Unhealthy Paradoxes of Healthy Identities

(individualists, organizationalists and beyond)

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Comparative cross-cultural studies and identity research in social psychology focused on national and organizational differences, clashes and dimensions (Hofstede, Barsoux & Schneider, Jackson, Ward, Bochner & Furnham, Capoza & Brown). Mapping cultural software of individuals and dynamics of small groups was supposed to provide additional managerial knowledge and skills indispensable for global expansion of stable organizational bureaucracies. However, social constructivists and critical social scientists have also exposed a contingent nature of managerial skills in complex and chaotic environments and demonstrated arbitrariness of sense-making in organizations (cf. Weick, Hatch). Increasing frequency of individual interactions and accelerated evolution of organizational forms drew attention of research communities to the unhealthy (irrational, pathological) paradoxes of what used to be considered healthy organizational identities (Alvesson, de Vries, Gabriel, Carr). Problems of identity and identization (cf. Honneth, Sievers, van Riel) acquired growing significance viewed against the background of three paradoxes. First, managerial ideologies call for flexible networks of empowered individuals, but managerialist ideologies tacitly support hierarchic control. Second, there is no sustainable “fit” between new psychologized individualism and evolving “organizationalism” (Leinberger & Tucker). Robust identities and sustainable fit are continually challenged by unhealthy shadows of authoritarian “psychostructures” and dominant forms of organizationalism (Negri, Melucci, Stehr, Beck). Third, emergent alliances in social and managerial sciences have not succeeded yet in changing the methodological and ethical landscape of research in order to challenge dominant modes of organizing, social embedding and self-reflection. Such a shift could offer insights into the unhealthy paradoxes of healthy identities assumed by functionalists and criticized by constructivists, contingency theoreticians and evolutionists (Abrahamsson, Boje, Featherstone, Clark & Fincham, Denzin & Lincoln).
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Motto
“The erasure of the personality is the fatal accompaniment to an existence, which is concretely submissive to the spectacle’s rules, ever more removed from the possibility of authentic experience and thus from the discovery of individual preferences. Paradoxically, permanent self-denial is the price the individual pays for the tiniest bit of social status. Such an existence demands a fluid fidelity, a succession of continually disappointing commitments to false products. It is a matter of running hard to keep with the inflation of devalued signs of life.” (Debord, 1988, 32)

“Moods are far from being a marginal, colourful add-on to our mentalistic explanations of how the actors behave in situations. They are the ground for our encountering the world; understanding and acting in the situation.” (Ciborra, 2002, 170)

Abstract
Comparative cross-cultural studies and identity research in social psychology focused on national and organizational differences, clashes and dimensions (Hofstede, Barsoux & Schneider, Jackson, Ward, Bochner & Furnham, Capoza & Brown). Mapping cultural software of individuals and dynamics of small groups was supposed to provide additional managerial knowledge and skills indispensable for global expansion of stable organizational bureaucracies. However, social constructivists and critical social scientists have also exposed a contingent nature of managerial skills in complex and chaotic environments and demonstrated arbitrariness of sense-making in organizations (cf. Weick, Hatch). Increasing frequency of individual interactions and accelerated evolution of organizational forms drew attention of research communities to the unhealthy (irrational, pathological) paradoxes of what used to be considered healthy organizational identities (Alvesson, de Vries, Gabriel, Carr). Problems of identity and identization (cf. Honneth, Sievers, van Riel) acquired growing significance viewed against the background of three paradoxes. First, managerial ideologies call for flexible networks of empowered individuals, but managerialist ideologies tacitly support hierarchic control. Second, there is no sustainable “fit” between new psychologized individualism and evolving “organizationalism” (Leinberger & Tucker). Robust identities and sustainable fit are continually challenged by unhealthy shadows of authoritarian “psychostructures” and dominant forms of organizationalism (Negri, Melucci, Stehr, Beck). Third, emergent alliances in social and managerial sciences have not succeeded yet in changing the methodological and ethical landscape of research in order to challenge dominant modes of organizing, social embedding and self-reflection. Such a shift could offer insights into the unhealthy paradoxes of healthy identities assumed by functionalists and criticized by constructivists, contingency theoreticians and evolutionists (Abrahamsson, Boje, Featherstone, Clark & Fincham, Denzin & Lincoln).

Key words
Identity, identization, individualism, organizationalism, qualitative paradigms
Marx, Kafka and Freud stand for three different approaches to an organizational identity. Marx grounded an identity of a historical agent in class consciousness – emergent awareness of belonging to a social class with a blueprint for a political agenda. A social class whose exploitation was crucial for the reproduction of society’s material existence was justified in struggling for empowerment and overall political change. However, the organizational form for this struggle was an exact copy of an authoritarian industrial bureaucracy – a centralized political party and/or a trade union, also conceived of as a hierarchic organization with increasingly professionalized and alienated elite. Kafka struggled with the emotional suffering caused by alienation of an employee of a large bureaucracy, thus illustrating with his individual artistic sensitivity a Weberian thesis about the hidden injuries of an iron cage of social division of labour. Paradoxes of instrumental rationality in Kafka’s novels were not only elegant logical puzzles but had a price tag – individual alienation, powerlessness in a Byzantine labyrinth of a bureaucracy, whose decisions appear as inscrutable. Freud went further both in his analysis of an interface between an individual experience and a collective organization constraining individual action. He had demonstrated that a suffering individual can trade his iron cage for a velvet one, and become a successful organization man in a modern society, provided he or she is ready to pay the psychological price for this adaptation. The price was a neurotic disorder caused by an assumed identity imposed by an individual on himself or herself in the course of socialization and self-reflection. In-depth psychology of the unconscious has been designed as a branch of a scientific research, which offered a chance to guide successful therapy for a less damaging adaptation to the world of social organizations. Marx assumed that identity was determined by a hierarchy of social classes (independently of an individual), Kafka saw identity emerge from a clash of a sensitive individual with a blind force of bureaucratic necessity (independently of an organization). Freud saw identity as a social and psychic construct, which can and should be modified both by society (which can be less repressive) and individual (who can be more creative). This is why Freudian contribution to the concept of identity is recognized in contemporary literature (cf. Gabriel, 1999, Carr, 2003, Ashmore & Jussim, 1997), much more so, in fact, than his attempts to establish a distinct school of therapy, which still struggles for acknowledgement of its theoretical claims.

Research in cross-cultural management has traditionally been focusing on three basic levels of identities: the level of national culture (where leading role of a nation-state in coordinating socialization practices has aptly been captured in Hofstede’s neo-Weberian ideal types of “cultural dimensions” underlying cultural identities generated by nation-states), the organizational level of companies and institutions (where managerial techniques have been validated and legitimised by identifying their legitimation within the organizational culture’s values and norms) and an individual level of a human subject (with identity developed out of a personality, through the fulfilment of an employment contract and by realizing of a potential – for instance for becoming an agent capable of identization, development and change on all three levels). The underlying idea is that early socialization in family, at school and among
neighbours is supervised by a nation-state and that by investigating influence, which national culture, managed by the state, had upon these aspects of socialization, which are relevant for a future professional work, one could prevent or defuse conflicts, increase the “fit” between individuals and organizations and improve general “wellness” for individuals and efficiency for organizational performance.

Three thinkers named in the title of the present chapter correspond, respectively, to the social, organizational and personal levels of socialization and identization. Marx studied socialization into class differences in national societies and noted that identities of social actors are forged in a class struggle. He observed that class identities are being defined in a way, which underlines the contrast between one’s own class and the antagonistic one. Kafka analysed alienation of an individual in anonymous, hierarchic, professional bureaucracies and noted that an individual cannot compete with this form of irrational, alienating control exercised through apparently rational managers. Freud studied the inner struggle for a dynamic equilibrium of an individual personality and noted that for a success in this struggle (obedience to an ego in individual decisions, to a cultural superego in organizational ones) one often pays in a broad variety of neurotic disorders. However, although both Marx and Freud left an intellectual tradition and schools of thought which are being continued (Marxism in philosophy and political sciences, psychoanalysis in psychiatry and therapy), contemporary research is very strongly but only indirectly influenced by their studies, while Kafka belongs to a literary tradition rather than to an obligatory reading in social sciences (in spite of the irony of the fact that he remains the only one of the three abovementioned authors, who had actually been working in a business company, namely as a bank clerk). In academic tradition the name of Max Weber with his stress on rationalization and disenchantment springs into mind, and so do names of his continuators (for instance, Randal Collins or George Ritzer, cf. Collins,1999,Ritzer,2001). Within the latter academic domain, that is social sciences in general and behavioural sciences in particular, comparative studies of culturally determined social and personal identities (classified from the point of their relevance for organizing and managing) as they are being pursued today, acquired a paradigmatic core with the arrival of the seminal oeuvre of G. Hofstede.

