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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>Preface</b>	v
<b>PART A</b> <b>INTRODUCTION AND DEFINITIONS</b>	
<b>Chapter 1 – Introduction, aim of the thesis and research methods</b>	<b>3</b>
1.1. A variety of stars	3
1.2. Performances are business activities	3
1.3. Special taxing rules for artistes (Article 17 of the OECD Model Tax Convention)	6
1.4. Aim of the study and delimitation	9
1.5. Structure of the study and research methods	11
<b>Chapter 2 – History of non-resident artiste taxation</b>	<b>15</b>
2.1. Income taxation of non-residents	15
2.2. International double taxation	16
2.3. Double (and multilateral) tax treaties	17
2.4. Oldest tax treaties; income from the “practice of art”	19
2.5. The League of Nations: no special rules for artistes	21
2.6. The 1939 United States–Sweden tax treaty	24
2.7. The 1945 United States–United Kingdom tax treaty	26
2.8. US treaties with other countries in 1951	29
2.9. German tax treaties in the 1950s and 1960s	31
2.10. The 1963 OECD Model Tax Convention; introduction of Article 17	33
2.11. The object and purpose of Article 17(2) in 1977	36
2.12. Reversal in the 1987 OECD Report	40
2.12.1. Mistrust, tax avoidance schemes	40
2.12.2. Equal treatment as principle, but still expanding the deviating treatment	41
2.12.3. Gross taxation, no deduction of expenses, appropriate tax rate	42
2.12.4. Tentative conclusions, suggested improvements	43
2.13. Implementation in the Commentary to the 1992 OECD Model	44
2.14. The limited approach in the 1996 US Model	46
2.14.1. Article 17 for artistes and sportsmen	46

## Table of contents

---

2.14.2.	The <i>de minimis</i> rule in Article 17(1)	47
2.14.3.	The limited approach in Paragraph 2	49
2.14.4.	Extensive use in the various US tax treaties	50
2.15.	Discussion after the 1987-1992 changes	51
2.15.1.	Publications in the early years after the 1992 implementation	51
2.15.2.	Book by Daniel Sandler and IFA Congress in 1995	51
2.15.3.	Rijkele Betten and Marco Lombardi on triangular situations in 1997	53
2.15.4.	Harald Grams on the German artistes tax rules in 1999	53
2.15.5.	Decision by the Tax Court of Canada	53
2.15.6.	General criticism of Article 17	54
2.15.7.	Taxation of payments to “star companies” in Spain	55
2.15.8.	Taxation of non-resident artistes’ income in Finland	55
2.15.9.	2001 IFA Congress in San Francisco	56
2.15.10.	Obstacles for international performing artistes	57
2.15.11.	Jörg Holthaus in Germany	58
2.15.12.	Rent-a-star – the object and purpose of Article 17(2)	58
2.15.13.	The <i>Arnoud Gerritse</i> decision by the European Court of Justice	59
2.15.14.	Limited approach of Article 17(2) in Sweden	61
2.15.15.	Angel Juárez, LLM in Leiden in 2003	61
2.15.16.	Further publications	62
2.16.	General discussion and conclusions	62
<b>Chapter 3 – Who is an artiste?</b>		<b>65</b>
3.1.	Various publications, different views, Article 3(2) of the OECD Model	65
3.2.	The meaning of the words “artiste” and “entertainer”	67
3.3.	First description in the 1939 United States–Sweden tax treaty	69
3.4.	Second description in German tax treaties in 1950s and 1960s	69
3.5.	Clearer description in the 1963 OECD Draft Model Treaty	71

