A license to mine?
Community organizing against multinational corporations
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Mijnbouwconcessie?
Confrontatie tussen lokale gemeenschappen en mijnbouw multinationals

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electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system,
without permission in writing from the author.
Romy Krämer was born on 12 March, 1981 in the Eastern part of Berlin. After studying Work & Organization Psychology in Leipzig, she joined the Industrial Psychology Research Centre in Aberdeen, Scotland to conduct applied research on collaboration among virtual teams in the oil industry. Intrigued by the complex set of social and environmental externalities produced by the oil and other extractive industries, Romy decided to more deeply explore CSR practices and anti-corporate campaigning in this context.

She joined the Rotterdam School of Management as a PhD student and spent several months with anti-mining activists in Orissa, India for her field research. Next to her PhD, Romy contributed to the set-up of the Greening the Campus initiative at the Erasmus University Rotterdam and ran the work group on sustainable catering.

Back in Berlin, Romy joined the DO School as a Program Director in 2011 to build and implement a social entrepreneurship course for international impact entrepreneurs. Together with her team, she also developed the world's first Massive Open Online Course that supported social entrepreneurs in their start-up journey. In 2015 Romy returned to academia as a freelancer to teach Business Ethics and CSR at the Kühne Logistics University in Hamburg. In her current role as the Managing Director of the Guerrilla Foundation, Romy once more has the chance to work with activists and social movements.

Romy enjoys working with individuals and organizations at the intersection of activism, social entrepreneurship, and ethical business and will continue to be active in these fields while moving between academia and practice.
SUMMARY

This doctoral thesis started in 2006 with an initial proposal to study corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the extractive industry in the context of contested operations on indigenous people’s territory. The early focus on corporate codes of conduct and the academic debates around the concept of 'Free Prior Informed Consent' for indigenous people quickly seemed insufficient when a first review of the management literature showed a lack of grassroots empirical work on the topic. Despite corporate claims to CSR in the extractive industry and a whole lot of academic literature on the ethical responsibilities of corporations and the identification of corporate stakeholders, there still seemed to be a big blind spot on the grassroots reality of contested extractive industry operations. From there, it was only a short way to planning a qualitative study of managers' and local community stakeholders' perspectives. This idea was further refined and narrowed down when facing the messy reality of the field (see chapter two).

This development process also speaks from the three papers that make up the core of this dissertation. The first co-authored paper (chapter three) reviews and adds to the international business literature on internationalization and local responsiveness. It systematizes and introduces the practitioner concept of the license to operate (LtO) and argues that local responsiveness is essential for extractive industry firms to obtain such a license which changes the perspective on an industry that traditionally is perceived as global and highly integrated with little local responsiveness.

Despite the alleged importance of the LtO to managers, the often fervent local opposition against extractive industry operations challenges corporate claims to community engagement and CSR. The remainder of this dissertation therefore revolves around an ethnographic case study of the resistance against Vedanta’s proposed mine in Niyamgiri and the corporate response.

In the second paper (chapter four), my co-authors and I contribute to the growing body of literature in management and organization studies that draws on a social movement perspective to examine mobilization in and around organizations. Tensions within the transnational resistance network against Vedanta emerged as a key topic from the empirical material gathered during the first field trip. Grounded in the empirical material and drawing on the existing literature on anti-corporate mobilization, we develop the concept of national advocacy networks to speak to the translocal nature of such resistance
(Banerjee, 2011). Our longitudinal ethnographic study also points to the processual nature of organizing and counter-organizing around the contested mining project in Niyamgiri.

The topic of counter-organizing is taken up again in the third paper (chapter five) in light of the continued conflict and the increasing repression of anti-mining protest in Niyamgiri in the period between 2010-2013. Drawing on the framing literature, chapter five explores how frames employed by pro-mining actors might contribute to such repression and adds to our understanding of counter-organizing and adversarial framing.

Overall, this dissertation provides a much needed grassroots ethnographic perspective to contribute to the management and organization studies literature regarding conflicts between corporations and their local communities.
SAMENVATTING

Dit proefschrift vond haar oorsprong in 2006 als onderzoeksvoorstel, met als doel het maatschappelijk verantwoord ondernemen in the winningsindustrie, in een context van omstreden activiteiten in inheemse gebieden, te bestuderen. De initiële focus op collectieve gedragscodes en de academische debatten over 'Free Prior Informed Consent' bleken snel ontoereikend toen de initiële management literatuur studie naar het thema een compleet gebrek aan lokaal onderzochte data aantoonde. Ondanks de claims die bedrijven in de winningsindustrie veelal leggen op hun maatschappelijk verantwoord beleid, en de overvloed aan beschikbare literatuur over ethische verantwoordelijkheden van ondernemingen en het identificeren van hun belanghebbenden, blijkt dat de lokale realiteit in de betreffende winningsindustrie vaak een andere is waar weinig oog voor is.

Met dat uitgangspunt was het een kleine stap een kwalitatieve studie naar de perspectieven van lokale corporate managers en belanghebbenden in de lokale gemeenschap op te zetten. Gezien de chaotische lokale omstandigheden bleek een beperking in deze bestudeerde perspectieven noodzakelijk, waarover in hoofdstuk 2 meer. Deze ontwikkeling komt ook voort uit de drie studies die de empirische basis vormen van dit proefschrift. De eerste paper, waarvan mede-auteur, geeft in hoofdstuk drie een analyse en verdieping in de bestaande internationale bedrijfskunde literatuur. Het systematiseert en introduceert het in de praktijk gebruikte ‘License to Operate’ concept, en beargumenteerd een meer lokale responsiviteit van de winningsindustriele ondernemingen die traditioneel gezien worden als globaal geïntegreerd. Ondanks zakelijke focus op de LtO, bestaat er een gapend gat tussen de corporate claims en de schijnbaar fervente lokale oppositie. Het vervolg van dit proefschrift draait om een etnografische gevalstudie naar het verzet tegen Vendanta’s voorgenomen mijn in Niyamgiri en de grootzakelijke tegenreactie.

Hoofdstuk vier draagt bij aan het groeiende management- en organisatie literatuur dat het sociale beweging perspectief gebruikt, om de mobilisatie in en rond ondernemingen te bestuderen. De spanningen binnen de transnationale weerstandsnetwerken die tegen Vedanta ontstonden, bleken een centraal onderwerp in het empirische materiaal dat ik gedurende de eerste field trip verzamelde. Gebaseerd op die empirische data, en aan de hand van bestaande literatuur over anti-kapitalistische bewegingen, ontwikkelden we een national advocacy network concept, dat aansluit op het translokale oppositie idee (Banerjee, 2011). Onze longitudinale ethnografische studie markeert ook processuele
karakter van het organiseren en tegen-organiseren van het aangevochten mijnbouw project in Niyamgiri.

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Two of the most memorable conversations about my PhD were with Hans van Oosterhout and Gail Whiteman. After a presentation in the department that did not go very well Hans took me to the side. He said "Lose your sympathy for the underdogs." and asked me to start writing from the perspective of a management scholar. Later, when I was struggling with how to frame the various parts of the dissertation, Gail pointed out what is obvious now but was hard to see when I was in the middle of it. She said "Our PhD topics often are closely aligned with what occupies us at a very personal level." In your starkly different ways both of you encouraged me to work through my emotional baggage in order to find and defend my own voice. I am grateful for this push.

Starting this dissertation would not have been possible without the support of Rob van Tulder and Gail Whiteman who gave me this opportunity. I still wonder why you planned a joint project with this German Psychologist. Thank you for your trust, engagement and also for your patience! Thanks also to Kristina Lauche, Steve Savaryn and Heiko Schulz who encouraged me to think about doing a PhD at all.

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APPENDIX
1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 The rise of Niyamgiri

In late 2007, the search term 'Niyamgiri' delivered only a couple of hundred hits in an online search. In spring 2015, the remote mountain range, located in the East Indian state of Orissa, returns over 130,000 search results and comes with an extensive Wikipedia entry.

In between these two searches lie a couple of years in which thousands of national and international news articles, videos, and reports were produced about the fight of the about 10,000 people strong Dongria Kondh tribe against multinational mining company Vedanta Resources. In a consortium with the Orissa Mining Corporation, Vedanta planned to mine one of Niyamgiri's mountain tops for bauxite to feed its already constructed aluminium refinery, at the foot of the mountain range. Located in middle of their traditional territory, a mine was no option for the Dongria Kondh who fiercely opposed Vedanta's plan. The song of Dambu Praska, a Dongria Kondh bard, tells the story of Niyam Raja, the tribe's deity or 'King of Law' that the Dongria believe to reside on Niyamgiri's summits (Padel & Das, 2010). Because they hold the mountain tops sacred, the locals keep them free of agriculture, logging, homesteads and — more recently — mining.

“He created fruit in the hills, grains in the plains,
He is the first of the Dongaria Kondh.
After making pineapple, mango, jackfruit and grains,
Niyam Raja said to us ‘Live on what I have given you’.
Niyam Raja is crying today; the hills will turn into mud,
The rocks will crumble and everyone will die.
Will there be any rivers left if there are no streams?
Will there be any streams left if there are no hills?
What will we do without the fruits, grains and buffaloes?
What will we do without Niyam Raja?
What will the animals do without the big forests?
What will we do without the plants that save lives?”
1.2 About this dissertation

This doctoral thesis started in 2006 with an initial proposal to study corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the extractive industry in the context of contested operations on indigenous territory. The early focus on corporate codes of conduct and the academic debates around Free Prior Informed Consent for indigenous peoples quickly seemed insufficient when a first review of the management literature showed a lack of grassroots empirical work on the topic. Despite corporate claims to CSR in the extractive industry and a whole lot of academic literature on the ethical responsibilities of corporations and the identification of corporate stakeholders, there still seemed to be a big blind spot on the grassroots reality of contested extractive industry operations. From there, it was only a short way to planning a qualitative study of managers’ and local community stakeholders’ perspectives that was then further narrowed down when facing the messy reality of the field (see chapter 2).

This development process also speaks from the three papers, that make up the core of this dissertation. The first co-authored paper, chapter three, builds on a review of and adds to the international business literature. It systematizes and introduces the practitioner concept of the license to operate (LtO) and argues for more local responsiveness among extractive industry firms that are traditionally perceived as global and highly integrated. Still dissatisfied with the corporate-centric nature of concepts like the LtO and the gaping difference between managerial claims about a social license and the reality of fervent local opposition, the remainder of my research and conceptual work and also the following chapters of this dissertation evolve around an ethnographic case study of the resistance against Vedanta's proposed mine in Niyamgiri and corporate reactions to it.

In chapter four, my co-authors and I contribute to the growing body of literature in management and organization studies that draws on a social movement perspective to examine mobilization in and around organizations. Tensions within the transnational resistance network that formed against Vedanta emerged as a key topic from the empirical material gathered during the first field trip. Grounded in the empirical material and drawing on the existing literature on anti-corporate mobilization, we develop the concept of national advocacy networks to speak to the translocal nature of such resistance (Banerjee, 2011). Our longitudinal ethnographic study also points to the processual nature of organizing and counter-organizing around the contested mining project.
The topic of counter-organizing is taken up again in the third paper, chapter five, as it became more important as the conflict between Vedanta and the Niyamgiri communities continued. In the light of the rising repression of anti-mining protest in Niyamgiri around 2010-2013, this chapter draws on the framing literature and explores how the frames employed by pro-mining actors might contribute to such repression and thereby adds to the literature on counter-organizing and adversarial framing. Overall, this dissertation provides a much needed grassroots ethnographic perspective on conflicts between corporations and the local communities in which they operate to the management and organization studies literature.

The remainder of this introduction is structured as follows: I will provide a brief overview of the context of community protest and CSR in the extractive industry and will illustrate this with information about the protest against the Niyamgiri mine. I will then discuss the conceptual and applied contributions of this dissertation in more detail and give an overview of the dissertation.

1.3 Community protest and CSR in the extractive industry

"Something is profoundly wrong with the way we live today. For thirty years we have made a virtue out of the pursuit of material self-interest: indeed, this very pursuit now constitutes whatever remains of our sense of collective purpose. We know what things cost but have no idea what they are worth. We no longer ask of a judicial ruling or a legislative act: is it good? Is it fair? Is it just? Is it right? Will it help bring about a better society or a better world? Those used to be the political questions, even if they invited no easy answers. We must learn once again to pose them."

(Judt, 2010)

In his last book, the philosopher Tony Judt raises an important point when he criticizes how today's society turns its attention on cost alone while forgetting to think about the actual value of things. This discrepancy is at the core of most conflicts between local communities and extractive industry corporations and touches the core of debates about CSR and stakeholder management, as I will briefly outline.

1.3.1 Reasons for community protest

Communities not only mobilize against the often detrimental socio-cultural, environmental and economic impacts of industrial scale natural resource extraction (e.g. Banerjee, 2007; Evans, Goodman & Lansbury, 2002; Frynas, 2005; Gamu, Le Billon &
but also because the globalized business forces that drive this extraction ignore their strong attachment to 'place' (Escobar, 2008) and fundamentally disrupt people's lifeworld, their domains of everyday meaningful practice (Habermas, 1981/1995; Bebbington et al., 2008).

Especially indigenous communities like the Dongria Kondh, with a strong cultural attachment to and subsistence dependency on their ancestral lands are disproportionately affected by extractive industry operations (Banerjee, 2011; O'Faircheallaigh & Ali, 2008; Whiteman, 2004; Whiteman & Mamen, 2002). When they loose control over their land, indigenous communities are often among the most fervent opponents extractive industry companies face (Martinez-Allier, 2002; O'Faircheallaigh & Ali, 2008; Whiteman 2009). Often the most marginalized segments of their societies (Eversole, McNeish & Cimadamore, 2005; Mander & Tauli-Corpuz, 2006; Mikkelsen, 2014), indigenous peoples and other disadvantaged communities around the world mobilize for the right to influence decision-making about their land and resources and to put their interests on the political agenda (Coumans, 2008). Anti-corporate movements are therefore often more than just against an individual corporation, they are symptoms for the fight for citizen rights and self-determination (Thompson & Tapscott, 2010).

Activists and campaigning organizations put forward five core arguments against the mine at Niyamgiri that are emblematic for the criticism against extractive industry projects around the world:

1. That Vedanta's mine would heavily impact a unique ecosystem inhabited by rare plant and animal species and the base of the Dongria Kondh's subsistence lifestyle.
2. That it would affect the streams and water table and threaten fresh water supply to the Dongria Kondh and tens of thousands of farmers downstream.
3. That this mine would be followed by others and create a precedent for mining and logging of the entire range of mountains.
4. That minerals-based industrial development would result in tremendous negative economic and socio-cultural effects for the Dongria Kondh whose more or less sustainable subsistence lifestyle and unique culture would be threatened by resettlement, the influx of outside workers, rising crime and other social issues prevalent in mining regions, and the overall influence by mainstream capitalist culture.
And, finally, that the expected economic benefits of the mine would accrue not to the tribal people who were most negatively affected and that it would be impossible to financially compensate for the actual environmental and social externalities created.

1.3.2 Resistance movements from local to translocal

Periphery country governments compete over their reputation as good destinations for foreign direct investment from core countries, often by lowering their social and environmental standards (Banerjee, 2008; Van Tulder & Van der Zwart, 2006). Driven by the need for foreign direct investment and expectations of resource rents, these governments give extractive industry multinationals the legal license to operate. Locally, however, affected communities heavily challenge this license, independently of whether legal permits were granted by the government (O’Faircheallaigh, 2008).

In democracies like India or Nigeria, and even more so in other states, communities threatened by mineral or oil extraction lack representation and protection of their rights due to widespread corruption and little effective local administration (Banerjee, 2008; Padel & Das, 2010; Thompson & Tapscott, 2010). As a result, they find extra-institutional channels to express their discontent with governmental development policies and demand recognition of their citizen rights (Mohanty, 2010). Even in the remotest locations, activists today are more resourceful than ever and able to connect to international supporters and construct networks of resistance (Escobar, 2008). Transnational advocacy networks connect community members to international activists and advocacy organizations who transfer knowledge, create solidarity between movements, and lobby governments and corporations (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). Therefore, anti-mining activists today can tap into a constantly growing body of knowledge from around the world about the extractive industry’s impact and successful mobilization strategies (Banerjee, 2011; Coumanns, 2008).

Increasingly, transnational social movements and their supporters target individual multinational corporations rather than governments to effect changes in their environmental and social performance (den Hond & de Bakker, 2012; McAteer & Pulver, 2009). Social movement pressure therefore is one of the main drivers for corporate social responsibility (CSR). However, movements against individual corporations are usually rooted in and connected to broader movements that challenge the economic development
discourse of governments and business elites after the often devastating experience of decades of structural adjustment and industrialization for the rural poor in India and other countries of the global South. By suggesting alternative definitions of the meaning of 'development' (Banerjee, 2008; Escobar, 1992; Padel & Das, 2010; Bebbington, 2007), these social movements are asking the political questions that Judt (2010) in the above quote reminds all of us to ask and therefore "can be a fundamentally important vehicle for realizing rights from the state, holding it to account, and struggling for more equitable and sustainable forms of development" (Gaventa 2010: xii).

However, the operations of multinational corporations clearly point to the challenges of unidimensional perspectives on governance. Nation states are only but one player among a host of private actors from multinational corporations to NGOs and community groups in a system of multilevel governance grounded in competing values. Therefore, Banerjee (2011) draws on the 'translocal' as a qualifier for cross-border resistance that addresses the question "who gets to decide what is right or wrong and how do current policy making mechanisms in society allow local participation in developmental decision-making?" (p. 335). Translocality adds a local situatedness to traditional 'transnational' perspectives (Brickell & Datta, 2011) that is especially relevant in the context of this dissertation. The idea of translocal resistance against mining multinationals goes beyond transnational advocacy approaches as it emphasizes the relevance of the particular local context in which such resistance is rooted.

In the case of Niyamgiri, Indian and international activists and NGOs amplified the local protest against the mine and forged a nation-wide and later a transnational campaign that gained considerable momentum from 2006 onwards. The many search engine hits of the term 'Niyamgiri' cited above bear witness to the size and reach of this campaign. Among these hits are hundreds of videos and images that show the pristine Niyamgiri mountain range and captivating portraits of Dongria Kondh men and women in their traditional adornment (see figure 1).

Today, the fight of the Dongria Kondh communities against the Vedanta corporation has become a powerful "legend" of "David vs. Goliath" (Kothari, 2015). Even more so as the company's defeat seems unquestionable at this point. In summer 2013, resulting from a several years long legal battle, local and transnational protest, the affected Dongria Kondh villages were asked to cast their vote about the contested mining project. In an unanimous collective decision, all affected villages rejected mining -- a sweeping victory for the anti-
mining movement and massive disappointment for Vedanta and its supporters. At the time of writing, the Niyamgiri case is being mentioned alongside other successful movements against mining such as the ones in Tambogrande, Peru (copper and gold mining) or against the Esquel gold mine in Argentina.

Figure 1: Dongria Kondh girls and Niyamgiri mountains on a campaign website

1.3.3 CSR and the license to operate

As argued above, local communities, often with international support, challenge the operations of large multinational oil and mineral corporations. Their economic power, the high visibility of their brands, and profound social and environmental impacts make especially large well-known corporations from the developing world salient targets for protest (Davis & Zald, 2005; Hendry, 2006). Reputation disasters such as the Deepwater Horizon, Brent Spar or Exxon Valdez accidents have shaped societal expectations for more responsible practices in the extractive industry that have pushed, oil and mining corporations to the forefront of the CSR movement.

On the other hand, it is clear that these firms are not only passively reacting to external drivers for CSR like societal expectations but rather actively promote and shape the CSR agenda themselves (Utting, 2005). Joint industry efforts like the Global Mining Initiative or the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative are examples for how the industry attempts to influence the public discourse and its own public image. Additionally, individual corporations produce extensive CSR and sustainability reports and voluntary codes of conduct in which they emphasize their commitment and responsibility towards environmental protection, safe working conditions and the communities in which they operate. The notion of business having to obtain a 'social license to operate' is especially
prominent in the extractive industry practitioner discourse and has considerably shaped the theoretical debate in the past couple of years (Owen & Kemp, 2013; Parsons, Lacey & Moffat, 2014).

Via the 'license to operate' corporate managers highlight the importance of local community acceptance for the feasibility of their local operations. Going beyond official legal permissions, so the argument, firms need to earn the 'goodwill' or at least silent commitment of the directly affected communities in order to be able to operate without protest and sabotage. The social license concept is thus rooted in a self-interested instrumental or "business case" perception of CSR where corporations strive to maximize long term profits through strategic short term investments into community benefits (O’Faircheallaigh, 2008).

Industry initiatives, sustainability reports by large multinationals and the license to operate discourse might create the perception that CSR is a pervasive and successful practice in the extractive industry, able to contribute to community development and poverty alleviation. However, there is a vast difference between the few massive multinational players that are usually targeted by transnational campaigns and the many more extractive industry companies that are still able to operate 'below the radar' of international NGOs. Examples include state-owned firms, those originating from developing countries or autocratic regimes.

CSR strategies are also often developed centrally at MNE headquarter level while their implementation clashes with local expectations and realities (Yakovleva & Vasquez-Brust, 2011) and lacks culturally sensitivity to deal with indigenous perceptions of justice and their different cosmology (Anguelovski, 2008; Banerjee, 2007; Whitmore, 2006; Whiteman, 2009). Several authors in the field argue that extractive industry companies still lack a positive track record when it comes to successful CSR that created sustainable benefits for local communities (Hilson, 2012; Hilson & Yakovleva, 2007; Prieto-Carrón et al., 2006; Slack, 2012). It is also questionable whether another output is possible as CSR is unable to address or mitigate "the key political and economic mechanisms through which multinational corporations undermine the development prospects of poor countries" (Hilson, 2012: 132) such as tax evasion or corporate lobbying (see also Utting, 2005; Banerjee, 2007).

Corporate-centric definitions of who is a stakeholder and who belongs to the local community often fail to resonate with local self-definitions and exclude affected groups
that then need to find other ways of expressing their grievances (Filer, Burton & Banks, 2008; Jenkins, 2004; Whiteman, 2009). It seems that impacted communities do not self identify as 'just another stakeholder' because they bear the direct social and environmental costs of natural resource extraction. Unimpressed by practitioners’ license to operate discourse, affected communities also mostly see CSR measures as insufficient compensation for negative impacts (Hinojosa, 2013) and it seems that CSR strategies are unable to account for the true value of resources, land, justice and place to these communities (Whiteman, 2009). Judt's (2010) differentiation above deeply resonates at this point: While the question for corporations will always be 'How much?', how much compensation, mitigation or CSR measures are needed to heed their imperative for resource extraction, for community members it will mostly be the question of 'Whether or not?' and if they have the option to say 'no' when resource extraction touches places and values that cannot be compensated for. However, usually "the right to say no to development on their land does not arise" for local communities in traditional corporate CSR strategies (Banerjee, 2007: p. 35). For all these reasons and despite claims to CSR, communities around the world resist mining and oil projects on their land.

While Vedanta's website speaks extensively of community development, the establishment of child care centers and women self-help groups and other economic development projects, activists and NGOs challenge the effectiveness of such measures and communities that were resettled for the establishment of the refinery report that they were forced to part with their land (Amnesty International 2010, 2013; Saxena, Parasuraman, Kant & Baviskar, 2010; Padel & Das, 2010).

1.3.4 Establishment of industry by force

Faced with fervent community resistance, corporations and governments frequently resort to repression and violence in order to implement extractive projects and India is one of many countries with a long history of mining related struggles and implementation of industry projects by force (Padel & Das, 2010). In some mineral-rich regions, communities are in a state of permanent mobilization over several decades to protect their land from mining. For example in the Gandhamardan mountains in Western Orissa a resistance movement developed that functions as a template for similar movements across the state. Bharat Aluminum Company (BALCO)1 was the first to attempt mining these mountains in 1981. After years of struggle, the company had to abandon the project in 1987. Continental
Resources of Canada (1990) and National Aluminum Company (2007) followed in futile attempts to mine the mountain despite local resistance. In 2008, Sterlite Resources, a subsidiary of Vedanta Resources, applied for the mining lease, again stirring up the decades-old resistance movement.

Violent confrontations with the police and military and clashes between local pro- and anti-corporate forces are a frequent occurrence around the world and not only in the Indian context studied here. In India, protesters have been threatened and beaten up, false cases were charged against crucial movement figures, some of whom got tortured and maimed in prison while other protesters were shot by the police (Goodland, 2007; Padel & Das, 2010). In Orissa alone, dozens of people were killed in the last two decades by police fire while protesting the loss of their land to industry. In the face of such examples of the establishment of industry by force and violence that even condones death, Banerjee's concept of 'necrocapitalism' — the "practices of organizational accumulation that involve violence, dispossession and death" (2008: 1543) sounds less bewildering than it should, especially given the prominence of corporate claims to responsible practices and community development.

In Niyamgiri, several violent confrontations between local community members and the police, military or local pro-Vedanta groups have been documented (Amnesty International, 2010, 2013; Padel & Das, 2010; Saxena, Parasuraman, Kant & Baviskar, 2010) especially since the beginning of the anti-Maoist operations in the region that some have linked to the wish of the government to create a safe operating environment for the corporation (Roy, 2009; Padel & Das, 2010).

1.4 Conceptual and applied contribution

The highly contested nature of extractive industry operations offers an extreme case for the study of corporate-stakeholder interactions and anti-corporate mobilization. As argued above, oil and mining corporations are at the forefront of the CSR movement while at the same time, their reputations are constantly at risk due to oil and chemical spills, dangerous working conditions, high greenhouse gas emissions, engagement with oppressive regimes and corrupt governments, negative impacts on indigenous peoples, and the industry's association with civil wars and increased poverty or economic inequality (e.g. Banerjee, 2007; Bebbington et al. 2008; Evans, Goodman & Lansbury, 2002; Whiteman 2004).
There is no other industry where negative public opinion and especially local community protest can have such a profound impact on business performance. Community resistance results in productivity delays with the associated financial losses quickly rising to several millions of dollars per week (Franks, 2014). Also Vedanta incurred severe financial losses due to its failed investment related to the planned Niyamgiri mine. Presumably in an attempt to create a fait accompli that would convince the authorities and guarantee mining permission, the company had already constructed a bauxite refinery in Lanjigarh at the foot of the mountain before opening the Niyamgiri mine (Padel & Das, 2010). Until today, this refinery creates financial losses as it operates on truckloads of bauxite brought there from other mines across India, instead of being fed directly into the refinery from the mountain on a giant conveyor belt the company was never allowed to finish (image 2).

Figure 2: Lanjigarh refinery and unfinished conveyor belt through Niyamgiri

The Niyamgiri case is but one example for the numerous instances of community protest against the extractive industry (see e.g. Banerjee 2011; Bebbington et al., 2008). Reflecting this situation, a recent Ernst & Young (2014) study ranks the 'social license to operate' among the top three greatest risks facing the mining industry and points to the "growing influence of communities to stop or slow projects". Also international financiers react to the losses incurred through community protest and are more and more reluctant to fund extractive industry ventures that lack a strategy for preventing and mitigating community resistance (Ernst & Young, 2014; O'Faircheallaigh, 2008).

In the face of the high practical relevance of corporate community conflict and the many cases of extensive translocal resistance, it is surprising that the management and organization studies pay comparatively little attention to the extractive industry (but see e.g. Banerjee, 2000; Bruijn & Whiteman, 2010). There is especially a scarcity of
ethnographic research that gives us a better idea of the grassroots dynamics between corporations and communities and the roots and local organizing tactics of translocal anti-corporate movements (Banerjee, 2011). The importance of understanding such dynamics is especially relevant at a time when, with the advent of new techniques like fracking to exploit so far unusable reserves, mobilization directed at the industry has surged around the world (Mazur, 2014). Anti-fracking protests anywhere from Algeria to the US and UK and a host of other countries show that corporate-community conflict and the formation of broader movements targeting the industry is a lasting and growing challenge that finds little reflection in the scientific literature so far.

Moreover, there is a strange tendency in the management and organization literature that examines the tensions between corporations and their stakeholders to confound anti-corporate campaigns forged by international NGOs with grassroots protest and to focus solely on the 'boomerang politics' of international NGOs (e.g. Joutsenvirta, 2011; Doh & Teegen, 2003; den Hond & de Bakker, 2012). This brushes over the complicated grassroots interactions that occur during the process of 'localizing' the demands and tactics of international NGOs to build up the transnational campaigns. Den Hond & de Bakker (2012) point to this shortcoming and call for further investigation that acknowledges the variety of actors involved. If we truly want to understand anti-corporate mobilization across borders, we need to add a sensitivity for the dynamics and grassroots interactions between the private actors involved in translocal movements: local, national and international NGOs, community organizations, pro-corporate local groups, and activists.

Finally, we also need a much better understanding of the role corporations play in these contested localities and should go beyond studying codes of conduct and general claims to CSR published on corporate websites. Such studies draw on easily accessible sources of data and reinforce the managerial discourse of CSR without paying sufficient attention to managerial discourse on the ground that might be much different. They also do not give insights in how managers frame and deal with resistance against their operations if it actually happens despite CSR. Given the above mentioned examples of the establishment of industry by force, it is time that management and organization studies pay more attention to managerial discourse as it shapes and emerges within this context rather than within the sanitized and firm-centric 'CSR universe'.
1.5 Overview

The dissertation project as presented here, developed from the initial idea to study corporate social responsibility in the extractive industry. Following a critical engagement with the existing management literature on CSR, especially standards and codes, as well as the international business literature on the internationalization of the industry (Kraemer & van Tulder, 2009), the focus on resistance against extractive corporations and claims to a license to operate emerged.

This dissertation is structured as follows: In chapter two, I present the method. I start off with a more detailed description of the process of focusing the research project on a single case study rather than carrying out the initial idea of conducting several case studies of resistance against one corporation in different locations. This is followed by an overview over the research process and kinds of empirical material collected, a description of how I gained access to studying the resistance movement in Niyamgiri and negotiated consent with study participants. I close with a detailed discussion of how the empirical material was collected and analyzed and how I tried to validate my findings with study participants.

Chapter three is a theoretical paper (Kraemer & van Tulder, 2012) that aims to synthesize the international business and stakeholder literature. It also theoretically develops the practitioner concept of the license to operate (LtO) further and emphasizes its different levels from local to global in order to clearly distinguish between industry legitimacy and reputation, legal licenses and government support, and local community acceptance of extractive industry operations that are often confounded in practitioner discussions about the LtO. It takes the idea behind the local LtO - that firms need to be embedded in and accepted by their local communities - to contribute to the international business strategy literature. The traditional argument in this literature is that upstream extractive industry companies face high pressures for integration and negligible pressures for local responsiveness. Based on the example of the extractive industry as an extreme case, we expand the discussion on drivers for local responsiveness to include the pressure these corporations face from local community stakeholders and argue that this considerably changes the nature of the traditional integration-responsiveness grid.

Chapters four and five draw on longitudinal data on the resistance movement against the Niyamgiri mine in Orissa gathered from ethnographic fieldwork and desk research.
Chapter four (Kraemer, Whiteman & Banerjee, 2013), zooms in on the process of social movement organizing and emphasizes the variety of actors from local to national and international that played a role in the establishment of the transnational advocacy network against Vedanta. Based on a narrative about the rise and fall of a young community leader, the paper contributes to the management and organization studies literature on anti-corporate organizing as it points to the complicated interactions within a system of transnational mobilization and unveils conflicts among actors that are rooted in the neglect of national level mobilization structures. It also highlights the counter-organizing tactics of corporations and their local supporters that pose a considerable threat for community activists.

Taking the idea about counter-organizing one step further, the emphasis of chapter five lies with the discourse of managers and other supporters of the Niyamgiri mining project. It contributes to the literature on adversarial framing by identifying two master frames in the empirical material that also seem to find widespread application across a range of movements in different locations: the outsider and criminal master frame. Next to arguing that these two frames provide a vocabulary to future studies on the framing of resistance, the chapter discusses how both frames were employed in Niyamgiri to delegitimize and weaken the anti-mining resistance.

Finally, in chapter six I draw together and jointly discuss the findings of the three papers in this dissertation. I discuss the limitations of this work, link it to the most recent literature in the field and suggest areas for future research.
2. METHOD

"I still haven't realized how I ended up here! Last week I landed in Delhi and now I’m already in Bhubaneswar with a couple of ‘activist friends’. We’re going to the ‘mass rally’ against POSCO’s steel plant tomorrow. No clue what to expect from the rally. Is it gonna be violent? We’re going to leave early I heard, because we need to take back roads to avoid police attention… No more information yet. All six of us, who have come from Delhi, are gonna share this room. A couple of beds and mosquito nets, Indian style toilets on the hallway. It’s even hotter here than in Delhi and everybody looks super tired after the one and a half days in the train. I was totally confused when we arrived in the courtyard. So many new faces and names! Can't remember one of them! Some of the older men everybody seemed to know and revere – who are they? Politicians? Activists? Got smiled at because I was trying to shake hands instead of making the ‘Namaskar’ to greet people. Who was this Lohia after which this place is named? Nitin\(^1\) said something about a socialist leader of the Independence Movement - felt like I should have known… In the train he was so interested in me coming from East Germany and it was embarrassing that I know so little. But how to answer a question like "What's the situation of the labor class in Germany today?" that felt like he had fallen out of time, or me fallen into another one... I envy the two young NGO guys who came with us, they are also new to this ‘going to the field’ stuff but at least they know the Indian context and have read and written about the several people's movements against various companies here in Orissa. [...] They just don’t stick out like I do and aren’t deaf and dumb… Now we’re all sitting here with our laptops and digital cameras and electronic equipment. I can relax a bit, talking about memory space and chatting but in a couple of minutes we’re expected downstairs to attend a vigil for some dead communist I’ve never heard about."

(Field notes, Dec. 3rd, 2008)

2.1 (The dream of) a multi-site ethnography

Early ideas about this dissertation evolved around a multi-sited qualitative study of local protest against multinational corporations from the extractive industry and their ability (or not) to gain a local license to operate and the role of CSR in this process. Multi-site ethnography has become more common in the last decades as researchers have formulated translocal topics and studied translocal phenomena (Hannerz, 2003). The idea is one of "placing the ethnographer in the translocal network of relationships" (Hannerz,

\(^1\) All names are randomly chosen first names that preserve the national identity (India/UK) of the informant (see section 2.4.6).
2003: 209) instead of focusing on complete immersion in and in-depth study of an entire culture or society (Hannerz, 2003; Marcus, 1995).

My foreshadowed problems (Malinowski 1922 in Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007) evolved around the perspectives of managers on anti-corporate protest and the transnational expansion of local resistance movements. The company I had selected was Vedanta Resources Plc., a mining and metals multinational traded on the UK stock exchange with mines (then) in India, Zambia, South Africa and Tasmania. There were a couple of reasons for that choice. First, Vedanta had operations in several countries where research could be conducted in English, a not unimportant practical consideration. Second, in all locations Vedanta had faced or still was facing some form of campaign or resistance against their operations from what I could gauge from my early scan of different extractive industry companies. Third, there was very little research in the management and organization literature on resistance against mining corporations (as opposed to oil or forestry multinationals) and in settings other than the Americas. Finally, yet most importantly, the campaign against Vedanta in Niyamgiri had considerably picked up speed between late 2007 when I first looked at it and a couple of months later when I made my decision to go to Orissa. The initial idea had been to travel to three of these locations for about two to three months to conduct qualitative interviews with corporate managers and immerse myself in the groups of activists and NGOs that were running the respective protests. The opening quote, written only a couple of days after I first set foot on the Indian sub continent to conduct what I then thought to be the first part of my study, illustrates why this plan quickly changed.

I had come to the field with the intention of studying the campaign against Vedanta's mining project in Niyamgiri to then move on to Zambia or South Africa to examine the resistance the same company faced elsewhere. I had come with images of transnational advocacy (Keck & Sikkink, 1997) in mind and assumed that international NGOs like ActionAid, Survival International and Amnesty International were the main players in the campaign. I had thought I could collect my data in India in three months. I was wrong.
2.2 Zooming out and zooming in: Early surprises and progressive focusing

Surprises or 'aha' moments can be an important guiding force for qualitative studies that offer great opportunities for insight (Christianson, 2011). The first two weeks in India challenged my assumptions and expectations as I went through several moments of surprise that considerably influenced the course of the study.

