The evolution of Tibetan representation and preferentiality in public employment during the Post-fenpei period in China: Insights from new data sources

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Table of Contents

Abstract 4
Keywords 4
List of Tables 5
List of Figures 5
Acknowledgements 5
Introduction 6

1 OVERVIEW OF THE URBAN EMPLOYMENT SITUATION IN TIBET 12
  1.1 Clarifying urban employment categories in China 13
  1.2 Urban employment polarisation in Tibet 15
  1.3 Structural changes in urban employment over time, TAR 19
  1.4 Graduate employment in the Tibetan areas outside the TAR 23
  1.5 Graduate and recruitment surges since 2010, TAR 26

2 DATA SOURCES AND RECRUITMENT PROCESSES 29
  2.1 Availability of Recruitment Outcomes 31
  2.2 Categories of Public Employment 32
  2.3 The Recruitment Process 34
  2.4 Types of Tibetan-medium Employments 36
  2.5 Data analysis and challenges 37

3 EVALUATING PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RECRUITMENT OUTCOMES AND TIBETAN REPRESENTATION 39
  3.1 Recruitment outcomes versus advertisements 44

4 RECRUITMENT ADVERTISEMENTS: PREFERENTIALITY BY TIBETAN LANGUAGE REQUIREMENTS 46
  4.1 Comparative Analysis 51

5 RECRUITMENT ADVERTISEMENTS: PREFERENTIALITY BY RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS 58
  5.1 Post-fenpei residency requirements in the TAR 58
  5.2 Residency requirements from the advertisement data 60

6 CONCLUSION 64

REFERENCES 67

APPENDIX: DATA SOURCES 68
Abstract

This paper exploits a new and exciting source of data on public employment recruitment in order to analyse the evolution of Tibetan representation and preferential hiring practices in public employment in all Tibetan areas from 2007 to 2015. Despite the limitations of these data, they provide a far more substantiated understanding of recent conditions than currently exists in the literature, even in the Chinese literature. Several major insights can be made from scrutinizing these data. First, following the retrenchment in public employment in the early 2000s and then the ending of the job placement system (Ch. fenpei), there was a strong increase in public employment recruitment from 2011 onwards. Second, Tibetan representation within the recruitment did not collapse, although it lagged significantly; within our sample of outcome documents, Tibetans were underrepresented in the recruitments across all Tibetan areas from 2007 to 2015, without any apparent regional or temporal patterns, at an average of 83 percent of what would be parity with their population share. More information is also needed on the ethnic composition of people exiting from public employment in order to have a more holistic evaluation of the evolution of Tibetan representation. Nonetheless, despite underrepresentation, new recruitment from 2011 onwards employed a much larger share of the university-aged population than during the late fenpei period, thereby reasserting the role of the state as predominant employment provider for educated Tibetan millennials.

Practices of preferentiality appear to significantly bolster representation, although they exhibited distinct temporal and regional variations. Language or Tibetan-medium degree type requirements were generally on the decline (especially in the TAR and Gannan, where their use became very marginal), with the exception of the Amdo region in Qinghai. Conversely, the use of residency requirements across all Tibetan regions has emerged as a significant form of practicing preferentiality in public employment, especially in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), where all public sector recruitments specify local ‘origin’ (Ch. shengyuan) since at least 2007. The TAR also reintroduced employment guarantees for all local university graduates in 2011, in what we call the innovation of a neo-fenpei system. The decline in the use of linguistic requirements suggests the continuation and entrenchment of assimilationist trends in education and employment policies, and a lack of priority for Tibetan medium education more generally (with the exception of the Amdo region in Qinghai). However, the stable and in some cases increasing use of residency requirements, especially in civil service positions suggests a trend of local level protectionism in public employment, probably led by local governments.

Keywords

Tibet; China; public employment recruitment and reforms; ethnic representation; preferentiality and positive discrimination; language
List of Tables

Table 1: Urban employment composition, selected provinces, 2010/2012 16
Table 2: Summary of recruitment outcomes from 24 documents 41
Table 3a: TAR recruitment advertisements 47
Table 3b: Ganzi TAP recruitment advertisements 48
Table 3c: Aba TQAP recruitment advertisements 49
Table 3d: Amdo Qinghai recruitment advertisements 49
Table 3e: Yushu TAP recruitment advertisements 51
Table 3f: Gannan TAP recruitment advertisements 51
Table 4: Residency requirements for prefecture and lower levels in the recruitment advertisements as shares of all job postings 61
Table 5: Share of Tibetans hired (or interviewed) for positions without Tibetan-medium requirements, by residency requirement 63

List of Figures

Figure 1: Urban employment, TAR, 1993-2014 20
Figure 2: Staff and Worker Employment, TAR, 1980-2014 22
Figure 3: Graduate employment by type of work unit or other, 2013-2015 24
Figure 4: TAR graduates, public employment recruitment, and changes in state-owned unit staff and worker employment 27
Figure 5: Tibetan share of outcomes versus Tibetan-medium share of advertisements 45
Figure 6: All advertised public recruitment per 100,000 people 52
Figure 7: All advertised public recruitment, all Tibetan Regions, 2011-15 54
Figure 8: Regional representativity ratios, all advertised Tibetan-medium 55
Figure 9: Representativity ratios, by Tibetan-medium type (2011-15) 56
Figure 10: Job categories by Tibetan-medium type (2011-15) 57
Figure 11: Representativity ratios of Tibetan-medium adverts, by region 57
Figure 12: Representativity ratio of advertised civil and public service positions with Tibetan medium requirements (cumulative 2011-15) 58
Figure 13: Residency requirement shares, all regions excl. TAR, by public employment category 62

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The evolution of Tibetan representation and preferentiality in public employment during the Post-fenpei period in China: insights from new data sources

Graduate employment is a heated politicized issue in the Tibetan areas of China. It is also a heated issue elsewhere in China, although it carries extra weight in the Tibetan areas given the severe disadvantages that Tibetans face in competing for employment in Tibetan towns and cities, where Han Chinese migrants to Tibetan areas are mostly concentrated. In particular, the types of urban employment that are deemed appropriate for university graduates tend to be dominated by Han Chinese, or else biased towards those who possess stronger Chinese language skills (and related cultural aptitudes). Hence, even Tibetans with tertiary levels of education face considerable disadvantages in the jobs that they target given their linguistic disadvantages in job competitions, and these linguistic biases in turn undermine efforts of linguistic preservation in higher education. The fact that tertiary graduates are also among the most political active of their society does not assuage the sensitivity of these issues in Tibetan areas.

Pressure has been mounting since the early 2000s in particular because of two contradictory dynamics: rising schooling attainments among Tibetans, especially in tertiary education, in contrast to the phasing out of the job assignment system (fenpei) from the late 1990s onwards. With regard to the former, rising schooling attainments have shifted the employment aspirations of an increasing share of young Tibetans away from fields and pastures, and towards the booming towns and cities that have been integral to development strategies in these regions, even more so than in other parts of China given the relative paucity of off-farm rural employment opportunities, as analysed by Fischer (2005, 2011, 2014). Moreover, the rapid increase in schooling attainments has been facilitated outside the TAR by an even more rapid expansion of Tibetan-medium education in both breadth and depth, as analysed in detail by Zenz (2013). This has accentuated demands for preferential employment practices because, in the absence of preferentiality, the non-Tibetan employers who dominate the urban economies of Tibet do not value Tibetan-medium education.

A further unique dilemma of the urban employment system in Tibetan areas is the extremely limited supply of formal and secure non-state (or private corporate) employment that would correspond to the levels of schooling and the associated employment expectations of tertiary graduates. This lack of gradation in local urban employment results in an all-or-nothing scenario facing Tibetan graduates, given that the only significant alternative to public employment is the option of insecure, lower status and lower wage forms of private enterprise employment or self-employment. Moreover, minorities such as Tibetans are more prone to face discrimination in the private than in the public sector, for instances as aptly shown in an analysis of callback rates for
online job postings by Maurer-Fazio (2012). The employment expectations of
tertiary graduates are therefore heavily focused on the state sector (and public
employment more specifically, rather than state-owned enterprise
employment), much more so than in China’s Han-dominated regions. Indeed,
Démurger (2015:29) similarly finds a much higher dependence on state-owned
unit employment among minorities with similar characteristics to Tibetans
(such as Khazaks) than the Han, based on national urban employment data
(also cf. Wu and Song, 2013). The silver lining is that it is much easier to
enforce preferentiality within the public sector than in the private corporate
sector, where appeals for efficiency tend to trump demands for equity. Indeed,
both Fischer (2005; 2009; 2014) and Zenz (2013) have identified the nexus
between tertiary schooling and public employment as crucial in supporting or
undermining Tibetan education and the development of Tibetan-medium
schooling in particular.

With regard to the erstwhile fenpei or job assignment system, this legacy
from the collective and early reform eras effectively served as an implicit
preferential employment policy in minority areas given that it guaranteed
employment to secondary vocational and university graduates. It thereby
allowed for several generations of a small but growing cohort of university
educated Tibetans to embed themselves within various state institutions. As
discussed by Zenz (2013), it also supported Tibetan-medium schooling given
that employment was guaranteed to graduates regardless of the language
medium or the degree type of their studies. Although the preferentiality was
implicit, the fenpei system was arguably the most important form of positive
discrimination practiced in Tibetan areas given that it actually guaranteed
outcomes in coveted public employment.

However, this system was phased out precisely at a time when the rapid
urbanization of an increasingly schooled Tibetan labour force was taking off,
thereby exacerbating the disadvantages and insecurities perceived and
experienced by Tibetans within these parallel transitions. The end of fenpei was
part of the broader state-sector employment reforms that started in eastern
China earlier in the 1990s and reached the Tibetan areas from the late 1990s
onwards. The precise timing depends on the province or even the locality or
sector within a province. In most regions of Qinghai province, fenpei was
phased out around 2001-02, although some prefectures abolished it in the late
1990s (Zenz, 2013: 132; also see Fischer, 2005, 2009, 2014). In Gansu, it
continued to some extent until the mid-2000s. The reforms started to be
implemented in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) in 2006, with full
implementation applied to all graduates from 2007 onwards, which was the
latest of all provinces. The end of fenpei was compounded by the more general

1 She found that applicants with Tibetan names were less than half as likely to receive a
callback than those with Han names, but that state firms were much more likely to render
equal treatment to applicants with minority names than private firms.

2 For instance, see 西藏成最后一个告别大学生计划分配的省份 (xizang cheng
zuihou yige gaobie daxuesheng biyesheng jihua fenpei de shengfen, tr. ‘The TAR accomplishes
its final farewell to the provincial graduate student’s job assignment system’, Xinhua, Nov 27,
accessed on 5 January 2016).
restructuring and restricting of state-sector employment in 1990s and 2000s (which again started earlier and went deeper in eastern China than in the Tibetan areas). As a result, one of the most substantive pillars of positive discrimination in Tibetan areas was removed precisely at a time when demands for preferentiality were increasing.

Nevertheless, preferential employment practices outlived the job assignment system through a variety of innovations. Indeed, some older practices survived the public employment reforms such as the preferential points system in job competitions, whereby minorities are given extra points on their exams for job competitions, or else lower point thresholds for qualifying in these exams. One innovation has been the practice of specifying language or even Tibetan-medium degree qualifications in public employment recruitments, which is technically permitted under the minority nationality laws of China and effectively offers a strong competitive advantage to Tibetans competing for such positions. The other innovation is the specification of local residency requirements in job recruitments, although this does not necessarily preclude non-Tibetans residing in Tibetan areas. The extent to which Tibetans are hired in Tibetan areas is usually greater than the number of posts with these specifications, insofar as Tibetans might make up the bulk of more general hiring as well. This is particularly the case in remote areas that are populated by large Tibetan majorities and where local preferentiality might also be practiced informally, such as through clientelism or nepotism, as analysed by Zenz (2013: chapter five). Institutional or structural inertia also tends to benefit locals in job recruitments, such as the remoteness of many Tibetan areas, which makes them undesirable for non-local applicants. Nonetheless, at the formal level, language, degree-type, or residency specifications are currently the most decisive means of practicing preferentiality in public employment. Language or degree-type specifications also have the additional feedback effect of supporting the development of Tibetan-medium education.

The problem is that we have had very little if any rigorous or systematic information on the extent of these post-fenpei practices or outcomes in Tibetan areas. In effect, the phasing out of the fenpei led to a period of ambiguity and uncertainty in the public employment systems in Tibetan areas. A strong assimilationist policy orientation appeared to be ascendant, which was buffered by a growing critique of minority nationality policy in China by the likes of Ma (2007) and others. As argued by Fischer (2009, 2012, 2014), this perception contributed to the political resentment that fuelled widespread protests throughout Tibetan areas inside and outside the TAR in 2008 and after. However, beyond this perception and the sporadic insights that substantiate it, we have had very little evidence with which to evaluate the actual situation. Indeed, the scholarship on minority nationality policy (e.g. see Leibold, 2013) has been mostly focused at the level of national politics and legality, whereas actual practices of preferentiality have evolved from the ground up with a strong degree of local specificity (albeit, obviously with a degree of central-level approbation, particularly concerning any policy development in the TAR).

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3 See the survey of these debates in China by Leibold (2013).
The main impediment is the lack of public employment data disaggregated according to nationality (minzu) status, which have been non-existent in publically available statistical sources since the early 2000s. The TAR did provide staff and worker data disaggregated by Tibetans and non-Tibetans up until 2003, up to the 2004 Tibet Statistical Yearbook (TSY 2004), although similar disaggregations are not publically available for other provinces containing Tibetan areas. According to these data, Fischer (2005: 115) observed a reduction of Tibetans in state-sector staff and worker employment in the TAR in 2002 and 2003, in both number and share. In particular, the Tibetan share of cadre employment fell sharply to just below 50 percent in 2003, which was the lowest level it had reached since 1980. Since that time, only anecdotal evidence or else indirect statistical extrapolations exist to suggest that the trends might have continued in the TAR through the 2000s, and possibly in other Tibetan areas as well (for some extrapolations, see Fischer, 2014: 234-35).

On the other hand, more recent policy developments appear to have changed the situation dramatically since the 2008 protests. Most notable is the major policy change for the TAR launched at the 8th Party Congress in November 2011, when the new TAR Party Secretary Chen Quanguo announced the aim of achieving ‘full employment’ (Ch. guan jiuye) for all tertiary graduates who are TAR residents. This new policy thereby effectively reintroduced a form of job guarantee scheme, or what might be called a neo-fenpei system. The policy was still in force as of 2015, and the TAR government claimed to have achieved four consecutive years of full employment for TAR resident tertiary graduates (from 2011 to 2014). To the best of our knowledge, such momentous policy developments have not been registered at all in the social science scholarship on Tibet, in particular outside of China.

As a means to overcome some of these data limitations, this paper exploits a new and exciting data source on public employment recruitment. The data first became available online in 2007 for the TAR, and for the civil service of Qinghai and of Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP) in Sichuan, and they have become widely available throughout Tibetan areas since 2010, based on an increasingly comprehensive publication of recruitment advertisements by government institutions. In particular, the data contain specifications such as minority language capabilities, and degree and/or residency requirements. The actual recruitment outcomes (or else intermediate shortlists of candidates) have also been published, although these data are often less comprehensive and less

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4 As analyzed in Fischer (2013), the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region yearbooks also provided a disaggregation of staff and worker employment by minority (Uyghurs, Kazaks and Hui) and non-minority (Han) minzu status up until XSY (2003), for data up to 2002.


6 See 西藏籍应届高校毕业生连续4年全就业(xizangji yingjie gaoxiao biyesheng lianxu 4 nian quanjiuye, tr. This year’s TAR resident higher education graduates with full employment for the fourth consecutive year), People’s Network, March 7, 2015, http://society.people.com.cn/n/2015/0307/c136657-2665444.html
consistently disseminated, even though some of the outcome documents are highly detailed. This practice of publishing recruitment advertisements and outcomes appears to be part of a wider effort to combat corruption in public recruitment processes by providing transparency given that such corruption has been an important source of minority (and Han) discontent.7

These data offer a unique opportunity to explore the evolution of formal practices of preferentiality in recruitment and, in some cases, to assess the extent of ethnic representation in the outcomes of these job recruitments in terms of the minzu identity of those hired (for both preferential and non-preferential jobs). Obviously, as recruitment data, these only offer indications of inflow rather than stock or outflow variables, that is, the extent to which additions to employment have been preferential or have resulted in Tibetan employment, rather than the extent of ethnic representation in existing employment. Even though the bulk of existing public employees would have been hired in the earlier job assignment system era and hence it might be plausible to assume a substantial share of Tibetan employment in Tibetan areas, this situation cannot be presumed to have persisted into the mid-2000s given the substantial retrenchment and restructuring of state-sector employment in the early 2000s, as mentioned above in the case of the TAR. A full appraisal of net changes in employment would also require some information on attrition, that is, retirements, lay-offs, or transfers (indeed, a substantial share of new state-sector employment in the TAR appears to be filled by channels other than these local recruitments). Nonetheless, the new data provide valuable insights that can be triangulated with more macro sources of employment data to provide a far more substantiated understanding of current conditions and practices than currently exists in the literature, even in the Chinese literature.

Several major insights can be made from scrutinizing these data. Most importantly, despite almost a decade of ambiguity and uncertainty in the public employment systems of the Tibetan areas due to retrenchment and the ending of fenpei, Tibetan representation within public recruitment did not collapse, although it lagged significantly, in tandem with strong increases in overall public employment from 2011 onwards. Within our sample of outcome documents that indicate ethnicity, Tibetans were underrepresented across all Tibetan areas from 2007 to 2015, without much apparent regional or temporal variation, at an average of 83 percent of what would be parity with their population share. This underrepresentation is significant enough to result in a chronic erosion of representation overtime and does not address historical underrepresentation, although more information is also needed on the ethnic composition of people exiting from public employment, such as through retirements or transfers to other provinces, in order to have a more holistic evaluation of the evolution of Tibetan representation. For instance, transfers out of the province are likely to be disproportionately non-Tibetan and hence compensating for the underrepresentation in recruitments. Moreover,

7 This insight has been suggested through discussions with various Tibetan and Chinese scholars and is implied by the level of detail offered by some of the documents. The problem of corruption, e.g. bribery, in public recruitment is discussed in Zenz (2013, chapter 5). Also see Hillman (2014).
following the surge in public employment, particularly in the TAR, new recruitment has employed a much larger share of the university-aged population than during the late job assignment period, thereby reasserting the role of the state as predominant employment provider for educated Tibetan millennials, after a period in which this role appeared to be waning under the force of retrenchment and marketising reforms.