3.6.	Minor adjustments in the 1977 OECD Model Tax Convention	72
3.7.	More description of the “artiste” in the 1987 OECD report	73
3.8.	Continuation in the 1992 OECD Commentary	75
3.9.	Little help in the wording in the 1996 US Model Tax Convention	76
3.10.	Klaus Vogel on double taxation conventions	77
3.11.	Daniel Sandler and IFA Seminar in 1995	79
3.12.	Articles and court cases in various countries	81
3.12.1.	Germany	81
3.12.2.	Austria	83
3.12.3.	Canada	85
3.12.4.	United Kingdom	86
3.12.5.	United States	87
3.12.6.	Netherlands	88
3.12.7.	Belgium	90
3.12.8.	Australia	90
3.13.	General definition of “who is an artiste”; list of examples	91
3.14.	General discussion and conclusions	93
 <b>Chapter 4 – What is performance income?</b>		 95
4.1.	Different types of (performance) income	95
4.2.	The Commentary on Article 17 of the OECD Model and the 1987 OECD Report	96
4.3.	Practical implications for different types of performance income	99
4.3.1.	List of examples	99
4.3.2.	Performance fee versus rehearsal fee	99
4.3.3.	Production expenses for a performance	100
4.3.4.	Inducement payments, options, retainers and restrictive covenants	102
4.3.5.	Cancellation fees and insurance cover	103
4.3.6.	Advertising and commercials	104
4.3.7.	Sponsorship	104
4.3.8.	Endorsement by suppliers of equipment	105
4.3.9.	Subsidies	107
4.3.10.	Royalties for record or movie sales	108
4.3.11.	Tour support from record companies	110
4.3.12.	Publishing copyright	111

## Table of contents

---

4.3.13.	Neighbouring rights	111
4.3.14.	Sales of merchandising	112
4.3.15.	Pensions and other insurance benefits	113
4.4.	The “territoriality” principle	115
4.5.	General discussion and conclusions	117

### PART B

#### PRESENT INTERNATIONAL SITUATION – BILATERAL TREATIES

<b>Chapter 5 – Tax treaties: allocation with Article 17</b>	<b>121</b>	
5.1.	Allocation according to Article 17(1) and (2)	121
5.2.	No special artiste clause in tax treaties	124
5.3.	Limitation to only business activities, exceptions for artistes/employees	126
5.4.	The use of Article 17(2) and its limitations	128
5.5.	The additional Article 17(3)	130
5.5.1.	Exception in the Commentary	130
5.5.2.	More frequent use than expected	131
5.5.3.	Germany: example of a country using Article 17(3) in tax treaty practice	133
5.5.4.	Variations in the content of Article 17(3)	135
5.5.5.	Undefined conditions	136
5.5.6.	Defending the state’s budget?	138
5.5.7.	Chances of unequal treatment	138
5.6.	Two examples of country’s tax treaties: the United States and the Netherlands	139
5.6.1.	Variations in tax treaty policy	139
5.6.2.	Tax treaties: United States	139
5.6.3.	Tax treaties: Netherlands	142
5.7.	Triangular situations	146
5.7.1.	Resident in different countries	146
5.7.2.	Decision in the Netherlands in 1983	146
5.7.3.	Article by Rijkele Betten and Marco Lombardi in 1997	148
5.7.4.	Change in the 2000 OECD Commentary	150
5.7.5.	Double taxation problems in triangular situations	151
5.7.6.	Pension benefits	152

5.7.7.	Reference to Article 1 of the OECD Model Tax Convention	152
5.8.	General discussion and conclusions	153
<b>Chapter 6 – Non-resident artiste tax rules in performance countries</b>		155
6.1.	Similarities and differences	155
6.2.	Survey of the non-resident artiste tax rules in performance countries	156
6.3.	Almost complete coverage	158
6.4.	The deduction of expenses	159
6.5.	The (withholding) tax rate	162
6.6.	Income tax return after the taxable year	163
6.7.	Concurrent taxation, other charges or levies	165
6.8.	Unilateral exemptions	167
6.9.	General discussion and conclusions	169
<b>Chapter 7 – Elimination of double taxation</b>		171
7.1.	Exemption or credit: history in general	171
7.2.	Explanation of tax exemption and tax credit methods	174
7.2.1.	Two different systems, with two variations	174
7.2.2.	Full exemption	175
7.2.3.	Exemption with progression	175
7.2.4.	Full credit	175
7.2.5.	Ordinary credit	176
7.2.6.	Summary of the figures	176
7.2.7.	Conclusions from example; recommendations in Article 23 of the OECD Model	177
7.2.8.	Differences in taxable income	179
7.3.	Recommended relief of double taxation under Article 17	179
7.3.1.	No recommendation in 1963, introduction in 1977	179
7.3.2.	Example: the Netherlands	181
7.3.3.	Exceptions in other countries	184
7.3.4.	Clearer position in the OECD Model Tax Convention?	184
7.4.	Basket/overall method versus per-country method	185
7.5.	Tax credit problems	187
7.5.1.	Tax exemption method is easier to apply	187

