regime were a prototype of British colonial policies designed to exclude the entry of Indians, Jews and communists as well as foreign activists and journalists into South Africa (Truong et al., 2014; Ocho, 2014; Handmaker and Parsley, 2001; Handmaker, 2001). In 1991, the apartheid regime introduced the Aliens Control Act, which included several matters related to border control and migration under its rule, such as entry and residence (Melde et al., 2014; Handmaker and Parsley, 2001). As a result of massive flows of undocumented immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees (particularly from Mozambique) into the country, South Africa continued to give priority to repatriation operations and strict control of entry and residence of immigrants. However, with the dawn of a democratic South Africa, one of the major challenges facing the country was the implementation of far-reaching migration reforms aimed at achieving standards of administrative justice.
3.6.2 Migration policy reforms

The first attempt to bring about reform of the migration policy in post-apartheid South Africa came in 1995. This was aimed at amending the Aliens Control Act (ACA of 1991). The ACA was considered draconian and an apartheid dinosaur because of its policies rooted in racism that perpetuated the violation of the rights of refugees and asylum seekers (Oucho, 2014; Handmaker and Parsley, 2001). The major objective of the 1995 amendment was to review the detention period under which people could be held without judicial decision. While the ACA had established that detained persons could be held in detention indefinitely, the 1995 amendment removed this provision and stipulated that detentions of longer than a period of three days should be reviewed (Oucho, 2014; Handmaker and Parsley, 2001). However, the 1995 amendment has not brought any change since the provisions have been applied, which has led to the need for further reforms.

The next attempt to reform migration policy came through the Green paper on International Migration in 1997 and the Refugee Act of 1998. The point of departure for the establishment of the Green paper was the lack of protection afforded asylum seekers and refugees, since they could be repatriated at any time. Therefore, the Green paper fixed a five-year period before either repatriation of a refugee or the granting of permanent residence in South Africa could occur (Handmaker, 1999). The main objective of the Green paper was to “provide temporary protection to persons whose basic human rights were at risk in their country of origin, until they could return home safely” (Handmaker, 1999:300). The Refugee Act of 1998 was intended to protect vulnerable groups on a permanent basis in accordance with international practices, reflecting South Africa’s obligations and various international human rights conventions (Donnelly, 2014; Handmaker, 1999). The Green paper was contested by the Human Rights Commission for its consistent failure to achieve standards for the protection of human rights, particularly with regard to repatriation within five years. Regardless of people’s expectations of the Refugee Act 1998, its implementation has raised concerns because of its
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origins in the ACA, thus representing a continuation of a draconian regime (Melde et al., 2014; Handmaker and Parsley, 2001). However, efforts to produce more contextualised migration policies continued. Post-apartheid South Africa introduced the Immigration Act of 2000 and its amendment Act in 2004. With these instruments, South Africa has embodied a different approach to immigration control, with particular focus on economic-related immigration and a link to border control (inside the country and on the remainder of the border). In doing so, the Immigration Act of 2000 in its preamble provides that the new immigration control system aims at ensuring inter alia that (1) security considerations when entering South Africa are completely satisfied, including strengthening border monitoring aimed at preventing illegal immigrants and deporting them in cases where they are detected; (2) foreigners promote and contribute to the growth of South Africa’s economy. Post-apartheid South Africa’s focus on the migration-economic development nexus is driven by the needs of global economic competitiveness on the one hand, and the need to strengthen border control in order to exclude desperate immigrants on the other. It is suggested that South Africa needs to take a step back in order to fully understand the dynamics of migration across its borders and at the continental level, and then to formulate more contextualised migration policies.

3.6.3 Integration of immigrants: a losing battle

3.6.3.1 Labour policy

Despite different attempts to adapt post-apartheid South Africa to a new migration context aimed at establishing a less racialised society and promoting respect for human rights, the country’s migration policies have left many migrant workers from neighbouring countries undocumented and exposed to labour exploitation and police brutality (Trimikliniotis et al., 2008). As Crush and Dodson (2007:451) point out, “since 1994, there has been a growing disconnect between the regional reality of migration and the inherited policy tools which seek to manage those movements”. In the matter of labour migration, post-apartheid South Africa has been plagued
by high rates of unemployment, a result of downsizing policies in the mining sector and job restrictions applied to low skilled workers. This has increased hostile sentiments regarding immigrants (Fine, 2014; van and Moppes, 2006; Wentzel and Tlabela; 2001; Posel, 2004). For example, the 1996 Amendment Act prescribes that if qualified South Africans are available, South Africa will no longer grant foreign work or immigration permits (Crush, 1999:6). At the same time, South Africa has undertaken further labour adjustments, including the signing of bilateral labour agreements with Lesotho, Botswana, Malawi and Swaziland, aimed at ensuring legal access to South Africa by workers from these states (Fine, 2014; Melde et al., 2014; Crush, 1999).

Apart from these arrangements, the South African government has made specific recommendations to neighbouring states stating, *inter alia*, that (1) all governments should provide work for their own citizens; (2) problems of immigration can only be solved by a coordinated regional and international strategy; and (3) there should be a fair and proper control of entry of migrant workers into host countries (Melde et al., 2014; Oucho and Crush, 2001). This suggests that countries in the region that are relatively advanced in terms of economic development, such as South Africa, Botswana and Namibia, tend to see other states as transit points for unauthorised immigrants on the grounds that those countries’ borders are less well protected and there are higher levels of corruption among their border officials (Solomon, 1997). Based on this, South African recommendations to neighbouring states could be regarded as a manifesto of hegemonic power in the region, which could seriously undermine mutual coexistence. Moreover, with this hegemonic positioning, other states in the region may find it difficult to cooperate openly in integration on the grounds that they might be dominated by South Africa (Ngoma, 2003).

Against this background, the former Vice President of South Africa (Thabo Mbeki) appealed to South African authorities to look carefully and holistically at causal factors and their potential impact on neighbouring countries. Job losses among mine workers, for instance, could easily
intensify clandestine immigration, which in turn would undermine South Africa's own interests as well as those of neighbouring countries (Crush and Dodson, 2007; Davies and Head, 1995). Despite this concern, South Africa has not yet adopted new immigration policies other than repatriation and securitisation of borders.

### 3.6.3.2 Border control

As has been highlighted in the previous sections, post-apartheid South Africa’s immigration policies and border controls have prioritised predawn searches and repatriation of immigrants who have irregular status in South Africa. Although these operations have been implemented under the guise of fighting cross-border crime (particularly trafficking), they have been characterised by police brutality and little respect for human rights, provoking criticism from humanitarian organisations who believe that these acts impair democracy and ignore the rule of law. As Crush et al. (2005:25) point out, “arrest, detention and repatriation procedures do not always protect irregular and regular migrants from abuse and have the potential to cause conflict between neighbouring countries”. As a result of these practices, the bulk of the literature proclaims that “South Africa's new democratic government inherited a system of cross-border migration management rooted in the abusive practices of the past, which became in direct conflict with government to transparency, equality, accountability, and fundamental human rights” (Crush, 1999:1).

In the matter of patrol operations, South Africa has raised concerns with its control of its extensive land borders, particularly those with Mozambique, where the border has been electrified and is patrolled by the South African National Defence Force (Melde et al., 2014; Vigneswaran, 2013; Crush, 1999).

Concomitantly, the post-apartheid South African government has increased its budget and resources for police raids and deportation operations including the tracing, arrest and repatriation of refugees and undocumented immigrants, particularly Mozambicans and Zimbabweans (Vigneswaran, 2013; Crush and Dodson, 2007; Crush, 1999). As a result,
in 1994 the South African immigration authorities deported about 91 000 immigrants to Mozambique and Zimbabwe, whom they believed to have entered South Africa clandestinely (Oucho, 2014; Oucho and Crush, 2001). As these operations have continued, South African authorities have also begun to deport non-Mozambican foreign immigrants (such as Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Indian and Chinese immigrants, as well as people from other parts of the region) on the grounds that they entered the country through Mozambique. This has damaged diplomatic relations between the two states (Melde et al., 2014; Crush, 1999).

Briefly stated, the increase in the budget for restrictive border control measures has not produced sustainable results for the South African government. From the legal perspective, South African arrest and deportation operations have fallen below international standards for the protection of human rights. From an economic perspective, South African arrest and deportation operations cost the government large sums of money, while the impact of this expenditure is nil (Vigneswaran, 2013; Oucho and Crush, 2001). From a socio-economic perspective, the focus on highly skilled immigrants who will meet the country’s economic demands has resulted in the marginalisation of the majority of immigrants, who have had to ‘fight’ for their own survival.

3.6.3.3 Legal protection of immigrants and social discrimination

While police brutality against immigrants has been increasing (such as police dog attacks on Mozambican immigrants in 2001), negative sentiment about immigrants has grown apace in post-apartheid South Africa. As far as the literature is concerned, massive arrest and deportation operations have embodied a discourse in which foreign citizens are seen as the cause of high rates of unemployment and crime, and this has sparked conflicts with local citizens (SAMP15, 2014; Crush, 1999). As Handmaker (1999:292) points out, “South Africa is reported to be experiencing a pronounced and worsening climate of anti-foreigner sentiment, extending to widespread social discrimination, which has occasionally translated into violent attacks”. For instance, the xenophobic attacks in May 2008 (resulting in several deaths, and destruction and
looting of foreigners’ property) illustrates that post-apartheid South Africa has prioritised selective immigration policies such as economically driven immigration (Adjai and Lazaridis, 2014; Crush and Dodson, 2007).

In the context of refugees and asylum seekers, South African anti-immigration policies have deprived immigrants of several of their rights. For example, section 22 of the Refugee Act of 1998 prescribes that asylum seekers have no right to study or work for 180 days while their status is being processed (Handmaker and Parsley, 2001: 43). Post-apartheid South African immigration policies have tended to move in tandem with Western receiving countries’ models in which immigrants face tremendous difficulties in achieving social integration, ranging from shrinking opportunities for language instruction, xenophobia and racist public opinions about immigrants (Boucher and Gest, 2014).

While post-apartheid South African anti-immigration policies have resulted in violations of human rights, discrimination and raised anti-foreigner sentiment, policy makers have also failed to explore different approaches to migration and border control, particularly the concept of intra-Southern Africa migration, which is grounded in the historical context of migration between Southern Africa states. The concept of intra-Southern African migration can be better understood in the context of south-south migration as an alternative to migration and border control strategies in an ongoing process of regional integration in SADC. Regardless of restrictive border controls in many countries of the world, south-south migration has been intensified by globalisation and by the increase in regional agreements on the free movements of people (Donzelli, 2013). In the case of the Southern African region, table 3.2 below illustrates the socio-economic and ethno-cultural factors of cross-border interaction, which stand as fundamental features of intra-Southern African migration. These deserve further discussion towards finding an alternative approach to migration studies in the region. To be more specific, cross-border interactions can offer an alternative to migration management, in contrast to international standards of border control, which are fundamentally designed to restrict the movements of so-called
criminals across international borders. How intra-Southern African migration might provide an alternative that diverges from the criminal-migration nexus of border control is discussed in the following section.

3.7 Prospect of intra-Southern African migration: a response to anti-immigration policies

Up to this point, this chapter has analysed various legal and institutional reforms that have been implemented since the end of the war in Mozambique and the collapse of apartheid in South Africa, and the impact of these on the movements of people. Evidence from the literature illustrates that these reforms have perpetuated anti-immigration ideology and have led to the spread of xenophobic sentiments about foreign immigrants (Boucher and Gest, 2014; Fine, 2014; Handmaker, 1999).

However, as table 3.2 below illustrates, migration flows from and within the Southern African region are marked by local dynamics of border crossing intertwined with the effects of the end of war and apartheid (as fully explored in chapters 4, 5 and 6) and by historical labour migration to South Africa. These require a deeper analysis of the usefulness of international models of border control that seek to lock down borders against so-called unwanted immigrants across Western countries. By focusing on migration from and within the Southern African region, an alternative to international models of border control by placing emphasis on the views of local people in cross-border regions instead of on sovereignty, which concerns national states (Asiwaju, 2011).

In the case of migration from and within the Southern African region, communities living in cross-border regions interact on both sides of the border on a day-to-day basis for different reasons, particularly those related to socio-economic needs. The table illustrates that since the end of the war in Mozambique, cross-border interaction has increased and local communities have been able to expand their informal trade activities across borders to access water, firewood and arable lands, all vital to their livelihoods. While cross-border interaction has tended to intensify, variations have occurred in border control regimes from country to
country. While these variations in border control (weak, strong and very strong) are related to each country’s material capacity to monitor the border, states have tended to develop similar concerns about border control that are often in conflict with the concerns of the local population. In short, these regimes of border control reflect states’ perspectives of border security, which merge transboundary socio-economic interactions with cross-border crime, particularly poaching, illegal exploitation of mineral resources and smuggling.

### Table 3.2

**Key interaction factors shaping intra-Southern African migration**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries bordering Mozambique</th>
<th>Border length (km)</th>
<th>Transboundary ethnic/linguistic groups</th>
<th>Transboundary legally trafficked goods</th>
<th>Transboundary illegally trafficked goods</th>
<th>Transboundary prominent concerns</th>
<th>Security regime type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>Makonde; Yao</td>
<td>Fabrics; consumer goods; electronic items; bicycles and spare parts</td>
<td>Minerals; timber</td>
<td>Poaching; illegal extraction of minerals; smuggling; illegal migration</td>
<td>Weak: extensive with few patrol units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>Emacua; Chiyao; Chichewa</td>
<td>Maize; beans; salt; vegetables; soft drinks; bicycles, motorbikes and spare parts; mattresses</td>
<td>Fertilisers; firewood; timber; bamboo; rustled cattle; alcohol</td>
<td>Smuggling; land disputes; illegal fishing; felling of trees</td>
<td>Weak: very extensive and porous border; land-oriented border crossings; limited control capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>Nyanja; Nyungwe</td>
<td>Dried fish; maize; beans; potatoes; plastic items;</td>
<td>Bales of second-hand clothes; spirits; cigarettes</td>
<td>Smuggling; illegal migration</td>
<td>Weak: Porous; search for livelihoods on both</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Language(s)</th>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>Shona; Manhyka</td>
<td>fabrics; soft drinks; minerals; rustled cattle</td>
<td>Smuggling; illegal migration; illegal extraction of minerals; water for agriculture</td>
<td>Strong: Constantly patrolled border; socio-economically oriented crossing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Swazi; Chichangana</td>
<td>Sugar; maize flour; meat; milk; rice; soap; Bales of second-hand clothes; spirits; cigarettes; minerals; rustled cattle</td>
<td>Smuggling of goods and rustled cattle</td>
<td>Strong: Patrolled border; economically oriented crossing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>Tsonga; Chichangana; Zulus</td>
<td>Meat; maize flour; potatoes; tomatoes; clothing; shoes; Rustled cattle; stolen vehicles; firearms</td>
<td>Smuggling; trafficking; illegal migration; poaching of rhinos; rustled cattle</td>
<td>Very strong: Highly patrolled border; economically oriented crossing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data collated by the author on the basis of interviews in the field

Historically, the discovery of minerals on the Witwatersrand and in Kimberley stimulated labour migration by creating a demand for a labour force from several neighbouring countries: Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Botswana, Swaziland, Lesotho and Uganda (Fine, 2014; Wentzel and Tabela, 2001). This migration has always been economically driven, which is a crucial factor underlying intra-Southern African migration. For example, following the end of the war in Mozambique and the collapse of apartheid in South Africa, immigrants from other Southern African countries such as Malawi, Tanzania and Zimbabwe began to look for alternative destinations such as Mozambique and Botswana for trade opportunities and better living conditions. This gave new impetus to
regional economies, particularly for local populations (Ama et al., 2014; Peberdy, 2000).

Given the renaissance of migration from and within the Southern African region, the concept of intra-Southern African migration can be expressed in the idea of south-south migration, which is referred to as the migration that occurs between developing countries or regions (Melde et al., 2014; Ratha and Shaw, 2007; Bakewell, 2009). Based on the World Bank development indicators, developing countries are characterised by low income, low levels of human capital and economic vulnerability (Bakewell, 2009). Among the drivers of south-south migration, this research concentrates on those that might lead to more integrated border management in the context of a migration – development nexus. Here, south-south migration is motivated by reasons ranging from income (also a determinant for south-north migration), petty trade, geographical proximity, social and ethnic networks, conflict and natural disasters and transit purposes (Melde et al., 2014; Ratha and Shaw, 2007; Hujo and Piper, 2007).

Southern African countries could use a more responsive definition of border to meet challenges related to the building of a more interconnected society, in which the exchange of skills and culture better reflects the needs of communities divided by the legal lines of state borders. Thus, while states have always regarded foreign immigrants as a burden rather than as a boon, local inhabitants tend to view foreigners from the perspective of partnerships and skills exchange for local development. For example, this research uncovered many examples: a resident in the Ressano Garcia community (Mozambique-South Africa border) stated that “people from the great lakes have shown different experiences by introducing container-based grocery shops, which are now common in the country”. In the Machipanda community (Mozambique-Zimbabwe border), local residents understand that Zimbabwean immigrants (who come in search of jobs) have skills in areas such as construction and plumbing, from which they can benefit. In the same vein, a senior border police officer stated that “it is relatively easier to hire and pay relatively low wages to persons from
developing countries rather than European worker”. Such statements imply that intra-Southern African migration may arise as an alternative concept in the context of post-colonial Africa, one that has not yet been addressed from the perspective of social and developmental issues, particularly in terms of opportunities for the countries, local communities and migrants involved (Melde et al., 2014; Hujo and Piper, 2014; Hujo and Piper, 2007).

As has been emphasised in the previous sections, Mozambique and South Africa together with other Southern African states have prioritised border controls that have tended to view immigration as a threat rather than as an opportunity, and this has prevented them from incorporating migration management into social policy frameworks such as poverty reduction (Hujo and Piper, 2014; Hujo and Piper, 2007; Crush et al., 2005). In this scenario, each country in the Southern African region has been concerned with the control of immigrants in terms of “who is allowed to enter the country, for what purposes and under what conditions, but fundamentally also about the settlement and integration of migrants who intend to remain in the country” (SAMP, 2014:5). This notion can be separated into two strands of integration: economic and political.

From the perspective of economic integration, states in the Southern African region may need to explore the core values and potential contribution of immigration to their development strategies (SAMP, 2014). As the literature makes evident, such states may need to refrain from regarding immigrants as a threat and instead treat them as an opportunity (Adjai and Lazaridis, 2014; Sablonnière et al., 2013; Crush et al., 2005). At the practical level, they may need to work with local communities and immigrants to establish development strategies in which nationals and immigrants participate, to facilitate and strengthen both immigrant integration and the hosting communities and countries. This matter is discussed further in chapter 8.

In terms of political integration, development strategies established to achieve the integration of immigrants can contribute to social cohesion and the building of a national identity beyond cultural similarities and territorial
belonging. From this perspective, social cohesion and national identity mean more than living together in the same neighbourhood; they include how foreign immigrants are integrated into local communities (SAMP, 2014).

Southern African countries may need to view borders as points of contact rather than barriers, particularly since borders can no longer be confined by political geography and territorial identity owing to the volatile nature of these subjects (Newman, 2006b; Kolossov and O’Loughlin, 1998). Moreover, state border officials, particularly in the context of post-colonial border regions, need to be adaptive and adaptable to security complexities influencing global policing. This represents a structural demand in that states and communities in the border regions may need to frame a concept of security that balances socio-economic, cultural and sovereignty interests.

3.8 Conclusion

This chapter has examined border control strategies adopted in post-war Mozambique and post-apartheid South Africa, and the driving forces that have led to these strategies.

Findings indicate that the post-war political environment in Mozambique has resulted in new migration trends related to the return of refugees from neighbouring countries and travellers from beyond the regional borders in transit to South Africa. In response to this new pattern of migration, the Mozambican government has implemented several reforms aimed at keeping the border protected against unauthorised immigration and cross-border crime (such as trafficking, smuggling, illegal exploitation of natural resources) that it views as serious threats to security. Border authorities’ fears concerning border security are rooted in the legacies of the war, particularly the threats posed by penetration by apartheid elements in support of Renamo guerrillas in Mozambican territory. As a result, the MBP has focused on the training and deployment of patrol agents on the border for surveillance and patrol missions. In addition, immigration authorities have undertaken related operations
ranging from back checks, arrests and the deportation of immigrants in irregular situations.

In a similar manner, post-apartheid South African migration policies and border control strategies have continued the segregating policies of the past when dealing with immigrants, particularly those from neighbouring countries. The reconnection of South Africa to global chains of transaction has resulted in the implementation of migration reforms that have punished the majority of unskilled labour immigrants from rural South Africa and from neighbouring states. The Immigration Act of 2002 and its amendment Act of 2004 is a vivid illustration of how post-apartheid South Africa’s economically oriented migration policies have discriminated against the majority of unskilled immigrants, dating from the discovery of gold and diamonds in the late 19th century. South Africa has not been able to address internal migration problems nor migration pressure resulting from downsizing policies and the consequent loss of jobs for thousands of foreigners and national citizens. Foreign immigrants are seen predominantly as a threat to socio-economic stability, increasing unemployment and the spread of disease and criminality.

Notes

1 Women’s visibility in “networks of cross-border migration” in SSA is a new pattern that has emerged since the 1970s. At one end of the spectrum this has resulted in competition with men for social responsibilities, and this is grounded in an economic perspective of migration, particularly since the end of apartheid in South Africa. That is, trader women make up the majority in the flow of traders crossing the Mozambican-South African borders and have been shown to support their dependents including spouses, children and extended families in terms of housing, food and the education of children (Peberdy, 2000).
The intensification of war and penetration of elements of the apartheid regime across the Mozambican borders led to the signing on 16 March 1984 of the Inkomati Accord of “non-aggression and good neighbourliness” between the Mozambican government and the South African apartheid regime. The key aim of the Accord was to end the war and its legacies since it was believed that if Pretoria would fulfil its goals under the accord, the intensity of bandit activity would rapidly decline.

Reaffirmation is a topographic activity that is conducted using maps and previous border treaties to replace milestones that have been removed or destroyed during a period of war, by animals or by natural phenomena.

While delimitation of the border is the description of its line in text, maps or cartographic letters, demarcation is an indication of the physical alignment of the border in own grounds (Brownile, 1987).

Interviewed in October 2012, in Maputo.

Although violation of a state’s borders is a contravention in Mozambique, it can be sanctioned as a crime in some cases. In cases of violation of a state’s borders by a warship, by border forces from neighbouring countries or by spying airplanes, all measures have to be taken against the perpetrator. In addition, administrative or criminal sanctions can be applied to any person found guilty of border violation (Provision Guide, 1979).

However, there are cases in which a given state decides unilaterally to close the border, as the South African authorities did at the simplified post of Mbuzine in Maputo Province.

A restricted border zone is the territory within the administrative boundaries immediately adjacent to the state border line, the territorial length of which stretches up to 20 km from the official border line. This area includes Mozambican inland waters, rivers, lakes and islands.

Interviewed in October 2012, in Maputo.

Interviewed in October 2012, in Maputo.

Interviewed in October 2012, in Maputo.

Parliamentarian and rapporteur for the International Relations Commission at the National Assembly, interviewed on 12 November 2012.
While South Africa has been concerned with the implementation of both downsizing and anti-immigration policies, Botswana has tended to take a capability approach to migration management. In this sense, Botswana has become more interested in skilled immigrants with temporary entry (Crush, 1999).

SAMP, or the Southern African Migration Programme, was founded in 1996 in Cape Town. It is an international organisation aimed at promoting awareness of migration-development linkages in the SADC region. Its focus is on applied research on migration and development issues that serve to provide policy advice and expertise to the countries of the region through training programmes and education campaigns.

Based on World Bank development indicators, developing countries/regions include Africa, the Americas excluding North America, the Caribbean, Asia excluding Japan, Oceania excluding Australia, and New Zealand (Bakewell, 2009). Other organisations such as the UN and the UNDP define developing countries based on the Human Development Index (HDI).

Resident in Ressano Garcia border, interviewed in October 2013.

Interviewed in March 2014.
4.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter it was argued that following the end of armed conflict in Mozambique and the collapse of apartheid in South Africa, the Southern African region witnessed an escalation in migration flows. Concomitantly, Mozambique’s position shifted from a country that traditionally sent labour migrants to South Africa to one that received migrants, including those in transit, from across the Southern African region. Today it receives immigrants from north Sahara who are pressuring Southern African borders as a result of the tremendous difficulties they encounter in trying to enter Europe, caused particularly by the intensified war on terror. Mozambique has thus become the preferential transit country for those wishing to enter South Africa, resulting in greater migration into the region.

In light of this, chapter 4 examines migration flows, border control responses (by the Mozambican and South African border authorities) and their impact on local communities situated across the busiest and most contentious crossing point between Mozambique and South Africa – Ressano Garcia. Since the end of war, Ressano Garcia has been targeted by travellers from all over the country as well as beyond its borders, significantly increasing migration flows. Given this scenario, the Mozambican border authorities have intensified patrol operations along this border and have abolished the ‘long period stamp’ certificates that were previously issued to local residents to allow them to cross the border.
into South Africa. These changes have been introduced (1) as a response to pressure from neighbouring countries (particularly South Africa) to clamp down on clandestine migration; (2) in response to international security standards applying to official travel documents; and (3) as a result of increased concern over territorial sovereignty and the protection of natural resources. These changes have had a marked effect on the life of local residents, particularly from a social and economic perspective. This in turn has resulted in differences in perceptions held by the Mozambican border authorities and local communities of the role and meaning of the border.

4.2 Ressano Garcia and the dynamics of border control

Ever since the discovery of diamonds in Kimberley and gold on the Witwatersrand, the South African mining industry has attracted a considerable labour force from its domestic boundaries and from neighbouring countries, particularly Mozambique, Lesotho and Swaziland (Spaan and van Moppes, 2006). As Mozambique was the area responsible for the greatest labour supply, the Zuid Afrikaansche Republiek signed a labour agreement with the Portuguese in 1897, aimed at ensuring a more regulated and cheaper labour supply (Fine, 2014; Wentzel and Tlabela, 2001). In terms of the agreement, the South African gold mines established the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WENELA) – a recruiting agency for migrant workers intended to ensure controlled and legal male labour migration. Since then, immigration flows into South Africa have been restricted by means of internal control operations and reinforced border patrols.

However, the end of the war in Mozambique in 1992, coupled with a growing demand for cheap labour in informal sectors in South Africa, has resulted in increased flows of migrants (particularly undocumented migrants) from different parts of the country and beyond, all of whom expect to cross the Ressano Garcia border (Adepoju, 2000). In response, the South African government has strengthened border patrol operations in order to crack down on clandestine and undocumented migrants (Fine,
For example, in 1996 South African border authorities pledged to raise the electrified border fence to a lethal mode if clandestine crossings were not significantly reduced (McDonald, Zinyama, Gay et al., 2005).

As the Ressano Garcia border has been identified as a conduit for clandestine migration, human trafficking and other transnational crimes (facilitated by an extensive criminal network in Sub-Saharan Africa [SSA]), scholars have related this problem to the lack of adequate apparatus, technology and patrolling required to defend the border on the Mozambican side (Gastrow and Mosse, 2002; Adepoju, 2006; Raimundo, 2009). As a result, South Africa, Botswana and Namibia have argued that weak border control in neighbouring countries is likely to increase migration flows into the most prosperous countries, thereby distorting regional development rather than creating equilibrium. This has postponed the implementation of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) protocols on the free movement of people in the sub-continent (Oucho and Crush, 2001). Discrepancies in free movement agreements have meant that each member state has a different agreement regulating the movement of persons. This opens the way for irregularities and unilateral arrangements.

In most of the cases, unilateral border control arrangements are in direct opposition to the perceptions of local residents. In the Mozambican context, the state defines and controls the border from a political perspective (sovereignty), while local residents perceive it as presenting socio-economic and cultural opportunities for their survival. Given these contrasting viewpoints, neither set of actors (neither the state nor local residents) has been able to establish a common ground from which to negotiate the border. This failure has provided this research study with an opportunity to bring human security border control into the ontology of migration studies.

In the context of post-colonial countries, border control requires an analytical framework that pays attention to the interplay of kinships...
divided by colonial borders, economic differences between countries and other socio-economic conditions that impair human life in border regions. In the following section, the state’s views on border control and the consequences for local views on border crossings are considered from the perspective of social constructivism.

4.3 Securitisation and human security perspective of borders

The end of the Cold War altered the concepts of security and border considerably, imbuing them with wide and contradictory meanings. On the one hand, the notion of security has been expanded, integrating protection of individuals and communities from internal violence, natural disasters, transmissible diseases and other aspects of deteriorating human circumstances and shifting the referent of security from state to individual (Amouyel, 2006). On the other hand, security has become a divisive concept in that interest in the individuals at the centre of the security discourse has remained twofold.

At one end of the spectrum, the protection of individuals in issues related to the provision of public goods and human rights, which constitute the building blocks of national security, has become the focus of the state’s attention (Amouyel, 2006). At the other end of the spectrum, individuals have come to the attention of the state as they are viewed as a threat to security. In the case of the latter, there is a growing belief that the globalisation of transactions, terrorism and increased organised transnational crime is a threat to the identity of states and societies (Bigo, 2007). As a result, state borders are regarded as conduits for criminals. For this reason, it is believed that these borders should be more restrictive to those who are perceived to pose a threat to security, thereby making law enforcement the last bastion of sovereignty (Dauvergne, 2008; Nunez-Neto, 2008). For example, in the Eurocentric perception of sovereignty, migration controls have changed the logic of surveillance in the protection of people and national identity, giving borders the connotation of racism and intolerance directed at so-called ‘unwanted’ immigrants (Bigo, 2002).
However, scholars of security studies understand that the association of migration with crime is a result of the social construction of security threats. Social constructivism is defined as “the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction in the dynamic process and epistemic interpretations of the material world” (Adler, 1997:322). It expresses the human capacity for reflection and the creation of meanings of the world he or she knows, experiences and understands (Adler, 1997). In security studies, constructivism is concerned with conceiving the components of social reality and world politics and how they are linked to each other (Balzacq, 2010).