While practices of preferentiality appear to significantly bolster this representation, they exhibit distinct temporal and regional variations. According to the recruitment data we have been able to analyse, language or Tibetan-medium degree type requirements in the TAR and in Gannan TAP in Gansu became very marginal, reflecting a very specialised niche role in the use of such specifications. The same requirements played a large role in Ganzi TAP in Sichuan, although this role diminished up to 2015, whereas their use in the Amdo region of Qinghai increased over this period. The trends in Yushu have been unclear (Dechen/Deqin TAP in Yunnan was not analysed). Overall, these linguistic specifications appear to have been largely in bilingual rather than Tibetan-medium degree requirements, and also concentrated in teaching positions, although this depends on the region and year. In contrast, the use of residency requirements across all Tibetan regions has emerged as the dominant form of practicing preferentiality or protecting jobs for locals in public employment. In the TAR, the transition from a *fenpei* system to a system of local residency requirements appears to have been seamless, given that all public sector recruitments from 2007 onwards specify local ‘origin’ (Ch. *shengyuan*), as a form of residency. The use of local residency requirements outside the TAR also became more prominent in Yushu from 2009 onwards and then in all other regions from about 2012-13 onwards.

The decline in the use of language and Tibetan-medium degree requirements suggests the continuation and entrenchment of assimilationist trends in education and employment policies, and a lack of priority for Tibetan medium education more generally (with the exception of the Amdo region in Qinghai). However, the increasing use of residency requirements, particularly in the civil service, suggests a trend of local level protectionism in public employment, probably led by local governments. This new development holds both promise as well as complications, the latter in relation to the labour mobility of university educated Tibetans across the Tibetan areas in China at a time when there has been a glut of qualified Tibetan candidates, as a result of surging university intakes in the 2000s.

These insights and their implications are discussed in the following five sections. The first provides an overview of the urban employment situation in the Tibetan areas, with a particular focus on the TAR where data are most complete, supplemented by data from other Tibetan areas where available, in order to illustrate the strong degree of similarity across regions despite different institutional/governance contexts. Second, the data sources, employment categories, and recruitment processes are presented, along with

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8 Dechen/Deqin TAR was excluded given the poor quality of the published public recruitment data. In any case, the small population weight of this prefecture would have little effect on the broader results presented in this paper.
the methods used in their analysis. Third, the recruitment outcomes are discussed, in terms of what can be gleaned from the patchy outcome data. The more comprehensive recruitment advertisement data are then analysed in two sections as a means to gain greater insight in the evolving policies and practices of preferential hiring in public employment, the first in terms of Tibetan-medium specifications and the second in terms of residency requirements, with further specifications on the policy developments in the TAR. The conclusion explores some of the implications of these findings.

1 Overview of the urban employment situation in the Tibetan areas

The urban employment system in Tibetan areas up until the 1990s was dominated by state-owned units, whether in the public sector (e.g. ‘government work units’) or in state-owned enterprises (for the sake of simplicity, the combination can be referred to as ‘state-sector employment’). In the TAR, Tibetans accounted for just over 71 percent of such state-sector ‘staff and worker’ employment up until 2000, although the share fell to just under 65 percent in 2003, and the Tibetan share of cadre employment more specifically fell from almost 72 percent in 2000 to just under 50 percent in 2003 (Fischer 2005: 115). The declining share corresponded to an overall reduction in the number state-sector staff and workers, which was disproportionately bourn by Tibetans whereas the number of non-Tibetan staff and workers increased. Given that regular public employees generally cannot be laid off, the reductions probably occurred in state-owned enterprises (SOEs), although a freeze on hiring combined with early retirements in public employment could have equally contributed to the reduction.

From the late 1990s there was also a gradually increasing number and share of registered employment in private enterprises and self-employment. The occupants of such employment would have included Tibetan migrants from local rural areas, migrants from other parts of China (both Tibetan and non-Tibetan), or by Tibetan urban residents not working in (or laid-off from) the state-sector. The heavily subsidized rapid growth of Tibetan towns and cities in the 2000s fuelled a brisk increase of these more informal types of private employment, stimulating both local Tibetan and interprovincial migration. Because state-sector employment remained stagnant until the mid-2000s due to retrenchment, even despite the fact that the state-sector dominated economic growth in terms of economic value-added, its share of overall urban employment fell sharply and the share of private enterprise and self-employment increased sharply, to more than half of total urban employment by 2007.

Despite this rapid transformation since the late 1990s, a persisting feature of urban employment in Tibetan areas has been the extremely limited supply of non-state formal employment, at least up to 2012. This refers to employment that offers wages, security, benefits and status en par with state-sector employment. As a result, the state-sector was the almost exclusive source of jobs appropriate for university graduates in these regions up until 2012. As discussed further below, there appears to be a new development in the TAR
from 2013 onwards of sharp increases in non-state formal employment, albeit this would nonetheless be heavily subsidised by the state given the on-going extremely heavy subsidisation of the TAR economy (e.g. see Fischer 2015). The persistence of the situation up to 2012 appears to have been unique in comparison to all other regions and provinces in China (although it might be similar to other remote sub-regions of other western provinces, i.e. it might be as much a result of peripherality as it is an outcome of policy or the result of "underdevelopment").

### 1.1 Clarifying urban employment categories in China

To clarify these classifications, urban employment in China is officially defined, registered and reported according to three broad ownership categories: urban units, private enterprises, and self-employment. In addition, the sum of these three does not amount to total urban employment (except in the TAR).\(^9\) The residual can be considered as an estimate of purely informal employment, that is, employment that is not registered under any category (and hence the figures on total urban employment are probably estimates).

Based on institutional definitions in China, ‘urban unit’ employment effectively amounts to a formalized and relatively privileged sub-category of urban employment, with higher wages and greater job security than in other forms of urban employment, and endowed with social security and other benefits. ‘Units’ in this sense are akin to corporate entities, whether public or private. They include state, collective/cooperative and non-state (or ‘private’) units of ownership. State-owned units can be conceptually divided between public employment (in government work units) and employment in state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Non-state, non-collective units include units of joint ownership, limited liability and shareholding corporations, foreign-funded units, and units with funding from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan.\(^10\) For example, corporations such as China Telecom, Sinopec, most banks in China, and many of the mining companies operating in Tibetan areas are state owned enterprises (although many of them might also issue shares). Companies such as Alibaba would most likely be registered as share holding corporations (particularly since it floated on the New York Stock Exchange in 2014), whereas Foxconn would be registered as a unit with funding from Taiwan. The Tibet Lhasa Brewery Company was once a state owned enterprise, although it started issuing its first public shares in 1997 and hence might have been re-registered as a share holding corporation from that time onwards, despite continued state ownership. It would have then been registered as either a joint venture or a foreign-funded unit when Carlsberg acquired a major shareholding in the company in 2004, although its shares continue to be traded (indeed, this example demonstrates the difficulties of attributing exclusive ownership status within these categories).

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\(^9\) This either begs questions of the accuracy of the TAR total employment data or else reflects the strict registration of the workforce in the police state context of the TAR.

\(^10\) This breakdown of urban units can be found in the China Statistical Yearbooks. See Fischer (2014: chapter 5) for further details.
In terms of structure, state-owned units (government work units and SOEs) accounted for 18.4 percent of total estimated urban employment in China in 2012 (including registered and unregistered/informal employment). Collective/cooperative units have become a very marginal category in the contemporary urban setting in China, at about 2 percent of total urban employment in China in 2012 (down from 26 percent in 1985). The largest employers in the ‘private’ corporate urban units in China have become limited liability corporations, which accounted for 10.2 percent of total estimated urban employment in 2012, while share-holding corporations and foreign funded units each accounted for 3.4 percent. In comparison, private enterprises accounted for 20.4 percent of total estimated urban employment in China in 2012, and self-employment accounted for 15.2 percent.

Previously, up to 2008 in the national yearbooks, urban unit employees were also referred to as ‘staff and workers’, while the ‘urban unit’ category was introduced from 2006 onward. Both terms refer to persons working (permanently or on contract) in these urban units and do not include those working in (formally registered) urban private enterprises or in urban self-employment. They would refer to both blue and white-collar employees working in these units. The employment reported in urban units is also not based on household residency (at least, not recently – this might have been the case up to the 1990s) and, hence, it would include temporary migrants, such as those working in the state-sector of the TAR and other Tibetan areas. Due to the associated wages, status, security and benefits, university graduates generally target urban unit white collar ‘staff’ jobs in particular, whether in the public or private sector.

In contrast to ‘urban unit’ employment, ‘private enterprise’ employment is a semi-formal employment category, in the sense that the jobs generally lack social security and other benefits, and are at much lower wages on average than in the corporate urban units (state or non-state). Similar considerations apply

11 The actual difference between the two measures of employment was negligible in CSY (2007), when the two data series overlapped. Similarly, the difference of average wages in the two categories was also negligible, although those of employed persons in urban units was slightly lower than those of staff and workers in these years, suggesting a wider inclusion of some workers employed in formal urban units not previously categorized as staff and workers and who are probably at the lower end of the wage scale within the respective urban units (such as part-time and/or contract workers). The difference is greater in the TAR than in the other provinces, suggesting a wider wage dispersion than elsewhere in China.

12 See the explanatory notes in CSY (2007). More generally, ‘staff and workers’ did not include persons employed in township or private enterprises, urban self-employed persons, retirees, re-employed retirees, teachers in the schools run by local people, foreigners, persons from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, and other persons not included by ‘relevant regulations’ (CSY 2005, Explanatory notes for Chapter Five).

13 The same would apply in the case of registered employment in private enterprises, whereas the registered urban self-employed are expected to hold urban residency certificates or to have resided in urban areas for a long time.

14 Average wage data generally refer to the ‘urban units’. The average wages of employed persons in (registered) urban private enterprises started to be reported for the first time in CSY (2010, table 4-17) for data starting in 2009, although these data were not reported for the TAR. According to these data in 2012 (CSY 2013 tables 4-11 and 4-16), average wages in private enterprises (28,752 yuan) were about 60 percent of those in urban units (46,769 yuan). No official wage data have been available for the poorer informalized categories of urban
for self-employment. In this sense, ‘private enterprise’ is not equivalent to what might be more generally called the ‘private sector’, in that it does not include private ‘urban units’. Hence, it does not include professional employment in the ‘private’ corporate sector, which is registered in the distinct categories of non-state ‘urban unit’ employment, as explained above. Examples of private enterprises include restaurants, catering, small retail shops, internet cafes, tourism operators, various types of family businesses, or the many small to medium-sized companies in prefectural or provincial capitals that offer different kinds of lower- to medium-skilled services.

### 1.2 Urban employment polarisation in Tibet

This clarification is crucial to understand the unique urban employment context of the Tibetan areas, as referred to above. In comparison to most other parts of China, the urban employment structure in the TAR and other Tibetan areas is polarized between a strong component of well-remunerated and secure state-owned unit employment on one hand, and private enterprise employment and self-employment on the other, the latter offering considerably less employment security and, on average, lower pay. The absence of any significant amount of private corporate employment with similar benefits as state sector jobs creates a gap between these two types of employment, with little to bridge them.

The TAR provides a good example of this polarization compared to other parts of China. Based on the 2010 employment data (drawing from Fischer 2014: 226), the TAR had 531,000 people registered as employed in urban areas. As shown in table 1, almost 42 percent worked in urban units, while 58 percent worked in either private enterprises or were self-employed. As noted above, there was no residual in the TAR, implying that either all employed were registered or else that purely informal employees were not estimated in these data. Of the 42 percent registered with urban units, nearly all (93 percent) worked in state sector units, whereas only 7 percent worked in collective or private non-state urban units (or, respectively, 39 percent and 3 percent of total registered urban employment).

In contrast, 55 percent of the registered urban employment in Qinghai was in urban units, and 75 percent of this urban unit employment was in the state sector, leaving a much greater proportion – 25 percent – working in non-state units (or about 15 percent of total registered employment). In Gansu, 61 percent of registered urban employment was in units and, of this, 25 percent was also in non-state units. These proportions need to be qualified by the fact that both Qinghai and Gansu had a significant proportion of total estimated urban employment that appears to have been informal (about one quarter in both cases), although the non-state unit shares nonetheless reveal a much wider range of graduate employment options than in the TAR. Similarly, 55

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employment in China, such as the self-employed or construction workers not working under contract, or even for registered private units in the TAR despite the predominance of private enterprise and self-employment in the TAR. Note that these wages are averages and these categories of employment are heterogeneous, containing a minority of high earners.

15 For further detail, see Fischer (2014, chapter five).
percent of registered urban employment in Sichuan was in urban units and about 40 percent of this was in non-state units (or 22 percent of total registered employment). This was close to the China average, where urban units also accounted for 55 percent total registered urban employment (albeit almost one third of total estimated urban employment appears to have been informal, in the sense of not being included in these registered employment data), and non-state units accounted for 50 percent of this urban unit employment (or about 27.5 percent of total registered urban employment). At this provincial level of comparison, it is only the TAR that stood out with an extremely limited range of more formalised employment options outside of the state-sector.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 1</th>
<th>Composition of urban employment, selected criteria and provinces, 2010/2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of employment registered as urban</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of reg. urban emp. in units</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of reg. urban emp. in p/e or s/e</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of urban units in state-sector</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of urban units in non-state units</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal as % of total urban (est.)</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: calculated from CSY (2011: tables 4-2 and 4-6), SSY (2013: tables 4-7 and 4-8) and QSY (2013: table 24-1).

The situation in the Tibetan areas outside of the TAR is similar to the TAR. Interpretive detours are required in dealing with the data for Qinghai given the limited publically available employment data disaggregated below the provincial level. The only significant data in the Qinghai Statistical Yearbooks are aggregated at the level of autonomous prefectures (APs), as per the QSY (2014: chapter 24), which do identify most of the Tibetan areas given that, of the six autonomous prefectures of Qinghai, five are Tibetan and one is Tibetan-Mongolian (TMAP). As discussed in Fischer (2008), the problem with this aggregation of Tibetan areas is that it includes the Haixi/Tsonub TMAP. This prefecture is sparsely populated besides the large mining town of Golmud (Geermu) – which has a population of 130,000, almost entirely non-Tibetan – or else a variety of smaller equivalents, such as towns related to resource exploitation in the Tsaidam Basin. The TAP of Haibei/Tsojang also has a much higher share of non-Tibetans than is the norm in the four more

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16 County-level data is provided in the QSYs (chapter 25), although these are too general to provide much insight and the employment data in this chapter appear to be highly inaccurate. 17 In QSY (2013), the same aggregation was identified as ‘Tibetan-inhabited areas’ rather than ‘autonomous prefectures’, although that denomination was also misleading because some Tibetan autonomous counties exist outside these six autonomous prefectures.
densely populated TAPs to the south (Haidong/Tsolho, Huangnan/Malho, Golok and Yushu).

Keeping these qualifications in mind, there were about 211,000 urban unit employees in the six Qinghai APs in 2013. In 2012, 84 percent of this unit employment was in state-owned units, 1.5 percent in urban collective-owned units, and 14 percent in ‘other units’, which would be the non-state corporate units described previously. Provincially, 71 percent of urban unit employment was in state-owned units and 26 percent in ‘other units’ in 2012. These proportions shifted radically in 2013, although this appears to have been largely due to a reclassification of state-owned units into ‘other’ units, most likely with respect to SOEs being re-classified as share-holding or limited liability corporations, particularly in the resource sector, perhaps due to a partial to full privatisation of some of these units. No data is provided on overall urban employment in these TAPs, although extrapolating on the basis of various assumptions, it is likely that such urban unit employment accounted for more than half of total urban employment, similar to the TAR in the mid-2000s.

The problem with evaluating these numbers and proportions, however, is the fact that these urban unit employees – especially the non-state unit employees – would have been concentrated in the mining towns of Haibei and Haixi, as noted above. These towns are also where the Han Chinese residing in these TAPs are concentrated. Publically available data are not available to disaggregate these employment statistics, although we can deduce that the availability of urban unit employment in the four remaining TAPs where Tibetans are dominant was even more limited than the above shares suggest. The degree to which Han Chinese dominated such employment is less clear, although given that the Han in these TAPs are mostly urban and economically active, as in the TAR, it is clear how they place a strong pressure on – and probably dominate – the limited availability of urban employment options for Tibetan graduates in these TAPs, as argued by Fischer (2009) based on earlier fieldwork in Qinghai and the TAR.

Calculated from QSY (2013: table 24-1).

The 2013 data, in QSY (2014), report a sudden increase in ‘other unit’ employment in the TAPs, from 29,800 employees in 2012 to 84,200 employees in 2013, and a corresponding drop in state units, from 173,800 to 124,300, resulting in a ‘other unit’ share of 40 percent in 2013. A similar change was reported in the provincial data of the same table, resulting in a share of ‘other units’ of 44 percent for Qinghai as a whole.

Assuming a labour force participation rate of about 50 percent of the population (as was approximately the case for the rural labour force in these APs), there would have been an active labour force of about one million people, based on a population of two million people. Given that there were 712,000 ‘rural labourers’, the urban employment would have been about 300,000 people. In which case, urban unit employment would have accounted for about two-thirds of total urban employment. Obviously, much of the regional private enterprise employment would likely concentrate in the core area in and around Xining, outside these TAPs.

Tibetans were only 58 percent of the population of all six TAPs in 2013 (all minorities accounted for 74 percent), and the remaining 531,000 Han Chinese residing in these APs would have been heavily concentrated in towns and dominated the opportunities there, especially the non-state options. For instance, assuming that these Han Chinese in TAPs were 80 percent urban (like in the TAR) and 60 percent economically active (which is probably reasonable, if not an under-estimation), and that those who were economically active were
In the Tibetan areas of Sichuan – mostly Aba (Ngawa) Qiang Tibetan Autonomous Preceture (QTAP) and Ganze (Kardze) TAP – the dominance of state employment in formal urban employment was very similar to the TAR in 2012 (and to what was likely the case of the more Tibetan-populated prefectures of Qinghai), and dissimilar to the rest of Sichuan. The data for these two prefectures are easier to interpret given that there are no predominantly Han populated towns in remote resource enclaves of otherwise sparsely populated areas, although the eastern borders of both prefectures contain lower altitude zones where some towns and much of the Chinese population are concentrated. The data also appear to be more consistent and of better quality than the Qinghai data. In 2012, approximately 24 percent of the 502,000 people considered to be economically active in Aba TAP were classified as urban employed, or about 122,000 people. Among these urban employed, about 62 percent were employed in urban units, of which 83 percent were in state-owned units, with most of the remainder in ‘other’ (non-state or non-collective) units. Similarly, approximately 19 percent of the 643,000 people who were economically active in Ganze (Kardze) TAP were classified as urban employed, or 123,000 people, and among these urban employed, 62 percent worked in urban units, 91 percent of whom worked in state-owned urban units. Considering that much of the ‘other’ urban unit employment was likely concentrated in the lower altitude, largely Chinese dominated eastern edge of both prefectures, the dominance of the state-sector in urban unit employment in the definitively Tibetan highlands would have been even greater than these shares indicate.