The author of “Culture’s Consequences” (cf. Hofstede, 2001) assumed tacitly that an overwhelming control exercised by a nation state upon pre-work socialization of most human individuals resulted in a much stronger (though not always conscious) identification with national cultures than with a generational, gender, professional, political or any other cultures or subcultures. His assumptions have been both directly and indirectly confirmed by a number of independent studies, which usually revealed a relative stability of values in most populations living in contemporary nation-states (in spite of turbulent history, including world wars and major economic crises). However, Hofstede’s followers failed to move outside of the pale of the sciences of management and some areas of social psychology (cf. Boski et al., 2002 for Hofstede’s influence on comparative studies in social psychology). If one studies mainstream literature in political sciences (cf. e.g. Inglehart, 1997) or in sociology of culture (cf. e.g. Crane, 1994) - lack of Hofstedian influence upon these disciplines becomes puzzling. Hofstede has also been directly criticized for failing to explain either stability of values and cultural dimensions related to them or threats to these dimensions’ or values’ stability. Threats to the stability of Hofstedian dimensions of national cultures could have been caused, for instance, by the European integration,
which introduces standardization and weakens the role of national organizational recipes. A more general, postmodern relative weakening of nation-state’s control of socialization in the course of privatization campaigns has also been mentioned (though it had not been investigated yet in full, in spite of promising studies on “the retreat of the state”, to quote the title of Susan Strange’s book on consequences of globalization for the sovereignty of nation-states, cf. Strange, 1996) and so has a growth of elective generational or gender identities, which might modify national ones or even clash or replace them (cf. Gooderham & Nordhaug, 2002).

Hofstede has undertaken his fundamental study in the late sixties in order to facilitate cross-cultural cooperation and engineer a theoretical frame for understanding cross-cultural differences and their consequences for individual behaviour and organizational efficiency. Today, his contribution towards our understanding of “culture’s consequences” is increasingly often accepted and used not only by practitioners (managers, consultants, international experts, trainers, facilitators), but also by communities of researchers, particularly in social psychology, especially by those, who focus on individual, organizational and social identities, and who are thus very much aware of the fact that:

“nowadays most people and groups strongly resist pressure to dilute their cultural identities, which is why world-wide, elected governments no longer overtly pursue assimilation policies. Furthermore, if the analogy from biology holds in the social domain, it would be unwise to reduce further global cultural diversity which is already under threat from modern developments, such as commercial globalization, the internet, and the domination of the film and television industry by a small number of western companies.”(Ward, Bochner, Furnham, 2001,17)

However, this “identity” turn in social psychology in general and in cross-cultural studies in particular, is not a foregone conclusion in spite of the fact that some authors explicitly declare this shift of focus – for instance S. Schneider (cf. Schneider, Barsoux, 2003). It is not – for two main reasons. The first is to be found in a reliance of modern organizations on professional consultants and managers offering new identities constructed in support of managerial projects conceived as large-scale organizational re-engineering. The second is to be found in an academic division of labour, which results in different domains of knowledge being activated in order to generate these identities (and thus delaying the appearance of a paradigmatic shift towards the “identizing” studies in managerial sciences). Why are professional consultants important?

“At a time when corporate processes are increasingly conducted on the basis of tradeable knowledge, managerial identities are themselves being constructed out of the ideas (fads, techniques, systems) that make up the stream of management fashion. Management gurus and management consultants are key figures that supply the management function and feed knowledge into corporate and organizational decision-making. Jointly they supply a business language crucial for the ideas that corporate groups deal in, and for which they need to control the impressions that managers receive and capitalize on managerial feelings of uncertainty.” (Clark, Fincham, 2002, 203)
Business language of consultants and gurus, in turn, depends on the academic background studies, against which it had been formulated and developed (and on which it leans for legitimation and support, especially in consultants’ tool-kits). Social division of labour within the academic research communities resulted in a long-term partitioning of the problems of identity and identization between a number of various disciplines in social sciences in general and in the sciences of management in particular. Thus personal and individual identity is being studied by psychologists (who had been under a strong influence of cognitivists) and social psychologists (cf. e.g. Social Identity Theory – Tajfel, 1981, Tajfel and Turner, 1986 or theories of intergroup perceptions and relations, cf. Triandis, 1994). Problems of personal and group identity also surface in research conducted by sociologists dealing with national and regional stereotypes, describing class differentiation, or dealing with an evolution of organizational forms (cf. Aldrich, 2003). The same holds true with respect to economists or historians. In economics and history, as in sociology, these ventures into the problems of identity are rarely reflected in a major paradigmatic revision, except when researchers are busy ideologically deconstructing or “inventing” identities.(1)

Within the sciences of management, the concepts of organizational and corporate identity had been researched by the representatives of organizational behaviour, marketing, corporate communications and strategic management (cf. van Riel, Balmer, 1997, van Riel, Hasselt, 2002, Rekom, 1998), failing to produce a theoretical consensus and providing a number of categorizations (e.g. corporate identities as manifestations vs. representations, as social facts vs. social constructions, as an ACID mix of Actual, Communicated, Ideal and Desired types of identity). Other researchers make a very selective use of Hofstedian dimensions – for instance, accepting only an individualism-collectivism dimension for studying group identization processes (cf. Capoza, Brown, 2000) and focusing on micro-group and intragroup processes, through which an individual forges his or her identity. These researchers are also encountering some difficulties in keeping to a single theoretical frame and thus they are concerned, for instance about:

“different psychological meanings that social identity might have in various kinds of groups – for example, where membership is ‘achieved’ rather than ‘ascribed’”, Capoza, Brown, 2000,185).

No wonder that having warned their audience that according to some researchers a collective, organizational identity is at best a useful fiction playing a role of an ideology in hands of the power holders (and at worst a cynical alibi to legitimise power elite’s decisions), the authors of a recent study on corporate and organizational identities suggest that we settle for five facets of collective identity in a business organization, without going into detailed analysis of a difference between – for instance – functionalists, interpretivists and postmodernists. These are:

- the professed identity (clear mission statements, articulated claims, which individuals believe in),
- the projected identity (mainly the use of managed media and symbols in corporate communications to the outside world, highly supervised),
- the experienced identity (conscious and unconscious impressions leading to some representations in individual minds),
- the manifested identity (historical identity of a given organization over some period of time) and
- the attributed identity (how organization is experienced from the outside).

This typology is based on a multistakeholder perspective, and although it’s authors avoid taking paradigmatic sides and profess neutrality in methodological and anti-managerialist struggles, they notice nevertheless, that with the forthcoming battle for “the share of mind” on symbolic battlefields, with the growing need to sell an “experience”, an “adventure”, not just a product or a service, organizations may simply manipulate symbols, change rituals and switch logos (in order to meet the expectations of potential partners and clients) instead of undergoing a substantial change. The manipulators may pretend they are changing, in order to adapt to a general “change mood” of all managers, while preserving the hierarchy typical of industrial bureaucracies and prolonging a schizophrenic split between professed willingness to change and actually manifested inability to change, to implement any alternative organizing order different from a conservative managerial bureaucracy. The authors thus ask:

“Does this race for a share of dreams lead to internal dysfunctions within organizations? Notably, what happens when the identity projected externally can no longer be reconciled with the identity experienced inside the organization? What are the ideal relationships between a corporation’s brand identity, attributed identity, and experienced identity? Is there not a risk that wide gaps add to the cynicism that is increasingly the hallmark of the psychological and legal contract between employers and employees?” (Soenen, Moingeon, 2002, 30)

Soenen and Moingeon’s criticism resembles conclusions reached by Alvesson in his studies of ambiguity, image and identity in knowledge intensive organizations. He had concluded that identity regulation in knowledge-intensive companies, in spite of the increasingly important role played by individual competence and self-development, still follows four main “top-down” managerial techniques for regulating individual identities in hierarchic organizations - “establishing standards for how employees should define themselves” (Alvesson, 2001, 878). Alvesson examined four types of identity-focusing managerial control in knowledge-intensive companies:

- identification with a company as an institution,
- an ideological identification with a corporate culture,
- a normalization as an identification with a professional self and
- a subjectification (“employees are encouraged to define themselves as the kind of people who would have chosen this kind of work” – ibid., 881).