However, critiques of social constructivism have come from various quarters, particularly from advocates for human security. Departing from the perspective of speech acts, advocates of human security hold that securitisation is theoretically restrictive and methodologically unrewarding as it is concerned with what matters to the power holder. The theoretical contradiction of constructivism is that the material, the subjective and the intersubjective worlds become disconnected in the way that a state’s security and human security are not the same (Balzacq, 2010). For example, from the perspective of security’s referent object, security interests between the concerned actors (state and individuals) become dissimilar since satisfaction of human needs is linked solely to protection of sovereignty, regardless of various aspects of human needs that remain unsatisfied (Floyd, 2011).

Based on this, social constructivism as it is perceived by the Copenhagen School (CS) is deemed incapable of making recommendations that can improve the lives of the most disadvantaged citizens (Floyd, 2007:38). Therefore, constructivists and scholars of human security find themselves in disagreement regarding security. This increases the inability of the CS to conceptualise the security concerns of dispersed local inhabitants (from below), who are ‘forced’ to accept the state imposed security policy without any bargaining power (Doty, 1998; Balzacq, 2010). While advocates of the CS understand that security is a social construct, advocates of human security see it as an actual human
need that demands political intervention, beyond battalions (Thomas, 2001). From this perspective, human security has embodied a paradigm shift, from a concern with weapons to a concern for human life and dignity, which has theoretically expanded the analytical framework of security (Floyd, 2007; Amouyel, 2006). However, if the making of a referent security object is intended to achieve survival purposes, the concept of security itself is blurred, lacks a single logic and needs further analysis, which implies that the state’s agenda on security demands critical analysis (Weaver cited in Stritzel, 2007).

For example, in the matter of cross-border communities, human security analysis focuses on family bonds and cultural identity, issues which force communities into continuous interaction regardless of the state’s views on security. Given that every state border is unique (Medeiros, 2015; O’Dowd, 2002), cross-border communities in the context of post-colonial countries are informed by a complex mixture of factors that clash with the Westphalian system of border control. As Newman (2006a:174) points out, “the division of tribal and ethnic territories between more than one state, or the inclusion of numerous ethnic groups in a single territory has plagued Africa and parts of Asia until today in constant strife”. Given the transforming nature of the concept of security, such strife can be pinpointed as the result of a lack of access to potable water and food, medical treatment, adequate education and other human necessities. Based on similar examples, the following section highlights how the Ressano Garcia border has become the most important and busiest land border in Mozambique, and most particularly, how different perceptions of security held by the Mozambican border authorities and local communities have turned this border into a site of a battle for survival.

4.4 Context and case study

While chapter 3 has interrogated general national security views that have driven Mozambique and South Africa to prioritise anti-criminal responses to border control, this chapter concentrates on a specific border region...
and analyses the position and practices of these states and the local community on the border. During the period of civil struggle, Ressano Garcia played a crucial socio-economic role for local residents, but its transformation into the busiest border in the country has set the stage for a conflict of interests between the Mozambican border authorities and communities living in cross-border regions. However, despite the Mozambican Government’s concerns about effective border control, Ressano Garcia remains the most important pipeline for the supply of commodities to informal sectors in Matola, Maputo and beyond. The following subsections illustrate how Ressano Garcia has evolved as an important point of intersection between South Africa and Mozambique, and how local residents have reacted to the changes that have occurred over time.

4.4.1 Ressano Garcia border: historical overview

Map 4.1
Ressano Garcia border region

Author’s own map
Source: https://maps.google.nl/maps?hl=en&tab=wl
The Ressano Garcia border region is located in the southern part of Moamba District (in Maputo Province). It borders the Republic of South Africa in the south, the Namaacha District in the east, the Sabié District in the west and the Moamba village in the north. As a result of a preponderance of stones and sand, the soil is unsuited to agriculture.

Initially, a village was established in the region in 1891 and the name was given as a tribute to Frederico Ressano Garcia, a Portuguese engineer who was prominent in the construction of the railway line from Lourenço Marques (now Maputo) to Pretoria (in South Africa), initiated in 1887.

The railway line played an important role in the Portuguese colony and in South Africa under the apartheid regime, being used as it was especially for the shipment of gold and other resources to the international market through the port of Lourenço Marques (today Port Maputo). While the transportation of raw material was common, immigration from Mozambique to South Africa was severely restricted and intended primarily for mine workers on short-term contracts. However, following the end of the war, the Mozambique-South Africa borders became the most important points for cross-border trade between the two countries, with Ressano Garcia playing a particularly key role. Factors that led to this transformation included the low cost of road transport, expansive transportation networks from north to south, and the demand for jobs and business opportunities in South Africa. As a result, Mozambican traders have increased their imports from South Africa as prices are relatively low. The South African traders have also started to expand markets for their businesses in Mozambique.

As a result of these business opportunities, informal traders, brokers, taxi-owners and travellers from different parts of Mozambique and beyond have turned the Ressano Garcia border into the busiest crossing point in the country. This transformation has led the authorities in both countries to increase border control measures. For instance, on the South African side, the border is protected by barbed wire and reinforced by patrol units, while on the Mozambican side, patrol units undertake surveillance and patrol operations aimed at fighting all manner of criminal activities, ranging from smuggling, poaching and trafficking to vehicle
theft. But while the state attempts to undertake unilateral security measures aimed at fighting cross-border criminality, local communities struggle to make their lives easier over the border. The following subsection describes how the Mozambican immigration authorities have responded to changes in migration flows across the Ressano Garcia border.

4.4.2 Immigration control

About 3,000 travellers and 1,000 vehicles cross the Ressano Garcia official land port daily. During the border’s busiest times (particularly during festival seasons), these numbers reach 25,000 travellers and 3,000 vehicles. In response to this increased flow of travellers and vehicles, the Mozambican government has introduced interventions aimed at speeding up the flow of passengers while ensuring the maintenance of security. The border has started operating 24 hours a day and there is an ongoing ‘one stop’ border project, aimed at reducing the time travellers spend at an attendant’s desk. These interventions were reinforced in 2010 with the introduction of independent lanes for pedestrians and vehicles. These lanes were created to avoid passengers on public transport using the same lane as those travelling in private vehicles. As a result, mine workers, tourists and mukheristas use different pedestrian lanes. During the busiest seasons, the Mozambique-South Africa border authorities make joint arrangements designed to expedite dealing with long queues of travellers.

In addition to these arrangements, Mozambican immigration officials have been involved in the implementation of measures to improve checks on official travel documents and passengers. For instance, the Head of Immigration Office at Ressano Garcia Border Post has observed that:

- in coordination with USA border authorities, there was an attempt to establish a database system to control foreigners’ travel information, but this arrangement could have made Mozambique a target of Al-Qaida as it is with other countries that have formed a strong relationship with the Americans in their war on terror from third countries.

This reveals that the war on terror has become an influential securitisation discourse in border control, which has had the effect of turning the bulk
of travellers into illegal immigrants (Dauvergne, 2008). For example, Mozambican immigration authorities\textsuperscript{8} believe that Somalis, Bengalis, Nigerians and Pakistanis are pose the highest risk in the context of Mozambique as these countries are generally deemed to be associated with networks involved in the falsification of travel documents related transnational crime.

In order to control these citizens, the Mozambican immigration authorities have started demanding (from family living in Mozambique) a form accepting responsibility for the traveller. This illustrates how the war on terror and the globalisation of security has brought about the prioritisation of international security standards over domestic concerns about security, particularly local perspectives of the crossing of borders. In responding to high migration flows, for instance, an immigration inspector at Ressano Garcia border post\textsuperscript{9} explained that Mozambican immigration authorities have introduced a ‘passport regime’ in order to ensure that every border-crosser complies with immigration requirements (a valid passport and related official travel documents), and purchases only the quantity of goods allowed by law. This has resulted in the prohibition of ‘long period stamp’ certificates\textsuperscript{10} as valid documents for local residents crossing the border.

This prohibition suggests that, in view of the state’s securitisation policies, local residents have become criminals who have to face all changes made without any kind of negotiation. Immigration authorities have for instance banned long period stamp certificates on the grounds that local residents used these to host and facilitate non-residents in crossing the border to South Africa. They also hold the view that local residents used to assist their relatives (particularly mukheristas from Maputo) in obtaining long period stamp certificates and using them to import goods for business purposes. This led to a breakdown in collaboration with border authorities as they could no longer distinguish local from non-local residents, which in turn has resulted in an increase in security measures recommended for restricted border zones\textsuperscript{11}. In line with the provisional guide\textsuperscript{12}, these security measures range from the prohibition of any construction within the restricted border zone to the prohibition
of fishing and hunting activities. These measures include the prohibition of non-residents from entering or exiting this zone without official travel documents.

Apart from increased concerns with security within the restricted zone, border authorities have become more attentive to security along the remainder of the border. Factors that have led to this increase in vigilance include poaching, smuggling, and undocumented migrants, all of which constitute major problems that have informed bilateral meetings and cooperation between the Mozambican and South African border institutions. This suggests that the human aspects of border crossings are discussed in direct relationship with criminality, thereby reducing the scope for the negotiation of a more integrated border between countries and cross-border communities. Moreover, sovereignty is reduced to the political and economic level of border control, and is thus far removed from the human aspects informing economic and social discourses from the perspective of local populations.

4.4.3 Patrol operations

Despite the fact that the war has ended, its legacy continues to inform border patrol operations in Mozambique as a whole. In the case of the Ressano Garcia border, border control strategies since the end of war in Mozambique have changed the interplay of security factors at the border, presenting a challenge to both border authorities and local residents. For example, the commander of the 2nd Battalion of the Border Patrol Unit at Ressano Garcia\(^1\) observes that “most of [the] residents along the border line cross the border for hospital treatments, commercial exchanges, and family visits. According to the Commander, in Mphuza, Manhoca and Statuene border communities (District of Ponta D ‘Ouro) local residents and their counterparts from South Africa organise international market fairs for exchanging their products”. He also explains that cross-border communities serve as transit points for undocumented migrants pretending to be local residents, which increases the need for a more closely patrolled border. From this perspective, “border control should be
understood from state legitimacy of use of power on the grounds that undocumented migrants, smugglers, and cross-border criminals are prepared to fight border patrollers. This suggests that clandestine migration and smuggling are key factors that have changed the state’s view of the border to that of a more restrictive space, ranging from its attitude to the socio-economic contribution of the border to the role played by local residents.

However, as the border plays different roles, so border institutions in the Mozambican context have different views of the border. For instance, while border patrol units undertake control from the standpoint of the preservation of the state’s sovereignty, customs officials on the other hand regard the border from an economic perspective, that is, as a source of revenue collection, and so focus their operations on the prevention of contraband and tax avoidance. From this perspective, customs and border patrol units understand the role of the border in a way that clashes with local views informing the crossing of the border. This diminishes the scope of the border as a space for negotiating human security-based border control, with the result that state authorities and local people are placed in a skewed power relation that has a detrimental effect on any bargaining process. In this regard, from the perspective of the CS, a speech act gains its power according to the capacity of the actor to deploy the means to protect the threatened security object, which people from below lack (Floyd, 2011).

As economically driven border control is central to customs operations, the need for a high quality system of technology and highly qualified personnel has led to reforms aimed at ensuring increased tax collection in the face of growing volumes of contraband, particularly since the end of the war. In relation to this contraband, the MRD estimates that, between 2000 and 2001, about 90,000 tonnes of sugar were illegally imported from South Africa, which forced the director of Mozambique’s National Institute of Sugar to warn that “the dumping of sugar below cost price in the Mozambican market could suffocate the country’s own sugar producers” (Gastrow and Mosse, 2002:15). USAID’s report in this regard found that the Mozambican and South African authorities have given little
attention to informal sector cross-border transactions. This represents a risk to economic development since most informal traders resort to paying bribes to customs agents in order to allow their goods to pass across the border without complication (Peberdy, 2014; Peberdy, 2000). In response to this, the MRD has gradually increased control of imported goods, particularly in the busiest places of entry such as Mavalane Airport, Port Maputo and the Ressano Garcia border.

On the operational front, the MRD has established FAST\textsuperscript{15} brigades – mobile teams designed to prevent the movement of contraband goods across the ‘green border’\textsuperscript{16}. FAST teams operate 24 hours a day, every day, in permanent coordination with border patrol forces. The Chief Customs official at the Ressano Garcia Border notes that “the Ressano Garcia border is a route of contraband goods in a double-circuit between Mozambique and South Africa”\textsuperscript{17}. Mozambican informal traders focus on goods from South Africa referred to as specific or luxury products such as alcoholic beverages, cigarettes and cosmetics. Their objective is to avoid the high import taxes imposed on these goods. South African traders enter the double-smuggling circuit in order to get exemption from Value Added Tax (VAT). In this circuit, they pretend to have imported goods from Mozambique. Regardless of persistent contraband evidence, the MRD’s goal is to increase tax collection, which is assumed to have been achieved with the introduction of a single window system that is to be linked to all border posts. Moreover, “an integrated control of imported goods can remarkably reduce contraband and speed up clearance procedures”\textsuperscript{18}. This suggests that, while the MRD’s reforms were initially aimed partly at preventing tax avoidance at the domestic level, they were also intended to comply with international security standards in ensuring legitimate trade by preventing the import and export of prohibited goods such as weapons, explosives and general goods unsuitable for public consumption. Based on this, the Ministry of Health and Agriculture has intensified its work with customs officials at the border. It is clear from this that border management has become a complex and cross-cultural space that should involve different actors in addressing issues of concern, particularly
disadvantaged local communities who have less influence on the state’s views of border control.

4.4.4 Community perceptions

Since colonial times, the local residents of Ressano Garcia have always been allowed privileged access to South Africa for the purposes of shopping. The status quo persisted during the period of war as the region was totally isolated from Maputo, with the result that local residents were more closely connected to South Africa. With the increased economic interplay between the two neighbouring countries, local residents have made the border an important part of their daily subsistence. For example, members of the Transport Association of Ressano Garcia regard the border as an opportunity to provide transportation services to passengers and their goods from Komatipoort (in South Africa) to the Ressano border and vice versa, thereby providing them with self-employment. For the mukheristas (informal traders), the high point was the abolition of visas in 2002. The visa abolition agreement between Mozambique and South Africa “is the best achievement by government in the post-war period as this has significantly reduced clandestine border crossings”\(^{19}\). However, local residents understand that there is more work to be done, particularly with regard to the improvement of water supply networks, the construction of roads, and a supermarket with relatively low prices compared to those in Komatipoort\(^{20}\). This reveals that local residents are concerned about the lack of government intervention in basic social needs, which forces them to cross the border in order to gain access to an infrastructure that provides for these needs.

In the case of the abolition of visas, low income people enjoy no advantage from the agreement. For example, a local unemployed youngster\(^{21}\) states that “3,000 meticais is too expensive to get a passport. Moreover, passports contain few pages, which brings no compensation as on a day-to-day basis we need to stamp them\(^{22}\)”. In line with these complaints, some local residents (particularly people on low incomes) rely on the goodwill of border authorities for permission to cross the border.
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without stamping their passports. One of their key arguments is that “we live here and there is no life for us without this border”. This argument reveals how local residents have related their survival to the border; they see the border not only as a space for their economic security, but also as a space to fight outsiders. For example, the Chief of Ressano Garcia village observes that in the past, security was concerned with mushwabo, while at present local residents are concerned with maribanes and challengers.

The term Maribanes refers to a group of youngsters who are involved in providing illegal access, in exchange for money, to undocumented migrants who wish to cross the border into South Africa. The crossing rate ranges from 100 to 250 South African Rand per person. An unnamed young man associated with the maribanes group explains that “there are many travellers who arrive at Ressano Garcia without passports on their way to South Africa and we show them pathways to cross the border until they reach the other side”. It is worth mentioning that, based on observations conducted at Ressano Garcia, when a taxi reaches the bus stop with passengers from Maputo, the maribanes’ major concern is to engage with travellers interested in crossing the border without official travel documents.

However, it is not only maribanes who are involved in assisting undocumented migrants in crossing the border. “Some local residents are complicit in clandestine migration to South Africa in exchange for money.” Moreover, undocumented migration has increased widely throughout the country to the extent that “it involves brokers who use their own vehicles or negotiate with long-distance trucks for transportation of potential migrants from their own villages, particularly Gaza and Inhambane Provinces, to the Ressano Garcia border”. A local informal trader states that “clandestine migration is a networked activity because on South Africa’s side these migrants find taxi-buses waiting for taking them to Johannesburg”. Moreover, regardless of constant road block operations in South Africa, vehicles transporting undocumented migrants experience no difficulty in reaching their destination, which reinforces the notion that there is a network of human smuggling across
the Ressano Garcia border⁹. This strengthens the argument that the Ressano Garcia border will always be a contradictory space as a result of different peoples’ opportunistic approaches to the border. For example, *challengers*³⁰ ambush smugglers and undocumented migrants, robbing them of their goods. In some cases, “they rape women, kill undocumented migrants, and engage in human trafficking”³¹.

In the eyes of the local residents, *challengers, marihanes, mukheristas, street vendors and informal money exchangers* are all outsiders. They come from different parts of the country and establish themselves in Ressano Garcia, from where they engage in various illegal activities for their survival. A local informal trader³² notes that outsiders engage in criminal activities because they are unemployed, forcing them to come to the border to steal passengers’ goods and vehicle parts. For instance, when the border is very busy, these youngsters deceive tourists by pretending to be facilitators who will help them to avoid queuing to have their passports stamped, but these stamps (including South African stamps) are fake; they also cheat their ‘customers’ when these want to exchange money. This highlights the fact that the Ressano Garcia human-security border control faces challenges, ranging from the relationship between local people and outsiders (alleged criminals) to the perception that the border authorities have of the local residents, and perceptions of the security on this border held by other countries.

Given the existence of cross-border crime in Ressano Garcia, local residents recognise the challenges faced by the border institutions. As an informal trader³³ remarked, “the green border should be well protected so that our children can abandon illegal transboundary activities and devote themselves to school and other legitimate activities. All those who are engaged with facilitation of clandestine migration have no time to go to school as they know they can survive from illegal border activities”. However, strong patrol measures or repatriation operations remain inadequate solutions since Mozambique lacks the favourable socio-economic conditions that could prevent deported migrants from returning to South Africa.
From the perspective of human rights, “arrest, detention and repatriation procedures do not always protect either irregular or regular migrants from abuse and have the potential to cause conflict between neighbouring countries” (Crush et al., 2005:25). For example, economically, repatriation operations are expensive and experience shows that, while many countries in the SADC region have been expending large sums on the deportation of undocumented migrants from neighbouring countries, the impact has been insignificant (Oucho, 2014; Melde et al., 2014; SAMP, 2014; Oucho and Crush, 2001). Analysts understand that an ideal solution for addressing cross-border criminality goes beyond highly securitised borders. It requires “an analysis of factors leading to socio-economic interplay between cross-border communities. It implies understanding why people cross the border undocumented and most importantly, it implies understanding different typologies of the border in spatial-temporal dimensions”\textsuperscript{34}. In the context of state security, this statement emphasises how border authorities have been concerned with infiltration by saboteurs, particularly given the rise of the extraction industry in Mozambique.

However, regardless of border authorities’ concerns with undocumented migration, smuggling, and immigrants presenting a risk to the state, the selected interviewees in Ressano Garcia community understand that foreigners are welcome as long as they create job opportunities for the local population. They recognise that foreigners (particularly those who are not engaged in transnational crime) have experience, from which they can expand their knowledge to better manage their lives. For example, unlike the Congolese in the Goma border region who want a border like a Berlin wall to protect against the possible penetration by Rwandan aggressors (Doevenspeck, 2011), Ressano Garcia residents want a border that can be negotiated with authorities and that will increase contact with foreigners and allow for better opportunities. They believe that “foreigners should create job opportunities taking into account the type and capability of the local labour force\textsuperscript{35}”. Based on this, “any foreigner who does not contribute to the economic growth of
Ressano Garcia is not welcome; a foreigner should not solely occupy the land, but should also contribute to the development and welfare of the local people\textsuperscript{36}. This reveals that local people relate a capability approach with the security of their social boundaries. They understand the border as a space for cooperation and mutual coexistence, while upholding the state’s security interests.

4.5 Cross-border cooperation: lessons from the case study

Whether they are in Europe or in Africa, cross-border regions are marked by differences and similarities, an understanding of which is crucial to framing greater cooperation or regional integration strategies. For instance, the European Community has adopted cross-border cooperation initiatives in the Rhine Basin (aimed at addressing specific problems ranging from pollution, transfrontier workers and land use) and applied them to the integration of the European Union (O’ Dowd, 2003).

In the case of the Ressano Garcia border region, local communities and state authorities are the main drivers of the various typologies of borders on which any model of cooperation depends. From the perspective of state security, the border is perceived as (1) a coercive space, which gives the state a legitimate monopoly over the protection of territorial sovereignty; (2) as a legal line, which implies that travellers must use official checkpoints with valid official travel documents; (3) as an international and global border, which appeals for cooperation for global security and compliance with international border control methods; (4) as a criminal space that is associated with porous borders, smuggling, human trafficking and other transitional criminality; and (5) as an orderly process that demarcates peaceful and secure territories from those that are not. From the perspective of local communities, the border is perceived as (6) a barrier, to the extent that those with little financial capacity encounter limitations in crossing it legally. Moreover, it is a barrier to foreigners who are perceived as a risk and a threat to national security; (7) as a deliberative space in which local residents understand that a negotiable border with authorities can lead to the resolution of their security concerns regarding
the border; and (8) as a set of opportunities that have allowed local residents to establish small scale business initiatives such as currency exchanges, transportation services and casual employment.

The typology of borders mentioned above suggests that the state is the crucial actor in the establishment of cooperation with local communities aimed at addressing security concerns from the perspective of local populations. This approach is central to understanding the concept of security and its transforming patterns. For example, scholars of international relations recognise that the shift in security priorities from the state’s perspective of territorial sovereignty to the centre of society is the result of the evolution of the concept of security itself (Anderson, 2013; Rudolph, 2005; Doty, 1998). On the one hand, human security has been recognised as a global public benefit that states have been integrating into their domestic security policies (Amouyel, 2006). On the other hand, state policies can reflect the human security dimension of the border based on the degree of cooperation with people from below and the extent to which they are given the power to map and discuss their security concerns about the border.

In the context of the case study, cross-border cooperation is reflected on two different levels. Firstly, at the domestic level, cooperation requires the establishment of a ‘win-win’ partnership between border authorities and local communities. Secondly, cross-border cooperation needs to involve a partnership between Mozambique and its neighbouring states in the matter of transboundary issues (such as access to supermarkets), the solution to which depends on bilateral cooperation. In retrospect, African heads of state have recognised that the African Union Border Programme (AUBP) requires greater cooperation between states in the management of cross-border issues if peace is to be promoted and conflict prevented (African Union Conference, 2007). As is discussed in Chapter 8, it should be kept in mind that cross-border regions in Mozambique are not necessarily marked by conflicts (strictu sensu); they lack the mechanisms of coordination that could address fundamental human security needs on a daily basis.
4.6 Conclusion

This chapter has examined life experience and border control priorities in one of the busiest border posts between Mozambique and South Africa – the Ressano Garcia border. In the post-war period, this border region has faced increased migration flows, which have become a concern to both the Mozambican and South African border authorities. In the case of Mozambique, the country’s concern with security measures is inextricably linked to high migration flows into South Africa, which are related to the smuggling of goods, clandestine migration and other transnational crimes. These perceived threats have resulted in security reforms regarding the crossing of borders. One of these security reforms has been the introduction of a ‘passport regime’.

These reforms have had a considerable effect on the lives of local inhabitants, so much so that they have had to rely on the goodwill of border authorities in order to cross the border and purchase basic consumer goods. Much like Mozambican border patrol responses, the South African border authorities have increased patrol operations, which have also been reinforced by the deployment of the defence force. These moves are aimed at stopping clandestine migration and preventing an increase in transnational cross-border crime.

One common theme arising from these findings is that the fighting of crime and the protection of sovereignty has become a buzzword for the border authorities, regardless of particularities related to the socio-economic dynamics in each border region. This implies that national security logic ‘blinds’ state authorities to local characteristics of border crossing, particularly those that are related to human security. The problem is that state officials give no recognition to these human aspects of border crossing, which results in security practices that clash with local needs.

Given the persistent perception and practices of border control as crime-fighting, this chapter suggests that state officials should be trained to understand the complexities of borders, with more emphasis placed on the role of border patrol forces as protectors of human life. While this
remains a theoretical suggestion, findings indicate that a state’s deployment of more patrol units along the border reinforces the connection between migration and security, which this chapter has revealed to be inadequate in the development of a more localised theory of border, particularly in the context of post-colonial countries.

Notes

1 Moamba District is situated in the northern part of Maputo Province, about 70 km from the capital of the country, and is the artificial border line with the South African Province of Mpumalanga.

2 Maputo Province is divided into seven districts, namely Boane, Magude, Manhica, Marracuene, Matutine, Moamba and Namaacha.

3 As a result of soil being unsuitable for agriculture, some local inhabitants have fields in Chanculo Locality (in Moamba District) where they grow peanuts, corn, potatoes, cassava and beans.

4 At that time, the village was composed of a few settlements and some canteens made of wood and zinc owned by local Portuguese and Indian traders. The only brick buildings were the railway station and related facilities and a brewery for local residents. As a result of the Anglo-Boer war between 1900 and 1901, the village expanded, forcing the Portuguese to build a strategic military station composed of an immigration office and a residence for its officials.

5 The one stop border project on the Ressano Garcia/Lebombo border is coordinated by the Mozambican immigration authorities and their counterparts in South Africa.

6 Mukheristas is a local name (particularly in the southern part of Mozambique) used to refer to informal traders (mainly women) who import goods from South Africa and Swaziland.

7 Interviewed on 15 October 2012.

8 Chief Immigration Officer at Ressano Garcia border, interviewed on 15 October 2012.

9 Interviewed on 2 October 2012.
With long period stamp certificates, local authorities were allowed to cross the border at (South Africa) to shop for consumer goods.

The restricted border area is a space that stretches up to 20 km into the interior from the official state border line. It is under permanent guard by the border patrol units. Its area includes Mozambican waters, rivers, lakes and islands within this established area.

The provisional guide is a blueprint that was established in 1979 for the Mozambican border forces. It prescribes operational procedures for protection of state borders against security threats.

Interviewed on 2 October 2012.

Commander of the 2nd Battalion of the Border Patrol Unit in Ressano Garcia, interviewed on 2 October 2012.

Originally, FAST was a US Marine company established in 1987. Its duties today are to perform security missions such as combating operations and other military operations aimed at protecting military cargo ships.

The green border is the rest of the extension of the state border that is under the direct control of patrol forces.

Interviewed on 10 October 2012.

The Customs Operational Chief at the Ressano Garcia Border, interviewed on 10 October 2012.

Community Leader in the Ressano Garcia border region, interviewed on 10 October 2012.

Community Leader on the Ressano Garcia border region, interviewed on 10 October 2012.

An anonymous respondent interviewed in the Ressano Garcia border region, October, 2012

A respondent interviewed in anonymity in Ressano Garcia border region, October 2012

A respondent interviewed in anonymity in Ressano Garcia border region, October, 2012.

Mushwapo was the practice of jumping into a train while it was in motion (coming from South Africa) in order to rob miners.

Interviewed in October 2012 on the Ressano Garcia border.
Community Leader in the Ressano Garcia border region, interviewed on 10 October 2012.

Immigration Inspector, interviewed in Maputo on 5 November 2012

Interviewed on 12 October 2012 in Ressano Garcia.

Immigration Inspector, interviewed in Maputo on 5 November 2012.

Challengers is a local name given to the criminal group that operates along the green border.

A local informal trader, interviewed in October 2012 in Ressano Garcia border community.

Interviewed on 12 October 2012.

Interviewed on 12 October 2012.

Chief Immigration Officer at Mavalane International Airport, interviewed on 17 October 2012 in Maputo City.

Community Leader in Ressano Garcia border region, interviewed on 10 October 2012.

An informal trader, interviewed on 12 October 2012.
5.1 Introduction

The previous chapter highlighted the fact that the Ressano Garcia-Lebombo border has become the busiest crossing point between Mozambique and South Africa, but also a most contentious issue between local dwellers and state authorities as a result of the restrictive border controls imposed after the end of the war in 1992. In the case of Mozambique, restrictive border controls were intended to halt the penetration of organised criminal groups, which had been associated with a lack of adequate patrol and surveillance technologies and the extensive and porous borders of the country (Raimundo, 2009; Gastrow and Mosse, 2002). On the other hand, South Africa has made its border a stronghold to deter foreign immigrants, particularly Mozambicans and Zimbabweans, thanks to barbed wire fences at the border and patrols reinforced by the South African Defence Force (Crush and Tawodzera, 2014; Crush and Dodson, 2007; Handmaker and Parsley, 2001; Crush, 1999). However, none of the mechanisms implemented by these countries has been able to deal with the day-to-day pressures of socio-economic migration patterns that have been transformed since the early 1990s.