The main difference between these TAPs of Sichuan and Qinghai and the TAR was the much larger share of private enterprise and self-employment in registered urban employment in the TAR. In this respect, the shares of Aba and Ganzi were closer to the norm of other western provinces. Indeed, they were lower than the norm, which is probably explained by the fact that much of such employment congregates in the provincial centres outside of these TAPs (i.e. Chengdu and Xining), whereas it gathers in Lhasa in the TAR. The very rapid expansion of these more informal types of employment in the TAR (as discussed further below) has been exceptional across all the cases (if it is not simply an artefact of differences in statistical reporting)\(^\text{22}\) and is probably related to the explosive increase in tourism and related petty trading activity, much of which was occupied by non-Tibetans. Similarly, the particularly high share of the state-sector in urban unit employment in the TAR (up to 2012) was also probably related to the exceptionally subsidized circumstances of the province in recent years (e.g. see Fischer 2015). Conversely, the prefecture figures for Qinghai and Sichuan do not reflect the urban unit employment

\(^{22}\) If the TAR data includes what would elsewhere be treated as purely informal (e.g. unregistered) forms of employment, and if the Aba and Ganzi data do not include such employment (correspondent to what appears to be the case at the provincial level of Sichuan), then the proportions of private enterprise and self-employment to total employment would in fact be quite similar.
opportunities for Tibetans outside these TAPs but within the same province, such as in the capital cities where many of the employment opportunities for tertiary-level graduates would be concentrated (or else in Beijing). However, most of these opportunities are beyond the reach of the average Tibetan university or vocational college graduate since they require excellent Chinese skills and degrees from top institutions. Moreover, the numbers involved are unlikely to significantly alter the broader structural picture of very limited urban unit employment opportunities facing Tibetan graduates. As discussed further below, recruitment adverts also show that the vast majority of government positions mandating any form of Tibetan language skills are located in Tibetan prefectures.

1.3 Structural changes in urban employment over time, focused on the TAR

The historical trends of the TAR can offer some further insight into the evolution of this setting of very limited non-state graduate employment opportunities in the Tibetan areas (keeping in mind the differences between the TAR and other Tibetan areas, as discussed above). As shown in figure 1 for data from 1993 to 2014, the notable development in the TAR was the rapid increase in private enterprise and self-employment (as shown by the shaded area) parallel to the continued dominance of the state sector within formal urban unit employment up to 2012 (as shown by the thick dotted line). The latter dominance had not changed over the course of rapid urban development since the mid-1990s. In fact, it worsened up to 2012, with a shrinking share of non-state unit employment up to 2012 due to a stagnating number of such employees from 2001 onwards, even while the state sector was undergoing retrenchment and restructuring from about 2001 to 2005.

The phenomenal increase in registered urban employment in the TAR started after the 1990s and especially from 2006 onwards (note that the railway opened in 2006), from 225,625 people in 2000, to 315,770 people in 2005, 530,889 in 2010, and 799,095 in 2014. This increase followed a period in the 1990s when urban employment was stagnant (and hence falling as a share of total provincial employment, given relatively rapid population growth). Indeed, total urban employment apparently fell in 1998 despite the beginning of rapid urban-centred growth at that time.23 Moreover, despite the fact that such rapid growth was led by the state-sector from the late-1990s onwards, and especially in the early years of the 2000s (e.g. see Fischer 2005), urban unit employment (mostly state-sector) was also stagnant until 2005: the peak of urban unit employment reached in 1996, at about 183,000 employees, was only surpassed in 2006. Hence, state-owned urban unit employment fell rapidly as a share to total registered urban employment, from 79 percent in 1998 to 34 percent by

23 Some of this might represent changes in statistical reporting, particularly in relation to employment reforms. For instance, based purely on informed speculation, it might have been the case that the registration and reporting of informal employment was not as strict or precise prior to this time and hence some of the subsequent increase of employment might represent the reporting (and hence visibility) of erstwhile informal employment.
2014 (and more general urban unit employment from 87 percent to 41 percent).

Rather, most of the employment creation up to 2012 was in the more informal category of private enterprise and self-employment, which increased almost ten-fold from 48,021 people in 2000 to 473,636 people by 2014. It was in this space of semi-formalised (if not entirely informal) urban employment where most of the dynamics were occurring between the interaction of local Tibetans migrating from rural areas or else laid off from state-sector employment, and migrants coming from other provinces (some Tibetans, but mostly Han Chinese, especially from Sichuan). We unfortunately know very little about these dynamics besides sporadic surveys (e.g. see Ma and Lhundrup 2008), extrapolation from related statistical sources (e.g. see Fischer 2005; 2014, or Yeh and Henderson 2008), and/or qualitative fieldwork insights. However, as concerns this study, Tibetan university graduates mostly do not target this space of more informal employment in any case, or else only rely on

24 The fine dotted line in figure 1 shows the rural share of total TAR employment declining from peak of almost 83 percent in 1999 to 63 percent by 2013. The total number of rural employed people continued to increase, from about one million people in 1999 to 1.3 million by 2013, with sharper increases occurring after 2003 given the government policy of increasing rural employment in the TAR (e.g. see Goldstein et al 2008, 2010), but this increase was less than the increase in total employment, hence the declining share. Some of this decline in share would represent rural-to-urban migration (i.e. the shedding of labour from rural areas), while some would be due to the fact that in-migration from other provinces, which is mostly urban, inflates the denominator of total provincial employment.
it temporarily, in waiting for opportunities to arise in formal (mostly state) employment.

Urban unit employment started to increase above previous peaks from 2006 onwards, although not as rapidly as non-unit employment until 2013. The state-sector share remained at well above 90 percent of total urban unit employment throughout this period, and even increased to a peak of 96 percent in 2012, but then suddenly fell to 86 percent in 2013 and to 83 percent in 2014, due to a sudden increase in non-state/non-collective urban unit employment (i.e. the ‘private’ corporate units). This sudden increase in ‘other unit’ urban employment between 2012 and 2014 occurred largely in mining, manufacturing, construction, and a variety of services. As such, the increase possibly reflects a shift in the government’s approach to urban development in the TAR, in terms of involving a larger private non-state unit role in the heavily subsidised urban economy. We can speculate that, in addition to ‘greenfield’ employment creation, some of the increase might have occurred through partial privatisation of state-owned units or else through formalisation of the more informal private enterprises. This sudden increase in such private unit employment would have created a large demand for relatively skilled labour in a very short period of time, the implications of which require further research. However, from a broader structural perspective, the change merely brought the TAR more in line with the autonomous prefectures of Qinghai, as discussed above, without yet decisively altering the overwhelming dominance of the state-sector in formal employment (in particular considering that most of the private unit employment would have relied on subsidised contracting from the government). Also, while the increase in 2013 resulted in a slight correction of the urban unit share of total urban employment, this still remained at slightly below 41 percent in 2014 (lower than its share in 2010), reflecting a continued polarisation of urban employment in the TAR.

Notably, state-sector retrenchment was also happening throughout China during the 1990s and 2000s, even to a more extreme extent, although the fall in state-owned unit employment was more than compensated by the rise of private corporate units, whereas this did not occur in the TAR (at least not

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25 The sharpest increase occurred in 2013. For instance, mining and quarrying by ‘other units’ increased from nothing to 3298 employees, manufacturing from 2168 to 6661 employees, construction from 64 to 9680 employees, wholesale and retail trade from 473 to 4594 employees, etc. (TSY 2014, table 3-4 and TSY 2013, table 3-4).

26 Unlike in Qinghai (as discussed above), it does not appear to have been the result of a reclassification of state-sector units (e.g. due to privatisation), given that employment in the state-sector was also increasing, although not by as much as the sharp jump in non-state units. Rather, some of the increase might represent the reclassification of private enterprises as urban units, particularly given the slower increase in private enterprise employment in that year. The number of private enterprise and self-employment increased by 24,939 employees in 2013, versus increases of 39,913 in 2012 and 71,789 in 2011, whereas non-state urban unit employment actually declined in 2011 by 386 employees, and again in 2012 by 4,645 employees, but then suddenly increased in 2013 by 33,377 employees. However, the bulk of the increase probably represents newly created employment. Conversely, some of the increase in these non-state units in 2014 might represent a reclassification of state-owned units in secondary sector activities, given reductions in state-owned unit employment in mining, manufacturing, 'electricity, gas and water production and supply' (probably related to the development of hydropower), and construction.
For instance, the number of people employed in state-owned units in China fell from 113 million in 1995, to 81 million people in 2000, and then to 65 million by 2005, where it has more or less remained up to 2013. Meanwhile, the category of limited liability corporations only appeared in 1998 and the number of people employed by them rose from 6.9 million in 2000, to 17.5 million in 2005, and then to 22 million by 2010 (and then suddenly from 38 million to 61 million between 2012 and 2013, again probably reflecting changes in the registration across various units). Employment in share-holding corporations similarly rose from 4.6 million in 2000 to over 10 million by 2010. 

The decline in the share of state-owned units in total registered urban employment in China was also not as pronounced as in the TAR, falling from 55 percent in 2000 to 28 percent in 2010, because the overall increase in registered urban employment was not as rapid (i.e. total registered urban employment in China increased 50 percent between 2000 and 2010, whereas it increased 135 percent in the TAR). Similar dynamics can be observed in the western provinces of Gansu, Qinghai and Sichuan, in the sense that the decline the state-owned unit share of total urban employment was less pronounced in these provinces than in the TAR, and was compensated by a rise in non-state unit employment (to a greater extent in Sichuan than in Qinghai and Gansu, as noted above). As discussed above, the particularly polarised context of the TAR was shared with the Tibetan areas outside of the TAR.

A slightly more fine-grained picture of the dynamics in the TAR can be gained from the data on staff and worker employment reported in the TSY’s, as shown in figure 2. As discussed above, staff and workers are a subcategory that
accounts for most of urban unit employment – those not included in this category seem to be the less regular (and less well paid) employees within these units. Similar patterns can be observed in these data, in particular the retrenchment of state-sector employment from the mid to late 1990s up until 2004, and then the rebound from 2005 onwards, although almost entirely due to state-owned units up until 2012. Indeed, ‘other types of units’ – which represent the non-state/non-collective ‘private’ corporate units – declined in number after a peak of 6,587 employees in 2001, except in 2011 when they reached 6,906 staff and workers. These private units then jumped in 2013 to 32,900 staff and workers, and then to 44,923 staff and workers in 2014. We can speculate that out-of-province migrants would have dominated this sudden addition of 27,827 new jobs in 2013 and then another 12,023 in 2014, precisely because of the private nature of the units involved, which generally precludes the practice of preferential employment, and also because these units were most likely out-of-province private units, hence with a strong preference for Han staff and workers. As discussed further below, local supply of appropriately skilled Tibetans would have had difficulty matching such demands in such a short period of time, although this of course depends on the nature of the particular industry. However, before this sudden surge, the ‘other’ (private) unit share of total staff and worker employment had declined over the 2000s up to 2012 even despite retrenchment in the state-sector. Also notable is the gradual phasing out of collective-owned urban units in number and share, from 11,752 staff and workers in 1998 to 2,973 by 2014, more or less eliminating these units as sources of new employment. Hence, the state-sector remained as virtually the only source of expanding formal urban employment up to 2012, and probably remained so for most Tibetan graduates in 2013 and 2014.

1.4 Graduate employment in the Tibetan areas outside of the TAR

Within state-owned units (or the state-sector), a reliance on public employment (versus SOEs) can be more specifically observed in the Tibetan areas outside of the TAR from reports issued by various universities on the employment outcomes of their graduates. This is shown in figure 3, drawing from various reports from 2013 to 2015. These reports adopt a slightly different terminology than the yearbooks, in the sense that they appear to include limited liability and share-holding corporations in the category of ‘private sector and self-employment’, which presumably also includes the less formalised category of private enterprise.28 On the other hand, the reports distinguish between government work units and state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which the yearbooks do not.

28 The reports refer to non-state enterprises as minying qiye huo geti (private enterprises or sole proprietorship, i.e. individually-owned), but also at times as fei-gongyouzhi qiye (non-public enterprises). In contrast to the categories employed in the statistical yearbook, the distinction between ‘private enterprise’ and limited-liability or share-holding corporations is not clear. We have therefore translated this category as ‘private sector’ rather than as ‘private enterprise’.
Accordingly, the reliance on public employment in government work units was highest in the universities with the highest minority shares, while employment in SOEs was lower, and in joint ventures or foreign enterprises was very marginal. This was most evident in the case of Qinghai Normal University, where the minority share of graduates in 2013 was 44 percent and where 47 percent of graduates were employed in government work units (although the high public employment share is also to be expected given that one of the principle functions of normal universities is to train teachers). This dependence on public employment was even higher in teacher training institutions in Tibetan majority areas. For example, The Gansu Nationalities Teacher Training College located in Gannan TAP, which likely had a much higher share of minority graduates, reported in 2014 that 86 percent of its graduates obtained employment at a government institution (although again, this is to be expected of a teacher training college). Likewise, the Sichuan Minzu College based in Ganzi TAP featured a 54 percent government employment share among its graduates (despite not having a specific focus on teacher training). In the case of Qinghai University for Nationalities, where 61 percent of graduates were minorities (also in 2013), 36 percent of graduates were employed in government units, versus an average of 29 percent for all seven tertiary institutions in Qinghai (in 2013 and 2014). The proportion was

29 Ch. Gansu minzu shifan xueyuan.
31 Ch. Sichuan minzu xueyuan, (see http://www.scun.edu.cn).
also lower for the Southwest University for Nationalities in Sichuan (at 22 percent in 2014), whose minority share among graduates was much lower than at the institutions cited above (only 26 percent) and that disproportionately supplied graduates to the ‘private sector and self-employment’.

In contrast, only 12 percent of graduates in Shanghai (in 2015) and 14 percent nationally (in 2012-13) were employed in government work units, and much larger proportions were employed in the combination of SOEs, joint ventures and foreign enterprises (35 percent nationally). Similarly, although not shown in the figure, among graduates from Qinghai University, the province’s top institution with a lower minority share of graduates (29 percent in 2013), 59 percent secured positions in at least medium-sized enterprises with 300 or more employees, whereas only 31 percent of graduates from the Qinghai Normal University and 39 percent from the Qinghai University for Nationalities secured such positions.  

An additional predicament for graduates from Tibetan-medium degrees is that they tend to be particularly restricted in their career options given their narrow ranges of specialization in their studies. This predicament is increasingly prevalent outside the TAR, as analysed in the case of Qinghai by Zenz (2013). In principle, their superior knowledge of Tibetan language should be a competitive advantage for public employment in Tibetan areas given that article 49 of China’s Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (Ch. minzu quyu zizhifa) stipulates that cadres in minority regions should have knowledge of the respective minority language. However, such principals are generally side-lined by the preference for Chinese language skills, which disadvantages Tibetan-medium graduates competing with Tibetans graduating from regular Chinese-medium degrees (who also benefit from non-language related preferential practices such as added points or residency requirements), let alone with non-Tibetan native Chinese speakers. Advertised positions also often require college degrees that can only be studied through Chinese, and employment exams and related interviews are by default entirely in Chinese (except for the limited positions that mandate Tibetan language skills).

The employment predicament of graduates from Tibetan-medium tertiary tracks is therefore twofold. Not only is their choice of career paths much narrower. Additionally, job positions that would appear to be predestined for them, such as administrative or teaching positions in Tibetan regions, require successful competition against highly trained Han or minorities from the Chinese-medium system. Ethnographic examples abound where Tibetan-medium graduates were unable to compete against either Han or Chinese-medium educated Tibetan applicants. However, this vector of disadvantage also faces Tibetans from Chinese-medium tracks given that they generally have weaker Chinese language skills than Han or other non-Tibetan applicants.

Indeed, as argued by Zenz (2013: 186-190), the wider range of career options that are open to such graduates does not necessarily put them on a better

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33 See especially Zenz (2013, chapter 5).
footing in comparison to Tibetans graduating with Tibetan-medium degrees, who might face less competition in more limited albeit specialised niches of public employment. This is precisely when language-based preferential recruitment practices become significant. Often, the only chance for Tibetan graduates—especially Tibetan-medium graduates—is to target one of the highly coveted Tibetan-medium teaching positions in Tibetan regions, or other government jobs that specifically mandate Tibetan language skills.

In sum, the employment horizon for Tibetan tertiary graduates—especially those from Tibetan-medium degrees—is disproportionately restricted to state-sector employment, and public sector employment more specifically, the alternative being in the less organized semi-formalized and generally lower wage sectors of private enterprise or self-employment. This leads to all or nothing prospects for graduates, insofar as employment in private enterprises or self-employment not considered appropriate, decent or dignified option for someone with tertiary degree. Hence, employment expectations are mostly placed on public employment, much more so than elsewhere in China.

1.5 Graduate and recruitment surges since 2010, with a focus on the TAR

The silver lining of the dominance of the state-sector in formal employment is two-fold. One is that public employment is the optimal sector for practicing preferential hiring, making it relatively easy for governments (central or local) to change tack if they decide to do so, with potentially large impacts in short periods of time on the (relatively small) labour force of tertiary educated Tibetans. The second is that, as indicated above, there has been a resurgence of hiring in state-owned units since the retrenchment of the early 2000s, starting in 2011 in the TAR and followed in other Tibetan areas with various degrees of timing and tempo.

The hiring surge is evidenced for the TAR in figure 4, which necessarily focuses on this region due to lack of sufficiently disaggregated data for other Tibetan areas. The figure shows the annual changes in the number of staff and workers employed in state-owned urban units and, as an alternative measure, the estimated number of public sector recruitments in each year (based on the data sources discussed in the next section). These data are supplemented with estimates of what fenpei recruitment would have been before it was phased out in 2006, based on the numbers of tertiary and secondary vocational (Ch. zhongzhuan) graduates in each year (i.e. the graduates who qualified for fenpei).

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34 The recruitment outcome estimate for the TAR is based on actual data for 2007, as discussed in section 3. Comprehensive outcome documents were not available for the TAR from 2008 onwards and thus hires were estimated by taking 85 percent of the advertisements for 2008-11, which is a reasonable assumption in light of the outcome data that we have for the TAR and other regions (e.g. for a subset, see section 3). Hires were estimated at 90 percent of advertisements starting in 2012 given that, from that year onwards, the TAR instituted a second intake round to fill positions left vacant by the first round.

35 Past fenpei recruitment is estimated based on the eligible graduate population of tertiary and secondary vocational (zhongzhuan) graduates. For the former, only BA and dazhuan figures are available, although research student graduate numbers were quite low in Western China in the
These measures are compared to a measure of annual student intakes of TAR residents in tertiary institutions anywhere in China, which has increasingly diverged from the student intakes in TAR tertiary institutions (not shown) since 2012 given the increasing trend of Tibetans from the TAR leaving the province in order to study in other provinces (the latter measure also includes non-TAR residents studying at TAR tertiary institutions). An estimate of the annual number of TAR residents graduating from tertiary institutions anywhere in China is also shown, based on lagging the above intake numbers for all TAR residents by three to four years, multiplied by a factor of 0.9 to account for those who do not complete or else those who continue on to higher studies. The latter graduate measure is relevant given that public recruitment from at least 2007 onwards has been explicitly open to all TAR residents who graduated in 2006 or after from tertiary institutions anywhere in China, as further discussed below in section five. In contrast, graduates from tertiary institutions in the TAR would include a significant number of non-TAR residents, who technically would not qualify for the public sector recruitments in the TAR.36

**FIGURE 4**

Intakes and graduation from TAR tertiary institutions, public employment recruitment, and changes in state-owned unit staff and worker employment

Source: CSY (2014: table 3-5); TSY (2000-15: tables 3-5, 15-6 and 15-7); 西藏自治区普通高等学校招生

late fenpei years. Tertiary graduate figures also have to be estimated from intakes, because student figures for all residents of a region at institutions throughout China, which is the relevant figure, are only available for intakes, and not for graduates. Hence, tertiary figures are estimated based on new student intakes for all residents from a region 3-4 years prior to each respective year (averaged with equal weight given to three and four years prior), multiplied by a factor of 0.95, assuming a 95 percent graduation rate. Total new student allocations for residents of each region at tertiary institutions throughout China were obtained from Ministry of Education (MOE) educational situation reports for different provinces and years (http://www.moe.edu.cn). Secondary vocational graduate data are from provincial yearbooks. 