Right after my arrival in Delhi, I was able to do a first interview with an activist couple who later became key informants (see section 2.4.2 below). From them I learned that much more was happening below the waterline of the internationally visible tip of the 'campaign iceberg' that I had been able to examine from my PhD student's office in Rotterdam. Throughout this conversation, I caught glimpses of the network of local and national organizations and individual activists that were supporting the local communities in Niyamgiri to resist the mine. I learned that international NGOs had in fact only recently joined an ongoing struggle, the main force behind which was a complex melange of Indian political, non-political, more or less organized, collective and individual social movement actors that were active below the iceberg's 'waterline'.

Later, the quickly growing relationships to key informants opened up an ‘opportunity to learn’ (Stake, 2005). I was surprised to hear that the translocal interactions (Banerjee, 2011; Hannerz, 2003) between Indian organizations and activists and their international counterparts were much more conflictual and complicated than I had anticipated. Motivated by the lack of coverage of such difficulties in earlier studies of transnational campaigns this resulted in the decision to further explore this complicated network of local, national and international social movement actors. As my research opportunities and interests developed further, the research covered a number of virtual and physical spaces (Hannerz, 2003; Marcus, 1995) though in a different way than initially anticipated: instead of multiple cases of resistance against the same company in different locations, I covered the activities of a variety of actors involved in the same movement across space and time.

Moments of surprise, emergent research opportunities and personal inclinations - my "sympathy for the underdogs" as one member of the department critically commented - therefore resulted in a move away from the initial corporation-centered conception of the
study, a decision that is backed by calls for more non-corporate focused research in management and organization studies (Bamberger & Pratt, 2010).

Progressive focusing (Silverman, 2010) helped to identify situations within my extended case (Stake, 2005) that were exemplary for the issues I wanted to cover. One example is the focus on Jika, the young tribal leader who emerged as a crucial figure in the transnational resistance movement and turned into a Vedanta supporter over the course of a couple of years (see chapter 4). Although co-optation of central movement actors was a recurrent theme in interviews and conversations with activists, it was not foreseeable that it would actually happen right before my eyes. My developmental research design allowed me to zoom in on this aspect when realizing its importance and presenting it as an example for the social movement process.

Based on the online available information about the case that had been published by international NGOs, I had come to the field with a boundaried notion of the campaign against Vedanta's mine in Niyamgiri. The opening quote from my field notes highlights the sudden realization that there was so much more to studying one movement than just this one movement. The first conversations with activists and Indian NGO staff were replete with references to other past and current anti-mining and anti-industrialization movements in Orissa and other states. Most of the people I met were and had been involved in several of these struggles. Before my arrival, I had not even heard about the strong local protest against the POSCO plant at Orissa's coast and a week later I joined some activists to attend a "mass rally" of which I did not know what to expect.

I needed to get a grasp of the rich history of past and present struggles in Orissa and India that formed a whole body of social movement activism, or social movement industry (Zald & McCarthy, 1977). Not only did this industry influence the tactics and perceptions of Indian activists who were involved in the Niyamgiri case, this context was also relevant for the framing activities of proponents of the mine (see chapter XX). I needed to 'zoom out' before I could 'zoom in' on one specific case and did so in a number of ways.

First, I had the opportunity to accompany one activist on a ten day tour through Orissa that he had planned to record material for a documentary on the various social movements in the state. Not only was this a chance to spend an extended period of time with a key informant on the Niyamgiri struggle, it also provided a broad overview over the various more or less prominent resistance movements across the state, their history and the networks of involved actors.
Second, I expanded my recruitment of interviewees to include actors from both sides of the conflict about the construction of the POSCO steel plant. This struggle was widely perceived by activists to be among the most emblematic struggles in Orissa at the time next to the Niyamgiri conflict. Though not intended as a comparative case, zooming out on this additional struggle allowed me to ascertain that I was not studying the idiosyncrasies of one company and its management. Along these lines, third, I also expanded from the initial idea to only interview Vedanta managers of the Niyamgiri project and covered the perspectives of others from multiple locations. This allowed an embedding of the case studied in its broader context and assured the relevance of findings beyond one specific site while still keeping the field research period practically manageable (Marcus, 1995). Having realized the importance of the social movement industry, I realized that I would not be able to cover Vedanta’s operations in other countries at the same level of detail with the time and resources available. This resulted in the decision to conduct a second field trip to Orissa instead of going multi-country.
2.3 Overview of the research process

The empirical material ultimately gathered for this study is a product of two factors: iterations between emerging theoretical ideas grounded in early coding of first empirical material and the literature (Burawoy, 1991; Charmaz, 2000; Corbin & Strauss, 2008) that resulted in a progressive focusing of the research questions (Silverman, 2010) and, second, opportunities to access certain sites or people which then again shaped the emerging research object (Marcus, 1995; Stake, 2005). The output is a piece of “patchwork ethnographic fieldwork” that combines classic ethnography with traditional qualitative interviews and other more focused ways of gathering empirical material (Tsing, 2005).

### Figure 3: Overview of the research period and types of empirical material

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Desk research (literature &amp; other materials like PR or CSR brochures)</th>
<th>Participant observation</th>
<th>Interviews</th>
<th>Online groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jun - Oct 2008</td>
<td>Preparation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov ’08 - Feb 2009</td>
<td>Field trip I &amp; initial coding</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar - July</td>
<td>Analysis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 2009</td>
<td>AGM in London</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep - Dec 2009</td>
<td>Analysis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan - Mar 2010</td>
<td>Field trip II &amp; initial coding</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 2010 - Jan 2014</td>
<td>Analysis &amp; writing</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Figure 3 (above) provides an overview of the research and analysis process. It outlines the variety of empirical material collected across time and space with the goal to contribute to management and organization theory through grounded theorizing (see section 2.4.2). The research period stretches across five and a half years from the decision about conducting a case study in Orissa in June 2008 to the end of the Niyamgiri struggle in January 2014 when the Ministry of Environment and Forest gave its final 'no' to the project on the grounds of public voting in Niyamgiri.

The next section deals in more detail with the process of gaining access, building field relations and negotiating consent with informants.

2.4 Access, field relations and informed consent

2.4.1 A web of relations, assigned roles, and negotiated borders

One of the main tensions emerging from multi-sited research lies in the increased complexity of one’s relationship to research partners when placing oneself within the network of various sites and relationships (Hannerz, 2003; Marcus, 1995). I was studying ‘up’ and ‘down’ (Nader, 1972) and got assigned multiple and changing roles by different actors. Some I took on, others I rejected. Remaining legitimate as a researcher while gaining access as a friend, trying not to become tangled up in moral conflicts and power struggles between conflicting actors, harsh critique of my outputs by one informant and demands for support or resources were some of the challenges that resulted from the fieldwork.

Below, I discuss in more detail how I gained access to study participants and established informed consent and also touch upon the “shifting affinities for, affiliations with, as well as alienations from” those with whom I interacted across time and different locations (Marcus, 1995: 113).

2.4.2 Access to social movement actors

Multi-sited ethnography often means “close affiliations with cultural producers (e.g. artists, filmmakers, organizers), who themselves move across various sites of activity” (Marcus, 1995: 114). This description fits the study participants that later turned into key informants (see table 1 below) who often performed several of the following
roles: filmmaker, researcher, part-time NGO employee/affiliate, freelancer, academic, and activist. Many were traveling extensively within India and some internationally in these various functions and were relying on several sources of earned income and/or grants.

Table 1: Key informants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Medha</td>
<td>Refers to herself as a &quot;human rights activist and independent researcher&quot; on one of her papers. Has worked for national and international NGOs and, although critical of the sector, mainly relies on selected NGOs for project and research work to generate an income. Co-organizes protest events and travels extensively to research, document, and support anti-mining and anti-industrialization struggles. Repeatedly part of fact finding missions after violent incidents and critical of the role of NGOs for grassroots social movements. Strongly involved in national level activism with ties to local activists, connecting different movements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanjay</td>
<td>Independent film maker and activist with a &quot;past in the NGO world&quot; but now critical of their &quot;development religion&quot; and impact on grassroots movements. Has produced several films and written about social movements and other relevant issues in Indian society (e.g. dalit people, climate change). Similarly to Medha, relies on project work and grants to finance these activities. Has traveled extensively to several struggle areas for documentation and research. Strongly involved in national level activism with ties to local activists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunil</td>
<td>Independent film maker and activist with a strong focus on documentation of corporate and social movement activities. Heavily involved in (online) distribution of information, specifically about the Niyamgiri struggle but also other movements. Less involved in on-the-spot grassroots mobilization but involved in developing a system of grassroots reporting. Nearly in daily contact with local community members and activists during times of high activity. Equally critical of NGOs' role in grassroots movements. Connecting local, national and transnational levels through information sharing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles</td>
<td>Academic who is strongly supporting anti-mining and anti-industrialization struggles in India mostly through academic work but less through grassroots mobilization. Attends international protest events if possible. Well connected to similar academics and activists across India and the UK. Emphasizes the potential of international NGOs to create awareness in corporate home countries but equally critical of their impact on grassroots movements.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The key point of access to this network of people was a members-only online email list server on mining conflicts in Orissa. The online group, founded in late 2004, brings together activists from India, the UK and other countries who work with one or several of the anti-mining or environmental struggles in Orissa. Prior to the first field trip, contacted several individuals and organizations that had been mentioned in news articles about the Niyamgiri conflict. One of them, another academic, vouched for me to enter the list server in summer 2008 after I had explained my research to him. With close to 100 members at the time and the anti-Vedanta movement in full swing, the group was quite active and hardly a day passed without at least one message. Members use the list server to share information and updates (e.g. protest letters sent to the authorities, relevant newspaper articles, reports about clashes between villagers and the police), coordinate and plan activities (e.g. share invites to attend protest events, collect signatories of protest letters), and sometimes to discuss more general ideological questions (e.g. the pro and contra of the government's war against Maoist rebels). I was introduced to the list as a PhD researcher who wanted to study the anti-mining resistance in Niyamgiri and once admitted, I was not only able to read the current daily posts but could also access all past messages online.

The online group made getting in touch with Indian activists easy and allowed me to make good contact with social movement actors before my arrival in India. I contacted individuals who from their posts seemed to be involved in the Niyamgiri case and made use of their social networks through a snowball sampling tactic (Atkinson & Flint, 2001) based on which I could gather a list of 13 prospective interviewees to kick off the first field trip. The snowballing technique proved very effective and allowed access to actors who were less prominent in the online world and on the sites of international NGOs but nevertheless important for the local movement.

Arrived in Delhi, I had a first interview with Medha and Sanjay who turned into key informants in the course of the study. They enquired about the interests and purpose of my study and seemed satisfied to find that I was willing to critically examine Vedanta's activities and had come to see with my own eyes rather than study their claims to CSR from afar. They offered to join them and a couple of other activists on their trip to Orissa where they were to attend a mass protest against the POSCO steel plant in Dhinkia and also wanted to trek through the Niyamgiri mountains to meet people in the villages, departing from Bissam Cuttack (see figure 4 below). Grasping this unique opportunity during my first week in India and abandoning my initial plan to do more interviews in...
Delhi had far reaching implications for my study as it allowed me to quickly meet other actors of the national advocacy network.

**Figure 4: Research locations in India, especially Orissa (Odisha)**

Activists and NGO staff in the UK were contacted via email and interviewed in London or on the phone. One UK activist rejected to be interviewed when I told him that I was interested in the conflicts and organizing processes within the movement because, as he said, he did not want to contribute to such problems by talking about them.

Snowballing has the potential to lead to selection bias and access regulation by gatekeepers (Atkinson & Flint, 2001) which was addressed in two ways. First, I did not
rely on the contacts made through early informants alone and deliberately sought out potential interviewees that were outside of the circle of social movement actors personally known to my early informants. In each interview I asked for other people who could tell me more about the Niyamgiri case or comparable social movements in Orissa.

Second, some key informants had done or were doing academic research themselves and were aware of academic requirements for unbiased information and triangulation of information when I brought up these issues. As a result and next to their obvious contacts, they also recommend interview partners who they did not know personally or whose activities they did not approve of but who they thought could provide different perspectives for my research. “You should speak to this person but don’t tell them that we gave you their name.” was something I repeatedly heard when looking for alternative sources of information. Often, these informants were staff of Indian and international NGOs whose activities key informants observed critically (see chapter 4). This, together with 'cold emails' sent out to organizations that were mentioned in one of the many online articles about the Niyamgiri conflict and calls for support that were published on many NGO websites, assured access to a diversity of viewpoints on the civil society side of this study across different locations (see Appendix 1).

Overall, 42 interviews were conducted with 47 social movement actors and their supporters amounting to nearly 180 hours of conversation. The table in the appendix lists these instances of formal interviews that were either accompanied by direct note-taking or, mostly, recorded and transcribed. Multiple interviews with the same person are also indicated with location and date of the interviews. Additionally, countless informal individual and group conversations and discussions were conducted and recorded in field notes throughout the weeks that were spent traveling and living with key informants. Several (translated) conversations with groups of villagers and opposition groups during the trek through the Niyamgiri mountains and when traveling to other struggle areas in other parts of Orissa should also be mentioned as they provided important context information that was recorded in field notes.

2.4.3 Building trust

About two months into my first field trip one key informant told me how he and other Indian activists had updated each other about my conversations with them, discussed whether Sanjay should take me on that trip with him and evaluated my trustworthiness. I
was struck by the realization that the ease with which I had gained access to social movement actors had not been all that self-evident. From the beginning, I had been open about my appreciation and sympathy for activists' work and their motivation to support the local anti-Vedanta movement (Mohrmann, 2010). However, after that conversation, I realized that these words had not been enough and that people had been waiting for me to prove myself.

An important step towards building trust with activists had been the confrontation with a Korean film team during our trek through the Niyamgiri mountains. The team had come to film the tribal people with the ‘permission’ of an international NGO and were oblivious about the situation on the mountain where the local resistance organization had basically announced a 'ban' on foreign visitors to Niyamgiri unless they had asked for their permission. When meeting the film team in a tribal village at night (see chapter 4), our group including myself tried to enforce the ban and sent the team away. This confrontation created a bond in our group and a shared story to tell and retell multiple times throughout the trip and allowed me to show that I was more than a passive value-free observer.

However, in my introductions and when describing my research project, I made clear that I would also examine the perspectives and opinions of corporate managers and their supporters. Much to my surprise, many activists were not put off by this but rather encouraged me to get in touch with the companies because they hoped to learn more about their motivations and views. Some tried to assign the role of their ‘spy in the corporate sector’ to me and asked me to share information from corporate interviews. Due to our close contact and me relying on them for travel information and other support, key informants usually knew where I was traveling and who I was meeting for interviews. Questions like “How was it?” or “What did he say?” were commonly asked when I returned from a trip to a Vedanta or other corporate office. Navigating this ethically difficult terrain, I would then share a broad summary of the conversations I had had - strictly and technically a breach of confidentiality. This “ethical situationism” (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007: 219, italics in orig.) seems justifiable in light of managers' power to protect their interests. Moreover, I was sure that none of the managers interviewed trusted me enough to share potentially harmful information as I told all of them that I was also speaking to activists when introducing my research. On the other hand, and again grounded in a value-based assessment of the different power relationships, I took a different stance when it came to the identity of and information provided by
informants from within the social movement (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007). In no instance did I reply to questions by managers about whom exactly I had spoken to or gave away information about the movement or its actors.

2.4.4 Access to corporate managers and pro-corporate actors

“To penetrate the shields of the powerful the social scientist has to be lucky and/or devious […]”

(Burawoy, 1998: 22)

Access to corporate managers was also obtained through a snowballing tactic similar to the one used with activists. Individuals who had agreed to support the research project with their interview were asked to suggest other relevant interviewees and, ideally, to make an introduction. The first contact inside Vedanta was one of these lucky coincidences mentioned above. I had told an Indian friend about the plan to study the resistance against Vedanta in Niyamgiri and found out that he had a childhood friend who, according to a recent Facebook update, had started working for Vedanta’s CSR department in Keonjhar in Orissa’s steel belt (see figure 4, above), where the company wanted to establish a steel plant. We exchanged some emails and he agreed to an interview on the challenges the company was facing in terms of community resistance and how the company was dealing with them.

Next to luck, a certain level of deception was needed when interacting with corporate managers (see also Douglas 1976 in Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007). I used the same standard formulation to introduce the research as with social movement actors, saying that I wanted to "study the Niyamgiri conflict and the perceptions of all actors involved: local communities, activists and NGOs, and corporate managers". However, I did not fully disclose the depth of interaction with activists and my participation in protest events. Moreover, while I downplayed the management background of my study when speaking to activists where I emphasized my interest in social movements against corporations, towards corporate managers I highlighted that the Rotterdam School of Management was amongst the leading European Business Schools. This helped in establishing my role as a researcher interested to learn more about how corporations perceived and were dealing with community protest.

Through this first contact in Vedanta’s CSR, interviews with other Vedanta managers in two locations and also with pro-corporate members of the local community in Keonjhar could be arranged. His recommendation to the local CSR manager also facilitated entry to
a resettlement colony at Vedanta's aluminum smelter and power plant in Jharsuguda. Having visited two different Vedanta operations in Orissa, it was much easier to contact their office in Bhubaneswar, reference my contacts in the company, the research I had already done and ask for an interview with someone who could speak about their Niyamgiri project. I was told to visit the office and, after two fruitless attempts where I was informed after a couple of hours that the person I was supposed to meet would be unable to receive me on this day, the corporate communications manager was ready for an interview. From there, I got connected to the CEO of the Lanjigarh operation who was also the Vice President of Mines at Vedanta and then moved on to the local Head of CSR & PR and the Assistant Manager of PR at the Lanjigarh refinery located at the foothills of Niyamgiri.

Lacking a contact to a POSCO insider, I walked into their Bhubaneswar office, introduced myself at the reception and asked who I could interview regarding the company's problems in acquiring land for the port and steel plant. This resulted in two meetings with the India PR Manager who connected me to his successor for another interview when I returned on my second field trip. Repeated attempts to gain access to staff at POSCO's field office at the proposed steel plant were rejected.

Overall, 12 interviews with 10 managers, ranging from top (six) to middle (two) and lower management (two) were conducted in four locations, three of these were operated by Vedanta and one by POSCO (see appendix 2). In addition, interviews were conducted with academics and consultants working for Vedanta and other mining companies and conversations included several government officials in the areas of tribal welfare and mining. This covered a range of perspectives on the corporate side, ranging from interviewees who directly interacted with local communities at contested sites, to managers responsible for these operations and corporate communications personnel intent at creating a positive public image of these operations. Additional interviews with pro-company villagers, the spokesperson of an industry association, and a manager of another smaller Indian mining company further ensured a diversity of perspectives not shaped by individual experiences in a single location. Additionally, Vedanta's 2009 Annual General Meeting (AGM) in London was audio recorded. Together with a number of other activists and NGO staff, I was able to enter this meeting on a ‘proxy share’ organized by UK activists. Not only did this meeting deliver insight into the semi-publicly expressed points of view of the Vedanta management board, it was also the only instance where a direct interaction between activists and the board of directors could be observed.
2.4.5 Informed consent

“Signed consent forms do not constitute informed consent, they merely provide evidence (perhaps of questionable value) that consent has been given [...] Informed consent is at heart an interpersonal process between researcher and participant, where the prospective participant comes to an understanding of what the research project is about and what participation would involve and makes his or her free decision about whether, and on what terms to participate.”

(Guillemin & Gillam, 2004: 272).

Evolving qualitative research projects, where informing everyone at all times about the exact purpose and content of the research is “neither possible nor desirable” (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007: 57), require processual forms of consent rather than the signing of consent forms by study participants (De Laine, 2000; Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007; Miller & Bell, 2012; Murphy & Dingwall, 2007). Especially when researching sensitive issues, target groups are unlikely to consent fully to the research without getting to know the researcher and building trust which results in progressive access to the field and its continuous negotiation (De Laine, 2000; Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007).

I openly introduced myself as a researcher to all study participants and it was obvious to everyone involved at all times that I attended events, had conversations with people, and asked for new contacts in my function as a researcher. Permission to observe, take notes or voice record conversations was negotiated informally with individuals or groups of people. For example, when conducting a focus group with the members of different NGOs who had or were working on issues of social justice in Orissa, I asked for permission to record the conversation. This resulted in a short discussion among the participants because some were reluctant. Only when I explained that I would contact them individually before using any of their verbatim quotes, did all participants agree to the voice recording.

Especially when spending longer periods of time with activists, some of which became close friends over the weeks and months I had known them, it became harder and harder to audio record conversations because it felt inappropriate and intrusive. I mainly relied on open note taking during these periods and only used the recorder during very relevant discussions and when several people were present. Consent in such situations was obtained with a raised eyebrow or short question on my behalf and a silent nod or smile by those involved. This was enough as people knew I was doing my research and had gotten used to me scribbling away in my notebook and recording things from time to time. In addition, I conducted repeated and more formal recorded interviews with several key informants,
mainly when I had not seen them for a while or felt that I had gathered a number of important questions that I wanted to discuss in more detail.

Some participants denied being recorded (see appendix 1&2) which meant that extensive notes were taken during these interviews. Especially some corporate executives and some NGO staff did not allow for recording. Managers cited reasons such as not wanting to be wrongly quoted and that their statements were the opinion of the corporation and not theirs as reasons for refusing recording. With NGO staff the main reason was fear of "being shut down" by the state if they were found to be too critical and directly quoted. Especially the staff of state-level NGOs expressed this fear.

2.4.6 Anonymity

Study participants were anonymized and are identified only with general categories such as "state-level activist" or staff of an "international NGO". Randomly selected first names that preserved the national identity were assigned to interviewees who were quoted more often, mainly with the goal to increase readability of narratives. Gender was not considered an analytically relevant category and informants might be identified with the opposite gender to further protect their identity.

2.5 Challenges and conflicts

2.5.1 Financial transactions and reciprocal relationships

"When I called Sanjay for his interview, he told me that a group of activists from Delhi were planning to go to Orissa to attend a mass rally against a steel plant and do a tour through the Niyamgiri hills to speak to the communities and assess the situation. During the call he also mentioned his lack of money to go with them. Later, in the interview, he again told me how much he would like to go with them to get footage for one of his documentary films. When we talked about whether I could accompany the group to Orissa, he suggested that I pay for his travel costs in exchange for his help with my research, that he would connect me to people, translate for me and help me find my way in Bhubaneswar. I was totally surprised by the offer, confused and excited at the same time and asked him for some time to think this over. Should I do this?"

(Field journal, November 2008)

On the third day in Delhi and after a couple of phone conversations with family and friends, I decided to abandon my initial plan of staying in the capital for about a month. I called Sanjay to confirm our deal which would catapult me right into the middle of the
conflict I wanted to study and give me access to activists and even another social movement I had hardly heard about before. Although delighted to leave Delhi and gain access to Niyamgiri so quickly, I was also concerned about the financial transaction involved and asked myself whether I should pay for my access to the field and whether my research would have been that interesting for activists had I been a penniless researcher from India.

Dealing with the hopes and expectations of study participants is a key challenge of fieldwork (De Laine, 2000; Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007) and made this early request for financial support from a gatekeeper so difficult. On the one hand, I was in a weak position and needed to get access. From what I could gauge, based on the frequency and nature of their activity on the list server and what they told me during that first interview, Sanjay and his wife were among the key actors in Delhi who supported the Niyamgiri movement. It was therefore important to establish a strong relationship and accompany them on the trip. On the other hand, I had not known them long enough to fully trust them and did not know exactly what I could expect from the trip. I was also hesitant to build relationships based on financial transactions only and afraid that I was about to create growing expectations in the future.

In our next conversation I made clear that, although I had been given me the funds to fly to India and back for my research, I was not equipped with unlimited funding and had to be careful not to spend too much of my research budget. I asked Sanjay for his best estimation of the overall costs of the trip and we agreed that any additional cost would be discussed and potentially split amongst us. Later, during the journey, however, I was relieved to find that my initial worries had be unfounded and that the people I accompanied painstakingly assured that everyone of the group contributed their fair share to meals, supplies we bought for the trek and our transportation. The rule was “Everybody pays what they can. If they work for an organization and can claim the money back, they pay more.” (Medha, fieldnotes). The only thing that I fully paid was what I had agreed on: the trip after the Niyamgiri trek where Sanjay took me to other parts of Orissa, collected video material, and brought me in touch with and explained to me much of the background and history of social movements in the state.

In the end, the situation turned out to be quite the opposite and I was hosted regularly by activists without them wanting to take any money for this. Trying to keep my independence and making the relationships at least somewhat reciprocal I paid people for
concrete support such as written translations, tried to pay my rent with those I spent extensive periods of time at and brought back a second audio recorder as a present when I returned for my second field trip. I also tried to build more reciprocal relationships based on my own expertise (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007). For example, I offered to look into ways to invite one informant to the Netherlands for a research seminar and provided a transcript of Vedanta's 2009 Annual General Meeting that I shared through the list server.

2.5.2 Discussions with managers

Corporate managers mostly engaged in 'PR talk' during interviews that did not yield much more than information about the size and expected positive impact of the contested project and the company's CSR achievements. In order to elicit somewhat more substantial replies to my questions, I used the background information and arguments shared by activists as a resource during the interview (Holstein & Gubrium, 1995), to engage managers in discussions. Against recommendations to create an empathic interview environment (Fontana & Frey, 2005), this controversial interview style seemed to better serve the purpose of studying ‘up’ (Nader, 19s72) and helped elicit answers that went beyond what could be found on corporate websites.

This interview practice also helped deal with the emotional effects of being treated as the “unthreatening” female which is often helpful in gaining access (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007: 74) but proved quite straining when asking substantial questions. The following quote from an interview with a senior POSCO manager illustrates the patronizing way in which some managers attempted to dominate the interview situation (emphasis in italics):

PS14: Now, now, now. Romy, Romy Kraemer, you are the head of POSCO, right? You want to set up a steel industry, right? You have land in India. Who do you speak with? YOU tell me, you tell me.
Interviewer: Well… [laughs uncomfortably] First I speak to the government of course.
PS14: Then?  
Interviewer: Then I would speak to the local people.
PS14: Then?  
Interviewer: See if they want it there or not and …
PS14:[interrupts] So why, why do you speak first to the government? 
[…]
PS14: Then?  
Interviewer: You might have to talk to village meetings instead of talking to village heads.
PS14: Hmm, wonderful! I LOVE the answers, I love that.
Interviewer: [laughs]
PS14: So you have spoken to a democratically elected government, then you go and try and speak to a democratically elected body of the village folks. There are 15 villages out there representing 20,000 people. Each of them has a gram panchayat which is the local body out there so you will keep speaking to all of them right?
Interviewer: hm
PS14: Romy Kraemer! You will never be able to set up your steel industry! [laughs contentedly]

Following this and similar situations, the practice of challenging managers with alternative interpretations of corporate activities and criticizing their activities helped to create a more equal level playing field in which interviewees tended to articulate themselves more openly.

2.5.3 Negative feedback from study participants

Disputes with informants about publication of the research are a common occurrence in qualitative studies (De Laine, 2000). About one year after its publication, in April 2014, the paper on the processual aspects of social movements (chapter 4) got challenged by an informant from within the social movement. Associated with a university himself and knowledgeable about the publication process, he had directly written to the Journal editor criticizing the factual correctness of the representation of the social movement in the paper and accusing the authors of a breach of his privacy.

All accusations could be answered to the satisfaction of the editor and the official response was forwarded to the claimant explaining that his accusation had been satisfactorily answered and a withdrawal was rejected. Undeterred, the claimant repeated the same accusations and demanded another time that the article be withdrawn from publication which, again, was refused because he did not substantially add to his argument. As a result, all measures were taken to cut any reference to this study participant from the remainder of the dissertation to avoid future complaints. The section on respondent validation below further highlights how I tried to assure in the best possible way the validity of the empirical material and interpretations.
2.6 Collection of empirical material

Contemporary multi-sited ethnographies are less focused on participant observation alone but rely on new forms of communication to maintain contact with and gather information from informants across space and time (Hannerz, 2003). Interviews and participant observation were complemented with material gathered from online forums, emails and website content, corporate and NGO reports, legal and various other documents, and even documentary films and a corporate advertising video. The diverse material reflects the various ‘truths’ and reality constructions of the actors and their organizations and helped tremendously in contextualizing interview and observational materials (Silverman, 2010; Stake, 2005) and address the challenges of impression management and retrospective sensemaking that come with interview data (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007).

I am hesitant to refer to the research process behind this dissertation as a process of collecting and working with ‘data’. The etymological meaning of the term (from Latin dare "to give") implies a givenness and objectivity which I do not see fit with the subjectivist approach of this study (Cunliffe, 2011). The term ‘material’ seems to be much more appropriate because it puts the emphasis on the created and creative nature of qualitative research where research participants are agentic subjects (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007) who actively participate in creating empirical material. Interview accounts are co-constructed between interviewee and interviewer (Hermanns, 2009; Rapley, 2001), participants point out potential interviewees and sources of information and hand over some documents but not others, they might even try to influence or use the researcher for their benefit (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007) thereby influencing the course of the research. Further, notions of science in practice as a craft (Burawoy, 1998; Cunliffe, 2011; Prasad, 2005; Rosen, 1991) support the idea of working with different materials rather than data.

Craftsmanship in that sense means that one is “[…] constantly engaged in adjusting and reconfiguring scientific protocols to meet the vagaries of each unique empirical situation.” (Prasad, 2005: 7). The ease of handling one’s tools and techniques as a crafts(wo)man, creatively combining and applying methods and drawing on certain research traditions, can only develop with long and regular practice. Reflecting upon the research and writing process of this dissertation, I note that I moved from an apprentice to
a practitioner over time. Below, I will outline the ways in which empirical material was obtained and collected.

2.6.1 Qualitative interviews

Initially, interviews were guided by foreshadowed problems and evolving research questions without imposing a-priori categories (Fontana & Frey, 2005). As certain themes emerged from the analysis of the already collected material, the interviews focused more and more on these topics and sampling of interviewees became more purposeful. In addition, during periods of participant observation, informal conversations and ethnographic interviews helped me to understand the situation, peoples’ activities, practices, and subjective experiences (Spradley, 1979). Interviews were audio recorded and transcribed verbatim if interviewees allowed it. Where this was not the case, field notes were taken during the conversation and elaborated upon directly afterwards.

Overall, 64 interviews were conducted with 58 informants (see appendix 1&2 for a detailed overview) which adds up to nearly 200 hours of formal interview time, the majority of which was audio recorded and transcribed. Interviews lasted between 26 minutes and nearly three hours with an average length of about one and a half hour.

Group interviews were conducted in addition to these one-to-one interviews, the most important one being a joint interview with six state-level activists in Bhubaneswar. Additional group situations that were recorded and later transcribed (and translated when needed) were meetings between activists and villagers during the trek through the Niyamgiri mountains and discussions between activists that I participated in. Another group interview was conducted with three consultants to the Indian government’s Ministry of Mines on the new mining law.

2.6.2 Participant observation

Participant observation was key whenever longer periods of time could be spent with informants. Unlike traditional ethnographies in cultural anthropology, multi-sited studies and studies from other fields often do not strive to reach the same depth and level of immersion and forego the focus on an entire ‘culture’ for attention to a number of phenomena or objects of interest (Nadai & Maeder, 2005). The time spent in particular settings was therefore often very short, anything between a couple of hours to several
weeks, compared to ethnographies with the goal to deep-dive into the lifeworld of a single group.

The majority of my fieldwork time was spent traveling or staying with Indian social movement actors which allowed me to share their daily lives and learn about their activities and perspectives via ethnographic interviews and participant observation. I travelled together with a larger group of two activists/key informants and three Indian NGO staff for a two-week period at the beginning of my first field trip. Together, we went out on a weeklong trek through the Niyamgiri mountains, the proposed site for Vedanta’s mine and close to the Lanjigarh refinery (see figure 4, above). We also visited an anti-POSCO mass protest in Dhinkia, went to a jail to visit the arrested leader of the anti-POSCO movement whom I later interviewed after his release during the second field trip, and a number of other activities. Living in the state capital with a key informant, I got to attend a number of official functions and events organized by the network of social movement groups and activists. Those included a memorial function for a Marxist politician who had recently died, an event organized in memory of a deceased activist who had been crucial in the early days of the anti-Vedanta struggle, and a number of street theatre performances intended to educate the general public about the anti-Christian riots that had started to sweep over large parts of East India in summer 2008. I accompanied an Indian member of an international NGO for a full day to the anti-POSCO protest area and another nearby village where her organization was active. I travelled with some key informants and two Indian NGO staff for two weeks to various villages in mining affected areas in Orissa. There, activists interacted with villagers and local resistance leaders in order to find out about their activities and those of the corporations/pro-corporate groups and I also had the opportunity to interview villagers or (former) resistance leaders. During those trips we rarely stayed in hotels because my key informants had (activist) acquaintances in many places who welcomed us into their houses. When not traveling, I mostly either lived together with key informants in Bhubaneswar and Delhi.

The 2009 Vedanta AGM in London offered a unique opportunity to observe interactions between Indian activists and their European counterparts (see chapter 4) as well as between social movement and corporate actors. Additionally, on two occasions, I was able to interact with corporate actors for periods that were longer than a simple interview. I stayed for two days in a Vedanta guest house where I mainly interacted with the CSR manager who did not leave my side and accompanied me to meetings with local
proponents and opponents of the project. Later I was able to visit a Vedanta ‘resettlement colony’ in another location together with the local CSR staff who also gave me a tour of the plant that was still under construction. Given the difficulty of gaining access to mining corporations especially in locations where their projects are highly contested, those short periods of time were extremely valuable in gaining a better understanding of the corporate perspective on anti-mining resistance. Some of the most revealing and interesting conversations took place when traveling with corporate informants in the car or during shared meals.

Observations were recorded on the spot in the form of handwritten field notes. When there was no time for writing, I voice recorded short ‘notes to self’ that were later added when going through the field notes at the end of each day. Like when traveling with activists, I also recorded some group settings, especially interactions between local villagers and CSR staff. I later had them translated to verify the information that had been translated back to me on the spot and learn more about the interactions between managers and locals.

2.6.3 Online sites

The above mentioned online list server, that often was the venue for debates and used extensively for communication among activists, represents another – virtual – site of this study that provided relevant empirical material. It was a great source of factual information on events and organizing activities but also revealed much about activists’ self-presentations and movement-internal debates. Moreover, via this online connection, it was possible to stay connected and continue gather information about the movement outside of fieldwork periods.

The list server is moderated by a UK based anti-mining activist and the majority of the over 90 members personally know each other from protest events and also across country divides. Group members receive a daily summary email with all messages posted to the group since the last summary. The type of information posted ranges from links to newspaper articles in Indian and European media that are related to anti-mining and industrialization struggles to calls for action or participation in events, updates on campaigning activities and recent local developments such as the arrest of an activist and plans for protesting it. Members also use the group to share their own relevant articles or multimedia productions. Less frequently, the list is used as a collaboration tool and
members share drafts and ask for input from other members (e.g. on letters to the ministry). Finally, the online group regularly was the venue for ideological debates and internal criticism among movement members.

Overall, since its foundation in December 2004 until autumn 2010, there had been over 6000 messages posted to the group. The number of messages posted per day has generally increased over time from just a couple of postings per week to currently about two to six posts per day. It also fluctuates strongly and can further increase to about 15 messages in times of high activity. Very rarely there is no daily update due to a lack of postings. There are about seven to ten core members who actively contribute a large part of the information with others mainly consuming it.

In addition to that, a closed Facebook group specifically on the Niyamgiri struggle was set up by an Indian activist and key informant of this study in 2009. Though there were many overlaps in terms of membership with the list server, this group had over 500 members at the time of the study who were less involved in the movement but rather sympathetic bystanders interested to spread the word about it. Although some of the information shared in the group overlapped with the list server posts, often more detailed information on the Niyamgiri struggle was provided there.

2.6.4 Other material

Official documents such as laws and censuses, annual reports, CSR reports and brochures, research documents and press releases published by companies, governments and NGOs were collected whenever possible to cross-check and contextualise information obtained through other means. Similarly, I followed the news on the Niyamgiri and POSCO struggle in the English speaking Indian and UK press. Overall, more than 1500 pages of documents and news articles were collected between 2008 and 2014.