This chapter moves on from this position of stalemate to an analysis of the interaction across the Mozambique-Zimbabwe border, particularly in the border regions between and across the Machipanda and Mutare
areas. The cross-border interactions between these communities located on either side of the land border in Machipanda and Mutare have evolved historically. In the early 1980s, many citizens from Manica Province in Mozambique fled civil war, crossing the border into Zimbabwe to seek shelter and land, particularly along the border regions of Chimanimani, Chipingue, Mpenhalonga and Mutare (Hughes, 1999). Conversely, with the deterioration of the Zimbabwean economy since 1997 in particular, Zimbabwean citizens have started crossing the border into Mozambique and have sought to reach neighbouring states such as South Africa and Botswana. Their main goal has been to find better opportunities for employment, trade and seasonal work on farms in the regions bordering the two countries, between Manica and Machipanda.

5.2 Contextualising migration flows across the Mozambique-Zimbabwe border

This section provides an overview of migration flows across the Mozambique-Zimbabwe border (MZB). The focus is on socio-cultural, economic and political factors that affect the interactions between people living within and moving between the border areas of Espungabera, Rotanda and Machipanda and across the MZB border. With regard to the control of immigration, specific attention is paid to the Machipanda border post itself. It should be mentioned here that I conducted two rounds of data collection in this area. On the first visit, I conducted FGDs, while on the second I presented my earlier findings, a process that allowed me to obtain further feedback through these validation seminars. People responded to the initial findings and this generated a great deal of discussion, enabling me to better understand their perceptions than if I had used FGDs alone. The feedback was helpful in discovering additional information that the first round of FGDs had not revealed, such as the historical context of the war and how this helped to explain the present patterns of human movement. One example that illustrates this process is that during the first round of FGDs I was not fully aware of the daily practices of border control within the border post. A local leader told me
that locals, too, were concerned about security and all local residents who received guests had to introduce them to the local leader, a practice that was common during the civil war. He believed that this was necessary to avoid local youths being recruited by Renamo. On my return, the question of the role of SADC became much clearer; much was lacking but it could be the basis for different regimes of border control, rather than having more securitised controls as in Ressano Garcia, for example. In this chapter, interviews with officials, notes from FGDs and archives in the local Border Police offices were drawn on.

**Map 5.1**

*Mozambique-Zimbabwe and the Beira corridor linking the Machipanda border to Port Beira.*

5.2.1 Political and economic factors underlying border crossing

The Mozambique-Zimbabwe border stretches for over 1200 kilometres, linking Tete, Manica and Gaza Provinces. In Manica Province, the border
has three official crossing points: Machipanda (in Manica District\textsuperscript{1}), Rotanda (in Sussundenga District) and Espungabera (in Mossurize District). Over the past two decades, the border has been shaped by fluctuating migration patterns and cross-border trade, which has plagued the two countries and presented new challenges to border management. A comprehensive human migration pattern across the MZB border can be traced, based on three main periods: the armed conflict in Mozambique, the economic crisis in Zimbabwe and the introduction of the American dollar as currency in Zimbabwe.

As far as the effects of the war are concerned, by 1992 Zimbabwe had hosted an estimated 60,000 Mozambican refugees (Toole and Waldman, 1993). This increased flow of Mozambicans to Zimbabwe was also related to famine and a long dry season in Mozambique; some Mozambican citizens fled to Zimbabwe in search of jobs while others relocated to find shelter and fertile land.

In relation to land, the literature reveals that “in 1991, a large wave of refugees from war and drought in Mozambique’s Mossurize and Sussundenga Districts streamed across the Rusithu River into Zimbabwe’s Chimanimani District” (Hughes, 1999:533). However, land allocation became a source of conflict between Mozambican refugees and local Zimbabwean citizens. On many occasions, these refugees were treated as smugglers or migrant workers, resulting in unfavourable land allocation and their exploitation by local leaders (Tornimbeni, 2005; Hughes, 1999).

The second phase in the migration across MZB is related to the economic crisis that has disrupted Zimbabwe since 1997. As a result, huge numbers of Zimbabwean citizens began to cross borders of neighbouring countries, particularly South Africa and Mozambique. The Head of Immigration in Manica Province\textsuperscript{2} observes that “since 2007, Machipanda and Espungabera border posts started to register higher immigration flows compared to the past. On a daily-basis, there were about 2,500 travellers crossing Machipanda border and about 500 crossing Espungabera border and this has never happened”. He explains that despite regular migration flows through official crossing points, there has been an increase in
unauthorised migration associated with a lack of travel documents and smuggling of basic requirements from Mozambique to Zimbabwe along the border line. Most Zimbabwean citizens have entered through the Machipanda or Espungabera border regions in search of casual jobs (such as construction and plumbing). For example, since the economic crisis began, many Zimbabwean citizens from Mutare have been employed as seasonal agricultural workers in border regions between Machipanda and Manica in Mozambique (Duri, 2010).

The third phase in the shift in migration patterns across MZB is related to the introduction of the American dollar into the Zimbabwe currency system after 2012. The Head of Immigration Department at Machipanda border post states that, “with the introduction of USD in Zimbabwe, massive flows of Zimbabweans citizens to Mozambique have declined, but some of them wish to purchase their goods in Mozambique on the grounds that with USD currency they can get more goods than in Zimbabwe”. Also, Zimbabwean immigrant-traders understand that precious goods such as mineral resources can be sold at higher prices in Mozambique, triggering smuggling. In fact, price differences are well documented as a factor that could stimulate certain types of activities across neighbouring countries (Perkman, 2003). In the case of the Machipanda-Mutare cross-border region, it has been documented that illegally panned diamonds are smuggled into and sold in Mozambique at high prices (Duri, 2010). This suggests that communities in the border regions will always be attracted by opportunities arising from economic differentiation between neighbouring states, and that is unsustainable to prevent these movements by insisting on anti-criminal responses at the border. Essentially, “the crucial point in the analysis of borders requires linkages to social standing of migrants rather than the extent to which borders are permeable to people’s movement or community networks” (Tornimbeni, 2005:314). This suggests that the movement of local populations across borders is determined by the socio-economic interests at stake, not by a lack of means to patrol these borders. As is illustrated below, Zimbabwean and Mozambican border authorities have prioritised
controls that fragment the economic and socio-cultural factors driving border crossings.

5.2.2 Socio-cultural factors

Apart from economic factors, MZB is shaped by other elements leading to cross-border interaction such as language, religious and historic events, which strengthen social bonds between populations in the border regions of the two neighbouring states.

The division of Mashonaland between Mozambique and Zimbabwe by the British and the Portuguese in 1890 meant that there were Shona-speakers on both sides of the border. For example, in Manica Province, Shona is spoken in all border districts (Manica, Mossurize, Sussundenga and Bárue) as well as in other regions across the province, while in Zimbabwe it is spoken all over the country.

Historical factors have also had an influence on the strong relationship between Mozambican and Zimbabwean citizens across the border. For example, the Head of Immigration on the Machipanda border observes that “to celebrate some events, militants of the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), members of the armed forces, police, musicians, athletes, teachers and students from Zimbabwe cross the Machipanda border in joint trips aimed at paying tribute to Zimbabwean heroes buried in mass graves at Inhazónia and Tembwe in Manica Province”. Furthermore, he adds that populations of the border regions cross the border to attend joint religious ceremonies and burials of their relatives on both sides of the border. These facts reveal that other than colonial factors, the context of war in Mozambique and the economic crisis in Zimbabwe have presented new factors that demand attention in the analysis of interaction between communities of these neighbouring countries. In the Rotanda border region, for instance, local populations prefer to cross the border into Zimbabwe for many reasons; inter alia (1) it is only a short distance to a hospital on the Zimbabwean side; (2) relatively high quality of medical treatment at affordable prices; (3) easy access to supermarkets where food can be bought at lower prices than
those charged by informal local traders. With regard to school attendance, most children from Mossurize District attend schools in Zimbabwe. An example is that “Mozambicans regularly ford the Rusithu to attend the Vhimba Primary School, located only 50 metres across the border” (Hughes, 1999:536-37).

Other factors driving closer relations between communities in the border regions of Mozambique and Zimbabwe are related to access to arable land, access to water and to firewood. For example, the Commander of Border Police in Manica points out that “in Espungabera border region, Zimbabweans citizens have expanded their farmland into Mozambican territory, which has generated conflict between local communities. In Chinhambuzi border region, Mozambican farmers opened dams to reserve water to irrigate their crops and this process has resulted in shortage of water for farmlands on the Zimbabwean side, which has created another conflict between communities”. While these facts reveal that border management requires analysis from socio-economic, cultural, and political perspectives (Duri, 2010; Tornimbeni, 2005), authorities believe that border conflicts are related to unclear demarcation of borders and feel thus that stronger measures of control should be taken. The following subsections focus on security arrangements made by the Mozambican border police, immigration officials and customs at the provincial level in response to new trends in immigration in the aftermath of the Zimbabwean crisis.

5.3 Patrol operations

5.3.1 Border police operations

As a result of new migration patterns (from Zimbabwe to Mozambique), border police in Manica Province have expanded their operations along the border in an attempt to put a stop to the smuggling of goods (foodstuffs, bales of clothing, cigarettes and alcohol), particularly from Mozambique into Zimbabwe. At the practical level, border patrol operations are often constrained by a lack of appropriate facilities to
monitor the most recondite sites of the border such as mountains, rivers and dense forests where smugglers frequently hide. For example, during my fieldwork, I had the opportunity to accompany a platinum patrol in the Mugoriondo community. I noticed several pathways used by smugglers in crossing the Machipanda/Mutare border. On the Zimbabwean side of the border, smugglers frequently use the bush paths leading from Forbs border post to Cecil Kopje Game Park, while from Manica they cross through the Bvumba Mountains (Duri, 2010).

Besides foodstuffs smuggled over the border, the Mozambique border police are also concerned about unauthorised migration (particularly immigrants from Malawi, who use Mozambique and Zimbabwe as transit countries from which to reach South Africa). Other concerns include deforestation and land mines along the border, illegal and unsustainable extraction of mineral resources and the rustling of cattle from Zimbabwe to Mozambique through the neighbouring Mossurize District. Based on these difficulties, the District Police Commanders of Manica and Mutare have acknowledged the need for ongoing bilateral meetings with joint border patrol operations to address and coordinate attempts to find common solutions with those over the border. For example, the Commander of Border Police in Manica District states that “smuggling in rustled cattle is a networked cross-border crime inasmuch as cattle are stolen in Zimbabwe and carried in rented trucks which are supposed to go through several checks”.

As far as the smuggling of minerals (particularly gold and diamonds) is concerned, border police in Manica Province have concentrated their patrol operations on the Machipanda, Zónue, Mpenhalonga and Espungabera borders, given their proximity to the industrial centres of Mutare and Chimoio. Apart from intensified border patrol operations, border police conduct regular awareness campaigns with local communities aimed at gaining their cooperation in the fight against unsustainable and illegal exploitation of natural resources and smuggling. Smuggling is of concern not only to border police; customs authorities in Manica Province have been carrying out control operations focusing on...
potential areas and routes used by smugglers. In some cases, customs control operations consist of mobile brigades and raids on households suspected of concealing smuggled goods.

5.3.2 Customs operations

According to the assistant delegate of Internal Revenue in Manica Province\(^\text{11}\), “the economic crisis in Zimbabwe has contributed to rampant smuggling across the border in such a way that smuggling has become a survival strategy involving networks of households from both sides of the border”. He goes on to explain that goods in smuggling circuits vary from one side of the border to the other. In activities from Zimbabwe to Mozambique, smuggled goods range from fresh milk, eggs, sugar, cigarettes, stolen electric cables and stolen vehicle spare parts (wheels, batteries, mirrors). In operations from Mozambique to Zimbabwe, smuggled goods include alcohol, bales of second-hand clothes, rice and meat. The spread of smuggling from Zimbabwe can also be related to the high prices at which goods can be sold in Mozambique. For example, smuggled goods from Mutare can be found in markets in Manica Village and Chimoio City (Duri, 2010). The Chief of Operations: Customs at Machipanda border post\(^\text{12}\) explains that the main smuggling paths along the Machipanda border region include Magaka and Tsetsera, where smugglers take advantage of the extremely porous state of the border and the difficulties police have in reaching these areas.

In response to high levels of smuggling, customs authorities have established FAST brigades to undertake counter surveillance and permanent operations along the main roads and in some border regions where there is the potential for smuggling to occur. According to the Chief of Operations: Customs in Manica District\(^\text{13}\) “these mobile teams are constituted by inspectors and detectives who are responsible for undertaking thorough checks on imported goods aimed at preventing the entry of prohibited or harmful goods and thereby contributing to legitimate trade”. Should reliable checks not be conducted manually (owing to the high volume of commodities or suspicions of prohibited
goods), the goods concerned are taken to Beira City for electronic scanning.

In Manica Province, FAST brigades operate from the Inchope control station to the Machipanda border post on national road 6, and they also expand their operations into bordering districts such as Sussundenga and Mossurize. During their operations, FAST brigades pay special attention to long distance vehicles that are suspected of concealing smuggled goods. Apart from operations targeting vehicles on the main roads, FAST brigades also undertake back checks and raids on warehouses and informal markets to verify compliance with customs taxes on imported commodities.

Apart from patrol operations, customs authorities depend on collaboration with local communities and with border patrol forces, particularly on the remainder of the border. For example, the Chief of Operations: Customs at the Machipanda border post noted that “in 2012, based on alerts given by some local members to border police on the Machipanda border, police were able to apprehend a large quantity of cigarettes concealed in the fuel tank of a lorry that was coming from Zimbabwe”.

As far as cooperation with other border divisions is concerned, a bilateral meeting was held in Mpenhalonga (Mutare) in March 2013 and brought together border authorities from the Mutare and Manica Districts who agreed to exchange information related to the smuggling of bales of second-hand clothes. Accordingly, surveillance operations were intended to focus on wholesale traders of second-hand clothes in Chimoio and Manica, from where smugglers could be tracked to the border. Surveillance operations were also planned to focus on vehicles that are used to carry smuggled goods to Zimbabwe. Bilateral meetings and joint operations have always been the priority when the Mozambican and the Zimbabwean border authorities take action. For instance, in 2008, the Mozambican authorities restricted the quantity of foodstuffs allowed into Zimbabwe on the grounds that most of the commodities were used for sale, which could result in increased prices in Manica. On the other hand,
Zimbabwean customs authorities allowed free duty on foodstuffs equivalent to USD1 (Duri, 2010).

Besides these arrangements, customs authorities run awareness campaigns with potential taxpayers in various local communities and villages, aimed at urging inhabitants to comply with import and export duties. The assistant delegate of Internal Revenue in Manica Province states that “we warn potential taxpayers to comply with their duties on the grounds that taxes are the main source of state revenue, from which all activities related to redistribution of wealth are undertaken”15. He explains that in order to expand tax collection, customs authorities in Manica Province have planned to establish more fixed control points along the border to ensure greater compliance among importers with customs duties. The first fixed tax collection posts will be established in Chipuje and Mpengo communities as they have become alternative routes for smuggling across the MZB (given their good road conditions). While smuggling and unauthorised migration has become the common concern for border authorities in Manica Province, the next section focuses on particular border posts across Mozambique-Zimbabwe-Machipanda and provides an analysis of both state and local community perceptions of crossing and controlling the Machipanda border.

5.3.3 Immigration control at Machipanda border post

*Map 5.2*

*Machipanda border in Manica Province in central Mozambique*
The Machipanda border is located in Manica district\textsuperscript{16} in central Mozambique and it is the main official crossing point into the Republic of Zimbabwe through the bordering province of Mutare. It is a strategic border post that links adjacent countries (Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi and the Democratic Republic of Congo) to the second-largest port in Mozambique, Beira, in Sofala Province. Large numbers of vehicles laden with various goods leave the Beira port every day. Given the strategic role of the Machipanda border, Zimbabwean authorities have raised concerns about security over the border as a result of the resumption of hostilities in central Mozambique in October 2012 with the return of the Renamo leader to the bush to take up arms once again. In view of renewed political instability in Mozambique, the Zimbabwean authorities have realised that the Zimbabwean economy could further deteriorate if the high costs of using alternative routes for importing and exporting commodities were incurred. The existing literature makes it evident that in the context of military tension, “borders can negatively affect regional economies by splitting economic catchment areas and by increasing transaction costs” (Anderson and O’Dowd, 1999: 597).
From the standpoint of migration control, Machipanda is the busiest official crossing point over MZB. Day-to-day immigration flows range from 800 to 1000 travellers and at busy times, particularly Easter and at the end of the year, numbers are even higher. However, since the start of the Zimbabwean crisis in 1997, the number of travellers crossing the border has been increasing and can reach up to 2500 in a single day. The migrants’ plight forces them to seek opportunities for trade and work in Mozambique, including in the agricultural sector. The immigration authorities in Machipanda border post are not able to provide accurate numbers of travellers because of unauthorised movements across the border. Given these circumstances, the Immigration Department in Manica Province has paid more attention to checking all travellers’ official travel documents such as passports, visas, residence permits and emergency certificates.\textsuperscript{17}

These measures have been reinforced by periodic and random post-entry internal checks\textsuperscript{18}, for example of migrants residing in hostels and hotels, or working in businesses, markets and other public places. An immigration inspector in Chimoio City interviewed by the researcher observed: “these measures are aimed at warning foreigners to comply with legal requirements for [entering and remaining]… in the country and that no person should be allowed to stay abroad illegally\textsuperscript{19}”. The inspector made reference to the Foreigners Law (\textit{Lei de Estrangeiros}), which governs the entry and residence of foreigners, and prescribes that “it is prohibited for foreigners who may be considered hooligans, beggars, or without the means of subsistence, or judged unable to raise such means, to enter or remain in the country\textsuperscript{20}”. Discussions and interviews in and around the border crossing post provided evidence that the Immigration Department in Manica has developed partnerships with some local hotels and guesthouses, urging them to provide Immigration Officers with information about their guests’ nationality, occupation, the purpose of their trip, length of stay and planned departure date, for example. In this way, the border authorities have established administrative procedures for internal border control through which immigrants are placed into different
risk categories, based especially on their nationality and their financial situation (Boucher and Gest, 2014; Crush and Tawodzera, 2014; Crush and Dodson, 2007).

Interviews with officials involved and discussions of the documentation revealed that in this risk category stratification process, immigration authorities at Machipanda border post were particularly concerned about certain nationalities, namely Somalis, Malians and Pakistanis. Several immigration officials explained that these groups were considered particularly high risk in terms of involvement in transnational crime. For example, the Head of Immigration in Machipanda noted that:

if a British foreigner says he is coming to Mozambique for tourism purposes, this is easily acceptable because they come regularly for leisure activities. On the contrary, it becomes doubtful to the immigration authorities when a Pakistani foreigner says he [sic]…is coming for tourism reasons because it is not their practice in Mozambique21.

This suggests that people of different nationalities are being pre-judged on the basis of categories that are not necessarily legal, but which may include colour, religion and nationality. Local officials are influenced by media reports and international discourses around the war on terror, and this has resulted in the criminalising of Muslims, including women wearing the veil, for example. Thus because Somali and Mali are countries that have experienced military conflict with separatist and militant religious groups, referred to as terrorists, their citizens are categorised as high-risk. This process of classifying migrants is returned to and discussed in more detail in Chapter 7. Officials at the border in Machipanda are reflecting the widely expressed views of the media and academic literature, that nationals from Pakistan, since they come from one of the most dangerous countries in the world when it comes to terrorism, may be involved in sponsoring or promoting terrorism themselves (Vigneswaran, 2013; Gastrow and Mosse, 2011; Riedel, 2008). In the US, for example, following the 9/11 attacks exclusion, detention and surveillance were expanded to non-citizens, especially to asylum seekers, and there is a general perception that
immigrants from Muslim countries pose cultural, economic and public safety threats (Messina, 2014; Ramirez, 2009; Miller, 2005).

Border authorities in many countries have begun to adopt risk identification criteria based on international norms, without careful analysis of the internal/local context of security threats. For example, the suicide bombing in Britain in 2005 was carried out by individuals born in the United Kingdom, making it clear that border control operations reflect how security threats have become a social construct aimed at preventing the entry of certain categories of immigrants. However, bombings by a country’s own citizens have challenged the idea that borders can protect people from threats from outsiders and that when they affect us it is because our borders and their guards have somehow failed (Dauvergne, 2008: 92).

Besides the risk-based categorisation of immigrants, immigration officials at the Machipanda border post believe that it is necessary to ensure that immigration control measures are applied to any traveller who crosses at an official migration control post. Moreover, their concern with the control of immigrants is extended along the length of the border.

As section 5.6 later illustrates, the long standing economic crisis in Zimbabwe and its effects on the Mozambican side of the border has not been given priority by the government’s responses to migration management and border controls. The following section provides evidence of interaction based on social, cultural and economic needs between populations in the three neighbourhoods in the Machipanda border region, namely Mugoriondo, Chizipa and Nhamatanda.

5.4 Life experience in the Machipanda border region

In this section, concerns raised by the inhabitants of three border regions in Machipanda, namely Mugoriondo, Chizipa and Nhamatanda, are discussed. Those who live in these border neighbourhoods share strong cultural affinities and long standing authority bonds with their counterparts in Mpenhalonga and Chimanimani (in Zimbabwe). As far as local leadership is concerned, in some areas leaders based on the
Mozambican side exert authority on both sides of the border and vice versa. A resident of the Nhamatanda neighbourhood states that “Makuiana and Chirara are local leaders who also perform authority on the Zimbabwean side. From the Zimbabwean side there is Mandeia local leader who rules on the Mozambican side as well”. He adds that these local leaders play a crucial role in addressing local problems related to land conflicts, leading awareness campaigns against cattle rustling, and bargaining with border authorities about the social and economic role of the border among local populations.

With regard to social relationships, there is some evidence of socially motivated border crossings. For example, the Operational Chief of Border Police in Manica notes:

most of border dwellers of Ruela border community in Mozambique are seasonal workers in Zimbabwe; most of the school children from Chirara study in Zimbabwe on the grounds that those schools are closer to their homes; border dwellers of Nhaligue community purchase their foodstuffs in Nhamaropa village (Zimbabwe) there is grocery shops in their area.

Such examples suggest that border management should give specific attention to local contexts in constant flux. From the literature it is evident that “borders and their associated regions require localised study and repay detailed comparison” (Anderson and O'Dowd, 1999: 594).

In the process of consultation with communities in the Machipanda border region, local border dwellers have raised concerns about security threats posed by criminal groups, smugglers and unauthorised immigrants from across the border. For example, a resident of the Nhamatanda border neighbourhood believes that the most threatening situation is related to evidence of abduction and the trafficking of children across the border between the two countries. Previous research into threats posed by criminal groups and smugglers has highlighted the fact that on both sides of MZB, there are bandits along the bush paths who intend to rob smugglers of their goods (Duri, 2010). Further evidence illustrates that special operations that are regularly launched by border police from the neighbouring countries always result in the arrest of large numbers of
smugglers (both Zimbabwean and Mozambican citizens), which increases feelings of insecurity among local communities. For example, a press report states that “an operation launched by the Mutare police in September 2001 netted 200 smugglers while hundreds more were languishing in Manica jails…” (Duri, 2010:142).

Based on these facts, local leaders have committed themselves to implementing security measures intended to share information related to guests. The local leader for the neighbourhood of Mugoriondo states that “every resident who receives any guest has to present him/herself to local authorities within two days and state the purpose of the visit, its duration and his/her permanent residence”25. He goes on to explain that the monitoring of visitors is intended to control the movement of people in these areas, given the fact that during the war infiltrators from Renamo were sometimes hosted there as guests. The inference that can be drawn from this evidence is that local dwellers face challenges on two levels. Firstly, the need to keep criminals away from local populations, which demands a well patrolled border. Secondly, they need to cross the border to fulfill the demands of everyday life, which requires a border that allows such interaction. Arguments in favour of an open border are related to (1) marriage bonds on both sides of the border; (2) transfer of skills in carpentry, construction, mechanics, plumbing and others from Zimbabweans to Mozambicans. For example, a resident of Chizipa remarked that “we like Zimbabweans because we learn from their experience and they charge affordable prices for services they perform”26. This makes it clear that the MZB establishes a limit to territorial sovereignty between the two neighbouring countries, but local border dwellers are driven by cultural, social and economic boundaries that are always constrained by state securitisation policies regarding the formal border.

Importantly, the Machipanda border region and that of any post-colonial state offers a distinctive approach to transition boundaries/zones. One point that deserves to be highlighted is that the creation of transition zones depends on the integration of the political and economic goals of
the bordering states. States oriented towards economic goals give priority to prosperity, while those led by political goals give priority to power, making it difficult to establish transition zones. Based on the example of Machipanda-Mutare as a colonial border, the next section addresses whether this region can be turned into a transition zone. Considering all the elements of interaction in border neighbourhoods, the Machipanda-Mutare region is marked by a high degree of integration between communities on both sides of the border, which could easily result in a complementary zone. Such complementarity depends on the policies of the states in question.

5.5 Reflections on the Machipanda-Mutare border region as an economic transition zone

Studying the detailed and localised context of borders implies an understanding of their social, cultural, security, political and economic roles in local communities. The management of borders requires a collaborative process of consultation with local leaders aimed at listening to different views of the functions of borders that might influence a state’s policies. An integrative and consultative process is also required at the interstate level in order to reduce the unilateral management of the border, which could lead to military intervention that has the potential to damage the regional economy (Medeiros, 2015; Anderson and O’Dowd, 1999). In effect, border regions require a degree of interconnection among local communities and interstate institutions if cross-border concerns are to be managed in a transparent and integrated manner.

This section unpacks socio-cultural, economic and political factors underpinning border interactions across the Machipanda-Mutare border and reflects on their role in a transition zone. Transition zones have come to exist as state borders are transformed from barriers into spaces of interaction between people in adjacent areas, the result of differentiated policies implemented by authorities of each state (Newman, 2006a). They result as a combination of (1) state policies aimed at transforming border
regions into spaces of interaction and (2) in the existence of mental exclusion between communities in the border regions (Newman, 2006b).

In the context of socio-cultural factors, communities in Manica (Mozambique) and Mutare (Zimbabwe) are Shona speakers and are linked by marriage and ethnic bonds, which foster interaction between those communities. Therefore, a state’s concerns with better patrolled borders can only reduce the interaction between these communities, but never eradicate socio-cultural factors. As Chapter 8 will illustrate, one fundamental weakness in the debate of integration in the SADC region is a careless definition of a ‘security community’ with the effect that the overlapping cultural and language similarities either side of the border remain totally ignored while they form one of the determinant factors of border crossing. For this reason, neighbouring states have a crucial role to play in the monitoring of borders that can secure socio-culturally oriented interaction between communities across borders such as in the Machipanda-Mutare region.

As far as economic cooperation is concerned, the Machipanda-Mutare border region is characterised by strong and longstanding informal cross-border trade between cross-border communities. Also, as a result of colonial legacies, Mutare is more developed in terms of its infrastructure and its economic sector, which over the past years has led to consolidation of informal cross-border trade between communities from the Machipanda-Mutare cross-border regions and beyond. In the case of Ressano Garcia, the local Association of Road Transport and its counterpart in Komatipoort in South Africa cooperate in the transportation of informal traders to and from each side of the Ressano Garcia-Komatipoort border point. However, informal cross-border trade in the area of the Machipanda-Mutare border has always suffered from restrictive state measures such as increases in customs duties or the prohibition of certain categories of goods, which in turn has been perceived as a factor that has had a negative impact on the economy of the two neighbouring countries (Duri, 2010). Lessons from European integration indicate that after little success yielded by sector-based
economic integration (coal and steel as well as atomic energy communities), Europe decided to launch a more advanced strategy aimed at breaking down national separatism and deepening economic integration in a broad manner (Niemann and Ioannou, 2015; Lindberg, 1963). The projected strategy was designed to reduce production costs, improving the standard of living, and was to be achieved through the abolition of trade barriers and the establishment of common external tariffs, (Niemann and Ioannou, 2015; Lindberg, 1963). As a result of substantial benefits derived from this strategy, “the economy of border regions has been rationally subject of regional development theories (Gualini, 2003:43).

As far as regional integration in SADC is concerned, border regions are characterised by trade opportunities that vary according to the type and volume of goods that are exchanged. This requires local cooperation initiatives if this integration is to benefit the cross-border communities. The Machipanda-Mutare border region itself requires a balance between opportunities and constraints that are fundamental to extending the formal (regional) and informal (local) processes of transition to a wider, more integrated community (Newman, 2006a).

Politically, the Southern African states all regard borders as fundamental spaces for the protection of territorial sovereignty and the fight against cross-border crime. This has led to the constitution of different regimes of border control by neighbouring states. Border policies that are sovereignty-oriented have limited the authority of local bodies such as municipalities or districts to establish cross-border cooperation initiatives. In such a context, the transformation of the Machipanda-Mutare region into a transition zone will continue to depend on central government. Moreover, taking into account different contexts in each cross-border region in SADC member states, it seems that the ongoing regional integration has not yet produced any ideas on how local communities might benefit from the integration process. As the next chapter argues (section 6.4), regional integration can contribute to the establishment of either transition zones or co-managed borders if local aspects of border crossing are addressed specifically in the integration
process. Most importantly, a constellation of local features in the border regions such as extensive forested areas, limited access to public transport and lack of socio-economic infrastructure are crucial elements that support the need for transitions zones or co-managed border zones as platforms for the redefinition and implementation of regional integration, different from the European model, in SADC.

5.6 Conclusion

This chapter has presented an examination of patterns of migration across MZB, particularly in the Machipanda-Mutare official crossing point. It has also examined responses to border control that have been implemented by neighbouring countries, and their implications for local communities in their daily economic activities. Findings indicate that MZB has been characterised by a reversal in migration flows since 1997, with migration into Mozambique largely replacing the movements out of the country during the civil war, especially in the 1980s. The war that ravaged Mozambique at that time led to an exodus by Mozambican citizens from the bordering regions of Manica into Zimbabwe. Together with this political instability, emigration to Zimbabwe was motivated by the search for employment. However, since the late 1990s, the economic crisis in Zimbabwe has brought about a shift in migration patterns with Mozambique becoming the preferred destination for Zimbabwean citizens, especially those living along the Beira corridor, who are either in search of employment or informal trade opportunities.