36 On a related point, see Fischer (2014: 260-65) for a discussion of a discrepancy in comparing schooling attainments between the 2009 population survey and 2010 population census, the latter that included temporary residents, whereas the former did not.
计划(Xizang zizhiqu putong gaodeng xueixiao zhaosheng jihua, tr. TAR regular higher education intake plan) Xizang jiaoyu kaoshi yuan (TAR Educational Exams Institute), various years, http://www.xzzsks.com.cn; (for fenpei estimate) Xizang zhizhiqu jiaoyu gaikuang (TAR education situation) for 2003-06, n.d., Ministry of Education website, www.moe.edu.cn; see appendix for the sources of advertisement data.

According to the recruitment data, the hiring surge in the TAR started in 2011. Estimated hiring peaked in 2012 (at 12,060 recruitments, out of 13,400 advertisements), and then settled to about 9,000 recruitments by 2015 (or around 10,000 advertisements), which was slightly less than the initial level reached in 2011. This was up from a trough of about 4,000 estimated hires a year from 2008 to 2010, and a low of 2,338 hires in 2007. The estimate of the previous fenpei recruitment was in between these two levels, at around 6,000 recruits a year from 2003 to 2006 (increasing throughout).

Considering the increasing numbers of graduating students between these years, the resurgence of hiring in 2011 effectively represented a return to the fenpei norm, except at a higher number of graduating students. Estimated hires slightly exceeded the number of TAR resident graduates anywhere in China from 2011 to 2014 (by a significant margin in 2012). However, actual hires fell below the TAR resident graduate measure in 2015. The surplus in hiring from 2011 to 2014 might well have been designed to make up for some TAR resident graduates who were not hired in the intervening years since the end of fenpei in 2006, particularly that there was much less recruitment than graduates between 2007 and 2010, when the annual number of graduates was increasing rapidly (reflecting, with a four year lag, the increased intakes of students earlier in the decade, before the fenpei was abolished). Nonetheless, compared with the TAR resident graduate numbers, overall public sector hiring between 2007 and 2015 fell short by around 7-8,000 jobs, despite the much-touted employment guarantee that started in 2011. In light of the estimated increase in the number of TAR resident graduates projected from 2016-18, the shortfall that appeared in 2015 suggests that the state has already been facing challenges in maintaining its new employment guarantee to such graduates. As discussed further in the fifth section, it will undoubtedly need to increase public recruitment further if it is to continue honouring the employment guarantee promise to TAR resident graduates. Indeed, the sudden rise in non-state corporate employment in 2013 and continued in 2014 was probably orchestrated to address this situation.

The state-sector staff and worker employment data (the thick black line) show different trends, offering a different perspective on these employment dynamics. Annual change in state-sector staff and worker employment surged in 2012 and 2013, when it reached almost double the number of recruitments in 2012 and more than double in 2013 (e.g. 21,158 additional employees in 2013). However, it was only one third of recruitments when recruitments surged in 2011, and then it grinded to a halt in 2014, with an increase of only 794 employees, despite the sustained level of recruitments. A similar one-off increase in staff and worker employment occurred in 2005, well above the estimated number of fenpei recruitment in that year. During the lull years of 2007-10, employment changes exceeded recruitments, besides in 2008. The lag in the increase in employment relative to the recruitments in 2011-12 might be explained by the fact that those recruited in 2011 only started their
employment in 2012. However, the much higher increase in employment in 2012-13 (as in 2005, 2007 and 2009-10) might also be explained by employment in SOEs (which might or might not tend to employ Tibetans), or else by transfers from outside of the province instead of local recruitments (such as often occurs at the cadre level). The end of the employment increase in 2014 requires other explanations, particularly given that it contrasts with the sustained level of recruitments. It would likely be explained by attrition to the stock of state sector employment, such as through lay-offs, outward transfers, or retirements. Indeed, it seems that much of the retrenchment that occurred in the early 2000s occurred through early retirements (forced or otherwise). Alternatively, it might represent a reclassification of some SOE employment as share holding employment, as discussed above.

All of this highlights the importance of the new data on government recruitment advertisements and hiring outcomes. They offer us key insights into what might be going on in various Tibetan areas during this period of resurgent public employment, at least in terms of the ‘flow’ variable of new additions to public employment, even if not the ‘stock’ of pre-existing employment (or attrition of this stock). Keeping the latter unknowns in mind, the advertisement data can indicate the evolution of explicit or implicit preferential practices in hiring for public employment (over a short but decisive period of time). Explicit in this sense refers to the use of language or degree specifications, whereas implicit refers to other specifications such as local residency. The explicit use of language specifications can also reveal government attitudes (usually local governments) towards Tibetan language and Tibetan-medium education, and the extent to which they are given a place in governance. Alternatively, the results of job recruitments offer some insight into the degree of representation that effectively results from either these or other channels, such as the intent of the government to maintain a degree of minority representation in the public sector regardless of preferentiality practices.

2 Data Sources and Recruitment Processes

The new data sources on government recruitment are related to the routine advertisement of vacancies by local governments (provincial, prefecture or county), which happens once or several times a year. These are compiled as lists with greater or lesser amounts of detail, which have been posted online starting from about 2007, entirely in Chinese language, and they are the same as the printed versions that circulate throughout China’s tertiary institutions. They provide for a far greater degree of detail and precision than that available in the official statistics found in provincial or national yearbooks because each advertised job position consists of a separate line in these spreadsheets or

37 For instance, the authors received anecdotal insights from conversations with journalists who visited the TAR in September 2015 of an expansion of Tibetan medicine companies employing Tibetan medical school graduates as assembly line workers.

38 This refers to intakes with detailed job description tables. General recruitment announcements with only total figures are available as early as 2005 (for Qinghai), but are of no use for analysing preferential practices.
tables, containing various amounts of detail, but always specifying the required
tertiary degree, the work unit and location, and additional requirements or
special comments (e.g. Tibetan language skills). In some cases, actual hiring
outcomes are also posted on line, often with surprising detailed and candid
information.

Zenz (2013) made the first attempt to systematically gather and analyse
these official online recruitment advertisements from various sources on the
Chinese internet – see the appendix for a complete set of hyperlinks to the
source documents. The earliest online documents with sufficiently
disaggregated data that he could retrieve contained data from 2007, although a
comprehensive availability of online documentation for all provinces only
started around 2010-11. Comparisons between regions in this paper are
therefore limited to the period from 2011 to 2015. Data availability also differs
by employment category. For example, Qinghai’s civil service recruitment
documents are available from 2007, whereas its comprehensive public service
documentation is only obtainable from 2011 onwards.

Recruitment advertisement documents initially appear on the government
websites of each region, typically as downloadable Excel spreadsheets or
HTML tables. They then quickly spread across career or local news-related
media websites. In some instances, the government versions are often no
longer accessible after a certain amount of time, but copies of them typically
continue to be available elsewhere, such as on private websites that specialize
in career assistance. These sites have an interest to provide comprehensive and
reliable information to their clientele, to which they try to sell career-related
services such as recruitment exam preparation courses. We have never come
across documents or announcements that appeared to have been intentionally
altered, although some differed in their formatting or, in a few uncommon
cases, provided shorter summaries of more comprehensive data. In some
recent instances, governments started to put passwords on spreadsheet files or
to write-protect them in order to prevent tampering, although a comparison of
different online files pertaining to the same intake would readily reveal any
alterations (which we never came across). Some of the oldest documents are
only available on public document storage sites such as wenku.baidu.com or
www.doc88.com, where private persons would have likely uploaded them. By
comparing the style, layout and language of documents, one can ascertain their
authenticity to some degree, and there would seem to be no apparent
immediate benefit for someone to change them. Moreover, the total amount of
positions advertised and in some cases other details can be corroborated with
news articles describing the announcement of the recruitment round. In any
case, only a very small subset of the older data was retrieved from such
sources.

These documents were systematically retrieved for all Tibetan regions,
including those outside the TAR (besides Dechen/Deqin TAP in Yunnan,
which was excluded because of the poor quality of the data in its documents).
The data was then cleaned and compiled (by the co-author Adrian Zenz). This
was done by parsing through tens of thousands of individual entries, which
allowed for a detailed analysis of Tibetan language or other requirements.
Moreover, in instances where outcome documents are available, there is often
a detailed trail of documentation from recruitment advertisement, to written exam results, interview results, and then to final recruitment outcomes, permitting additional verification. All of this increases the reliability and verifiability of the data analysis.

2.1 Availability of Recruitment Outcomes

In addition to the recruitment advertisements, documents detailing the recruitment outcomes at one or several stages of the recruitment process are also published online, such as the shortlists for interviews or the final hires made. By showing actual outcomes (or potential outcomes if the data refer to middle stages of the hiring process), they are an important way to verify and complement employment analyses, and to offer some inferences about the degree of representativity in the outcomes, regardless of whether preferentiality was exercised. However, the coverage of these outcome documents is partial and, hence, they are inadequate for comprehensive comparative evaluations.

The reasons for this are multiple. Firstly, not all employment intake outcomes are publically disseminated. For example, nearly all of Qinghai’s civil service recruitment outcomes are only available to the applicants themselves through a login-protected website. In other instances when outcome documentation is made available, often only the first (written exam) stage of the process is listed and not the final hiring decisions. Overall, these limitations render it very difficult to systematically gather recruitment outcomes across all regions over sustained periods of time.

Secondly, outcome documents vary widely regarding the amount of information they divulge. Many of them withhold an essential piece of information: the ethnic status of the recruited. For the 2007 intake, the TAR published detailed outcomes, including ethnic status and the job that each successful applicant applied for, which allows for detailed analysis. For 2008, the documentation only indicated ethnic status and total points (see below), precluding an examination of which shares of advertised positions were actually awarded, or how Tibetans fared in different employment categories. For 2009, documents were even less helpful, listing all applicants, and not just those who were actually recruited. Since then, outcome lists for the TAR have become essentially useless (for the purposes of this study) as they no longer specify ethnic status, nor the position for which the applicant applied. Similarly, none of the outcome documents for Gannan TAP that we have evaluated contain ethnic status information. This trend is not surprising considering the socio-political sensitivity of minority employment.39

However, at the other extreme of the spectrum, some outcome documents are very detailed. Some contain such a plethora of details about applicants that privacy advocates would be alarmed: date of birth, place of registration, political affiliation, university degree, and even body height and other biometric indicators are all listed (at times in hidden spreadsheet columns

39 As noted by Fischer (2005), the TAR stopped divulging the Tibetan share of staff and worker employment from the TSY (2005) onwards, relating to data from 2004 onwards. This was not specific to the TAR – similar cessations occurred in other provinces with large minorities around the same time, such as Xinjiang (e.g. see Fischer 2013).
that have to be manually made visible within the Excel software). Moreover, some provide all of the point results from each step of the recruitment process (see below), permitting a close examination of the process by which applicants are weeded out or how Tibetans fared at each stage of the process. One can even calculate what share of Tibetans would have been recruited for each job category if they had received more or less added points, or verify whether Tibetan language exams had the desired effect of privileging Tibetan applicants or applicants holding Tibetan-medium degrees. Nonetheless, the dissemination of such detailed information is highly irregular, even across different years for the same region. This erratic divulging or withholding of potentially sensitive information even within the same year alludes to the haphazard processes by which these outcome documents are published.

In the middle of the spectrum, Qinghai’s outcome documents rarely list minzu status. However, they almost always show which applicants received added points (although the outcome documents of Yushu TAP rarely provide this information). Since minorities consistently receive five added points, it is easy to assign minority status to each applicant, which adds valuable information for analysis. However, this method is not without problems given that minorities are typically required to register their ethnic status with the examining authority within a certain period of time before the exam. To give an example, the 2011 public service teacher recruitment lists for Hainan/Tsolo TAP show that 30 percent of all interview candidates for Tibetan-medium teaching positions did not receive added points. However, all of them had distinctly Tibetan names (evident despite the Chinese character rendering). The most likely explanation is that they were Tibetans who failed to register their minority status and therefore forfeited their preferential treatment. Even so, that example appears to have been exceptional. More generally, the added points column appears to permit a roughly reasonable approximation of results.

2.2 Categories of Public Employment

These recruitment advertisement and outcome documents refer to different categories of public employment in China. These categories can be broadly divided into civil servants or cadres (Ch. gongwuyuan), and public service unit employees (shiye danwei). Civil servants are the most prestigious category. They are classified into different ranks from office workers (within various government agencies) to state-leaders. As in imperial times, admission into civil service is still very much equivalent to entrance into the upper strata of society. Apart from high remuneration and job security, civil servant positions come with administrative powers (xingzheng zhifaquan), dominating key power positions such as those within the legal system, law enforcement, public security, inspection bureaus, and all ministries and government agencies. As such, they often endow their holders with considerable social power.

Civil service exams are quite uniform throughout the country. Even though specific exam questions are determined at the provincial level, exams consist of the same two sections: the administrative skills aptitude test (xingzhe zhiye nengli ceyan), made up of a range of maths and logics puzzles, task ordering exercises and other sections that test managerial and clerical
skills; and the so-called *shen lun*, an argumentative essay related to political, economic or societal topics of relevance to government policy, whose conception is inherently Confucian.\(^{40}\)

The government employment category of public service units\(^ {41}\) refers to public institutions that perform public services, in areas such as education, culture, science, health, environmental services, or the state media. Additionally, various types of assistant staff positions (including manual workers) at core government agencies are also classified in this category. In recruitment documents, public workers can be referred to as technical staff (*jishu renyuan*), professional staff (*zhuanye renyuan*),\(^ {42}\) or simply ‘workers’ (*gongzuo renyuan*).

In contrast to the civil service system, public service employees are not employees of the state *per se*, but are directly employed by their respective local public institutions (which function nonetheless, at least nominally, as state institutions at the local prefecture or county level). These local institutions and/or local governments also fund the respective jobs (although of course these local expenditures are in turn generally subsidised by higher levels of government, especially in heavily subsidised Tibetan areas). A notable exception to this rule is in the TAR, where public service hiring is done at the provincial level.

As a result of the sub-provincial character of public service positions (outside of the TAR), they are generally (but not always) less well remunerated and carry fewer fringe benefits than civil servant posts. Moreover, they typically do not come with direct administrative powers. Even so, the high job security makes them very popular amongst college graduates, including Tibetans. In particular, teaching jobs carry overarching ethno-symbolic and practical career-related significance for Tibetans, and many Tibetans, especially those from the Tibetan-medium education system, pursue teaching jobs not only for financial reasons but also for ethnic preservation. With this consideration, and because most advertised Tibetan-medium employment is typically found among teaching positions, which warrants separate analysis, we have calculated teaching jobs as a subcategory of the public service in this paper, with total public service positions (not shown) disaggregated into non-teaching and teaching public service positions.

Finally, there is another category of employment within the education sector. In 2006, the Ministry of Education initiated the ‘Rural Volunteer Education Phase School Teachers Special Job Positions Plan,’ abbreviated *tegang jihua* (or simply *tegang*).\(^ {43}\) The aim of the initiative is to boost teaching staff in minority regions where the enforcement of nine years of mandatory education had been hindered by serious staff shortages. Salaries and benefits are comparable to those hired into regular government teaching positions, with the bulk of the funding coming from the central government. *Tegang* jobs are

\(^{40}\)The words *shen lun* derive from a phase from the Confucian Analects, ‘*shen er lun zhi,*’ which mean ‘explaining, expounding, arguing, and reasoning.’

\(^{41}\)For instance, see the discussion of this by Burns (2007).

\(^{42}\)In TAR government recruitment announcements, both types are listed together as ‘*zhuanye jishu renyuan*’.

\(^{43}\)The full Chinese name is *nongcun yiwu jiaoyu ji* *xeduan xuexiao jiaoshi teshe gangwei jihua*. 
supposed to be converted to regular positions after three years at which point local governments become fully responsible for the provision of salaries. Originally, the program was due to expire in 2011, but it has so far remained in place (as of the time of final editing in December 2015). For some reason, the TAR never participated in this initiative and there are no indications that it ever undertook related recruitment. However, the tegang program has been a significant source of teacher recruitment in Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan and other Western Chinese regions.

2.3 The Recruitment Process

The recruitment process for all of these public sector positions consists of two stages. The first stage comprises the written exam (bi shi). Typically, there has to be a minimum number of applicants who complete the written stage and enter the interview stage (mian shi) in order to ensure that positions are awarded through sufficient competition. If this number is not reached (usually 2 to 5 applicants), the position is removed from the list. While competition for some positions (such as those in provincial capitals) can be extremely high, competition for more remote or less appealing positions can be low. As a result, approximately 80 to 90 percent of positions are typically filled and the rest dropped (our analysis of outcomes indicates that 85 percent of advertised positions across a range of 25 recruitment outcome exams sampled from most of the Tibetan regions from 2007 and 2015 were actually awarded). However, most Tibetan regions analysed in this paper have been holding second or even third rounds of recruitments designed to fill such ‘vacant positions’ (Ch. kongque zhiwei). For example, the TAR has been consistently having additional intakes from 2012 onwards in order to fill up vacant positions (Ch. kongque zhiwei bulu jibua). This should mean that the share of advertised positions that ends up being assigned should be moving closer toward 100 percent in more recent years. The number of candidates who therefore advance to the interview stage is equal to the number of positions multiplied by the minimum competition requirement. For example, if a region advertises five translation positions and each position must have at least three applicants, then 15 candidates advance to the interview stage (provided that enough apply), of which the top five (based on a combined written and interview score) will be hired.

Local examination practices vary widely and commonly change from year to year. Typically, the interview counts for 20 to 40 percent of the final grade, and the written exam for the rest. In some intakes, applicants for positions specifying Tibetan-medium criteria are required to conduct the interview in Tibetan and may be given a choice of completing parts of the written exam in Tibetan. For example, Tibetan-medium applicants for the 2011 teacher recruitment of Yushu TAP in Qinghai could complete the subject knowledge section in Tibetan (although the general knowledge section had to be written in Chinese). In other instances, such as the 2012 public service teacher recruitment exam of Hainan TAP in Qinghai, applicants for Tibetan-medium positions were even required to complete their exam in Tibetan, or else receive zero points.