Video coverage of protest events, campaign clips and documentary videos produced by NGOs and activists also provided important background information about the case and related struggles in Orissa. One crucial video is the official exit of Jika (see chapter 4) from the Niyamgiri movement that was published on Youtube in summer 2009. A Vedanta PR DVD on one of their new plants provided important insights into the corporate perception of the positive economic and social impact of the project and the ability of the company to ‘uplift’ entire regions.
2.7 Analysis and presentation of findings

Combining and theorising from historical data, retrospective interviews and longitudinal data gathered from different sources, I use extensive quotes, narrative (Czarniawska, 1999) and grounded theory to make sense of and present the empirical material. In line with the grounded theory building processes (Charmaz, 2000; Bryant & Charmaz, 2007), the material was coded, categorized and sorted to develop a theory grounded in the empirical findings. Early coding with open and preliminary codes and frequent iterations between theory and the material informed the theoretical sampling of participants, settings and situations until saturation was reached (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). All digital texts, interview transcripts, documents, websites and online newspaper articles, were analysed with NVivo. Handwritten field notes, field journal entries, and printed texts (e.g. reports, corporate PR materials) were coded manually. In extensive handwritten memos the material was analytically interpreted and the evolving thoughts about the material documented (Noerager Stern, 2007; Bex Lempert, 2007).

Grounded theory approaches share an affinity to study processes (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Langley, 1999) and center on activities as main categories of analysis. Activity-type categories were further defined by specific properties. For example, the category 'local community mobilizing' was developed to describe the observed and re-told activity of national level activists that traveled to remote communities in the Niyamgiri mountains. This category was further defined by the properties of 'mobilizing by sharing learnings from past and current struggles', 'mobilizing by explaining socio-economic impacts and scientific facts' and 'mobilizing through stories of injustice'). These properties had emerged from the material as a result of the process of coding and constant comparison of empirical material, codes and the emerging categories (Kelle, 2007). Categories were clustered and expanded as analysis and material collection proceeded. After saturation was reached, categories were again clustered and collapsed upon one another and then hand-sorted to put them into relation and make sense of the material (Noerager Stern, 2007). Memos guided this process, new ones were produced and formed the basis to discuss the emerging theory with co-authors and supervisors.
2.7.1 Respondent validation

Respondent validation increases the validity and quality of the outputs produced. Gathering feedback from those studied is considered essential for ethical qualitative research, as a tool to increase the agency of study participants (Locke & Velamuri, 2009) and also to counter-check content based on a responsibility to protect study participants from harm (De Laine, 2000). Two types of respondent validation were employed: informally sharing emerging ideas with key informants and explicitly sending written documentation for fact-checking.

Feedback on the evolving research focus and the outputs to be produced was obtained from key informants via informal conversations and email. Albeit subtle, this was an important step to assure that the political implications of the research project were counter-checked with activists. The topics of the two empirical papers, within-movement dynamics and defection as well as movement repression and perception by managers were considered relevant and interesting by those who provided feedback. Reacting to the first topic, some activists expressed hopes that the findings would reach NGOs and other international actors to have them reflect on their interactions with local movement actors.

In addition to this ongoing updating and exchange about my evolving research focus, written drafts of the empirical papers were shared with key informants with the request to provide feedback. However, only two informants with ties to academia made use of this opportunity and provided extensive written comments, suggesting additional readings and pointing out smaller flaws in the flow of the text and facts provided. These were taken into account during the revision process.

2.8 Declaration of contribution

In this section, I declare my and others’ contribution to this dissertation. All field and literature research that forms the base of this dissertation was conducted solely by the author. Several parts of the present work were presented at conferences and in research seminars where feedback was obtained from participants that informed revisions and improved the final output. The process of respondent validation that also contributed to the empirical chapters was outlined in section 2.7.1 above. Chapters 3-5 were also
considerably improved based on the feedback of anonymous reviewers. Below I will further detail the most important contributions to each individual chapter.

Chapters 1, 2, 5 and 6 were ideated and independently written by the author and later improved with the feedback obtained from Prof. Rob van Tulder (promotor) and Prof. Gail Whiteman, (co-promotor).

Chapter 3 was conceptualized together with the promotor, independently written and jointly finalised for publication in *A stakeholder approach to corporate social responsibility* (2012) by A. Lindgreen, P. Kotler, J. Vandamme & F. Maon (Eds.) with the author of this dissertation as the first and the promotor as second author of the book chapter.

The idea for chapter 4 was developed by the author based on her empirical findings as well as the repeated discussions with the promotor, co-promotor, and Prof. Bobby Banerjee (Cass Business School, City University London). Feedback on several versions of the paper was obtained from Prof. Whiteman and Prof. Banerjee who are also the second and third authors of the final paper. This paper was published in 2013 in *Organization Studies*, 34(5-6), pp. 823-852.

Finally, the idea for chapter 5 was independently developed and written by the author and finalised with the feedback of the promotor and co-promotors. It was then submitted to *Organization Studies* where it received feedback and an R&R that could not be finished due to time constraints and other commitments.
3. A LICENSE TO OPERATE FOR THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES?

Operationalizing Stakeholder Thinking in International Business

3.1 Abstract

The concept of the ‘License to Operate’ (LtO) has emerged as practitioners’ operationalization of corporate responsibilities towards multiple stakeholders, especially in the oil and mining industry that faces a unique and complex set of stakeholder pressures. The LtO is a poorly and often strategically employed concept-in-use. This chapter seeks to (re)conceptualize the LtO for multinational enterprises and draws implications for international business theory. Examples from the extractive industry are examined through a multilevel LtO-lens. The chapter then re-assesses and rephrases traditional thinking about the trade-offs between global integration and local responsiveness/embeddedness for multinational firms, building on international business and stakeholder theory. We highlight the need for international business to go beyond a strictly task-related focus when assessing factors that influence the activities and location choice of multinational firms. A shift from a ‘responsiveness’ to a ‘responsibility’ approach is suggested to improve the managerial sophistication of the LtO concept.

3.2 Introduction

In May 2002, Occidental Petroleum pulled out of its legally granted concession to explore and extract oil in U’wa territory, Colombia. The U’wa believe that the crude oil is the blood of their “mother earth”; they did not consent to the extraction and were supported by international NGOs whose campaign led investors to sell their Occidental shares and ultimately resulted in the company’s withdrawal.

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2 This chapter is co-authored with Prof. Rob van Tulder and published in A. Lindgreen, P. Kotler, J. Vandamme & F. Maon (2012) *A stakeholder approach to corporate social responsibility*. Farnham: Gower.
In 2003, following immense public and shareholder pressure, Canada’s largest oil company, Talisman Energy, pulled out of its Sudanese investments because it had been accused by civil society groups of fueling the rampant civil war through generating income for the Sudanese government.

In April 2008, Shell reported an output loss of 169,000 barrels of crude per day due to sabotage of its main pipelines in southern Nigeria. Overall, violence in the southern Delta region has reduced Nigeria’s total crude oil production by a quarter since January, 2006.

In September 2010, after years of campaigning by a coalition of national and international NGOs and activists in support of the Dongria Kondh tribe, the Indian government denied UK mining company and major aluminum producer Vedanta Resources, environmental clearance for a bauxite mine on the ancestral land of the tribe.

Following the massive oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico caused by the explosion of BP’s Deepwater Horizon, the US government — after strong pressure by, among others, local fishery communities — put a hold on all offshore drilling licensing until the safety requirements for this practice had been reviewed.

These examples illustrate the complex set of stakeholder pressures and their influence on the operations and location choice of corporations from the extractive industry (mineral and oil and gas). Growing awareness for the impact of business operations in other parts of the world in the home countries of large well-known European and North American multinational enterprises (MNEs) from contested industries has turned them into prime targets for attacks by alliances of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and locally affected stakeholders. The influence of NGOs and local communities on MNEs operations is an interesting perspective on international business (Doh & Teegen, 2003; Teegen, Doh & Vachani, 2004). It adds to the traditional emphasis on the quality and availability of natural resources, liability of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995), the bargaining power of the host country government (Fagre & Wells, 1982; Grosse, 1996; Ramamurti, 2001; Vernon, 1971) and the need for global integration (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989b) as relevant factors for extractive industry companies’ investment decisions. Such theoretical ideas about the nature of the extractive industry and the pressures it faces stand in stark contrast to today’s management reality where, beyond the industry’s operational and location imperatives, the need to obtain a “License to Operate” (LtO) is central to managerial discourse:
Chevron: "Our approach to stakeholder consultations is designed to earn our license to operate … We believe in earning our license to operate and bringing benefits to communities where we operate.” (McLeod, 2009)

BHP Billiton: "We understand it is a privilege to operate in communities, and that our licence to operate is crucial to our continued success as a company.” (Nasser, 2010)

Vedanta Resources: "Being well knit in the social fabric of our communities has enabled us to nurture our social license to operate and to work hand in hand with the local communities and the environment.” (Annual Report, 2010)

The risk of losing the LtO has been dramatically described as “probably the single greatest threat to mining operations throughout the developing world” (Reichardt, 2006) and its importance was likened to that of financial resources (Post, Preston & Sachs, 2002). Such statements clearly point to the crucial nature of stakeholder relationships for corporate success and future expansion strategies in the extractive industries. At the same time, they highlight the need for a reassessment of classic international business theory and an expansion of current thinking to a focus beyond the internal drivers for investments onto the external conditions within which such investments are embedded.

However, despite its popularity among managers, too many questions still remain to be answered, for example which stakeholders actually grant the LtO and especially how it can be conceptualized. This chapter is an attempt to systematize and work towards a coherent perspective on the LtO in order to limit its rhetorical and strategic usage and improve its realistic and managerial use. The chapter therefore extends traditional notions of local responsiveness in international business theory towards an incorporation of stakeholder thinking. Departing from a description of the extractive industry as an ideal case to examine stakeholder pressures, we review the use of the LtO concept by industry representatives and stakeholders. Based on its use by managers in the industry and the available academic literature, a multilevel conceptualization of the LtO is proposed and applied to a discussion of examples from the minerals and oil industry. Going beyond the related concepts of “local embeddedness” and “responsiveness”, we highlight how the LtO can extend current international business theory through a shift from traditional ideas about local responsiveness to the notion of stakeholder responsibility. We conclude with a critical discussion of the meaning and implications of the LtO as a concept-in-use and suggest directions for further research.
3.3. Stakeholder Pressures in the Extractive Industry

Multinational corporations from the extractive industry (EI) have been confronted with the most long-standing, the broadest, but at the same time also the most fragmented set of requests from a variety of stakeholders, especially when operating in developing countries. Due to the boundedness of their location choices to the availability of natural resources and the increasing need to explore earlier uneconomic and remote reserves, EI firms often operate under the most complex and challenging conditions, e.g. in politically tense conflict zones, under unstable regimes, in disadvantaged rural communities in developing countries and on the lands of indigenous peoples — often combining more than one challenge (Coumans, 2008). Conflicts and local resistance to extractive operations are more frequent than in any other industry and our opening examples show that extractive industry firms repeatedly had to involuntarily withdraw from investments that seemed viable from a purely operational and economical perspective. Responsiveness to local claims and circumstances is therefore crucial to avoid high transaction and sunk costs and is becoming a precondition for future expansion strategies (Reichardt, 2006). The EI has therefore been at the forefront of debates about corporate responsibilities and the role of multinational corporations in development (Frynas, 2009; KPMG, 2005; UNCTAD, 2006; van Tulder & van der Zwart, 2006; Zyglidopoulos, 2002). Mining and oil multinationals are also featured prominently in debates about the internationalization of MNEs from transition and developing countries, south–south investment, and the strategic and developmental implications of such developments in international investment patterns (Athreye & Kapur 2009; Aykut & Goldstein 2007; UNCTAD 2006). These corporations are thus a highly relevant example for the need to integrate non-market and nonprofit dimensions into the study of MNEs. Nevertheless, they remain a relatively poorly studied subset of MNEs (Jones, 2005).

Pressures from and conflicts with three main stakeholder groups have shown to be especially relevant for EI companies in the past. The first, and most directly affected stakeholder group are the local communities who are displaced by or located in the vicinity of mining and oil development. A MNEs’ interpretation of “sustainable development” increasingly also means corporate community involvement and responsiveness to local needs (Fortanier & Kolk, 2007; Jones, Pollitt & Bek, 2007; Kobeissi & Damanpour, 2009). Acknowledging the multiple social, cultural, environmental and economic effects of
mineral and oil extraction (Banerjee, 2000; Evans, Goodman & Lansbury, 2002; Whiteman, 2004; Yakovleva, 2005) some EI corporations engage in a host of more or less successful local development projects, often carried out in collaboration with NGOs. The second stakeholder group entails national and international NGOs. They often support communities’ claims and shape the public opinion about individual corporations as well as the entire sector. Greenpeace’s role in the controversy about the sinking of Shell’s Brent Spar oil platform is a well-known case in point (Zyglidopoulos, 2002). NGOs are central in the escalation of conflicts around large-scale investments in contentious industries (Skippari & Pajunnen, 2010) and have been crucial in highlighting important issues for the EI such as revenue transparency, their role in climate change discussion and the environmental and human rights impact of EI operations (Levy & Kolk, 2002; Utting & Ives, 2006). The third stakeholder group are the host country governments. They have a high impact on the activities of EI multinationals, e.g. through their role in the granting of exploration and exploitation licenses, taxation and the threat of nationalization due to the strategic nature of the sector (Vernon, 1971; Vernon, 1981).

The combination of an often demanding operational environment accompanied by conflicting stakeholder demands creates a unique challenge for EI corporations. Sparked by the controversy and high attention with which their operations are usually met, EI multinationals have been at the forefront of CSR activities and rhetoric and have been crucial in coining the LtO concept. This has motivated major NGOs like Oilwatch or Corpwatch to accuse the industry of “greenwashing” and highlight deviations from their stated CSR commitments. This chapter thus also faces the challenge to try to go beyond the rhetoric and develop the LtO into a more sophisticated concept in which the complex stakeholder relationships in host locations are realistically included.

3.4 Trends in the Practical Use of the LtO Concept

Extractive industry firms in particular have embraced the LtO as a leading paradigm for business conduct and the achievement of long-term profitability. How central the LtO concept has become is apparent in industry-specific conferences, especially in Australia and Canada with titles such as "Social License to Operate 2010" or "Land Access Forum". In 2011, the latter offered a panel discussion on “Obtaining a License to Operate” with the following description:
"The perceived right to have a physical presence of place in a community is a core challenge to the resources industry. Some might say it is the biggest issue they are facing. Gaining regulatory approval for mining and petroleum projects and developing the necessary infrastructure is a challenging, time and money intensive process. But without a social license to operate in a region, these physical and administrative investments can be rendered worthless."  

Table 2 lists additional material from a simple web search (using the terms “license/licence to operate” on Google and different corporate websites). This quick review illustrates three general trends: first, community and society at large feature most prominently as grantors of the LtO. Secondly, the LtO, instead of being a tangible document, is used in a metaphorical sense. It is the perception of managers that the firm’s presence and operations are accepted by the local population. Finally, despite this relative consensus, there remains considerable variance in terms of the antecedents, outcomes and nature of the LtO, as well as related concepts such as reputation or citizenship. The importance of community, however, indicates that contributing to sustainable local development is widely seen as the key to local acceptance (Amaral & La Rovere, 2003). The lower part of Table 5 further suggests that the notion of the LtO has also been taken up by NGOs, consultants and the general public when discussing issues relevant for the EI and its stakeholder relationships.

This characteristic of the LtO as a concept-in-use and its widespread application across industry actors without a clear consensus about its meaning, makes it comparable to the concept of “corporate citizenship”, a term which also largely originated from American multinationals and EI corporations (van Tulder & van der Zwart, 2006). Practitioners seem to attach increasing value to the LtO as a means to operationalize stakeholder relationships, while local communities and stakeholders embrace the concept also as an argument in obtaining a better bargaining position in their negotiations with investors to achieve better preconditions for sustainable development. Like corporate citizenship before it, the LtO concept has been embraced by academics (Gunningham, Kagan, Thornton, 2004; Howard-Grenville, Nash & Coglianese, 2008; Nelsen, 2006; Nelsen & Scoble, 2006; Post, Preston & Sachs, 2002), notwithstanding its conceptual and managerial ambiguities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LtO Quote</th>
<th>Stakeholder Group</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Our license to operate in a country is only as good as the community’s attitude towards us.”</td>
<td>Community</td>
<td>Eyton (2010), Head Research &amp; Technology, BP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Our licence to operate—it’s our reputation as a partner of choice. Gaining and maintaining our licence to operate is critical to our business. We aim to ensure that the communities in which we operate value our citizenship.”</td>
<td>Community</td>
<td>BHP Billiton (2007), website</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Social license is the acceptance and belief by society, and specifically our local communities, in the value creation of our activities, such as we are allowed to access and extract mineral resources.”</td>
<td>Community, society</td>
<td>Pierre Lassonde, Newmont Mining (cited in Reichardt, 2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Most companies recognise the far-reaching effects that health, safety and environmental issues can have on their business. Like us, they believe that long-term competitive success depends on being trusted to meet the expectations of society as well as those of shareholders and stakeholders.”</td>
<td>Society, shareholders, stakeholders</td>
<td>Shell website</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“For international oil and gas companies like BP, our ‘license to operate’ depends on the consent of the societies in which we work. Mostly, we operate under license. We rarely work alone. Almost nothing we do is unregulated. To succeed, we have to be in step with society.”</td>
<td>Society</td>
<td>Rice (2002), Director Policy Unit, BP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“The social license is intangible, renewable daily and granted by the people only when their needs are being met”</td>
<td>Community</td>
<td>Kurlander (2001), Senior Vice President, Newmont Mining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“A ‘social licence to operate’ is earned by acquiring free, prior and informed consent from indigenous peoples and local communities.”</td>
<td>Community</td>
<td>McKibben &amp; Waters (2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Due to the egregious number of safety violations and warnings; they should lose any license to operate within the United States at all.”</td>
<td>Host government</td>
<td>Reader comment on an article about the BP oil spill, Huffington Post (2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“If society gives business its license to operate, then surely society can demand that business takes responsibility for any significant negative consequences associates with its products.”</td>
<td>Society</td>
<td>Blog entry on a business ethics consultancy website</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.5 A Theoretical Elaboration

3.5.1 Conceptualizing theLtO at Three Levels

The LtO, sometimes also termed “social license” or “social license to operate” has mainly entered the field of management studies as part of stakeholder theory:

“At the level of an individual project the Social License is rooted in the beliefs, perceptions and opinions held by the local population and other stakeholders about the project.”

“With respect to individuals and groups involuntarily impacted by corporate activity, in particular those subject to pollution, congestion, unwelcome cultural influences, or the like, the critical management goals have to be avoidance of harm, reduction of risk, and/or the creation of offsetting benefits, so that the continued operation of the individual enterprise — its ‘license to operate’ — remains acceptable to all parties.”

(Post, Preston & Sachs, 2002)

Like the many practitioner statements shown in Table 2 above, the academic definitions focus primarily on corporations' impact on and relationships with community stakeholders. Others cover the LtO from a legal perspective based on research in the pulp and paper industry (Gunningham, Kagan & Thornton, 2004) and, following a very hands-on industry approach, also in the mining industry (Nelsen, 2006; Nelsen & Scobble, 2006). Some authors focus on firm internal factors that influence how the need for an LtO is perceived and what response strategies are chosen in the face of external stakeholder pressures. They argue that the LtO is constructed through a continuous interaction process (Howard-Grenville, Nash & Coglianese, 2008).

Table 2: Overview of the use of the license to operate (LtO) concept

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Quote</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cramer (2002)</td>
<td>&quot;The degree to which the firm’s conduct is accepted by society.&quot;</td>
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</table>
Despite the initial focus on communities, at the same time the LtO always also has a more broad societal component that resonates in many of the definitions and industry statements. At the most extreme, it is the stated requirement for the corporation to “earn its ‘license to operate,’ both locally and globally, by demonstrating its respect for people and its contribution to building a better world” (Post, Preston & Sachs, 2002: 256).

Others have criticized this weakly developed notion of the LtO as an obligation in return for the special privileges and benefits conferred on businesses by society (Hopkins, 2007). Considering these lines of contention, it is very likely that the LtO discussion will move into an intellectual stalemate comparable to the one on corporate citizenship. To prevent such a situation, and in order to synthesize the existing literature and the ways in which the concept has been used by practitioners, we propose a concept of LtO that interrelates three levels: the societal/global, the legal/national and the social/local license (Figure 5).

Before explaining these levels, however, we need to clarify how the LtO relates to other concepts — most importantly the concept of legitimacy (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008). While legitimacy is primarily a theoretical construct, the LtO clearly is a practitioner concept and strategically employed to create a societal perception of organizational acceptance in society. Moreover, legitimacy is usually described as the absence of challenges towards the object of legitimation and as a non-rival and homogenizing concept (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008). This is often interpreted and operationalized as a “negative duty” approach. The LtO approach departs from a more “positive duty”
approach, where practitioners emphasize the need for actively obtaining a license (and with it potentially also a competitive advantage) from local or state-level stakeholders, as well as society.

Figure 5: Multilevel conceptualization of the LtO

The LtO, as it is currently used, is more immediate and dichotomous (either present or absent) and granted at a micro level compared to the more abstract concept of legitimacy that grows over time and can increase with increasing numbers of legitimizing actors/institutions (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008). Legitimacy is a broader concept that relates to the general societal acceptance of, for example, the extractive industry as a whole. This will be further referred to below as the “License to Exist”. The local LtO might thus be seen as a possible expression or benefit of a firms’ overall legitimacy (Bansal & Roth,
These ideas will be integrated into a theoretically informed operationalization of the practitioner’s LtO concept in order to apply it to an analysis of the challenges faced by the EI and extend current thinking about local responsiveness and global integration later in this chapter.

The societal/global level refers to the broad acceptance of EI operations in general (Cramer, 2002), likened above to the overall legitimacy of the industry. Individual firms try to alter the image of the EI as a “dirty” industry and to align their values with those prevalent in the societies where operations take place in order to remain in business (Humphreys, 2001). Joint EI company initiatives such as the “Mining, minerals, and sustainable development” initiative (MMSD, 2002) are attempts to build public trust and contribute to the overall legitimacy of the industry, which we label the License to Exist because of its broad overarching industry-level implications. In moral theory, this notion builds on the general “fiduciary duty” of corporations and has been operationalized as the compliance likelihood of codes of conduct and reporting strategies (Kolk & van Tulder, 2005).

The national level of the LtO is concerned with obtaining necessary governmental licenses and permits for a local operation and complying with, for example, emission and waste management guidelines. Past operating performance plays an important role here (Birley, 2005; Zinkin, 2004) in that it paves the way in the form of what has been labelled “reputation capital” by a Newmont Mining executive. However, the national license is not entirely legal in nature. If host governments decide that companies’ activities are not benefiting the country enough, they might pull their support and withdraw the LtO through non-renewal of legal licenses, inviting competitors, or, in the worst case, nationalization of the industry. Governments need to trust firms for them to obtain prospecting rights and access to blocs of land for oil, gas or minerals exploration or to be accepted by the country as a retailer (e.g. selling refined petroleum). In the 1990s this was an issue for example in the opening up of Eastern European countries where not all foreign firms were equally successful in obtaining the licenses to operate gas stations from the local bureaucracy (Knot, 1997).

The local LtO can be conceptualized in line with what many authors have referred to as the “social” LtO and portends to the management of relations with important local stakeholders — usually referred to as “the community” in the above quotes. Those are the stakeholders who could effectively prevent operations or increase transaction costs for
corporations at the local level, e.g. through loss of production (strikes, blockades, land conflict), higher costs for security provision, costs for dispute resolution (community consultation, capacity building stakeholder meetings, employee/management time) and additional costs for data gathering and verification (e.g. environmental data, consultants) (Reichardt, 2006). This relates to the original meaning of corporate citizenship that requires corporations to be responsible members of the local community in which they operate (Andrioff & McIntosh, 2001). The local LtO is not guaranteed by obtaining the support of the state and society and might not be equally persistent over time as a signed contract with the host country government. In that sense it is tied to “local needs” as referred to above by Kurlander (Table 3) and continuously negotiated. Reluctance of local governments to support firms in struggles with local stakeholders and normative expectations for good local relationships within and outside the enterprise (e.g. codes of conduct or policies such as ILO 169, World Bank Operational Directive 4.20) require firms to negotiate directly with local stakeholders and add to the need for obtaining a local LtO (Wasserstrom & Reider, 1998). Additionally, the increasingly sophisticated organization of local communities and their expertise in linking up with international activists and campaigns makes it harder for firms to ignore those groups and practice what has been called a 'right of way' policy (Wasserstrom & Reider, 1998), where trespassing and land use issues were resolved with small cash payments to locals without any further consideration of their development needs.

Figure 5 also highlights the interconnectedness of the three levels and the two-way relationships among them. An industry’s overall license to exist is influenced by the LtOs granted to individual firms all over the world at a national and local level and by the existence and public debate about universal standards or “hypernorms” (Logsdon & Wood, 2002). As for reputational effects (Fombrun, 2005), it has been shown that deviance of individual firms and their loss of the LtO has negative spillover effects for innocent firms within the same industry and thus has implications for the overall legitimacy or license to exist (Jonsson, Greve & Fujiwara-Greve, 2009). Internationally operating activists and NGOs therefore raise broader questions about the legitimacy of the EI in general and have successfully influenced the relationships between MNEs and host country governments (Kobrin, 2005) as well as considerably change public awareness of the negative impact of the EI on host countries and communities. Likewise, national and societal challenges to an
industry’s or individual corporation’s LtO can improve the chances of local communities in challenging individual EI corporations and motivate them to take local action.

3.5.2 Application to the Extractive Industries

The 2010 BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico and the subsequent congressional hearing with executives from ExxonMobil, Shell and Chevron highlights the threat of a loss of the License to Exist (LtE) for corporations following an individual corporation’s malperformance. Likewise, the public debate about doing business in Sudan threatened the LtO of Western oil corporations in general and had an impact on individual firms such as Talisman Oil, who had to pull out of the country. In South Africa, the Black Economic Empowerment movement, supported by international NGOs, considerably affected the way individual mining firms now conduct their operations and engage in CSR by sparking a wider societal discussion (Hamann, 2004). The lawsuit of the inhabitants of Kivalina against Exxon Mobil and 23 other American oil producers because of their contribution to global warming and attempts to influence the public discourse threatens their overall LtE and would not have been possible without the current concern about climate change in the wider society. In general, calls for sustainable community development, that extend beyond the life cycle of the individual resource development project, would not be possible without the wide perception in society that long-term sustainability is a legitimate claim.

On the other hand, conflicts over natural resource development bring to light conflicts and deeper clashes of worldviews (Mander & Tauli-Corpuz, 2006) and interests between different segments of society that are especially pronounced in industrializing countries and/or those with indigenous populations, ethnic or religious differences, and smoldering civil conflicts that are usually exacerbated by the prospect of resource rents. In countries like India or Brazil, the majority of the mainstream population supports the LtE of the mining and oil industry on the grounds that it is able to deliver income for national development, while the local LtO is routinely challenged by indigenous peoples and poor rural communities whose ways of life and subsistence base are threatened and who might not want or are unable to participate in the kind of development resource extraction might bring (Ali & Behrendt, 2001; Young, 1995). Faced with local resistance, EI corporations, claiming their legal rights and building on the national LtO, often call in the government/police forces for support. The Sudanese government, for example, used heavy military force to “clear” areas for petroleum development and forestall local resistance to
exploitation of resource wealth (Human Rights Watch, 2003), the Indian government has been accused of similar activities with respect to mining and the focus on fighting so-called Maoists in mineral rich states (Roy, 2010).

The complexities of earning a national LtO have for example been felt by RioTinto operating in Guinea, where legal licenses stand and fall with the appointment of ministers. As a result of such turbulences, the company runs the risk of their right to exploit the largest known undeveloped iron ore reserve in the world being withdrawn and might incur sunk costs of $300 million (Ross, 2008). In Russia, Shell lost half of its shares in the hugely profitable Sakhalin II project after signing an initially very beneficial production-sharing agreement with the government back in 1996. Ten years later, the technical ability of Gazprom to develop the reserve had increased and the Russian government, suddenly backing environmentalists’ claims against the company, took over ownership in the enterprise. This is a prime example of a government (ab)using local level claims against a firm to increase its own bargaining power in negotiations about the national LtO.

The local LtO can be challenged or revoked at any time and the conditions under which it is granted are subject to renegotiation. If firms do not fulfill their obligations and promises for local development, local stakeholders will try to claim justice. In Mambia, Guinea, Russia’s aluminum company Rusal signed an agreement with the local community in 1984 and by 2008 had failed to fulfill its promises regarding the provision of public services to affected communities. Two people were killed and several others injured during local protests (BBC, 2008), only one example among many such incidences all over the world that make clear that EI corporations often fail to gain the local LtO.

3.6 Incorporating the LtO into International Business Theory: From Embeddedness and Responsiveness to Responsibility

3.6.1 Local Responsiveness and Embeddedness

International business theory, though interested in the investment behavior of multinational corporations, has so far not paid much attention to the specific stakeholder pressures faced by the EI and thus has not yet contributed to the concept of the LtO, a
lacunae that we wish to address. Two core concepts have been introduced in the international business literature to research and prescribe management practices: responsiveness and embeddedness. Both concepts are relevant, but need updating and repositioning.

First, the integration-responsiveness (I-R) ideal (Ghoshal & Noria, 1989) belongs to the classic tenets of international business and strategy. It illuminates the tensions for multinational firms that arise from the need to balance responsiveness at subsidiary level with global efficiency, integration and headquarters control and has been widely applied at the level of the industry (Porter, 1986), the multinational enterprise (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989b; Doz, Bartlett & Prahalad, 1981; Ghoshal & Noria, 1993) and their subsidiaries (Jarillo & Martinez, 1990; Johnson, Farrel & Henderson, 1995; Taggart, 1997). Integration means exploiting cost and efficiency advantages and opportunities for standardization arising from multi-country operations, whereas local responsiveness is understood as reacting to domestic competition and host country demands while sufficiently differentiating operations to handle global competition. The classic international business thesis as formulated in the “integration-responsiveness grid” (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989a; Doz & Prahalad, 1991) portrays extractive industries as a prime example of “global industries” that combine a high pressure for integration and a low pressure for responsiveness (Figure 6).
Levitt’s original work on globalization reinforced this impression: oil majors and mining companies serve global markets with relatively standardized products (Levitt, 1983). Pressures for integration and responsiveness vary not only across firms and countries, but also between functions within businesses, e.g. CSR and human resource management (Doz & Prahalad, 1991; Muller, 2006; Rosenzweig & Noria, 1994). Previous studies however, favored the examination of pressures for global integration and only more recent work tried to investigate the environmental, industry-structural, and firm-related factors that influence the local responsiveness of subsidiaries (Birkinshaw, Morrison & Hulland, 1995; Kobrin, 1991).

The I-R model has been criticized for a number of reasons: for instance its lack of conceptual clarity which has lead to problematic empirical validation Luo, 2001), or its ambiguity as regards the nature of the pressure (exogenous, endogenous representing
managerial choices) and its relationship with performance (Venaik, Midgley & Devinney, 2004).

Second, the concept of embeddedness (Granovetter, 1985; Polanyi, 1944) has also been widely applied in the international business literature, e.g. with respect to the integration of foreign subsidiaries into the local economy (Dunning, 1995), local clusters (Porter, 1998, 2000) and the potential of FDI to contribute to regional development (Lall & Narula, 2004; Pavlinek, 2004; Phelps, MacKinnon, Stone & Braidford, 2003). Other studies examined institutional embeddedness (Choi, Raman, Usoltseva & Lee, 1999), the relationship between local embeddedness and employee attitudes (Newburry, 2001), or relational embeddedness between parent and international joint ventures (Dhanaraj, Lyles, Steensma & Tihanyi, 2004). Local embeddedness through connections and local networks is a source of information, knowledge and physical resources, but also of power and legitimacy (Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001). In terms of legitimacy, embeddedness created through corporate citizenship activities is said to help companies to overcome their liability of foreignness in a host country location (Gardberg & Fombrun, 2006). What can be learned from those studies of firm networks is that embeddedness enables firms to obtain reliable information to categorize other actors in the network and inform decision-making regarding which players are important for the focal firm (Karamanos, 2003). Applied to the EI context, higher embeddedness of Shell in local stakeholder relationships with local groups in the Niger Delta might have facilitated recognition of the importance of the oppositional movement led by Ken Saro-Wiwa, before it was too late for the company to take sensible action. Even 15 years after the original case materialized, the company is still struggling (in American and Dutch courts) with this issue.

Such local knowledge and learning issues have brought some authors to equate local embeddedness with local responsiveness, arguing that subsidiary managers possess crucial local knowledge that is needed at MNE headquarters and that knowledge and technology transfer to parents improves through embeddedness (Andersson & Forsgren, 2000; Hakanson & Nobel, 2001; Ling, Floyd & Baldrige, 2005; Mu, Gnyawali & Hatfield, 2007). The local context is seen as a source of important information which headquarters are unable to obtain and that local responsiveness/embeddedness can thus deliver strategic advantages (Bartlett & Ghosal, 1986; Birkinshaw, 1997).

Despite the prescriptions for local responsiveness and the seemingly high value of firm embeddedness into local networks, the international business literature is ripe with
examples of under-adaptation of firms to their local environment, be it in marketing (Dow, 2006), human resource management (Johnson, Lenartowicz & Apud, 2006), or internationalization strategy (Magnusson et al. 2008). Similarly, for extractive industry operations, local adaptation is normatively seen as a specific success factor (Hamann, 2004), though it is often not reached in practice.

3.6.2 From Responsiveness and Embeddedness to Responsibility

Both the mainstream responsiveness and embeddedness approach have their limitations. The added value of the LtO concept to traditional international business theory is that it upgrades the idea of local responsiveness as mentioned in the I-R grid approach to include also the increasingly challenging stakeholder relationships that firms in the EI in particular face.

Local responsiveness as it is currently used is strongly biased towards market-seeking MNEs and their need to adapt products and services to suit host country markets and be responsive to local institutions and business cultures (Harzing, 2000; Luo, 2001; Roth & Morrison, 1990). Pressures for responsiveness originate from customers and business partners: other local stakeholders are rarely considered in such a context. Our discussion of the LtO has shown the importance of a more diverse set of stakeholders that challenges the applicability of the classic I-R grid to the EI.

Due to the specific nature of the industry, responsiveness is not just a question of being able to “successfully confront cultures, markets, and business practices” (Luo, 2001: 452) and of gaining some competitive advantage through exploitation of those differences. Local responsiveness in the EI often means securing the operability of a project or reducing transaction costs to a tolerable size. Current conceptualizations of local responsiveness do not account for this situation. Firms trying to obtain or maintain their local LtO usually do so with initiatives that are summarized under the label of corporate social responsibility. The traditional I-R framework (Figure 6) can thus be reformulated into an integration-responsibility (I-R2) framework (Figure 7).
Figure 7 illustrates that the initial distribution of industries in the I-R framework changes considerably in the I-R2 grid. Professional service firms, for instance, experience much less pressure for local responsibility than for responsiveness. Manufacturing industries (such as the car and chemical industries) have to be split-up into a “low” and “high” polluting segment, in order to take into account pressures of responsiveness and responsibility. In this case it seems increasingly obvious that responsibility overrules responsiveness as an influencing factor for internationalization strategies. For specific consumer goods the pressure for local responsiveness (and adaptation) remains high. C. K. Prahalad’s (2006) notion of the “bottom of the pyramid” builds on this idea and is basically a marketing approach built on responsiveness to the needs of billions of so far untapped customers at the lower end of the market. However, the claim that this strategy can be
coupled with responsibility — in short that it might lead to alleviating poverty — is highly disputed (Hopkins, 2007). Responsiveness and responsibility in consumer product markets are not the same.

With respect to the location of EI multinationals in the I-R2 grid, we can see that it strongly depends on their position in the global value chain. The more vertically integrated and upstream and the bigger they are, the more they are prone to both pressures for integration and responsibility. While less integrated and smaller EI firms and those more active in downstream activities only face one of these pressures, the former for responsibility and the latter for higher integration.

The LtO is most relevant in the area encircled by the dotted line in the updated I-R grid. Firms outside this area benefit from low direct threats to their overall LtO. They might, however, as in the case of downstream EI firms, suffer from negative spillovers should the LtO of a firm from the same industry that is more vertically integrated be threatened. It is thus not the case that the LtO is irrelevant for all firms outside the oval. However, the direct threat to the LtO through a lack of responsibility is lower for these industries.

The need for a shift to local responsibility has also been emphasized elsewhere. From an international strategy perspective, London and Hart caution that “the transnational model of national responsiveness, global efficiency and worldwide learning may not be sufficient” and argue further that MNEs need to change their strategies in order to develop “a global capability in social embeddedness” (London & Hart, 2004: 350).