Over the years since the 1980s, informal trade exchange between communities across the Machipanda-Mutare border regions has been consolidated, so much so that the main supplies to local markets in the Manica District are refined products from Zimbabwe, such as soap, flour, rice and other staples.

However, the political change in Mozambique brought by the end of the war has led to security sector reform which has altered the state’s approach to border control. This has in turn affected socio-economic interactions among communities living in cross-border regions as a whole.
In the context of the Machipanda-Mutare border, the Mozambican and Zimbabwean customs authorities have become concerned with increasing the collection of external taxes on goods being traded across the borders. As Table 3.2 in Chapter 3 showed, this has led to a fairly stringently patrolled border in an effort to prevent smuggling. Likewise, immigration authorities have become more concerned about compliance with passport regimes, with visas and other documents required for entry and legal residence. This has led to border patrols conducting internal searches as well as preventing unauthorised migration at the border. Although accurate data on this subject was not available at the border crossing, it seemed from observations and interviews that daily rejections of entry were in the hundreds rather than in the tens.

Regardless of these reforms, none of them have been focused on longstanding informal trade exchanges between communities in the cross-border regions. Neither Mozambique nor Zimbabwe has established communication mechanisms with local communities in order to respond to political and economic changes in the neighbouring states in a sustainable manner. From the perspective of the African Union Border Programme, the Machipanda-Mutare border region could shift from barrier to point of connection by strengthening such trade exchanges in coordination with neighbouring state institutions. In this context, the Machipanda-Mutare cross-border region could be developed from a transboundary conservation area or from a more classically patrolled border such as Ressano Garcia-Lebombo border. These variances remain unexplored in the region, which also makes these regions less visible in the face of international border governance.

Notes
Other districts in Manica Province are Bárue, Gondola, Guro, Machaze and Macossa.

Interviewed on 5 March 2013.

Interviewed on 7 March 2013.

Interviewed on 7 March 2013.

Interviewed on 17 January 2013.

This visit was on 8 February 2013.

Zimbabwean immigration officials complain about Malawian immigrants who are denied entry to South Africa. They enter Zimbabwe through Mozambique with an Emergency Certificate, but this document is not accepted by South African immigration authorities. The difficulty lies in the fact that Malawian immigrants in irregular situations are understood to be a financial burden on Zimbabwe, especially when it comes to their deportation. Based on this, Zimbabwean immigration authorities have requested Mozambique to be vigilant in order to limit the entry of Malawian travellers in transit to South Africa through Zimbabwe.

Zimbabwean border authorities complain about deforestation that has resulted from the rampant felling of trees by Mozambican citizens in their production of charcoal. This in addition to deforestation caused by bush fires (mostly originating on the Mozambican side of the border) and the degradation of soil resulting from the illegal extraction of minerals in the Machipanda border region. Based on regular bilateral meetings, the District Commanders of Police in Manica (Mozambique) and Mutare (Mozambique) have decided to undertake permanent awareness campaigns and joint operations to educate people in the border areas in an attempt to reduce human activities that destroy the environment.

Interviewed on 17 January 2013.

In the past, Manica District was a corridor for traffic in diamonds from Zimbabwe. The situation was brought under control when the Zimbabwean authorities conceded the diamond mine in the area to a Chinese mining industry.

Interviewed on 5 March 2013 in Chimoio City.
Manica District is situated in the western part of Manica Province, about 80 km from its capital city Chimoio. Geographically, it occupies a total land area of 4391 km$^2$ which is surrounded by mountains, plains and valleys. Manica District is divided into five Administrative Posts (APs) and five localities. The first AP is Machipanda and it is divided into three localities, namely Machipanda Village, Muzongo and Maridza. Mavonde is the second AP and has two localities: Mavonde headquarters and Chitunga. The third AP is Messica and this is made up of five localities: Messica Village, Bandula, Chinhambuzi and Nhaucaca. The fourth AP is Vanduzi and this has four localities, namely: Vanduzi Village, Chigodole and South Púngoe. The last AP is the Manica municipality, which is the Headquarters of the District. Statistical data from the general population census of 2007 indicates that there are about 215,275 inhabitants in the area, 107,076 males and 108,199 females. The area is subtropical and there are two seasons. The first is from October to March and is hot and rainy; the second, dry season begins in April and lasts till September. The altitude varies between 600 and 1900 metres and the highest point is Mount Muriangane in Machipanda AP. The district is traversed by 24 rivers (Honde, Nhancuarara, Mavuze, Chimedza, Ticue, Révuè, Messambudzi, Vanduzi, Messica, Zónue, Topodzi, Ruace, Mudzidzi, Munene, Nhamatanda, Zombe, Chirambadini, Nhamatchassi, Vermelho, Condeja, Citheo, Tchaka and Machinga), providing it with agro-ecological conditions that make it favourable for agriculture. People grow corn, pearl millet, sorghum, beans, peanuts, sweet-potatoes, onions, tomatoes, kale, cabbage and tropical fruits such as mango, avocado, litchi and pineapple. In addition, the agro-climatic conditions are favourable for the production of some crops for income generation such as tobacco (burley and Virginia), sunflower, ginger, Rhine potato and wheat. These crops are sold in Zimbabwe and in Beira and Chimoio cities under the monitoring of local agricultural companies. There is a culture of ancestor worship (spirits are invoked through songs and traditional dances), the payment of dowries and
respect for traditional holy places such as Chinhamapere cave paintings, the ruins of Nhamachato, Fort Massequesse, the Fort at Mudza, the mass grave at Révuè and the Sepulchre of Guindingue. The majority of the inhabitants of Manica speaks three languages: Chimanhica, Chitewe and Chibarue. Chimanhica carries a Zimbabwean influence as long before the Portuguese colonisation, the Manica region belonged to the Kingdom of Mwenemutapa. Soon after his fall, it changed hands and became the ultramarine province of the Portuguese colony. As far as its governance is concerned, the district is headed by Filomena Meigos Manhiça, supported by the heads of APs and localities as well as by community leaders in the dissemination of government programmes and performance. In line with this, there are regular visits to the local communities aimed at assessing the impact of various projects in the field and their main concerns. As a result, local communities are concerned about unemployment, electricity supply and public infrastructure (particularly roads). As Chico António points out, “in the past, lack of employment and interest in English language (in primary schools) were the principal factors that led to high emigration flows to Zimbabwe”. However, at this point the situation has changed because unemployment in Zimbabwe is high and the Mozambican government has introduced the English language to primary schools.

17 The Emergency certificate is a document issued by the Immigration Department to citizens from neighbouring countries who have lost their passports. It is valid for a maximum of 90 days.

18 In 2012, 11 joint operations (police and migration) were conducted in Chimoio and Manica as well as in the villages of Catandica and Guro, aimed at establishing the legality of foreign citizens and discouraging illegal mining.

19 Interviewed on 7 March 2013 in Chimoio City

20 Item (f), article 34, of the law 5/93, of 28 December. The law establishes the legal regime of foreigners in the Republic of Mozambique; establishes standards of entry, stay and departure as well as rights, duties and guarantees.

21 Chief of Immigration Office on Machipanda border, interviewed on 7 March, 2013

22 Interviewed on 12 March 2013.

23 Interviewed on 8 March 2013 in Manica Village.
24 Interviewed on 12 March 2013.
26 Interviewed on 12 March 2013.
6.1 Introduction

As was pointed out in Chapter 1, every border region is unique in the sense of the variation of socio-economic factors over time and the mechanisms of border control that have been implemented by border authorities. This chapter examines land-driven socio-economic interaction in the Mandimba-Mangochi border region in the north of Mozambique. On the subject of cross-border management, the chapter examines the socio-economic relations of communities on either side of the border and considers the literature on transboundary conservation schemes. Based on an analysis of the experience of transboundary conservation areas in Southern Africa and in Latin America, this chapter proposes that productive land in Mozambique can reinforce the belief that the SADC concept of a security community might be expanded in future to incorporate the concept of borders from the perspective of local people and their interests. This topic is discussed in more detail in Chapter 8. The method used in the data collection for this case study was similar to that used in the other border areas, although more time was spent in the field, with the result that observations over longer periods were possible. This enabled me to better understand the meaning of the porosity of the border, and how people had social reasons for crossing it, something I had not encountered in the other border areas I researched. This made the Mandimba border area an interesting one to study and about which to theorise. For some local people, the border appeared to
be no more relevant to them than the vegetation! However the main purpose of movement and the main point of contention was land, land use and the harvesting of resources from this land, especially on the Mozambican side, for use in Malawi. Hence the centrality of land issues in the analysis of the border in this chapter.

6.2 Return of refugees from Malawi and a new landscape of border in Niassa Province

Niassa Province is located in northern Mozambique and has the most extensive land border with the Republic of Malawi, stretching over 1500 km from Mecanhelas District (Zambézia Province) up to Mecula District (Cabo Delgado Province). During the armed conflict in Mozambique, Malawi became the most receptive country of refuge in Southern Africa, with an estimated number of 780 000 Mozambican refugees by 1989 (Babu and Hassan, 1995).

Following the end of the armed conflict, the majority of these refugees returned to Niassa and established their settlements in the bordering districts of Mandimba, Mecanhelas, Lago, Sanga, Mavago and Mecula. They established themselves in these cross-border regions for one major reason: in case of the resumption of war, they would easily be able to cross the border back into Malawi. The cross-border regions across Mozambique-Malawi border have also been shaped by disputes over fertile farmland with Malawian citizens, who have overextended their lands, planting crops on the Mozambican side of the border.
The escalation in land disputes between Mozambican and Malawian citizens in the border regions has seen the government of Niassa Province trying to address the problem with local leaders, but three key factors have hindered solutions: ethnicity and family bonds, local arrangements, and political legacies of the war. Mozambican and Malawian citizens in the border regions (across Niassa Province) belong to the Chichewa and Yao ethnic groups, which binds them closely together. Besides their ethnic bonds, over the years family bonds have been strengthened by marriages between Mozambican and Malawians citizens. These bonds have allowed members of the same household (split between Malawi and Mozambique) to obtain farmlands on the Mozambican side of the border.
Local arrangements have resulted in influential members (particularly community leaders) in the border regions of Niassa hiring Malawian citizens as labourers on their tobacco farms; they then allocate pieces of land to these labourers in payment. Such local land allocation has given rise to conflicts between local leaders and the district government of Mandimba. The administrator for Mandimba District indicated two cases of land dispute that local leaders had not been able to deal with. One case occurred in 2010 in the Luelele Administrative post. Malawians citizens claimed to belong to the Mozambican in order to gain access to fertile land there. A second case, in the Chivande border region, involved local leaders who were accused of selling land to Malawian citizens. This led to conflict among members of the local population who were deprived of their land.

As far as the political legacies of the war are concerned, land disputes have become difficult for local authorities to address given the role played by Malawi in hosting Mozambican refugees during the war. Today this has resulted in reluctance on the part of immigration officials to control the Mozambique-Malawi border very tightly. At one end of the spectrum, local government lacks the authority to take political decisions on cross-border policies of control. Informally, however, though policy issues remain decided at central government level, local practices do vary from region to region. To some extent, the national border authorities understand that border controls, seen from the perspective of territorial sovereignty, can come into direct conflict with the needs of those living in cross-border communities that are located in neighbouring states on both sides of the border line. According to the Director of Human Resources of the Niassa Province Immigration Department:

Illegal migration has become a common problem under discussion in bilateral meetings with Malawian and Tanzanian border authorities. The common belief is that the problem is associated with porous borders and complicity of some elements within local communities in facilitating illegal border crossing and smuggling […] which makes control of migration flows challenging.
Mandimba region: rethinking land-related cross-border governance

The evidence above suggests that state authorities tend to have a fixed understanding of the role of the border as a space for fighting crime and securing sovereignty. As was illustrated in Chapter 5, to date restrictive customs regulations across the Mozambique-Zimbabwe border have resulted in widespread smuggling and unauthorised immigration, instead of – as intended – the control of cross-border crime. From the point of view of central state authorities, there are divergences. Some understand the need for relatively open borders, while others insist that tighter controls are needed throughout the border areas to prevent crime. Since both Mozambican and Malawian citizens from cross-border areas have relatives on both sides of the border, however, local immigration officials recognise pragmatically that these individuals will find a way to cross to border both specifically to access land and their relatives, and more generally for survival purposes.

For scholars, too, as Whiteside (1998:43) points out, “cross-border migration is perhaps something of an outsider’s construct – the local populations do not really see themselves as Malawians or Mozambicans, but as members of a lineage who have moved over centuries in an area across which there is now a border defined by others”. Against this background, the Mozambique border police in Niassa province are intent on the protection of territorial sovereignty across the Mozambique-Malawi border.

6.2.1 Socio-economic factors

Mandimba is a district in Niassa Province situated in north-west Mozambique. It borders Ngauma district in the north, Mecanhelas and Cuamba districts in the south, Majune and Maua districts in the east and, for 110 km in the west, the Republic of Malawi. Mandimba is a very busy district given its location in the Nacala corridor and its proximity to the Republic of Malawi, which attract traders from Lichinga and Cuamba districts. The economy is based essentially on agriculture, fishing and small scale commercial activities. The population grows maize, sweet potatoes, beans, rice, and peanuts as well as tobacco for commercial purposes. While the population of Mandimba produces surplus food, their counterparts in
Mangochi face food insecurity as a result of the over-cultivation of their soils, which has forced them to look for fertile land in Mandimba. For example, the Administrator of Mandimba District has observed that “good ecological conditions for agriculture in Mandimba have resulted in a high demand for land by Malawian citizens, but the problem is concerned with community leaders who allocate land without informing government officials”. He explains that “community leaders tend to hire Malawian citizens to work on their tobacco farmlands and in turn grant them pieces of land as payment, which attracts them to stay in Mozambique”. Further evidence of this lies in the fact that most family members belonging to a household that is scattered on both sides of the border possess farmlands in Mozambique. After the harvest, they take part of the crop to Malawi.

These problems related to land allocation are given special attention by the district government in regular meetings with community leaders where the latter are alerted to the imperative to prevent Malawian citizens from building their settlements along the border. For example, the administrator of Mandimba district states that “the central government does not allow us to allocate land to Malawian citizens on the grounds that Malawian citizens do not belong to Mozambique”. However, he adds that despite this macro-tension, it is not easy to take the radical decision of expelling Malawians citizens, given the historical relationship between Malawi and Mozambique. He recognises that “Malawi has been the major hosting country of Mozambican refugees compared to other neighbouring countries, and it remains a historical solidarity gesture that comes to mind before a radical decision could be taken”.

The evidence provided above reveals that land-related cross-border movement in Mandimba district is grounded on two unsustainable options. First, border control arrangements driven by the protection of sovereignty and a lack of competence among local government officials to find a definitive solution to land allocation will not prevent Malawians citizens from securing land in Mandimba (through family ties or through bribes paid to local leaders). As far as the literature is concerned, crossing the border between Mozambique and Malawi is driven predominantly by family and
social connections, and new members are rapidly integrated into local communities (Whiteside, 1998). Very often, through family ties, local communities allocate land based on mutual benefit.

Apart from land, informal trading is a contributory factor in cross-border interaction between the communities in Mandimba and Mangochi. The district governments of Mandimba and Mangochi have decided to establish international fairs where local dwellers can exhibit and sell their goods. Based on this initiative, there is one market fair in Chiponde Village (Malawi), one in Mandimba village and a third in Luelele locality. In Chiponde, fairs are open on Sundays, in Mandimba on Thursdays, and in Luelele on Fridays. Malawian citizens mostly exhibit manufactured goods such as plastic items for domestic use, clothing, roofing materials, bicycles and their spare parts; fruit (particularly avocados and apples) as well as electronic items for domestic use. On the other hand, Mozambican stalls are dominated by agricultural commodities ranging from maize, cassava, and capulana, to homemade goods. Apart from agricultural commodities from market fairs, Malawians are interested in other goods for commercial purposes such as fertilisers, fuel, firewood and coal for domestic use.

In addition to this economically driven contact, border dwellers interact for social reasons, particularly medical treatment either in Malawi or in Mozambique. As these communities are mostly located along the border, they go to the hospital nearest to where they live (which could be in Malawi or in Mozambique). For example, a community member from the Ndaua neighbourhood in Mandimba village states that “Mozambican citizens from Mandimba go to hospitals in Malawi in cases of serious health conditions such as injuries demanding surgical interventions which are not available in local hospitals. On the other hand, there are Malawian citizens who come for malaria treatment in Mozambique because health services in their country are expensive”.

Regardless of socio-economic concerns such as health-driven border crossings, border authorities in Mandimba and local dwellers believe that Malawian border authorities are hostile to Mozambican citizens, particularly to local traders. For example, the administrator of Mandimba
district points out that “very often Malawian police seize money from Mozambican importers after they have sold their goods under allegations that kwacha\textsuperscript{13} belongs to Malawi and not to Mozambique\textsuperscript{14}. He explains that the Malawian government has established an efficient and systematised justice system at their official border, which is made up of police officers, prosecutors and judges. In view of this, the district government of Mandimba believes that the system that has been established at the Malawian border post is detrimental to Mozambican importers inasmuch as in most cases, Malawian authorities take snap decisions that result in huge losses without any real possibility of recovering the money or merchandise.

As a result of these circumstances, local dwellers requested the Mandimba Administrator to participate in bilateral meetings (arranged by the two bordering district governments) where they could raise their concerns directly with the authorities concerned. In the face of this, in 2012 the district government of Mandimba negotiated with its counterpart in Mangochi to reach a reasonable solution that would contribute to good neighbourliness.

Notwithstanding the fact that the bordering district governments (Mandimba and Mangochi) have reached a bilateral agreement on cross-border matters, border authorities and the bulk of Mozambican citizens in Mandimba continue to complain that Malawian police officers remain intolerant towards them. For example, one of the respondents remarked that:

When we enter Malawi with our motorbikes, we are arrested by police officers and our motorbikes apprehended under allegation of lack of insurance documents. On the contrary, Malawian citizens come to Mozambique with their motorbikes and they do not get any complication from Mozambican police officers. Moreover, on many occasions, we try to ask the police to concede permission on our way to hospital in Mangochi, but due to long ‘negotiating’ time some patients perish before they get to hospital\textsuperscript{15}.  

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Based on these claims, the main appeal from the population in Mandimba village is that Malawian police officers should desist from confiscating their motorcycles because these are used primarily to transport patients to hospital. These facts make it evident that Mangochi border authorities (immigration and customs officers) regard the border as performing a selective role regardless of local context, such as market fairs, health needs, and other socio-economic concerns. As a result, the Mandimba villagers have developed a hostile attitude to Malawian border authorities, which is also reflected in some social relations, particularly where family bonds do not exist.

Local leaders in Mandimba, for instance, allegedly believe that Malawian citizens disrespect Mozambican law and perpetrate most of the abominable new crimes that have occurred, such as the exhumation of dead bodies, abduction for purposes of trafficking and armed robberies, which local residents had not seen before the end of war. Based on these criminal acts, local residents see Malawian citizens as being the ‘exporters’ of a new criminal index. A community leader in Mandimba village observed that “new typology of crime is the result of close interconnectedness with Malawian citizens in the post-war period and this situation is rampant due to porosity status of the border which allows unauthorised migration across the border”\(^{16}\). The belief among local inhabitants that Malawian citizens perpetrate most of these crimes can be interpreted in two ways. Firstly, it is a reaction against the hostility of Malawian authorities at the border, which could lead to xenophobic reactions to Malawian citizens. Secondly, regarding Malawian citizens as responsible for bringing these crimes to Mozambique can be interpreted as a social construction as there is no evidence that Mozambicans are not involved in these criminal acts. From this perspective, constructivism manifests in how border dwellers in Mandimba associate Malawian citizens with terrible crimes. In short, the perception that Malawian citizens are criminals can be consolidated by the collective human consciousness and generates a structure of relationships that did not exist in the past (Adler, 1997). Regardless of claims by Mozambican citizens in
Mandimba that Malawian citizens are involved in crime, the interaction between these cross-border communities deserves deeper analysis because of the evolving day-to-day interdependence between communities in cross-border regions.

6.2.2 Cultural factors

Two main local languages are spoken in Mandimba District: Emacua and Chiyao. A third language is Chichewa, originally a Malawian language. In the matter of religion activities, the cross-border communities in Mandimba and Mangochi (Malawi) celebrate Ceara (an Islamic ceremony held in both Malawi and Mozambique). Apart from religion, the traditional ritual ceremony in Mandimba is Unhago, which is celebrated soon after the harvest of crops. Unhago is celebrated to prepare young girls and boys for future marital life. During the ceremony, they are indoctrinated in values that prepare them to deal with adult life. However, over the years, the period in which the ritual usually took place was changed because the harvest period (April – June) did not coincide with school holidays. The reason for this is that during the traditional ritual boys and girls are circumcised and time must be allowed for the wounds to heal. Based on this, Unhago celebrations were moved to the end of the year when school children are on holiday.

6.3 Border patrol operations

As indicated in the previous section, Mozambique shares the most extensive land border with Malawi, in mainly in the Niassa Province. Physically, the border runs through a landscape ranging from mountains, rivers and dense forests, which make the monitoring process difficult for border patrols. As the Chief of Operations of Border Police in Niassa Province put it, “our challenge at the border is to control smuggling and unauthorised immigration across Malawi and Tanzania border”. According to him, Malawians are largely involved in the smuggling of fertilisers and firewood, goods for domestic use, and stolen cattle, especially through the Mandimba and Entrelagos border districts.
Furthermore, the Chief explains that Tanzanian citizens engage in the illegal and unsustainable exploitation of natural resources, particularly poaching in Niassa Reserve, and the illegal exploitation and smuggling of timber and gold from the Lupilichi border region in the Lago District, and the M'Sawise border region in Mavago District (Unpublished Report, Border Patrol, Niassa Province, 2012).

Other related cross-border crimes comprise motorcycle theft and illegal fishing in Mozambican lakes and rivers. With regard to illegal fishing, border police in Niassa Province see this as a problem related to their lack of equipment that makes it difficult to patrol the border effectively. The Operational Chief of Border Police in Mandimba District points out that “at night we witness a veritable plunder of natural resources from Mozambique; Malawian and Tanzanian fishermen regularly come sneaking into our country, either through Lakes Niassa, Chirua, Chiuta and Amaramaba or through Lugenda and Rovuma Rivers without any capacity from our side to pursue them”. He explains furthermore that effective control of a border depends not only on material capacity or well trained staff, but requires strong cooperation with local communities. For example, the Operational Chief of Border Police at Luelele border post observes that “information related to smugglers is gathered by trusted elements from local communities”. He explains that these elements are also aware of possible transboundary activities by members of Renamo, who may recruit people for combat.

Historically, Mozambique and Malawi have developed political relationships based on mistrust, particularly with regard to Malawi’s support for the Renamo movement and suspicions related to the death of the late Mozambican President, Samora Machel (Lalbahadur, 2013). As Robinson (2009:2) points out, “it is well-documented that throughout the civil war the Renamo rebels […] used the territory of neighbouring Malawi to supply their forces in Mozambique and seek refuge from the operations of the Mozambican armed forces”. Very recently (particularly during the mandate of the late Malawian president Bingo Wa Mutharika), Mozambican and Malawian relationships have become strained for two
reasons. Firstly, in 2009, the Malawian border guards confronted the Mozambique police at the Caloca border post (Niassa Province) and set fire to the Mozambican border post building (Lalbahadur, 2013). Secondly, in 2012, the Mozambican authorities confiscated a barge destined for the inauguration of the Shire-Zambezi Waterway Project before the approval of the feasibility study by the Mozambican Government (Lalbahadur, 2013). With these political-diplomatic tensions, the Mozambican border forces have sought to increase patrol operations in order to reinforce the protection of state sovereignty.

6.4 Customs operations

As referred to above, the paramount goal of the border police is to prevent cross-border crime and ensure the protection of territorial sovereignty. For the customs authorities in Niassa Province, territorial sovereignty is directly linked to the collection of taxes, which is their chief concern. The Chief of Operations: Customs Division in Niassa Province points out two reasons for the drop in the collection of taxes. Firstly, the rampant spread of smuggling, with growing participation among local inhabitants. Secondly, owing to their nature, imported goods from Malawi and Tanzania contribute very little to the collection of higher taxes. These goods include bicycles, motorbikes and spare parts, mattresses, shoes, clothing and household utensils.

In order to counteract smuggling, customs officials have created mobile brigades to intercept potential smugglers, particularly those heading for Lichinga City. Mobile teams are spread over the main border posts in Niassa Province, namely Entrelagos, Mandimba, Lago and Cuamba. Thirdly, during the rainy season, the road linking Lichinga to Cuamba District becomes very muddy, leading to a low volume of imports. This situation is perceived by local customs officials as the main factor leading to low tax collection. For example, when I returned from fieldwork in Mandimba, it took nine hours to travel 258 km to Lichinga, a distance that would take one third of the time in normal road and driving conditions.
In the face of multiple factors leading to low collection of duties, customs officials in Niassa Province propose a two level solution. Firstly, they believe that the installation of an Electronic Single Window could control tax evasion significantly while ensuring legitimate trade. Secondly, they demand improved surveillance along the remainder of the border. In this regard, the Chief in Charge of Revenue Collection in Niassa Province observed that “the deployment of more border patrollers in 2006 in Niassa Province resulted in decreasing smuggling rates and increases in collection of taxes on imported goods”. He believes strongly that priority should be given to border control to strengthen the human and technical capacities of the patrollers and to reduce the physical vulnerability of the border. This would ensure the political and economic sovereignty of the country. In the case of the Mandimba border, customs officials believe that the porosity of the physical border could be reduced by erecting fences along the border as much as 25 km in the direction of the northern part of Mandimba District. The key to this argument is that vehicles used to transport smuggled goods cannot travel beyond further than 25 km in this direction because there are no roads. In the next section, the chapter provides a context for border crossing in Mandimba.

6.5 Immigration control: Mandimba border post

The Mandimba official crossing point is less busy than Machipanda or Ressano Garcia. The number of travellers crossing the border daily ranges from 100 to 300. These figures vary depending on the season; from April to October, the movement of travellers increases (given the movement of tourists travelling to Cabo Delgado and Nampula Provinces) while in the rainy season, this drops.

From the perspective of crime control, the immigration officers are mostly concerned with unauthorised immigrants and over-stayers (particularly young Malawians). The Chief of Immigration at the Mandimba border post states that “these young people come to Mandimba due to famine in Malawi. Most of them look for casual jobs on local farms, manufacturing of bricks and construction of houses”. He
suggests that immigration officers at Mandimba and Mangochi may need to coordinate the measures they take. The first measure is related to the issuance of circulation cards as identification documents to all border inhabitants in the interdicted area. An immigration inspector in Mandimba border post explains that a lack of coordination with colleagues in Mangochi on the issuance of circulation cards could open doors for criminals, allowing them to cross the border and stay wherever they like without any possibility of tracing them. He further explains that “in 2012, a guard at a grinding mill was murdered by a group of individuals who also robbed money in a shop nearby and fled to Malawi”. Based on this evidence, he believes that both Malawian and Mozambican citizens are involved in such crimes, and that the most important thing is to have their profile as border inhabitants. Moreover, the immigration department in Mandimba is also concerned by the fact that local communities cross the border at any point they find convenient, contributing to unreliable records of migration flows. As was made evident in the previous chapter, border crossing trends among local communities are shaped mostly by socio-economic and cultural factors that have existed over decades.
6.6 Life experiences in Mandimba border region

This section focuses on two border neighbourhoods within the Mandimba District, Chicolone and Luelele, and describes life experiences of some local inhabitants of areas adjacent to Mandimba town. The section considers the main activities and factors of interaction among populations on both sides of the border.

6.6.1 Chicolone community

Chicolone is a neighbourhood bordering the Lissiete Administrative Post – 17 km north of Mandimba village. Inhabitants of this neighbourhood are chiefly subsistence farmers. They grow beans, soybeans, rice, maize and sweet-potatoes, which they sell to Malawian citizens at international markets. They also share leadership with Malawian citizens from same border area. For example, the leader of the Chicolone neighbourhood states that “regulu (local leader) Mpanga exerts authority both in Malawi and in Mozambique”. He explains that this situation has prevailed since the end of the war in Mozambique given the fact that during that period...
some members of families from the community fled to Malawi while others remained on the Mozambican side.

Border dwellers in the Chicolone neighbourhood are in constant interaction with their counterparts in Malawi for various reasons: marriage bonds, participation in burial ceremonies, celebrations of national holidays, and social events. For example, a resident in the Chicolone neighbourhood explains that “most of the time, young men from both sides use their bicycles to carry commodities for informal traders from Lichinga up to Mandimba village. Also, many young men from Malawi cross the border to Mandimba in search of casual work on local farms”. Another factor that leads to permanent cross-border interactions in Chicolone is related to Malawian citizens who have lands on the Mozambican side of the border.

Regardless of the reasons that keep border dwellers of both sides in need of permanent interaction, crossing the border from one side to the other can be complicated, as some local residents explain. A respondent in the Chicolone neighbourhood stated that:

From one side of the border to the other, border police demand for illegal fees for us to cross the border either going to hospital or to grinding mills. In case, we don’t pay, they seize our goods either money or any other good concerned.