Often, minorities will receive added points (jia fen) based on preferential treatment policies for minorities. Added points are usually added on top of
either written and interview scores (or both) in order to yield the final score (typically, the maximum final score is 100 points). In Qinghai, the *jia fen* amount is usually five points, whereas in Ganzi TAP in Sichuan, all minorities only receive one added point. Again, regional practices vary widely, but tend to be somewhat consistent over time within a region. Minority applicants might be required to register their minority status within a specified deadline with the examining authority in order to receive added points (e.g. this is practiced in Qinghai). This can result in situations where applicants with Tibetan names do not receive the *jia fen* points, as discussed above regarding Hainan TAP in 2011. However, in most instances applicants for Tibetan-medium positions are listed as having received such preferential treatment.

In the TAR, minority applicants do not receive added points, but benefit from a lower required points level (*fenshuxian*). The difference between the required threshold of minority versus Han points is set individually for each position, and may be as little as two or as big as 20 points. In a substantial share of advertised positions in the TAR, no required points levels are set, thereby forfeiting any minority preferential treatment.

In addition to language and degree-type requirements, the advertised positions also often specify local residency requirements, either from the province, or from the prefecture where the position is advertised. This effectively serves as an implicit form of preferentiality, particularly in prefectures where Tibetans are overwhelmingly dominant, although of course it does exclude non-Tibetans who might be locally resident and it is also sometimes designed with the intention to reduce competition from non-local Tibetans, such as in the remote pastoral areas of Golok and Yushu. In these remote areas, there is strong resentment against the lowland Tibetan ‘farmers’, i.e. those from the north, closer to Xining, who are perceived as dominating local public employment due to their superior knowledge of Chinese and higher education levels, in much the same way that Chinese are advantaged. The fiercest competition for desirable government jobs often comes from well-educated Han (or other minorities) from regions with strong educational foundations, such as provincial capitals or their surrounding areas. In these cases, prefecture residency restrictions offer significant potential to increase the share of positions allocated to local minorities such as Tibetans. Indeed, in prefectures with majority Tibetan populations, residency restrictions are significant and, in the more recent job advertisements that we have been able to analyse, the residency requirements are not just limited to those who hold a current residency from the region (Ch. *huji*), but also include those who were original from (i.e. born in) the region (Ch. *shengyuan*). As discussed in the previous section, all recruitments advertised for the TAR included this type of *shengyuan* requirement (with respect to education, not birth) since at least the earliest advertisements that we have been able to access and analyse (starting in 2007).

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44 Exams are typically scored out of 100 points and count for 70 percent of the final score (the other 30 percent is based on the interview).
45 See Zenz (2013, chapter 5).
2.4 Types of Tibetan-medium Employments

As discussed in the introduction, Tibetan-medium specifications within these public sector recruitments are a particularly important means of practicing preferentiality by giving a decisive advantage to Tibetan applicants, especially those with Tibetan-medium degrees, arguably even more so than the added points or lower threshold practices. Moreover, differences between types of advertised ‘Tibetan-medium jobs’ in the public sector could have major implications for the employment prospects of different types of Tibetan university graduates. There are generally two types of Tibetan-medium employment: jobs that require a Tibetan-medium degree, or jobs that require candidates to possess various levels of Tibetan language skills without necessarily requiring a Tibetan-medium degree. The latter are typically referred to as ‘bilingual’ positions (Ch. shuangyu) in the job advertisements (and are likewise called ‘bilingual positions’ in this paper).

The Tibetan-medium degree jobs specifically require a Tibetan-medium college degree, such as Tibetan language, Tibetan medicine, or Tibetan-Chinese translation (referred to in this paper as ‘Tibetan-medium degree positions’). This is the most restrictive possible requirement and more-or-less guarantees that the successful applicant will be a Tibetan who has passed through the various levels of the Tibetan minority education system. For instance, based on an aggregation of 21 outcome documents that have sufficient data to analyse these specificities, Tibetans (or minorities) were hired for 99 percent of jobs that specified Tibetan-medium degrees, and these jobs also guaranteed that all or nearly all of these recruitees had Tibetan-medium degrees. These positions need to be carefully distinguished from advertised positions that require applicants to know Tibetan language, such as an ability to teach Tibetan language in schools, but that do not actually require them to possess a Tibetan-medium degree. Exam results (such as from the TAR in 2007) show that, in the latter case, many of the applicants hold non-Tibetan-medium degrees, even though most or all of them might be ethnic Tibetans. In the same documents mentioned above, Tibetans (or minorities) were hired for 84 percent of these bilingual jobs, although the share of recruitees with Tibetan-medium degrees was much lower (with a few exceptions, related to teaching). In comparison, Tibetans/minorities were hired for 58 percent in jobs that did not specify any Tibetan medium, and very few if any of the recruitees for these jobs had Tibetan-medium degrees.

The requirements for ‘bilingual’ positions, and the enforcement of their requirements, vary widely. The actual language competency of applicants is at times tested through Tibetan language exams, but this is often not the case. Some positions require applicants to ‘understand both the spoken and the written language’ (Ch. dong liangzhong yuyan wenzi), which generally necessitates the applicant to have gone through at least some level of Tibetan-medium education. In rare instances, the minimum level of Tibetan-medium education is specified, such as middle or high school levels. However, such jobs will often attract Tibetans with significant amounts of Chinese-medium education.

Even less restrictive are positions that merely require applicants to ‘understand both languages’ (Ch. dong liangzhong yuyan or dong hanzang shuangyu), or even more basic, to be merely ‘familiar with Tibetan’ (shuxi zangyu). Such
positions are essentially open to any Tibetan with spoken language capabilities, which would apply to even the many so-called ‘sinicised’ Tibetans who went through all Chinese-medium education. In fact, as argued by Zenz (2013) in the case of Qinghai, sinicised applicants who at times merely retain a ‘shell’ of what the Tibetan community considers to constitute ‘Tibetanness’ are often the government’s favourite solicitors for such positions. Indeed, many positions that mandate an understanding of Tibetan specify either a degree that cannot be studied in a Tibetan department (e.g. law or economics), or even specify a Chinese language degree. All of these are included in the figures for Tibetan-medium positions in this study.

The situation is additionally complicated by the fact that some Han and members of other ethnic groups who grow up in Tibetan areas might be able to speak Tibetan with various degrees of competency, and a few of them even go through the Tibetan-medium education system. This occurs mainly in Tibetan regions in Sichuan and Qinghai. However, their numbers are fairly low and exam results indicate that they are typically unsuccessful in competing with Tibetans for (various types of) Tibetan-medium jobs, although there are some notable exceptions. 46

Consequently, a definition of ‘Tibetan-medium jobs’ has to carefully take into account all of these variations. For the purposes of this article, we distinguish between only two types of employment: firstly, ‘Tibetan-medium degree’ jobs that explicitly require applicants to have completed a Tibetan-medium tertiary degree. Secondly, Tibetan-medium jobs which mandate applicants to hold various levels of Tibetan language competency. This category is very broad, but we opted against breaking it down into further categories since local requirements vary widely, rendering cross-regional comparison extremely complicated at a more specified level of analysis.

2.5 Data analysis and challenges

The analysis of recruitment advertisements is not always entirely straightforward. Whereas the vast majority of positions advertised specific numbers of jobs for each degree requirement, at times multiple possible tertiary degrees were specified for a job category. In these cases, we have assumed that each degree specified was allocated an equal share for the job posting, e.g. if fifty jobs were advertised for a range of five possible degrees, we assume that each degree was allocated ten jobs. This is of course an approximation, although it was mostly limited to a few positions advertised in TAR documents from 2007-09.

A second problem stems from job adverts that do not differentiate between teaching levels or Tibetan language or university degree requirements. This was mainly the case for public service teacher recruitment in Gannan TAP, where primary and secondary teaching positions were not clearly distinguished, nor were Tibetan language teaching positions versus Tibetan-medium teaching positions of other (non-language) subjects.

46 An example is a Ganzi teacher recruitment (tegang) exam outcome discussed further below.
A third challenge arises from the complexity with which intakes occur, especially the public service intakes. The easiest and least error-prone region for data analysis is the TAR given that recruitment for both civil and public service positions occurs through one central document in two annual intakes. An exception took place in 2008, when there were three intakes, of which only the first was adequately documented. Consequently, we have overall figures, but no reliable disaggregated information about public service employment for the TAR for that year. Otherwise, the situation can be substantially more complicated in other regions. In Qinghai, civil service and tegang teacher recruitment is advertised in one annual batch for the entire province. However, public service recruitment occurs by prefecture, at times in multiple intakes. Since 2013, Qinghai’s public service teacher recruitment has been advertised centrally for the entire province. The data gathering is additionally complicated by the fact that, for all regions besides the TAR, some prefectural civil and public service jobs are advertised in provincial intakes, which are separately advertised by institutional category (e.g. law enforcement etc.). The implication is that civil and public service figures besides those of the TAR are potentially incomplete, although based on extensive searches on relevant government sites as well as the Chinese internet in general over the past four years, we believe that a majority of positions are reflected in our summaries.

The recruitment analysis for Qinghai is additionally complicated by the fact that Tibetans make up only about a quarter of the population of the province, concentrated in multiple prefectures and counties (most of which are Tibetan autonomous areas). In order to group these areas, we use the term ‘Qinghai Tibetan Majority Areas,’ or Qinghai TMAs for short, defined as including any TAP or Tibetan Autonomous County (TAC) with a Tibetan population that is more than 50 percent of the total population (adapted from Zenz 2013). This includes the TAPs of Hainan (Chabcha), Huangnan (Malho), Golog, and Yushu, and the TACs of Gangca (Gangchha; in Haibei TAP) and Tianjun (Thenchu; in Haixi MTAP). The Tibetan share of the total population of these Qinghai TMAs was 81 percent in the 2010 census.

The reason for not including other regions with a lower Tibetan population share is to enable a realistic analysis of Tibetan representation in areas that are definitively Tibetan (in the present) and hence that would have strong legitimacy in advocating for greater representation in public employment. Moreover, Zenz (2013) found that job postings that specify Tibetan-medium criteria tend to be very limited or even non-existent in

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47 Note that Zenz (2013) uses the term ‘Tibetan Majority Regions’, although we have opted for the term ‘Areas’ rather than ‘Regions’ given that the latter is connoted as a provincial level of jurisdiction, e.g. the TAR.

48 The Mongolians of Henan County in Huangnan TAP were included in the Tibetan population count, because for all practical purposes they are like Tibetans in terms of Tibetan-medium education and employment. At tertiary institutions in Xining, the other Tibetans consider them to be linguistically and culturally ‘Tibetan’ (see Zenz, 2013). However, Monguors were not included, although of course this could be subject to debate (as it was between the two authors).

49 These include the rest of the counties in Haibei and Haixi TAPs, or else counties in Haidong Prefecture that have substantial albeit minority Tibetan populations such as Ping’an, Minhe, Huzhu, and especially Hualong and Xunhua.
Tibetan populated areas that are not governed by a higher-level (county or prefecture) Tibetan autonomous entity, such as Hualong Country in Haidong Prefecture. For instance, despite Tibetans accounting just under a quarter of the population of Xunhua County, only a very small fraction of its job postings have specified Tibetan-medium criteria.

Similarly in Sichuan, not a single Tibetan-medium government position was advertised between 2010-14 in Muli TAC, which is part of a non-Tibetan prefecture in Sichuan. For this reason, this paper defines the Sichuan TMAs as only consisting of Aba (Ngawa) and Ganzi (Kardze) TAPs. Likewise, only Gannan TAP in Gansu Province is included in this analysis as a TMA. Deqin (Dechen) TAP in Yunnan Province was excluded given the poor quality of the published public recruitment data.

In the Tibetan areas of Sichuan, the data situation is very similar to Qinghai, except that civil service positions are advertised by prefecture. Some local civil service positions are also advertised in prefecture documents published by different institutions, typically with respect to jobs in the local taxation system (dishui xitong), the commerce system, the prison and re-education system (jianyu laojiao xitong) and the quality supervision system (zhijian xitong). Another difference with Qinghai is that there were multiple intakes within each prefecture in some years. The documentation for Gannan is essentially the same as for Qinghai.

Generally, the task of comprehensively categorizing and summing job postings for each Tibetan region is complex, time-consuming and prone to errors. While it is impossible to guarantee that all data presented here is complete and accurate, significant efforts were made on our side to compile figures that adequately reflect the officially published situation of public employment in these Tibetan areas.

3 Evaluating public employment recruitment outcomes and Tibetan representation

The analysis of these data is best started with the more partial data on recruitment outcomes. While these are much more limited, they nonetheless provide some very valuable and rare insights into actual Tibetan representation in recent employment, or at least in recruitments. The data on job recruitment advertisements, by contrast, allow for an analysis of formal institutional practices of preferential recruitment. As discussed in the next section, these formal institutional practices fall into two categories: Tibetan-medium requirements and local residency requirements. They influence Tibetan representation in the outcomes in very significant ways, even though they do not explain the totality of these outcomes, hence the logic of starting with the more limited outcome insights in this section.

The analysis of recruitment outcomes in this study is based on a sample of 24 outcome documents, including Aba (2 documents, from 2011 and 2013), Ganzi (10 from 2011-14), the TAR (2 from 2007 and 2008), and the Qinghai

50 See Fischer (2014, p.114-17).
51 Not all of these categories were represented in each year.
TMAs (10 from 2009-15). This sample gives a disproportionate weight to Ganzi (31 percent of observed outcomes versus a population share of 16 percent), although the other regions represented correspond roughly to their population weight within the sample. The sample is also temporally imbalanced, particularly in terms of the TAR where the character of the outcomes probably changed significantly from 2011 onwards. However, there is no alternative given that these are the documents that provide adequate outcome data and we are fairly confident that the sample is roughly representative of the overall outcomes, especially for Tibetan areas outside of the TAR. The TAR stopped providing outcome data after 2008, although as discussed in the next section, they reintroduced job guarantees in 2011, which mostly likely sets its trends apart from other Tibetan areas from that year onwards.

As discussed above, some of these documents only show if the applicant is a minority (versus Han), without indicating the exact minority. In these cases the population share of all minorities is used to calculate the representativity ratio (see below). Later, in the discussion of Tibetan-medium specifications in the recruitment advertisements, the population share of Tibetans only is used, given that this is the relevant reference group for assessing Tibetan-medium jobs and graduates. Two of the documents (both from Hainan) only showed intermediate outcomes, i.e. the applicants who advanced to the interview stage, but not those who were actually recruited. In these two cases, we focused on applicants who secured the top interview spots, correspondent to the number of positions available, as a reasonable approximation of the applicants who were most likely hired (indicated in the second column of the table as ‘t’).

As shown in table 2, the share of Tibetan (or minority) applicants who were recruited (or who were top placed after the written exam) in the aggregated sum of these 24 documents averaged 69 percent of the total. A representativity ratio can be calculated by normalising this recruitment share by the Tibetan (or minority) population share, whereby a ratio of one indicates a recruitment share that is on par with the population share. A ratio of less than one indicates underrepresentation and more than one indicates overrepresentation. The representativity ratio of these 24 documents was 0.83, meaning a small but significant underrepresentation of Tibetan (or minority) recruitment in public employment relative to the Tibetan (or minority) population share (parity is represented by a ratio of one).

Some underrepresentation is to be expected given the marginalised and disadvantaged status of Tibetans and other minorities, such as their much lower levels of schooling, in addition to other structural and institutional considerations including discrimination. Indeed, although a strong preferential or affirmative action policy might seek to attain a ratio of more than one as a means to redress underrepresentation inherited from the past, such policies more generally tend to result in lessening the extent of severe underrepresentation. In this light, the representativity ratio of 0.83 might in fact be indicative of a significant degree of preferentiality in recruitments,

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52 For more discussion on preferential and affirmative action policies, see the conclusion in Fischer (2014).
whether through language criteria specifications or other practices, given that
in the absence of such practices, underrepresentation could well have been
worse (as observed, for instance, in the 2003 staff and worker data for the
TAR, as discussed above). Nonetheless, all else held constant, such an
underrepresentation of hiring overtime would gradually erode Tibetan (or
minority) representation over time; the result is perhaps better than what more
pessimistic views would speculate, although it is also not sufficient to address
chronic historical underrepresentation of Tibetans in the public employment of
the regions where they are dominant.

### TABLE 2
Summary of recruitment outcomes from 24 documents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recruitment place and sectors *</th>
<th>minzu/ result **</th>
<th>Total hired (or top placed)</th>
<th>Tib/min share of hired</th>
<th>Tib/min repres. ratio</th>
<th>Tib-med share of adverts</th>
<th>Tib-med share of hired</th>
<th>Share of Tib. hired for Tib-med jobs</th>
<th>Tib/min. pop. share (2010 cen-sus)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aba 2011 c/s</td>
<td>Tib/hired</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>54% +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aba 2013 legang teachers</td>
<td>Tib/hired</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>54% +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gangca TAC 2012 p/s teachers</td>
<td>min/hired</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ganzi 2011/2013-14 p/s health-related</td>
<td>Tib/hired</td>
<td>842</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ganzi 2012-2 c/s</td>
<td>Tib/hired</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ganzi 2013-1 c/s</td>
<td>Tib/hired</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ganzi 2014-1 c/s</td>
<td>Tib/hired</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ganzi 2014-2 c/s</td>
<td>Tib/hired</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ganzi 2012-14 legang teachers</td>
<td>Tib/hired</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golog 2014 c/s</td>
<td>Min/hired</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golog 2014 legang teachers</td>
<td>n.i./hired</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golog 2013 p/s teachers</td>
<td>min/hired</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golog 2015 p/s teachers</td>
<td>Tib/hired</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hainan 2009 c/s</td>
<td>min/top</td>
<td>25*</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hainan 2011-12 p/s teachers</td>
<td>min/top</td>
<td>49*</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huangnan 2014 c/s</td>
<td>min/hired</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huangnan 2014 legang teachers</td>
<td>Tib/hired</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAR 2007 (all sectors)</td>
<td>Tib/hired</td>
<td>2336</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAR 2008 (all sectors)</td>
<td>Tib/hired</td>
<td>1262</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All documents</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7253</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All docs (excluding TAR)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3655</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* c/s signifies civil service; p/s public service;
** Tib indicates that Tibetans were specified in the document; min means that minorities were
generically specified, hence all minorities are included in the calculations; hired signifies that
the document specifies the final outcome of actual hires/recruitments, whereas top signifies
the candidates in top positions after the written exam (correspondent to the number of
available positions) in the case of documents that only give the results of the written exam. N.i. indicates that no minzu information was indicated.

^ Because actual hires are not indicated, the number of advertisements is used as a rough estimate of the hires and is indicated in parenthesis. This would slightly overestimate the actual hires in these cases.

* Includes rGyalrong Tibetans.