3.7 Discussion and Conclusions

Our review of the specifics of the extractive industry, cases of failed or contested investments in this business and practitioner perspectives on how to confront this situation shows that natural resource development takes place in a complex and challenging stakeholder environment. We traced the emergence of the concept of the LtO among corporate executives and stakeholders of the extractive industry. The varieties of uses of the LtO concept suggests that, like sustainability or globalization, it is an “empty signifier” that takes on different meanings at different times and for different actors (Laclau, 1996). Nevertheless, we have tried to develop a first theoretical conceptualization of the LtO based on the scant academic literature and its current importance as a “concept-in-use”. This conceptualization proposes three interconnected levels of LtO that highlight the local,
national and societal requirements posed upon the extractive industry (and potentially also other industries). This approach combines the multiple ways in which the LtO has been selectively used into one overarching concept to highlight what has also been shown in a brief case review and application of the concept to the extractive industry. EI firms have rarely been able to obtain the LtO at all levels, especially when operating in developing countries. Discussing the LtO at all relevant levels can help to unveil contradictory activities undertaken by EI firms when trying to reconcile the diverse stakeholder challenges they face. While they engage heavily in CSR and community initiatives to gain the “local license”, these firms might at the same time demand support from the host country government in violently suppressing local resistance movements. Likewise, while funding alternative energy projects, many EI corporations have been accused of lobbying activities to deny climate change and maintain their overall license to exist (Levy & Kolk, 2002).

Despite failed investments and high sunk costs incurred by many EI firms, current thinking in international business on local adaptation has largely ignored this industry (Jones, 2005) and has evoked an illusion of nearly total discretion on the side of MNEs when it comes to investment decisions and the degree of local responsiveness (Shenkar, Luo & Yeheksel, 2008). Traditional approaches to local responsiveness and embeddedness of MNEs in their host locations do not take into account some of the specific challenges of the extractive industry. On the contrary, subsequent versions of the I-R framework have been simplified rather than being extended (Venaik, Midgley & Devinney, 2004). A reformulation of the traditional integration-responsiveness to an integration-responsibility grid was presented that captures the complexities raised by the notion of the LtO and might help save the original idea from its present critics.

The emphasis on local communities as a crucial set of local stakeholders strengthens the link between stakeholder theory and international business that has so far focused on MNEs’ relationships with host governments (Fagre & Wells, 1982; Vernon, 1981) and, more recently, international NGOs (e.g. Doh & Guay, 2004; Teegen, Doh & Vachani, 2004). The multilevel LtO concept highlights the importance of all three stakeholder groups and points out the increasing importance of the local license that, in interaction with the national and societal LtO, should be incorporated much more strongly in international management thinking. The emergence of the LtO rhetoric points to the fact that managers have realized this importance.
The I-R2 grid points out that the “local license” is also relevant for other industries, and the multilevel LtO can potentially be applied to a wider set of corporations than has been done here. In the Indian state of Orissa for example, 11 out of 14 mega-investment projects in the mineral but also mineral processing and service industry (together nearly 40 bn USD) are halted or delayed by community protests despite having been granted a national/legal license to set up business (Bisoi, 2009). Likewise, after nearly two years of struggle, considerable sunk costs and the suicide of a number of farmers, Tata’s Nano car plant was relocated from one Indian state to another (BBC, 2008). These examples speak for the relevance of the multilevel LtO concept and the importance of including stakeholder considerations in international business theories about the investment behavior or MNEs. Future research should examine whether and how the LtO terminology is applied in other industries and what alternative concepts are being employed.

This contribution has also illustrated that the notion of the LtO, in particular the way it is currently used, needs to be critically examined. From an industry perspective, employing the LtO concept is a matter of “hegemonic strategizing” (Utting & Ives, 2006: 16) in an attempt to shape the corporate responsibility discourse in favor of the extractive industries, to define what it means to gain a LtO and who is able to grant it. The risk is that, employing the LtO discourse, corporations interact with specifically selected stakeholders who are perceived to have the power to actually influence the firm’s conduct to gain a LtO from this stakeholder group that then provides a tangible “insurance” against stakeholder activism. They might further use the LtO rhetoric to imply a continuous “license” equal to a legal license, which is the risk that lies in the use of such a term. Another risk is the ignorance of the role of the state in discussions that are focused on obtaining local licenses in the sense of a “right of way”. This always carries the risk that individual licenses are “bought cheaply” from the local population with promises and CSR projects that ultimately often fail to produce the expected benefits.

Our multilevel conceptualization and discussion of the LtO is thus relevant, because it points out the three levels at which an LtO needs to be obtained and the tensions emerging from competing stakeholder claims. It also highlights the fact that the LtO is not some “thing” to be obtained or a one-time achievement that legitimizes the operations. The LtO is a process of ongoing negotiations between the corporation and its stakeholders who continuously evaluate corporate performance according to criteria they deem important and who influence and compete with each other. The terminology “license” in that sense
seems not to fit the actual processes underlying it, but is now too deeply rooted in managerial discourse to be changed. A multilevel perspective on the LtO might counteract a tendency to apply the concept in a way that allows it to appear all too manageable and continuous. The level of the national LtO also emphasizes the role of the state and society in pressuring corporations to operate according to overarching principles, which avoids a situation where corporations only invest in social issues that might gain them a local LtO while ignoring issues of broader importance or claims of stakeholders that are not powerful enough to threaten their license. Our approach might help in safeguarding the LtO concept from its early supporters who adopt a too superficial and strategic understanding of the concept which makes it meaningless.

Future work should elaborate the preliminary conceptualization of the LtO presented in this contribution and further strengthen the link between International Business and stakeholder theory. In light of the increasing importance of EI multinationals for developing and transition economies (Hoyos, 2007), that often function as shareholder-independent strategic extensions of their home country governments, future work should also examine the firm internal factors (Howard-Grenville, Nash & Coglianese, 2007) that might influence differing perspectives among managers on the need to gain an LtO at all levels or how to obtain it. Although such corporations are less receptive to the traditional influence tactics of NGOs (e.g. shareholder divestments, public shaming), they too suffer from increased operating costs and the potential “inoperability” of a project due to local resistance and might forge even stronger alliances with repressive national governments than has been possible for shareholder-owned corporations.

With respect to the embeddedness of the MNE, some suggest the need of a “cultural embeddedness” (Shenkar, Luo & Yehesekel, 2008). Our case discussion has shown that this seems hard to achieve. One could argue that even the hiring of local employees might not considerably improve this situation due to the clashing interests and worldviews, and the tensions within many developing countries that we have discussed above. Here it is the “relative power or powerlessness, accorded to various cultures and cultural practices” (Escobar, 2006: 8) that should be examined by management scholars instead of supporting a focus on corporations’ embeddedness into dominant cultures.

Finally, the role of smaller EI corporations that are less globally integrated deserves further attention in light of the current discussion about local responsiveness/responsibility. Due to their smaller size and focus on specific locations that are then crucial to the
business success of the entire firm, such corporations have potentially more to lose from an
unsuccessful investment and high sunk costs caused by local resistance. Although they
might not have the funds available to implement large CSR or corporate citizenship
programs, their need to embed themselves locally might be stronger and result in a more
wise use of available funding. The success of such firms might prove the idea that it is (as
often) not size that matters for the success of community investments (Jones, Pollit & Bek,
2007).
4. CONFLICT AND ASTROTURFING IN NIYAMGIRI

The importance of national advocacy networks in anti-corporate social movements

4.1 Abstract

Traditional models of transnational advocacy networks (TANs) and stakeholder management do not capture the nuance and dynamics of (counter-)organizing processes around anti-corporate mobilization. Based on the case of a resistance movement against a planned bauxite mine on tribal land in India, we develop a process theory of interactions between local, national and international actors within transnational advocacy networks. These encounters are not always friendly and are often characterized by conflict between actors with disparate goals and interests. We highlight the importance of national advocacy networks (NANs) in anti-corporate social movements and describe the conflicts and disruptions that result from ignoring them. Our findings also point to the role of corporate counter-mobilization strategies in shaping resistance movements. Our narrative revolves around a particular focal actor in the anti-mining campaign: a young tribal man who emerged as a passionate spokesperson of the movement, but later became a supporter of the controversial mine. Our findings contribute to a richer understanding of the processes underlying transnational and national anti-corporate mobilization.

4.2 Introduction

"The time has come to fight; there is no time to waste. That is why we are stopping the bulldozers… Even if we die, we will not let Niyamgiri go. That is why we want you to join our struggle."

(Jika, video published by an international NGO 2008)

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4 This chapter has been written with Gail Whiteman and Bobby Banerjee and was published in Organization Studies 34(5-6), 2013. The online version of the article can be accessed here http://oss.sagepub.com/content/34/5-6/823.
"I realized that this mining project will not have a detrimental effect on our livelihood and culture in any way. It would rather usher in development in our area."

(Jika, national TV interview 2010)

The Niyamgiri mountain range in India is a chain of hills covered by dense old-growth forests, rich in biodiversity and largely untouched by modern infrastructure. For the 8000 members of the Dongria Kondh tribe that inhabit the region, the mountains are a source of livelihood and carry deep religious significance. The mountains also contain a rich deposit of bauxite and one mountain, Niyam Dongar, is the proposed site for a large bauxite mine that will supply an existing refinery located on the plains. Since 2002 the multinational company behind this project, Vedanta Resources, has faced considerable opposition from a continually evolving alliance of local communities, Indian activists and political organizations, as well as international activists and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Many of the Dongria Kondh and their supporters claim that the open-pit mining project would destroy their local environment, contaminate the water supply of the entire area, severely impact their livelihood and culture, and desecrate Niyam Dongar, the mountain they consider the abode of their god.

The social movement against Vedanta is an example of a local movement that developed into a transnational advocacy network (TAN), where social movement actors from various countries and organizations engaged in a common ‘battle’ against a corporation (McAteer & Pulver, 2009; Zavestoski, 2009; Davis, Morill, Rao & Soule, 2008). In this paper, we narrate the story of Jika, a Dongria Kondh in his early twenties and one of the few English-speaking members of his community. During 2006, after a period of involvement with national activists, Jika emerged as the key spokesperson of the anti-mining movement and became the public face of the resistance against Vedanta. Over a three-year period, Jika appeared in numerous Indian and international articles, and was featured on television and documentary films about the campaign to save the mountain from mining. At the time of writing, a Google search with his name yields more than 1000 results – an impressive return given the complete lack of internet access in Niyamgiri. Jika also played a crucial role as a grassroots organizer of community resistance and as a conduit for international and Indian activists wishing to gain access into the remote Dongria communities. However, on July 27, 2009, Jika ‘changed sides’, announcing his support for Vedanta’s bauxite mine in a YouTube video. The opening quotes highlight his volte-face and what appears to be a sudden and unexpected transformation from strident
opposition to mining to an avid supporter of the mine as a means to achieve local
economic development.

How are we to theorize these events? What can they tell us about the dynamics within
transnational movements and about the role of corporations in counter-mobilizing? Despite
the potential power of transnational advocacy networks to achieve social change,
relationships between actors within the network are not always smooth (Bebbington et al.,
2008; Jordan & van Tuijl, 2000; Rodrigues, 2011). Yet, the issue of heterogeneity,
disruption and conflict within transnational advocacy networks remains under-researched.
Astroturf organizing, corporate efforts to form or support artificial grassroots groups that
resemble the genuine grassroots opposition they face (Beder, 1998), further adds another
layer of complexity to TANs that requires deeper empirical investigation. We address these
two gaps through our analysis of the anti-Vedanta movement and the story of Jika in an
attempt to unveil the mechanisms and interactions within and against the anti-corporate
movement. Our longitudinal case study describes and analyses the events and interactions
leading up to and following Jika’s dramatic reversal as well as the changing structure of the
advocacy network. Our paper makes two main contributions to organizational studies of
transnational anti-corporate mobilization.

First, we highlight the diversity of actors involved in anti-corporate resistance and
argue that too little attention has been paid to national advocacy networks (NANs) and the
heterogeneity of local and national conditions under which domestic movements seek
transnational support. Rather than framing anti-corporate movements as a static front
opposing the corporation, we highlight actors’ dynamic interactions and differences in
interests, power, ideology and background, which we label social movement organizing.

Second, we point to the active role of the corporation in countering the resistance
movement. In the context of anti-corporate mobilization, social movement organizing is a
process that is embedded within changing constellations and networks of organizations and
actors whose activities (directly or indirectly) have a bearing on the activities of a
corporation and evolve in interaction with corporate counter-mobilization activities. Jika’s
defection represents only one of several other disruptions in the complex process of social
movement organizing at different scales, but one in which the active role of the targeted
corporation in disrupting and co-opting social movements should not be underestimated.
We argue that current theories of stakeholder management do not capture this complexity.
In developing a process theory of anti-corporate mobilization and counter-mobilization we
hope to contribute to a fuller and more nuanced understanding of conflicts between market, state and transnational coalitions of civil society actors.

Our paper is organized as follows. First, we introduce the theoretical background of our study. Drawing on accounts of conflict in transnational movements and the critical role of NGOs in transnational networks, we point out that organization studies has largely ignored the often disruptive nature of transnational anti-corporate organizing efforts, and that there has been insufficient attention paid to NANs. We review the literature on heterogeneity and conflict in anti-corporate movements from other fields to add more nuance to their discussion in management and organization studies. Second, we introduce our case study, method and our sources of data. We then present our findings in form of a rich narrative, followed by a discussion of the theoretical implications of our findings. Based on our findings we develop a process theory of the resistance movement that can also be applied to other anti-corporate movements. We conclude by identifying directions for future research.

4.3 Transnational Advocacy Networks and Anti-Corporate Mobilization

Transnational advocacy networks are international networks of actors who collaborate on a particular issue and use informational and symbolic resources to influence power holders – usually national governments and multinational corporations. Much of the literature on TANs has emerged from studies in international relations, political science and sociology where the focus is on states and international organizations as targets of mobilization around particular global issues (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Smith, 2004; Smith & Johnston, 2002; Tarrow, 2001).

TANs bring together local, national and international social movements and international NGOs (Tarrow, 2001). Domestic activists provide grassroots information about local struggles and their transnational supporters use their clout with international organizations and other governments targeting national governments and corporations to achieve domestic policy change and empower anti-corporate activism (Doh & Teegen, 2004; Kapelus, 2002; Keck & Sikkink, 1998). Ideas and tactics generated in movements,
such as the peace, human rights, women’s and environmental movements are said to spread from the Western world to countries in the so-called ‘periphery’ of the world system (Smith, 2004). This basic assumption leads to an emphasis on the role of international NGOs – most of them with their headquarters in the ‘core countries’ – that strategically use information to influence power holders and provide know-how, material resources to domestic activists and social movement organizations in the periphery, giving them the leverage they need to achieve policy gains through a ‘boomerang pattern of influence’ (Keck & Sikkink, 1998, p. 12).

Keck and Sikkink (1998) emphasize the importance of good collaboration between activists at different levels but do not go into detail of the workings of such transnational networks. This is a gap we hope to address with our study of the anti-mining campaign in Niyamgiri, which we think has applicability more generally. The social movement against Vedanta is not an isolated case. Corporations from the extractive industry sector (oil and gas, mining as well as the extraction of renewable natural resources) often have significant social, environmental, and economic impacts at the local and national level which turns them into prime targets of anti-corporate mobilization at the local, national and transnational level (Banerjee, 2008; Bebbington et al., 2008; Kapelus, 2002; Whiteman, 2009). Social movements, especially when amplified by transnational networks, can influence CSR practices (den Hond & de Bakker, 2007), the investment decisions of multinational corporations (Skippari & Pajunen, 2010), and provide support to weak stakeholders increasing their chances of holding multinational corporations to account (Doh & Teegen, 2004; Kapelus, 2002).

There are two major shortcomings in much of the management literature on anti-corporate movements. First, the focus is primarily on powerful and formally organized Western NGOs, who amplify the voices of weak domestic stakeholder groups in developing countries to reach out to Western supporters, who then in turn have the power to hold the corporation to account in a classic boomerang pattern. National level actors and the ‘decentralized, non-hierarchical, grassroots-based social movements’ (Boehm, Spicer, & Fleming, 2008, p. 170) that usually are at the forefront of anti-corporate mobilization at the local level are generally ignored. Second, there is an assumption that coalitions between NGOs and local corporate stakeholders are stable. We argue that behind the visible protests and NGO campaigns against corporations that are the focus of most of the literature (de Bakker & den Hond, 2007; Doh & Teegen, 2004; Jordan & van Tuijl, 2000;
Soule, 2009), lies an unstable conglomerate of actors with changing and often conflicted relationships over the life cycle of a campaign. To address these shortcomings we introduce the concept of national advocacy networks to account for national social movement structures, using the example of India.

4.4 Intersecting Networks: TANs and NANs

Transnational advocacy networks are often conceptualized using the well-known boomerang model, which assumes that transnationalization occurs because of weak influence of domestic activists and their lack of technical know-how and material resources (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Smith, 2004). The argument is that local movements from countries in ‘the periphery’ seek transnational support because they face high levels of repression and lack the political resources to influence policy at the domestic level. As Smith (2004, p. 313) argues, ‘the world-system hierarchy makes both elite and social movement actors on the periphery […] far less able to affect the global economic and political decisions that shape their environments’ which is the reason why they need transnational support from the so-called ‘core countries’.

While certainly true for many countries, we argue that the assumptions of the boomerang model and the core-periphery distinction do not capture the full diversity of conditions under which local social movements transnationalize and are not attuned to the specifics of anti-corporate mobilization in countries such as India. The Indian national context is characterized by a strong civil society and decades of social mobilization in a democratic system. India also has a long history of social movement organizing (see Ray & Katzenstein, 2005) from the independence movement in the early 1900s to more recent farmers’ rights struggles and anti-corporate movements (Banerjee, 2011a; 2011b). These include social movements against multinational agricultural giants Cargill and Monsanto (Herring, 2005; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999), protests against CocaCola in Kerala (Raman, 2010), to the current protests against mining and metal multinationals like Vedanta and the Pohang Steel Company from South Korea. National level networks and social movement organizations such as the National Alliance of People’s Movements or the National Campaign against Big Dams are examples of the very active national advocacy networks that pose a ‘serious challenge to the dominant ideology of meaning and patterns of development’ in the country (Swain, 2010, p. 49).
These networks comprise a class of experienced domestic activists who are internationally networked, resourceful and media savvy (Katzenstein, Kothari & Mehta, 2001; Shah, 2004; Swain, 2010). Anti-Monsanto activist Vandana Shiva, anti-Narmada dam figurehead Medha Patkar and social activist Arundhati Roy are prominent, internationally known examples but there are many more who have gained national prominence. Despite being classified as a developing country, India cannot be considered a ‘peripheral’ country, neither in terms of its economic development and growing importance on the world stage, nor with respect to the strength of its domestic activists and social movement organizations. The core/periphery distinction of the boomerang model therefore does not capture the full diversity of conditions under which local social movements transnationalize, and cannot account for the national context in which mobilization occurs.

To address this domestic gap, we introduce the concept of the national advocacy network, or NAN (see Figure 8). NANs consist of national activists, NGOs, community organizations, research organizations and independent media groups that are engaged in national-level advocacy on behalf of the numerous local struggles in remote parts of the country. NANs, with their focus on domestic goals, operate alongside internationally oriented actors and, as we will show, this may result in collaboration but also in conflict and disruption. NANs can be conceived of as national ‘social movement communities’ (Staggenborg, 2002) at the often neglected meso-level of analysis in social movement studies (McAdam, 2003). Our assertion is that at the domestic level, NANs operate according to the same principles as TANs – empowering local grassroots activists through the provision of technical and strategic know-how and leveraging local information into broader campaigns to influence national power holders. We argue that rather than lacking influence at the national level as assumed in the boomerang model, in most cases NANs and the grassroots groups they support do have various pathways of influencing the state and corporations. Local resistance strategies (such as blocking access roads to prevent the construction of a mine) can be surprisingly effective in delaying progress of projects and national-level lobbying under democratic circumstances might result in political influence-taking on corporations. Nevertheless, NAN activists may decide that transnational networks might be valuable to disseminate information and gather broader support for their cause. However, this process of local-national-transnational activism has not yet been explored and we argue that the NAN concept enhances our understanding of this process by extending the traditional boomerang model to include the
national context as a factor that impacts the preconditions from which support is being sought and thus shapes the relationships within transnational networks.

Figure 8: Extended boomerang model

A NAN perspective represents a meso-level focus that is well suited to uncover dynamics, relationships and processes within movements rather than the conditions of their emergence and outcomes (Gerhards & Rucht, 1992; McAdam, 2003; Staggenborg, 2002). Such a perspective can illuminate the mechanisms of TAN formation and the conflicts accompanying that process. Moreover, the structure of NANs can account for the role of individual actors and informal networks of activists in addition to formally organized NGOs that are the dominant focus of studies on anti-corporate movements. Individual actors can become important figures in social movements, even if they are not official
‘movement leaders’ of organized resistance movements (Juska & Edwards, 2005). Other authors have also highlighted the role of individual domestic activists in the process of framing and ‘selling’ local issues to outside supporters (Bob, 2005), recruiting new activists (McAdam, 2003), building transnational linkages (Sikkink, 2005) and coordinating organizations and networks in larger movements (Gerhards & Rucht, 1992). Thus, the NAN is conceived of as a set of engaged, more and less formally organized and networked national actors in a country’s internal advocacy efforts.

NAN actors, in contrast to transnational advocacy organizations, are less interested in the creation of a global polity (Reitan, 2007) but focus their attention on targeting powerful stakeholders at the national level. While transnational activists may shift their focus to other struggles once a particular campaign is over, local and national activists often continue to operate in the region. The local and national focus of NANs may at times be at odds with the expectations, strategies and behaviors of transnational actors. There is a growing awareness that transnational networks are not always as benign as they might appear and that more powerful Western activists and NGOs often have different interests in and understandings of local grievances (Bob, 2005; Holzscheiter, 2011; Jordan & van Tuijl, 2000; Smith, 2004).

Studies have shown that TANs often fail to fulfill the ‘promises of empowerment’ (Rodrigues, 2011, p. 3) and underrepresent the interests of domestic activists (Dingwerth, 2008). For example, in her comparative case study of two Latin American movements that received transnational support, Rodrigues (2011) found that the main reasons for the absence of local empowerment were the lack of long-term support by international NGOs and the inability of local groups to consolidate the gains provided by transnational support. Her work highlights the importance of national-level activists and organizations for guaranteeing some form of continuity in the movement and acting as mediators between international and local actors. Despite their adherence to a common cause there are tensions between national and transnational actors and transnational NGOs. Western NGOs often tend to promote their own agenda, which at times may conflict with local interests, (Jordan & van Tuijl, 2000; Rodrigues, 2011). As Jordan and van Tuijl (2000) argue, successful and equitable cases of cooperation and interaction in transnational campaigns are the exception rather than the rule.

A study on a transnational campaign against child labor in the Pakistan soccer ball industry by Khan and colleagues (2007) is one of the few critical accounts of transnational
mobilization in management studies and exposes the different interests and meanings of campaign success for TAN participants. Supporting earlier findings from the Bangladeshi garment industry (Brooks, 2005), Khan and colleagues showed that while at first sight successful in stopping the use of child labor, the transnational campaign ultimately condemned producer families to even deeper poverty. The authors describe how local villagers, deprived of their livelihoods after the ‘successful’ international campaign, attacked the vehicles of international NGO staff, but they do not explore in more detail the events leading up to this situation, or which actors were involved, nor the tensions within advocacy networks (Khan et al., 2007). While not discounting the value that transnational support can bring to local struggles, we argue that there is a need for a more critical analysis of power relations between actors in transnational networks while recognizing that international NGOs have the potential to abuse their power within TANs (Bob, 2005; Dingwerth, 2008; Holzscheiter, 2011; Mendelson & Glenn, 2002).

In our study, we track the emergence and development of what became a transnational anti-corporate movement, focusing on the interactions and disruptions taking place among focal actors ranging from national and international NGOs to domestic activists and individual local actors. We provide a detailed account of the relationships within a transnational network that is sensitive to heterogeneity and conflict, and takes into account the role of corporations as key actors influencing the elements and direction of the network. Our case study thus provides a richer and more complex picture of inter-, and intra-group dynamics, and shifting priorities and loyalties that result.

4.5 Method

This paper is part of a larger study of the resistance against Vedanta and other development projects in Orissa. Responding to calls for more qualitative and ethnographic research on the meso-level dynamics within social movements (McAdam, 2003), ethnographic fieldwork conducted by the first author from November 2008 to March 2009 and again from March to May 2010 was the main source of empirical material. The transformation of our main protagonist, Jika, from a resistance icon to supporter of the project occurred in the northern summer of 2009. His transformation from a tribal ‘village kid’ to a central figure in the anti-mining campaign emerged as a key theme during the process of ‘progressive focusing’ of the case study during the first field trip (Silverman,
2010). His being ‘pulled at’ by all major actors involved in the conflict, his ‘defection’ in 2009, and the way in which his story was repeatedly discussed by key informants make Jika’s experience an ‘extreme’ case (Eisenhardt, 1989) within the larger case study that offered an excellent opportunity to examine the dynamics within transnational networks and the role of corporations in counter-movement organizing. We present our rich empirical material in form of a narrative (Chase, 2005; Langley, 1999; Whiteman & Cooper, 2011). All individual names were changed in the narrative to protect people’s identities but we specified the nationality of the individual to be able to distinguish between domestic and foreign activists. We did not change the names of the key organizations involved because their involvement in the resistance movement is publicly documented.

4.5.1 Data sources

Our narrative is built from six sources:

(1) Three in-depth interviews with Jika, the central protagonist in our narrative.
(2) Twenty-nine unstructured interviews with nine activists, five managers, seven NGO, and two government staff, who were involved in the Niyamgiri struggle at either the local, national or transnational level. Multiple interviews at different times were conducted with some of these respondents.
(3) Participant observation and ethnographic interviews conducted during a field trip in the Niyamgiri mountains by the first author along with five Delhi-based activists in December 2008, guided by Jika and two members of his tribe.
(4) Participant observation and ethnographic interviews by the first author who lived and travelled with different activists on various occasions, totaling a period of about 3 months during which intensive contact was maintained with local and national Indian activists.
(5) Email exchanges and postings on a daily electronic mailing list (list server), where up-to-date information on anti-displacement campaigns in Orissa and other states is distributed among activists.
(6) Regional and national newspaper articles, press releases, legal documents, research reports and other documents related to the case published between 2002 and 2011.

All interviews, except four of the five interviews with Vedanta staff and the government officials who did not give their permission, were recorded (in total over 45 hours) and
transcribed verbatim. Detailed notes, that also contained short verbatim quotes, were taken during interviews when recording was not allowed, and written up in a detailed report directly after the interview. Extensive handwritten field notes were maintained during phases of participant observation, and later written up in detailed field reports covering events, interactions, discussions and first tentative theoretical connections made by the first author.

4.5.2 Validity checks

When gathering this type of retrospective information, hindsight bias and the potential for informants’ inaccurate recall of information need to be taken into account (Fischhoff & Beyth, 1975). Respondents were permitted to skip certain events when they indicated they could not recall them properly, and subsequent cross checking of information with other participants and data sources was done to ensure accuracy of the description of particular events. Hindsight bias was addressed by comparing information gathered at different points in time. Multiple visits to the field and on-going contact maintained with key informants in between field trips allowed us to juxtapose explanations given after Jika’s defection with statements and observations recorded during the time when he was still involved in the movement. Finally, the empirical material used to build the final narrative was triangulated using the diversity of data sources and available interviews.

4.5.3 Data analysis

All empirical material was compiled and analyzed with two purposes in mind. First, the history and evolution of the anti-Vedanta movement was reconstructed and triangulated from the diversity of gathered information. Second, using theme analysis (Dutton & Dukerich, 1991; Plowman et al., 2007), we explained ‘the pattern of interpretations and actions over time’ (Dutton & Dukerich, 1991, p. 522) with respect to the interactions of movement actors at local, national, and international levels, their conflicts and interpretations of events. The initial coding of all interview material by the first author resulted in 58 broad themes that emerged from respondents’ discussion or activities. These themes were then jointly discussed by all authors and narrowed down to ten categories by grouping the larger number of themes. Examples of these categories are: ‘disruption and conflict’, ‘Jika’s emergence’, ‘national advocacy’, ‘negative grassroots impact of NGOs’, ‘mobilizing people’, ‘goal conflicts in the movement’, ‘counter-movement’, and
interaction among movement actors’. The category ‘negative grassroots impact of NGOs’, for example, grouped all statements about activists’ perceptions of how the NGO system had negative consequences for grassroots mobilization. The category ‘Jika’s emergence’ grouped all statements related to his emergence as a central movement figure and spokesperson. ‘Counter-movement’ comprised all themes to do with pro-corporate activities by the government, Vedanta, or local pro-corporate groups.

These categories and related themes were then used in a third step for a detailed analysis of all interviews. The detailed coding explicitly showed the depth and breadth with which each category and its themes were supported by the empirical material and allowed us to focus our analysis. The additional textual material, like newspaper articles, reports, legal documents, et cetera was used to further augment our analysis, especially with respect to reconstructing the history of the movement. The narrative was then written up by the first author using our reconstruction of the history of the movement as well as the central categories and themes as a guideline. Some of the more central categories and related themes were used as headings and sub-headings. The narrative went through a number of iterations following discussions among all authors about their understanding of the dynamics within the movement and the interactions of key actors in it, as well as the degree to which different themes were supported by the empirical material.

4.6 Findings

Our findings distinguish four periods of relative continuity in terms of the activities and actors involved: local resistance, NAN support and emerging international interest, rapid internationalization, and conflict and re-localization. Without assuming a predictable progression between the phases, examining the four periods enables us to capture the interactions between activities and emerging networks. Setting temporal brackets, we can examine ‘how actions of one period lead to changes in the context that will affect action in subsequent periods’ (Langley, 1999: 703). Specific events in the process of anti-corporate movement organizing indicate the discontinuity of the system and represent ‘turning points’ in which structural changes occur that have an influence on further interactions (Hernes & Bakken, 2003). Based on our analysis of the anti-mining movement in Orissa we propose a process model of resistance movements as shown in Figure 9. While we do not wish to generalize our findings from a single case study to all social movements we
believe there are certain patterns, contextual factors and underlying logics that can enable us to develop a process theory that is both interpretive (i.e. has multiple stories and actors) and critical (i.e. giving voice to local actors whose role may be marginalized due to the influence of more powerful transnational actors) (Langley, 2008).

Figure 9: Process visual map of mobilization and counter-mobilization


The resistance against Vedanta emerged in 2002, when Vedanta Aluminium Limited started to acquire land for an aluminum refinery project at the foothills of Niyamgiri on land inhabited by Kutia Kondh tribal people and other subsistence farmers. The refinery was to be supplied with bauxite from a mine in the Niyamgiri mountains located on the lands of another tribal group, the Dongria Kondh. The affected villagers quickly mobilized at the village level and later formed a resistance organization that was supported by citizens of a nearby town. Resistance was mainly spontaneous but often involved hundreds of people, although organized mass protests were rare during this time, since resistance networks were still being formed. A high profile international NGO had been working with the rural communities for some years, providing traditional development aid. The local head of the NGO was therefore present and got involved very early with the emerging resistance movement against the refinery. The agitation against Vedanta started at a time when the international NGO shifted its mission from providing aid to a rights-based advocacy approach. The grassroots campaign against Vedanta represented an immediate opportunity to demonstrate this strategic shift.

Overall, the movement against Vedanta at that time consisted of a largely localized and unstable alliance of actors with different interests, a lack of systematic communication, strategic planning and leadership, and no transnational activities. Early protests targeted the refinery construction in the plains only. Little attention was paid to the proposed mining venture in the mountains. Since the international NGO and the urban resistance organization lacked contact with the remote Dongria Kondh communities, the initial mobilization did not involve them. Over time, information about the mine reached the Dongria villages in the mountains, first through the efforts of a local NGO that worked with the Dongria on improving sanitation and farming methods, and later through NAN activists. When in early 2003 some Dongria leaders wanted to protest at a public hearing
about the project, they were forced out of the meeting by Vedanta security staff and police.
(Amnesty International, 2010). As shown in the process map (figure 9), the Orissa government strongly supported Vedanta’s mining and refinery project from the beginning.

4.6.2 NAN support and emerging international interest (end 2003–early 2006)

During this period, organized rallies and protest demonstrations, often with thousands of participants replaced the largely uncoordinated resistance against land acquisition for the refinery. Governmental land acquisition teams and Vedanta security personnel allegedly repeatedly intimidated protestors and tried to repress local resistance. This period also saw the emergence of pro-Vedanta groups of small business owners and potential contractors from nearby areas along with others hoping to benefit from industrialization in the region. Connected to this, groups of so-called ‘goons’ started a campaign of fear and intimidation in the refinery area and villagers were warned not to participate in any anti-corporate protests. According to activist reports by Indian activists, local community members and international NGOs, resistance leaders and their families were frequently arrested, threatened and beaten. In 2005, one anti-Vedanta activist was killed in a car accident under suspicious circumstances that locals felt were never properly investigated by the police. Members of a youth club, ironically funded by Vedanta as part of their CSR activities, assaulted anti-Vedanta protestors with company-sponsored cricket bats. The company also mobilized local development NGOs to promote their CSR initiatives that promised economic benefits to local villagers provided they stopped opposing the refinery project. Several reports documented the apparent collusion between the state government and Vedanta in the systematic repression of the anti-Vedanta movement (ActionAid, 2007; Amnesty International, 2010; Council on Ethics, 2007).

This repression also affected NAN activists who started to become involved in the Vedanta case from 2003 onwards. These activists came from diverse backgrounds and included young university graduates working as researchers for Indian NGOs, activist film-makers interested in spreading the word about people struggles all over India, lawyers providing pro-bono support to grassroots struggles, seasoned community organizers as well as full-time activists who once worked for national or international NGOs but had left their organizations because they were dissatisfied with the NGO movement and wanted to operate as individual activists and researchers. NAN activists started attending local protest events, mobilizing villagers and making connections between grassroots activists and other anti-industrialization struggles across Orissa. Citing their experiences with earlier
struggles, many of these NAN activists argued that the case of Vedanta’s refinery and planned mine was only one example of the reckless industrialization policies of the Indian government:

"As you can see in the tribal populated areas of India that only mineral based industries and industrialization on the base of mineral industries [...] it is something like a looting of resources [...] just exporting the raw products [...] is not at all employment generating. It is not in the interest of middle class even. And the tribal people they will be displaced and will become destitute. This development model has to be stopped. [...] Our ultimate goal is to stop this process, have an alternative development model [...] in which the tribal people, the village farmers who are dependent on agriculture and forest resources... the model should keep their survival in the center.”

(State-level activist, March 2010)

Due to the systematic lack of information and exclusion from any public hearings conducted by Vedanta and the local authorities (Amnesty International, 2010), many Dongria Kondh until quite late were not aware of the mining plans, the connection between the refinery and a later mine, as well as the potential impacts of a mine on their lives. Even the NGO-led alliance had until then focused its efforts on the refinery and did not seek to collaborate with the Dongria Kondh on the mining issue at the time because they did not have access to the remote hill communities. Moreover, the Dongria traditionally had little connection with the people in the plains. Resistance among the Dongria grew rapidly as soon as they faced the first impacts of Vedanta’s mining plans in the form of the building of roads and other construction activity on their ancestral lands. Through the mediation of NAN activists, Dongria Kondh leaders officially joined the anti-Vedanta organization in the plains. Starting in 2004, NAN activists had not only locally mobilized people but also filed a number of petitions with the government that ultimately reached the Indian Supreme Court. Public awareness of the Niyamgiri case increased within India and several government and civil society research teams visited the remote Niyamgiri mountains to conduct social and environmental impact assessments and fact finding missions on allegations about Vedanta’s activities, such as illegal test blasts and construction of roads and facilities (Amnesty International, 2010; Padel & Das, 2010).

Through their informal networks, these early NAN actors disseminated information about the anti-refinery struggle to the wider NAN network until it reached a group of activists in Delhi who had formed the ‘Delhi Solidarity Group’ to support anti-mining and other struggles. By 2006, a number of Delhi-based activists became involved in the case. These activists worked independently and were not affiliated to any specific organization;
however, they were connected to a wide network of other activists, support groups, and national as well as international NGOs, and became the backbone of the Indian national advocacy network (NAN) supporting local Niyamgiri communities in their struggle for land rights. Together with state-level and local activists, the Delhi-based activists visited the mountains to collect information and make local connections that would enable them to successfully channel grassroots information to the national level where they started to lobby the central government and organize protest events in the national capital.