This last type of identity-focusing managerial control appears especially interesting in view of the fact that it offers an example of a psychological, almost Freudian self-engineering, self-manipulation. The more an employee is expected to become a free and creative human subject, the more this process of subjectification increases the subtle managerial control – to the point that an employee is expected to identify his or her own personality as the one with a proper “fit” to the present shape of an organization. The problem of remaining authoritarian structures, bureaucratic controls and unchecked power of top management can be discreetly dealt with by an ideology of knowledge-intensive company. Professional pride in challenges taken on by the
profession as a whole serves as a smoke-screen hiding authoritarian control of academically credited professionals. Silicon Valley replaces large steel mills as a symbol of professional identity and promise, while humane, coaching and facilitating managers replace whip-cracking overseers of the Fordist factory.

Alvesson’s main contribution to the literature on identity and identization is a grounded criticism of the functionalist view of contemporary professions, according to which a growth of abstract professional knowledge plays an emancipatory, individualizing and democratizing role by empowering professionals-employees to a “bottom-up” participative management and undermining traditional managerial hierarchies. The latter could be dysfunctional in exercising control since their new subordinates would have much more symbolic, cultural and social capital than employees of industrial bureaucracies of the past and thus would have more resources to organize resistance. When explaining the processes of loyalty and exit by highly educated employees of knowledge-intensive companies in terms of activation and de-activation of various identities, Alvesson notes a similar schizophrenic effect, a split between two types of stories and discourses on the topic of leaving a company and moving to another one, dividing them into two groups:

“Some of them deal with issues of freedom and creativity and use key words such as entrepreneurship, development, change, new ideas, and reactions against bureaucratisation. Other discourses address the issue in completely different value terms and indicate that it is a matter of egoism, greed, illoyalty and so on.”(Alvesson, 2000, 1118)

Undermining an utopian vision of a flexible, loosely coupled network of communities of practice, between which free-floating professionals migrate virtually and bond organizationally, is a welcome countermeasure to the mainstream literature on knowledge management, which has heretofore been mainly criticised from the point of view of sociologists and historians of science (cf. Fuller, 2003, Holden, 2002). It is also particularly relevant for the vision of information society, with knowledge assets as the new form of “capital”, the key to rapid, sustainable growth. Introduced by Boisot (cf. Boisot, 1995,1999), this vision relies on changes brought about by inventions in communication and information technologies and invests much hope in a potential for individualization and bypassing of bureaucratic gate-keepers in interorganizational contacts. Hence Boisot’s belief that Kafka’s analysis of individual alienation caused by bureaucratic rationing of knowledge will be more relevant for knowledge-intensive economies than Marx’s analysis of class inequalities. The main inequality will be – according to this technological utopia of an information economy – the one separating organizations managing their knowledge in a bureaucratic, secretive manner (which leads to a “Kafkesque” universe in which every individual, client of employee, has to walk endless corridors of corporate power before getting access to vital information) and organizations managing their knowledge-intensive horizontal networks with a human face, in a democratic way (Kafka’s nightmare will wither away, since all individuals will surf freely through virtual and real databases accessing them from any convenient point). Boisot’s information space model of knowledge-intensive economy is one of the most elegant formulae for expressing the same technological optimism, which guided the expansion of eBusiness before the great crash of 2000. It is also based on an assumption that characteristics of
information-processing and knowledge production influence organizational identities to a higher extent than property relations and power struggles.

However, in view of Alvesson’s findings, Boisot stands corrected. Not only does not “knowledge-intensive” organization automatically mean empowerment of employed professionals (if empowerment does take place, it results from the power struggles not unlike the ones in less knowledge intensive organizations, and not unlike class struggles analysed by Marx), but the new requirements of flexible, client-oriented jobs far from upgrading an individual - further increase managerial control of employee identification processes placing professionals struggling to work out a robust, healthy identity before an unhealthy paradox:

“In ambiguity-intensive organizations rhetoric, image management and ongoing negotiations become necessary and are offered a large arena - Alvesson, 1990. As clients and customers often have problems estimating the value of the product/service offered, establishing close social links between the knowledge-intensive company and the customer/client becomes vital. Interactions must be carefully orchestrated and efforts to strengthen ties given priority. Rhetoric, image production and the fine-tuning of social bonds rely upon supportive work identities. Successful talk, appearance and interaction call for the right kind of subjectivity. There is a close and complex relationship between these qualities: identity constructions are being backed by rhetoric and images, at the same time as the fluid and fluctuating nature of persuasive talk, appearance and adapting to whims and wants of clients undermine the prospect of, as well as the usefulness of, fixed identity constructions (italics mine – S.M.). Knowledge intensive signifies an intensity of rhetoric, image, interaction and identity-regulation.”(Alvesson, 2001,880-881)

Employees are thus subjected to an increasing pressure to “identize”, i.e. to develop “supportive work identities”, but at the same time they are exposed to the accelerating mutability of many components of their organizational setting and environment. They are subsequently required to develop “supportive work flexibility” as well – which in turn undermines the results of their self-identizing heretofore.

Identizing accelerates under various pressures and becomes important for individuals dealing with increasingly distributed and unpredictable organizational interactions (“all that is solid melts into air”). At the same time organizational identities, far from being robust, solid and healthy, are relatively quickly and easily undermined (in the name of an increased organizational “agility”), leaving an individual in an uncomfortable situation of obligatory flexibility a la minute – thus further increasing the need for even more identizing, for a search of new identities. These newly won identities will have to be discarded even more quickly than the previous ones (since the rate of organizational change and flexibility in search for clients and solutions also increase), thus reinforcing the drive towards recognition of still more identities to come. Identizing becomes a movement, identity a temporary construction.(2) Rationalization of this process of identizing breeds disenchantment with its results. Not only ultimate values of our culture are becoming ‘disenchanted, i.e. subjected to a critical, rational, instrumental manipulation (and thus devalued), but the organizational values, and values attached to an individual identity – do not escape the same fate. Is re-enchantment possible?
2. Identizing as re-enchantment: towards a sustainable “fit” of individualism and organizationalism

What does identizing mean in a contemporary context of a knowledge-intensive, rapidly changing organization? What is the role of subjectification in an over-psychologized concept of postmodern managerial control? Sociologists speak of collective identities as they emerge, as they are being constructed primarily as systems of action for individuals. These collective identities resemble social movements and are composed of cognitive definitions (a map of social reality and competence built of knowledge and skills), networks of active relationships (a flow of communities, networks and organizations, in which individuals work and live) and emotional investments (Melucci, 1996). Emotional investments are not less significant than the other components of a collective identity:

“Passions and feelings, love and hate, faith and fear are all part of a body acting collectively, particularly in those areas of social life that are less institutionalised, such as the social movement. To understand this part of collective action as ‘irrational’, as opposed to the parts that are ‘rational’ (a euphemism for ‘good’) is simply nonsensical. There is no cognition without feeling and no meaning without emotion.” (Melucci, 1996, 71)(3)

Our understanding of organizational identities depends on three developments – on finding out what individuals identifying themselves with these organizations think about themselves and their organizational forms, on registering what individuals who interact with them from the outside (i.e. from within other organizations) think of them, and finally, what researchers in sociology and social psychology of organizations or movements and in organizational theory, behaviour, development and change suggest (having compared many organizations and movements over some period of time). Individuals who function within knowledge-intensive organizations experience a number of difficulties in trying to accomplish a match or a fit between various identities they want to sustain. A professional identity of an academic member of a research community can prompt actions, which are difficult to reconcile with actions undertaken after identifying with a university as an institution and organization. For instance as a managing dean downsizing a department or a faculty, one can experience stress linked to the fact that one has to act against the principles of professional solidarity with other members of academic profession and against one’s beliefs in a promising nature of some research projects. Much more frequently, and on many more levels of organizational structures, this clash of organizational identities is being experienced as a result of a flexitime or part-time work arrangement, of outsourcing or subcontracting, telecommuting and project-hopping. Fixed identities, described as firmly lodged, anchored or embedded in a single organization ceased to be a norm – organization man gave way to a spider woman (cf. Johansen, Swigart, 1994).(4)