** The average of all documents only includes documents with available data for the column.

_Sources: see appendix._

This being said, actual changes in Tibetan representation would depend on what was happening to the other unobserved variables, e.g. the ethnic composition of retirements and transfers out of the region. For instance, in the case of the TAR, it is likely that transfers out of the province are disproportionately non-Tibetan and hence compensating for the underrepresentation in recruitments. Indeed, the data presented in figure 4 suggest that this might have been the case in 2014 given that estimated recruitments were 9,720 (and had been higher than this for the two previous years) but changes in state-owned unit employment only amounted to 794 employees, suggesting an strong attrition of about 10,000 employees in that year. If the attrition was disproportionately composed of non-Tibetans, then it could have easily compensated for the less than parity Tibetan representation in the recruitments, with a net effect of increasing Tibetan representation in the stock of public employment. However, all of this is speculative given that we do have access to data that would allow us to evaluation such dynamics.

Another point worth considering is that, with the revival of public hiring at least in the TAR, a slight underrepresentation in public employment actually corresponds to an increase in the share of Tibetan public employment in the overall local labour force, particularly among the age cohorts that have been graduating around the time of these policy changes. Indeed, based on the estimates of graduate recruitments in the late fenpei period, shown above in figure 4 (see footnote 35 for methods of estimation), and comparing this to the size of the respective age cohort (22 years old), it is clear that the TAR was annually recruiting a higher percentage of 22 year olds into public employment from 2011 onwards than during the late fenpei years. For instance, using the advertisement data and assuming an 85 percent hiring rate (which was the average in the outcome sample), recruitments in 2015 amounted to almost 17 percent of the 22-year old cohort in that year (and a peak of 22 percent in 2012), compared to an equivalent ratio of 12 percent in 2006 (which would have been the peak of fenpei recruitments based on increasing enrolments and graduations during that period). It is also noteworthy that this ratio fell to only 3.7 percent immediately following the phasing out of fenpei in 2007, and only 6 percent in 2008, which offers some insights into the very austere employment conditions facing graduates during these transitional years, just before the outbreak of large-scale protests in Lhasa and elsewhere in 2008.

Similar comparisons for the Tibetan regions outside the TAR are rendered difficult given the lack of equivalent data for the late fenpei period. Nonetheless,

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53 This was calculated for the population aged 22 at the time of the fenpei graduation year using the 5-year cohort averages from the 2010 census (Tabulation 2012).
at the provincial level, Qinghai’s ratio of fenpei recruitment to 22-year old cohort in the early 2000s, when fenpei was being phased out there, was probably around 9 percent, whereas in 2014, the province’s ratio increased slightly about 11 percent. For the Qinghai TMAs, the ratio was quite low in 2011, at around six percent, but jumped to close to 17 percent by 2015, similar to the TAR level. Again, the low ratio in 2011 might give some insights in the graduate employment conditions surrounding the on-going manifestations of protest in these years following the 2008 protests in these areas.

Returning to the outcome results above and questions of representation, the Tibetan shares of the recruitment outcomes do not reveal any particular pattern across regions, sectors, or years. For instance, by excluding the TAR from the sample, the Tibetan share of hires was slightly lower (63%), but the representativity ratio was the same (0.83) given a lower Tibetan population share than in the TAR. In terms of range, the representativity ratios were as low as 0.66 for the second round of the 2012 Ganzi civil service intake, 0.70 for the 2014 Ganzi civil service intake (for all minorities), or 0.78 for the 2007 TAR intake (all sectors), while they were as high as 0.91 for the 2008 TAR intake,54 1.01 for the 2009 Hainan civil service intake (for all minorities), 1.21 for the first round of the 2014 Ganzi civil service intake, and 1.30 for the 2012 Gangca public service teachers intake. In other words, both lower and higher than average ratios are observed in the same area and in both civil service and teacher recruitments.

It is worth noting that Tibetan shares of Tibetan-medium jobs that are slightly below 100 percent are to be expected given that some non-Tibetan minorities, such as Mongolians and Monguors (Ch. Tu), have become highly Tibetanised, meaning that they are native Tibetan speakers. Some Han who grow up in Tibetan regions also speak Tibetan, although by and large the non-Tibetan recuitees for Tibetan-medium jobs are mostly from these other minorities rather than the Han. The only notable exceptions in our data were from the 2011 and 2013 Ganzi public service health intake, in which about 25 percent of all Tibetan-medium positions were filled by Han applicants even though there was a Tibetan language exam, and the first 2013 Ganzi civil service intake, in which 24 percent of those recruited into Tibetan-medium positions were Han. In the two health sector intakes, the language exam only made up 10 percent of the total written score and the associated jobs could typically be performed without significant Tibetan language skills, in contrast to Tibetan-medium teaching jobs. In the first 2013 civil service intake there was no Tibetan language exam despite the specification of Tibetan-medium. Besides these exceptions, however, Tibetans filled positions mandating some kind of Tibetan language ability in most cases.

54 The increase in the TAR from 2007 to 2008 might reflect normal variation, although the timing is conspicuous given that the uprising occurred in March/April while the second intake in 2008 occurred in September. In the aftermath of the uprising, the number of Han applicants from either inside or outside the TAR might have fallen, particularly considering that recruitment postings only increased moderately, whereas the change in state-owned unit staff and worker employment in that year was actually less than the recruitment postings, as shown in figure 4 above.
Tibetan-medium job specifications also do not necessarily guarantee that those hired are graduates with Tibetan-medium tertiary degrees – this usually requires stricter criteria. For instance, in the first 2013 Ganzi civil service intake mentioned above, 92 percent of the positions required applicants to have Tibetan language skills, but there was no related Tibetan-medium tertiary degree requirement and only 8.4 percent of the Tibetans recruited held such a degree. In contrast, the 2012 Ganzi tegang teacher recruitment required Tibetan-medium degrees for Tibetan teaching positions. Correspondingly, all of those hired for these positions had such a degree. Inversely, those with Tibetan-medium degrees often do not succeed in securing jobs that do not require such degrees. For example, only one of the 21 recruited applicants who had Tibetan-medium tertiary degrees in the Ganzi 2012 outcome secured a position that did not require such degrees. Similarly, none of the Tibetan-medium degree graduates who applied for positions not specifically requiring such degrees in Aba’s 2011 civil service recruitment even secured an interview place. Nonetheless, as noted above, Tibetan-medium positions do appear to promote the more general employment of Tibetans even without the specification Tibetan-medium degree requirements. Indeed, applicants with Tibetan-medium degrees generally only apply for positions that at least require bilingualism, rather than attempting to compete for positions without any language preferentiality. This highlights the importance of bilingual positions in supporting Tibetan-medium education and also the degree to which they provide relatively protected niches of Tibetan employment. They also reflect the degree of local government political commitment and priority that is given to supporting Tibetan linguistic development. All types of Tibetan-medium job postings are thus important subjects of research in their own right, even if they only cover part of total Tibetan recruitment.

3.1 Recruitment outcomes versus advertisements

Comparing the outcomes to corresponding job advertisements, many more Tibetans were consistently recruited than the number of job postings with language or degree-type requirements (with a few exceptions). This points to a certain floor of Tibetan hiring that takes places irrespective of preferentiality through Tibetan medium requirements. For all of the documents, the share of Tibetans recruited (69 percent) was double the Tibetan-medium share of adverts or hires (both 34 percent); without the TAR, the difference is less, but still large (e.g. 63 percent versus 41 percent for adverts and 46 percent for hires. Moreover, Tibetans/minorities were hired for 58 percent of the non-

55 Likewise, in the 2011 Aba civil service exam, only 7.1 percent of all hired Tibetan applicants had graduated with a Tibetan-medium degree (whereas 22.9 percent had pursued a Chinese language-related degree, while the rest held degrees such as finance, accounting or law). Note that between 2010-2014, only Aba’s 2011 civil service exam results provided applicants’ minority status.

56 For example, in Ganzi’s 2011 civil service exam (second intake), all applicants with a Tibetan-medium degree applied for a Tibetan-medium position even though none of these positions mandated a Tibetan-medium degree. None of them attempted to compete for a regular position. As a result, Tibetans made up 76.5 percent of all interview candidates for all positions, but only 36.4 percent of candidates for non-Tibetan-medium positions.
Tibetan-medium positions in the aggregated sample, which likewise substantiates this floor of hiring.

A detailed breakdown by document or groups of documents is shown in figure 5, based on the data from table 2 and ordered from lowest to highest share of Tibetans hired. With the exception of the first 2013 Ganzi civil service intake and the combined 2011 and 2013 Ganzi public service health related intakes, the Tibetan share of outcomes was substantially higher than the Tibetan-medium share of job postings in all of the other cases. The difference was huge in some cases, such as the 2013 Aba tegang teachers intake, in which no Tibetan-medium positions were posted, but where 48 percent of the jobs were given to Tibetans (for a 54 percent Tibetan population share, hence a representativity ratio of 0.87 or close to parity). Similarly, in the second 2012 Ganzi civil service intake, Tibetans accounted 52 percent of those actually hired (for a Tibetan population share of 78 percent, and hence a representativity ratio of 0.66), even though only three percent of job postings had Tibetan-medium requirements. Indeed, the floor for the Tibetan share of actual recruitments is evidenced by the fact that the share of Tibetans hired fell only slightly below 50 percent in only two instances (both in Aba), even in cases where there was little or no preferential language or degree requirements (although minorities would have nonetheless benefited slightly from the added points to the written exam results, e.g. one point in the case of Ganzi).

FIGURE 5
Tibetan share of hiring outcomes versus Tibetan-medium share of advertisements

Overall, this shows that Tibetan medium requirements have been part of a wider variety of practices that have been securing Tibetan representation, resulting in more representative outcomes than the language specifications would imply, even though such representation has nonetheless been below parity in most cases. The Tibetan-medium positions nonetheless help bolster these shares given that, within the aggregated subsample of 21 outcome documents that contained Tibetan-medium job type information, ethnic
Tibetans/minorities were hired for 84 percent of bilingual positions and 99 percent of the positions requiring Tibetan-medium degrees. Residency requirements help to explain part of the discrepancy, although not all (in particular because they often overlap with the Tibetan-medium requirements). Part is explained by the fact that some Tibetans simply compete well for non-preferential positions (such as those graduating from the mainstream Chinese-medium universities) or else that there is a lack of non-Tibetan competition for certain types of jobs (such civil servants in remote areas). Part is also explained by informal practices such as corruption or nepotism in many of these areas.

The job postings data are nonetheless very useful to examine in addition to the outcome data for several reasons. One is that they offer a much more representative set of data given that the coverage of regions and years is much more comprehensive. Moreover, higher shares of job postings with preferential criteria generally correspond to higher Tibetan shares of actual recruitments, as can be observed in figure 5. In addition, as noted above, the average Tibetan-medium share of total job postings across the outcome sample was almost the same as the Tibetan-medium share of actual recruitments in these samples (34 percent in both cases for the whole sample, or 41 percent versus 46 percent excluding the TAR, as shown in figure 2). The share of Tibetans hired in these positions is also consistently high, as noted above, at 85 percent for the whole sample (or 82 percent excluding the TAR). As a result of all these considerations, the Tibetan-medium share of job postings gives a reliable indication of at least the minimum number of Tibetans that would be hired in a particular round of recruitment.

4 Recruitment advertisements: preferentiality by Tibetan language requirements

The very substantial body of advertised recruitment data is summarised in table 3, with a focus on Tibetan-medium job postings for each year from 2007 to 2015 and for all regions on which this analysis was based (the TAR, Ganzi TAP, Aba TQAP, Amdo Qinghai, Yushu TAP, and Gannan TAP). The total for each year and region is subdivided according to three employment types (civil service, public service excluding teachers, and teachers), and these totals and subtotals are also shown for the subcategories of Tibetan-medium jobs (i.e. a job with any Tibetan-language specification) and again for the more

57 Note that differences in these shares of advertisements versus actual recruitments depends on the rate at which positions are filled in the Tibetan-medium and non-Tibetan medium categories. For instance, across all the samples, an average of 76 percent of all advertised Tibetan-medium positions and 82 percent of all advertised positions were filled (or 89 percent and 84 percent excluding the TAR). The proportion of the advertised Tibetan-medium jobs that were actually awarded in the TAR in 2007 was unusually low, at only 47 percent. However, this is arguably not representative of later practice in the TAR, given that from 2012 onwards the TAR held additional (second) intake rounds for unfilled positions, which would have significantly boosted actual recruitment outcome shares. For instance, in the second intake for the TAR in 2014, 980 vacant positions were re-posted after the initial recruitment, of which 302 were filled. In the first 2015 intake, 1275 vacant positions were re-posted, resulting in 977 previous applicants who reached the minimum points threshold in this round. Based on various extrapolations, we can assume that a large proportion of them were hired.
specific sub-category of Tibetan-medium degree jobs (i.e. jobs that require a Tibetan-medium degree).

A general overview for each region is provided in a separate table, based on the aggregated, non-population-adjusted data, followed by a comparison of the results across regions. As with the previous section, it is also important to recall that these measures only offer insights into current intakes and do not give any information on the pre-existing stock or previous intakes. For instance, lower intakes in the beginning of the period studied might have been preceded by higher intakes before data was available, as is suggested by the fenpei estimate shown in figure 4. Or else lower intakes in one region might correspond with a higher stock inherited from the past in that region, compared to other regions. Hence caution must be exercised in interpreting trends or comparisons across regions from these data.

### TABLE 3a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All jobs</td>
<td>3,200</td>
<td>4,648</td>
<td>5,500</td>
<td>4,680</td>
<td>10,313</td>
<td>13,400</td>
<td>11,559</td>
<td>10,800</td>
<td>10,010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil service</td>
<td>1,383</td>
<td>2,084</td>
<td>2,859</td>
<td>1,471</td>
<td>4,160</td>
<td>3,885</td>
<td>2,745</td>
<td>2,055</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public service (no teachers)</td>
<td>617</td>
<td>1,911</td>
<td>2,156</td>
<td>2,784</td>
<td>4,409</td>
<td>7,795</td>
<td>6,438</td>
<td>6,310</td>
<td>5,838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>653</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>1,744</td>
<td>1,720</td>
<td>2,376</td>
<td>2,435</td>
<td>2,172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... All Tibetan-medium jobs</td>
<td>808</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>572</td>
<td>472</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... as share of all jobs</td>
<td>25.3%</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil service</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public service (no teachers)</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>210</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>227</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... as share of all jobs</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil service</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public service (no teachers)</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>207</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>227</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese-degree (all jobs)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>216</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** see appendix.

Public sector recruitment in the TAR (table 3a) was reinvigorated in 2011, corresponding to the policy shift announced by the TAR government in that year to (re-)guarantee graduate employment, as discussed in the introduction and in the next section. Advertised recruitments approximately doubled, from a plateau of around 5,000 a year from 2008 to 2010, to over 10,000 a year from 2011 up until the most recent data for 2015. As discussed above with respect to figure 4, the estimated level of fenpei-related recruitments in the final years of fenpei up to 2006 was higher than the trough from 2007 to 2010.

Correspondingly, the resurgence of public sector hiring from 2011 onwards would partly represent a return to previous levels of hiring, augmented by the higher numbers of tertiary graduates, and might have also been compensating for the shortfalls that occurred in the years immediately following the end of fenpei. The increase occurred across all job categories, although besides a civil service hiring surge in 2011-12, the strongest sustained increases were in the administratively less powerful and also less costly public
service category (including teachers), especially from 2012 onwards. The share of public service adverts (not including teachers) in particular increased from 19 percent of the total in 2007 to 58 percent in 2012 and remained at that share up to 2015.

In contrast to this general hiring surge, the Tibetan medium job adverts remained very limited and even fell in number relative to 2007 (again, we cannot speak of trends before 2007 because of a lack of prior data). In the context of the general hiring surge, Tibetan-medium share of adverts fell from around one quarter in 2007 to below 5 percent from 2010 onwards (except in 2014, when the share was slightly above 5 percent). Also, since 2010 almost all of these Tibetan-medium adverts were specifically for positions that required a Tibetan-medium degree. Indeed, all of the Tibetan-medium civil service and teaching adverts fell into this case during these years. This indicates that Tibetan-medium positions came to be restricted to only specialized niches that explicitly required Tibetan-medium degrees, such as translation or teaching Tibetan literature.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 3b</th>
<th>Ganzi TAP recruitment advertisements by year, region, and employment categories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All jobs</td>
<td>1,917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil service</td>
<td>399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public service (no teachers)</td>
<td>876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... All Tibetan-medium jobs</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... as share of all jobs</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil service</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public service (no teachers)</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.... Tib-med. degree jobs</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.... as share of all jobs</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil service</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public service (no teachers)</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese-degree (all jobs)</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: see appendix.

While the trends in Ganzi (table 3b) were not as clear as in the TAR, there was a definite increase in advertisements in 2012 relative to 2010-11, which peaked in 2013, although this largely represented a return back to the level in 2009, before which we do not have data. Indeed, by 2015 the advertisements had fallen below the level in 2009. Ganzi is also one of the regions with a strong Tibetan-medium component, although the Tibetan-medium share of all jobs nonetheless fell sharply and, relative to 2009, the fall was also nominal in 2014-15. Besides one spike in 2013, Tibetan medium degree jobs were consistently in the range of six to seven percent of all jobs, which was relatively minor but more than in the TAR.
The trends in Aba TQAP (table 3c), also in Sichuan, were less clear. There appears to have been a slight increase in 2011-12, and then a one-off spike in 2014, although this petered out by 2015. Moreover, the spike in 2014 was in large part due to a tripling of civil service recruitments in that year. Tibetan medium positions were much more limited than in Ganzi (between seven and ten percent throughout), and Tibetan medium degree positions were even more limited, generally at less than half of the Tibetan medium positions. These latter levels were similar to the TAR, probably reflecting the similar niche role of Tibetan medium degree positions in this prefecture.