Our process map depicts how the initial local and grassroots resistance of the Dongria slowly evolved into national activities by NAN activists that provided a broader platform to local voices within the country. Largely disconnected from this movement were the international NGO’s activities against the refinery that were entirely dependent on the local network of their staff, who did not collaborate much with NAN activists. A NGO publication from that time illustrates that there were two rather separate movements in the Niyamgiri region: the one focusing on the refinery was a small local NGO-led network, the other was a national-based campaign against the entire mining and refinery project and unbridled industrialization in the region. A call to action at the end of the NGO publication mentions only three ‘campaigning groups’ apart from the NGO itself: a forum of anti-refinery citizens from the nearby town where the NGO’s campaign leader was one of the core founding members, the local organization of affected communities that had been founded with the support of the NGO, and a third organization for protection of the rights of India’s tribal people. The publication does not make any mention of the efforts of state and national-level activists against Vedanta and the emerging resistance movement by the Dongria in the hills. In early 2006 the first international anti-mining activists from the UK travelled to Niyamgiri and began to publicize the Niyamgiri struggle in the UK, marking the beginning of another phase of resistance against Vedanta.

4.6.3 Rapid internationalization (2006–2008)

According to local and national activists, two main factors led to the establishment of the refinery in 2007: repression by Vedanta, police and local pro-Vedanta groups, and the lack of coordinated leadership in the resistance movement at the grassroots level. NAN activists accused the international NGO of fragmenting the resistance movement by making grassroots activists dependent on their financial support and not making connections with other national resistance activities. During this time, Jika, the young
Dongria Kondh man, rose to central importance in the anti-mining movement at Niyamgiri. Jika grew up in a village close to the plains and a nearby city that had more contact with the outside world than other more remote Dongria hamlets. From a young age, he was familiar with the activities of locally operating NGOs and at the age of 17, he decided to live with a Christian missionary who had opened a school. Learning English from the Bible, Jika soon became the only member of his tribe at that time fluent in three languages: Kui, the local tribal language, Oriya the state language, and English. He began supporting local NGOs in their work and started interacting with several Dongria villages in the mountains. Until 2006, however, Jika had not been part of the emerging resistance movement. His role in the movement began to change significantly once international activists recognized his multilingual ability. Ian, a UK photographer and activist, ‘discovered’ Jika and hired him as his guide and recommended him to other visitors:

“I said to him ‘Look, you know, you can, you can make some money being an interpreter and a guide to these people [activists, NGOs] so you can get some sort of income and you help educate your people about what is taking place’.”

(Ian, December 2009)

Another UK activist, Charles who was well connected with the NAN, and Sunil, a filmmaker and anti-mining NAN activist from Orissa’s capital, also met Jika when traveling to the mountains to document the emerging grassroots movement. Though impressed by his ability to speak English, they initially did not see him as a person who could be a leader of the emerging resistance in Niyamgiri. Looking back, Sunil claims that Jika was ‘not very interested’ in the resistance because he seemed happy wandering around the mountains talking to his fellow tribals about God and the things that he had learned from the local NGOs. As Ian put it, Jika was ‘just a village kid who went around the hills singing songs about Jesus’.

However, Jika’s multilingual ability was an asset for Ian, Sunil and Charles, all of whom hired him as a guide during their trips through the villages and eventually each of them developed a friendship with the young man. Charles invited Jika to his house to talk about his tribe and the threat of mining and encouraging Jika’s musical interests, began to teach him to play the violin. He also gave Jika a book to read, which Jika later claimed had as much influence on him as the Bible did previously and eventually led him to leave his ‘home’ at the missionary’s house. The book, ‘Earthworm and Company Man’, written by an Indian activist, describes the exploitation of tribal populations in India by the onslaught
of industrialization into their lands and their subsequent loss of livelihood. Jika later described his reactions to the book:

"That time, I didn’t know what is Niyamgiri [laughs]. […] When I read this book about the tribe, I realized what they are and that I am a member of the Dongria Kondh. I then knew that this was something to protect."

(Jika, December 2008)

"I was reading this book and … it is really we have to fight for my people, for my land."

(Jika, March 2010)

Jika also stayed with Sunil, who later recalled spending long nights with Jika talking about the mountain and its god, Niyam Raja, and making plans about the future of the Dongria Kondh. Ian even claimed that he "talked him [Jika] out of" his belief in Christianity. Ian also played a role in publicizing the Niyamgiri case in the UK media by bringing a number of UK news agencies to Niyamgiri, all of who used Jika as a guide, quoting him as a spokesperson and resistance leader. Increasingly, state-level activists encouraged Jika to speak at resistance meetings that they organized together with the Dongria communities. As Jika explained:

"Nobody came and warned us about this [the mining]; we had to learn about it by ourselves. Now that I have learned I am telling everyone. Just today I visited three villages. When I arrive I call all the villagers and explain to them what is happening. I tell them how we will fight and that we have to remain strong at this moment. I have talked to different activists, and sometimes they come with me to help our people to understand what’s happening."

Ashok, a seasoned activist from Orissa, claimed that it was he who taught Jika how to ‘organize people’. Charles also took Jika to Delhi for a protest meeting where he introduced him to other activists, notably Medha and Sanjay originally from Orissa, who were well-connected with the Delhi and Orissa activist movements and had earlier worked for international NGOs in the capital before turning to activism. They also used Jika as a guide on their trips to Niyamgiri and encouraged him to travel from village to village to educate his people about their forest rights and the potential impacts of a mine on Niyamgiri.

Within a few months, through his regular interaction with activists, local, national and international NGOs, Jika evolved from being a tour guide and local informant to become the public face of the anti-Vedanta resistance, and a key actor in the mobilization of the Dongria Kondh. He appeared in a number of national and international newspapers, was
cited on many NGO websites, and featured in two documentaries and several video clips reporting the struggle:

"And all of a sudden he was embraced by everyone, he was kind of the darling of [the] Niyamgiri, you know. This sort of young, you know energetic, tribal kid who powerfully worked to help his people. And I got him on BBC, I mean, I sent so many people there to him and so many magazines, stations and newspapers and stuff."

(Ian, photographer/activist, UK)

Over a two-year period (2007–2008), Jika visited over 100 Dongria villages mobilizing support against Vedanta’s plan to mine Niyam Dongar. He played tour guide to a host of national and international activists, resistance members, photographers, film-makers and researchers (including the first author). Supported by activists from the NAN, he became a skillful public speaker and community organizer occupying a central position in the national campaign against Vedanta. Jika became the main conduit and native informant for anyone wanting access to the Dongria Kondh villages. He even met high-ranking national and international politicians on trips to Delhi, organized by NAN activists. After the Norwegian Government’s decision to disinvest from its shareholdings in Vedanta due to ethical concerns (Council on Ethics, 2007), Jika personally thanked the Norwegian Ambassador for his country’s support. The Norwegian Ethics Council had received considerable input and support by NAN activists and organizations that had conducted several studies on Niyamgiri and disseminated their information and provided local contacts. As a result of the Council’s report and the subsequent disinvestment decision, the international campaign against Vedanta grew in strength and a number of international NGOs took up the issue and began to lobby other institutional shareholders.

During this period the international NGO that had been working in the plains where it supported the anti-refinery struggle began taking more interest in the Dongria and the mining project and had begun an international campaign against Vedanta by staging a protest at the company’s Annual General Meeting in London in the summer of 2006. Internationalization of the movement was not without its problems: Indian NAN activists were critical about how the local NGO staff publicized the case in the UK media by claiming she represented the affected tribal people. Charles and Ian both used their connections in the UK to convince another international NGO with an indigenous people focus to take up the Dongria’s case. Later, another international human rights NGO followed and several smaller international NGOs took up the case, if not by doing local research but at least by publishing it on their website and promoting the movement abroad. What began as a small, local and disorganized struggle by this time truly was an
international movement supporting a couple of hundred tribal forest dwellers against the might of a multinational corporation and the Indian State.

4.6.4 Conflict and re-localization (2006–2008)

We will describe the activities and events during this period in three stages: conflicts within the anti-Vedanta movement, tensions caused by pro-corporate mobilization, and the re-localization of the movement as an outcome of these conflicts and tensions.

Conflicts within the movement. As discussed earlier, during the internationalization period, NAN activists already held the first international NGO at least partly responsible for losing the struggle against the refinery construction. They accused the organization of having had a "damaging" influence on the movement because it would "intervene in the field" directly instead of just amplifying local voices from the grassroots as they expected (Medha, February 2009). Based on this and other experiences, many Indian NAN activists at state and national levels shared a general suspicion towards the negative local effects of the activities of international NGOs in general and felt a need to restrict their role in social movements:

"As far as our experience is concerned, the role of NGOs is very controversial. We feel that if a certain NGO, which is understanding its limitation just [...] restricts itself giving some information support or logistic support, then this is OK. But if any NGO, national or international, locally they start playing the role of leading the movement, giving direction to the movement, they are to be suspected."

(State-level activist, March 2003)

According to Delhi-based NAN activists, the first international NGO in Niyamgiri had created a ‘parallel leadership’ within the anti-mining resistance and misrepresented tribal culture to the outside world through the staged mass worship event that it had started conducting in March 2008. While NGO staff claimed that the event was a way to ‘showcase Dongria culture’, NAN activists maintained that mass worships were not consistent with actual Dongria Kondh customs. Even the organization’s attempts at giving an international platform to local voices was met with criticism. From 2008 onwards, the NGO flew local community members to the UK to voice their complaints in front of Vedanta’s Board of Directors at the company’s Annual General Meeting (AGM). While such tactics generated international attention and definitely played a role in further disinvestments from Vedanta (see Figure 2), they did little to strengthen local activism and in fact, caused deeper divisions within the overall resistance movement. The NGO was
criticized for speaking on behalf of the affected tribal people and for misrepresenting the movement by portraying members of other tribal groups that were not part of the resistance as spokespersons of the movement. The following incident at the 2009 AGM of Vedanta illustrates the dysfunctional relationship between NAN activists and international NGOs.

Sagar, an Indian activist living in the UK had come to protest at the AGM with hand-written banners and a megaphone. Most other protesters, in branded red and yellow shirts and with professional banners, had clearly been mobilized by the two international NGOs involved in the campaign at that time. Sagar arrived and nearly immediately started to shout anti-Vedanta slogans in Oriya instead of English, claiming to carry ‘the voice from the ground’ to London by using local language and causing a stir among those present. He protested loudly when asked to stop shouting to not cause disruption of the ongoing interview with Bianca Jagger that was being conducted by one NGO on the sidelines of the protest.

Another NAN activist claimed that the international NGO was not collaborating with people other than those it supported financially (and who were thus dependent on it). He also claimed the organization had collaborated with a local politician who had coined the slogan ‘Don’t take Niyamgiri, take another mountain’ which he felt betrayed the movement. For NAN activists, the issue was much broader than a mine on Niyamgiri. A mine elsewhere, so the argument, would simply shift the problem and not address broader issues of tribal rights to land and their own way of life as well as corporate and governmental accountability. The international NGO was accused of pushing its own agenda and ignoring these more general struggles. Apparently, a number of NAN activists had become so frustrated with its involvement in different grassroots movements all over India, that there had been discussions about sending an official complaint letter to the organization’s Indian headquarters.

Hence, when another UK NGO with a specific focus on indigenous peoples joined the struggle and sent a staff member to Niyamgiri for a research trip, one Delhi activist saw it necessary to warn him not to “repeat the same mistakes” as the first international NGO (Medha, November 2008). Again, Jika served as the paid guide and interpreter during this visit and a film team was later sent to produce a documentary about the resistance movement causing more rifts and tensions. Despite his lack of access to electricity and the internet in his mountain home, the film team gifted Jika a laptop to stay in touch. This raised discontent among Indian activists in Delhi and Orissa who, at the same time, had
arranged a desktop computer for Jika at the office of a local NGO near his home village. Moreover, during the second visit the NGO’s staff had less time to meet with NAN activists, leading to accusations that it was ignoring local knowledge and ideas about the campaign. Aware of the discontent that had been caused among local activists, a NGO member later commented:

"It was a much faster, frantic trip with no time to visit everybody and I think a few people’s noses got put down as a result. And I think it was also, because it wasn’t one person traveling alone asking lots of questions but it was three people with a lot of, you know, high-tech equipment with a clear plan. I don’t know, I think we gave the impression more that it was … ehm … that our objective was a selfish one."

(International NGO staff, October 2009)

Well aware of the different decision making styles and organizational processes between the NAN the international organization, he added that there was not always ‘an awful lot of time to convince people that you're not there to screw them over’. Essentially, the NGO had started to make its own decisions about what direction the movement should take without consulting with NAN activists.

The following episode vividly illustrates the turf war within the anti-mining movement.

At the end of 2008, a group of activists from Delhi (along with the first author) conducted a field trip to Niyamgiri. Jika had agreed to guide a group of five through the mountains. While the NAN activists were waiting for him at Charles’ house close to Niyamgiri, Jika called to inform them that he was already occupied in guiding a Korean film team that had been sent by one of the international NGOs and that had offered to pay him for his services. When Medha informed the group about Jika’s unavailability, a heated debate erupted about the ‘interference’ of international NGOs in grassroots resistance:

"How come [the NGO] just gives out his phone number? We have to get him a new number as soon as possible. […] They [foreign NGOs] are destroying the movement by putting him in such an elevated position and it creates conflict in the village. […] This is another extractive industry happening."

(Activist, December 2008, field notes)

Only after several phone calls and considerable pressure, Jika decided to abandon the Koreans and join the NAN activists from Delhi as a guide. However, the Korean film crew was determined to get their footage and ventured out alone in their hired jeep, looking for their elusive guide. In the evening of the same day, the Koreans encountered the NAN activists at Jika’s home village. An acrimonious confrontation between Indian activists and the Koreans ensued, with Jika caught in the middle. Despite Jika’s popularity with international activists and the media, NAN activists took great pains to explain to the
Koreans that Jika was just one person within a larger collective of grassroots actors and that the NGO had no right sending the film crew to Niyamgiri without giving Jika the chance to consult his people.

This conflict also came at a time when a Marxist political resistance organization had started to become involved in Niyamgiri. The organization supported broader struggles for land and economic rights among disadvantaged sections of the Indian population and was considered by NAN activists to be a more legitimate and effective local actor than international NGOs. They therefore sought good relationships with the Marxist leaders and were not willing to jeopardize their own position by not adhering to the ban on international press and NGOs in Niyamgiri that had been announced by the Marxist organization.

Jika, encouraged by NAN activists had joined the Marxist organization together with a couple of other Dongria youths that the NAN activists hoped would emerge as local leaders. As a proof of his willingness to ‘do or die’ for their cause, Jika had three hammer and sickle symbols tattooed on his body. His new organizational membership however, was in conflict with his role as an international guide as the encounter with the Koreans showed. That night, Jika was visibly upset about the confrontation between NAN activists and the Koreans and admitted reluctantly that the Marxist organization had warned him that they would withdraw their support if he was being ‘corrupted by the money of foreigners’.

After a long discussion, mainly led by NAN activists and only weakly supported by Jika, the Koreans decided to leave Niyamgiri. This episode strongly influenced activists’ attitudes to and support for the NGO’s engagement and seemed to confirm similar negative experiences with other international NGOs. NAN activists criticized the lack of sensitivity expressed by the organization, the lack of consultation and alignment of strategies. Jika, however, later expressed how he had felt sorry for the Koreans that night:

"My heart was very sad that time. They have come to meet some purpose […] [laughs] How can you oppose, no? They have come spending lots of money to meet my people."

(Jika, March 2010)

Why were NAN activists so motivated to present Jika as "one among many" and a "member of the collective" to the Korean film team? Our process model shows that Jika’s role as a spokesperson and community mobilizer and the "darling of Niyamgiri", as Ian had put it, did not remain unchallenged. The more he rose to fame, travelled to Delhi and other places, the more local people doubted his trustworthiness and accused him of taking
money and gifts from outsiders. His attempts at dressing up as a Dongria Kondh, growing
his hair long and wearing more traditional clothes and jewelry for photos and resistance
meetings were criticized by other Dongria Kondh and he began to face accusations and
distrust in every community that he visited. Based on their experiences with other
movements, NAN activists saw the risk of co-optation for Jika whom they considered too
young and inexperienced to be able to deal with his sudden popularity. They strongly
encouraged the young man to create strong bonds with the grassroots political
organizations they deemed supportive of tribal peoples’ interests (as opposed to more
mainstream political parties) and to let other spokespersons and leaders emerge next to
him. NAN activists were also conscious of their own role in making Jika the public face of
the resistance and even before his actual defection they were aware of the tensions and
pressures that Jika experienced as a result of his role. Jika also regretted the disruptions
that the movement had caused in his daily life. He complained that his life had been
entirely taken over by the campaign and he was being pulled at by too many parties,
including his father who wanted him to study or get a job:

"And everybody came to me, political party, NGO people ‘Jika, Jika’ they took me this
side, that side, that side. I went this side, that side… I don’t have time, nothing I can
do."

(Jika, December 2008)

"Sometimes I was utterly tired that time, means I had no peace that time. […] You
know there is this big foreign company and only Jika is fighting. It’s OK if there are 10
or 7 Jikas, it’s OK, it would be easy for them. But if Jika will go to every village, Jika
will do everything, what can one Jika do?"

(Jika, March 2010)

"Every time [my father] will scold … ‘Don’t come to my house! Study or you don’t
come to my house!’ My mom also, my village people also. I was very angry. I don’t
want to stay in family but I will fight for my people. Like I was mentally … broken. So
I couldn’t study because of these guys [activists], I [also] couldn’t go to my family."

(Jika, March 2010)

Reacting to such complaints, some NAN activists urged Jika to deal with these
tensions, arguing that ‘times are tough and Jika also needs to be tough’ and demanded that
he filled his role as a community mobilizer:

"He was built up as a leader of the resistance over years. Everybody cares for him, is
giving him presents and attention and now, when it is time for him to do something, he
just shies away from any kind of responsibility, he shies away from doing the hard
work, he just wants the glamour, like taking white people around Niyamgiri and seeing
his name in the newspaper. But when it comes to telling people about the Forest Rights
Act, he doesn’t do it. Medha gave him a booklet about the Act a year ago and he still
didn’t read it. This is what is important and what he should be doing instead of playing around with his laptop.”  
(Sunil, February 2009, field notes)

These quotes indicate the tensions and contradictions that Jika faced at the end of this period. Torn between his loyalties to local activists, NANs, foreign NGOS and his own community, Jika became the perfect target of corporate counter-mobilizing strategies, as we will see in the next section.

**Counter-mobilization.** Repression by state police, corporate security forces and local pro-Vedanta supporters increased during the anti-refinery protests. Physical assaults and intimidation of protesters at meetings and public hearings, specific targeting of NAN activists before resistance meetings, delaying activists at train stations and following their vehicles, all of these tactics contributed to the demise of the anti-refinery movement. When resistance against the proposed mine emerged in Niyamgiri, both the corporation and state responded with counter-mobilization efforts in an attempt to quell opposition to the mine. Jika recounted that Vedanta supporters were present at many resistance meetings and they made him understand that he was being watched. Two black jeeps driven by pro-Vedanta ‘goons’ regularly traversed the mountains and some Vedanta supporters even occupied a hut in a Dongria Kondh village to demonstrate their continued presence and intimidate villagers. Dongria Kondh women were threatened and at one point were too afraid to walk to the weekly market. Pro-corporate ‘thugs’ appeared in villages and at resistance meetings, intimidating attendees and those who spoke out against the mine. The heavy-handed tactics and violence by various pro-corporate actors are well documented by international NGOs, building on information gathered with the support of local and NAN activists (ActionAid, 2007; Amnesty International, 2010; Council of Ethics, 2007).

Some NAN activists were afraid that Jika, due to his high public profile, was in danger of being falsely charged, arrested, or even killed like the anti-refinery leader who died in a mysterious car ‘accident’ in 2005 and whose death was never properly investigated by the Orissa police. In 2009 some Dongria men attacked a Vedanta exploration team that had illegally entered their forest, resulting in severe injuries for one team member and a burnt jeep. Afterwards, Sunil feared that the incident could have severe consequences for local resistance leaders like Jika:

"People will be arrested, framed on false charges, people like Jika, Mukti, Anil, etc. will be the first to be targeted. And if that does happen, a bigger casualty than Kalinga Nagar [another struggle area in India where 12 tribal people had been shot by the police
in 2006] cannot be ruled out. If it doesn’t happen while the elections are on then it will
definitely happen when they are over.”

(message to a non-public activist Facebook group)

Jika was also well aware of the possibility of his arrest and in 2008 during our trip to
the mountains had joked when we passed a newly constructed jail that he would end up
there. He had also heard of rumors about a bounty on his head allegedly set by local
construction company contractors eager for the mining project to proceed. It is hard to
ascertain whether Vedanta actively participated or merely tolerated repression of the
anti-mining movement by pro-corporate groups. Reports about vehicles of pro-corporate thugs
entering and leaving the refinery and well known pro-corporate local businessmen being
seen together with refinery managers support such assumptions. What is relatively clear
however, are Vedanta’s attempts at influencing the Orissa government to curb the activities
of activists. In a press release in 2009, Vedanta urged the Orissa government to limit the
activities of "foreign" NGOs and activists in Niyamgiri because they were "provoking
innocent tribals to defame the government and the company" and "forcibly interacting"
with local people. Extensive press coverage of alleged corruption of government officials
by the company supports the view that Vedanta was hardly an innocent victim of the anti-
mining resistance movement. Finally, Jika reported that from 2008 on Vedanta personnel
and local company supporters regularly contacted him with offers of money and assistance
in an attempt to buy him out of the resistance movement.

In its counter-mobilization activities, Vedanta imitated a number of strategies employed
by activists. Where NAN activists tried to connect grassroots struggles across Orissa by
taking Jika to other locations of anti-mining struggle and organized delegations of activists
to visit Niyamgiri, Vedanta organized a visit of several Dongria Kondh to another bauxite
mine to "learn about the benefits" that would accrue from mining in the region.
Communication strategies of NAN activists in the form of videos featuring local
testimonies and documentaries describing negative social and environmental impacts of
the mine were countered with pro-industrialization and pro-mining videos produced by the
company and its supporters. Jika’s exit video followed a similar pattern, showing his
conversion from an anti-mining leader to a promoter of minerals-based industrialization.

As described above, Jika’s grassroots legitimacy was never as stable as NAN activists
might have wished. That, together with his personal desire to study and pursue a career
made him receptive to Vedanta’s offers of a better life. Rumors, that Jika and other activists
claimed were spread by pro-mining groups, were prevalent about Jika accepting money
from Vedanta and other pro-corporate sources. During this period Jika was contacted repeatedly by refinery managers and local businessmen resulting in his defection from the anti-Vedanta movement in the summer of 2009. Jika explained his position in a later interview:

"When the company people they met me they asked ‘Oh Jika can you take some money? What do you want?’ They were thinking Jika is a married person and with money he will be silent. I told ‘Sir, I don’t want anything, If you want to help me, my aim is education. I’ll study and study and work for my people’. They were very happy. ‘OK no problem we can help you for your education. No problem’, they told like that.”

(Jika, March 2010)

From early 2009 onwards, Jika gradually reduced his involvement with the resistance to the point that activists found it difficult to reach him by phone. Rumors about him having ‘changed sides’ intensified and were confirmed by his official exit video that appeared on Youtube in July 2009. In the video, Jika explained his decision with the same passion he had earlier displayed when mobilizing Dongria communities against the mine. Supporting the the anti-NGO rhetoric regularly employed by the pro-mining movement as a counter-mobilization tactic, he argued:

"And we were misguided by the NGOs […] different NGOs from other countries are coming to our Dongria Kondh area. […] Actually, they are not working for our tribe peoples’ interest, they are working for their own interest. They never want development for my people. They want that Dongria people should be like that, they should be in the forest, they should be naked, there should be no development in that area. So they never wanted development for my people. So, all our people oppose them. Nobody will help them for those things. So, if they will come next time we just will send [them] out from our boundary, we will not allow them to enter into our area.”

(Jika, July 2009, video)

Jika further claimed in the video to have finally realized that Vedanta’s CSR initiatives were the only way to lift his tribe out of poverty and that his engagement with the company enabled him to work for the betterment of his people in a more effective way than being part of the anti-mining movement:

"Because our people are in darkness, they don’t know what is light, so we have to show them light, because they also need development. They need development like other people that live in the plain area and they don’t want to oppose the mining. They will support the mining and we request to Anil Agarwal chairman of Vedanta, please, he has to start mining on the top and he has to develop our Dongria Kondh people. Otherwise no NGOs, no political party can develop my people. […] This is the time. Vedanta has come which can really [bring] development, which can do really development for our people, we hope. And we’ll join with this company and we’ll help [the] company. […] But my aim … I will study. I have time I’ll study, I’ll do a job, and I’ll work for my people not only against the company. […] I will stay neutral… Actually, I’m not this
side and not this side. Means, middle, means if I’m thinking my aim is education. First, I will do my education [in] three years [then] I will see what can I do.”

(Jika, March 2010)

So for a CSR investment of about Rs 7000 (about 117 Euro) annually for three years plus provision of room and board at a management school in Orissa’s capital, Vedanta had transformed Jika from a community mobilizer and anti-mining activist into a fervent supporter of the mine. It had become nearly impossible for activists to get hold of Jika to try and persuade him to re-think his decision as the company had given him a new phone and he had apparently discarded the one given to him by activists. Although Jika regretted losing many good friends among the NAN activists, he tried to downplay his defection in March 2010 arguing that politicians changed sides all the time and that he was not the only young Dongria man being ‘sponsored’ by Vedanta.

Re-localization. At the end of 2008, when the episode with the Korean film team occurred, power relations within the resistance movement had begun to shift. During 2009–2010, the Marxist organization had grown in importance and had begun to change the nature and direction of the resistance movement in an effort to make it part of a larger national movement against the government’s development and industrialization policy. The Marxist organization had announced a ban to stop the influx of foreigners into the mountains in order to build more sustainable grassroots resistance structures. NAN activists supported such a strategy and urged Jika to find other local youth to join the movement. Thus, the emergence of a new organization changed the processes of mobilization in Niyamgiri and the power dynamics between key actors because the resentment against international NGOs and their tactics diminished the latter’s influence.

After Jika’s defection, the international NGO that had already been involved in the anti-refinery movement continued with its parallel mobilization internationally and organized another protest at Vedanta’s AGM in London. The NGO presented a young tribal man to the international audience claiming he was a Dongria Kondh, a claim countered by NAN activists and Dongria villagers who asserted that the youth was from a village in the plains and had nothing to do with the anti-mining movement in the mountains. After his return from London, the young man was seen together with Jika and openly admitted that he was not against the mine but had agreed to speak at the AGM only because of the opportunity to travel to London.
Although many were deeply disappointed at Jika’s defection at a personal level, NAN activists and international NGOs claimed that grassroots resistance was still strong and had not been affected by Jika becoming a Vedanta supporter. None of the activists saw Jika’s exit as an endpoint in the resistance movement and many pointed to the fluid nature of grassroots organizing processes:

"Many people had projected him as a symbol of the movement. They became very disillusioned […] but it’s a test for the dynamics of a movement also whether it can sustain [itself]. Some leaders will be taken over, some might be purchased, some will become frustrated. These things will happen and in the process new leadership also emerges. That is also the charm of a movement, we can say [laughs]."

(State level activist, March 2010)

The continued strong commitment among the Dongria to oppose the construction of the mine and the changing resistance structures were demonstrated during a mass gathering of tribal people on top of the Niyamgiri Mountain in the spring of 2010. Organized mainly by the Marxist organization, the event was similar to the much-criticized mass worship first organized by the international NGO. The major difference was in the ownership of the event: whereas the NGO event was seen as being externally imposed, this time there was considerable local involvement of people and more grassroots mobilization by the political organization as well as support from NAN activists. As a telling reflection of the shift in power dynamics, the gathering explicitly excluded foreign NGOs in an attempt to unite tribal people and poor farmers on the issue of land rights and anti-industrialization struggles. The Marxist organization sent one of its activists to Niyamgiri where he took over Jika’s earlier job, traveling from village to village and mobilizing the Dongria Kondh against the mine. NAN activists claimed that as of March 2010, the resistance activities had become much more locally grounded as opposed to earlier phases where international NGOs and activists had been the dominant actors in the anti-Vedanta movement.

4.7 Discussion and Conclusion

Our case study vividly illustrates the role of national advocacy networks in shaping local resistance and transnational dynamics, a role that has largely been neglected in the traditional boomerang model (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). We argue that in countries like India, with its strong civil society and long history of social movements, it is critical to consider national and transnational dynamics within anti-corporate mobilization over time.
(summarized in Figure 10). Our narrative also shows the tensions and disruptions that occur when diverse actors come together to mobilize against a common target. It appears that the presence of a strong NAN makes within-movement conflict more likely especially when a grassroots movement internationalizes. It would be naive to assume that interactions within movements are purely benevolent and that the various individual and collective actors are easily aligned towards a common goal just because they claim to fight the same corporation. Our findings support and extend earlier work that argues that it is not the presence of transnational support per se that makes anti-corporate movements successful (Bebbington et al., 2008; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; McAteer & Pulver, 2009). Actors within transnational movements need to manage internal differences; national advocacy actors need to hold powerful transnational actors within such networks to account while dealing with corporate counter-mobilization strategies at the same time. We find that in social movement organizing NANs may or may not seek support from TANs and that their motives for doing so may be different from the usually assumed disparities in material resources, knowledge and influence. Nationally powerful NANs might seek transnational support to gain an additional arena in which to fight corporations while at the same time maintaining their powerful role nationally.
In addition, our case highlights the need for a process approach to studies of social movements. In the organization studies literature, process thinking has been put forward as a way to conceptualize organization among networked actors (Hernes, 2008). Hernes and Bakken (2003), for example, conceptualize events as important decision points that are connected by processes. Jika’s defection in that sense is an event that resulted from the processes of recruitment by NAN activists and international NGO actors and the elite defection tactics used by the pro-mining movement. While some scholars describe anti-corporate movements as a fixed coalition of actors confronting a corporation with a set of observable events that have particular outcomes (King & Soule, 2007; Soule, 2009), others adopt a more dynamic approach (Diani & McAdam, 2003; Koopmans, 2004). Emphasizing the ‘movement’ in social movements, these studies focus on the ‘ongoing accomplishment of collective action’ (McAdam, 2003, p. 285).
corporate mobilization tries to identify mechanisms that underlie particular events and strategic decisions by the involved actors to ‘penetrate the logic behind observed temporal progressions’ (Van de Ven & Poole, 1995: 1385). Based upon our empirical material, we identified internationalization and localization as two central processes in transnational anti-corporate movements that recursively interact under the influence of a third central process, counter-movement activities by the company (and the state). Figure 10 illustrates the processes unfolding within the social movement campaign against Vedanta in Niyamgiri.

We observed four mechanisms in each of these three central processes: internationalization processes were characterized by scale shifts, brokerage, recruitment and publicity mechanisms. Mechanisms underlying localization processes consisted of scale shifts, recruitment, politicization and strategic adaptation while the mechanisms of counter-organizing processes were strategic adaptation, lobbying, elite defection, CSR and public relations. This confirms earlier findings about mechanisms of social movement organizing (Koopmans, 2004; McAdam, 2003; Walker 2012). Our main contribution is the integration of these mechanisms within a larger framework of the complementary and recursive anti-corporate movement organizing processes of internationalization and localization and the consideration of the effects of counter-mobilization on them. Using our model, we are able to draw a much clearer picture of the processes involved in anti-corporate social movement organizing and corporate counter-organizing in general, that can be expected to occur also in other cases of anti-corporate mobilization.

Internationalization is characterized by the mechanisms of scale shift – the ‘shifting up’ of movement activity from the grassroots and national level to the international realm, such as through the organization of protest events at Vedanta’s AGM. Scale shift often is a result of brokerage, where NAN activists connect grassroots struggles to international NGOs. Charles, albeit originally from the UK but deeply embedded in the NAN against Vedanta, brought the resistance movement against Vedanta to the attention of an international indigenous peoples rights NGO in London. He and other NAN activists shared their information with international NGOs to persuade them to publicize the case abroad. Recruitment is another mechanism of the internationalization process. Identification, selection and presentation of local spokespersons like Jika (and his replacement at Vedanta’s AGM) at international events are key aspects of transnational mobilization. Our narrative shows that recruitment of local people by international NGOs was a major reason
for conflict within the movement and was criticized by NAN activists because the local recruits had nothing to do with the grassroots resistance movement or because NAN activists feared to lose control over the process of recruitment and publicity. Finally, publicity is a key internationalization mechanism for transnational mobilization. The story of the resistance movement depicted by impressive visuals and images of the Dongria Kondh, as in Ian’s photos and the NGO’s documentary, was particularly appealing to Western audiences eager to take up the cause of a tribal community living in harmony with nature and battling a destructive multinational corporation. The Dongria Kondh were interesting enough for the international media to fill what has been labelled the ‘tribal slot’ – the strategic use of indigenous identity primarily by Western NGOs to promote their movements (Bruijn & Whiteman, 2010; Li, 2000).

Localization is a second process, also characterized by scale shift, this time from the international back to the national and grassroots levels. Localization is fostered by politicization of grassroots movement actors and their continued mobilization around issues such as land rights and their growing links to local political organizations. The Marxist organization and NAN activists played a key role in the politicization of the Dongria Kondh. Mobilization for these actors involved connecting the Dongria Kondh to a network of other struggles in Orissa that were attempting to change government policy on mineral investment and extraction. Finally, as in internationalization processes, recruitment of suitable local leaders to mobilize and represent the movement at national and local events is a key mechanism in localization. Jika’s case clearly shows how such recruitment mechanisms can create conflicts and tensions between individual actors while causing disruptions in the resistance movement leaving key actors vulnerable to corporate counter-mobilization strategies. Strategic adaptation was the final mechanism in localization processes in our narrative. NAN and grassroots activists realized the potential of the mass-worship first organized by the international NGO and adapted the strategy to publicize the tribe’s struggle and obtain wide media coverage. Instead of welcoming this assimilation and localization of their strategy, the NGO continued to organize their own separate mass event. But NAN activists also emphasized differences, rather than commonalities with the NGO. This lack of collaboration reflects ideological differences and cleavages and the need to create and defend one’s own ‘turf’ between actors at various levels in the anti-corporate movement that complicate transnational social movement organizing.
The last element of the model describes how corporate strategies can influence social movements through astroturf organizing. While this phenomenon has not received much attention in the study of anti-corporate movements, a few recent studies have emphasized the need to pay more attention to corporate non-market strategies directed at stakeholders, especially at the grassroots level (Walker, 2009; 2012). In the Niyamgiri case, CSR played a key role in counter-mobilization or astroturfing. CSR literally and figuratively became a weapon used by the corporation to counter the resistance movement, culminating in the elite defection of Jika. We have described earlier how the company’s CSR initiative of sponsoring a local youth club resulted in the severe beating of anti-Vedanta protestors by members of the same club using cricket bats purchased by the company. In 2012, Vedanta launched a massive CSR advertising campaign with the theme ‘creating happiness’ using local communities to sing the praises of the company and highlight the benefits created by mining. Pro-Vedanta actors also began publishing online videos with local testimonies – just like the resistance movement, which constitutes another case of strategic adaptation. At the political level, the company also engaged in extensive lobbying in an attempt to influence the government to support land acquisition, provide police protection for their construction activities as well as prevent the movement of activists and NGOs in the Niyamgiri area. Finally, Jika’s story shows how corporate managers and other pro-mining supporters (allegedly businessmen from nearby towns) directly targeted key actors in the movement to persuade them to change sides and support the mine. These elite defections had, at least temporarily, a destabilizing effect on the resistance movement.

Future studies of anti-corporate movements should also pay more attention to the context in which transnational anti-corporate mobilization occurs. When transnational advocacy is added to existing, and often very effective grassroots and national mobilization, the complementary processes of internationalization and localization are set in motion. Anti-corporate movements need both elements: strong grassroots action and engagement at an international level to be successful when fighting multinational corporations. A transnational movement against the Niyamgiri mine alone, for example, would have not been able to halt the illegal deployment of construction vehicles in the mountain for which local people blocked the road in January 2008. Moreover, without strong local resistance and the emergence of Jika as a tribal leader, the legitimacy of transnational engagement would have diminished. Investors would not divest from a
company without receiving ‘proof’ of its destructive actions and grassroots resistance against it.