Individuals thus experience this blurring of organizational contours and the importance of networking beyond organizational boundaries as an obstacle on their way to a self-identification. Their roles and identities begin to overlap with roles and identities of others, they have to look for new segmentation of responsibilities and to deal with a return of a personal authority at the expense of an impersonal,
bureaucratic one (which means an intensification of a power struggle at all levels of an organization). This is the result of a first-hand experience on a job in a contemporary organization: “as organizational members shift across positions, tasks, and projects, formal structures and job descriptions become increasingly less relevant.” (Jaffee, 2001, 285-286)

This fluidity and mutability makes it even more difficult to recognize and acknowledge new identities for those coming from outside of an organization. Dealing with an individual with an academic status from another university, one does not automatically recognize this individual’s role in research, teaching, management and consulting, since formal job descriptions hardly reflect flexible networks and changing projects in which an individual may be active. The others, members of multiple stakeholders interacting with – let us say – a university, also experience difficulties in pinpointing identities because of both organizational transformations. For instance, a policy of an “enterprising university”, very popular in the 1980ies and 1990ies, often means undertaking joint ventures with commercial companies, or commercialising parts of higher education (usually MBA programs or their clones, in-company projects and other forms of executive education). It is clear that taxpayer’s money is then either invested at a risk or used as a start-up capital for a business enterprise. Difficulties may also be caused by individual mutability of members of an organization. In case of a university, there are special chairs funded by business companies – they do not have to reflect an academic merit of the holder, and so a person contacting an owner of such a chair does not really know if he or she is dealing with the author of respectful research or a company consultant rewarded with academic endowment. On the other hand, a successful academic researcher often switches to an almost full-time consulting, thus blurring the borderline between researchers and consulting profession (the same happens the other way round, when acknowledged and successful consultants ask for a part-time chair at a university in order to embellish their CV). Finally, some managerial positions at universities (e.g. deans) are farmed out to professional managers, who then sometimes acquire an academic title along with the position. Thus outsiders interacting with a changing organization are bound to notice that real organizational identities are being forged in a tension or force-field between the still prevailing hierarchic professional bureaucracy as a dominant form of economic and public organization on the one hand and the forthcoming more flexible, horizontal, network-like plethora of more open organizational forms. In spite of the spectacular rise in the salaries of top managers of large corporations (which had immediately been noticed by critical media and academics), most of major companies are experimenting with a less managerialist, less hierarchic and less bureaucratic form of control. Concepts of collaboration, commitment, cooperation, climate and organizational wellness (as a trigger of creativity and a competitive advantage) abound and so do the concepts of an organizational culture as an indispensable complementing and correcting influence compensating a relative empowerment of the employees (and a relative loss of control by corporate bureaucracies).

Steady career of the concept of an organizational culture and of the whole domain of cross-cultural studies is due to the fact that in dealing with individuals coming from different organizational backgrounds everybody, not only top managers, find it useful to develop a distinctive cross-cultural competence. Researchers trying to facilitate the activities of those trying to recognize organizational identities point out that a cross-
cultural competence should enable one to respond simultaneously to different cultures, be aware of culture’s consequences, even at home organization, be able to pursue different cognitive strategies at once and be prepared to accept change – by being able to quickly learn (and unlearn):

“The challenge is to have the willingness to confront our own assumptions, to question them, and to hold on to the essential ones out of a sense of conviction rather than fear of something different. With that as an anchor, it becomes possible to share differences by creating openness and encouraging empathy, as well as to test them and disagree without destroying one’s sense of self. Cross-cultural recommendations may sound like little more than common sense but it takes considerable robustness, openness, and effort to see to it that common sense prevails.”(Schneider, Barsoux, 2003, 209).

This recommendation brings us to the third development influencing the making of organizational identities – the contribution of researchers in managerial and social sciences, who offer comparative studies of organizational identities across generations. Contrary to appearances, their contribution towards the social construction of the common sense is quite substantial both in defining what is a common sense definition of an individual (new forms of individualism) and what is a common sense definition of a minimal organizational composed of loosely coupled interacts (transformations of an intuitive organizationalism). Sociologists studying the transformations of a workplace, in particular the difference between the middle managers in a large corporation in the 1950ies and 1960ies on the one hand and their sons and daughters travelling through many more organizations and companies in 1970ies and 1980ies, have come up with a new version of a “fit” between an individual and an organization. By focusing on differences between parents’ generation (the one studied by Whyte in “Organization Man” published in early 1960ies) and children’s (coming of age during the late 1960ies, hence acquiring generational experience around 1968, starting their working lives in 1970ies and continuing them in the 1980ies, when they were interviewed), Leinberger and Tucker describe a new brand of highly psychologized “individualism” of the children’s generation. This generation, sometimes called “baby boomers” – since they had been born between 1945 and 1955 – is presently managing most organizations (and has been on its way when studied in 1980ies. What marks them off against their parents is not only their generational experience of having participated in mass social movements of protest against the war in Vietnam and racial discrimination. It is also the fact that they work and struggle against the background of a very different “organizationalism”. This separates them even further from their parents, since they are not interested in joining a single corporation, where they can find a niche and pursue an upward mobility along a single “immortal hierarchy”).(5) Their social identities have been “movementized” in the late 1960ies, not “corporatized”, like their parents’ in the early 1950ies.

Leinberger and Tucker focus on registering the effects of social change in the second half of the XXth century upon individual decisions guided by individualist considerations (new individualism) and taken in the context of new organizations (new organizationalism). Social change is understood fairly broadly, as “changing conditions of work, leisure, economics, politics, and family life”(Leinberger, Tucker, 1991, 8) providing background for personal decisions and leading to many intended
or unintended consequences. Their main findings can be summed up as follows: in spite of the fact that a political protest of the 1968 generation was easily suppressed and failed to produce a lasting institutional transformation of political landscape, this generation’s social imagination and identizing efforts produced a new brand of individualism. This new individualism is not Riesman’s “inner-directedness”, a counterforce opposing the conformist pressures of an organization – it is the cultivation of a private, authentic self. This is what the authors mean when they say that the generation of baby boomers, sons and daughters of the “organization men”, have deleted a political and social component embedding individualism in social organizations and turned it into an entirely psychological phenomenon. Instead of establishing individual choice in struggle around a family radio (to select a station to be listened to by the whole family) or a company personnel policy (to start an upward climb on a company managerial ladder) – baby boomers bought a Walkman or shifted to another company. They enjoyed a TV set, a PC or a stereo set as a solitary pleasure and made a limited, conditional, temporary part-time contracts with the employers. However, the fact that these new individualists turned towards “self-expression, self-fulfillment, self-assertion, self-actualization, self-understanding, self-acceptance”(op.cit.,11) meant that organizations could also evolve (change, re-engineer themselves, downsize, become lean and mean – fearing no pressure from new individualists) in a way which made them less committed to employees, less bound by the moral standards of inner-directed men and local communities and less attractive as life-long choices for individuals. The authors trace consequences of a legal and common sense personification of corporations and draw far-reaching conclusions, which link those two processes into a single matrix of a social change, encompassing the ways in which people live and work:

“We have not only individualized bureaucracies, we have bureaucratised individuals; our corporations have become psychic projections and our psyches corporate reflections. They – we – are all artificial persons now.(…) The rise of postmetropolitan suburbs, which are neither center nor periphery, and the emergence of organizational networks, which replace old hierarchical structures, have thrust the new generation into concrete ways of life to which the authentic self is increasingly extrinsic.(…) In their individualism, they see identity as culture, in their organizationalism they see culture as identity.” (op.cit., 14, 16, 406)(6)

Leinberger and Tucker conclude that these new individualists are quite realist in assessment of their chances in the world of organizations and that they are “antiorganization” (in a sense that they refuse to choose a single “immortal” organizational bureaucracy to which they will pledge loyalty and in which they will make a career), but not antiorganizational (which means that they are quite prepared to join many independent project teams and belong to many changeable and mobile networks within organizational settings), anti-communitarian but not anti-community (meaning that they will readily associate with the others, for instance in virtual communities or communities of interest, but will not go back to “bowling with neighbours”) and anti-fundamentalist but not anti-spiritual.(7)

These new individualists are thus becoming also the new organisationalists – but they do so on different conditions than their parents and create new paradoxes of the forthcoming organizationalism by forcing organizations to comply, to adapt to their new individualism. Since organizations have reduced their “social” and “caring”
services and facilities for individuals and focused on their “core businesses”, their managers can expect loyalty instead of an exit only when they manage to become leaders of new individualists, who are reluctant to be led, who do not easily become followers. Unless, that is, they strongly identify with the company culture.