In one FGD, a participant who was also a local resident expressed his frustration with border police by making a request to the researcher in the following terms: “Can you please talk to these border guards just to be kind with us? When we buy corrugated zincs from Malawi to roof our own houses we have to pay bribe; where else do we have to go”. What may be missing on the part of border authorities at this simplified border crossing is the meaning of a border as a socio-economic set of interactions, since they tend to implement state-centred border control principles – protection of territorial sovereignty. Regardless of this persistence of state-centred border controls, the quotation above illustrates that Mozambique development policies, under implementation since the end of the war in 1992, have neither improved basic socio-economic services to local
communities, nor enabled the establishment of cooperative arrangements with neighbouring states aimed at improving cross-border integration – a fundamental fact of life for local communities. In this context, local communities are frustrated by the inability of the bordering governments to improve their standard of living (Anderson, 2013; Rudolph, 2005).

Based on these realities, some dwellers in the Chicolone community have suggested that border police should be more tolerant on sensitive matters such as the need to cross the border to buy basic consumer goods. Moreover, they understand that bribes paid to police on the border have been contributing to low numbers of traders at international markets and drive casual workers from Malawi to use bush paths in order to cross the border. For example, a respondent from Chicolone border neighbourhood stated that “most Malawian casual workers on their way back home use unofficial crossing points in order to avoid border police”.

This reveals that the Mozambican government’s efforts in training and deploying more border forces in order to preserve national security constitute one of the major factors in the insecurity to local communities. As far as the literature is concerned, cross-border interaction is still marred by struggles between local communities and border official regarding restrictive measures, rent seeking and corruption (Whiteside, 1998).

Apart from concerns over the behaviour of border police, border dwellers in the Chicolone neighbourhood lack grinding mills, hospitals, drinkable water and schools, which forces them to cross the border to Malawi. For example, a local leader points out that “we take decision to go to Malawi to grind maize due to high price we are charged in Mozambique and the distance we make on foot to reach those mills”. He explains that the nearest grinding mill is about 7 km from their community (in Luelele) and another is about 18 km (in Mandimba village), but grinding mills in Malawi are just across the border and prices are relatively low.

Women from the Chicolone neighbourhood have to travel 18 km on foot or by bicycle to the nearest Mozambican hospital in Mandimba village. According to a resident from the Chicolone neighbourhood,
“some patients from this neighbourhood and others from other areas prefer to pay bribes demanded by some of the Mozambican border officers to cross the border to find the nearest hospital in Malawi”. Furthermore, he explains that, as a result of the distance, the majority of local schoolgirls drop out before they reach grade 6 and beyond because their parents believe that it is too dangerous for their daughters to travel 15 km on foot to a secondary school on a day-to-day basis. Other claims raised by Chicolone border dwellers are concerned with job opportunities. For example, a local woman\textsuperscript{33} states that “here, we lack jobs that women can perform and get some money to assist our children. Most of the jobs are not appropriate for women as they demand more physical power that we lack”. Firstly, this suggests that the population from this particular border region faces security threats posed by the over-securitisation of the border by border police aimed at collecting bribes. Secondly, the statement above reveals that this particular community faces socio-economic problems that require specific policy interventions other than the general approach to development that the Mozambican government has been implementing since the early 1990s. As the study found, inhabitants of Chicolone pointed out that the district government of Mandimba had made several promises, but nothing had been done to improve access to hospitals, schools or grinding mills.

6.6.2 Luelele community

The Luelele locality is situated in the northern part of Lissiête Administrative Post – 25 km from Mandimba village. In the past, the region was part of the Nyasaland colonial concession. After independence one part was integrated into Malawi while the other remained in Mozambique, which left relatives divided on either side of the borders of neighbouring states. With regard to leadership, a local dweller in Chicolone\textsuperscript{34} states that “the area in which Katur local leader was ruling has been separated, which has resulted in two Katur communities (one in Malawi and another in Mozambique)”.

Compared to other communities, Luelele border region is the most densely populated in the Mandimba District as a result of its fertile lands, which are
the leading reason for the high demand for land here by Malawian citizens. On the subject of land, the leader of the Luelele community states that “in some sections of the border, beacons dividing the two countries were destroyed by Malawian citizens, who expanded their cropping lands onto Mozambican side of the border”. He adds that the problem was addressed in 2010 in a coordinated process between the chief of the Luelele locality and the community leader of the Kalange community (Malawi) who had to explain to people under his leadership that they should respect state borders. The Chief of Luelele community states that “the central idea was to alert Malawians citizens to the need to respect national borders since they establish the boundaries of states’ sovereignty”.

Once the reaffirmation process had been completed, the Malawian citizens who had removed beacons to expand their cropping areas and extended their settlements along the border were absorbed into the Mozambican side. As a result, some of them left the country and returned to Malawi while others remained in the same areas although they are identified neither as Mozambicans nor as Malawians. According to the Administrator of Mandimba, “this is a central topic which dominates our bilateral meetings with the District Government of Mangochi, but a definite solution to the problem must come from the central Government”.

While the district government waits for solutions from the central government, local inhabitants have been reinforcing their integration. For example, in the case of commercial activities, people living in the Luelele border region have constructed a warehouse that they use to store their surplus. A local inhabitant explains that this warehouse has become a meeting point for Malawian buyers and it has also meant that they no longer have to travel long distances into the interior in search of surplus supplies. Moreover, local inhabitants understand that it has significantly reduced the bribes they have to pay as the warehouse is situated close to the simplified crossing point, which does not tolerate any unprofessional conduct from border police officers. While the remainder of the border is plagued by conflicts between the Mozambique border police and local populations on either side of the border, the likelihood of conflict is growing, as SADC
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Integration propaganda suggests, given the absence of debate about border regions and their associated issues: local development, poverty alleviation and food insecurity. In the following section, the focus falls on land as a shared resource, specifically in the case of the Mandimba-Mangochi border region, that could shape border regions with new initiatives such as collaboration or co-management aimed at addressing problems of access to land and its sustainable utilisation.

6.7 Rethinking the Mandimba-Mangochi border as a co-managed border zone

6.7.1 Context of co-management and few examples

The concept of a co-managed border zone arises from a partnership-based approach to natural resource management, which applies in a situation where those resources straddle the political borders of different sovereign states (Plummer and Fitzgibbon, 2004; Pomeroy and Goetze, 2003; Borrini-Feyerabend, Farvar, Nguinguiri et al. 2007; Munthali, 2007). In co-management, two or more social actors work to negotiate a fair sharing of management functions in a given territory with natural resources straddling the states concerned, aimed at achieving sustainable use of natural resources, poverty alleviation, social justice and equity as well as democracy (Munthali, 2007; Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2007). Since a lack of cross-boundary cooperation is deemed detrimental to the sustainable use of natural resources, co-management of borderlands is essentially dependent on an understanding of the opportunities presented by integrating borders and borderlands of adjacent sovereign states (Asiwaju, 2011; Perkmann, 2003; Timothy, 1999). As Perkmann (2003:158) points out, “…the rationale of cross-border cooperation will be based on the persistence of differences between the nation state territories concerned, as for instance with respect to complementary locational advantages”.

Based on various opportunities across border lands of nation states around the world, there are several examples of co-management partnerships that indicate how cross-border cooperation can be conceived and managed in the context of the Southern Africa region, particularly in
the Mandimba/Mangochi cross-border region in northern Mozambique. Examples of existing co-management partnerships range from (1) the International Peace Garden straddling the border between north Dakota (USA) and Manitoba (Canada), which was established in 1932 as a monument to worldwide peace (Timothy, 1999); (2) the Roosevelt Campobello International Park, established in 1964 along the USA-Canada border, regarded as part of these nations’ cultural heritage (Timothy, 1999); (3) Waterloo-Glacier International Peace Park, established in 1932 on the USA-Canada border with the paramount goal of promoting peace while preserving the natural environment (Timothy, 1999); (4) the Belize Barrier Reef system in the Caribbean Coastal region, stretching over 260 km from Mexico to Guatemala. It was established to fight threats to marine and coastal resources, unsustainable fishing, improper land use, all of which were threatening the tourist industry (Pomeroy and Goetze, 2003). As a result, two co-managed partnerships were established: i) the Laughing Bird Caye National Park and ii) the Gladden Spit Marine Reserve; and (5) the Bénoué National Park Complex, a wildlife co-management partnership in the Cameroon. The establishment of this park addressed the concerns of local communities, particularly hunters, whose hunting territory occupied 44% of the land in question (Mayaka, 2002).

6.7.2 Co-management of natural resources in the Southern African region

Historically, the Southern African region has experienced resource-driven border conflicts between neighbouring states, particularly in the case of the Uganda-DRC, Kenya-Uganda Tanzania-Malawi, Tanzania-Uganda and Uganda-Rwanda borders (Okumu, 2010:280). In addressing conflicts related to existing natural resources in these border regions, the AU Assembly has urged African states to accelerate regional integration as one method of addressing border-driven conflict, particularly in areas where resources straddle the borders of states’ territorial jurisdictions (African Union Conference, 2007).
In general, in response to both the African Union and global regimes (for the management of bioregions and issues related to climate change), sub-Saharan Africa has adopted several transboundary conservation initiatives aimed at promoting effective conservation of biodiversity, the maintenance of peace and security, poverty alleviation and economic growth (Munthali, 2007; Wolmer, 2003; Duffy, 2001; Katerere et al., 2001). In the case of the Southern Africa region, these initiatives range from Transboundary Natural Resource Management Areas (TBNRMAs), Transfrontier Conservation Areas (TFCAs), Peace Parks, Spatial Development Initiatives (SDI), and Development corridors (Wolmer, 2003). These initiatives were implemented on the grounds that many resources in Southern Africa (river basins, marine resources and wildlife populations) are shared across international borders and that a cooperation mechanism for their management could bring sustainable development to the regions (Katerere et al., 2001; Munthali, 2007).

In the process, the Southern African region has focused chiefly on TFCAs as a 'model' that is projected to evolve from an individual country level to promote complementary approaches to sustainable land use and biodiversity conservation (Munthali, 2007). Under the TFAC model, the Southern African focus is on government protected areas and community conserved areas as sites for the establishment of Peace Parks. Peace Parks are defined as conservation areas or bioregions crossing the frontier of more than one state. The objective of establishing such parks is to address transnational environmental problems by focusing on co-management partnerships (Duffy, 2001). At present, Peace Parks in the Southern Africa region are at different stages; some have already been established while others remain as ongoing projects. Examples include the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park, the agreement for which was signed in 2000 by the governments of South Africa, Zimbabwe, and South Africa for the establishment of the Gaza-Kruger-Gonarezhou TFCA; the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park, the agreement for which was signed in 2000 by the governments of South Africa and Botswana, and which is oriented to tourism (Hanks, 2003); the Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Mozambique...
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TBNRMA, aimed at improving the sharing, exchange and management of resources among these countries (Katerere et al., 2001); the Maputaland Centre of Endemism – a transfrontier conservation area that has been developed to ensure the long term survival of a biodiversity system covering approximately 17,000 km² in Southern Mozambique, northern South Africa and western Swaziland (Smith, Easton, Nhancale, et al, 2008); and the three nations Namib desert TFCA, which is projected to integrate the Ai/Ais/Huns National Park in Namibia, the Richtersveld National Park in South Africa and the Iona National Park in Angola (Hanks, 2003).

Although the transboundary conservation initiatives are designed to alleviate poverty, promote integrated sustainable development and to ameliorate political and cultural tensions related to disputes over shared resources through peaceful cooperation between states (Wolmer, 2003), there is much scepticism regarding their focus. Firstly, these initiatives are funded by international financial agencies and environmental institutions such as the World Bank (WB), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the World Travel and Tourism Council (WTTC), the Peace Parks Foundation (PPF) and other non-government organisations (Duffy, 2006; Wolmer, 2003, Katerere et al., 2001). Secondly, transboundary conservation areas have been established in the fulfilment of a common global model for environmental management, which has led to a social construction of the environment (Duffy, 2006). The core argument in favour of a global approach to environmental management is that environmental problems have global impacts and consequently they require global science to understand them, and global institutions and experts to manage the areas (Katerere, et al., 2001:8).

However, the common model for the management of the environment is a top-down approach, which is oriented towards business purposes, particularly those of the particular funding agencies. This is often runs counter to the needs of with local communities. Where Peace Parks have been established, communities have been forced to leave their land and have been deprived of access to it (Munthali 2007). In the context of the Southern African region, most TFCAs have been established without
consultation with local communities, which has exacerbated tensions rather than addressing them. For example, in the establishment of the Great Limpopo TFCA, populations in Campfire (in Zimbabwe) were evicted from their homes to make way for wild animals while in the case of the Sengwe community, people were not consulted about the dimensions of the park (Duffy, 2006). Also, communities in Coutada 16 in Mozambique would have to be evicted to allow the establishment of the Gaza-Kruger-Gonarezhou TFCA (Katerere et al., 2001).

In all these cases, local communities have difficulties in accessing land, water and other livelihoods in their areas. As a result of the social construction of the environment, most of their survival strategies have been criminalised as poaching, trafficking or theft of natural resources. All in all, the Southern African region has fallen into the trap of the global model of environmental management, which has prevented the region from responding to the needs of local communities regarding their use and share of transboundary natural resources. In an elaboration on this subject from the perspective of poverty alleviation and sustainable development, the following sections comprises a discussion of how the fertile land in Mozambique (which is the key convergent factor of communities in the border regions) could be used to address food insecurity.

6.7.3 Challenges for co-management of the Mandimba-Mangochi border region

Contrary to the case studies presented above, the Mandimba-Mangochi border region is shaped predominantly by land-driven cross-border interaction for the production of food crops. Based on the rationale of TFCAs (that is, poverty alleviation and sustainable development), fertile land in Mozambique presents an ongoing challenge to the establishment of a local development oriented approach to co-management partnership in the Southern African region, one which goes against financially driven partnerships such as Peace Parks. Based on the SADC rationale of economic integration, the integration of communities and economy would
transform state territories into social and political communities and institutions (Blatter, 2004). More specifically, for economic integration to occur, SADC considers “food security, land, and agriculture” as crucial areas that should be strengthened in order to sustain a security community.

In the context of the Mozambique-Malawi border regions, co-management partnership needs to stand out as a unique experience owing to the fact that the land in Mozambique could be used to address food insecurity in Malawi, the impact of which would affect Mozambican soils by dint of the cultivation of unsuitable food crops. For example, a significant number of Malawian households has fled into Mozambique in response to the use of resources by the Malawian government, driven by national food security policies while at the same time ruling out any thinking on household livelihood security (Whiteside, 1998; Adger, 2006). In response to this, are number of different co-management analyses have been proposed to establish cross-border partnerships aimed at addressing problems of access and use of land. One common approach to cross-border partnerships is the co-management analysis research framework, which is intended to examine (1) legal feasibility – the existing customary/traditional laws and regulations for use of land; (2) political feasibility – the current political will, stability and capacity to enforce decisions; (3) institutional feasibility – the chance to build pluralistic management institutions across borders and possible conflicts that might result; (4) economic feasibility – the satisfaction of economic needs and availability of financial resources; (5) cultural feasibility – the status of the current population and socio-cultural diversity and their dynamics (Pomeroy and Goetze, 2003; Borrini-Feyerabend et al., 2007).

Elaborating on the analytical structure given above, Mozambique and Malawi have different laws and regulations controlling access to and use of land. The Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique stipulates in article 109 that (1) Land is the State’s property and (2) every Mozambican citizen has the right to access and use of land for socio-economic purposes. On the other hand, Malawi has three categories of land ownership: public, private and customary land (Takane, 2008).
majority of the poor cannot hold public land (owned by government) or private land (this is owned by large-scale farmers). Moreover, according to customary law, land is not for sale. It is managed in accordance with each ethnic group’s customary law, whose transaction modalities depend on patrilineal or matrilineal rules (Place and Otsuka, 2001; Takane, 2008). Therefore, lower purchasing power preventing the poor from owning private land coupled with the confining of land transactions to matrilineal and patrilineal rules have resulted in a high demand for land in Malawi. Ultimately, this high demand has resulted in a shortage of land, which has in turn led individuals to search for new sources of land rights, particularly from non-matrilineal kin members (Takane, 2008).

From the perspective of political feasibility, Mozambique and Malawi have had challenging political relations, which might play a significant role in decisions on cross-border partnerships in access to and use of land in Mozambique or in any other neighbouring state. At present, strong political decisions depend on the state of the debate on SADC integration. Importantly, cross-border partnerships for use of land are different from bioregion initiatives in the sense that the latter straddle state borders while the former constitute the driving force behind the movement of people across state borders. While such partnerships are as yet unknown in the Southern African region, each state continues to make its borders as secure as possible to protect its territorial sovereignty.

From the perspective of economic feasibility, Malawian land has always been over-cultivated and lacking the replacement of nutrients, which has resulted in poor fertility and erosion (Whiteside, 1998). For example, research has illustrated that without an economic market network between the Mozambican communities (Niassa, Zambézia, Tete, and Nampula) and Malawi, development in these communities would be very different (Whiteside, 1998). In contrast, Mozambican informal traders see Malawi as their key market and source of labour for work on their lands. Mozambican products are predominantly agricultural, such as maize, beans, salt, fertilisers and vegetables. These facts reveal that while cross-border co-management partnerships in Southern African remain
dependent on political decisions, local communities continue to rely on unsustainable alternatives for access and use of natural resources, which is the persisting reality exposed in this study. Based on the three case studies discussed above, the next section provides a summary of convergent factors (socio-economic and cultural) and their relationship with state practices of border control.

6.8 Conclusion

In contrast to other cases studies, the Mandimba-Mangochi border region is dependent predominantly on agriculture, given the ready availability of land and the favourable climatic conditions. Given these circumstances, cross-border interaction occurs mostly in informal trade exchanges of agricultural surplus and access to arable land by Malawian citizens on the Mozambican side of the border. Malawian citizens’ reliance on this land has led to conflicts over land in some communities in the Mandimba border region.

Regardless of the communities’ daily need to cross the border (including access to arable land), the Mozambican and Malawian border authorities have prioritised control mechanisms that constrain local communities and prevent them from addressing their socio-economic and ethno-cultural concerns across the border. As Chapter 8 will show, the SADC concept of a security community is diminished by the drive for security in the border regions.

As far as co-management of border zones is concerned, fertile lands in Mandimba present a challenge to Mozambique and Malawi in advancing cooperative mechanisms that could address food insecurity. In establishing such forms of management, the Mandimba-Malawi border could become a force of change in an approach to the border region that reflects the context of post-colonial African states. More specifically, the Mozambique-Malawi approach to land issues could illustrate a form of integration in SADC that differs from profit-oriented TCAs, which are based on global standards of environmental management.
Notes

1 From Tete to Cabo Delgado province, Mozambique shares 900 km of land border with Malawi, most of which is porous. As a result, border patrol units believe that criminals are taking advantage of this to perpetrate various crimes, especially smuggling of fuel into Malawi and various goods into Mozambique. There is information on the increase in trafficking and smuggling of stolen cars across the border dividing the two countries. In response to this, however, the border authorities of the two countries have established a mechanism for sharing information and undertaking sporadic joint patrol operations along the border, very often in the Dedza and Angónia districts of Tete province.

2 In the Republic of Mozambique, land is not for sale. Article 109 of the Constitution prescribes that 1) land is the State’s property and 2) land shall not be sold, alienated, or transmitted by other means such as mortgage or seizure.

3 Interviewed on 7 February 2013 in Lichinga City.
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4 Mandimba District is located in the southern part of Niassa Province. It is 150 km from Lichinga City and 5 km from the border with the Republic of Malawi. It is also bordered by the Ngauma District in the north, Mecanhelas and Cuamba Districts in the south, Malawi in the west and Majune and Metarica Districts in the east. The district is divided into two administrative posts: Mitande and Lissiete, which also have internal subdivisions. Mitande has one locality called Mississe while Lissiete is divided into two localities, Luelele and Meluluca. The existing statistical data from the general population census of 2007 shows that there are about 159 000 inhabitants, of which 79 000 are men and 81 000 women. The climate is moderate with dry winters. The average annual temperature is 20 degrees Celsius with annual amplitude of less than 10 degrees in all regions of the district. The rainy period begins in March and lasts until November with precipitation ranging from 1000 to 2000 mm and a relative humidity varying between 55% and 75%. The orography of Mandimba district is shaped by two main landscape platforms: fluvial landforms and mountains with valleys. Fluvial landform areas are composed of sand and dunes along Lake Amaramba with an altitude ranging from 600 to 700 metres; in other sub-regions this altitude ranges from 800 to 1000 metres. On the other hand, mountains with valleys are characterised by altitude variation along the entire east-west part of the border with the Republic of Malawi. The main elevations of the district include Mount Ivenga (1099 m), Mount Lussange (1127 m), Mount Lissiete (1598 m) and Serra Chigulo (1278 m). In some areas, such as Messalo and Luchimua, the altitude rises beyond 1500 metres. Soil in Mandimba is red clay, susceptible to erosion. The main types of wooded areas include shrubby savannah, swampy forest and rocky forest. In these forests, the dominant tree species are Jambire, Chanfuta, Mbaua, Umbila and Sândalo Africano (Ministério da Administração Estatal, 2005).

5 Interviewed on 15 February 2013 in Mandimba Village

6 Administrator of Mandimba district, interviewed on 15 February 2013 in Mandimba Village

7 Interviewed on 15 February 2013 in Mandimba Village

8 The administrator also strongly believes that during the war, Malawian authorities allowed members of Renamo to enter Mozambican refugee camps in Malawi to distribute essentials and clothing as a way of gaining sympathy, which has supposedly played a significant role in voting trends going in favour of the opposition party, particularly in the 1994 elections.
The Mandimba administrator explains that the district has been implementing a green zones strategy, which has resulted in large quantities of surplus. As a result, the district has registered huge demand from Malawian citizens, which has stimulated local populations to produce more. However, the administrator explains that the most important message for local populations is that they should not sell their surplus at prices that will not compensate them. Also, local populations are warned to avoid stock break for their own consumption. For example, in the first two months of the year, Mozambicans buy maize in Malawi, the same maize that they sold to Malawians earlier.

Capulanas is a manufactured fabric used by women to wrap their body and head.

Kwacha is the name of the Malawian currency.

Administrator of Mandimba District, interviewed on 15 February 2013 in Mandimba Village.

Community member in Mandimba village, interviewed on 13 February 2013.

Interviewed on 13 February 2013.

Interviewed on 10 February 2013 in Mandimba.

Unclear demarcation of the border in Lupilichi border area has brought Mozambicans and Tanzanians into competition for the exploitation of minerals.

The border police report of 2012 states that on 1 June border police apprehended a motorbike (at Mpapa simplified crossing point) that was suspected of being stolen in the Republic of Tanzania. It was in the possession of a Tanzanian citizen, Inete Hiela, who was trying to smuggle it into Mozambique through the jungle.

Interviewed on 8 February 2013.

Interviewed on 10 February 2013 in Mandimba.

Interviewed on 9 February 2013 in Mandimba.

Interviewed on 10 February 2013 in Mandimba.

Interviewed on 7 February 2013 in Lichinga City.

Interviewed 10 February 2013 at Mandimba official border post.
Interdicted zone is a space stretching up to 20 km from the official line of state borders.

Lissiete Administrative post is headed by Régulo Mpanga.

The leader of Chicolone community, interviewed on 13 February 2013.

A resident in Chicolone border community, interviewed on 13 February, 2013.

Interviewed on 13 February, 2013.

The leader of Chicolone community, interviewed on 13 February 2013.

A resident in Chicolone border community, interviewed on 13 February 2013.

Interviewed on 11 February 2013.

Interviewed on 11 February 2013.

Interviewed on 11 February 2013.

Interviewed on 15 February 2013.

TBNRMAs are contiguous areas of neighbouring states, but they are not necessarily protected areas (Katerere et al., 2001).

TFCAs are defined as linked protected areas between neighbouring countries (Katerere et al., 2001; Smith et al., 2008).

Other transboundary co-management partnerships in Southern Africa include the Beira corridor, which was established by the governments of Mozambique and Zimbabwe and intended to use transport infrastructures from Port Beira to Zimbabwe and thereby reduce transportation costs; the Maputo corridor, which was established in 1995 by the governments of Mozambique and South Africa, aimed at facilitating the access to global capital and infrastructures development, and which has culminated (for example) in the construction of a toll gate road connecting Maputo (Mozambique) and Witbank (South Africa).

Bioregion is defined as a self-contained and equilibrated place structured and governed by its life forms, its topography and its biota rather than by human dictates and legislature (Wolmer, 2003).
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7.1 Introduction

In Chapter 2 reference was made to the common concept of security that took hold after the end of the Cold War, and the expansion of border controls outside the immediate frontiers of the EU and other ‘Western’ countries. In the process, human movement was reconceptualised as a threat to national sovereignty. The cases studies discussed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, have shown how life experience in cross-border regions, the relationship between cross-border communities and border control perspectives differ from such dominant thinking about state security and the governance of migration. Overall, findings show that the interaction of communities in the border regions is motivated by day-to-day socio-economic needs, but is limited by a state’s securitised international borders. While the Mozambique border police at land crossings are involved in controlling the border only insofar as this might prevent the national territory from external threats, such as cross-border crime, at airports and seaports much less discretion is possible on the part of immigration officers and customs officials. This chapter thus returns from the localised dimensions of border governance at land borders in Mozambique, to the globalised dimensions of border governance through
the imposition of international security standards on border controls, which are more visible at airports and seaports than at most border crossings (with the possible exception of Ressano Garcia, which is today in many ways an internationalised border crossing).

In this chapter the analysis focuses particularly on the experiences of Mozambique in applying international security standards to border control at sea ports and airports. In particular, the focus of this chapter will be on how the Mozambique Immigration Department has implemented mandatory standards set by the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) for the issuance and checking of Machine Readable Travel Documents (MRDTs), particularly passports and visas. At the same time, an analysis is provided of the impact of reforms undertaken by customs authorities in relation to e-luggage checking, aimed at ensuring legitimate trade in accordance with recommendations of the World Customs Organisation (WCO). As the chapter will show, recommended security standards and practices have resulted in significant changes in recent years in terms of technology, including biometric passport checks and a single electronic window for rapid clearance of imported goods, both introduced in 2010. E-luggage checking and adjustments to security practices at sea ports and airports are discussed. Based on these findings, it is argued in this chapter that international institutions have gained direct authority over many areas that were traditionally under the command of national states.

7.2 Externalisation of international security standards of border control: the role of international institutions

Chapter 2 established that the growing security threat posed by terrorist groups and other organised criminal groups has pushed the Western world to undertake restrictive migration policies and to tighten border control measures in an attempt to regulate the movement of people across international frontiers (Weber and Grewcock, 2011; Dauvergne, 2008; Rees, 2008). Western concerns with border control have been sparked by the 9/11 attacks in the US, the Madrid bombings in 2004 and the London
bombings in 2005, all of which have led to the adoption of new security regimes in the control human migration, the control of cargo shipment, security of seaports and their facilities as well as airports and related facilities. In the case of the US, maritime security experts believed that there was a need to establish common practices and standards at all seaports and an international maritime security regime in order to ensure effective maritime trade worldwide (Frittelli, 2008). In the case of EU, common border control technology and practices have been externalised – in other words, exported to external borders, generally in a way that aims to control transnational crime and undocumented human movement (Grabbe, 2000).

At the global level, these regimes have been introduced through several mechanisms, ranging from (1) the enactment of compulsory legislation (such as the United Nations Conventions against terrorism, against transnational organised crime and against human trafficking) and agreements aimed at controlling unauthorised migration from potential sending countries, and direct support as well as physical border patrol operations from third countries; (2) compliance with recommended standards for the issuance and control of biometric travel documents; (3) compliance with international security standards for e-luggage checking for air and sea navigations, which has resulted in the ascendency of biometric border control technology and its ‘enforcement’ on a global scale (Amoore, 2006; Salter, 2004; Boswell, 2003).

As far as legislation and agreements are concerned, in 2004 the EU adopted the Qualification Directive, which prescribes common criteria that are useful for reducing the existing socio-economic differences between member states in the identification of persons in need of international protection (Nessel, 2008).

In the matter of direct support and physical border control operations from third countries, the EU and the United Kingdom have been sending their officers to refugees’ countries of origin where they are stationed at airports and seaports, for example, explicitly in order to prevent the departure of potentially unwanted migrants (Nessel, 2008). This strategy
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has been supported by both the US and EU security authorities on the grounds that relying on countries of origin to check the legality of people who plan to migrate, before they embark, is not sufficient. Externalising controls may be costly, but allows the EU and US to avoid the high costs of deportation operations later (Guild and Bigo, 2010). From the perspective of trade control, the EU has strengthened maritime border control and increased collaboration with points of origin of trade aimed at avoiding penetration of trade and travel networks by terrorists (Bellavita, 2011; Wolff, 2008; Bryan and Flynn, 2002). These collaborative initiatives are complemented by patrol operations at the EU external borders designed to stop migrants before they enter these territories (Rees, 2008; Nessel, 2008).

In the EU, the patrol of external borders is undertaken through FRONTEX operations FRONTEX plays two fundamental roles. First, at the operational level, it has been adopted as a strategy aimed at protecting the EU’s internal security by preventing transnational organised crime from reaching European territory (Mounier, 2007:47). These operations involve the cooperation of border controls of third countries. For example, in 2004 the EU proposed the establishment of five detention centres: in Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia (Nessel, 2008:661). Secondly, FRONTEX has been adopted as a model that would involve other countries in fighting threats that concerning not only EU geopolitical borders (Burgess, 2009). As Rees (2008:97) points out, “the incorporation of the Schengen Convention into the Union established a borderless internal area with a hard external frontier that was designed to provide a high level of common security”.