The efforts of NAN activists also significantly contributed to raising national awareness about the case through lodging cases in local and national courts, providing material used in various court cases, conducting protests in the capital, and supporting local people in filing claims against the government. These efforts also resulted in putting pressure on the Indian government and influenced the decisions of the environmental ministry and garnering support for the struggle from leading politicians. Moreover, it can be argued that through their efforts at connecting the Niyamgiri struggle to other struggles against mining across the state and country, NAN activists contributed to a more sustainable and long-term learning and mobilization of communities affected by mineral development. Our extended boomerang model (Figure 8) adds such a national perspective to studies on transnational anti-corporate mobilization that takes into account the national context of mobilization and the historical mobilization structures that might exist in many countries.

We believe that the concurrent processes of internationalization and localization are crucial in the context of social movement organizing against multinational corporations. We have provided empirical evidence to develop our process model that explains the movement-countermovement dynamics of social movements, which we believe is a significant contribution to the field. Unlike most studies that focus on the origins of movements we have discussed how a particular social movement evolves over time, the power dynamics between key actors, conflicts and disruptions and the range of mobilization and counter-mobilization strategies employed (Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996).

Despite the temporal arrangement of our process model we do not see the process of resistance as a neat, orderly and linear process but one that is fluid, multivalent and contested with feedback loops that breakdown alliances, create new ones, and produce new forms of behavior among key actors. The outcomes are multivalent in the sense that ‘good’ or ‘bad’ outcomes remain contextually based. For example, one could argue that Jika’s defection was a bad outcome for the movement but a good outcome for him personally as he was able to get access to education and build a new life. That particular disruptive event, in part influenced by corporate strategies to co-opt resistance against mining, had consequences for subsequent actions of both, NANs and TANs as well as the Dongria Kondh. Thus, NANs and TANs provided the bridging mechanisms and chains of influence that informed actions at the local, national and transnational levels.
4.8 Epilogue

In September 2010 the Indian Ministry of Environment and Forests revoked the ‘in principal’ environmental clearance that had been granted to Vedanta for the mine at Niyam Dongar, and one month later also stalled the expansion of Vedanta’s refinery. The Orissa Mining Corporation, Vedanta’s partner in the project, is seeking to overturn this decision by appealing to the Indian Supreme Court. Hearings had not yet been conducted at the time of writing. While the ruling to stop the mine represents a remarkable victory for the movement, key actors continue their mobilization and counter-mobilization efforts. For example, Vedanta-sponsored local NGOs have petitioned the Orissa High Court to allow the refinery expansion; Jika released a music CD with traditional Dongria Kondh music as part of Vedanta’s CSR to promote the tribe’s culture; and the company has widely publicized a rally of tribal people from the foothills of Niyamgiri who demanded ‘industry and development’ for their area. The last of these pro-corporate protests happened in August 2012, amidst rumors that the refinery had to be shut down due to lack of cheap local bauxite. It appears that Jika has successfully been transformed into a pro-corporate community mobilizer. According to reports by activists, in late 2010 Jika played a key role in mobilizing a Dongria community to deny access to an international fact-finding team sent to the mountains by one of the international NGOs.

In April 2012, due to extensive NAN lobbying and a 2011 report by Amnesty International that refuted Vedanta’s environmental impact assessments, the Environment Ministry halted the environmental hearing process for the company’s refinery expansion plans. In May 2012, the Forest Department even filed three cases against the CEO of Vedanta Aluminium Limited, under the Orissa Forest Act for encroaching village forest land for the refinery construction in 2004 – a victory for the movement that was widely reported in the UK where it was portrayed as a ‘real-life Avatar’ fight similar to the Hollywood blockbuster (Burke, 2012).

Locally, the situation remained full of tension and characterized by attempts to weaken the movement. In early 2012 local pro-Vedanta groups assaulted several Dongria Kondh members who were preparing for the annual mass-worship. Other Dongria were arrested on the charge of ‘indulging in Maoist activities’ (Mohanty, 2012). In August 2012, NAN activists revealed that Vedanta had donated nearly six million USD to political parties in the last three years. In the same month, executives reported that the Lanjigarh refinery
might be shut down due to the additional costs of importing bauxite from other mines, which resulted in large pro-Vedanta demonstrations by factory workers and their families. By September it appeared that the anti-Vedanta movement had won at least a temporary victory – several national papers reported that the company planned to shut down the refinery in December 2012.
5. "OUTSIDE INSTIGATORS" AND "CRIMINALS"

Legitimacy attacks on anti-corporate protesters through adversarial framing

5.1 Abstract

Based on qualitative empirical material on the more than decade-long struggle of local communities and their supporters against a large-scale mining and refinery project in Orissa, India this paper examines how supporters of the project frame their adversaries. Based on past descriptions in the literature of how those who are attacked generally react to protest, I identify and define two master frames that seem to find widespread application across a range of movements in different locations: the outsider and criminal master frame. Next to arguing that these two frames provide a vocabulary to future studies of the framing of resistance, I show how both frames were employed in the specific case examined here to delegitimize adversaries and weaken the opposition against the mining project. The harmful effects of adversarial framing for the local resistance movement are illustrated with a short narrative. I conclude with a critical discussion of these findings and argue that corporate managers and their supporters might contribute to the emergence of 'dangerous stakeholders' who lack legitimacy but possess power and urgency with negative consequences for community stakeholders and the corporation.

5.2 Introduction

"The responsibility of giving the land is [the] government’s." 
(Vedanta Manager, Jan. 2009)

"We are here on invitation of the government of Orissa."
(POSCO Manager, Jan. 2009)

Orissa is one of the poorest Indian states but one of the richest when it comes to mineral resources. The Orissa state government, like many other governments around the world, considers minerals-based industrialization a key driver of economic development and tries to attract foreign direct investment in this sector. Vedanta, the Korean Pohang Steel Company (POSCO) and several other minerals companies in Orissa, enjoy the full
government support for their large-scale projects but at the same time face strong and extended local opposition (Dash & Samal, 2008). For example, supported by national and transnational activists and NGOs, local villagers resist the Vedanta refinery and mining project in the Niyamgiri mountains for over a decade now (Kraemer, Whiteman & Banerjee, 2013). Similarly, POSCO has struggled since 2005 to establish their steel plant and harbor that would be India's largest FDI project if ever established (Park, 2011).

Large-scale international projects like the above involve multiple actors, from partners to suppliers and clients, that form a complex project network and depend on local firms to 'anchor' them to the respective host environment (Aaltonen, 2013). To establish the legitimacy of a contested project, these supportive actors might adhere to existing rules and standards (conform), recruit "friendly project co-optees" (select) or lobby and influence regulators (manipulate) (Aaltonen, 2013: 18). While social movements might focus their attack on the multinational corporation behind the project for campaign-strategic considerations like visibility and brand name (Hendry, 2006), Aaltonen's work suggests that they face a conglomerate of project and public administration actors that collectively supports the establishment of a corporate project. Next to strategies to increase project legitimacy, these actors have a second set of strategies available: attacks on the legitimacy of protesters who challenge the legitimacy of the project. Such counter-attacks are often ignored in the management literature which seems surprising given the fact that the literature on corporate reactions to external pressure mentions legitimacy attacks as an equally viable strategy to co-operation for a corporation that is facing external pressure (Oliver, 1991).

Framing, the ongoing and intentional attempt to shape how an audience perceives a particular issue, plays a central role in struggles over legitimacy between corporations and local stakeholders (Creed, Scully & Austin, 2002; Joutsenvirta & Vaara, 2009; Zietsma & Winn, 2008; Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010). Stakeholder legitimacy is socially constructed (Mitchell, Agle & Wood, 1997) and can thus be discursively influenced through framing. Framing contests (Benford & Snow, 2000; Guérard, Bode & Gustafsson, 2013) are fought out in two arenas: that of the factual, empirical base of the claim itself and that of the legitimacy of the party making a claim (Benford & Snow, 2000; Kaplan, 2008). Both, corporations and anti-corporate protesters, have been shown to use strategic framing to “vilify their opponents and create support with other actors” (Zietsma & Winn, 2008: 81; Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010). Who wins this contest is largely determined by actors’ ability
to creatively identify and form coalitions with powerful partners and in the ability to attack the legitimacy of central actors within chains of influence (Zietsma & Winn, 2008). While winning is a matter of perspective, it might be that adversarial framing of opponents results in losses on all sides. While several studies examined how anti-corporate movements attack the legitimacy of corporations, legitimacy attacks on anti-corporate protesters themselves have so far only been mentioned in passing (Kneip, 2013; Zietsma & Winn, 2008; Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010).

“If left-wing extremism continues to flourish in parts which have natural resources of minerals, the climate for investment would certainly be affected.”

(Indian Prime Minister to a gathering of Chief Ministers, cited in Roy 2009)

"In mineral resource areas there is a situation close to civil war."

(Spokesman CPI-ML, March 2010)

These quotes point right to the center of what has been labelled "India's dirty war" (Bahree, 2010) where the Indian government employs military force to fight Maoist rebels who advocate the armed struggle of the rural peasantry against the government and ruling classes with the ultimate goal to seize state power. Estimated at about ten to twenty-thousand full-time armed cadres that are active in over one-third of all Indian districts with many more lightly armed supporters (Guha, 2007; Mahadevan 2012), the Maoists use guerrilla warfare to create 'liberated zones' in the Indian hinterland where state rule is abolished. In 2006, the Indian government started an anti-Maoist military offensive and the then Prime Minister described Maoism as the “single biggest security challenge ever faced by our country” (Bowring, 2006) . The number of violent incidences between Maoists and government forces has steadily increased since the start of the offensive (Kapur, Gawande & Satyanath, 2012). In 2009, the Maoist arm of the Communist Party of India (CPI-Maoist) was officially declared a ‘terrorist outfit’ and is since then considered a threat for the integrity and sovereignty of the country. On these grounds, the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act of 1967 allows the arrest of Maoists and alleged supporters as terrorists. Since its start, the anti-Maoist offensive has internally displaced several ten-thousand and killed thousands in the states of the so-called Red Corridor, especially in Jharkhand (Miklian, 2012). Critics argue that the government's fight against the Maoists most often it results in the militarization of the very same remote regions that are earmarked for mineral exploitation with the goal to prevent or repress resistance against it (Bahree, 2010; Roy, 2009).
Local villagers and activists who resist large-scale industrial development projects live in a dangerous hotbed of pressures and choices: They face the violence of pro-corporate local people and business men who hope to benefit from industrial development. They are tempted to join them by the promise of quick, but often short-term, benefits of corporate payments or CSR activities. They suffer the negative side-effects of militarization, ranging from nightly search operations and interrogations to arrests, killings and the restriction of freedom of movement and assembly. In some regions, they might even be confronting Maoist rebels who are looking to strengthen their ranks by recruiting those who are frustrated with the political system, lack opportunity, and are receptive to promises of abolishing caste and gender differences and quasi-feudal class relationships.

This study is set in Orissa, India, in this complex and difficult context of “war, politics and business interest” (Miklian, 2012: 563) where the government fights Maoist rebels while local communities resist Vedanta's large-scale mining project that is supported not only by the corporation but also its local partners, suppliers and the state government. As with any contested industrial development project, at the very local level it is also the employees of these firms and others who hope to benefit (e.g. local business owners hoping for increased economic activity) who support the venture and therefore stand against those who resist it based on their claims to its environmental as well as socio-cultural effects. How do supportive project stakeholders defend the project vis-a-vis anti-corporate protesters in such a context? While many tactics might be employed to establish the legitimacy of the project and deflect protesters' attacks, in this paper I focus solely on how project proponents discursively attack the legitimacy of protesters. I am interested especially in the discursive resources employed by project proponents in framing their attacks on anti-corporate protesters and how these relate to the specific context in which the conflict takes place.

The paper is structured as follows. I first briefly review the social movement literature on framing before I focus on framing contests in the context of corporate projects and distinguish issue framing as contest over factual claims from adversarial framing employed for legitimacy attacks which I focus on here. Second, I identify two master frames that project proponents might draw on to attack the legitimacy of their adversaries. Third, I introduce the case study of the protest against Vedanta's bauxite mine in the Niyamgiri mountains and the wider socio-cultural and political-economic context in which it occurs. I then use textual analysis of interviews, newspaper articles and other texts produced by
proponents of Vedanta’s mine to show whether and how these master frames provide the
discursive resources for proponents’ framing and how they adapt these master frames to the
specific context in which the conflict is placed. Finally, a short narrative shows the effects
proponents’ adversarial framing had on the anti-mining resistance in the Niyamgiri
mountains. These reach from direct and often violent movement repression to rifts within
the opposition that emerged from the threat of being branded as a Maoist or sympathizer. I
conclude with a discussion of my findings.

5.3 Frames, Framing and Framing Contests

The concept of frames was initially developed by Erving Goffman (1974) to describe
the individual interpretative schemata that influence how people see the world and
themselves. Social movement scholars use the term ‘collective action frames’ to describe
the mobilizing power of discursive constructions, the “metaphors, symbols, and cognitive
cues” that articulate problems in a particular way, propose a solution and mobilize people
to action (Campbell 2005: 48; Benford & Snow, 2000; Snow, 2004). Framing in this
context is the dynamic and strategic process of meaning-making within and among
movements and countermovements (Benford & Snow, 2000; Snow, 2004; Snow &
Benford, 1992). Next to the presence of mobilizing structures and political opportunities,
framing is the third central component of importance for social movement emergence
(McAdam, McCarthy & Zald, 1996; Snow & Benford, 2000). Unlike pre-existing
individual cognitive schemata, strategic framing in the social movement literature is a
deliberate and goal oriented attempt to highlight particular aspects of an issue or event
while hiding others (Polletta & Ho, 2006; Williams & Benford, 2000). With their frames
activists interpret reality in a certain way in order to “activate adherents, transform
bystanders into supporters, exact concessions from targets, and demobilize
antagonists” (Snow, 2004: 385). A good frame should fulfill three ‘core framing tasks’ to
identify a problem and responsible party (diagnostic), propose a solution (prognostic) and
mobilize people by presenting a need for action (motivational) (Benford & Snow, 2000).

Successful collective action frames resonate with their target audience and correspond
with discursive opportunity structures that reflect public opinion and attitudes (Williams,
2004). Activists often draw on a number of widely used master frames that provide an
archetypal interpretive lens crosscutting several movements (Snow & Benford 1992; Snow
A master frame is an influential and inclusive collective action frame that “allows for numerous aggrieved groups to tap it and elaborate their grievances in terms of its basic problem-solving schema” (Snow & Benford, 1992: 140). Some commonly used social movement master frames for example are the ‘political-economy account of injustice’ that is used by the feminist, peace, labor and anti-poverty movement alike (Carroll & Ratner, 1996), the ‘environmental justice’ frame employed around the world by grassroots activists to demand equal rights for communities affected by various types of pollution (Čapek, 1993) or the anti-neoliberal frame employed by various movements that oppose globalization in its various phenotypes (Ayres, 2004). Especially with the study of transnational movements and protests against economic globalization (Smith & Johnston, 2002), master frames as far-reaching diagnostic, prognostic and mobilizing categories have become more important than ever and provide a diagnostic category for the analysis of social movement framing across groups, movements, and time (Snow, 2004).

Although social movement theory has increasingly found its way into the organization studies literature (see Davis, McAdam, Scott & Zald, 2005, de Bakker & den Hond, 2008; Vogel, 2012 for an overview), the majority of the work in both fields focuses on the mobilization and influence tactics of grassroots movements, disenfranchised populations, and on framing in conflicts between corporations and their stakeholders. Only a comparatively small number of recent studies in social movement studies (Knight & Greenberg, 2011; Messer, Adams & Shriver, 2012) and organization studies (Guérard, Bode & Gustafsson, 2013; Vogus & Davis, 2005) examine in detail adversarial framing and counter-mobilization of those who are challenged by social movements. As Guérard and colleagues argue: The “resistance of those under fire has been mainly overlooked” in management and organization studies (2013: 782). Contributing to the growing literature that emphasizes both sides of framing contests, this paper therefore takes a detailed look at how supporters of a contested mining project react to the resistance movement that formed against it. These studies suggest that framing contests over power and legitimacy between challengers and defenders take center stage once an issue has been raised onto the agenda (Erkama & Vaara, 2010; Zietsma & Winn, 2008) and the initial framing and counter-framing of opponents and defenders’ position has taken place (Guérard, Bode & Gustafsson, 2013; Kaplan 2008). I will now take closer look at such framing contests before I outline the contributions I hope to make with this paper.
In framing contests, opposing parties try to promote their competing diagnoses of an issue, identify responsible actors and suggest ideas for a solution. They attempt to have their definition prevail in the public discourse (Benford & Hunt, 2003) and to influence the actions and interpretations of bystanders and interested others (Guérard, Bode & Gustafsson, 2013). Frames and counterframes evolve and get transformed in this interactive process (Benford & Snow 2000).

I focus on the frames used by those stakeholders who can be summarized in the broad category of 'project proponents' with which I mean those who stand to benefit from the successful establishment of a mine or other industrial project. This group might include corporate managers, subcontractor companies and their employees, local politicians, officials and members of the business community who believe in a trickle down effect from industrial growth also for rural communities who are directly affected by land loss, social and environmental impacts. Local community members who hope to benefit from a large industrial development project like local shop, restaurant or hotel owners and other suppliers, but also young people hoping for training and employment might belong to this group of supportive stakeholders. It is important to examine the role of such groups that are - or might be turned into - supportive project stakeholders. Recent work on corporate legitimacy emphasizes the relevance of local subcontractors in establishing the legitimacy of large scale international industrial projects that involve multiple actors across countries (Aaltonen, 2013). However, beyond the embeddedness of local firms into the cultural norms and standards of the host region, this literature ignores the potential for negative ways in which such project-supportive stakeholders might attempt to defend or build project legitimacy in a host location through framing and counter- or astroturf organizing (Lyon & Maxwell, 2004). It has been repeatedly argued that local politicians, subcontractors and others who hope to benefit from mining are involved in the organization of pro-corporate countermovements that often use violent tactics to confront anti-corporate protesters (Padel & Das, 2010; Özen, 2007; Warnaars, 2012). Also politicians do take action to influence conflicts around corporate projects, with or without the knowledge or consent of the corporation. For example in the case of POSCO’s steel plant in Orissa, the same politicians that invited the company later also sent armed police to persuade and intimidate villagers when they started resisting the plant (Miklian, 2012). In such contexts, where industrial development relies on police or military support against protesting communities (Miklian 2012; Navlakha, 2010; Roy, 2009; Ukeje 2001) or where
anti-corporate protest is treated as a matter of ‘national security’, ‘public order’ and ‘national interest’ (Baviskar 2005a; Roberts 1981 in Banerjee, 2007; Wekerle & Jackson, 2005) approaches that only examine corporate reactions to protest seem too narrow. My first contribution therefore is that I include a broader set of stakeholders that support a specific corporate project into my examination of counterframing activities.

The literature on conflicts between organizations and their stakeholders has examined the framing and counterframing of issues and also firms’ attempts to bolster their own legitimacy but has so far not paid much attention to adversarial framing, especially attacks on the legitimacy of those who challenge corporations. Most of the organizational literature that applies social movement theory to conflicts between firms and their stakeholders examines how stakeholders gain power and legitimacy vis-a-vis firms (e.g. den Hond & de Bakker 2007; Derry & Waikar, 2008; King, 2008; Zietsma & Winn, 2008). Yet, very little is known about the defense tactics of the proponents of contested corporate projects. Derry and Waikar (2008) for example study the framing contest about public acceptance and trust between the tobacco industry and tobacco control activists. They show how secondary activist stakeholders employ framing to gain power and legitimacy to a level that the tobacco industry was forced to adopt a “public display of acceptance” of activists and their claims (p. 131). They argue that “attempts at collaboration and assertions of the firm’s trustworthiness” (p. 131) were the two options for firms to reestablish legitimacy. While these are certainly viable strategies, a third - and equally viable - potential strategy seems to be a (counter)attack on the legitimacy of activists. Also Erkama & Vaara (2010) do an excellent job in examining managers’ rhetorical strategies to legitimize a contested corporate project. They do not mention, however, whether and how managers attempt to delegitimize their opponents. Too little is known about the strategic counter-framing activities of those who are attacked by social movements (Haydu, 1999, Messer et al. 2012).

I use the term counterframing to refer to the reactions of pro-project stakeholders to attacks on a corporate project they support. Counterframing, according to the social movement literature, can take the following forms: denial, counterattributions, counterprognoses, and attacks on the character of the movement or its members (Benford & Hunt, 2003). I argue that rational arguments, often backed by scientific research, play a central role for counterattributions and counterprognoses. Velasquez (2012), for example, describes in much detail the contest over scientific knowledge production between a
mining company, affected farmers and the state regarding the levels and causes of water pollution around an Ecuadorian gold mine. Similar tactics were also identified for framing contests within organizations (Kaplan, 2008). While opposing organizational teams initially tried to outsmart each other with ever more data and analyses, Kaplan argues that they later resorted to the last tactic, character attacks, to increase their legitimacy as claims-makers and “actively worked to undermine the legitimacy of the frames and authority of opposing coalitions” (p. 741).

Guérard, Bode & Gustafsson (2013) develop a process model of institutional emergence through conflict between adversaries. Based on a study of the struggle around the establishment of diesel motor particle filters as a standard in the German automotive industry they find that, following initial framing and counterframing that is mainly based on diagnostic and prognostic frames, a legitimacy contest takes place. In this contest, movement actors try to build alliances and recruit actors whereas those who are challenged employ ‘buffering strategies’ to prevent this. Next to the disciplining of actors not to join the movement, also these authors identify de-legitimization, “attempts to discredit and individual, a group, and organization or a social movement” (Guérard, Bode & Gustafsson, 2013: 811), as a key buffering strategy employed by those who are attacked. They conclude that social movement legitimacy “is an ongoing project that has to be constantly reaffirmed” (p. 813) given defenders’ buffering strategies.

Also in the field of social movement studies, delegitimation has been identified as a central tool employed in framing contests and adversarial framing of other actors in the field of contention opponents is seen as a way to construct movement identity, vilify opponents, and mobilize people to action (Gamson, 1995; Hunt & Benford, 2004). Knight & Greenberg (2011), for example, based on their study of the battle between climate change deniers and climate scientists, identify five reputational dimensions in opponents’ framing of their adversaries: attacks on practices, moral character, competence and qualifications, social associations, and the exposing of real versus apparent motivations. Fine (2006) also shows how those who are attacked by a social movement defend themselves through delegitimizing frames, what he calls 'reputation work'. He argues that defenders pick out (assumed or real) radical elements in social movements and frame them as representative for the entire movement with the goal of attacking its legitimacy via the moral character of its members. Based on this body of work on delegitimizing framing from different fields, I argue that character attacks add a different quality to framing
contests. They shift attention away from contests about the nature and righteousness of claims to how opposing parties attack one another’s “claims-making practices and moral character” (Knight & Greenberg, 2011: 324; Fine, 2006). It is this intersection where the social movement literature on counterframing connects with the organization studies literature on legitimacy attacks and stakeholder legitimacy where I hope to make my second contribution through a detailed examination of the counterframes employed by proponents of a contested mining project to defend the legitimacy of the project by attacking the legitimacy of protesters.

Bringing together these first two contributions, I argue that first an examination of a broader set of project proponents is needed to really examine the framing contest around contested corporate projects. Corporations whose legitimacy is challenged by local resistance against their operations tend to distance themselves from political discussions and focus their defense on legalistic arguments and scientific expertise (Joutsenvirta & Vaara, 2009; Messer et al., 2012). However, as the literature on the legitimacy of international projects suggests (Aaltonen, 2013), there are other local stakeholders supporting large industrial projects that need to be considered because they might engage in different tactics to delegitimize protest. I therefore examine framing activities not only by corporate managers but include the framing of other actors and especially local political and economic actors interested in the establishment of the contested Niyamgiri mine. Second, I focus on one aspect of framing, character attacks on the adversaries of a corporate project, instead of looking at the entire range of tactics employed in framing contests. More specifically and going beyond a simple case description of how defenders frame their adversaries, I look for the existence of master frames that might deliver the narrative elements and a shared vocabulary to those who defend themselves against social movement attacks by defaming the character of their opponents. In the next section, I try to identify such master frames for character attacks in previous studies on framing contests which is my third contribution. Again, as stated earlier, my focus are generic narratives for character attacks and not the entire repertoire of counterframing strategies (Benford & Hunt, 2003).
5.4 Introducing Two Adversarial Master Frames

Based on a reading of a number of studies from various disciplines that mention character attacks in framing contests, I suggest that there are two master frames that provide the narrative for a wide array of adversarial framing that attacks the character of the opponent. I call these the ‘outsider’ and ‘criminal’ master frame and will describe both in more detail below drawing on examples from the literature on delegitimization of protest. I follow the analytic scheme of Snow & Benford (2000) and examine the steps involved for defenders to make their diagnosis about opponents’ character and outline each frame's prognostic as well as motivational elements.

The outsider frame was already described in the early last century by German sociologist Georg Simmel who argued that “From earliest times, in uprisings of all sorts the attacked party has claimed that there has been incitement from the outside, by foreign emissaries and agitators.” (Simmel, 1908/1971: 146). Haydu (1999) identified this frame in the reaction of early 20th century industrial elites to labor union mobilization. These industrialists drew on a master frame that portrayed union protesters as ‘hired thugs’ and ‘outside agitators’. It was also more widely employed by members of the upper class to defend their power base and transmitted through the overlap of organizations and personnel between the industrial and societal upper class.

It seems that today it is international and foreign funded NGOs that are prime targets of outsider framing. They are portrayed as outside agitators only promoting their own interests and their activities are considered an affront to state sovereignty (Baviskar, 2005; Mayhew 2005; Riker, 2002). An increasing number of national governments draw on this master frame and take steps to restrict NGO activities. In Russia, for example, foreign funded NGOs have to self-identify as ‘foreign agents’. This term is commonly associated with being a spy and the law not only has administrative and cost consequences but also a negative impact on the public acceptance of and trust in NGOs (Maxwell, 2006). In India, the Foreign Contribution Regulation Act, 1976/2010 and the Charitable Trust Act, 1950 forbid ‘political activities’ for NGOs that are funded from outside the country. While initially geared at the prevention of foreign secret service interference with state politics, these laws have recently been tightened and are now used to curb transnational support for grassroots movements (CIVICUS 2010; Kamat, 2002).
But also other movement actors are framed and delegitimized as outsiders. Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, for example, attacks the diaspora opposition against his rule as illegitimate arguing that “To be considered a genuine oppositional force, one must live in Syria with the Syrian people and experience its problems and difficulties.” (cited in Merz, 2014).

The diagnosis of the outsider frame happens in three steps (see figure 1): first, it localizes an issue to a particular place, this delegitimizes anyone not from that place to speak on the issue. Third, it generalizes the presence of such illegitimate outside support to attack the legitimacy of the entire movement. Following this diagnosis is the prognosis that 'If outsiders are eliminated from the movement, there will be no unrest.' which results in a clear motivational aspect inherent in this frame: 'The activities of outsiders must be curtailed or their involvement in the movement stopped.'

The second kind of legitimacy attack that protesters all over the world face is the ‘criminal subject’ master frame. The degree to which protest is framed as criminal varies. In its mild form, activists’ legitimacy is attacked by accusing them of protesting in their own (often financial) interest. Climate change scientists for example were accused of knowingly employing poor methodology and promoting incorrect results based on their interest to maintain government funding for climate change research to their institutions (Knight & Greenberg, 2011). Government actors also accused environmental movement members of having purchased land earmarked for a road construction and now protesting against it to drive up compensation (Shriver, Adams & Cable, 2012). While such accusations will mostly not result in legal prosecution, stronger variants of the criminal master frame do have this potential. Fine (2006) provides a good review of how the American civil rights movement was weakened by its opponents and its repression facilitated through accusations of being infiltrated by ‘communists’ and ‘radicals’. Where activists are portrayed as ‘unlawful combatants’ (Žižek in Wekerle & Jackson, 2005} or prosecuted for law violation, arrests are a frequent result.

In the US, the Patriot Act facilitates criminalization of activists that are framed as ‘unpatriotic’ (Ayres, 2004) and an Eco-Harassment Bill condemns the critique of businesses on environmental grounds if such critique threatens business activities (Wekerle & Jackson, 2005; Austin, 2012). Panitch (2002) provides a more detailed overview of how post-9/11 anti-terrorist legislation in Canada, the US and the European Union promotes a
very broad definition of ‘terrorism’ that facilitates the repression of for example the anti-globalization protests (see also Staun, 2010; Bartolucci, 2010).

In an effort to publicly condemn and vilify resistance, it is presented as an ‘insurrection’ and protesters as aberrant (violent) troublemakers. Such framing functions to justify violent repression (Cunningham & Browning, 2004).

In the most extreme form of “discursive combat” (Shriver et al., 2012: 874), protesters are framed as ‘terrorists’ (Heßdörfer, Pabst & Ullrich 2010; Shivji, 2006). The terrorist frame gained considerable strength with the discourse on (the fight against) global terrorism after September 11, 2001 (Chagankerian 2013; Pokalova, 2010; Wekerle & Jackson, 2005) and “terrorism has been rediscovered as a unifying construction of dangerousness” that justifies repression (Kappeler & Miller-Potter, 2004: 35). Bartolucci (2010) even argues that ‘terrorism’ did not exist in Morocco prior to the 9/11 attacks. While initially perceived as a threat for political activists only (Keane, 1985/2010), the ‘terrorist’ master frame has now found widespread application to counter the claims of dissidents, religious leaders, and anti-globalization protesters around the world. It has been argued that terrorism can be seen as a “securitization language game” (Staun, 2010: 403) itself has become inherently political as it seems to be common practice for political actors to use it as a tool to get rid of uncomfortable opposition on the way to reaching their interests (Staun, 2010). Around these issues an entirely new field of ‘critical terrorism studies’ has emerged in the past decade with its own journal, Critical Studies on Terrorism, with the aim to publish articles that “recognize the inherently problematic nature of the terrorism label”. The criminal/terrorism frame shifts attention on the character of movement actors and away from their political demands and thus makes a political solution or dialogue impossible. This delegitimization and depoliticization facilitates the repression of protest through increasing public acceptance for hard measures vis-à-vis criminals or terrorists (Bartolucci, 2010; Chagankerian, 2013; Pokalova, 2010)

Comparable to the outsider frame, the diagnosis of the criminal master frame takes effect in three steps (figure 11). First it conflates the entire movement with its (alleged) radical elements. Then, emphasizing their illegal and (in the case of terrorism) irrational and unjustifiable acts, it delegitimizes them as criminals. Again, this is then generalized to the entire movement who are seen as accepting or inviting these radicals. The prognosis that follows from such a diagnosis is a threat to public order and security' which results in the motivational aspect of the frame, the call to arrest them.
Both, the outsider and criminal adversarial master frame have at their core the attack on the character of movement participants, whether these are framed as outsiders or criminal subjects. Table 4 below draws on articles from a variety of fields from sociology to development studies as well as newspaper coverage to show how various types of resistance have in the past been framed as caused from the outside, as criminal and even terrorist.

Both delegitimizing frames are often also used in combination as the following corporate response to protest against the clear cutting of forest in British Columbia suggests framing it as “an assault on the democratic process [. . .] by a small interest group that didn’t get its way” (cited in Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010: 202). Also the framing of the Syrian opposition by Bashar Al-Assad is a good example for the joint use of all frames. Cited in Merz (2014), he describes the Syrian opposition as composed of “armed terrorists” and “oppositional groups abroad” who “are reporting to Western foreign ministries and their intelligence organizations”.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OUTSIDER FRAME</th>
<th>CRIMINAL FRAME</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Localize</strong></td>
<td><strong>Conflate</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Delegitimize</strong></td>
<td><strong>Delegitimize</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Generalize</strong></td>
<td><strong>Generalize</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Problem:</strong> Outsiders speak on an issue that is not theirs and cause protest.</td>
<td><strong>Problem:</strong> The movement is run by criminals.</td>
</tr>
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**DIAGNOSIS**
- What is the problem?

**PROGNOSIS**
- **Who is responsible?**
  - Responsible: international NGOs, non-local activists, anyone speaking on an issue who is not directly affected
  - Projection: Without outsiders, there will be no opposition.

**MOTIVATION**
- What action should be taken?
  - **Action 1:** Stop outsiders’ interaction with the movement to prevent protest.
  - **Action 2:** Ignore the movement because it is not genuine.

**CRIMINAL FRAME**
- **Conflate**
- **Delegitimize**
- **Generalize**
- **Problem:** The movement is run by criminals.

**DIAGNOSIS**
- What is the problem?

**PROGNOSIS**
- **Who is responsible?**
  - Responsible: radical groups, criminals, and/or terrorists
  - Projection 1: Criminals threaten the public order/security.
  - Projection 2: Criminals illegally benefit from protest.

**MOTIVATION**
- What action should be taken?
  - **Action 1:** Fight criminals with legal, police or military means.
  - **Action 2:** Ignore movement demands and don’t negotiate with criminals.
The review of a vast array of literature on framing contests and specifically attacks on the legitimacy of protesters suggests two master frames, the outsider and the criminal frame, the latter with one more and one less extreme variant, that I also expect to find in the reactions of pro-project stakeholders to protest. Before moving on to an introduction of the case study and findings, I will briefly discuss the real-world effects of framing to highlight the relevance of examining adversarial framing.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Framing of Protest</th>
<th>Nature of Protest</th>
<th>Source</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outsider Frame</strong></td>
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<td>NGOs are framed as hypocritical, self</td>
<td>Social, environmental, anti-mining</td>
<td>Welker, 2009</td>
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<td>interested and corrupt external actors</td>
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<td>who mobilize local communities</td>
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<td>NGOs and activists are labeled “non-local,</td>
<td>Environmental, anti-mining</td>
<td>Bridge, 1998:</td>
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<td>external, bureaucratic and elitist,” anti-</td>
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<td>234</td>
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<td>development” and a threat to the</td>
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<td>livelihoods of those involved in the</td>
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<td>local industry</td>
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<td>Pro-mining groups accuse the movement</td>
<td>Anti-mining</td>
<td>Özen, 2007:</td>
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<td>against the Bergama mine in Turkey of</td>
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<td>277</td>
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<td>being planned and orchestrated by an</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;external force&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zapatista rebels portrayed as “guileless</td>
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<td>Collier, 1994</td>
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<tr>
<td>but gullible natives inspired and led by</td>
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<td>foreign subversives”</td>
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<tr>
<td>Union protesters of the early 20 century</td>
<td>Union members</td>
<td>Haydu, 1999</td>
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<tr>
<td>framed as led by ‘hired thugs’ or ‘outside</td>
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<td>agitators’</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political actors frame the US communist</td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Noakes, 2000</td>
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<tr>
<td>movement as directed by ‘puppet masters’</td>
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<td>in Moscow in a ‘countersubversive master</td>
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<td>frame’</td>
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<tr>
<td>Activists accused of being paid by foreign</td>
<td>Environmental</td>
<td>Shriver et al.,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sources to foster their interest</td>
<td></td>
<td>2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>President Assad accuses the armed Syrian</td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Merz, 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>opposition movement as “outside</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>aggressors fighting for foreign interests”</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Criminal Frame</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>G8 summit protesters in Genoa are arrested</td>
<td>Anti-globalization</td>
<td>Boyle, 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>under laws usually reserved for dealing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>with the mafia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Source</td>
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<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Climate scientists accused of material self-interest and wanting to maintain government funding for climate change research, climate sceptics in turn are framed as driven by industrial interests</td>
<td>Environmental</td>
<td>Knight &amp; Greenberg, 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmentalists are blamed to protest in order to drive up land prices for their own benefit</td>
<td>Environmental</td>
<td>Shriver et al., 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union protesters framed as ‘lawless mob’ in the early 20th century</td>
<td>Workers’ rights</td>
<td>Haydu, 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-import actors framed protesters as “violent radicals” and as a threat to social stability</td>
<td>Anti-US beef import protesters in Korea</td>
<td>Lee, 2012: 407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-nuclear proliferation accused protesters to be allies of the Soviet Union which resulted in repression as ‘communist organizations wanting to weaken the American democracy’</td>
<td>Anti-nuclear</td>
<td>Benford &amp; Hunt, 2003</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Criminal - Terrorist Frame**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anti-POSCO protesters are associated with Maoists by the company and negotiations broken off for matters of internal security</td>
<td>Anti-mining</td>
<td>Miklian, 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-globalization protesters are compared to terrorists in their “disdain for democratic institutions” in the Canadian national press</td>
<td>Anti-globalization</td>
<td>Panitch, 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ugandan gay rights activists are labeled terrorists who “plan the destruction of our country” by a Minister</td>
<td>Gay rights</td>
<td>Smith, 2012a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protesters are persecuted by the anti-terror police in Turkey after opposing the construction of a shopping mall in Gezi Park</td>
<td>Environmental, anti-neoliberal</td>
<td>e.g. Adams, 2013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.5 Effects of Framing

Frames have significant influence on movement outcomes (Campbell, 2005) through their consequences at the individual and societal level. Individually, they influence attitudes, collective identity and thereby generate support for social movements (Snow, 2004), it also shapes political and discursive opportunities (Benford & Snow, 2000). The official frames promoted by state agencies and government elites are of crucial importance in shaping the “context in which social movements rise, prosper, and decline” (Noakes, 2000: 669). Conservative governments for example apply the terrorism master frame to normalize the repression of progressive movements and to foster an urban securitization agenda (Weckerle & Jackson, 2005). In the context of contested infrastructure and corporate projects, state and private sector actors often collaborate to influence the public discourse, as has been shown for example for a large road construction project (Shriver et al., 2012). Corporate framing also might justify and legitimize grassroots astroturf organizations that support their projects (Austin, 2002; Pichardo, 1995; Shriver et al., 2012). These grassroots organizations tend to be more violent in their expression than corporate and government representatives who often distance themselves from such activities (Shriver et al., 2012). Nevertheless, I argue that grassroots violence would be impossible without elites providing the broader frames to justify their behavior and again highlight the importance of including a broader set of actors into examinations of framing contests around corporate projects. I will now outline how the delegitimizing master frames identified above might facilitate repression of social movements.