Leadership in new organizations thus involves an ongoing negotiation with the employees and an attempt to win them over to the company’s vision, values and a more democratic way of functioning (command-and-control organizations score poorly in retaining employees from this generation). As the authors put it, in an explicit polemic against Putnam, we should not be bemoaning the loss of authentic community (either in a working or a living environment and context), but we should be “seeing how narratives of care may be humanely elaborated in a mobile and fragmented society that is likely to become more so”(op.cit.419). In other words, a new organizationalism requires a step beyond a functionalist view of organizational rationality and towards the constructivist processual view of an organization as a local culture influencing the social processes connected to the creation and maintenance of meaning and influenced by social and historical transformations - of which generational change described in “The New Individualists’ is a case in point. Baby boomers have emerged from a collective generational identizing process and their ability to survive the managerialist policies of the last quarter of the XXth century is a historical test of their ability to:

“impose certain images of themselves, and to counter attempts by dominant groups to denigrate their aspirations to be recognized as different. (…) The ability to impose negative and stigmatised definitions of the identity of other groups constitutes, effectively, a fundamental mechanism of social domination.”(Della Porta, Diani, 1999, 92)

One of the most effective ways of imposing images is through a control of identizing processes within an organizational setting, which blocks an emergence of autonomous identities and forces a flight into over-psychologized concept of authentic self, thus lowering the capacity for a potential collective action. Such action would probably increase the creativity of employees and contribute to their wellness – but it would have been shaped outside of the control of organizations’ managerial elites. It would have been shaped at the expense of their managerial control – while dealing with over-psychologized concept of self they have more instruments to process their problems within the managerialist ideology of human resource management. Their contradictory aim is both to control employees with individualized policies and to “unleash” them so that a more creative, sustained input into company’s activities and competitiveness can be achieved. It is far from certain if the present wave of managerialism (which prompts individualization as a response to the de-socialized and reduced concept of organization) is able to secure this outcome or whether it will subside challenged by both increasing complexity and by movementization of identizing processes. This emergence of intra-organizational employee mini-movements on managers’ own turf – inside most of our organizations – will be an interesting example of a post-class or neo-class struggle on a mezzo-level, halfway between individual and macro-social (national society’s) one. Should this happen – a phrase “long march through the institutions” would acquire a new meaning, not only in organizations, but also in organizational sciences and their paradigmatic configurations.
Is this already being perceived by social scientists in general and organizational scientists in particular? It is; in a relative weakening of paradigmatic monopolies in a cognitive sphere (scientific research programs begin to resemble egalitarian Noah’s Arks rather than exclusive country clubs) and in a return of paradigmatic empires in social organization of academic knowledge-production in a socio-organizational sphere (in tacit campaigns decimating and dis-empowering representatives of rival paradigms).

3. Paradigmatic empires always strike back

Sociologists and social psychologists, researchers in organizational behaviour and development often focus on identizing and identities when they study transformations of the concepts of individualism and organizationalism as social processes. Personal and organizational identities in various constellations are viewed as “crucial interfaces” between a single human being and a society at large (macro-level, a level of society organized within a nation-state). Personal identity (and the accompanying individualization) is considered to be the latest in a long series of theoretical concepts of self, preceded by a traditional identity of descent and by a universalist concept of an immortal soul or an objective light of reason (all of which were historical attempts to limit individualization from the point of social control). The appearance of an obligatory personal identity and of optional organizational identities testifies to the democratisation and meritocratization of societies, because it has an egalitarian influence upon social mobility, motivating all individuals to strive for accumulating self-worth and self-esteem as something they did not traditionally inherit, but have to negotiate all the time, comparing themselves to increasingly broad pools of individuals:

“Women were not expected to compare themselves to men, the poor not to the rich and the black not to the white. As long as individuals accepted the validity of these distinctions and applied the corresponding expectations to themselves, anxiety about self-worth was kept within certain limits; this changed with the corrosion of traditional patterns and the fracturing of common standards. Individuals are now on their own, with the result that the assessment of self-worth becomes much more problematic. At the same time, the normative pressure on individuals to engage in self-assessment is stronger than ever.”(Danziger, 1997, 146)

Social scientists see social processes of organizing as composed of multiple actions, exchanges, interactions (sometimes resulting in economic, political, religious, philosophical or scientific clashes) and of (often incompatible) experiences of both expected and unexpected results by many individuals in many settings. Most of the representatives of organizational sciences are implicitly challenging the realist and functionalist approach to organizational rationality. They do so first by tacitly accepting paradigmatic differences and incommensurability between scientific research programs, whose results they find pragmatically useful and second by assuming a dynamic and constructivist model of an organization. In the first case they try to focus on a problem field and list the methodological research programs, refusing to compare their paradigmatic claims. This is the way in which Aldrich, for instance, lists the methodological research programs in organizational evolution and change. According to him six theoretical perspectives, which had contributed most to
our understanding of organizational evolution are the transaction costs economics
(based on rational choice theory), institutionalists (who move towards socio-historical
analysis of organizational forms), ecologists (who try to investigate organizations at a
population level, in order to determine their chances for survival), resource-
dependence theoreticians (who add a political twist by viewing organizations’
interventions in an environment as conscious re-shaping of the latter), researchers
foocussing on organizational learning (which has an evolutionary element in a
variation-selection-retention model) and the interpretivists (who focus on socio-
psychological processes of creating and sustaining meaning, among other through
emergent identities):

“Each of the six approaches offers something of value to an evolutionary perspective
on organizations. In practice, an evolutionary analysis borrows selectively from them,
as befits its eclectic nature. Evolutionary theory remains open to the unexpected and
the improbable, thus sharing something in common with interpretive and
organizational learning approaches. As in the institutional approach, its explanations
cut across levels of analysis and encompass both the short and the long run in
organizational life cycles. Evolution is a locally adaptive process whose course is not
predetermined and thus has something in common with ecological and transaction
costs economics approaches that also stress local selection processes. Finally, the
evolutionary approach emphasizes that few people know exactly what they are doing
or why. Therefore, the organizations and institutions people participate in are
vulnerable to being changed by aggressive members who know what they want, and
are willing to work hard to get it.”(Aldrich,2003,74)

Aldrich refuses to compare paradigmatic claims of these research programs in order to
avoid ordering them according to a preconceived hierarchy. He does not, for instance,
criticize a qualitative research program as not measuring up to the standards of a
quantitative one. Neither does he criticize the quantitative research programs from the
point of the qualitative program’s criteria of relevance and fairness. In his approach a
successful explanation of a complex process – for instance of the making of an
organizational or individual identity, of the emergence or decline of a strong leader –
is best accomplished within a paradigmatic Noah’s ark of a theory of evolution of
social forms of organizing. Aldrich is aware of the fact that increasing numbers and
varieties of organizations have become the basic building blocks of our societies,
influenced individuals and groups by creating communities of practice and that they
have been both breeding social change by differentiating individual lives (and thus
creating inequalities, which prompt collective actions) and have themselves been
falling prey to a continuous change (thus further increasing complexity and
uncertainty). He realizes that no methodological monopoly can claim privileged
access to the study of the processes of organizing, counter-organizing and de-
organizing of the Protean selves and organizations.