Table 3c
Aba TQAP recruitment advertisements by year, region, and employment categories

<table>
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<tr>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>All jobs</td>
<td>3,164</td>
<td>1,711</td>
<td>1,646</td>
<td>3,562</td>
<td>4,642</td>
<td>3,398</td>
<td>3,054</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil service</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>1,172</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>842</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>983</td>
<td>3,284</td>
<td>1,199</td>
<td>568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public service (no teachers)</td>
<td>1,206</td>
<td>1,172</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>842</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>983</td>
<td>3,284</td>
<td>1,199</td>
<td>568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>786</td>
<td>668</td>
<td>518</td>
<td>1,706</td>
<td>1,430</td>
<td>1,045</td>
<td>964</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... All Tibetan-medium jobs</td>
<td>3,138</td>
<td>872</td>
<td>873</td>
<td>1,028</td>
<td>1,154</td>
<td>1,522</td>
<td>568</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... as share of all jobs</td>
<td>51.8%</td>
<td>51.0%</td>
<td>43.1%</td>
<td>41.4%</td>
<td>36.6%</td>
<td>30.9%</td>
<td>19.9%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil service</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>646</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public service (no teachers)</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>115</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
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<td>701</td>
<td>682</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>115</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>231</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>210</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... as share of all jobs</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil service</td>
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<td>32</td>
<td>283</td>
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<td>35</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>58</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>74</td>
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<td>52</td>
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<td>234</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>123</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Chinese-degree (all jobs)</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>162</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: see appendix

Table 3d
Amdo Qinghai recruitment adverts by year, region, and employment categories

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All jobs</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>864</td>
<td>1,547</td>
<td>712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil service</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>864</td>
<td>1,547</td>
<td>712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public service (no teachers)</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>864</td>
<td>1,547</td>
<td>712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>778</td>
<td>492</td>
<td>1,230</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>... All Tibetan-medium jobs</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>938</td>
<td>725</td>
<td>1,188</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... as share of all jobs</td>
<td>27.6%</td>
<td>30.6%</td>
<td>41.4%</td>
<td>29.2%</td>
<td>36.1%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil service</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>217</td>
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<td>Public service (no teachers)</td>
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<td>52</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>217</td>
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<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>659</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... Tib-med. degree jobs</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>211</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... as share of all jobs</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil service</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public service (no teachers)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>172</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese-degree (all jobs)</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>311</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: see appendix
The Amdo Qinghai region (table 3d) differs from the two prefectures in Sichuan in terms of a definite sharp increase in recruitments from 2013 onwards, although from a low level in 2011-12 and also from what appears to have been quite low levels before this, from the perspective of the civil service advertisements, which are the only ones available before 2011. The increase up to 2014 was due to a sharp increase in civil service positions from 2012-14, whereas public service job advertisements actually declined between 2013 and 2014, although the latter and teaching advertisements then surged in 2015, while civil service advertisements halved. Moreover, as noted in the comparative section below, the one-off surge in civil service hiring in 2014 was almost entirely due to advertisements for security sector related positions, i.e. those in the prison system, legal system (courts etc.), law enforcement, police forces (including special police units) and public security.58

The Tibetan medium trend was also opposite to that of Ganzi, increasing to over 50 percent of advertisements in 2015, and the increase was spread fairly evenly across all three job categories. The Tibetan medium degree share was fairly marginal, similar to the other regions above, although the nominal increase in 2015 was substantial. These were concentrated in teaching and to a lesser extent in non-teaching public service, and very few occurred in the civil service. Nonetheless, given that Qinghai has been very much leading the way in terms of the development of Tibetan medium tertiary degrees (see Zenz 2013), with an estimated total of 3,980 Tibetan-medium degree graduates between 2011 and 2015,59 even the total number of 211 Tibetan medium degree job advertisements in 2015 appears was starkly inadequate to meet the demand for such jobs generated by the Tibetan-medium tertiary education system.

The data for Yushu (table 3e) are similarly limited in time frame and they appear to show an increasing trend in 2014-15. The Tibetan-medium share of advertisements oscillated around one quarter of the total. The Tibetan-medium degree share was the highest among all of these regions, although it fell sharply in 2014-15 and, like elsewhere, it was concentrated in teaching positions.

There was no significant upward trend of job advertisements in Gannan (table 3f), particularly in light of the collapse in hiring that occurred in 2015, which was due to a freeze on non-teaching public service recruitments and a sharp reduction in teaching recruitments. The prefecture had already announced that it would strictly limit local government job allocations in order to reduce unnecessary human resource expenses, and the drop in 2015 is explicitly a result of that decision.60

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58 The Chinese names for security-related recruitment categories are fayuan xitong, sifa xitong, gang’an jiancha, renmin jingcha, tejian jingcha (or tejing), zhifa dadui etc.

59 Tibetan-medium graduate figures are estimated from new student intake figures of Qinghai residents in Tibetan-medium programmes across the country, obtained from the new student intake documents (Ch. zhaoxue jihua) of each respective tertiary institution.

TABLE 3e
Yushu TAP Recruitment advertisements by year, region, and employment categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil service</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public service (no teachers)</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>544</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>613</td>
<td>527</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>559</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>... All Tibetan-medium jobs</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>272</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>... as share of all jobs</td>
<td>29.6%</td>
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<td>23.0%</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
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<td>Teachers</td>
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<td>239</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>111</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>... Tibet-med. degree jobs</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>111</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... as share of all jobs</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Civil service</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public service (no teachers)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>26</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>85</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese-degree (all jobs)</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: see appendix

TABLE 3f
Gannan TAP Recruitment adverts by year, region, and employment categories

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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil service</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>162</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>883</td>
<td>1,506</td>
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<td>116</td>
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<tr>
<td>... All Tibetan-medium jobs</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>83</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... as share of all jobs</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>29.9%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil service</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public service (no teachers)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... Tibet-med. degree jobs</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... as share of all jobs</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil service</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public service (no teachers)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese-degree (all jobs)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: see appendix

4.1 Comparative Analysis

For comparison, the results are normalised by population in order to facilitate cross-regional comparison, based on presenting the recruitment advertisements per 100,000 people (drawing from the 2010 census data, which provides for a superior measure of population than the annual surveys – see Fischer 2008). The population-normalised measures are calculated using the general population for overall recruitments, whereas the Tibetan population is used in the case of more specific Tibetan-medium recruitment. In terms of adjusting
Tibetan-medium shares of recruitment to their respective population weight, a measure similar to the representativity ratio of the previous outcome section is used: the shares of Tibetan-medium recruitment are divided by each region’s population share, resulting in ratio whereby one indicates that the share of Tibetan-medium recruitment postings out of total advertised recruitments is at parity with the Tibetan share of the population. This is not precisely a representativity measure given that, as analysed previously, significant numbers of Tibetan are hired in non-Tibetan-medium positions, although it nonetheless allows for an evaluation of the availability of Tibetan-medium recruitments relative to Tibetan population share.

From this normalised perspective, it is clear that the recruitment numbers of the TAR were very much within the wider regional norm at the beginning and end of this period of nine years, as shown in figure 6. The TAR was only exceptional insofar as it led the general surge in hiring by one to three years (in comparison to the Ganzi, Amdo Qinghai, and Yushu respectively). With the exception of the sudden fall in Gannan in 2015 and the volatility in Aba, the general trend converged towards a higher plateau roughly in the range of 250-
350 recruitment advertisements per 100,000 people. If we would simply take the averages for each main province (the TAR, Sichuan and Qinghai), the Tibetan majority areas of Qinghai converged with the TAR by 2015, at around 350 advertisements per 100,000 people, whereas those of the Sichuan TMAs fell to just under 250. The weighted average of all regions rose from 253 to 326 advertisements per 100,000 between 2011 and 2014. TAR recruitment level after the 2011 surge was therefore not particularly high compared to the Qinghai and Sichuan TMAs, despite the fact that the TAR includes all provincial-level governance jobs in the total count (whereas province-level positions would be located outside the TMAs of Qinghai and Sichuan).

Several major distinctions in these data are worth highlighting. First, in terms of job categories, there was generally a higher share of teaching recruitments outside of the TAR, similar shares of civil service recruitments, although in both cases non-teaching public service recruitments constituted the largest share of overall advertisements (and, presumably, actual hiring as well).

Second, as mentioned above, the increase in civil service hiring outside of the TAR was substantially due to adverts for the security sector: the prison system, legal system (courts etc.), law enforcement, police forces (including special police units) and public security.63 These positions for all regions increased 3.3 times between 2011 and 2015, constituting 19 percent of all job advertisements in the TAR during these years, and 12 percent for all other regions. They accounted for a particularly high share of the increase in recruitment advertisements in all regions in 2012-13 and 2015. Security-related intakes in the TAR took place mostly within the public service, whereas they occurred almost exclusively in the civil service outside the TAR, where they constituted 49 percent of all advertised civil service positions in 2011-15.64 The highest security-related job posting share of all postings from 2011-15 was in Amdo Qinghai (24%), then TAR (19%), Yushu (15%), Ganzi (10%), Aba (9%) and Gannan (5%).

In terms of Tibetan-medium recruitment, several further distinctions are worth highlighting. First, only 12.7 percent of all advertised positions in all Tibetan areas from 2011 to 2015 required any form of Tibetan language skills, or 13,551 advertisements out of a total of 106,948 (see figure 7). Accounting for Tibetan population shares, this gave a representativity ratio of 0.17. This ratio is quite low considering that minority language requirements are legally stipulated.

Moreover, only about one-third (36 percent) of all Tibetan-medium positions mandated a Tibetan-medium college degree. Tibetans from the Chinese-medium education system would have been more likely to secure the remaining two-thirds of Tibetan-medium positions due to their superior Chinese language skills, as noted above. The low share of positions that were prioritized for Tibetan-medium degree holders reflects the specialized niche role of Tibetan minority education in China’s Tibetan regions. Indeed, the

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63 The Chinese names for security-related recruitment categories are fayuan xitong, sifa xitong, gang'an jiguan, renmin jingcha, teshu jingcha (or tejing), zhifa dadui etc.
64 In 2014 alone, security related positions accounted for 58 percent of all civil service advertisements and 21 percent of all adverts for Tibetan areas outside the TAR.
number of advertised positions requiring a Chinese language degree – or closely related degrees such as secretarial studies (Ch. wenmi) – was only slightly lower than that of Tibetan-medium degrees.

However, these results were strongly differentiated by region. This is shown in figure 8, based on the population adjusted representativity ratio of Tibetan-medium jobs in the total advertisements for each region, and figure 9, based on the representativity ratios for cumulated job advertisements from 2011-15 for each region and Tibetan-medium type. In the first case, the differentiation was especially marked in 2013 when there was a strong increase in bilingual jobs outside the TAR, in contrast to their continued marginalized role in the TAR since 2009, where 94 percent of all Tibetan-medium postings from 2011-15 required a Tibetan-medium degree. The other extreme was represented by Amdo Qinghai, where there was a strong surge in bilingual jobs but only 14 percent of these required Tibetan-medium degrees. The other regions fell in between these two extremes, although Ganzi fell sharply from the highest share of Tibetan-medium positions in 2009-10 and converged with the overall average and the share of Aba and Yushu by 2015. The trends in Gannan were more or less the same as in the TAR, including the decline of bilingual positions, versus a preserved niche role for a small number of Tibetan-medium degree positions. Overall, the average Tibetan-medium job share for all regions increased from 10 percent in 2011 to 14 percent in 2015 (or from a ratio of 0.13 to 0.18).
FIGURE 8
Regional representativity ratios of all advertised Tibetan-medium

In terms of the cumulated advertisements from 2011-15, as shown in figure 9, the regions can be roughly distinguished according three groups regarding total Tibetan-medium recruitment advertisements from 2011-15: Amdo Qinghai and Ganzi in the top group, Yushu and Aba in the middle, and Gannan and the TAR at the bottom. The regional differences were not nearly as pronounced for positions requiring Tibetan-medium degrees, although according to this measure, Gannan and the TAR also featured below-average shares. If measured per 100,000 population (not shown), these groupings would be the same in terms of Tibetan-medium advertisements, although in terms of Tibetan medium degree positions, the TAR actually advertised more per Tibetan capita than Amdo Qinghai given that it advertised significantly more overall jobs per capita than Amdo Qinghai between 2011-15, as shown above in figure 5. Indeed, as shown in table 3 above, the TAR emerged in 2014 and 2015 as by far the largest provider of Tibetan medium degree jobs in nominal terms despite the very marginal role that these jobs played in overall public recruitment in the TAR.

These regional differences and shifts over time reflect fundamentally different political attitudes towards the role of the Tibetan language in society and in the education system. All of the TAR’s bilingual positions in 2007 were for Tibetan-medium teachers in subjects other than the Tibetan language, and they made up 50 percent of all of that year’s total advertised teacher recruitment. At that time, the Tibetan language was therefore assigned a significant a role as a medium of educational instruction. However, the TAR did not advertise a single Tibetan-medium teaching job other than for Tibetan language instruction after 2009. In contrast, in Ganzi and especially in Amdo Qinghai, advertised bilingual teaching position have become more numerous than the ‘standard’ Tibetan language teaching jobs.
As a last note on Tibetan-medium positions, there was also variation between public employment categories. The teaching category occupied a dominant role, especially for Tibetan-medium degree postings, which is not surprising considering that Tibetan language teachers are required to hold a Tibetan-medium tertiary degree. For all regions, 3,027 out of the 4,857 Tibetan-medium degree job postings from 2011-15 were in teaching (62 percent), even though teaching positions made up only 25 percent of all advertised public jobs. In contrast, Tibetan-medium degree shares for the administratively more significant civil service were disproportionally low. This was especially drastic in the Qinghai TMAs, where a mere 11 of 1,072 Tibetan-medium civil service job postings from 2011-15 specified such a degree requirement, while the large majority of Tibetan-medium degree postings were reserved for teaching positions (81 percent). As shown in figure 10, public service jobs were also underrepresented among all Tibetan-medium advertisement (23 percent of the subtotal), in contrast to their frequency for all advertisements (49 percent of the total), whereas the civil service was only underrepresented with respect to Tibetan medium degree positions specifically (13 percent of the subtotal), not with respect to general Tibetan medium positions (25 percent of the subtotal, versus 26 percent of the total).

Even though the higher Tibetan-medium shares in teaching are understandable, the low shares in the other two sectors are problematic because these sectors are the loci where the political and even economic significance of the Tibetan language is ultimately decided. In this respect, it is also notable that Ganzi and Amdo Qinghai again stood out in terms of having relatively high shares of Tibetan medium positions in the civil and public service recruitment advertisements, as shown in figure 11, whereas the extremely low shares in the TAR stand out quite drastically.
However, the same cannot be said for the shares of Tibetan medium degree positions in the civil and public service recruitments, as shown in figure 12. Nearly all regions besides Ganzi had extremely low percentages (the average ratio for all was 0.029, or 2.9 percent of what would be parity relative to the Tibetan population share). This is particularly problematic for Tibetan-medium graduates, whose choice of Tibetan education system is already high risk due to narrow options (i.e. virtually no stable and adequately remunerated private sector options). Amdo Qinghai in particular is a region that produces a large amount of Tibetan-medium tertiary graduates, yet it advertised a share of Tibetan medium degree positions outside of teaching that was second-lowest, only 0.1 percentage point higher than the TAR’s paltry 1.7 percent.
Recruitment Advertisements: Preferentiality by Residency Requirements

As noted in section three, another important factor providing preferentiality in the recruitments, and that partly helps to explain the much higher share of Tibetans hired than would be suggested in the Tibetan-medium requirements in the recruitment advertisements, is the specification of local residency requirements. Residency requirements restrict local public job allocation to local residents, of the entire province, of the prefecture where the position is advertised, or even of the county. In prefectures with a majority Tibetan population, prefecture or county-level restrictions are significant. The fiercest competition for desirable government jobs often comes from well-educated Han (or possibly minorities) from regions with stronger educational bases, such as provincial capitals or their surrounding areas. In these cases, prefecture residency restrictions offer significant potential to increase the share of positions allocated to disadvantaged local minorities such as Tibetans. More recently, residency requirements are often not just limited to those who hold a current residency from the region (Ch. kujj), but also include those who ‘originated from’ (i.e. were born in) the region (Ch. shengyuanmei). As with all aspects of recruitment, residency requirements in Tibetan prefectures can potentially be circumvented by bribing the relevant officials, including by Han applicants from outside the locality (e.g. see Zenz, 2013:184). As noted before, the central government’s general crackdown on corruption may have improved enforcement of regular procedures in this respect.

5.1 Post-fenpei residency requirements in the TAR

The TAR stands out as a notable exception in terms of residency requirements, to the extent that these appear to have more or less supplanted the language requirements, as discussed above. The case therefore deserves more attention,
which is also possible given that the case is fairly well documented in various government reports or Chinese public media. The TAR has featured a comprehensive residency requirement since at least the availability of TAR public recruitment advertisements in 2007. This specifies that all types of advertised TAR government positions are restricted to graduates who took their university entrance exam (\textit{gaokao}) in the TAR and were TAR residents at that time. The requirement therefore potentially excludes local residents who had studied outside the TAR (as well as non-residents). This is clearly stated in every single TAR recruitment advertisement document and is referred to as ‘origin’ (\textit{shengyuan}). Contrary to residency, origin can never be changed but is determined by a fixed prior condition, which in this case is defined with reference to the \textit{gaokao}. This blanket \textit{shengyuan} requirement is well known to applicants and is discussed, for instance, on online forums, where those replying to questions about TAR jobs affirm this fact. There was even an official news article in June 2015 reminding secondary graduates from the TAR who were about to take the \textit{gaokao} that they must choose a TAR \textit{gaokao} location, otherwise even a TAR resident can forfeit their right to compete for TAR public employment later on.\textsuperscript{67} Given that \textit{shengyuan} for this purpose is not defined as original place of birth, one could presumably move to the TAR during secondary education (such as the child of a cadre), change residency and take the \textit{gaokao} there, study college anywhere else in China, and then return to apply for TAR public employment. However, considering the generally inferior state of secondary education in the TAR, this would not be the obvious choice for those who would be able to navigate such a scenario.

This exceptional blanket \textit{shengyuan} requirement in the TAR since at least 2007 appears to have served as the maintenance of a form of preferentiality (or local protectionism) in public employment following the phasing out of \textit{fenpei}. We do not have information as to whether this restriction also applied in the TAR under the \textit{fenpei} system; we also do not know to what extent it applies to state-sector employment more generally, although we can presume that it does not apply to the bulk of recruitment in SOEs. Whether or not the local recruitments cover all public employment in the TAR is also an important question. For example, it might be the case that a significant portion of public sector employment in the TAR, particularly at more senior cadre levels, is filled not by local recruitments but by transfers from other parts of China, as is often reported and regularly observed in the TAR. It is also not clear to what extent recently migrated Han Chinese or other non-Tibetans can qualify for local residency in order to apply for such positions, particularly given the very low rates of tertiary level graduates in the permanently resident (mostly Tibetan) working age population (see Fischer 2014: 261). Other strategies might be used to override the requirement such as corruption, which is generally rampant in these public employment processes, as mentioned earlier. Notably, unlike other Tibetan areas such as Ganzi or parts of Qinghai, the TAR is much less transparent about actual recruitment outcomes.

\textsuperscript{67} Wang Dong. 2015. 给考生提个醒：你是“西藏生源”吗？(gei kaosheng ti ge xing: ni shi “xizang shengyuan” ma?), June 16, \url{http://www.tibet.cn/news/index/szyw/201506/t20150616_3232414.htm}
Nonetheless, this *shengyuan* requirement in the TAR is a significant insight that, to a certain extent, contradicts much of the standard perception that non-local Han Chinese are dominating and squeezing out local Tibetans from such job opportunities (indeed, as was argued by Fischer 2005, albeit based on data from the early 2000s that indicated that this was the case, as discussed above). The restriction would have reserved at least a substantial share of local public employment for local residents, although the shortfall of recruitments compared to graduates from 2007 to 2010, as discussed in the first section with reference to figure 4, meant that it did not yet function as a job guarantee given the surplus of graduates. It is only from 2011 onwards that the TAR government appears to have innovated a sort of neo-fenpei job guarantee for local graduates through its explicit guarantee to employ local graduates, as discussed in the introduction. As mentioned above, the fact that the local government posted more recruitments than local graduates in 2012 indicates that it was probably trying to provide jobs for graduates from previous years who did not manage to secure jobs in previous recruitment rounds (anyone meeting the requirements and who had graduated since 2006, i.e. since the ending of fenpei, could apply to these jobs, so graduates in one year would also have to compete with reapplying graduates from previous years). However, as also discussed in the first section, increasing shortfalls between numbers of TAR resident graduates and job advertisements suggest that maintaining this full guarantee will soon require again higher levels of public sector employment or else other strategies of formal employment generation.