**Table 4: Examples for the application of the outsider and criminal master frames**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activists of the Environmental and Animal Liberation Front are labeled ‘domestic terrorists’</th>
<th>Wekerle, 2005</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Environmentalists are ‘anti-American’, ‘fundamentalist’, ‘eco-terrorists’ and ‘extremists’</td>
<td>Environmental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shriver et al., 2012</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic separatists in Turkey and Chechnya are framed as terrorists</td>
<td>Pokalova, 2010</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Activists of the Environmental and Animal Liberation Front are labeled ‘domestic terrorists’ – Wekerle, 2005

Environmentalists are ‘anti-American’, ‘fundamentalist’, ‘eco-terrorists’ and ‘extremists’ – Environmental

Shriver et al., 2012

Ethnic separatists in Turkey and Chechnya are framed as terrorists – Pokalova, 2010
The 'outsider' frame makes first hand grievance or affectedness a requirement for legitimate claims. Simmel considers the outsider - the stranger as he calls him - as "the freer man" who "examines conditions with less prejudice" and against objective standards (Simmel, 1908/1971: 146). Because the actions of the stranger are not confined by "custom, piety or precedence" (Simmel, 1908/1971: 146) (s)he has the potential to disrupt existing agreements and dependencies. The outsider frame denies legitimacy to speak on a specific local issue to those who advocate for environmental protection or the rights of minorities in more general terms and are not subjectively affected. As a result, this frame diffuses attention away from the initial targets, causes and broader political motivations of protest to the person(s) behind it (Pokalova, 2010; Simmel, 1971; Wekerle & Jackson, 2005). Criticizing outside involvement, the outsider frame also hinders the emergence of trans-movement linkages that are important for mobilization (Polletta, 1999).

The 'objectivity' that Simmel claims for the stranger is attacked by the 'self-interest' variant of the criminal frame. Far from objectivity, this frame suggests dishonest motives behind each and every expression of movement support. Movement supporters morality and legitimacy to speak for others is questioned by portraying their activities purely self interested. The 'negative radical flank effect' of the (assumed) presence of deviant individuals or groups in a social movement erodes movement legitimacy while the 'positive radical flank effect' would be that moderate movement members move toward the political center because they represent an alternative to radical elements (Fine, 2006).

Moreover, the 'criminal' master frame stigmatizes resistance and protest as a threat to public order. This has been said to facilitate the policing and repression of movements through legal persecution and increased public tolerance for hard measures against protesters (Della Porta & Fillieule, 2004; Pokalova, 2010; Shriver et al., 2012). Looking at the effects of the terrorist frame as the most extreme variant of the criminal frame, others have argued that instead of asking what terrorism is and looking for definitions, scholars should focus on “what ‘terror does’, that is, what the language game of terror and securitization does or what happens when something or someone is articulated linguistically as a terror threat.” (Staun, 2010: 414). Framing groups as terrorists is far from innocent (Bartolucci, 2010; Staun, 2010). The terrorist frame makes way for preventive actions in the name of national security and deflects attention away from underlying economic and socio-political causes of conflict (Banerjee, 2011; Heßdörfer et al., 2010). The pure labeling act already creates a different sense of urgency and implies
and rationalizes the applicability of national security laws instead of normal jurisdiction and thus more severe means of punishment (Staun, 2010). Staun further argues that terrorism “is neither something objective (terrorist in itself) nor something subjective (a matter of individual perception), but something intersubjective and inherently political and institutionalized” (p. 411). In this sense, the ‘terrorist’ frame influences societal norms and public acceptance for particular anti-terrorist actions: increased control of movement and access to particular places and also the re/definition of the scale of political and non-political behavior (Williams, 2003).

It has also been argued that, especially in developing countries, the terrorist label renders socially acceptable governments’ defense of first world business interests against their own citizenry (Sheptycki, 2005). Moreover, beyond the actual policing of protest, the criminal master frame functions to create an atmosphere in which dissent, and even the potential for protest, is being criminalized and socially controlled, thus not only policing existing movements but foreclosing the spaces for them to emerge (Starr, Fernandez & Scholl, 2011). Overall, the repeated application of master frames in different contexts contributes to their visibility and facilitates future framing of protest elsewhere as it “dramatically structures readings of related protest events” (Boyle, 2011: 115). It is therefore important to study and make visible the framing of protest and its direct and indirect effects.

I have argued above that while master frames provide the script for a broad narrative, they need to be adjusted in order to resonate in a particular societal and political context. I also discussed the potential effects of the two delegitimizing master frames for social movements. I will now briefly present the case study and method before answering the following three research questions. What are the frames that proponents of the contested corporate project employ to attack the legitimacy of the protest movement? Can these frames be traced back to the two master frames introduced above? And, finally, what are the concrete effects these frames have for the repression of the social movement?

5.6 Case and Method

The East Indian state of Orissa is one of the poorest Indian states, rich in mineral resources, and has a long history of public protest against large scale industrial development projects (Padel & Das, 2010). The Indian Ministry of Home Affairs considers
Orissa to be one of the three states most affected by Maoist activity. About two-thirds of the remote Niyamgiri mountains belong to Rayagada district, officially declared a Maoist-affected area and the remainder lies in Kalahandi which is considered ‘at threat’ of becoming Maoist (Singh, 2010). This paper draws on a case study of the conflict about the establishment of a bauxite mine in these mountains that are home to the Dongria Kondh tribe (see figure 12). The majority of the Dongria Kondh, left political parties, national and international NGOs, individual activists, and anti-mining civil society groups oppose the mining of Niam Dongar, the sacred mountain of the tribe and located on their ancestral land. The mine is supported by an equally complex melange of some tribal people, pro-mining civil society groups, local business men, the local government, as well as mining multinational Vedanta Resources. We have shown elsewhere, how important it is to consider the organizing and counter-organizing activities among these groups and not mistake conflict parties as stable entities (Kraemer et al., 2013). Figure 12 shows how the development of the local resistance movement relates to the global discourse on the war against terror, the emergence of the anti-Maoist military offensive. It also outlines key dates in the legal fight between proponents and opponents of the mine that culminated in the final verdict against the mine in summer 2013. It also marks the arrest of Lado Sikkaka, a local tribal and member of the resistance movement, for Maoist activities. I will outline the events around this emblematic arrest in more detail in my narrative below.
This paper draws on 26 interviews conducted by the first author in the course of two field trips, one from November 2008 to March 2009 and another from March to May 2010 (see figure 12). These covered nine local, state-level and national-level activists from the anti-Vedanta movement, nine middle and top-level managers of Vedanta Resources Plc., one POSCO manager - a company that faced similar opposition as Vedanta, four NGO staff, a Orissa government bureaucrat, one local TV journalist, and the spokesperson of a politically left marxist organization that is alleged to be a frontline organization for
Maoists in India and that was mobilizing people in the Niyamgiri mountains around their land rights. Interviews were audio recorded and transcribed verbatim. Extensive notes were taken and written up into a detailed report directly after the interview for the four managers who refused to be audio recorded. Additionally, on an ongoing basis from summer 2007 until the time of writing, the first author conducted desk research on developments in Niyamgiri through Facebook groups, an online list-server covering several anti-mining struggles in Orissa and the English speaking press about the Vedanta case as well as the anti-Maoist fight of the Indian government, extracting data on the development of the framing contest between corporate and state elites and anti-Vedanta protesters.

An initial theme analysis (Dutton & Dukerich, 1991) of interviews with activists revealed ‘branding of anti-corporate resistance’ as a central theme. The emic term ‘branding’ was especially prominent and used to describe the framing of anti-corporate activists in a particular way with the goal to facilitate repression. The collection of qualitative material was progressively focused (Silverman, 2009) on this topic, also paying attention to the context and effects of such branding and seeking corporate texts that represented the corporate perspective on anti-corporate protesters for further frame analysis.

Struggles around legitimacy largely are discursive struggles of framing and counter-framing that are visible in speech acts and media reports (Joutsenvirta & Vaara, 2009; Joutsenvirta 2011). Based on a variety of empirical material from interviews, newspapers, and corporate texts, I construct a rich narrative (Czarniawska, 1998) about the conflict about the contested mine in Niyamgiri. Into this narrative, I integrate the framing of the anti-mining resistance in Niyamgiri and their national and international supporters as well as the effects that such framing had for the resistance movement. For discursive analysis, small but significant amounts of text are already sufficient (Silverman, 2001), especially if they originate from influential actors or are widely disseminated such as press releases or statements by corporate executives. Next to trying to identify the two delegitimizing master frames described above, I will analyze and contextualize the frames to study meaning-making by opponents of a contested corporate project in its socio-cultural and political context.

I present my findings in three sections. First, I provide a rich narrative account of incidences in Niyamgiri that relate to the framing of the local anti-mining resistance. Then,
I focus on how mining managers frame the protest before I contextualize these findings with quotes from corporate and government elites that relate to the Indian context.

5.7 Findings

5.7.1 Minerals-based development - a cure for the Maoist threat?

“If left-wing extremism continues to flourish in parts which have natural resources of minerals, the climate for investment would certainly be affected.”

(Indian Prime Minister to a gathering of Chief Ministers cited in Roy, 2009)

“Maoist violence is inflicting a far greater and insidious toll than the unending death-count […], targeting the economic sinews of the nation, and sapping international confidence in India’s capacities for growth and ordered governance.”

(Singh, 2010)

“Although geographically the region of Maoist insurgency seems remote, it contains large deposits of iron ore, coal, and many other materials that a nation on a steep growth curve desperately needs. Most importantly, a permanent region of instability at the heart of the country would spell disaster for the free flow of trade and commerce in the nation.“

(Gupta, 2007: 179/180)

These quotes speak for the fear among those in India who benefit from economic growth brought about by mineral development. The new closeness between the Maoists and India's popular people's movements against the social and environmental impact of such industrial projects clearly seems to be a reason for concern among those groups.

The Indian government tries to tackle the Maoist challenge with a two-pronged strategy. Economic and infrastructure development shall discourage the general population from joining the radicals out of economic motives while military interventions and arrests shall tackle the problem of armed cadres (Government of India Planning Commission 2012). To foster the economic development goals, forest regulations were relaxed in Maoist affected districts to facilitate infrastructure development and increase accessibility for industry (Vishnoi, 2013) and special police forces are dispatched to secure industrial development projects. Despite the many historic negative examples (Padel & Das, 2010), mineral exploitation is therefore widely promoted as a route to development and a cure for extremism. The head of Orissa’s Dongria Kondh Development Agency, for example, argued in an interview “mining means development” and was convinced that only companies like Vedanta were able to create “completely alternative livelihoods to poverty
and extremism” for the Dongria Kondh. Likewise, several Vedanta managers, off and on recording, expressed the idea that a lack of economic development and participation in India’s economic growth was motivating the Dongria Kondh’s assumed support for the Maoist rebels:

"There [in Niyamgiri] is no hospital, there is no school, there is no proper colleges […] if that went into a different channel and, you know, condenses across one common frustration called Maoists, I wouldn't be surprised."

(Vedanta Manager Lanjigarh, March 2010)

The assumption among the Vedanta leadership seemed to be that the combined mine and refinery project could singlehandedly alleviate poverty in Niyamgiri and Orissa, serve all needs of the local population and thus eradicate the assumed reasons for sympathy with the Maoists:

“The Lanjigarh Project is critical at the national, state and local level owing to its role in the social and economic wellbeing especially of the local community and the scale of contributions that it is financially making to society at large. As the sole major industry with almost the entire local community depending upon it for their livelihood; the Lanjigarh Alumina Refinery can well be construed as an engine of economic growth and sustenance for the region. It is creating jobs, promoting education, introducing/facilitating healthcare services and facilities and in the process ensuring community development for local people, including the vulnerable Dongria Kondhs and Kutia Kondhs.”

(Vedanta, 2012: 11)

Repeatedly, the Vedanta management made sweeping arguments about the potential impact of the project and portrayed the Niyamgiri project and Vedanta as a company as an indispensable development engine:

“[…] The project is expected to change the profile of the entire district bringing considerable direct and indirect employment, infrastructure development, community development, social-economic development and empowerment.”

(Press release Vedanta 9th Dec. 2009)

“In these areas, we are working towards eliminating poverty, food, school education, right to health care services, medical treatment. […] I am trying to see how we can eliminate poverty completely from Bihar, Orissa, Rajasthan […]”

(Anil Agarwal, Chairman Vedanta, June 2010)

In an even larger context, and using references to Indian pride and the right to development, the company leadership clearly saw minerals-based industrialization as a way to quickly become equal to other developed nations with a large minerals sector:

“How long you want us to be powerless and without water? India has more resources than developed countries like Australia and Canada. How long do you want to wait?
I’m looking at India to be on the fast track where we can compete with the world shoulder to shoulder.”

(Anil Agarwal, Chairman Vedanta, June 2010)

Given such an importance attached to the Niyamgiri project and Vedanta as a whole, how did project proponents react to challenges to its legitimacy?

5.7.2 Outside instigators and criminals - Framing resistance against the mine in Niyamgiri

In interviews and their external communication the Vedanta leadership and management left no doubt about their idea that the resistance against the mine was caused by outside actors who were assumed to mobilize the Dongria Kondh:

“The resistance is fabricated from London and mainly related to the tribal people.”

(Vedanta Corporate Communications Manager, January 2009)

“CEO M. S. Mehta […] implied that the Dongria were voting ‘no’ [to mining] because of the presence of outside observers.”

(Report about Vedanta’s 2013 AGM on List server)

“The NGOs, they try to tell people to resist. […] They mobilize people from this area telling them to oppose this particular project. […] It is only a few people, better-knowers at those NGOs who are doing this protest. The local tribals are very simple [and believe the] misinformation that these NGOs are trying to put into the minds of these people.”

(Plant Manager Vedanta Lanjigarh, January 2009)

The last interview quote is exemplary for the widely shared perception among managers that tribal people were unable to even imagine the benefits industrial development would bring for them and were therefore easily swayed by NGOs.

Other supporters of the project repeated nearly identical statements to those made by corporate managers during interviews and in the press. A newspaper report about the upcoming vote about mining in Niyamgiri in summer 2013 cites the president of Adivasi Bikash Parishad, described as a local "pro-industry group" in the article as saying:

"Many outsiders are visiting our area and trying to influence the villagers against the Niyamgiri mining project. These activities disrespect the SC [Supreme Court] verdict which says that proceedings of the gram sabha should take place independently. It is unfortunate that the state government has not taken any action against them."

(Business Standard, May 2013)

When asked about the motivation for external actors to create resistance in Niyamgiri, the answer was usually self interested motives. Local politicians were accused of abusing the conflict for gaining votes while NGOs were looking for funds. One manager argued:
“Some manufacturers [of protest], some political activists are protesting because of the money. [...] besides the politicians also some NGOs are there. They are not really... they are really small, [...] they are only exploiting money to distract people from the right path. In the name of Niyamgiri, they will be getting so many funds from inside the country and outside the country also, so people have a lot of money and they will divert people from the project.”

(Ass. GM Corporate Affairs Vedanta, February 2009)

The CSR Manager of POSCO also shared the opinion that any resistance was created from outside. He argued that “local people never create problems” but that it was “a handful of [...] people with vested interests” that he also referred to as “negative elements” and “mischief mongers” coming from outside “spoiling people’s minds” that were stirring locals up to resist against the company’s steel plant and other industrial projects. He also identified politicians and NGOs as the main suspects behind resistance against the industry:

“It is so easy to organize some kind of opposition and if you dissect the people who are opposing that project, who are taking the leadership of [opposing] that project, you will find them... they are politicians who have failed in the hustings. They want to somehow survive. Okay? Now, yesterday in that rally, today there has been a report, I saw it on television. 2000 people they are claiming were there. I doubt that. Normally I've seen that people said it was 2000 and it was 200. But even those people themselves, all of them are from outside Orissa. [...] Obviously, the NGOs have brought them. All of them. So they are professional people who are being brought in every time there are protests. They are brought in and their photographs are in the newspaper and the leaders who speak are all professionals. It is like some people decide that they are the voice of society. They don't allow [local] people to speak for themselves.”

(POSCO CSR Manager, January 2009)

Vedanta's communication to the press suggests that the perception of outside actors being behind the protest culminated in calls upon the authorities to restrict the movement of foreign activists:

“[...] foreign NGOs who have been circulating a lot of false information about the entire mining activity in Orissa [...] There has been a sudden movement of foreigners / foreign NGOs in Lanjigarh, Kalahandi district in the past few days. Strangely foreigners coming on tourist visa from countries like Italy, Germany, Australia, Denmark, UK etc. have become frequent and they are freely moving in the region. These people have been forcedly interacting with local tribals and disturbing their peace.”

(Press release Vedanta, 9 Dec. 2009)

“VAL [Vedanta Aluminium] has been demanding proper regulation of foreign NGOs and visitors in tribal areas saying that it has started yielding positive results as the former could hold Palli Sabhas [village meetings] successfully. [...] Earlier the Vedanta
Group had asked the state government to restrict entry of foreign non-government organizations (NGOs) in Lanjigarh area, saying they were instigating locals. The company, in a letter to the state Home Ministry, had sought restriction on movement of such foreign nationals, besides investigation into their source of funding.”

(Patnaik, 2012)

“They (foreign NGOs) are enemy of industrial development in the state. If such NGOs and foreign nationals have come on tourist visas, why are they camping in jungles of Kalahandi, Rayagada. If they do not abide by rules, they should be sent back.”

(Vedanta executive cited in Press Trust Of India 2009)

A Vedanta manager in another location where the company was also facing community protest, complained that the government was not taking stricter action against activists which he referred to as "trouble makers":

“Many times our government is also not very tough on people who are breaking laws. We need to take more actions. Because after all, the land is to be given by the government. Okay? And okay, you need to explain to the people and all that but that is there. But the people who are nuisance makers, the people who are trouble creators - how to take care of them? That is not taking place.”

(Plant Manager Vedanta, interview January 2009)

Repeatedly, Vedanta executives connected their criticism of outside interference to India's colonial past. Some statements can be read as appeals to acknowledge India's sovereignty and highlight the ability of its government and scientific elite to govern the country:

“I think it's very important at this point to know that the whole opinion or perception [about Vedanta’s operations] was getting hijacked or driven by people sitting miles away not honoring the people who are qualified or entrusted with this job to monitor and examine our growth model.”

(CEO Vedanta, AGM 2009)

“[…] there seems to be a desire that the administration of Orissa and the administration of India should be run from here [London]. Actually I feel I'm going back in time. There is no attempt to understand Indian law, Indian procedures and in what manner people are now operating in India, there is a complete ignorance, I'm totally amazed. [...] If anybody has any grievance, including you, Amnesty [International] or anything, there is a National Human Rights Commission, which is a very vigorous and strong party who is headed by a Chief Justice of India, every member of this commission is like a supreme court judge. You please bring anything to their notice and it will be enquired into. We are subject to our country’s laws and human rights commission. And this human rights commission activity is something which is respected all over the world, it's not a body that can be just pushed around. So we would very much like to have, especially from an organization like Amnesty, you can rest assured that it would be given the most detailed consultation.”

(Member of the Board, Vedanta, AGM 2009)
Also in reaction to Amnesty International’s 2010 report that outlined human rights violations, and negative health impacts and lack of informed consent for the mining and refinery project, online news sources cited a Vedanta press release saying:

“The report implicitly criticizes a number of highly respected Indian governmental, regulatory and independent assessment organizations, including the Supreme Court and the state of Orissa, all of whom have reviewed, refined and endorsed the approach manifested by Vedanta.”

(Livemint.com 2010)

But not only managers, also other interested actors framed the protest in Niyamgiri as externally caused. The head of a governmental institute on tribal people issues in the capital of Orissa for example located the roots of anti-mining protest in “agencies from outside who inject and sensitize people” with which he meant NGOs. To illustrate his point, he recounted the story of another mining company whose project in Orissa had been stopped by a NGO campaign. According to him, the involved organizations had been sponsored by a competing Australian mining multinational.

Vedanta also lists several newspaper articles on its website that cite various ‘industry experts’ who, in line with the company, criticize foreign funded NGOs as the cause of conflicts with communities. According to these reports, NGOs were “obstructing the Indian development agenda” by hindering Indian companies to exploit the country’s rich mineral reserves.

Below, I narrate the developments in Niyamgiri in the time period between 2009 and 2010 to explore further how the anti-mining resistance was framed in public during a period when the anti-Maoist military initiative had reached the region.

5.7.3 “I told them I was not a Maoist.”

These words were uttered by Lado Sikaka Majhi an anti-mining social movement activist with the Niyamgiri Surakshya Samiti (‘Niyamgiri Protection Committee’ NSS) and a member of the Dongria Kondh tribal group, after his arrest by anti-Maoist paramilitary forces in August 2010 and several days in jail.

Lado and two other anti-mining activists had been on their way to the train station where they were to board a train to Delhi in order to attend a meeting on the Forest Rights Act (FRA) - an important piece of legislation about tribal customary land rights. In an extensive interview with a national newspaper (Sahu 2010), Lado reported how their vehicle was stopped by about a dozen men with rifles. After taking the car keys and everyone’s mobile phones, the men then forced the activists into their car without telling
them why they were arrested and where they were going. Two activists were released from the car shortly after, but Lado had to remain in the car:

“I could not see where they were taking me because I was blind-folded. After about four hours, my blind-fold was removed and I found myself in a police station. There they started beating me with bamboo sticks. They accused me of being a Maoist, organizing Naxal meetings on the Niyamgiri hills and uniting the Dongria Kondhs to protest against Vedanta. I told them that I was not a Maoist and organizing meetings of the Niyamgiri Surakshya Samiti, fighting for the protection of the hills. But they did not listen to me and beat me.”

(Lado Sikaka Majhi, August 2010)

In the days of his arrest, Lado was interrogated repeatedly and coerced into signing two documents: a statement that he had sheltered Maoists and another blank piece of paper. He was released after four days with the warning: “No further meetings.” A police official justified his arrest in a local newspaper:

“Our men had picked him up on the assumption that he had links with Maoists. But later we found that he was a member of Green Kalahandi [a local anti-mining organization]. So we released him. This is what we do normally in these areas. There is quite a heavy movement of Maoists in Lanjigarh area.”

(Mohanty, 2010)

From about spring 2009, the anti-mining protest of the Dongria Kondh was at threat of being connected to the activities of Maoist insurgents. Local newspapers and Vedanta-friendly websites reported that Maoists had put up anti-Vedanta posters around Vedanta’s refinery at the foothills of Niyamgiri. At the same time, a number of Dongria Kondh testified in front of a fact finding committee on Vedanta’s environmental and legal violations. The Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) conducted first combing operations in Niyamgiri, allegedly to find Maoists. Members of the police force entered Dongria Kondh villages without notice, interrogated people and searched huts to look for incriminating material. The main target of combing operations were villages where people had testified to the committee and were members of Chasi Mulia Adivasi Sangha, a tribal land rights organization regularly portrayed in Indian mainstream media as a Maoist frontline organization (Nayak, 2005; Pradhan, 2009). A representative of the organization explained in a TV interview:

“The police chase us all the time. And when we go into hiding, they label us as Maoists. It's the police who are creating Maoists.”

(NDTV, 2010)

Shortly after the testimony, the dead body of one of the witnesses, Arsi Mahji, was found close to Vedanta’s refinery compound wall. Despite the obvious threat to their lives
and the intimidation through the combing operations, Lado Sikaka and hundreds of other Dongria Kondh mobilized to demand the closure of Vedanta’s refinery at the foothills of Niyamgiri. With their protest they had to confront not only the police but also local Vedanta supporters: small business owners, construction entrepreneurs, and their recruits from the villages.

Although he denied that there were Maoists in the Niyamgiri mountains, a regional police official in summer 2010 admitted that CRPF had been stationed and various checkpoints set-up in Muniguda, a small town at the foothills of Niyamgiri and a key entry point into the mountains. He reasoned that “they [the troops] are not for Niyamgiri” (Singh, 2010) but did not provide an alternative explanation for their presence. This was given by a Vedanta official in the same article, who accused the tribal people in Niyamgiri to be a “threat for national security” (Singh, 2010). In November 2010, again two Dongria Kondh were arrested as Maoist supporters by the CRPF. More arrests followed in December:

“The Special Operation Group of Odisha police and the CRPF on Tuesday based on the information a Maoist camp was being run in the Niyamgiri jungles conducted a raid and arrested five Maoists including two hardcore Maoists, a woman and two minor girls.”

(The Pioneer, Dec. 16th 2010)

In December 2010, Vedanta asked the central government’s Ministry of Environment and Forest to explain its decision to ban mining in Niyamgiri despite an earlier ruling that had allowed it. When they did not receive a reply immediately, Vedanta managers jointly with Orissa’s Chief Minister Naveen Patnaik asked the Indian Prime Minister to put pressure on the Environment Ministry for a speedy decision. At the end of February 2011, the Dongria Kondh gathered on top of Niyam Dongar for an annual mass meeting to renew their vow to protect the mountain and fight for the closure of the refinery. The gathering was attended by national activists and who managed to give it some national media coverage. Shortly after, pro-Vedanta men destroyed a shrine that the Dongria had constructed on the mountain top and more CRPF were stationed in the Niyamgiri mountains. Activists and a report commissioned by the Ministry of Environment (Ramanathan, 2010) accused Vedanta of supporting the police operations, for example by hosting the police forces in one of their defunct mid-day-meal centers for children in Lanjigarh (advertised by the company to provide “one square meal per day” to local kids). Police presence grew steadily from then on and by May, CRPF also inhabited a market building originally intended to store fair trade products produced by the Dongria Kondh.
With CRPF stationed directly at the foot of Niyamgiri, the pressure on the Dongria Kondh through combing operations markedly increased, especially prior to another mass resistance meeting that the NSS had announced for the end of March. According to activists, Vedanta supporters stepped up their presence in Niyamgiri. They took over an empty hut in one of the villages and from this base ventured into neighboring communities to question and intimidate people and show their presence at meetings of anti-mining protesters. Their black jeep allegedly was repeatedly seen as it entered the Vedanta refinery compound.

In early May, three additional platoons of CRPF were dispatched even deeper into the Dongria Kondh’s traditional territory. One platoon each was stationed close to the three most strongly resisting tribal villages. According to a local NGO representative, an "atmosphere of terror" was created by the sheer presence of police in the middle of the mountains, their holding up of villagers for random interrogations and by the blank shots that were fired into the night. As a result, many Dongria Kondh stopped attending the local market – the women, according to activists, afraid of sexual assaults and violence and the men fearing to be held up as Maoist supporters. Indian activists were highly concerned:

“The day is not far when we will hear that either a Dongria Kondh lady has been sexually tortured by the forces or that a man of the tribe has been killed by them. […] By framing anti Vedanta activists as Maoists they want to create fear amongst all of us who want to extend solidarity with the people of Niyamgiri and throttle any sort of activism within the constitutional framework. In other words they want to send out a message that activists from nearby cities and towns will be in trouble if found in Niyamgiri. While repression continues unabated in Niyamgiri the Dongria Kondh have been left alone to protect themselves.”

(Activist on ‘Save Niyamgiri’ Facebook group, May 2011)

The CRPF publicly announced that Maoist posters demanding the release of a Dongria Kondh who was under arrest for his alleged Maoist connections had been found in Niyamgiri. Local people alleged that during combing operations the police had paid more attention to Forest Rights Act (FRA) information and application materials instead of looking for Maoist leaflets or posters. Also, villagers were interrogated and asked about the names of external activists and organizations that were teaching locals about the FRA. Activists widely expressed their fear that during the searches documents could be destroyed that would have helped the Dongria to claim official land rights under the FRA. In 2012, again right before the annual mass gathering, Dongria Kondh leaders were threatened by the CRPF to not oppose the mining plans (Amnesty International, 2012).
Albeit much less compared to local activists, also NGO staff faced repression. In April 2012, an Amnesty International researcher was traveling to villages near the refinery to gather information from the affected communities when he was approached by two police officials who asked him about the names of the villages he had visited.

“The police officials said they had received calls from the ‘company’s intelligence’ stating that ‘persons belonging to foreign organizations are trying to spread false propaganda against the plans for the mine and refinery’s expansion’. During the encounter, the police officials received telephone calls which they said were from the Kalahandi district superintendent of police, Sudha Singh, and the ‘company’s intelligence’. The police cautioned Amnesty International against visiting the Niyamgiri hills and meeting the Dongria Kondh community. The police asserted that the hills were being frequented by Maoists who had, in March 2012, abducted two Italian tourists and held them hostage for about a month before releasing them in exchange for the release, from prison, of their jailed colleagues. The police said the Orissa authorities had issued orders banning ‘outsiders’ from visiting the hills.”

(Amnesty International, 2012)

Further incidents between the CRPF and Niyamgiri villagers also occurred in 2013 and in June 2013 CRPF soldiers shot on a group of Dongria Kondh adults and children who had been bathing in a stream. In a letter to the Human Rights Commission in Orissa’s capital, Bhubaneswar (Foil Vedanta, 2013) activists cite one of the victims:

“This is an assault on our very lives. The CRPF has no right to shoot at us without any provocation. Villagers bathing in a stream are not Maoists. Little children are not Maoists. These are our mountains, our forests, our land. Because of the CRPF, today, we cannot roam around freely in our own area. We do not feel safe anymore, we have to live in fear and insecurity. Our lives do not matter to the state, they can kill us whenever or wherever.”

(Duku Jakesika, June 2013)

In another incident, a group of Dongria women were held up and questioned, one of them was video recorded while she reported the encounter:

“Few days back we were gathering forest products near our village. At that time so many armed forces arrived and they pointed guns at us and surrounded us. They started asking ‘Where is Lada?’ [meaning tribal leader Lado Sikaka] ‘Where have you hidden the Maoists? Where have you hidden the weapons? Why are you opposing mining?’ Someone from behind yelled ‘If you resist the mining you will be killed like dogs’.”

(Anonymous, cited by Foil Vedanta5, 2013)

This renewed CRPF pressure came at a time where local villagers were asked by the Indian government to hold a referendum on mining in Niyamgiri. At one of these referendums, the formerly imprisoned Lado Sikaka publicly demanded the government to withdraw the police forces from the mountains:

5 www.foilvedanta.org (last accessed 22.11.2015)
“Why do the police, armed force destroy our fields and crops in the name of combing [for] Maoists? Why are they entering our territory? Withdraw them immediately.”

(Lado Sikaka, August 2013)

Especially on Indian NGOs and international ones with physical offices in India had to be afraid to be shut down for political activities or being associated with Maoists. According to an activist blogger, in Jharkhand, Orissa’s neighboring state, numerous NGOs had been shut down in 2010 “as sympathizers of the Naxalites” without clarifying the meaning of this term and creating a fear among NGO staff that any protest against government or mining activities in the Red Corridor would be treated as Naxalite activity.

“NGOs are afraid of working directly on mining. Because government people they are harassing them, they will threaten that their license will be taken away. […] In many areas they would say those people are Maoist when they raise their voice for democracy. That is a difficult thing to work with. We face problems in that we have so many organizations we want to work with but that fear this kind of harassment.”

(International NGO staff, Bhubaneswar, December 2008)

“Those [NGOs] who even want to come to the forefront but they cannot come, because they are the creature of the statutes, the government statute. So they cannot say ‘Yes, I want to oppose the policy of the government’. Then their foreign funds will be stopped. That has happened.”

(Delhi activist, January 2009)

The fear of being shut down as a Maoist sympathizer even resulted in ruptures within the anti-Vedanta movement when it was channeled into an overly strong motivation to distance oneself from the grassroots resistance. Asked about the annual protest meeting on top of Niyam Dongar in spring 2010, a local staff of one of the international NGOs involved in the anti-Vedanta mobilization was clearly uneasy and argued that her organization had “certainly not been part of it”. In her fear of being associated with anti-government activities, she even accused the local organizers of Maoist connections:

“I have heard some people say that it was done by Naxals. […] I just keep out of all this […] and the government of India is very strict on us. See, all this violence and things like that… I feel it doesn't help because the state can right now install a few platoons of police and nobody will be able to move out of that place and which will be a miserable condition for the tribal people and for especially women and children. We have seen what is happening in Dantewara, Chhattisgarh, what's happening in Koraput now. We don't want the same thing in Niyamgiri.”

(International NGO staff, Bhubaneswar, March 2010)

However, members of the protest movement were clear about their difference from the Maoist insurgents. In spring 2013 when the gram sabhas (village votes) were being held for the affected villages to decide whether they want mining or not, Maoist rebels tried to prevent these democratic activities from happening. However, social movement
organizations from the national advocacy network organized a mass event in May to motivate people to attend the votes:

“This democratic mass movement had more impact on tribals of the area and the tribals realized that Maoist stance in relation to Niyamgiri agitation was not in favour of the interests of the localites.”

(State spokesperson of CPI-ML (New Democracy) in The Hindu, 2013)

5.8 Discussion

The extractive industries are notorious for long standing and often violent conflicts about the set-up and running of their high-impact projects. The struggle around the Niyamgiri mining and refinery project is only one among many similar cases around the world (Banerjee & Yousfi, 2014). On both sides of such struggles, conflict parties form alliances, build chains of influence and engage in mobilization and counter-mobilization activities (Kraemer et al. 2013; Zietsma & Winn, 2008). Most of the work in management and organization studies on conflict between corporations and their opponents, however, focuses on stakeholder attempts to influence the corporation. Moreover, studies of framing contests between corporations and their opponents have so far paid more attention to legitimacy attacks on the corporation. Counter-attacks on the legitimacy of protesters are hardly examined (but see Erkama & Vaara, 2010; Shriver et al. 2012, for exceptions). Most studies also largely ignore the role of the wider alliance of supportive project stakeholders that, similarly to the movement against the corporation, can extend from the local until the (trans-) national level in such framing contests.

Therefore, adding to earlier work on the discursive defense of corporate projects (Erkama & Vaara, 2010), I contribute to the literature with a detailed theorization of delegitimation through adversarial framing. Based on the literature on framing contests, I zoomed in on legitimacy attacks on opponents through adversarial framing as a specific tactic that is usually employed when framing and counter-framing of the issue is unsuccessful. Based on a review of studies that covered how government and corporate elites defended their position through attacks on protesters’ legitimacy, I identified and theorized two master frames: the outsider and criminal master frame. I discussed their diagnostic, prognostic and motivational elements (Benford & Snow, 2000) as well as their potential effects on the targets of such framing. I thereby provide a terminology and
interpretation template for future studies of corporate framing of resistance against their operations.

I also hoped to identify these two, and potentially other, master frames in my case study of the conflict around the Niyamgiri project in which I examined the reactions to community mobilization against the mine. My empirical material covers the adversarial framing of a range of supportive stakeholders over a timeframe of several years at the height of the transnational protest against the project. I also provide a short narrative to illustrate the effects of such framing for the grassroots social movement and its supporters.