One of the consequences of a continuous change and the movementization of
individual and organizational identities is the problem with and dynamics of a
legitimization. One does not accept the bureaucratic rationality of a formal
organization developed in Western Europe after Enlightenment as a privileged one
and thus either immune to criticism or at least granted a different status than non-
bureaucratic alternatives. Neither does one accept - without a critical examination -
the rationality of a social movement struggling to mobilize for a change. Neither SMO
(social movement organization), nor an NGO (non-governmental organization) nor a multinational corporation (MNC) can automatically command respect. Neither Shell nor Greenpeace will be accepted on their face value – the public has to decide whether to sink the next generation of “Brent Spars” in the North Sea or to re-cycle them into piers in a Norwegian fjord. The media have to mobilize for pressure on politicians and organizations have to respond. Rationality of decision-making will be decided by agreeing on procedures and mobilizing for support. Most of social scientists would assume, in other words, that rationality is a social construct, which can be compared to the other constructs and that a formal organization is a successive invention derived through trial and error from experience and bound to evolve further. New individualism and new organizationalism are cultural reflections of accelerated identizing. They are echoes of an ongoing social change fuelled and reinforced by an increasing number of ever more complex, networked and overlapping organizations. At the level of complexity of an European Union one deals with basically open and unpredictable flow of processes, with no clear model of supra-organization as a goal, but multiple practices, from which a set of organizing solutions may emerge. Social constructivists, symbolic interactionists or cultural anthropologists, ethnographers and neo-institutionalists belong to a large movement in contemporary social sciences, whose representatives:

“question the social origins of the whole constellation of institutions and at the same time seek to grasp not the universal laws that generate social practices, but the social practices that generate universal laws, and, in organizational theory, attendant management prescriptions.”(Dobbin, 1994, 123)(8)

While not many researchers would go as far as to follow the anarchist or dadaist battle-cry of Paul Feyerabend that “anything goes” and thus allow sorcery or astronomy (pace Adorno) to stand on a par with science in explaining the meaning of behaviour and controlling the environment or in legitimising our decisions, they would probably agree that methodological constraints of scientific research programs (imposed to a large extent by paradigmatic gate-keepers with institutional clout) make it necessary to allow some measure of eclecticism. Most of researchers steeped in quantitative methods would assume that their quest is primarily for the discovery of – ideally – universal or covering laws, whose discovery, in turn, could eventually guide and generate improved social practices. Thus the opposite point of view expressed above – namely that social practices generate universal laws, would be foreign to them. The logic of scientific inquiry, while historically changing, offers, according to them, objective standards handled by peer control mechanisms in academic institutions.

Quite the reverse would be true in case of qualitative researchers, for whom universal laws, as any other methodological concept, would obviously be a product of a definite social practice put into service of powers that be, or more specifically, these powers that chose to do the gate-keeping and control the research community. A truly critical social scientist should reject the view that a set of methodological principles elevated to a universal status can be applied to all circumstances at all times. Alternative approaches exist and have their advantages:

“Our second assumption builds on the tensions that now define qualitative research. There is an elusive center in this contradictory, tension-riddled enterprise. We seem to
be moving farther and farther away from grand narratives and single, overreaching ontological, epistemological and methodological paradigms. The center lies in the humanistic commitment of the qualitative researcher to study the world always from the perspective of the gendered, historically situated, interacting individual. From this complex commitment flow the liberal and radical politics of qualitative research.” (Denzin, Lincoln, 2003, 612)

The abovementioned struggle for recognition and legitimacy of individual and organizational identities (as part and parcel of studied social and organizational realities), so crucial in processes of organizing and managing, leading and changing, echoes an interesting development in the explicitly eclectic methodology of organizational sciences, of which Aldrich’s book on evolution of organizational forms is a case in point. Healthy and robust paradigmatic identity should prevent me from assembling an eclectic patchwork of theoretical insights from different research programs, for fear of contaminating my theory with methodologically less legitimate components. However, my pragmatic goal of understanding complex and mutable realities of organizing and managing and guiding them successfully will not be reached, if I remain paradigmatically pure and stick to a single paradigm only. I should thus swallow my paradigmatic pride and be guided by eclecticism and pragmatic concerns. Aldrich’s sentiments are shared by social constructivists from a qualitative end of research spectrum:

“Qualitative research is an interdisciplinary, transdisciplinary, and sometimes counterdisciplinary field. It crosscuts the humanities, the social sciences, and the physical sciences. Qualitative research is many things at the same time. It is multiparadigmatic in focus. Its practitioners are sensitive to the value of the multimethod approach. They are committed to the naturalistic perspective and to the interpretive understanding of human experience. At the same time, the field is inherently political and shaped by multiple ethical and political allegiances.” (Denzin, Lincoln, 2003, 613)

Thus both researchers with a preference for a quantitative research program and researchers casting their vote with the qualitative one express willingness to be pragmatic and eclectic, open and cooperative, to put their paradigmatic identity at risk, to recognize contribution of a paradigmatic enemy. Do they feel comfortable and secure enough in their paradigmatic and institutional identities to search for alternatives to their preferred approach? Do they feel safe enough in their organizational and professional identities to risk a continuous professional, organizational and institutional border-crossing? They appear to be quite prepared to accept new, more challenging roles and to let new identities emerge from their critical practices:

“We are not the only scholars calling for a social science that is more responsive – not to the policy community, which has often used research for its own ends, but to the communities in which we do our work. The press for a civic sociology (...) is not without its dangers. We may find that as we work more often with the communities to answer their questions, we have less funding available with which we can do such work. We may also find that this work takes us away from campuses far more than our home institutions would like. Certainly, such work is much more labour intensive and time devouring than our traditional ethnographies dictated. The calls for a civic
sociology – by which we mean fieldwork located not only in sociology, but in an extended, enriched, cultivated social science embracing all the disciplines – nevertheless characterize a whole new generation of qualitative researchers: educationists, sociologists, political scientists, clinical practitioners in psychology and medicine, nurses, communication and media specialists, cultural studies workers, and a score of other assorted disciplines.”(Denzin, Lincoln, 2003, 635-6)

This ideologically or paradigmatically unhealthy paradox of otherwise healthy identity (if openness for change and tolerance for the other paradigms can be considered a criterion of health, which is not always the case in academic institutions) has already been encountered in the philosophy of science during the most turbulent years of the late Popperian school. Popper, Lakatos, and Feyerabend, and many other academic researchers with interest in the philosophy of science were wrestling with the impact of Kuhn’s “Structure of Scientific Revolutions” upon their discipline. What they encountered was an incompatible view of scientific rationality and what they experienced was an unexpected historical and hybrid outcome of the clash. This paradox is still with us, though interest in discussing its implications for researchers’ communities in a public debate has waned after Lakatos, Popper and Feyerabend died, and their followers failed to sustain the attention of researchers, philosophers, logicians and managers of academic research and education (and of a general public, since neither the advances of genetic engineering nor progress in developing information and communication technologies managed to revive interest in the philosophy of science, even in the guise of knowledge management theories, which are remarkably flat and philosophically uninspiring).

What happened in the philosophy of science in the 1970ies? Popper’s views emerged as a critique of the neopositivist philosophy of the Vienna circle, and were expressed primarily in “The Logic of Scientific Discovery” (a book he wrote in 1937 but published in English in 1959) and “Objective Knowledge” (1972). Logical positivists from Vienna saw the task of philosophy as a methodological reflection on human knowledge (and stop short of going beyond that – in famous words of Wittgenstein, it should have kept silent about those matters, about which we are unable to speak). It was supposed to provide a logical analysis of the language of empirical scientists. Philosophers were expected to support the evolution of scientific knowledge, which had to be accumulated in a continuous, endless quest for a more precise and exact insight into objective reality. Popper introduced important corrections to this normative ideal – by tracing actual developments in history of science, especially the development of quantum physics, he concluded that researchers should not simply try to verify their theories. They should focus on other researchers attempts to falsify them and actually try to falsify themselves (arguably a counterfactual assumption, but then his was the normative idea, to which individual researchers should mature). In case falsification attempts fail – one may tentatively accept an un-falsified theorem or theory, provided no better one came along. Popper was one of the last philosophers, who were not afraid of publicly chastising distinguished scholars and scientists for methodological drawbacks and mistakes in their academic publications, even if they were acknowledged authorities in their field (for instance biology). He was not a neopositivist, but he did accept their assumption that a philosophy of science should check if real science measured up to the normative ideal.
While he struggled with the necessity to account for historical evolution of critical norms, which had to be applied to empirical research, Kuhn’s book on “the structure of scientific revolutions” provided a rival explanation of the evolutionary mechanism, which allegedly guides criticism and engineers the growth of science. Kuhn claimed that logical and methodological merits of a paradigm are of secondary importance – what matters is that followers of a given paradigm monopolize crucial positions, reproduce their paradigm in new generations of researchers and establish themselves as a dominant scientific community. Eventually, their paradigm will accumulate problems and unsolved puzzles and paradoxes, which will provide followers of rival paradigms with a chance to overthrow the old paradigm and impose a new one upon academic institutions. However, if a new paradigm eventually dethrones the old one, this does not happen in the course of a rational dialogue on relative merits of two rival research programs. Social networking and political power are crucial. Philosophy of science is thus less useful in understanding real science than sociology and history, and these disciplines cannot prescribe a scientific inquiry nor evaluate; they can only describe the surviving paradigm as – by definition – “the fittest”. In other words, Popper tried to demonstrate that truth claims matter and various paradigms can be compared by educated and free individuals, able to distinguish between a superior and inferior knowledge. Identizing of academic community members is a matter best entrusted to a parliament of researchers presided over by a philosopher of science (who is only a speaker of this parliament and helps to shape a tentative consensus).