Furthermore, the EU has been expanding external border governance through the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). This is designed to prevent the development of security threats in the neighbourhood that could jeopardise the EU, while at the same time maintaining certain influences in these areas (Marchetti, 2006; Bosse, 2009). As Marchetti (2006:16) observes, “it will be argued that the ENP can be understood as a manifestation of the EU’s will to create a ring of states in its vicinity to
serve its purposes of protecting itself and exercising influence”. Indeed, the European Security Strategy of 2003 stipulates that “our task is to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations” (Smith, 2005:760). The EU and the US are not alone in having externalised their model of border governance through providing physical support to neighbouring states; security standards have become compulsory for the rest of the world through international security institutions such as the UN, the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) and the WCO. In the next section, the focus is on ICAO and its mission in the governance of air transportation.

7.2.1 The International Civil Aviation Organisation and the technologies of border governance

The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) is a United Nations agency established in 1944 under the Chicago Convention as a platform for planning, developing and providing recommended standards and practices for the safety of air transportation, including provisions for clearance of persons through border controls (ICAO, 2006). In compliance with its mandate, the ICAO has devoted expertise to developing standardised aviation safety and security measures (AVSEC), with which every contracting country is obliged to comply. Security standards and practices recommended by the ICAO are contained in several legal instruments such as Annexes 9 and 17 to the Chicago Convention, which are the most adaptive and frequently revised documents.

Annex 9 provides contracting states with advanced tools to ensure the reliable management of Machine Readable Travel Documents (MRTDs). As a complementary legal framework to prevent acts of unlawful interference, Annex 9 is concerned specifically with the facilitation of landside formalities for clearance of aircraft and passengers, goods and mail with respect to the requirements of customs, immigration, public health and agriculture authorities. It provides a frame of reference for
planners and managers of international airport operations, describing the obligations of the aviation industry as well as the minimum facilities to be provided by governments.

Annex 17 establishes international standards and recommended practices for civil aviation aimed at preventing acts of unlawful interference. It defines acts of unlawful interference as all those that are intended to jeopardise the safety of civil aviation, *inter alia*: unlawful seizure of aircraft in flight or on the ground; hostage taking on board aircraft or in aerodromes; introduction on board an aircraft, or at an airport, of weapon or hazardous devices or material intended for criminal purposes. Based on this, annex 17 prescribes that special attention shall be given to flights on their departure and arrival. For example, the Chief of Police Operations at the Mavalane Airport in Maputo explains that:

On departure flights, special attention is paid to potentially risky passengers who may enter aircraft with prohibited goods; while on arrival flights, the focus is shifted to check travellers with irregular visas, who do not declare their goods at customs and those who may have endemic diseases are checked by the health authorities.

This suggests that the control of the movement of people undergoes different levels of security checks. People are checked against state security; security of financial sources; security of goods in international trade circuits; security against diseases in both transit and receiving countries; security of travel documents and other categories of security that peoples on the move are subject to undergo. With regard to the security of travel documents, the ICAO has devoted a great deal of time and resources to developing advanced technology for the issuance and control of electronic documents – the MRTDs.

*7.2.1.1 Machine Readable Travel Documents in the context of passenger control*

Under the Chicago Convention, the ICAO’s main mandate was to develop a standard document – the MRTD –, which would be compatible with security features such as durability, data storage, storage capacity, data
content and format, optical character recognition capability, biometrics, contactless chip technology, and privacy with respect to national laws (ICAO, 2007). Initially, ICAO’s development of MRTDs was launched in response to weak passport controls, particularly with regard to the authenticity of electronic passports. This concern was linked to the rise of human migration on a global scale, in the context of both tourism and international trade as well as the fear of cross-border criminality associated with passport theft.

More recently, particularly in the context of the war on terror, “the deployment of electronic personal data to classify and govern the movement of people across borders has become a key priority” (Amoore, 2006:341). The ICAO has responded to this challenge by incorporating biometrics in travel documents as the single best way to link these documents with their rightful holders (ICAO, 2007). In this case, the challenge facing the ICAOs was to create a passport that was replicable globally but also unique – representing the data of only one bearer (Salter, 2004). Bio-technology experts proposed risk profiling techniques for travellers as a technical solution to governing people’s movement across borders (Amoore, 2006).

In pursuance of this proposal, the ICAO has developed standardised requirements for document (format and contents) that could facilitate international travel as well as enable nations to determine the validity of travel documents more quickly. The ICAO’s work has resulted in an innovative MRTD – an official document for international travel technically referred to as ICAO Doc 9303, which is compatible with biometric identification and global interchange using both visual (eye readable) and machine readable means (ICAO, 2007). From the perspective of document security, the standardised format of the MRTD comprises a visual inspection zone containing mandatory and optional data elements in a prescribed layout and a machine readable zone (MRZ) containing mandatory data elements in a form and position that are absolutely mandatory (ICAO, 2006).

As an innovative document, the MRTD has replaced handwritten travel documents (whose information could easily be altered or destroyed)
with a standardised data placement and other security features aimed at reducing data alteration or counterfeiting, as well as arithmetically derived security verifying check digits (ICAO, 2006). With this innovation, all ICAO contracting states have been urged to incorporate biometric data in their MRTDs and they are also advised to update security features regularly in new versions of their travel documents to prevent their misuse and to facilitate the detection of cases where such documents have been unlawfully altered, replicated or issued (Annex 9, 2005: 15).

From a technical standpoint, the MRZ contains a digital signature, which is readable by a modified Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) – a trusted data encryption hierarchy system that helps to ensure privacy, security and integrity in the achievement of global interoperability. Global interoperability is achievable when a passenger’s information is captured, processed and shared through an integrated circuit technology within all ICAO certified states. Authenticity of data encrypted on MRTDs is certified by the Public Key Directorate (PKD), an essential component of PKI for the checking and validation of digital signatures. The major advantages of PKI include the conceding of access to PKD to inspectors of e-passports throughout the world and the use of public signing keys to validate passports in confidence; preventing people from wrongful crossing the border and from wrongfully boarding an airplane (ICAO, 2006).

All in all, the ICAO’s efforts in establishing recommended security standards and practices for the safety of air transportation has made it the creator, monitor and governor of a passport regime in which travel documents are used for the control of people’s movements across borders, and for the categorisation, tracking and restriction of travellers. The passport is the primary identification document by which border officials classify the international status of the bearer and decide whether he or she is desirable or undesirable to the country of destination (Salter, 2004). Through the internationalisation of security standards, the ICAO has exercised full autonomy and independence in prescribing standards to contracting countries, the implementation of which has placed global governance in the hands of powerful states that back the creation of these
institutions. The following section discusses some of the arrangements made by the Mozambican Civil Aviation Institute in order to implement the recommended security standards and practices for the safety of air transportation.

7.3 ICAO’s security standards and their impact on Mozambican border control reforms

7.3.1 Security standards for air border control

Under the Chicago Convention, “contracting states are obliged to develop and adopt international standards for customs, immigration, and other procedures to facilitate the border-crossing processes involved in international air transport” (ICAO, 2007:6). In this regard, the ICAO has provided technical assistance to contracting states in establishing and implementing their own national civil aviation security programmes, with the primary objective of ensuring “the safety of passengers, crew, ground personnel and the general public in all matters related to safeguarding against acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation” (Annex 17, 2006:2).

In response to these mandatory recommendations, a security manager at the National Institute of Civil Aviation of Mozambique (IACM) explains that the institute has made some progress towards compliance with security and safety measures in aviation transportation. The institute has submitted a proposal blueprint to the National Assembly on key security programmes aimed at improving security practices at all airports. From a technical perspective, the security manager explains that the key components of civil aviation security encompass training in safety measures, quality control (inspections and auditing), preventive actions and physical patrol around airport premises. Under the coordination of IACM, these programmes will be undertaken by a large team composed of the national defence force, the police, managers of airports and operators. This multilateral security sector is planned as a response to the ICAO’s provision, which reinforces that “each contracting state shall keep under constant review the level of threat to civil aviation within its
territory, and establish and implement policies and procedures to adjust relevant elements of its national civil aviation security programme accordingly” (Annex 17, 2006:3).

Apart from the ICAO’s endeavours to establish the recommended security standards and practices to ensure the safety and security of air transportation, other organisations such as the World Customs Organisation (WCO\textsuperscript{6}), the International Trade Organisation (ITO), the UN\textsuperscript{7} and the International Maritime Organisation (IMO\textsuperscript{8}) have passed mandatory security measures with which contracting states are obliged to comply.

For example, in order to be fully compliant with recommended practices for sea border security, Mozambique has made efforts ranging from the delimitation of sea borders with neighbouring states (Mauritius, Madagascar, Seychelles, South Africa, and Tanzania) to the ratification of international legal instruments for more reliable and secure borders (including ships and port facilities). At the legal level, Mozambique has become a contracting state to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and to the International Code for the security of ships and of port facilities by the signing and ratification of resolutions 25/2004 and 26/2004 of July 14. The Code for security of ships and of port facilities is intended to: facilitate access to and assessment of the exchange of information related to security threats by appropriate contracting governments; prevent unauthorised access to ships, port facilities and their restricted areas; prevent the introduction of weapons or explosives to ships or port facilities; and master of security plans and procedures (Resolution 26/2004).

Furthermore, SOLAS recommends that “contracting governments shall set security levels and ensure the provision of security level information to port facilities within the territory, and to ships prior to entering or whilst in a port within their territory” (Resolution 25/2004:262). Under this prescription, contracting states have a duty to update their security strategies according to international standards.
In the following subsection, the history of Mozambican sea borders is provided and security reforms that have been implemented at Port Maputo to date are discussed.

7.3.2 Security reforms for sea border control

The history of Mozambican sea borders is recent and is still under construction. Until recently, sea borders had no legal framework to guide their delimitation or demarcation. Such a legal instrument was passed in 1982 as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This convention addressed theoretical controversies that had until this point dominated the technical discourse of the delimitation of the sea and the exploitation of sea resources in a peaceful manner.

At the one end of spectrum was a group of states in favour of freedom of the oceans, allowing any state in the world to navigate and explore resources in a free manner. At the other end of spectrum were advocates of sustainable use of the sea and its resources. This group advocated respect for the jurisdiction and sovereignty of coastal states as well as the protection and safeguarding of interests of landlocked states and their access to the sea. States embracing the latter philosophy recognised that, in a spirit of mutual understanding and cooperation, UNCLOS was provided a legal framework for the seas and oceans that would facilitate international communication and promote the peaceful use of the seas and oceans, the equitable and efficient utilisation of their resources, the conservation of their living resources, and the study, protection and preservation of the marine environment (UNCLOS, 1982).

UNCLOS has provided guidelines for the delimitation of various jurisdictions, including that imposed on the territorial sea between states with opposite or adjacent coasts. Member states signing up to the convention understood that unclear delimitation of well-resourced border areas had pushed states into war and that compliance with these provisions would contribute to peace keeping, justice and progress for all peoples of the world (Couto, 1988). With the signing of the convention, the jurisdiction of the sea was divided into five key areas, namely: the territorial
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Sea\(^{10}\) – article 2; internal waters\(^{11}\) – article 8; the exclusive economic zone\(^{12}\) – article 55; the continental shelf of a coastal state\(^{13}\) – article 76; high seas\(^{14}\) – article 86.

Table 7.1
Sea divided into various legal zones

Although UNCLOS has established all procedures for delimitation and demarcation of the sea between states, many lack the resources and technology to ensure proper monitoring and surveillance of their sea borders. In most cases, they reinforce security at departure and arrival points. Port Maputo offers an example of security reforms undertaken to ensure legitimate trade and security the port premises.

7.3.2.1 Port Maputo and security reforms

Port Maputo is situated in the South East African interior as a strategic gateway to international markets. Since the year 2000 it has become a busy port with annual volumes of cargo reaching 12 million tons in 2012 (Leatherbarrow, 2012). Port Maputo handling services have been pressured by high demand from China, India and elsewhere for the shipping of minerals (coal, ferrochrome, nickel, iron) and other resources, which has
presented challenges to port security providers on the one hand, and to the customs authorities on the other. In response to this, Port Maputo authorities have reinforced security measures for the safety of employees, port facilities and ships in accordance with the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code under the ISO 28000-700 accreditation. In doing so, the Maputo Port security officer observes that “the aim is to sustain current standards whilst securing strategies to assure clients and their staff that neither personnel nor cargoes will be compromised within the boundaries of the port” (Leatherbarrow, 2012: 27).

Port Maputo’s efforts to comply with international security standards for sea border protection has been implemented in response to the vulnerability of all modes of transportation presented by terrorist activities, something which has become a threat to global maritime commerce, particularly in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks (Frittelli, 2008). Maritime border protection is given both national security and economic security importance by the fact that ships are the primary mode of the transportation of cargo globally and that developing international security standards for protection of port facilities and ships has become a global security imperative (Frittelli, 2008).

In response to these security imperatives, particularly to provide physical protection to Port Maputo, local security authorities have hired two security companies, Executive Protection, which renders security at the entrance gates to the port buildings, and SPACE, which is responsible for the protection of the perimeter of the port through continuous and random checks on individuals and vehicles. Protection of the perimeter of Port Maputo is a requirement of international security standards aimed at preventing terrorists from entering port facilities through adjacent areas or in trucks in loading and unloading operations (Frittelli, 2008). To this end, SPACE has reinforced security by introducing identification security cards for workers and visitors inside the port site.

As far as the control of passengers travelling by sea is concerned, the Chief of Immigration Control Post at Port Maputo explains that security measures focus solely on the control of sailors and passengers on board
cruise ships, given that the number of passenger travelling by sea has diminished. In compliance with international security procedures for sea transport, he explains that “sea travellers have a unique embarking and disembarking point (unless there is an emergent health problem among passengers) and a complete registration list of passengers on board is submitted in advance by the navigation agent to the Immigration and to Customs officers, from which they can proceed with check out”.

In the control of cargo shipped at Port Maputo, the MRD has been adjusting its operations to match the global demand for trusted trade, which includes compliance with port-security operations ranging from a) selecting of risk ships before they enter the port area; b) cargo information handed to a port of destination in advance; c) electronic screening of containers to prevent the import/export of prohibited goods or hazardous substances (Frittelli, 2008).

In doing so, in partnership with Kudumba, the MRD established integrated technological equipment for border security at Port Maputo in 2006. On the one hand, a non-intrusive scanning system has been introduced to ensure legitimacy and integrity of international trade and to speed up cargo flow at Kudumba. On the other hand, the system is designed to crack down on terrorist activity and the potential for criminal assault on the movement of imports, exports and transit freight (Leatherbarrow, 2012). Geoffrey McPherson observes that “cargo is being moved more quickly and efficiently than by many other ports in the region and the high security standards will augment these performance improvements” (Leatherbarrow 2012: 27). For example, a senior officer at Port Maputo explains that “once the ship has docked at the port, a joint team constituted by elements of the Maputo Port Development Company (MPDC), intelligence brigade, and customs officers examine the list of merchandise on the ship in order to control the introduction of any prohibited goods”. He adds that once the verification stage is complete, merchandise is submitted to non-intrusive inspection. Also, the deputy manager of the Maritime Terminal at Maputo explains that “cargo control at this terminal is subject to a risk profile check, which consists of
getting important information on goods abroad before they are shipped. This information is related to the country of origin and routes used by the ship”. Based on this information, customs officers are able to categorise the risk of the goods concerned. For instance, if a ship departs from Angola heading for Colombia, then Brazil, then Durban and finally to Maputo, there is high probability that it is involved in drug trafficking.

Furthermore, risk profiling of goods may be used to ensure legitimate trade and also to prevent tax evasion, smuggling and threats of terrorism. The Deputy Manager\textsuperscript{21} of the Maritime Terminal at Maputo explains that some importers may declare second-hand clothing while they are in fact importing new clothes or even illicit goods such as drugs or weapons. He therefore believes that security practices require continuous updating because criminals may find new methods to protect their illicit goods from security checks. He explains that the Electronic Single Window (ESW)\textsuperscript{22}, which has already been introduced, will assist the intelligence sector in activating risk profiling on the system and in analysing documents before the arrival of goods and in inspecting them physically once they have arrived. The Deputy Manager\textsuperscript{23} believes that ESW system represents the most advanced level of the adaptation of MRD to the new trade environment.

7.3.3 Reforms in the Immigration Department

While the MRD security reforms are focused on the control of cargo in the interests of legitimate trade, the Immigration Department has been concerned with reforms aimed at controlling entry, stay and departure to/from the Republic of Mozambique. From a legal standpoint, migration across the Mozambique borders is regulated by the Migration Act 5/93 of 28 December, which prescribes legal regimes for dealing with foreigners (rights, duties and guarantees). The Act is complemented by other legal instruments such as Decree 55/2003 of 28 December, which established recommended standards required for the facilitation and security of passengers travelling on aeroplanes; Decree 13/2008, which has introduced biometric passports; Resolution 21/2001 on the abolition of
visas in passports among the community of Portuguese language countries (CPLP); and the Southern African Community for Development (SADC) Protocol on the facilitation of movement of people, approved by heads of states in the region on 13/07/2005. These legal instruments have been implemented progressively over time as the security situation has demanded. In its efforts to comply with the ICAO’s security standards, the Mozambican immigration department has become more interested in establishing a reliable system to profile travellers’ information. For example, the Chief of Immigration at Mavalane Airport states that “we need to respond efficiently to high immigration flows by implementing security standards on issuance, certification, and checks of official travel documents in all key entering/exit points”. He adds that since 2007, Maputo has become a new destination for many international airline companies such as Ethiopian, Kenyan and Qatar airways, which has made Mavalane airport very busy. Also, at the domestic level, the Mozambican airline (LAM) has established direct flights from Maputo to Pemba and Vilankulos airports, which has increased the demands made on staff and technology in the drive for improved control of migration flows in the country.

However, Mozambican authorities believe that strict control of immigration flows at airports, seaports and official land crossing points is still unable to deliver reliable data on actual numbers of immigrants. They point to the physical vulnerability of land borders and corruption within the Immigration Department as the main reasons for this. For example, the Immigration Inspector at Mavalane Airport observes that “many foreign immigrants (particularly those from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zaire and Rwanda pretending to be refugees and asylum seekers) have been able to get national official documents by paying bribes”.

In order to counteract corruption, the immigration authorities believe that the ICAO MRDTs for certification of official travel documents should be connected to the Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration (STAE), the National Directorate for Civil Identification, the Criminal Police, the National Department for Migration (NDM), the
National Institute for Land Transport, Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, and the Ministry of Justice. The integration of all these departments would reduce corrupt practices to since the system is replicable and centralised, offering few options for alteration without interface.

Despite this desire for integration, the Mozambican government has not yet integrated its immigration control system into the ICAO’s PKD. As a result, the country has followed the practice of handing over responsibility for the productions of the state’s official information (such as personal identification) to various private companies, which has not as yet proved reliable. For example, a private British company (Brithol Michicoma) was until recently responsible for printing biometric passports, visas and bar codes as well as other official documents. A private Belgian company (SEMILEX) has now taken over from this company and is also printing IDs, drivers’ licenses and other electronically readable identification cards for various Ministries. Against this background, the Immigration Inspector at Mavalane Airport observes that “SEMILEX does not comply with ICAO recommendations for placement of biometric data, which distorts the logical structure of MRTDs”. He clarifies this by providing the example that when a passport number is entered on their system, the name of the holder is not recognised, creating a weakness in the control of official travel documents at check points.

Given this evidence, the MID believes that the absence of a reliable system of controlling the flow of immigration has exposed the country to three categories of risk: risk nationality, risk passports and risk flights. Risk nationality is used as a label for foreign immigrants who are most likely to be involved in drug trafficking, forging of official travel documents, illegal extraction of mineral resources and other transnational offences. In this regard, the MID believes that Nigerians, Malians, Pakistanis, Somalis and Bengalis pose the greatest risk as immigrants. For instance, “Nigerians were the earliest foreigners who were found with forged passports and they are well known in the world as risk nationality passengers”\textsuperscript{28}. As a
result, most passengers coming from the so called ‘risk countries’ are suspected of behaving criminal intentions, which damages their relationship with local people and limits their access to public services. Suffice it to say that the categorisation of travellers as ‘risk nationalities’ is a discourse emanating from the risk-based identification of persons crossing international frontiers, which has dominated concerns since the launch of biometric border control (Amoore, 2006).

In the case of the category of risk flights, the term is applied to flights that carry passengers who are in irregular situations, particularly those who have visas that do not satisfy the travel requirements. Ethiopian airways are the most commonly placed in this category. In this regard, the MID believes the problem can be related to inadequate technical capacity at Mozambican embassies, particularly misinterpretations of the bill of foreigners regarding requirements for the issuing of visas.29

The term ‘risk passports’ refers to passports with ‘low security features’, which increases their vulnerability to being forged. The introduction of biometric passports in 2010, and with it figures pointing to a significant decrease in forged passports, has become a contentious issue. At the one end of spectrum, some immigration officers believe that falsification has decreased because biometric passports feature more secure items that cannot be manually replaced, such as the electronic picture, which was the main feature that was falsified on handwritten passports. At the other end of spectrum, however, some officers believe that there has been a shift in modus operandi in falsification rather than an actual decrease. For example, the Chief of the Information Department at the NDM notes that the falsification of passports has become a networked business, involving employees from various sectors. The starting point is the falsification of the birth certificate in order to obtain an ID and thereafter a passport.

As falsification of official travel documents and other related crimes such as human trafficking have increased, the MID has begun to implement various security operations including detailed checking of travel documents, regular internal checks of public places, tourist
attractions and locations that are suspected of harbouring foreign immigrants in irregular situations. These operations are also aimed at controlling international financial transactions since terrorist groups are always on the lookout for relatively easy ways to fund their activities. The Chief of Information in the Department of Immigration explains that “terrorists are able to explore weaknesses in internal legislation and thereby develop economic activities that can raise funds for unlawful purposes”. He adds that, according to the actual context of migration patterns in Mozambique, the bill of nationality is outdated on issues related to citizenship; some Portuguese citizens have been able to claim Mozambican citizenship as a result of loopholes in the legislation.

The evidence above can be interpreted as a major factor in precluding effective implementation of international standards for immigration control. Mozambique is dominated by particular domestic problems that need to be addressed before any international recommendation can be implemented. For example, an immigration inspector at Mavalane Airport explains that “the country needs about 56 USD million to get registered into ICAO interoperability system, but there is lack of political willingness”. This statement can be interpreted in two ways. Firstly, registration on the ICAO’s system requires shared technological standards to ensure compatibility, which consolidates governance through technology that is provided mostly by private actors in coordination with super power states. From the standpoint of realists, the ICAO’s standards have framed a global governance mechanism that has been created to serve the interests of super powers on the one hand, and the providers of technical standards on the other (Abbot, 2014; Abbott and Snidal, 1998).

Secondly, the ICAO’s technological standards are not applicable to border problems related to porosity and surveillance facilities that are unable to conduct effective monitoring. At some point, western technology and standards of border control and migration management are meant to respond the movement of people across international borders under common principles of control (Abbot, 2014; Parker and Vaughan-Williams 2009; Amoore, 2006; Abbott and Snidal, 1998).
While the MID has not been successful in implementing MRDTs, the Revenue Department’s reform process has led to considerable success, particularly in increasing internal tax collection.

### 7.3.4 Security reforms in the Mozambique Revenue Department

The Mozambique Revenue Department (MRD) is divided into two main tax sectors: Internal and Customs taxes. Since 1996, these two sectors have been undergoing continued institutional and operational reforms assisted technically by a British company, Crown Agency. These reforms have been undertaken in order to establish modern and efficient services that meet international security standards while improving revenue collection and facilitating legitimate trade. At the operational level, the MRD wanted to prevent the import and export of prohibited goods in order to ensure the import and export of goods in accordance with international standards as well as to combat corruption within the Customs system (Mosse and Cortez, 2006).

In 2006, the customs department was officially established as the MRD under the control of Mozambican managers in accordance with its institutional vision and mission. In order to achieve its goals, the MRD is concerned with increasing the collection of taxes in a sustainable manner and in modernising tax administration using advanced technologies. At the security level, it is concerned with compliance with the ICAO Annex 17 security measures and the WCO provisions for legitimate trade. WCO’s key interest lies in the establishment of guidelines and tools to assist customs officials to master international security standards, rules and procedures in order to facilitate the flow of international trade while preventing illegal trade.

In response to this, the MRD has established the Fleet Anti-Terrorism Security Team (FAST) – a security force equipped with high level tactics and techniques for the prevention of the entry of harmful goods. The Assistant Chief of Customs at Mavalane Airport explains that the introduction of such security reforms at the airport is aimed at responding to large numbers of passengers, flights and new destinations. He adds that
“these changes have been more noticed since 1998 when traders have encountered relatively large opportunities and low prices in China and Dubai”. These flows have also been driven by internal business opportunities in general commerce, the tourism industry, the construction sector and mining.

As these transformations have resulted in high volumes of exported and imported goods passing through the country’s borders, the MRD has introduced electronic luggage checks while at the same time enhancing security along the borders and ensuring legitimate trade. Large numbers of customs officers have been trained in E-luggage checking and in tactical response aimed at assisting standing teams at all cargo terminals. With regard to the apprehension of prohibited or illegal goods, the Deputy Chief of Customs at Mavalane International Airport in Maputo explains that in the past the situation was worse in that there was a drug-related arrest at the airport every day.

Despite attempts to improve the effectiveness of luggage inspections, the Mavalane Airport is facing considerable security constraints, inter alia: the main entrance gates to the airport are under the control of a private company (G4S), the personnel of which are regarded as poorly trained in the specific tactical responses required in cases of terrorist threat. Moreover, police believe that the private security company acts in direct opposition to the ICAO’s security practice guidelines, which prescribe that “each contracting state shall ensure that the persons implementing security control possess all competencies to perform the duties and are appropriately trained according to the requirements of the national civil aviation security programme and appropriate records are maintained up to date” (Annex 17, 2006:3). Although the ICAO prescribes that each country shall tailor security standards according to that specific country’s security priorities, it is practically impossible to establish different regimes of border control (for sea, air and land border), which leads to the general enforcement of a ‘global regime’ of border control, regardless of local particularities.
7.4 Securitisation and overlapping of regimes of border control

Reforms implemented by the Mozambique Immigration and Customs Departments and aimed at better control of sea-borders and airports are oriented to responding to the globalisation of security threats posed by the movements of people and the shipment of cargo. Realistically, these practices have been put in place in order to allow the borders of third countries to be secured against a non-existent threat/enemy (Guild and Bigo, 2010; Nessel, 2008; Bigo, 2007).

From the perspective of securitisation theory, using the borders of third countries as buffer zones against constructed security threats has led to an overlap between international and local regimes of border controls, and of perceptions of cross-border threats. Chapter 2 has revealed that the need to enhance security of EU external borders has created the perception that asylum seekers and refugees pose major security threats and should be stopped from entering third countries (Léonard, 2010; Nessel, 2008). Chapters 4, 5 and 6 have illustrated that Mozambique and its neighbouring countries are characterised by socio-economic and ethno-cultural dynamics that make both state-centric and international border governance incongruent in the day-to-day dynamics of cross-border regions.

In this chapter, it has been made evident that Mozambique’s adherence to the international technologies of border governance has turned the country into a recipient of regimes of border control that are geared to the frame or perception that the main threat is that posed by transnational criminal groups, and particularly terrorists. Electronic luggage checking, biometric passports, the single electronic window are examples of how Mozambique has introduced an international regime of border control, particular on sea-borders and in airports.

Sea-borders and airports are interconnected by a truncated system in which the implementation of common procedures for passport and luggage checks is relatively achievable. By contrast, cross-border regions in Mozambique and in Southern Africa as whole are characterised by
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diversified natural landscapes (forests, mountains and rivers) and communities that are scattered over different locations as a result of access to livelihoods. This demands a model of border governance that is capable of balancing local realities with international interests.

Regardless of these distinctions, evidence presented in this chapter suggests that Mozambique’s efforts in implementing an internationalised model of border governance have reinforced national security-driven border controls against external threats. For example, unauthorised immigrants are perceived as threats to the country’s economy and public security, which is the same discourse that led to restrictive borders in the West. This means that localised perspectives of cross-border controls, especially at land borders, may be neglected or displaced by these internationalised and more securitised models of border governance.

7.5 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the impact of international security standards for migration management and border control on Mozambique. In the case of Mozambique, Immigration and Customs Departments have implemented reforms aimed at matching international security established by the ICAO and WCO. As is the case in many other third world countries, Mozambique has encountered financial problems in implementing those reforms (particularly in the case of the Immigration Department and Border Police). Despite financial constraints on major reforms, the Immigration Department has introduced biometric passports, but as a result of a failure to comply with recommended standards for the interoperability of data, Mozambique is not yet considered a secure transit country in accordance with the ICAOS’s recommendations.

Thus, the chapter finds that Mozambique border control strategies are influenced to a great extent by international security norms that have an active focus on seaports and airports. Since the end of the Cold War, developed countries, especially the US and EU, have been relying on international security standards for migration management and border
control, which has brought with it the involvement of international security institutions as providers of technologies for border governance into the domestic institutions of border governance in Mozambique. As international institutions have developed and updated recommended security standards aimed at establishing common procedures for better control of travellers and goods worldwide, the cost of maintaining international standards has risen, and attention and resources for alternative border control regimes have shrunk.

In the current scenario, international technologies of border governance, coupled with state-centric border controls in Mozambique, contribute to criminalising everyday and economic cross-border interactions, as three distinct case studies of cross-border areas have illustrated. The international model of border governance should not lead to the neglect of other kinds of cross-border dynamics and regimes. Mozambique’s government may even need to affirm the value and usefulness of ‘simplified’ regimes of control in cross-border areas, perhaps in the context of agreements within Southern Africa generally. Based on this concern, the following chapter examines how the socio-economic and ethno-cultural dynamics in cross-border regions have been taken into account in ongoing regional integration in SADC. As has been suggested in previous chapters, the prototypical international security standards derived from Western-driven security concerns certainly cannot be applied as a model of border control in the Southern African region. The chapter now discusses how SADC could move beyond its present state-centric approach towards a border governance system that balances national security interests of SADC member states with the needs and priorities of local cross-border communities, such as those examined in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.