## Table of contents

---

7.5.2.	Tax certificate	187
7.5.3.	Qualification of foreign tax	187
7.5.4.	Final and compulsory payments	189
7.5.5.	The person of the artiste	189
7.5.6.	Triangular situations	191
7.5.7.	Net deals: transfer of the tax burden to the organizer	192
7.5.8.	Differences in taxable base	192
7.5.9.	Year of tax credit (or exemption)	192
7.5.10.	Creditable domestic tax in the residence country	193
7.5.11.	Complexity of the system of foreign tax credits	193
7.6.	Excess tax credits	195
7.7.	Deduction of foreign tax as an operating expense	195
7.8.	General discussion and conclusions	196
<b>Chapter 8 – The deduction of (production) expenses</b>		<b>199</b>
8.1.	Expenses seem to be difficult	199
8.2.	Non-deductibility of expenses for non-resident artistes in most countries	199
8.3.	The amount of expenses	201
8.3.1.	Survey in the Netherlands	201
8.3.2.	More information about the earnings	202
8.3.3.	Expenses in the database	204
8.3.4.	Total earnings and expenses period 2001-2003	205
8.3.5.	Confirmation with survey of the Dutch tax authorities over 2002	206
8.3.6.	Specified earnings and expenses for the year 2003	207
8.3.6.1.	Figures for 2003, explanation of the two graphs	207
8.3.6.2.	First graph: variance of percentage of production expenses	208
8.3.6.3.	Second graph: number of applications, brackets of expenses	209
8.3.6.4.	Conclusions from the figures and the graphs	209
8.3.6.5.	Information about individual performances	210

8.3.6.6.	“Happy few”	211
8.3.6.7.	“Well-established professionals”	213
8.3.6.8.	“Artistes struggling for recognition”	215
8.4.	Why do artistes incur such high expenses?	216
8.4.1.	Variation in expenses	216
8.4.2.	Connection between expenses and royalties	218
8.5.	Special rules and exclusions for amateurs	220
8.6.	General discussion and conclusions	224
 <b>Chapter 9 – Examples of international excessive taxation</b>		 227
9.1.	Excessive taxation can occur	227
9.2.	Eight examples, divided into three groups	228
9.2.1.	Explanation of the examples	228
9.2.2.	Three individual examples	229
9.2.3.	Four examples, following Paragraph 11 of the OECD Commentary	232
9.2.4.	One extra example: no source tax in the country of performance	237
9.3.	Results from these examples	238
9.3.1.	Too heavy taxation in the country of performance	238
9.3.2.	The reversal in the 1992 Commentary hits the wrong target	238
9.3.3.	Small risk of undertaxation or even double non-taxation	239
9.3.4.	Excessive taxation can turn into double taxation	240
9.4.	General discussion and conclusions	241
 <b>Chapter 10 – Tax revenue and administrative burden</b>		 243
10.1.	Size of the contribution to a state’s budget	243
10.2.	Calculation of the tax revenue in the Netherlands	243
10.2.1.	Two reliable sources	243
10.2.2.	Extrapolation of the Dutch study on expenses	244
10.2.3.	Evaluation of the Dutch artiste and sportsman tax system	245
10.2.4.	Conclusions for the Netherlands	245
10.3.	Tax revenue in other source countries	246
10.3.1.	Figures from three countries	246
10.3.2.	United Kingdom	246

## Table of contents

---

10.3.3.	Australia	247
10.3.4.	New Zealand	247
10.4.	A weighted average of tax revenue for the four countries	248
10.5.	Tax credits or tax exemption in the residence country	249
10.6.	Administrative burden	250
10.7.	General discussion and conclusions	251

### PART C

#### PRESENT SITUATION WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION

<b>Chapter 11 – Unequal treatment in the European Community</b>	<b>257</b>	
11.1.	Market integration in the European Community	257
11.2.	Obstacles for international performing artistes within the Community	260
11.3.	The role of the European Court of Justice	261
11.4.	The <i>Arnoud Gerritse</i> decision (C-234/01)	262
11.4.1.	First case about artiste taxation	262
11.4.2.	The facts and the preliminary question	262
11.4.3.	Discussion while the case was pending	263
11.4.4.	Decision by the ECJ, after conclusion of the Advocate-General Léger	265
11.4.5.	Reactions and changes after the decision	267
11.4.6.	Ambiguity following from the second answer	269
11.5.	New cases pending before the European Court of Justice	270
11.6.	<i>FKP Scorpio Konzertproduktion GmbH</i> (C-290/04)	271
11.6.1.	The facts of the case and the preliminary questions	271
11.6.2.	Discussion and action while the case is pending	275
11.6.3.	Official reaction from the German authorities	275
11.6.4.	Reactions by the European Commission and some Member States	276
11.6.5.	Oral hearing	277
11.7.	<i>Centro Equestre da Leziria Grande Lda</i> (C-345/04)	277
11.7.1.	The facts of the case and the preliminary question	277
11.7.2.	Administrative obstacles	280