Kuhn tried to demonstrate that power grows out of the barrel of a research fund and that if a given community of researchers manages to establish a paradigmatic monopoly, they acquire a right to decide whose truth claims are more valid.(10) Identizing of academic community members is a matter of a collective decision by the elite of “peers” who decide whether to fund and evaluate research papers, projects and products. They have a right to decide what is “normal science” and what is not, which led one of the more critical commentators to remark that:

“all scientists working in the same paradigm are equal, but some are more equal than the others. These are the peers, whose opinions always seem to matter in the peer review processes used to fund and evaluate scientific research. The only sense in which Kuhnian scientists dictate the terms of their own inquiry is that they all agree to abide by the decisions taken by their elite peers. This, in turn, provides a unified front of legitimacy to the larger society.”(Fuller, 2003, 52)(11)

This is thus an unhealthy paradox of a healthy identity; in order to legitimise the organizational identity of an academic professional, he or she has to accept an evolutionary organizational form, which dominates because other forms declined and the remaining ones converged (as is the case with contemporary universities and research institutes), not because they are optimal and closest to the ideal of rationality. The ideal of rationality, while still celebrated in institutional rituals and embedded in some research programs (rational choice theory, transaction costs economics) does not work. What works are organizational procedures and organizational culture, all geared to the powerful alliances of academic peers, political decision-makers and business sponsors.

What about alternative professional identities? What about attempts to generate an organizational identity of an academic professional, who wants to be more critical,
more interpretive, more socially aware and politically committed, than a docile researcher pursuing normal science within his or her dominant paradigm? What about a researcher who wants to be closer to emergent rationalities and constituencies in his or her environment? Does he or she have to undermine the very organizational forms, which secure his or her long-term professional stability? Contemporary university bureaucracies allow the top rank academics and professional external managers to exercise power at the expense of all other categories of researchers and academics and to ignore their democratic checks and balances installed after 1968 (and – ultimately - guaranteeing personal, professional and organizational identities). Nevertheless, alternative identities do emerge. Such alternative possibilities are emerging in social sciences in general (cf. global ethnographies of Michael Burawoy and his collaborators or critical science studies of Steve Fuller, Mike Reed, Steve Woolgar and Bruno Latour) and in organizational sciences in particular (Denzin, Lincoln, Deetz, Boje, Hopfl, Czarniawska, Linstead, Alvesson, Weick, to quote but a few).

Paradigmatic empires always strike back (in practice, if not in theory or in philosophy of science) – but anti-paradigmatic challenges also return, while unhealthy paradoxes of healthy organizational identities generate research interests and motivate research projects, stimulate emergence of new professional associations, publication of new research periodicals and networking of regular interactions and exchanges. Even in mainstream managerialist literature we do find attempts towards embedding of such concepts as emotional intelligence (cf. Ciarrochi et al, 2001) or emotional dynamics in the theory of interpersonal behaviour and face-to-face interactions (Turner, 2002)(12), and their appearance (as well as attempts to include the qualitative insights in a quantitatively constructed general mechanism of organizational interaction and change) signals mixed effects of this endeavour and, perhaps, an unhealthy identity paradox. If attempts to sustain a healthy paradigmatic identity on the part of one of the core disciplines supporting “managerialist” ideology – let us say a sociological theory of interpersonal behaviour or a psychological theory of emotional dynamics of a group – fail, then, perhaps, a pluralist multi-methodological inter-paradigmatic truce will replace the cold managerial war to engineer dominant position of the neopositivist, quantitative methodologies in academic institutions. We do not have to return from Kuhn to Popper, but we should think about unmaking at least some of the institutional consequences of the cold war for our academic organizations. After all, this is what Max Weber has also imagined when he had asked himself if it is possible to reconcile experimental, realistic social theory constructed in a socially responsible way with sensitivity to:

“the effects of its own rationalism and to the problem of contributing to the further rationalization and disenchantment of the world”(Gane,2002,155-6)(13)

Rotterdam, June 10, 2003
Notes:

(1) Antonio Negri is a case in point. His critique of national identity is based on a Marxist interpretation of nationalism: “Behind the ideal dimension of the concept of nation there were the class figures that already dominated the process of accumulation. Nation was thus at once both the hypostasis of the Rousseauian general will and what manufacturing ideology conceived of as a community of needs (that is, the capitalist regulation of the market) that in the long era of primitive accumulation in Europe was more or less liberal and always bourgeois.(…) The process of constructing a nation, which renewed the concept of sovereignty and gave it a new definition, quickly became in each and every historical context an ideological nightmare.”(Hardt, Negri, 2000, 96-97)

(2) Once again, Negri notices that this process of accelerated identizing leaves some of the institutions behind, unable to follow and adapt. As a political theoretician, he selects a case of a political party, which cannot leave an organizational stage, because it “constructed itself on the basis of representation (or presented itself as a vanguard of the masses) and realized its institutional form. The political part is always constrained within that space of power that excludes the biopolitical determination, while on the contrary, we are speaking of a subject that is at once the product of the biopolitical and that generates the biopolitical. It is not political representation that can construct the common telos within the multitude, on the contrary, it can only be constructed by taking leave of representation and all the representative institutions in order to install itself in the new common temporalities.”(Negri, 2003, 260) On the other end of the ideological spectrum, two respected scholars from Harvard university, not particularly interested in rocking the socio-political boat, pursue the strategy of grounding collective action and identity in biological “drives” (to acquire, bond, learn and defend), which would basically limit organizational sciences to a new variant of social Darwinism, as the authors themselves seem to suggest, criticizing Putnam: “As impressive as Putnam’s findings are, we believe four-drive theory would offer an even better explanation of a community’s adaptive fitness. (…) Such a study would provide a clear way of validating four-drive theory at the community level of analysis. Notice that Putnam’s measures of social capital, as well as the ones we have outlined as indices for the four drives, could easily be extended upward to nation states as the unit of analysis, or downward to cities, towns and neighbourhoods.”(Lawrence, Nohria, 2002, 288-289)

(3) Melucci – though far less militant than Negri – shares with his incarcerated compatriot a certain emotional attachment to the ideals of the 1968 generation: “Keeping open the space for difference is a condition for inventing a present – for allowing society to openly address its fundamental dilemmas and for installing in its present
constituzione a manageable coexistence of its own tensions.” (Melucci, 1996, 10)

(4) “Climbing the organizational hierarchy is no longer like climbing stairs in a stable structure. The stairs have become rope ladders, with managers climbing desperately for balance. Organisation Man is changing into Spider Woman” (Johansen, Swigart, 1994, 8) To which, perhaps, a remark by Gergen on the protean self should be added. The person who zigzags through organizational networks like a spider woman is not reducible to a single self: “persons exist in a state of continuous construction and reconstruction: it is a world where anything goes that can be negotiated. Each reality of self gives way to a reflexive questioning, irony and ultimately the playful probing of yet another reality. The center fails to hold.” (Gergen, 1991, 71)

(5) “Individualism is not only an idea that collides with the material circumstances of an organization; it is a set of material circumstances. Conversely, organization is not only a set of material circumstances, it is also an idea. Whether we realize it or not, we carry around with us a philosophy of organization formed, like our individualism, from our cultural experiences. But while we have the term individualism to denote our philosophy of the individual, there is no comparable term to cover our philosophy of organizations. For now, the term organizationalism will have to serve. (…) The latter foregrounds the organization, and though it may involve substantial assumptions about the nature of the individual, it also encompasses issues of authority and legitimacy, efficiency and responsibility, and process and purposes that may fall outside the purview of individualism.” (Leinberger, Tucker, 1991, 12) In Leinberger’s and Tucker’s research – very much like in studies by Negri or Melucci, one clearly notices a very clear historical borderline of a generational experience of the 1968 student rebellion and its aftermath (which explains why a neoconservative and fundamentalist revival of the 1990ies failed to mobilize most of this generation).