Notes
AVSEC was developed by the ICAO in collaboration with the John Molson School of Business at Concordia University in 2004. Its aim is to provide aviation security middle and senior management personnel with new management skills and a greater understanding of the application of standards and recommended practices contained in Annex 17. The unique skills and understanding have become mandatory in dealing with emerging threats to civil aviation worldwide.

Interviewed on 27 October 2012 in Maputo

These requirements comprise the compatibility with travel document issuance and renewal; compatibility with machine assisted identity verification and inspection processes; redundancy of the biometric and its capture process; storage requirements and performance. Of those compatibility factors, the face came out on top with an 85% compatibility rating while finger and iris came identification was in the second position with a 60–65% compatibility rating. Face was determined to be the primary biometric mandatory feature for global interoperability.

Global interoperability is an inspection system (either manual or automated) in different states throughout the world, capable of exchanging and processing data received from systems in other states, and utilising that data in inspection operations in the respective states.

Technician for Facilitation and Security at the National Institute of Civil Aviation of Mozambique interviewed on 30 October 2012, in Maputo.

The main contribution made by the WCO to counterterrorism at sea comprises the development of security measures while ensuring international trade supply. These measures are intended to provide a methodology for identifying in advance high-risk consignments carried on ships, providing a secure environment for maritime trade and facilitating legitimate cargoes being carried on those ships. This package of security measures has the potential to contribute to the early warning mechanisms and to protect port facilities, staff and ships against terrorist activities.

The UN Security Council Resolution of 2003 places great emphasis on the growing danger of terrorist access to and use of nuclear, chemical, biological
and other potentially deadly materials and the consequent need to strengthen controls on these materials is emphasised. Customs administrations have a key role to play in the prevention, detection and investigation of such offences and, even though currently the powers of Customs in relation to these issues may vary from country to country, their potential future role should be recognised as part of national government’s response to terrorism.

8 The purpose of the Organisation is to provide machinery for cooperation among governments in the field of governmental regulation and practices relating to technical matters of all kinds affecting shipping engaged with international trade; to encourage and facilitate the general adoption of the highest practicable standards in matters concerning safety at sea, efficiency of navigation and prevention and control of marine pollution from ships.

9 The Convention on the law of the sea and borders establishes methods for delimitating baselines and the territorial sea between states with opposite coasts as well as key concepts of sea borders. These key concepts include the continental sea; internal waters; straight baselines; territorial; sea; the contiguous zone; and the continental shelf.

10 Territorial sea refers to a space beyond its land territory and internal waters and, in the case of an archipelagic state, its archipelagic waters, to an adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial sea.

11 Internal waters are those on the inland side of the baseline of the territorial sea. The normal baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the low-water line along the coast as marked on large-scale charts officially recognised by the coastal state (UNCLOS, 1982).

12 The exclusive economic zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, subject to the specific legal regime established in this part under which the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal state and the rights and freedoms of other states are governed by the relevant provisions of the Convention.

13 The continental shelf of a coastal state comprises the seabed and the subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured, where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend for that distance. The seabed outside
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national jurisdiction constitutes the common heritage belonging to the peoples of the earth (Couto, 1988).

14 High seas refer to all parts of the sea that are not included in the economic exclusive zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a state, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic state.

15 ISO 28000 is a supply chain security management system that protects a company’s goods from point of manufacturing to point of sale. It reduces opportunities for criminal elements to infiltrate the company’s supply chain. WCO argues that supply chain security management is vital for the establishment of early warning systems to protect borders against dangerous or harmful cargoes arriving, departing or moving through state territories.

16 Interviewed on 18 October 2012 in Maputo City.

17 These goods are defined in Annex to the Decree 34/2009 of July 6. They entail all goods with counterfeit trademarks or false origin as such as: books, artistic works, CDs, and other counterfeit publications; hospital medicines and foodstuffs harmful to public health; narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, except when imported for hospital use; distilled alcoholic beverages containing essences or chemicals recognised as harmful, such as wormwood, benzoic aldehyde, hyssop, and other items specified by special legislation.

18 KUDUMBA is a Belgian company that is responsible for installing and providing technical assistance using non-intrusive scanners in Mozambique.

19 Interviewed on 7 November 2013 at Port Maputo.

20 Interviewed on 6 November 2012.

21 Interviewed on 6 November 2012.

22 Electronic single window is a system that uses integrated tools adapted to any system used in the international system and constitutes a complete solution to trade facilitation, especially for the clearance of goods and their monitoring by customs. It consists of two computer systems that communicate with each other, the Customs Management System for Customs Processes for the exclusive use of customs and the Trade Net, which is a computer platform designed to enable interconnection and exchange of information with all users of customs procedures such as customs agents,
shipping companies, port operators, freight terminals, commercial banks and other entities involved in the process of customs clearance. With this integrated system, user information is introduced only once and all entities have access to it. Responses related to that information will be sent automatically and simultaneously.

23 Interviewed on 6th November 2012.

24 Interviewed in October 2012.

25 Although the frequent cases are related to the issuance of false passports or residence permits, from observations I made at Mavalane Airport on 17 October 2013 between 10h00–14h00, I noticed that some passengers who had arrived on the same flight were sent back while others were left in a small lounge from which, after bogus bargaining and phone calls, they were allowed to enter the country.

26 Interviewed in October 2012.

27 Interviewed on 17 October 2013 in Maputo City.

28 The immigration inspector at Mavalane International Airport interviewed in October 2012 in Maputo.

29 Chapter 5, number 2 of bills relating to foreigners establish different visa categories, namely: Student visa; Business visa; Work visa; Transit visa; Tourist Visa; Residence visa; Visitor visa.

30 Interviewed on 18 October 2012 in Maputo City.

31 Interviewed on 18 October 2012 in Maputo City.

32 Interviewed in October 2012.

33 The MRD’s institutional vision is to become a national and international reference in the provision of quality services, collecting revenue and in the promotion and protection of the economy and society. The mission is concerned with the collection of revenue to fund public activities, the promotion of effectiveness, efficiency and fairness in the application of tax policies, including customs, the ensuring of greater convenience to taxpayers in the fulfilment of their duties as well as the protection of the economy and society.

34 Originally, FAST was the US Marine company that was established in 1987. Its aim was to perform security missions such as combating operations and
other military operations aimed at protecting military cargo ships (Thornton, 2005).

35 Assistant Chief of Customs at Mavalane International Airport, interviewed on 17 October 2012 in Maputo City.

36 E-luggage checking is done using scanners that allow customs officials to make rapid luggage checks without opening suitcases and other containers. Currently, these facilities are in operation at Maputo and Pemba airports as well as at Maputo, Beira and Nacala ports.

37 Interviewed on 17 October 2012 in Maputo City.

38 GG4S is a multinational security services company founded originally in Copenhagen in 1901. It started operating worldwide in 2004 when four security companies (from Great Britain and Copenhagen) merged. G4S currently has its headquarters in Crawley, United Kingdom.
Rethinking cross-border regions in Mozambique in the context of SADC integration

8.1 Introduction

The previous chapter discussed the impact of the international model of border governance on domestic policies of border control in Mozambique. Prior to that, in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, three cross-border case studies were examined for lessons on how migration governance and border controls in Mozambique might be understood and even improved. The main discussions in these chapters will be presented here in the form of an integrated discussion on the various border regimes that have been analysed, and the differences in perceptions of the border held by local people and officials. Differences between the three areas, airport and port regimes, and central and local officials will also be discussed.

In Chapter 4 it was pointed out that, given the international nature of flows across the Ressano Garcia-Lebombo border, Mozambique and South Africa can address the conflicts between the local communities and border authorities only by establishing mechanisms for cooperation that will balance both the needs of local populations and the state’s security concerns. Chapter 5 revealed that the Machipanda-Mutare cross-border region has long standing chains of informal trade exchanges that could lead the neighbouring states to establish a transition zone aimed at strengthening trade exchange and promoting the development of communities on both sides of the border. In Chapter 6 it emerged that, given land-driven interaction between communities in the Mandimba-Mangochi cross-border region, Mozambique and Malawi could make a
remarkable contribution to management of cross-border resources by establishing the co-management of land in order to address the food insecurity faced by local communities. Such co-management initiatives would be substantially different from Peace Parks, which are established under the guise of the global regime for environmental management and which have presented obstacles to local communities’ access to livelihoods and their development of husbandry.

Given these differing contexts, this chapter examines the regional institutions and processes of SADC integration in relation to migration governance and concepts of security. The second half of the chapter reflects on the extent to which Mozambican border officials and government institutions are able to integrate cross-border socio-economic and ethno-cultural dynamics into their working practices, especially in the context of wider debates on border governance and regional integration in SADC. Are more conventional security priorities – such as those identified in Chapter 7 – still overriding considerations of inter-country mobility for migrants? Essentially, this chapter reflects on how the kinds of cross-border dynamics already identified in the case studies relate to cross-border dynamics as understood from the perspective of SADC regional integration and security. It does so by examining the interface between wider regional integration frameworks and national contexts of border crossings. The analysis in this chapter will integrate the discussion of SADC’s concept of security throughout, reflecting on how regional, national and local realities of border crossings in Mozambique differ and overlap.

8.2 Interrogating SADC’s rationale for a security community

Historically, SADC was crafted from its predecessor – the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), which was established in 1980 (in Lusaka, Zambia) as a political and economic structure aimed at opposing apartheid and colonial dominance in the Southern African region (Schoeman, 2002; Evans, 1986). As a political organisation, SADCC was established as a defensive mechanism against the ideological and military
domination of apartheid. As an economic organisation, it was created to reduce economic dependence on and vulnerability to South Africa and thereby to promote development in the region (Schoeman, 2002).

However, SADCC member states failed to establish a synergy in economic development that was able to reduce dependence on South Africa, which led to the establishment of SADC in 1992 (Schoeman, 2002; Nathan, 2012). In contrast to SADCC, SADC was created as an economically oriented organisation aimed at achieving economic liberalisation, regional integration and a security community (Schoeman, 2002). Its scope of cooperation encompasses a broad array of areas ranging from food security, land and agriculture; infrastructure and services; industry, trade, investment and finance; human resources development, science and technology; natural resources and the environment; social welfare, information and culture; politics, diplomacy, international relations, peace and security (Malan and Cilliers, 1997; Hammerstad, 2005).

Notwithstanding this broad range of areas of cooperation among SADC member states, the concept of a security community remains open to question. Neither is it clear how security cooperation will be undertaken nor how SADC will provide human security for people in the wider Southern African region (Van Nieuwkerk, 2006). To some extent, experience of protracted conflicts in the region and mistrust among states has resulted in the concept of a security community taking on a military bias, implying that human security is a strictly secondary consideration (Nathan, 2012; Du Pisani, 2010).

Thus, the Protocol on Politics, Defence, Security Cooperation¹ (PPDSC) of 2001 and the Mutual Defence Pact² (MDP) of 2003 create the concept of a security community based on the possibility of violence within and between states as a fundamental factor threatening peoples’ security (Nathan, 2012). The preambles of both the PPDSC and the MDP highlight the commitment of SADC heads of state to the principles of strict respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence, good neighbourliness, interdependence, non-aggression and non-interference in internal affairs of other states. Moreover, article 2 (a) of the
PPDSC provides that the Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security (OPDS), created in 1996, is concerned to protect “people and safeguard the development of the region against instability from the breakdown of law and order [...].” The implication of this quotation is that the security of people in the SADC community is understood to be threatened by the breakdown of law and order and by internal conflicts or conflicts between states, and not by a failure of ‘human security’ or excessively stringent border controls, for instance. In the context of inter-state conflicts, the preamble of the PPDSC emphasises the need for respect for states’ borders.

SADC’S reference to a military-oriented security community derives from experiences of war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the civil war in Angola, which ended in 2002, the electoral violence in Lesotho in 1988, in Malawi in 1999, in Zimbabwe since 2000, and also the constitutional crisis in Zambia in 2001 (Laakso, 2005). As a result, the OPDS has been focusing its activities on key sensitive areas such as military/defence, crime prevention and foreign policy, security and intelligence, and political affairs (Cilliers, 1996).

At the defence level, OPDS values include the protection of people from inter-state and intrastate conflicts as well as aggression; development of a collective security capacity for peace making and peacekeeping, which implies promoting the interoperability of military equipment and joint multinational exercises for enhancing peace and security in the region (Ngoma, 2003).

At the level of crime prevention and foreign policy, the Organ is concerned with institutional cooperation in law enforcement (immigration, customs, and border police), the promotion of common political value systems and institutions to prevent cross-border crime (which brought about the launch of the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation – SARPCCO). In the security and intelligence domains, the OPDS is concerned with the establishment of early warnings, cooperation on transnational crime, terrorism, food security, protection of maritime resources, and harmonisation of
intelligence systems; promotion of cooperation and common political value systems (Cilliers, 1996).

In the political domain, the Organ seeks to build nation-states in the region in tandem with the process of building an accountable community; consultations intended to improve a democratic culture (this includes democratic elections), good political cooperation, and mediation of conflicts and disputes. Given the prevailing militarily-oriented concept of security, the embodiment of a human-oriented concept remains absent in the SADC region. In the context of post-colonial African borders, a clear distinction needs to be established between integration as an economically-oriented reality and cooperation as a more security-driven challenge in the region.

8.3 Economic integration and security cooperation

Since the inception of the African Union (AU) in 2002, the concept of Regional Economic Communities (RECs) as crucial regional mechanisms for conflict prevention, management, and resolution has gained momentum (Lunegelo and Mbilinyi, 2009). While the AU has been making efforts to establish RECs, regional member states have seen security and economic integration as complex and juxtaposed realities. As a result, the mainstream idea is that integration starts with economic and cultural cooperation and proceeds to political and security cooperation on the grounds that a security community can only be created if there is confidence, shared values and material interests in common between concerned states (Laakso, 2005). As far as the literature is concerned, security cooperation among developing countries needs to be defined in the particular regional context (Du Pisani, 2010; 23). In the context of SADC, security experts understand that there is a lack of capacity to monitor the implementation of joint agreements, which reinforces the idea that regional security cooperation can only be attained after recognising the principles of state sovereignty, strong confidence and shared values among intra-regional member states (Laakso, 2005).
In SADC, the OPDS was established as a platform from which to harmonise individual state values towards the attainment of a security community in the region (Hammerstad, 2003). However, several concerns have been raised regarding its functioning mechanisms in the region. Firstly, SADC lacks a parliament and the Organ operates at summit level (through cooperative arrangements to address all issues related to peace, stability and democracy), which leaves the feasibility of its function open to question (Cilliers, 1996). Moreover, the SADC parliament forum lacks authority to formulate binding policies as it operates at observation and monitoring levels with biannual meetings; this results in negative sentiments among members about the contribution of the OPDS to peace in the long term (Van Nieuwkerk, 2001).

Secondly, scholars believe that it is difficult to hold political leaders accountable since they seem to be pursuing interests other than those concerning the attainment of a security community. Put differently, many regional projects in Africa have failed in their implementation stages because the elites in charge have not gained any private benefit, which leads to their losing interest (Söderbaum and Taylor, 2008). Most meetings held by SADC heads of governments are referred to as clubs of dictators plagued by the politics of greed, which has resulted in intense pressure to allow a greater degree of transparency, freedom and democracy in their countries in a move towards preventive diplomacy and conflict management in the region (Cilliers, 1996; Ngoma, 2003).

Thirdly, at operational level, SADC states have been reluctant to allocate the Organ to a single country due to the sensitivity of the issues it deals with and political implications of military, intelligence, and early warning affairs, the consequences of which encompass a lack of shared perceptions of threats to security and tenuous political links between countries (Ngoma, 2003). There was a general perception that South Africa would play a dominant role in the development of collective security capacity through partnerships for the training of standby forces for peacekeeping missions, and this is seen by the majority of member states as a transfer of sovereignty outside the sub-region (Ngoma, 2003).
Based on the assumptions mentioned above, researchers believe that SADC states are not yet ready to embark on security integration projects because of persistent mutual mistrust (Hammerstad, 2003). As far as the PPDSC is concerned, however, SADC member states have committed themselves to building a security community based on sovereignty-oriented cooperation to prevent border crime, interstate conflicts, and external aggression (Malan, 1998). As the main concern regarding the borders between states is crime prevention, SADC efforts have resulted in the establishment of SARPCCO – a regional police organisation designed to fight cross-border crime.

8.4 Efforts towards regional security cooperation

The Treaty of SADC establishes (in article 21) different areas of cooperation among member states. One of these areas is cooperation in politics, diplomacy, international relations, peace, and security in order to promote and defend peace and security. Since the inception of SADC, member states have raised concerns about rampant cross-border crime and its trends in the region (Gastrow and Mosse, 2002; Gastrow, 2001). In response to cross-border crime, SADC members have committed themselves to establishing SARPCCO (in 1995 in Harare). SARPCCO’s objectives are to promote, strengthen and perpetuate cooperation and foster joint strategies for the management of all forms of cross-border crimes with regional implications; to prepare and disseminate relevant information on criminal activities in the region; to undertake regular reviews of joint crime management strategies in view of changing national and regional needs and priorities; to make relevant recommendations to governments of member countries in relation to matters affecting effective policing in the Southern African region.

The need to reinforce cooperation in dealing with cross-border crime has been reinforced by the African Union Executive Council. As Spaan and van Moppes (2006:3-4) point out, “…several African governments and the African Union have acknowledged the importance of migration for their countries, and have recognised that migration and development
are interlinked processes”. Based on this, Executive Council of the AU recognises that there is a need for a well-managed migration, one that should create development opportunities for people of adjacent countries within regional communities (African Union Conference, 2007). In line with this, the Executive Council of the AU has acknowledged that “combating irregular migration and establishing a comprehensive migration management system can contribute to enhancing national and international security and stability” (van and Moppes, 2006:6). These assumptions can be interpreted from two different angles. Firstly, regional states need to establish integration initiatives aimed at bringing development to their people, which reinforces the need for greater consideration of intra-regional migration (as discussed in Chapter 4). Secondly, enhancing national and international stability through border control reinforces the idea that people on the move represent the major threat to insecurity, which has resulted in different regimes of border control, particularly in western countries (Bosworth and Guild, 2008). For example, the EU has been reinforcing border control through FRONTEX, which involves extensive cooperation with European countries external borders (Neal, 2009; Léonard, 2010).

In the case of SADC, the need for police cooperation was raised when there was a belief that the Southern African region remained a relative low risk point for organised criminal groups who had been able to establish better cooperation links than the police themselves (Van der Spuy, 2009). Since then, the bottom line has become to increase police cooperation in order to respond to organised crime that has gone regional (Gastrow, 2001). In cooperation with INTERPOL, SARCCO’s main priorities are motor vehicle thefts, drug trafficking, economic and commercial crimes; trafficking, terrorism, unauthorised migration, and stolen and lost travel documents as fundamental challenges to good governance, democratic policing, and peace keeping (Van der Spuy, 2008).

In pursuance of its mission, SARPCCO has begun to undertake several joint operations (particularly surveillance) aimed at stopping cross-border crime, particularly motor vehicle theft and smuggling (Mills, 1995). For
example, in 1997, police officers from South Africa, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Zambia undertook a ‘Voyager 4’ operation, which resulted in the recovery of 1576 stolen motor vehicles and the arrest of 147 suspects (Gastrow, 2001). Regional police have continued to undertake further joint operations targeting stolen motor vehicles, such as Atlantic⁶ and Midas⁷ (1998), Sesani⁸ (1999), and Makhule (2002). In tandem with these operations, SARPCCO introduced a Motor Vehicle Clearance Certificate in 2000 in an effort to stop cross-border motor vehicle theft (Van der Spuy, 2009; Gastrow, 2001).

In the matter of the trafficking of firearms, SADC adopted the Protocol on the control of firearms, ammunition and other related materials in 2001, from which SARPCCO drafted a Plan of Actions aimed at combating the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the region. This plan resulted in the training of regional police officers in destruction of illegal weapons and field operations such as Operation Rachel (Van der Spuy, 2009). The region has also been concerned with raising awareness of drug crime trends and demand-supply chains as well as implementing training programmes in how to deal with drug interdictions (Van der Spuy, 2009). In addition, SARPCCO has raised concerns about the policing of financial and economic crimes, particularly intensified responses to terror activities around the world. In doing so, the organisation has established financial intelligence units in the region, partially as a response to United Nations Resolution 1373 (Van der Spuy, 2009). As far as good governance and democratic policing are concerned, regional police have implemented several reforms in an effort to make policing more humane and effective. In order to achieve this aim, SARPCCO has adopted a code of conduct, which provides standard values and principles of conduct for police officers in the region. Inter alia, the code emphasises respect for human rights (this includes the prohibition and prevention of torture), respect for the rule of law and the use of minimum force. Apart from these codified values and principles for police officers in the region, SARPCCO has delivered standardised training programmes on violence against women and children aimed at
ensuring effective responses to such cases of violence (Van der Spuy, 2009).

SADC states have different interpretations of the roots causes of unauthorised migration, which has made it difficult to harmonise strategies for cross-border cooperation. Different interpretations of human migration have prevented a common approach to border management in the region (Van der Spuy, 2009). For example, South Africa has been redeploying the military to increase surveillance and patrol operations along the border with Mozambique with the purpose of preventing the poaching of rhinos in the Kruger National Park, smuggling, stock theft and unauthorised migration along the border.

As far as peace-keeping cooperation is concerned, SADC member states envisage the continuous development of the capacity of peace-keeping missions in the regional training centre in Zimbabwe. As SARPCCO has been established in tandem with INTERPOL’s cooperation needs, training in peace-keeping missions is seen as an opportunity to exchange security expertise and police intelligence. For instance, in preparation for the FIFA soccer World cup in 2010, South Africa gained valuable experience in the policing of big events and soccer hooligans, as well as training from the FBI on tackling terrorism and money laundering (Van der Spuy, 2009).

Regardless of these advantages, SADC members remain concerned about joint peace-keeping operations on the grounds that training programmes are run by NGOs; this is perceived as a threat to ‘regional’ sovereignty (Ngoma, 2003; Van Nieuwkerk, 2001). To some extent, the SADC cooperation process is evolving from the need to fulfil international requirements for economic and security cooperation. However, the three case studies presented in this thesis (Chapters 5, 6, and 7) reflect different local contexts and dynamics in the border regions that could lead to a (re)framing of the concept of a security community in the process of regional integration. In the following section, experiences of the Mozambique border police in the border regions and the challenges they are faced with are discussed.
8.5 Border control regimes in SADC

As is the case in many RECs in worldwide, integration initiatives focus on economic transactions while restricting the movement of persons (Léonard, 2010; Adamson, 2006; Andreas, 2003a). In the context of SADC, the protocol on the free movement of peoples was benchmarked on the European model, which motivated its rejection owing to incongruences with prevailing sovereignty-driven border control (Vigneswaran, 2013; Crush, 1999). As Crush and Dodson (2007:449) point out, “the response to the protocol was swift and immediately, South Africa vociferously declared its opposition and found allies in Botswana and Namibia”. South Africa and its allies wanted to hold the right to determine who should cross their borders before taking such a major step. Moreover, South Africa was solely concerned with free trade, which is why it encouraged others to stop the implementation of the protocol (Trimikliniotis et al., 2008).

One of the main reasons for the rejection of the protocol on the ”free movement of peoples” is that regional integration needs to follow its own patterns much as the European Union is an exception to be implemented in the SADC region (Crush and Tawodzera, 2014; Crush and Dodson, 2007). For example, the National Commander of the MBP9 understands that the “African concept of border is incomplete and unique. It is incomplete given the emerging focus on natural resources, which leads to new geopolitical tensions between countries”. He explains that in the SADC region, South Africa claims the right to possession of the Mozambican region of Ponta D’ Ouro while Swaziland claims possession of the totality of Maputo Province. This illustrates how the African context of border remains unstable regardless of official state borders recognised under the sacrosanct10 principle adopted in Cairo (Egypt) in 1964.

As a unique concept, African borders are deeply grounded on the ideas of sovereignty, territory and population as the building blocks of the political power of the state (which cannot be discussed in more integrated manner between countries). Furthermore, the National Commander of
the MBP explains that “from the meetings we have with border authorities of neighbouring countries, there are different interests over the border, whose impact is a lack of compliance with existing bilateral agreements”. As a result, each SADC member state has been developing its own policing strategies and adopting its own patrol methods, regardless of the impact on diplomatic relations and local communities. The Tanzanian border, for instance, is patrolled by militias; Mozambique has police border patrollers; while Swaziland, Zimbabwe and Malawi use police and military units to patrol the border. South Africa has been relying on the national defence force to patrol its borders with neighbouring states, particularly with the increase in poaching in the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park (in Mpumalanga Province – border with Mozambique).

However, the National Commander of the MBP explains that in most cases, South Africa undertakes these operations unilaterally, which has resulted in a break in regional agreements, particularly the SARPCOO code of conduct that establishes standards for democratic policing and respect for human rights. The literature reveals that the militarisation of borders is referred to as practices of securitisation, which consist of turning actions that were used to fight traditional security threats (from third counties) to use in preventing the movements of asylum seekers, refugees and other desperate persons (Léonard, 2010). Despite the negative social impact of regime-based border control on human life, border authorities in neighbouring states are reluctant to openly consider security concerns from the perspective of cross-border communities on the grounds that integrated regionalism will not necessarily benefit all participants, and could instead open the way to asymmetrical relations and create imbalances within society across geographical spaces (Söderbaum and Taylor, 2008: 23).

In the context of this evidence, SADC will continue to give priority to sovereignty-driven border control, with a particular focus on what and how to train border police to meet national-security strategies (Gavrilis, 2008; Crush and Dodson, 2007). A point of reflection regarding regional integration in SADC is that border regions have not yet become spaces of
contact and interaction in a move towards rapid and accelerated socio-economic development; rather, communities in the border regions lack socio-economic services fundamental to their survival. In the following section, an analysis is provided of some of development programmes that have been implemented by the Republic of Mozambique since 2000, aimed at improving various priority sectors. The key argument in this section is that Mozambique’s development strategies lack specifications on development in border regions, although regional economic development is a prevailing mantra.

8.6 Rethinking border governance from within: local communities and border officials

In 2007 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, African heads of state recognised the need to address resources-driven border conflicts and adopt integration initiatives to bring development to people in contiguous borders. Their key argument was that “by transcending the border as barrier and promoting it as bridge linking one state to another, Africa can boost the ongoing effort to integrate the continent socio-economically, to strengthen its unity, and promote peace, security and stability through the structural prevention of conflicts” (African Union Declaration, 2007:1). This statement suggests that African borders can be understood as barriers as a result of practices of border control that are sovereignty-driven, which in turn hampers socio-economic and cultural interaction between peoples in cross-border regions. It is worth highlighting that the concerns felt by African heads of state about regional integration underpin the assumption that “the greater the difference between the economies on either side of a border, the greater the scope for activities such as illegal trafficking” (O’Dowd, 2002:25).

Despite compelling arguments for regional integration, specific development strategies reflecting socio-economic differences between border regions are still lacking. For example, the Ressano Garcia, Machipanda and Mandimba case studies reveal similar and distinctive factors of interaction (see Table 1.1) that can be interpreted from two
perspectives. Ethnic, socio-linguistic and economic factors are determinants of interaction in the context of day-to-day border crossing, but states’ responses to these convergent factors differ depending on their approach to the border in question. Two examples are presented below:

**Example one** – a resident in Chizipa border community11 (in Machipanda border region) states that “when border police came in this region, they have occupied our land and we cannot crop, hunt, or getting fire wood in areas where we have been using for years. We now face a total restriction imposed by the Mozambican border police.”12 This example reflects a situation where state decisions are implemented without taking into account local contexts. The MBP Provision guide establishes *inter alia* that no construction shall be undertaken within the restricted border zone; no fishing or hunting activities shall be undertaken; and if they are authorised, non-residents shall enter and exit this zone through official ports of entry with their official travel documents. The difficulty lies in the fact that interdicted border zones were established in communities that had long been settled in those areas, with strong patterns of informal trade and human movement back and forth across the borders.

**Example two** – after the reaffirmation of the Mozambique-Malawi border in 2010, most Malawian citizens in the Mponda/Katur cross-border region decided to obtain Mozambican nationality, thereby acquiring or retaining the right to access arable land. This example reveals that the identity of people is not solely linked to the political ‘mantra’ of national unity but that people tend to identify themselves with what satisfies their daily needs. This illustrates how the meaning of the border can be influenced by border governance arrangements on both sides, and how movement reflects the strictness or laxness of border governance on either side. A sense of belonging is not based solely on national identity, but on the pragmatic, material considerations of those living in cross-border areas. The question of identity is not discussed in detail in this thesis, but it is important and is returned to in the concluding chapter.
Example three – In the Ressano Garcia cross-border region, local communities and some border officials suggest that there is a need for collaborative initiatives that would promote the participation of local communities in cross-border areas in finding their own solutions to their concerns. A local leader in the Ressano Garcia community\textsuperscript{13} expresses the view that “we should act as advisory councils in which we can raise our opinions and influence decisions about local development”. The kind of collaborative initiatives that might be introduced is not specified, but what this example shows is that Mozambique and other SADC countries could still explore the meanings and different understandings of border held by people whose daily lives involve crossing, or seeking to cross, the border. Perhaps by paying more attention to these perceptions, such locally informed views on border governance could influence the establishment of more realistic human development programmes that could accommodate the complexities of cross-border movement.