11.7.3.	Changes by the German tax authorities in November 2003	282
11.7.4.	Comparison with transfer pricing and allocation of head office expenses	282
11.7.5.	Comparison with other ECJ decisions	283
11.8.	Solutions through permanent establishment(s)?	283
11.9.	Can gross taxation of non-resident artistes be a (forbidden) VAT?	284
11.10.	Actions in the cultural field	288
11.11.	General discussion and conclusions	289
 <b>Chapter 12 – Conflicts between OECD Model and EC Treaty</b>		 293
12.1.	Community law supersedes treaty law, unless it provides otherwise	293
12.2.	The (non-)deductibility of expenses and the position of the Commentary	295
12.3.	Interpretation of Article 17(2): limited or unlimited approach	298
12.4.	Exemptions from corporation tax ( <i>Stauffer – C-386/04</i> )	300
12.5.	Unequal treatment following from Article 17(3)	302
12.6.	Deviating treaty provisions and most-favoured-nation treatment	304
12.7.	Is Article 17 of the OECD Model permissible under Community law?	309
12.8.	European law and the tax credit problems in the country of residence	310
12.8.1.	The limitation of the ordinary tax credit	310
12.8.2.	Tax credit problems	312
12.8.3.	Mutual assistance, exchange of information	313
12.8.4.	Developments towards a full tax credit in the European Union	316
12.9.	General discussion and conclusions	318
PART D		
DISCUSSION OF THE PRESENT SITUATION		
 <b>Chapter 13 – Discussion and conclusions after the study</b>		 325
13.1.	End of the study	325
13.2.	Conclusions based on the nine criteria defined in 1.4.	325

## Table of contents

---

13.3.	Considerations of tax avoidance and non-compliance	331
13.4.	Awareness at the OECD in 1987, but lack of action since then	333
13.5.	Conclusions	334

## PART E FUTURE

### **Chapter 14 – How to improve Article 17 of the OECD Model** 339

14.1.	Problems with international artiste taxation need solutions	339
14.2.	Reintroduction of the limited approach for Article 17(2)	339
14.3.	Change in Paragraph 10 of the Commentary	340
14.4.	Normal income (or corporation) tax returns	342
14.5.	Special provisions for small artistes (the <i>de minimis</i> rule)	342
14.6.	Restrict Article 17 to business activities, exempt employees	344
14.7.	Exemption for equivalent part of fixed salaries	346
14.8.	Addition of Article 17(3) to the official text of Article 17	347
14.9.	Change to tax exemption or full credit would give a better balance	348
14.10.	Conclusions	349

### **Chapter 15 – Can Article 17 of the OECD Model radically be changed?** 353

15.1.	Is more possible than just modifications?	353
15.2.	A radical change may be considered	353
15.2.1.	Turnaround of Article 17 of the OECD Model	353
15.2.2.	Still counteracting tax avoidance behaviour	355
15.2.3.	Exchange of information and compliance	355
15.3.	Comparison with the nine criteria from the aim of the thesis	356
15.4.	Conclusions	359

PART F  
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

<b>Chapter 16 – Summary and conclusions</b>	365
16.1. Introduction and definitions	365
16.2. Present situation – bilateral treaties	367
16.3. Present situation within the European Union	372
16.4. Conclusions for the present situation	375
16.5. Future	377
<b>Chapter 17 – Summary and conclusions in Dutch</b>	381
17.1. Introductie en definities	381
17.2. Huidige situatie – bilaterale belastingverdragen	383
17.3. Huidige situatie binnen de Europese Unie	387
17.4. Conclusies voor de huidige situatie	389
17.5. Toekomst	391
<b>Bibliography</b>	395
<b>Legislation and case law</b>	409



## **PART A**

### **INTRODUCTION AND DEFINITIONS**