### 5.2 Residency requirements from the recruitment advertisement data

With this clarification of the TAR in mind, a brief summary of the residency requirements indicated in the recruitment advertisement documents is shown in table 4. The data only show prefecture-level residency requirements that require applicants either to hold current residency or to have originated from the prefecture. Provincial residency requirements, which are very common and are not sufficient to protect Tibetans from non-Tibetan competition in the Tibetan areas outside of the TAR, were not taken into account. Moreover, positions with residency restrictions are at times also open to those who have served in one of the voluntary government service programs in the respective prefecture. These positions were likewise not counted as because they do not sufficiently restrict application to genuine locals, and may lead to significant competition from outsiders, who are often more highly-educated Han.

It is also important to note that residency requirements were often linked to Tibetan-medium positions. By restricting a high proportion (typically about 60-100 percent) of Tibetan-medium positions to local applicants, Tibetan-medium competitors from other regions are excluded. This type of protectionism protects graduates from regions with weaker Tibetan-medium education. However, it also prevents the cross-regional transfer of highly skilled Tibetan labour forces across Tibetan regions, which is especially problematic for regions with high numbers of Tibetan-medium degree graduates yet low related advert figures, such as Amdo Qinghai.
Indeed, cross-regional employment has been a common phenomenon. For instance, quite a few of Qinghai’s Tibetan-medium tertiary graduates had been able to obtain related positions in the Sichuan TMAs, among them some of the fieldwork informants of both authors. This can also be observed in Ganzi’s 2012 tegang teacher recruitment, which did not carry any local residency requirements, and in which 13.1 percent of all recruitees were from Qinghai, who filled only 3.4 percent of the Chinese-medium teaching positions, but 47.1 percent of the Tibetan-medium positions.

However, residency requirements are by no means restricted to Tibetan-medium job postings. Table 4 shows that different regions have imposed them to varying extents. For all regions apart from the TAR, 48 percent of all job postings carried residency requirements (2011-15), meaning that just over half of all job postings outside the TAR were open to wider competition. The reason for the fairly inconsistent fluctuations within regions over time is due to the fact that these requirements are often attached to particular job types. For example, Aba and Ganzi feature a blanket residency requirement for all primary-level teaching positions, but none for secondary teaching jobs. Therefore, the share of teaching positions with residency requirements varied according to the frequency of recruitments across these various job categories. Similarly, health-related public service positions typically do not carry residency requirements, whereas county-level positions mostly do. Hence, residency requirement shares fluctuate along with variations in these job types. This explains, for example, Ganzi’s low 2015 residency requirement share, while the lower 2015 average share for all regions was also strongly impacted by the fact that Gannan advertised no public service jobs for that year.

Even so, we can discern basic policy changes in several regions starting in 2012. In that year, Amdo Qinghai introduced residency requirements for its public service positions for the first time (but already had them for teaching and civil service jobs), while Aba and Ganzi started them for civil service jobs for the first time (but already had them for teaching and public service. Gannan did not impose higher shares of civil service residency restrictions until 2013. Given that civil service positions are targeted at higher-skilled applicants and carry more responsibilities, they have typically been open to applicants from entire provinces, or even from the whole country. A common

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amdo Qinghai</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yushu</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aba</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ganzi</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gannan</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAR</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All (excl. TAR)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
limitation for civil service job postings prior to 2012 was that applicants with an inferior associate degree had to be from the prefecture, whereas those with a BA degree or higher could be from anywhere in the nation. However, by 2014-15, nearly half of all civil service positions outside of the TAR carried prefecture-level restrictions (48 percent in 2014 and 41 percent in 2015, compared to only 7 percent in 2011; see figure 11). In particular, the Sichuan TMA’s residency requirement shares for this employment category rose from 7 percent in 2011 to 52 percent in 2014. The increase, if applied, would have substantially inhibited Han competition from other regions of Sichuan.

Rising shares are a sign that minority-dominated prefecture governments are increasingly able (or at least willing) to meet their human resource needs with locals. This is likely motivated in the interests of serving and/or appeasing their own constituencies at a time when graduate employment has become an increasingly sensitive political issue. It is a reflection of improved educational levels in Tibetan regions, both with regard to regular as well as Tibetan-medium education. For example, the increased residency requirements for Sichuan’s TMA’s, especially for Tibetan-medium jobs from 2012 onwards, must be understood in light of the fact that Sichuan’s reported intake of new Tibetan-medium tertiary students more than doubled, from about 350 in 2010 to nearly 790 in 2015. However, figure 12 also indicates that the use of residency as a protectionist measure has not been consistent over time.

FIGURE 13
Residency requirement shares, all regions excl. TAR, by public employment category

Recruitment outcome documents that list the residency of applicants are rare. Ganzi’s 2011 civil service list of interview candidates is one rare example. This intake only required applicants with an inferior associate degree to hold Ganzi residency, and otherwise applicants from the whole country were permitted. Of all interview candidates, 82 percent were Ganzi residents. Only
46 percent of Han applicants were prefecture residents, in contrast to 93 percent of Tibetan and 100 percent of other minority applicants.68

**TABLE 5**
Share of Tibetans (or ethnic minorities) hired (or interviewed) for positions without Tibetan-medium requirements, by residency requirement, from four outcome samples

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region / intake</th>
<th>Local residency requirement</th>
<th>No local residency requirement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ganzi 2012 civil service (2nd intake, Tibetans, recruited)</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ganzi 2015 public service (health sector, Tibetans, interview candidates)</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hainan and Huangnan 2015 public service teachers (select minorities, interview candidates)</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huangnan 2015 public service (select minorities, interview candidates)</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The actual impact of local residency requirements can be at least tentatively gleaned from the public recruitment outcome documents examined in table 5. This table is based on only those positions that did not require any Tibetan-medium requirements, so as to isolate the preferential effect of residency requirements in the absence of overlapping language requirements. Even though these few examples cannot be taken to be representative, they confirm that local residency requirements serve to reduce competition from more highly educated outsiders, potentially leading to higher recruitment shares for Tibetans in positions that do not carry any other preferentiality attributes such as Tibetan language or degree requirements.

The results from these four examples are in fact quite similar to the outcomes by language requirement. In the sample of 21 outcome documents analysed previously, the Tibetan or minority recruitment (or interview candidate) share for positions without any language or degree requirements stood at 58 percent, whereas the same recruitment share for bilingual positions amounted to 84 percent. Table 5 indicates a comparable effect for preferentiality by residency requirement and in the absence of language requirement. However, the relatively high overlap of both types of preferentiality reduces the impact of local residency stipulations in promoting Tibetans representation. Additionally, the residency requirements erect barriers for the cross-regional transfer of Tibetan-medium job applicants, which can ultimately be quite problematic for regions with high numbers of Tibetan-

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68 All Han interview candidates were from Sichuan, whereas 4 percent of the Tibetans were from outside of the province (mostly from Qinghai).

69 Ethnic minorities were identified by an added five points in the data tables. Interview candidates with the Chinese last name “Ma” (马) were categorised separately since these candidates are almost certainly not Tibetans but rather from a Muslim ethnic group such as the Hui or Salar. For all ethnic minorities, the shares are 92% (local residency requirement) versus 71 percent (no local residency requirement).

70 Ethnic minorities were identified by an added five points in the data tables. Interview candidates with the Chinese last name “Ma” (马) were categorised separately since these candidates are almost certainly not Tibetans but rather from a Muslim ethnic group such as the Hui or Salar. For all ethnic minorities, the shares are 92% (local residency requirement) versus 71 percent (no local residency requirement).
medium graduates (such as Amdo Qinghai). If the regional distribution of public Tibetan-medium degree positions continues to be highly divergent, residency requirements will likely serve to further disadvantage this already vulnerable group of employment seekers.

6 Conclusion

Several major insights can be made from scrutinizing the available data on public employment recruitment advertisements and outcomes in the Tibetan areas of China. Most importantly, despite almost a decade of ambiguity and uncertainty in the public employment systems of the Tibetan areas due to retrenchment and the ending of fenpei, Tibetan representation within public recruitment did not collapse. Rather, in tandem with strong increases in overall public employment, particularly from 2011 onwards, Tibetans appear to have been significantly underrepresented in new recruitments across all Tibetan areas in China from 2007 to 2015, without any significant regional or temporary patterns. The underrepresentation, at an average of about 83 percent of what would be parity with their population share, is significant enough to result in a chronic erosion of representation over time and also does not address historical underrepresentation. However, more information is also needed on the ethnic composition of people exiting from public employment, such as through retirements or transfers to other provinces, in order to have a more holistic evaluation of the evolution of Tibetan representation. For instance, transfers out of the province are likely to be disproportionately non-Tibetan and hence compensating for the underrepresentation in recruitments.

Moreover, following the surge in public employment, particularly in the TAR and the Tibetan majority areas (TMAs) of Qinghai, new recruitment has employed a much larger share of the university-aged population than during the late job assignment period, thereby reasserting the role of the state as predominant employment provider for educated Tibetan millennials, after a period in which this role appeared to be waning under the force of retrenchment and marketising reforms. Indeed, the slump in recruitments in 2007 preceded the outbreak of large-scale protests in the TAR and other Tibetan areas in 2008. Of course we must be careful in drawing direct causal links between the very austere employment conditions facing graduates during these transitional years and the protests given the lack of precise information on the identity of the protesters, e.g. whether they significantly included recent graduates or not.

Practices of preferentiality appear to significantly bolster representation, although such practices do exhibit distinct temporal and regional variations. According to the recruitment data we have been able to analyse, language or Tibetan-medium degree type requirements in the TAR and in Gannan TAP in Gansu became very marginal (besides in 2007 due to what appears to have been a surge in teacher recruitments). This reflects a very specialised niche role in the use of such specifications. The same requirements played a large role in Ganzi TAP in Sichuan, although this role diminished up to 2015, whereas their use in the Amdo region of Qinghai increased over this period. The trends in Yushu and Aba are unclear (Dechen/Deqin TAP in Yunnan was not analysed).
Overall, these linguistic specifications appear to have been largely in bilingual rather than Tibetan-medium degree requirements, and also concentrated in teaching positions, although this depends on the region and year. While the predominance of bilingual over degree-related job requirements is inadequate for addressing the urgent employment needs of graduates from the burgeoning Tibetan-medium education system, bilingual requirements nonetheless appear to have the potential to substantially increase the share of recruited Tibetans.

In contrast, the use of residency requirements across all Tibetan regions has emerged as a significant and relatively stable (although not uniformly dominant) form of practicing preferentiality or protecting jobs for locals in public employment. The limited available evidence indicates that this form of preferentiality likewise may bolster the recruitment of (local) Tibetans by restricting non-local competition, although this can also exclude Tibetans from other Tibetan areas.

In the TAR, the transition from a fenpei system to a system of local residency requirements appears to have been seamless and total, given that all public sector recruitments from 2007 onwards have specified local ‘origin’ (Ch. shengyuan) as a form of residency, and then the government re-introduced employment guarantees for graduates with such shengyuan in 2011. The actual impact of this particular form of preferentiality in the TAR cannot be assessed given that outcome documents for this province after 2009 do not provide the ethnicity of applicants or recruits. However, it is likely that the 2011 employment guarantees would have had a strong effect on at least maintaining the level of representation at previous levels (depending, of course, on the Tibetan share of TAR graduates from anywhere in China with shengyuan).

It is in this sense that we have coined the term neo-fenpei to characterise the emerging system of employing local graduates in the public sector. The system has the same effect of guaranteeing employment for such graduates, but within a radically different and new context in which such public sector employment only accounts for a minority of total urban employment, whereas it would have dominated urban employment during the fenpei period. Hence, whereas fenpei would have been an equalizing force within the urban areas (although not across urban and rural areas) – also by extending social provisioning associated with formal employment to the families of those employed – the neo-fenpei system has become a strong source of segmentation and differentiation within the emerging urban employment system, in particular by accentuating university education as a gateway to privilege. Given the much lower schooling attainments in rural areas, this would presumably have the effect of also maintaining the strong institutional segmentation and inequality between urban and rural areas that were characteristic of the earlier fenpei system, except through less explicit mechanisms, particularly if and when the hukou (household residency) system comes to be fully abolished.

Outside the TAR, a notable policy change can be discerned in several regions in the form of introducing or increasing local residency requirements for public service and/or civil service jobs (as opposed to teaching jobs, where this was more common). As a result, nearly half of all civil service positions outside of the TAR carried prefecture-level restrictions by 2014-15, compared to only 7 percent in 2011. The increase, if applied, would have substantially
inhibited Han competition from other regions. The fact that civil service positions often had (and at times still have) no restriction at all, meaning that anyone from China could apply, makes the residency requirements especially pertinent in this more privileged and power-laden job category.

The generalised decline in the use of language and Tibetan-medium degree requirements suggests the continuation and entrenchment of assimilationist trends in education and employment policies, and a lack of priority for Tibetan medium education more generally (with the exception of the Amdo region in Qinghai). The sharp decline in Tibetan-medium requirements in Ganzi was particularly exceptional, especially in light of the exceptionally high share of recruits with such requirements in 2009 and 2010. Overall, the decline in language or Tibetan-medium degree requirements, particularly outside of teaching, that occurred parallel to the recruitment surge (in some regions) suggests a continuing if not increasing irrelevance of the minority language stipulations contained in the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law.

The expansion of residency requirements, particularly in the important civil service sector, alternatively suggests a new movement of local level protectionism in public employment, probably led by local governments. This new development holds both promise as well as complications, the latter in relation to the labour mobility of university educated Tibetans across the Tibetan areas in China. Indeed, this new policy approach was previously constrained by the shortage of educated Tibetan labour in remote Tibetan areas, whereas it has been permitted and facilitated by the glut of qualified Tibetan candidates by the late 2000s across all Tibetan areas, as a result of the education campaigns started in the 1990s (with respect to primary and secondary schooling), which in turn allowed for a surge of university intakes in the 2000s.

The strong increases in advertised public recruitment from 2011 onward in nearly all regions likely reflect a recognition on the part of the government that secure and well-remunerated (i.e. corporate) private employment in China’s west remains starkly inadequate, as discussed in the first section, and that Tibetans are severely disadvantaged in competing for the little that is available. It probably also reflects the government’s perception that an adequate supply of appropriate employment for minority graduates in is central to securing social stability in these potentially restive regions. This is also suggested by the fact that the state has used the recruitment drive to bolster the ranks of its security apparatus, especially in the TAR and the Qinghai TMAs. However, even despite the TAR’s revived ‘full employment’ guarantee for its graduates since 2011, total recruitments from 2007-15 fell short of the number of graduates over the same period by about 7-8,000 jobs. Given stabilising numbers of recruitments versus rising numbers of graduates, a shortfall already appeared in 2015 and is likely to progressively worsen in the near future, assuming current trends (which, as we have come to know with respect to China, is never a wise thing to assume). With recruitments and state-sector wages at already relatively high levels, it is clear that continuing such a state-dominated employment policy in the TAR will become increasingly costly for the state. The same applies to Tibetan areas outside the TAR, particularly considering their greater reliance on more expensive civil service positions, and
where lower state-sector salaries are counterbalanced by more austere local government financial circumstances.

Finally, this paper also demonstrates the significance of these public recruitment data (both adverts and outcomes) for enabling detailed meso-level analyses that connect micro-level insights to macroeconomic trends in the official employment data. They offer a potential for insights into a range of practices and outcomes regarding the recruitment outcomes of potentially disenfranchised minorities, linguistic promotion in public employment, evolving practices of local government employment protectionism, graduate employment circumstances, and so forth. This study focuses on the Tibetan case, in which the issue of public sector recruitment of graduates is especially salient, particularly in light of significant advancements in Tibetan minority education, and the findings give cause to a range of concerns. Indeed, given the vast scope of the Tibetan areas in China and the political complications of gaining permission for comprehensive local research, this new data source offers a very precious insight into these issues and presents a trove of data for further research. Nonetheless, these new data sources are equally pertinent to other parts of China, for research on similar issues and for similar types of analysis in non-Tibetan areas, provided of course that analyses are conducted on the basis of robust understanding of the local contexts to which the data refer.

References


Appendix: Data Sources

Graduate student reports of China’s tertiary institutions:


Qinghai University for Nationalities:

Tertiary graduate and new student figures by province were the provincial reports on economic and social development (Guomin jingji he shehui fazhan tongji gongbao):
Qinghai: http://xsgk.qh.gov.cn/html/663/List.html
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TAR: http://www.tjcn.org/help/3571.html
Gansu: http://www.gstj.gov.cn/www/HdClsContentMain.asp?ClassId=8

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Teshe gangwei teacher recruitment:

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2012: http://www.qbedu.cn/zwgg/tzgg/201206/20120620_8101.html,
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Gansu:
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2013: http://www.gsedu.gov.cn/UploadFile/2013/05/2013052201419468.xls

Sichuan:
2011:
http://imgs.sc.gov.cn/DocAnnex/2011/4/26/5b48f5c787344f6e9a98c9b75b31a32.doc
2015: http://tg.ncss.org.cn/tgdt/288785.shtml

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2013: all regions  

2014: all regions  

2015: all regions  
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Gannan TAP: see ‘Public Service Recruitment’

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2011:  
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2012:  
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2013: regular intake  
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2014: regular intake  
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Ganzi TAP:

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Public Service Recruitment: (note primary and secondary school teacher recruitments are not included in these documents except for Gannan TAP).

Amdo Qinghai:


Yushu TAP:


2013: prefecture, county and township levels


2015: see Amdo Qinghai

Gannan TAP:


2015: no intake

Aba TAP:

2010: health sector and general intake

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2013: health sector and general intake (first intake)
http://www.abrsj.gov.cn/u/cms/www/201304/12165222oqnu.xls, general intake supplementary recruitment (jinque zhuanye jishu renyuan)
http://www.abrsj.gov.cn/zwog1/1211.jhtml

2014: health sector and general intake (first intake)
http://www.abazhou.gov.cn/gg/zzgs/201406/W020140625370335046297.xls, general intake supplementary recruitment (jinque zhuanye jishu renyuan)
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2015: provincial and prefectural levels
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78
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2007: general intake
(2008 special police: [http://www.docin.com/p-775391498.html](http://www.docin.com/p-775391498.html) and

2009: general intake
special police forces (gong’an tejing)

2010: general intake

2011: general intake


(Compare

2014: first general intake
special police forces (gong’an tejing)

2015: people’s police

Ganzi TAP:

2007: village and township finance and law enforcement systems
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