Example four – According to the Head of the Immigration Office at Mavalane Airport\textsuperscript{14}, “local communities can be empowered through training programmes that can help them identify and manage local development problems such as sustainable usage of water basins [for preventing conflict over access to natural resources][…] conception and management of small development projects in local communities”.\textsuperscript{15} What this implies is that conflict-prevention can be facilitated by a more accommodating and more participatory approach by the state towards local cross-border communities. In keeping with this comment, it is recognised in the literature that improved coordination with local communities can create synergies that boost the capacity of the state to deal with security threats in their embryonic stage (Kaldor, Martin and Selchow, 2007). As section 8.7 will show, Mozambique’s development strategies need to be (re)shaped to match the actual complexities and specific status quo of urban and rural contexts of cross-border development.

What this suggests is that the concept of development still needs to be adapted to accommodate both perspectives based on regional integration,
Rethinking cross-border regions in Mozambique in the context of SADC integration

and practices of development and security at the local level in cross-border areas. This is both a complex and challenging task, however, and based on the Mozambican experience of border control, a more complex approach than simple state-centred security may be required to go beyond questions of national identity, natural resources and national sovereignty. However, concerns of officials often lie with state security and ‘informal’ means of evading border controls. Thus the Head of the Immigration Office at Mavalane Airport in Maputo observes:

Mozambique was not a successful example in managing refugee policy. The Convention and Protocol related to refugee status prescribes that the status of refugee shall not be applicable if the circumstances in connection with which have ceased to exist, but most of refugees in Mozambique did not leave the country at the end of the war.

Based on this, he believes that most refugees who acquired Mozambican citizenship in the past did so through unofficial mechanisms. Moreover, he is convinced that communities in cross-border areas can be easily manipulated for electoral purposes by neighbouring countries through uncontrolled cross-border movement and voter registration. As a result of such suspicions, in most cases border police and immigration officers tend to see border regions as spaces for potential conflicts rather than spaces of complementarity where cooperation might yield development dividends and improved security. Such prevalent suspicion, mistrust of others and national exclusivity makes reform and a more human-centred approach very difficult (Nathan, 2012; Newman, 2010; 2006a; 2006b). In the context of the SADC, the legacy of mistrust and the discovery of mineral resources can lead to territorial claims and disputes, particularly if those resources stretch over the transboundary regions adjacent to Mozambique’s land borders (Nathan, 2012; Okumu, 2010). Based on these circumstances, the MBP believes strongly that African countries have not reached a point where they can claim power without making reference to real physical borders. According to the Head of the Immigration Office at Ressano Garcia border post,
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…a neighbouring country can be interpreted as an enemy depending on political orientation and interests at stake. The best way is to work on good neighbourhood between countries, (this implies also respect to bilateral agreements between countries for better economic cooperation). Every country should behave as a friend and not as a regime in the region.

This statement implies that the Mozambican authorities understand regional integration from its economic angle, while security remains a challenge for each member state regardless of the geographical proximity. Importantly, there is little faith in the commitment of African states to regional integration inasmuch as most of them gain membership simply because of their geographical proximity to each other (Laakso, 2005).

Basing his argument on these assumptions, the Head of the Immigration Office at Mavalane Airport in Maputo suggests that SADC should establish regional institutions such as a regional parliament, a regional court and a regional Central Bank, like the European bank. The European Union experiences illustrates that central institutions such as a bank, a parliament and a court are prerequisites in the development and implementation of central policies of integration (Niemann and Ioannou, 2015; Lindberg, 1963). In the context of human development, these institutions should to enable people to meet sustainable development, promote cost-benefit sharing, gain access to funding, policy exchange and the sharing of best practices (Kaldor et al., 2007; Gualini, 2003; Perkman, 2003).

In the context of SADC, regional institutions could be responsible for harmonising different systems of legislation; establishing an official language (which includes training border officials and establishing common working procedures); and coordinating regional economic development (creating opportunities for citizens of the member countries to apply for financial investment in equal circumstances). However, the Head of the Immigration Office at Mavalane Airport points out that “without regional institutions to regulate economic development, regional integration will not achieve its purposes, which will lead member states to rely on national-oriented development”. In the question of management
of migration and border control, SADC states have different bilateral agreements concerning the free movement of persons across the region, a circumstance that has perpetuated anti-immigration feelings in some countries in the region. For example, in mid-July 2014, the South African government unilaterally withdrew the issuance of emergency certificates to Mozambican citizens (including mine workers) without notifying the Mozambican authorities, alleging non-compliance with international security standards prescribed by the ICAO\(^2\) (Jornal Verdade, 2014). Moreover, a spokesman for the South African Department of Home Affairs observed that “South Africa will make efforts to comply with international regulations, and as a sovereign state, the country is in the right to protect its borders against unauthorised immigration, transnational crime as well as any kind of hostility across borders” (Jornal Verdade, 2014:1). Two weeks later (6 August 2014), South African authorities established unilateral proof of a minimum subsistence amount of R3000 for each traveller crossing the border. The reaction to this decision was immediate as dozens of travellers on the Mozambican side blocked the border gate (see image 8.1) with various objects (bricks, tree trunks, sticks, stones and branches). This forced the South African authorities to retract this decision (Maluleque, 2014).

This evidence suggests that, regardless of the existing protocols on the free movement of people, there is a trend to resort to a state-centred approach to border control, which makes irrelevant the power of those legal instruments that reinforce opposition to the protocol modelled on that of the European Union (Crush and Dodson, 2007). The original designation of this protocol changed from the ‘free movement’ to the Protocol on the facilitation of movement of people, finalised in 2000. Regardless of this step, SADC member states have not yet embarked on ensuring the free movement of people in the region. The following section provides a discussion of the consolidation of a regime-based border control system, one which is based on cooperation while keeping a state-centred approach to border control and migration management.
After the end of war in Mozambique, the country’s first harmonised strategic plan for development was the Poverty Reduction Action Plan (PARPA), in 2000. PARPA is the government’s medium-term strategy and is aligned with the National Planning System, the Agenda 2025, and the Millennium Development Goals. Since its inception, PARPA has been updated three times: (PARPA I, 2000-2004; PARPA II, 2006-2009; and PARPA III, 2011-2014). The goal of PARPA is poverty reduction, and this is implemented with a view to achieving inclusive economic growth (IMF Country Report, 2011).

In pursuance of the goal of achieving inclusive growth, Mozambique has defined three interrelated objectives that are intended to 1) increase output and productivity in the agriculture and fisheries sectors; 2) promote employment; and 3) foster human and social development (IMF Country
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These objectives are interdependent in different ways. Since more than 70% of Mozambican families are dependent on subsistence agriculture, improved agricultural and fisheries production would ensure food and nutrition security, which is fundamental to a healthy population (African Development Bank Group, 2011; Multi-Annual strategy Plan, 2013). A healthy and educated population (human development) would contribute to productivity (IMF Country Report, 2011).

Notwithstanding the country’s progress in certain areas (IMF Country Report, 2011), Mozambican development strategies are at odds with the AUBP (African Union Border Programme) perspective of development in the context of regional integration. The AUBP calls a rapid and accelerated integration of border regions a crucial mechanism in providing development to peoples in adjacent borders regions (African Union Conference, 2007). Mozambique lacks clear specifications for its development strategies in the context of border regions. For example, the Evaluation Office for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) highlights the point that “a major challenge for Mozambique is how to ensure that the benefits of a growing economy are used equitably to alleviate widespread human poverty, especially in the rural sector…” (2004:7).

This quotation suggests that Mozambique also faces a challenge in determining how populations in the border regions will benefit from the country’s economic growth. As far as SADC integration is concerned, the challenge is to get all member states to engage in multi-level development strategies. Here, development is contextualised from the human perspective of conditions that are created for human security and human dignity (such as access to medical treatment, access to mills, schools, and markets). In the context of Mozambican border regions, the issue of human security is not about protecting people from extreme vulnerability (Newman, 2010); it is about human security that is achieved as a result of normal development strategies. Des Gasper points to the need to separate the concept of security from the context of human individuals as the best
level at which to situate the notion of human security (Gasper, 2010; 2005). What is at stake here is the protection of individuals and communities from various kinds of threats, and not only from military threats or “security” threats in the usual sense (Gasper, 2010; Gasper, 2005). Arguably, this distinction between a narrow focus on the security of states to the human referent of a broader notions of security represents a substantial advance, shifting the focus of policy interventions from the state to the individual’s self-defined and collectively-defined security arrangements (Vietti and Scribner, 2013; Gasper, 2005; King, 2001). This may be particularly relevant for those individuals and communities living in the kinds of cross-border areas discussed in this study.

A focus on human dimensions of security could help to challenge the dominant view, emerging from interviews with officials, that concentrating on military threats is the best means of responding to threats to human life. From a development perspective, human security can at least influence the dominant model of governance by reconceiving development as concerned with the provision of protection to individuals from a wider range of threats, including chronic diseases, traffic accidents, crime, polluted environments, inadequate food security, domestic violence and poverty, as well as more conventional physical security concerns (Oberleitner, 2002; Vietti and Scribner, 2013; Paris, 2001; Newman, 2001; Haftendorn, 1991). Such a (re)definition of security would require officials at border crossings, for example, to judge whether particular circumstances posed threats to national security or threats to the quality of life of inhabitants of the local areas, and to make decisions about cross-border controls accordingly. Based on this more complex understanding of border control, security, migration and development can be understood as interactive dimensions of the policy processes and local decision-making, aimed ideally at framing more innovative ways of achieving “harmonious and peaceful coexistence”, as well as within SADC among neighbouring states (Truong, 2011: 24).

Table 8.1 below presents an analysis of state security concerns and community security challenges on a day-to-day basis in the particular
cross-border regions (Ressano Garcia, Machipanda, and Mandimba). The comparison is based on four referent security questions: (1) Security for whom? (2) What values are under threat? (3) What threatens those values? (4) How to respond to those security threats? (Bajpai, 2000).

**Table 8.1**

*Analysis of human security and state security based on three border communities in Mozambique*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security referent questions</th>
<th>Communities (Ressano Garcia Mandimba; Machipanda)</th>
<th>State (Mozambique)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(i) Security for whom?</td>
<td>Individuals in the border regions</td>
<td>The state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) What values are under threat?</td>
<td>Well-being; human dignity; safety</td>
<td>Territorial integrity; political independence; natural resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii) What threatens those values?</td>
<td>Food insecurity; access to land (militarised spaces), water, hospitals; bribes at the border</td>
<td>Unauthorised migration; transnational crime (trafficking, smuggling)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iv) How to achieve security?</td>
<td>Community Consultation Forums for boosting state-community collaboration; Strengthening of cooperation between states for boosting local community interaction; Locally oriented socio-economic development initiatives</td>
<td>Training and deployment of more patrol units; raids, arrests, deportations; joint patrol operations; ongoing development policies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Author’s own table based on field data and Bajpai (2000).

The table suggests that individuals and communities in the three border regions are exposed to similar threats, such as the prevention of access to basic needs and the need for secure cross-border movement for the
purposes of their livelihoods. Limitations on cross-border movement threaten their well-being and human dignity. On the other hand, officials and policies of the Mozambican state give overwhelming priority to territorial integrity and physical security as more fundamental values that are seen to be threatened by transnational crime, smuggling and other forms of cross-border interaction. While local communities, as illustrated in the examples in the last section of this chapter, propose the establishment of consultative forums to find joint solutions to local problems, state official tend to give greater priority to the training of border patrollers so that these are able to respond more efficiently to threats, especially transnational crime and ‘terrorism’. From a human development perspective, Mozambican border governance has not yet proved its appropriateness in responding to the socio-economic context of those who inhabit cross-border regions. Similarly, at regional level, it could be suggested that as part of the process of SADC integration, all member states may need to (re)frame the concept of security in order to meet the development needs of individuals and local communities, without assuming that this would diminish the security of the state.

8.8 Conclusion

This chapter has addressed the question: “to what extent are human development aspects in cross-border regions taken into consideration in the ongoing process of regional integration in SADC?” In particular, this chapter explored how the socio-economic and ethno-cultural aspects at play in cross-border regions are taken into consideration – or not. In relation to Mozambique, the chapter finds that SADC integration has focused mainly on economic aspects of integration, which has limited possibilities for incorporating cross-border communities’ interactions into the SADC regional integration framework. By focusing largely on economic integration and by defining security as national security, SADC member states have focused on eliminating trade barriers while ensuring that legitimate trade is monitored in accordance with WCO security practices.
On the question of border control, each SADC member state has been relying on its own internal security strategies, which has led to different regimes of border control in the region. Mutual distrust between countries and the political legacies of war in the region are the driving forces behind the reluctance to move away from the present state-centric approach to border control towards a more integrated system that would pay closer attention to the needs of communities in cross-border regions and across the SADC region.

As a result, the concept of a security community, as framed by SADC, centres on intra-state and inter-state conflicts, and this can detract from a broader understanding of security as socio-economic and as “human security”. This broader conception of security may be particularly vital for areas adjacent to border crossings, where communities are directly affected by the nature of border governance regimes and their implementation on both sides of the border. From the perspective of human development and human security, the SADC concept of a security community lacks reference to the usefulness of inter-connecting cross-border areas as part of regional integrated development. In Mozambique, for instance, development strategies that have been put in place since the early 1990s say little about the transformation of border regions into integrated zones in accordance with AUBP. Although SADC member states will continue to face global influences that push them in particular directions in relation to security in the region, they may also need to consider a wider variety of types of cross-border control, and, more specifically, models of border governance that are more appropriate to the day-to-day dynamics of migration within and across the SADC region.

Notes

1 The protocol on Politics, Defence, Security and Cooperation can be accessed through the following link: http://www.sadc.int/files/3613/5292/8367/Protocol_on_Politics_Defence_and_Security20001.pdf
2 The Mutual Defence Pact was created to stop member countries from promoting hostile activities from each other’s territories and calling for support from each other in such eventualities (Ngoma, 2003). SADC MDP can be accessed through the following link: http://www.sadc.int/files/2913/5333/8281/SADC_Mutual_Defence_Pact_2003.pdf

3 The existing economic regions in Africa encompass the East African Community (EAC), which was originally founded in 1967 and then brought into force again in 2000; the SADC region, the treaty for which was signed in 1992; the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which was originally founded in 1975 and revised in 1993; the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), formed in December 1994 and replaced by the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa region (PTA); the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which was fully approved and adopted in 1995; the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) that became active in 1988; and the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), which came into force in 1989.

4 The European countries forming the external borders are the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Latvia, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Switzerland.

5 INTERPOL is the International Police Organisation, founded in 1923. Its mission is to prevent and fight crime through enhanced cooperation and innovation in police and security matters.

6 The Atlantic operation was conjointly undertaken by Botswana, Namibia and South Africa with the primary aim of combating motor vehicle theft. The operation resulted in the seizure of 114 stolen motor vehicles, 11 firearms, 71 rounds of ammunition, 27 910 kilograms of dagga and the arrest of 23 suspects.

7 The Midas operation was conjointly undertaken by Lesotho, Mauritius, Swaziland and South Africa and was aimed at motor vehicle theft, drug-trafficking, firearms-smuggling and other attendant crimes. The operation resulted in the seizure of 76 stolen motor vehicles, 14 firearms, 20 000
rounds of ammunition, 11,694 kilograms of dagga and the arrest of 22 people in connection with these crimes.

8 With technical support from South Africa, the Sesani operation was undertaken by Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Its purpose was to address motor vehicle theft and associated cross-border crimes. It resulted in the seizure of 180 stolen motor vehicles, 47 firearms, 15.1 grams of hard drugs (heroin and cocaine), 413 kilograms of light drugs (dagga and Khat), and the arrest of 64 suspects.

9 Interviewed in February 2014 in Maputo.

10 The sacrosanct principle was adopted in Cairo (Egypt) in 1964, at a time when many African countries were achieving independence. Under this principle, the African Union established its border programme and urged all member states to finalise the reaffirmation and delimitation process by 2012 (African Union, 2007). The African Union Border Programme is a framework that is concerned with the delimitation and demarcation of all African state borders as a vital milestone in preventing conflict and promoting peace, security and stability as fundamental elements in the facilitation of integration and sustainable development in Africa. The African Union Body acknowledges that the borders that were established by the colonisers in their scramble for natural resources have now become sources of conflict in post-independence Africa. In order to prevent endless conflicts, the key challenge facing the AUBP is to transform borders from barriers into bridges of solidarity and mutual trust (African Union Conference, 2007).

11 The Chizipa Community is a jurisdiction of Machipanda Administrative Post in Manica District in Central Mozambique.

12 Interviewed in March 2014 in Manica District.

13 Interviewed in October 2012.

14 Interviewed in April 2014 in Maputo City.

15 Interviewed in March 2014 in Maputo.

16 Interviewed in October 2014 in Maputo.

17 Interviewed in March 2014.

18 Interviewed in March 2014.

19, Interviewed in March 2014.
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20 ICAO stands for the International Civil Aviation Organisation created by the Chicago Convention of 1944.

21 The Mozambique Agenda 2025 is a government intervention plan for development that focuses on key areas: 1) peace and stability; 2) democracy and participation; and 3) competitiveness and technological transformation.
Summary and research agenda for the future

9.1 Introduction
This thesis has examined border governance in Mozambique in the context of new trends in the dynamics of migration flows in cross-border regions since the end of the war in 1992. It sought to provide answers to the main research question of how state border authorities and communities in the cross-border regions understand the concepts of ‘borders’ and ‘security’. How can these understandings be reconciled or balanced within Mozambican and regional border governance arrangements and principles? This main question was broken down into four sub-questions aimed at achieving the abovementioned objectives: (1) How has the end of the Cold War and of apartheid influenced border governance at national and international levels, and the realities of cross-border movements in the Southern African region, and more specifically in post-war Mozambique? (2) On the basis of three local case studies, how do communities in the border regions experience day-to-day border controls; what kinds of border controls can be identified, and in what ways do they accommodate – or not - such localised understandings of cross-border interactions? (3) What impact have the international norms and migration governance standards had on the Mozambican borders (seaports and airports). (4) To what extent are human development aspects in cross-border regions taken into consideration in the ongoing process of regional integration in SADC?

Based on these sub-questions, this concluding chapter will begin with a synthesis of the three empirical findings and the intersection of local realities in cross-border regions with international models of border controls as well as the regional interests in SADC. This is followed by a reflection on the theoretical contribution of the findings and suggestions
of topics for further research. Finally, the chapter concludes with the implications of the empirical findings for policy makers.

9.2 Empirical findings

The main findings of this study were presented and discussed in three chapters: Chapter 4 dealt with Ressano Garcia, and internationalised, securitised, border controls; Chapter 5 concerned the Machipanda region, defined as blurred boundaries of a border economy; and Chapter 6 discussed the Mandimba region and involved rethinking land-related cross-border governance issues. Findings were presented in order to address the second sub-question of the thesis, which is “on the basis of three local case studies, how do communities in the border regions experience day-to-day border controls; what kinds of border controls can be identified, and in what ways do they accommodate – or not - such localised understandings of cross-border interactions?”

In response to this sub-question, Chapter 4 dealt with the Ressano Garcia border, which since the early 1990s has become the busiest crossing point on the Mozambique-South Africa border. The end of the war in Mozambique, coupled with the collapse of apartheid in South Africa, has transformed Ressano Garcia into an international (rather than transnational) land crossing point with thousands of travellers and vehicles making the crossing daily. In response to high flows of migration through Ressano Garcia, South African border authorities have tightened their control of the border by erecting electrified fences, deploying more patrol units and using the defence force to fight irregular forms of migration, trafficking and smuggling. Likewise, the Mozambican border authorities have introduced reforms such as the replacement of the long pass stamp (which was issued to the local populace, allowing them to cross the border into South Africa without a passport) with a passport regime and the deployment of more patrol units along the border. While both the South African and Mozambican border authorities have made efforts to fight irregular forms of migration and cross-border crime, the daily life of
communities in the Ressano Garcia border region has been adversely affected. It has become difficult for the local populace to cross the border to Komatipoort to buy consumer goods without a passport. Long-standing tensions between border authorities and local communities remain unresolved, and this has perpetuated irregular forms of migration and smuggling.

Findings from the case study discussed in Chapter 5 indicated that since the period of war in Mozambique, day-to-day interaction between communities in the Machipanda-Mutare cross-border region have been marked by strong ties of informal trade exchanges, particularly from Mutare to Machipanda but including further afield such as Chimoio and Beira Cities. As a result of the economic crisis in Zimbabwe that has persisted since the mid-1990s, the Machipanda-Mutare cross-border region has continued to register intense informal economic exchanges, but with a reversal in migration patterns, from Zimbabwe to Mozambique. Regardless of the political and economic dynamics in Mozambique and Zimbabwe that have altered migration patterns, border authorities in the neighbouring countries have prioritised border control measures aimed at restricting the volume of goods exchanged in trade (by increasing tax duties) and limiting irregular forms of migration (by deploying more patrol units along the border). These measures have not addressed the socio-economic demands related to the daily crossing of the border, an issue that continues to divide border authorities and local communities. Moreover, given the long-standing informal trade exchanges coupled with ethno-cultural proximity (one of the key characteristics of post-colonial African states), the Machipanda-Mutare cross-border region could be transformed into a transition zone through institutions that could further coordinate and strengthen those trade exchanges.

In Chapter 6, the Mandimba-Mangochi cross-border region was discussed. This case differs substantially from the previous two case studies. Day-to-day life in the Mandimba-Mangochi cross-border region is affected by access to arable land (by Malawian citizens on the
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Mozambican side of the border) and informal exchange of trade in agricultural surplus (by Mozambican citizens on the Malawian side of the border). Regardless of these key interaction factors, border authorities in the two countries have been putting more effort into the control of cross-border crime. This control strategy has not responded to food insecurity, which is the main factor leading to intense interaction between communities in Mandimba and Mangochi. This chapter suggested that co-management of land across the Mandimba-Mangochi cross-border region would lead to the establishment of a border governance model more suitable in addressing typical post-colonial African border problems in accordance with recommendations prescribed in the African Union Border Programme. This could counteract the global regime of environmental management, which has led to the establishment of Transfrontier Conservation Areas (TFCAs) in the Southern African region.

Based on the findings from these three empirical cases studies, the thesis concludes that, regardless of the distinctiveness of one cross-border region from another, Mozambique and other neighbouring states have prioritised a state-centric model of border control. This approach has resulted in different regimes of border control in the region, which has led to a failure to discuss ongoing integration in SADC from a human development standpoint in the context of socio-economic and ethnocultural dynamics in cross-border regions. Not only Mozambique but also other countries in the Southern African region have failed to incorporate cross-border issues into their border control strategies, and they have been unable to adapt international models of border governance to these cross-border regions.

9.3 Theoretical implications and future research

First and foremost, existing scholarly reflections on migration in Mozambique (Gastrow and Mosse, 2011; Raimundo, 2009; Gastrow and Mosse, 2002; Gastrow, 2001) have been limited to understanding the
impact of restrictive border controls on people on the move. By contrast, this thesis has expanded on the reflection on the impact of border controls on the people living in the cross-border regions. As evidence from the three cases studies has shown, Mozambique's cross-border border regions are shaped by different socio-economic and ethno-cultural dynamics, demanding an analytical framework that goes beyond the Westphalian regime of state sovereignty and diverges from international models of border governance. Findings from the three case studies suggest the need for an understanding of local complexities informing cross-border interactions and of factors with the potential to bring mutual benefits to people living in adjacent borders regions without threatening state interest in national security. Further studies may be useful in reflecting on how border governance might be rethought, both in the context of SADC integration and in a confrontation of the realities of internationalised models of border control.

What the case studies have illustrated is how each cross-border region, though different from another, reflects that on their own, state-centred border controls and internationalised, threat-oriented models of border governance will be inadequate. Both these will clash with the local realities of cross-border areas. Based on this key finding, this thesis has identified at least three research topics that combine theory and practice, and that could help to ensure that the concept of cross-border regions as critical meeting-points for post-colonial African states, specifically in the Southern African region, could provide alternatives to more state-centred border governance. These concerns firstly, questions of identity in cross-border areas; secondly, the social integration of non-nationals; and thirdly, the way in which human security concepts might help in the reformulation of principles of border governance.

9.3.1 Hybrid identities in cross-border regions

It is difficult to pinpoint the role of identity behind the often messy realities of complex and multiple cross-border interactions. Given the socio-economic differences between neighbouring countries in the
Southern African region on the one hand, and ethno-cultural proximities between communities in cross-border regions on the other, this raises interesting questions for the researcher. Why do some border officials believe that communities in cross-border regions can be manipulated during elections in neighbouring states? Why are stronger controls in cross-border regions unlikely to work effectively? Based on such contradictions, what role can hybrid identities play in moving beyond either-or thinking about the nature and interests of communities living in cross-border regions? Could a hybrid form of legal identity help border authorities and politicians in neighbouring countries to better understand the daily realities of people living in border regions? In the context of co-managed and transitional zones, can politicised sites of separated sovereignty, based on fixed, mutually exclusive identities and territorial lines on the map, become more flexible for local communities?

9.3.2 Social integration of foreigners

Although the war ended in 1992, Mozambique immigration authorities have yet to develop a coherent model for the integration of immigrants into the country. Rather, the country has been mainly concerned with controlling admission, transit and deportation of immigrants. In contrast, communities in cross-border regions understand that foreign immigrants can make a great contribution to local development through the establishment of job opportunities and skills transfer. Based on this background, the researcher suggests that further studies may be needed to examine how integration policies in Mozambique compare with local opinions held by Mozambican citizens on the role foreign immigrants play, and how immigrants might be better integrated into the economic, social and political life of Mozambique. This study could provide a real picture of social interaction between foreigners and national citizens, one which might suggest that foreigners are neither a burden for the state, nor for local communities, but that relationships will vary depending on local conditions. Hybrid identity and social integration are complementary topics that can help to expand the understanding of border controls and
the challenges posed by migration management in the Southern African region.

9.3.3 Human security, development and border governance

Human security is a complex discipline that embraces aspects of security related to the provision of protection to individuals from a variety range of threats such as chronic diseases, traffic accidents, crime, pollution and inadequate health care, food security, external aggression, domestic violence, poverty and other aspects threatening human survival (Vietti and Scribner, 2013; Gasper, 2010; Gasper, 2005; Oberleitner, 2002; Paris, 2001; Newman, 2001). On the subject of human development, evidence from the field suggests that Mozambican development strategies are broadly designed and implemented without any clear reference to human security in cross-border regions. Based on this gap, the thesis suggests that further research on human development and how it relates to human security and border governance would be useful, especially in meeting some of the needs expressed by the cross-border communities studied here. If taken further, the results of such research might help politicians to reconceptualise cross-border areas as development ‘nodes’ instead of as problem areas. This could contribute positively to human security in Mozambique and might also help to ensure that development programmes reflect the concerns of local communities to a greater extent.

9.3.4 Implications of this study for policy makers

The problem that prompted this research in the first place was a contradiction between two paradigms of border governance. On the one hand, officials were informed by the state’s national security-driven view of border controls, influenced by international and regional priorities of ‘combating crime’. On the other hand, such perceptions came into confrontation with the daily socio-economic and ethno-cultural realities of local dynamics in cross-border regions. These tensions became more apparent after the end of war in Mozambique in 1992. In fact, these two contrasting logics of border management have intensified with the
internationalisation and externalisation of border security by the West. In this way, the study set out to show how fighting transnational crime can pose hardships for local communities in the border regions, since their day-to-day life depends on constant cross-border interactions. The study indeed confirmed this view, and this led to the setting of three interrelated objectives. Firstly, the existing academic literature on the concept of security was reviewed and related to responses to migration policies and border controls by Mozambique following the end of war and the collapse of apartheid in South Africa. Secondly, life experiences of communities living in and moving through the three selected border regions in Mozambique were compared and contrasted. Thirdly, the impact of both international and regional border governance regimes on Mozambican policies and communities was assessed.

This suggests that the general literature on security can help us to understand how, since the end of the Cold War, countries like Mozambique have been faced with major changes in how security threats from cross-border movements have been perceived. Individuals on the move are now considered a threat to national sovereignty in the wider global context of restrictive migration policies in Western societies and beyond. This study has shown how internationalised models of border governance are reinterpreted at regional and national levels. This implies that those responsible for overseeing and reforming contemporary border governance arrangements may not achieve enhanced human security for the population simply by restricting the movement of so-called transnational criminal groups. Measures are needed that are more appropriate in addressing the socio-economic and ethno-cultural interests and needs of communities living in cross-borders areas of Mozambique, and in the Southern Africa region in general, and these may need to be elaborated upon in future if the overall (human) security situation is to improve.
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Curriculum Vitae

**Mr. Fulgêncio Lucas Muti Seda:** In November 2015 is expecting to defend his Doctor degree at the International Institute of Social Studies (ISS) of Erasmus University, Rotterdam, The Netherlands. In the last four years he has been working on his thesis titled *“Border Governance in Mozambique: The intersection of international border controls, regional integration and cross-border regions”*. Mr Seda also has MA degree in Public and Development Management (2008) from the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa and Honour degree (2004) from the Academy of Police Sciences of Mozambique. He has attended several short term courses on security management and research methodology for development studies.

Since 2005, Mr Seda has been teaching Domestic Tax Law and Techniques for police intervention at the Academy of Police Sciences in Maputo and International Tax Law at Polytechnic University in Maputo. From 2008 to 2009, he was involved as a liaison officer for the joint research Project aimed at establishing a data base on crime and victimization in Mozambique between the Institute of Security Studies of South Africa and the Academy of Police Sciences of Mozambique.

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