(6) In fact, Leinberger and Tucker arrive at conclusions, which are not unlike the conclusions of Foucault or Negri about biopolitics and mischrophysics of power. “It is an individualism predicated not on the self, but on the person, while self connotes a phenomenon that is inner, non-physical and isolated, person suggests an entity that is external, physically present, and already connected to the world. In effect, it is the realization that authentic self is more of an oxymoron than is artificial person.(…) To these three historical modes of conformity (tradition-directed, inner-directed, outer-directed, as in Riesman – S.M.) we add a fourth; the subject directed.(…) The emotional control in this emerging character type is mourning (originating, in part, from the “death” of the authentic self). The source of the sanction of mourning is simultaneously the artificial systems to which the person is subjected and the person’s particular
subjectivity in which those systems intersect in unique ways. Thus the source of mourning is neither “inner” nor “outer”, neither “self” nor “other”, but arises as part of a more inclusive world in which such simple oppositions have little meaning. As we shall see, the subject directed character type is remarkably, even alarmingly, open-ended – like the culture he or she inhabits.” (op.cit., 17)

(7) Leinberger and Tucker quote Cleck in differentiating between a shift in the legitimising modes of authority over the past few hundred years: in a traditional society a source of authority and the meaning of political institutions were visible in the person of the king. In bureaucratic societies it was legible in all sorts of legal documents – laws, regulations, instructions and procedures. “However, with the emergence of the artificial person as the dominant social character among the organization offspring, the break with legibility is likely to be complete. To a much greater extent than ever before, they will no longer see the rational as unproblematically legible in self-evident laws or rules. Rather, they will attend to the discourses that surround those laws and rules, interpenetrate them, and render them ambiguous and almost instantly dated artefacts of never-ending play of power and signification. (…) Legitimacy, then, will be conceived not as legible and univocal, but as audible (even when written down) and equivocal. The notion of the audible should not, however, suggest the presence of some transcendent speaking voice. What is ‘heard’ is not some real or authentic voice, but various discourses intertwined in utterances or in documents.” (op.cit., 407)

(8) Dobbin mentions – among others - the following representatives of social sciences dealing with these matters: Meyer & Hannan, Hall, Zelizer, Granovetter, Latour, Lamont, Bloor, Knorr-Cetina, Perrow, Scott, DiMaggio, Powell, Zucker and Weick. He does not mention a growing research literature on social movements and social movement’s organizations, in which the problem of identity plays a fundamental role: “Collective identity refers to that identity or status that attaches to the individual by virtue of his or her participation in movement’s activities. One of the most powerful motivators of individual action is the desire to confirm through behaviour a cherished identity.” (Friedman, McAdam, 1992, 169). Moreover, the researchers also tackle the managerial problems of movementized identity: “The problem is theretofore how to reach a satisfactory balance between the number of people that a particular definition of identity can include, and the ability to talk to provide with appropriate incentives that section of the potential base of the movement which would in any case be the most willing to take action.” (Della Porta, Diani, 1999, 105)

(9) Latour is even more explicit in explaining why there should be no science wars between followers of different paradigms: “Neither of the two monstrous forms of inhumanity – the “mob down there”, the objective world ‘out there’ interests us very much. And thus we have
no need for a mind or brain-in-a-vat, that crippled despot constantly fearful of losing either “access” to the world or its “superior force” against other people. We long neither for the absolute certainty of a contact with the world, nor for the absolute certainty of a transcendent force against the unruly mob. We do not lack certainty, because we never dreamed of dominating the people. For us there is no inhumanity to be quashed with another inhumanity. Humans and nonhumans are enough for us. We do not need a social world to break the back of objective reality, not an objective reality to silence the mob. It is quite simple, even though it may sound incredible in these times of science wars: we are not at war.”(Latour, 1999, 15)

(10) Fuller points out that Kuhn, although claiming that paradigmatic shifts result from academic power struggles, never tried to encourage his students to analyze them, least of all in his home setting (he managed to get a tenure at Harvard against explicit will of his peers and only due to a strong support by James Bryant Conant, a former president of Harvard and a chief scientific administrator for the US atomic bomb project, who functioned as a manager of the interface between political power, business research funds and the academic community): “Kuhn observes that the institutionalisation of paradigms as university departments has often required the intervention of education ministries, commercial interests and professional bodies that somehow managed to exert leverage over the local academics. But beyond advising Ravetz to read some articles by a recent Princeton Ph.D. Kuhn offers no further insight into the role of the universities. Interestingly, that former Princeton doctoral student, R. Steven Turner, returned to the topic fifteen years later, arguing the flip side of the issue – that without a formal academic base, a paradigm that cuts against the grain of established disciplines will have its influence dissipated in the long term, as members of the paradigm’s network, lacking mechanism for reproducing their collective work, regress to the norms of their home disciplines. Turner’s finding is worth recalling in an era when universities are increasingly fixated on ‘knowledge management’ strategies that identify dynamism with flexible networks rather than autonomous institutions.”(Fuller, 2003, 141)

(11) “Kuhn sees the scientific community on the analogy of a religious community and sees science as scientist’s religion. If that is so, one can perhaps see why he elevates Normal Science above Extraordinary Science; for Extraordinary Science corresponds, on the religious side, to a period of crisis and schism, confusion and despair, to a spiritual catastrophe.”(John Watkins, cf. Fuller,2003,100) (10)

(12) Turner claims thus, true to his neopositivist social atomism: “it is clear that micro-to-meso-to-macro change occurs. Indeed, such would have to be the case since, ultimately, social structures are composed of strings of encounters.”(Turner, 2002, 249). But he adds quickly, tacitly accepting one of the basic assumptions of
managerialism that “we will generally learn more by examining top-down rather than bottom-up linkages among the three levels of reality” (ibid., 250)

(13) Gane quotes Karl Loewith, who wrote that: “the fundamental and entire theme of Weber’s investigations is the character of the reality surrounding us and into which we have been placed. The basic motif of his ‘scientific’ inquiry turns out to be the trend towards secularity. Weber summed up the particular problematic of this reality in his concept of ‘rationality’. He attempted to make intelligible this general process of the rationalization of our whole existence precisely because the rationality which emerges from this process is something specifically irrational and incomprehensible”. (cf. Gane, 2002,5) Then – for a good measure – he adds a quote from Brubaker, who warns that Weber’s “political writings are punctuated by passionate warnings about the threat posed by unchecked bureaucratic rationalization to human freedom” (ibid.) One cannot help thinking about multiple iron cages, in which bureaucratic rationalization attempts to imprison mankind forever (because of the shift towards instrumental reason, which has been institutionally embodied in an organizational form of a hierarchic bureaucracy), and about the Simmelian idea that human history is a sequence of both imprisonments and liberations, none of which appears to be the terminal one (but both of which succeed each other at an ever increasing speed). Both appear to repeat the business cycles of retail commerce, increasingly supported by symbolic communication ruled by the iron laws of fashion, which is just as well because in the present institutional order; “no longer far from the mad crowd, the university is built increasingly among shopping malls, and shopping malls amidst the university. It is no longer selling out: it has already been sold and bought. The deed has been written and signed, and the check already signed, too. But the deed has not been registered, and the check not cashed as yet. To right the situation, to null the transaction and be just to all on earth, we may have to relearn the sense of the world, the totality, that includes all peoples in every race, class and gender.” (Miyoshi, 2002,78) Miyoshi, who teaches literature in California, has also written a book on “The University in Globalization: Culture, Economy and Ecology”, which is forthcoming (Harvard university Press, 2003), but has not been available as of the present writing.

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