I will first discuss how mine supporters employed both master frames to discredit protest against the Niyamgiri project before I examine how they were adapted to the Indian context. I then discuss the implications of my findings for the stakeholder and framing literature, pointing to opportunities for future research. Finally, I return to the specific context in which this study was placed and discuss the broader implications of my findings.

5.8.1 The outsider frame

Vedanta's managers and other supporters of the mine and refinery project heavily relied on the outsider frame to blame foreign NGOs and external activists for stirring up the tribal people of Niyamgiri. They argued that the local resistance movement would not exist if it was not for external influence-taking. The conception of 'outsiders' seemed to include national-level activists, as well as international NGOs and supporters of the anti-mining struggle. The outsider frame not only denies local actors their agency but is also grounded in stereotypes about tribal people as 'primitive' and 'backwards' and unable to understand the implications of a large industrial project. Moreover, by blaming the resistance on outside instigators, proponents of the venture entirely discounted local grievances and motivations for protest (Simmel, 1908/1971, Wekerle & Jackson, 2005) and allowed managers to ignore the large numbers of protesting people and villages in Niyamgiri. The day-to-day negative experiences of many of the affected people in the refinery region (see e.g. Amnesty International 2010, 2012) and legitimate worries of the Dongria Kondh about the impact of the mine on their ability to live their normal lives were entirely ignored as potential legitimate causes of the protest.

While it cannot be denied that external actors, ranging from individual supporters and activists to networks and organizations such as political parties and national and
international non-profits that were part of the national or transnational advocacy network (Kraemer et al., 2013) were important for the Niyamgiri movement, several spontaneous and early mobilization activities in Niyamgiri (Padel & Das, 2012) suggest a strong grassroots opposition to the mine.

In line with our theoretical expectations, the motivational aspect of the outsider frame were demands towards the authorities to curb the influx of NGO staff and other foreigners into Niyamgiri - a clear attempt at counter-organizing with the goal to influence local attitudes about the mine.

5.8.2 The criminal frame

Managers often used terms like 'enemy' or 'nuisance makers' in reference to foreign activists who were accused of traveling on tourist visa, camping in the wild and disturbing the 'peace' of tribal people. Such statements can be interpreted as attempts at criminalization of the movement supporters. The argument about the risks to tribal lifestyles through foreign activists can be interpreted as a deflection of the earlier activist critique of the stationing of Central Reserve Police Forces in Niyamgiri who had feared negative influences on the cultural integrity and safety of the Dongria Kondh and speaks for how frames and counter-frames evolve in interaction (Snow, 2004). The criminal framing was used to justify demands to restrict activists’ free movement in the Niyamgiri hills and expel them from the country if they were found ‘guilty’ of abusing their visa status.

Another variant of the criminal frame were accusations that particular supporters of the movement were acting not on legitimate grounds but in their own self-interest. This was especially employed with reference to NGOs and politicians who were accused to act in a certain way in order to attract funding or votes. It has been argued that such frames that portray adversaries as dishonest and criminal can be seen as attempts at preventing the use of a ‘victimization’ frame by the movement (Knight & Greenberg, 2011). It appears that those who publicly have been established as immoral and criminal subjects will have a hard time portraying themselves as victims of repression and thus are unable to “appeal to and mobilize the attention, sympathies, and support of third parties” (Knight & Greenberg, 2011: 337).

Finally, the criminal master frame was also employed in its most radical variant when members of the resistance movement were orally framed and repressed as Maoist
guerrillas. Based on academic definitions of terrorism, Indian Maoists are not terrorists but a social movement that employs radical tactics. Terrorism implies violence against innocent targets that are not actually opposed but are hit based on opportunity or for their representativeness for or connection with a target group (Schmid & Jongman 1988 in Staun, 2010). Victims of terrorism are seen as 'message generators' in this definition and used to manipulate the actual target audience - beheadings of Westerners by the IS being an illustrative case in point here. Nevertheless, Maoists in India are treated with anti-terror legislation and our narrative further suggests that the anti-Maoist fight lends itself as a welcome tool to clear regions earmarked for industrial development projects from protesters. These findings make an important contribution to management studies that usually focus on win-win and solution-seeking tactics like CSR and communication strategies when corporations are faced with stakeholder protest (Laasonen, Fougère & Kourula, 2012). More violent means of local ordering (Hönke, 2012) however, are rarely analyzed. I argue that the outsider and criminal master frame together were used to delegitimize the movement in Niyamgiri and thereby create a certain level of public acceptance for the violent repression of protest (Della Porta & Fillieule, 2007; Welker, 2009).

The criminal framing makes use of the fact that boundary control is impossible in social movements like the one in Niyamgiri. It is impossible to say whether there are Maoists among those who appear for large scale protest events. The movement is therefore vulnerable to accusations of welcoming radical or other disreputable elements in their middle and susceptible to claims that these kinds of individuals are emblematic for the movement (Fine, 2006). Again, as argued above, the empirical material clearly speaks against the tendency to conflate the Niyamgiri movement with Maoists. In summer 2013 all 12 villages that were asked to cast their vote about the mine voted against it with high participation numbers. This is despite attempts by the Maoists to prevent this democratic decision-making process as a symbol of state power that were countered by the movement with a large march (padayatra) through the region to motivate locals to attend the vote. During this and similar events, movement members made every effort to distance the "democratic mass movement" from the activities of the Maoists.

In summary, it can be argued that the outsider frame helped proponents of the mine to successfully shift any discussion on the conflict away from potential real grievances to the 'trouble making' of external activists. The criminal frame on the other hand was employed
to justify the militarization of the Niyamgiri mountains and argue for the positive economic impacts of the project which was expected to reduce the alleged local support for the Maoists. By presenting protesters’ activities as outside of dominant norms, values and definitions (Suchman, 1995) by connecting it to outside instigation or terrorist activity, proponents of the project tried to discursively de-legitimize the anti-mining resistance and used their impression management tactics to influence public perceptions of opponents’ legitimacy (Elbsbach & Sutton, 1992; Fiss & Zajac, 2006; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). As a result, by framing the opposition as illegitimate and threatening to the public order, positive or meaningful engagement between corporations and the opposition is prevented. I will now turn to a discussion of how the master frames were adapted to the specific context of the case studied here.

5.8.3 Frame adaptation

While on the one hand master frames provide broader diagnostic categories, these are subject to frame translation and adaptation (Benford & Snow, 2000; Campbell, 2005). My findings show how context-specific individual action frames were constructed on the base of the two master frames through bricolage by actors with particular interests, norms and cognitive identities operating in this specific context (Campbell, 2005). The outsider and criminal master frames were adapted to resonate with the culturally and contextually influenced ‘sounding board’ (Williams, 2004) of audiences in Orissa/India. The major context-specific factors that clearly shaped how both master frames were adapted in the case studied here were first, Indian sensibilities about issues of colonialism and state sovereignty and, second, the national government's military offensive against the Maoists and the global discourse about the fight against terrorism which I will discuss in more detail below.

The outsider frame was tactically amplified through references to India's colonial past where British rulers had decided the fate of the country from afar. Making use of the Indian anti-colonial sentiment that has its roots in the Independence movement which united Indians under a strong national identity, proponents of the mine portrayed international NGOs and activists as foreign adversaries that were - again - trying to impose their will and perspectives on the Indian people ‘sitting miles away’, as one manager put it. The emancipatory anti-colonial discourse was also referenced in supporters' frames when they rejected foreign expert opinions and research. Repeatedly, interviewees emphasized the
qualification of Indian experts and rejected the findings and reports of outside observers such as the Norwegian Pension Fund's Council of Ethics or Amnesty International arguing that they lacked an understanding for Indian matters and ignored the activities of equally qualified Indian experts. The anti-colonial framing helped especially Vedanta's managers to shift attention away from the fact that Vedanta, as a company traded on the UK stock exchange, in fact is answerable to European institutions and the European public as well as to the local communities affected by its operations. In that sense, the involvement of especially UK-based NGOs in the social movement seems justified.

This frame adaptation benefits from an overall critical stance vis-a-vis foreign NGOs in India that are often criticized as being run by foreign money and to act in the interest of outside actors. Conspiracy theories about the impact of foreign NGOs on Indian matters were ubiquitous among interviewees supportive of Vedanta as well as among many activists. This shows how powerful this frame adaptation was in the specific context.

Second, I want to discuss the wider discursive and political opportunity structure around the fight against terrorism that influenced how the criminal master frame could be employed in the context studied (Kriesi, 2004; Polletta & Ho, 2006; Snow, 2004).

The global availability of the anti-terrorist discourse originates from the global war against terrorism following the 9/11 attacks (Chagankerian, 2013; Pokalova, 2010; Wekerle & Jackson, 2005). In India, the anti-Maoist offensive that was launched in 2006 provides a national equivalent. Since the fight against the Maoists was declared a national priority, the topic is strongly and regularly present in the mainstream media, rendering the framing of opponents as terrorists readily available in the Indian context. Together, political structures and alliances, the accessibility of the political system, and the reporting practices of the mass media shape public attitudes and create an "institutional common sense that defines some claims and ways of making claims as feasible, appropriate, even rational." (Polletta & Ho, 2006: 197). The radical tactics of the Maoists are condemned as 'terrorist activity' so as not to disturb the moral values of the wider society when violently repressing them. Likening anti-mining protesters to Maoist terrorists renders it publicly acceptable to treat them in a similar way. Our narrative on the effects of the anti-Maoists combing operations and arrests on the anti-mining movement in Niyamgiri shows how such geopolitical and national conditions and associated framing opportunities materialize in tangible effects in terms of local protest policing (Della Porta & Fillieule, 2004).
Likewise, these moral values of society are decisive for how controversial corporate activities are being legitimated and how particular corporate practices such as CSR are publicly constructed (Joutsenvirta 2011: 71; see also Kneip, 2013). There was a clear effort to frame corporations as key contributors to poverty alleviation and construct them as able to remedy the assumed causes of sympathy with the Maoists in remote regions like Niyamgiri. Again, this can be interpreted as an attempt to shift attention away from the negative consequences of large-scale minerals-based development to the assumed positive societal benefits which would outweigh negative impact on a few directly affected villagers.

5.8.4 Theoretical implications

It has long been argued in the field of social movement studies that movements around the world tend to take similar forms and use the same master frames to respond to the challenges of economic globalization because they face a globalized threat, comparable opportunity structures and transnational actors facilitate the diffusion of tactics (Giugni, 2002). This study aimed to contribute to a growing field of literature on framing contests and responses to protest by those who are attacked (Fine, 2006; Guérard, Bode & Gustafsson 2013; Knight & Greenberg, 2011) and argues that the same is true for the actors that face these globalized movements and their master frames. Where corporations and their supporters are faced with comparative threats, they are likely to draw on the same set of tactics and responses. I have focused on the master frames such actors employ to defend their projects and argue that the outsider and criminal master frame I identified in this paper will also be relevant in comparable conflicts around the world. Both frames are inclusive and flexible which are typical master frame characteristics (Benford & Snow, 2000). This means that they are easily adapted to specific contexts in order to resonate with local audiences and to describe a wide range of possible behaviors.

Framing is an important tool for opponents to discursively construct reality and can open up or limit political opportunities (Benford & Snow, 2000). While there might be Maoist activity in Niyamgiri and external support for the movement, so to say an undeniable 'reality', it is the effect of framing if anti-mining protest is widely considered as organized by left radicals or outside support for the movement shunned as external influence taking rather than a normal part of social movement formation in times free information flow from the local to the transnational level. This speaks for the power of
framing to discursive reality construction amidst given structures (Fiss & Hirsch, 2005). Corporations and other powerful supporters of contested industrial projects do have the power to considerably shape public opinion about anti-corporate protest. Their voice is heard by local supporters of a project who might draw on the frames promoted by corporations to justify violent action against protesters. This is where this paper contributes to the literature on CSR and stakeholder engagement.

The classic stakeholder literature identifies salience of certain stakeholders for corporations based on their characteristics, mostly power, urgency and legitimacy (Mitchell, Agle & Wood, 1997). It has also been shown how stakeholders take strategic action to increase their salience, for example through the construction of chains of influence (Zietsma & Winn, 2008). What has been, however, largely ignored so far are systematic discursive attacks on the legitimacy of stakeholders and the master frames that are behind them. My findings show that managers and other interested stakeholders through their adversarial framing were actively involved in the discursive construction of the ‘dangerous stakeholder’ (Mitchell, Agle & Wood, 1997) which the authors describe as powerful and with urgent claims but lacking legitimacy or societal acceptance. The authors further describe the coercive tactics used by dangerous stakeholders and list employee sabotage and some tactics of environmental activists in the same sentence with “religious or political terrorists using bombings, shootings, or kidnappings to call attention to their claims” (Mitchell, Agle & Wood, 1997: 877). The authors recommend that firms identify such stakeholders and take measures to prepare for their actions while denying them any form of acknowledgement so as not to encourage similar behavior. There is no mention, however, of the possibility that managers and other stakeholders might be involved in discursive attacks on stakeholder legitimacy and that this might actually result in the choice of more radical tactics to regain salience.

I also contribute to the literature through my emphasis on the role also of other pro-project stakeholders. The narrative and quotes show the important role of local police and pro-corporate community members or local business men in social movement repression. Local actors who stand to benefit from a contested corporate project might not own a powerful voice themselves to attack the legitimacy of protesters but do contribute to the discourse, and, more importantly, seem to draw on discursive templates provided by corporate and government elites to justify repressive and violent activities against movement actors.
The implication of this is simple: corporate social responsibility is not enough if corporate managers at the same time contribute to a discourse that has real and harmful effects on grassroots movement members. Currently, it seems that Vedanta has decoupled their CSR from what I would call their 'discursive responsibility' - the responsibility to not contribute to violence by sponsoring powerful frames that delegitimize large parts of their local community stakeholders and provide legitimizing templates for violent local actors. It has been argued that corporations frame the environment for their employees (Kaplan, 2008). I would argue that they also frame it for other project stakeholders like local business owners, community members hoping for employment and others that hope to benefit from the establishment of the mine. Given the emblematic nature of the Niyamgiri conflict and the high media attention, I argue that press releases and public statements by managers and politicians that frame the resistance movement as criminal and/or caused by outsiders will not only have implications for the conflict at hand but rather provide templates for future discourses for actors in similar conflicts through the process of discursive institutionalization. Frames matter for public opinion formation and influence the attitudes and behaviors of audiences, especially when they are communicated by corporate or governmental elites (Chong & Druckman, 2007) that engage in framing with the goal to influence how other actors think about an issue (Scheufele & Scheufele, 2013). If “(multinational) corporations - and other private actors - are not just players within the game, but also and increasingly are taking part in creating and enforcing the global rules of the game” (van Oosterhout 2010: 257), what does the present case tell us about the rules Vedanta is contributing to set for multinationals operating in contexts of violent conflict between the state and its citizens? The high expectations towards corporations as key players in the creation of peace and economic stability in conflict settings (Davis, 2013; Haufler, 2010; Kolk & Lenfant, 2012; Oetzel, Getz & Ladek, 2007) that are also reflected in the Indian government's anti-Maoist policy are questioned by my findings that connect corporate actors to frames that contribute to conflict at the local level. More research needs to be done on the connection between elite frames of protest and the emergence and activities of grassroots astroturf or counter-movement activities (see Shriver et al., 2012 for an overview). While corporate managers usually claim to be unrelated to local eruptions of violence in which anti-corporate activists are threatened and even killed, others have argued that such grassroots activities are just manifestations of elite ‘discursive obstruction’ (Shriver et al., 2012). Future research could try to link such findings to critical
discussions of the meaning and nature of corporate social responsibility (Banerjee, 2008). Before discussing further ideas for future research on this topic, I now examine the practical implications of my findings.

5.8.5 Practical implications

My goal was not only to contribute to the theory on delegitimation through adversarial framing but also to point to the effects of such delegitimation for anti-corporate movements. The narrative connects the framing of the Niyamgiri movement as supported by outsiders and run with the involvement of criminals or terrorists to the legitimization of two forms of movement repression: overt violent action against 'outsiders' and the control of 'terrorists' by national level forces. Armed police forces created an atmosphere of fear among locals through search operations, surveillance, random arrests, and firing of bullets into the air and on people. According to activists, normal community life in Niyamgiri was severely hampered as a result which put an additional strain on the already distressed local population. Also international social movement activists and NGO members were affected by repression, albeit less strongly.

While company officials claimed to wait impartially for a solution to the conflict, a closer examination of the empirical material lends itself to an alternative interpretation. Clear parallels emerge from our narrative: managers’ outsider and criminal framing and the publicly expressed wish for curbing the activities of outside instigators coincides with the actual repression of NGOs and attacks on local activists by local authorities and more radical local groups supportive of mining. I argue that managers' framing of the resistance provided legitimation and templates to violent pro-company grassroots groups and encouraged them to take action. The discourse and framing of managers and high ranking government officials is especially influential as it is more likely taken up by the mass media (Chong & Druckman, 2007) to publicly justify the overt control of protest and also provides framing templates and legitimation for violence by local pro mining groups. It moreover seems that direct logistic support was given by Vedanta to pro-corporate groups and the military that resulted in violence against movement members. This is consistent with other findings from comparable cases in India that connect mining companies to the activities of corporate-sponsored militia to clear land for mineral exploitation and even report the corporate sponsoring of Maoist rebels for the same effect (Miklian 2012). The extension of the anti-Maoist military operations to curb local movement activity in
Niyamgiri also created fears in other protest regions. After large sections of the Saranda forest had been leased to several mining companies against the will of the local population, an observer explained the “eerie silence” in the tribal villages: “To protest would be at the risk of being called a Maoist.” (Bera, 2012).

In summary, even though managers denied involvement in violent activities, their framing of events can be related to grassroots movement repression by other supportive actors. My findings therefore contribute to claims that framing paves the way for violent repression of peaceful movements (Shriver et al., 2012). Especially in explosive contexts like Niyamgiri, where frustrations with past and current politics and the wish for emancipation from quasi-feudal landholding patterns in tribal regions clashes with the minerals-driven developmental dreams of governments and the hybris of multinational corporations to be able to deliver to these the terrorist frame is a powerful tool to move the control of social movements from the local to the national level, from the police to the military.

An open question remains whether this clash contributes to movement radicalization. Attempts at explaining why people in the Red Corridor sympathize with the Maoists do cite atrocities committed during industrialization next to other economic and political reasons (Miklian, 2012). Our findings support the idea that being identified as a Maoist or sympathizer is a severe threat to individuals, families and entire villages in the states of the Red Corridor. Especially in the course of so-called ‘combing operations,’ villagers are beaten, arbitrarily arrested and detained, tortured and sometimes killed, women sexually abused, entire villages burnt down, and crops destroyed {Kashyap 2008}. Given such atrocities, many Maoist recruits are motivated by a desire for revenge or justice after experiencing violence by police or armed forces, often in the context of the takeover of land for the establishment of mining or other industrial ventures (Padel, 2014). It is the lack of de facto citizen rights and voice of affected communities to influence political decisions that affect their lives (Banerjee, 2011) that are a key motivator for sympathy with the Maoists who claim to revise caste, gender and quasi-feudal relationships that cause widespread exploitation of the rural population and seem to provide a way out of injustice, corruption and the growing socio-economic gap between urban elites and the rural population result in alienation from traditional politics (Guha, 2007; Shah & Pettigrew, 2009). Additionally, a recent ideological shift among the former elite Maoist militia seems to have increased its grassroots and mass orientation through an emphasis on social justice.
and the shared grievances of India’s poor as a uniting force (Harriss, 2011; Mahadevan, 2012). Although criticized as a benign mask behind which the rebels continue to follow their ultimate goal of seizing state power through a people’s war (Pradhan, 2009), this re-focussing on mass organization around a pro-poor participatory development frame together with the tangible security and development benefits for poor communities in Maoist ‘liberated zones’ (Roy, 2009) seems to result in a new closeness between Maoists and social movements against large-scale industrial projects that mobilize large sections of the rural Indian population whose livelihoods are threatened (Shah & Pettigrew, 2009). It is, however, also clear that Maoists resist mining ventures out of their own strategic motivations in order to strengthen their ranks (Padel, 2014: 7) and counteract infrastructure development that threatens their remote hideouts. It appears that the Maoists do not oppose mining per se as they have supported mineral exploitation in other places and depend on the mining industry for access to explosives and as a source of finance (Miklian, 2012; Padel, 2014).

Confounding local resistance movements with Maoist rebels and applying the terrorism frame therefore seems counter-productive for several reasons. First, because of the direct negative effects of anti-Maoist militarization on the local population that is likely to result in increased sympathy for the Maoists and bears the potential of radicalization. While repression and the policing of protest have been shown to discourage the mainstream of peaceful protesters, a counter-effect can be observed for more radical and ideologically motivated segments of social movements (Della Porta, 1995). Repression might increase movement legitimacy and delivers templates for ‘injustice’ and ‘repressive state’ frames that strengthen the morale of already radical movement sections and are likely to result in “spirals of violent action-reaction” (Della Porta & Fillieule, 2004: 234; Jenkins, Jacobs & Agnone, 2003; Olzak & Olivier, 1998) rather than a solution of the conflict. Movement actors have realized the risk of the Maoist frame and actively counter it in their communication and discourse, however, as others have argued, unwanted support is hard to deflect and “An individual approved by communists is assumed to have sympathy with those who cheer.” (Fine, 2006: 414).

Second, applying an anti-terrorism discourse on social movements turns the conflict between mine opponents and supporters into one of national security where collective survival can only be assured by countering terrorism with violent means. Similar to war rhetoric, the conflict becomes one about winning rather than about finding a solution.
(Staun, 2010) and is thus highly unproductive. Persistent violent conflicts around separatist movements all over the world support the argument that the short term gains from framing such protest as terrorist, mainly public support, do not outweigh the long-term violence that is evoked (Pokalova, 2010).

The findings suggest a strong belief on behalf of managers and government officials in minerals-based development as a cure for poverty and also for pro-Maoist sentiments that were assumed to be a direct result of the poor living conditions in remote rural regions. The Vedanta leadership expected that their venture to be able to achieve what decades of state- and NGO-driven development efforts had not been able to: eliminate poverty in Niyamgiri, one of the poorest regions within one of the poorest among all Indian states and over 1.3 Million inhabitants. It is unclear whether or how Vedanta’s mining venture would be different from other large-scale mining activities in Orissa and neighboring states that have so far not led to the promised economic development across all segments of society and whose benefits traditionally passed by especially tribal and other disadvantaged groups (Actionaid, 2008; Bhushan, 2008). Even a brief examination of Vedanta’s CSR activities – be it lunch for child care centers or settlement agreements with affected communities – delivers enough reasons for skepticism (see e.g. Amnesty International 2010 & 2012 for a more detailed review). The child care centers that Vedanta co-manages with the government are one of its most promoted CSR measures. Observers have expressed doubts about their benefits, arguing that “Vedanta’s contribution is only peanuts, literally and figuratively both.” after finding that children received only flattened rice with ground peanuts – both of questionable nutritious value (Mohanty, 2011). Vedanta’s community settlements forbid signatory communities to criticize corporate activities now and in the future and demand cooperation in all aspects in exchange for CSR benefits and therefore seem to support paternalistic and quasi-feudal dependencies (Ramanathan, 2010) that motivate people to join the Maoists. Stakeholder engagement for Vedanta seems only possible with citizens that sign away their citizen rights.

It moreover seems unlikely that industrialization projects that are implemented by military means, even if they might generate economic gains for some, will contribute to more democratic and less radical sentiments among the population. Where the executive sides with corporations and appears unable - or unwilling - to distinguish members of local resistance movements from actual Maoists, little reduction of radical sentiments can be expected and accusations that the Indian government abuses its anti-Maoist offensive to
clear mineral rich land and forests from their inhabitants (Padel, 2014; Roy, 2009) will thrive. Other examples support such arguments and highlight that Niyamgiri is not a single case.

In 2011, the government intensified anti-Maoist operations in the then Maoist controlled Saranda forest at the borders of Jharkhand, Orissa and Chhattisgarh. Similarly to the events described in my narrative, CRPF forces were stationed in the region and combing operations conducted in order to drive out and arrest alleged Maoist rebels and discourage their local support base. After the successful end of the anti-Maoist operation, a regional development plan was launched that, according to Rural Development Minister Jairam Ramesh, was supposed to benefit the mainly tribal population through infrastructure development. Until summer 2013 nothing much happened in this regard until the news broke that 19 new plots within the forest had been licensed to Jindal and other iron ore mining companies (Goswami, 2013; Kumar, 2013). While the Minister had initially demanded “a gap of 10 years” to allow the local population to recover and develop the qualifications to benefit from future mining (Yadav, 2013), it appears that this period will be cut short considerably.

The last practical implication I want to discuss here is tensions within the movement itself that resulted from the adversarial framing of proponents of the Vedanta project. We have pointed to changing constellations and tensions within the anti-mining movement before (Kraemer et al., 2013) and it seems that these are amplified by the adversarial framing of the movement by its opponents. The outsider framing contributes to a widespread criticism of foreign NGOs as dominated by foreign interests that is also prevalent amongst some Indian activists. Added to this was the risk of being branded a Maoist supporter which posed an additional threat to NGOs that supported the Niyamgiri movement. My findings show that most likely due to fears of being shut down by the government, some NGO representatives felt that they had to distance themselves and their organization from the rest of the movement and painfully avoided any association with alleged Maoists. This is not surprising in a context where NGO legislation has been applied to repress critical civil society organizations (Kamat 2002). Mine proponents' adversarial framing thus potentially contributed to the deepening of pre-existing tensions and divisions within the movement. These findings also point to the need for a more nuanced perspective on the potential of transnational mobilization. It seems that the outsider adversarial frame is being applied in several countries around the world to deflect
resistance movements that are externally supported and that especially in countries with a colonial past it falls on fertile ground and has the potential to exacerbate conflicts within movements. This highlights once more the importance of existing national advocacy networks (Kraemer et al., 2013) and their role in developing a strong local base for resistance movements that cannot be dismissed as externally caused.

5.8.6 Limitations and future research

First of all, the main limitation of this study is its case-based nature that does not allow for generalizations beyond the Niyamgiri protest. I have argued above that there is reason to assume that the outsider and criminal master frame will be applied also in other contexts and the literature review above suggests the same. However, there is ample room for future studies to prove this assumption in different contexts and across a variety of contested corporate ventures and to theorize potential other master frames that I might have overlooked.

One of the contributions of this study was that it examined the adversarial framing of a wider group of mine supporters instead of only looking at the framing contest between the corporation and opposing stakeholders. While this is a first step towards a more full examination of conflicts around corporate projects, one of the main limitations of my study is a lack of attention to dynamics within this group of project supporters. Future studies should delve more deeply into this topic and examine whether there are differences in the type of master frame that particular groups (e.g. politicians vs. managers) typically draw on, what the interactions and diffusion processes (Benford & Snow, 2000; Campbell, 2005) are and how they are turned into core action frames (Derry & Waikar, 2008). With respect to interactions Earl (2006) for example argues that distant actors like politicians shape the conditions in which those at the front lines (e.g. the police) operate in for example setting the overall tone that either allows or condemns violent repression of social movements. In terms of diffusion, it would be interesting to examine how adversarial framing moves across sites within India and transnationally and to unpack in detail “what this process looks like” (Campbell, 2005). It would further be interesting examine in more detail whether particularly those movements that receive transnational support are the target of the outsider frame or whether it is equally applied to national level activists that come to support local movements.
It is very well possible that frames fail and do not yield the desired outcomes (Benford & Snow, 2000). One limitation of this study therefore is that I did not systematically connect adversarial framing to outcome variables such as the publicly perceived legitimacy of the movement or movement repression. The narrative suggests that there were considerable negative effects from Maoist framing for local communities and tribal activists and that also the outsider frame had an impact on attacks on the freedom of movement of NGO staff and foreign activists. Moreover, the framing activities of project supporters apparently were serious enough for social movement actors to react with distancing - one of five reframing tactics that have been theorized in social movement literature (Benford & Hunt, 2003). Members of the local movement and the supporting national advocacy network went at great length to distance the movement against Vedanta from Maoist activities and reject this dangerous label. However, future studies could link framing activities more directly to outcomes like public perceptions of the movement and potential impacts of criminal/terrorist frame on the acceptance of social movement repression. With respect to the general public’s perception of and solidarity towards a movement, it is assumed that the outsider and criminal framing can erode a movement’s cognitive legitimacy base by reducing its comprehensibility and taken-for-grantedness (Suchman, 1995). The existing social movement literature provides inspiration for how to study framing of anti-corporate protesters more broadly. For example, Cress & Snow’s (2000) qualitative comparative analysis of the impact that framing and other organizational and context factors have on outcome variables could be a great model for future studies of reactions to anti-corporate protest and their effects.

More attention should also be paid to the reframing processes in response to outsider and criminal framing. Future studies could also examine how exhaustive the outsider and criminal master frames are in terms of describing the framing of corporate actors and their supporters and under what conditions or in which contexts around the globe they are applied during framing contests between corporations and their stakeholders. Findings from the anti-globalization movement suggest that anti-corporate protest around the world is at risk of being repressed as left radicals also in other, comparable, contexts where the symbol of left radicalism is culturally available (Williams, 2004).

Of course, our findings could be dismissed as a single case, other reports from around Orissa and neighboring states, however, suggest differently. The POSCO plant as well as another bauxite mining project in the Gandhamardan mountains of Orissa also seem to face
a similar combination of criminalization and outsider framing (Miklian, 2012; Pradhan, 2013). Our goal was it to present a more nuanced perspective on the situation of grassroots activists that are sandwiched between the promises of radical left groups, the violence associated with the government’s anti-Maoist fight and the threat of losing their lands and livelihoods to mining corporations. The fact that the villagers of Niyamgiri - against the call of Maoists to boycott these - recently attended the village meetings to decide about the future of Vedanta’s mine, speaks for their willingness and ability to make use of democratic means to defend their rights if given the chance.
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

I will open this chapter with a summary of the papers presented in chapters three, four and five and then discuss them in more detail. Connecting the dots between the papers, I reason how the initial focus on CSR and international business, immanent in chapter three, shifted towards a more grassroots approach to studying resistance against corporations in chapters four and five. Then, I discuss the theoretical and practical conclusions of my work and suggest promising areas for future research.

I conclude this dissertation with an epilogue in chapter seven to update the interested reader about the current situation in Niyamgiri. Posing the question 'Now what?', I discuss a potential avenue for supporting distressed communities beyond transnational and translocal advocacy.

6.1 Summary

6.1.1 A license to operate for the extractive industries?

The first paper, A license to operate for the extractive industries? Operationalizing stakeholder thinking in international business, departs from a couple of emblematic examples of stakeholder protest and sabotage to highlight the power of stakeholders to influence the location decisions and economic success of extractive industry projects. Van Tulder and I argue that the traditional international business literature has largely ignored managers’ practical need to obtain a license to operate (LtO) that is evident from managerial discourse especially in this contested industry.

Our goal in the paper is twofold: First, we develop a more thorough theoretical concept based on practitioner notions of the LtO and a synthesis of the existing literature on the topic. Second, we discuss this multilevel LtO definition in the light of the existing international business literature and argue that traditional ideas about multinationals' need for local adaptation require updating, given the increased influence of local stakeholder protest.

Based on practitioner definitions of the LtO and existing literature we conceptualize the LtO on three interconnected albeit distinct levels: social/local, legal/national and societal/global and discuss these for the extractive industry. We distinguish the general level of
societal acceptance for EI operations that might be influenced by highly publicized disasters such as the Deepwater Horizon accident, from legal permissions for specific resource extraction projects granted by host country governments and the local acceptance of such operations by the affected communities. While these three levels would ideally all be positively aligned for a risk-free operating environment, in practice there often is a stark disconnect. This might mean that while there is strong governmental support for a mining project, the local communities might strongly resist it. Our multilevel conception of the LtO therefore helps to clarify the level at which a license has been granted or not.

In international business, the concepts of local responsiveness and embeddedness are widely used to describe how multinationals respond to the pressures they face when operating across different contexts. The integration-responsiveness grid (Ghoshal & Noria, 1989) maps firms and specific industries depending on their need for local responsiveness at subsidiary level on the one, and pressures for global integration and efficiency on the other axis. Drawing on the discussion around the LtO, we upgrade the local responsiveness axis to emphasize pressures for responsibility to local community demands. The pressure for local responsiveness has influenced strategic positioning and product development in industries like professional services and specific consumer goods that depend heavily on local context factors and regionally different tastes. While important, these considerations ignore other local pressures that emerge when corporations infringe on the land and resources of local communities with their operations. We show that, when mapped on such an integration - local responsibility grid, a different pattern emerges where the local license to operate is a central factor for some companies - especially those in the extractive business. The classic notion of the extractive industry as high in integration and low in responsiveness in the traditional I-R grid therefore belies the reality of local resistance and the need to respond to pressures that extractive firms face on the ground. When mapped on our integration - responsibility grid, a more nuanced consideration of highly invasive upstream extractive industry production (high need for local responsibility) on the one and downstream selling of e.g. petrol (low local responsibility) on the other hand emerges.

The paper thus highlights how traditional international business theories largely ignore local stakeholder pressures that have the potential to considerably affect the success of multinationals' operations. It also shows how industry practitioners have reacted to this with a discourse about the need to obtain a 'license to operate' which drives CSR activities in the extractive industry today. What this paper leaves unanswered, however, is how local
protest might gain a threatening relevance for the corporation. What are the grassroots interactions that result in (trans)local protest strong enough to extract acts of 'local responsiveness' from the corporation? What is the nature of these corporate responses in such a contested environment? The two papers that follow try to shed some light on these questions.

6.1.2 Conflict and astroturfing in Niyamgiri

In the second paper, *Conflict and astroturfing in Niyamgiri: The importance of national advocacy networks in anti-corporate movements*, published together with Gail Whiteman and Bobby Banerjee, we develop a process theory of interactions between local, national and international actors in transnational advocacy networks (TANs). Based on a narrative about the rise and defection of a young tribal man - a temporarily central figure in the mobilization against Vedanta’s mine - we highlight the often conflictual interactions among actors within TANs and point to the importance of national advocacy networks which we refer to as NANs.

Our findings show the heterogeneity of national level conditions under which social movements might seek transnational support. Based on our findings for the Indian context, with its strong civil society and long history of social movements (Ray & Katzenstein, 2005), we argue that under certain conditions transnational advocacy might be perceived as an additional avenue of support rather than the only option for social movements to influence power-holders. The traditional perception of TANs (Keck & Sikkink, 1998) does not account for such situations, which is why we suggest an extended model that captures the potential for a coexistence of national-level and transnational advocacy. This model also includes a larger diversity of actors than just domestic NGOs who are active in these NANs and involved in the establishment of TANs.

NAN activists approach international advocacy organizations for support and connect them to local movement actors. They provide logistic support and are active communicators and 'information hubs' where news about local events flow together, are cross-checked and turned into material that can also be used by transnational campaigners. Most importantly, NAN activists also work to achieve national policy change, for example by embedding individual local movements into the national social movement landscape and supporting them in taking legal action at the national level.
Our narrative and longitudinal study of the Niyamgiri movement show that NAN actors are more than actors in the 'periphery' of the world system (Smith, 2004) who are in need of support, know-how and leverage provided by transnational NGOs from the 'core' countries. We challenge such traditional perspectives on transnational mobilization and point to the complex and often conflictual interactions among local, national and transnational movement actors. Our examination of the meso-level interactions between NAN activists and international advocacy organizations over time challenges the idea of anti-corporate movements as a unified front opposing the corporation. We uncover a much more nuanced and complex picture of power play, collaboration, and conflict and contribute to a more critical appraisal of the interactions in and benefits of TANs (Bob, 2005; Holzscheiter, 2011; Jordan & van Tuijl, 2000; Rodrigues, 2011; Smith, 2004). We identify internationalization and localization as two central processes in transnational anti-corporate movements that recursively interact under the influence of a third central process, counter-movement activities by pro-mining actors. Both, internationalization and localization are characterized by the mechanisms of scale shift, brokerage, recruitment and publicity. For counter-organizing we identify and explain strategic adaptation, lobbying, elite co-optation and CSR/publicity as central mechanisms.

Mechanisms such as brokerage and elite co-optation/defection also by less organized individuals therefore can be seen as the microfoundation of transnational campaigns. The management and organization literature, however, almost exclusively focuses on broadly defined categories such as 'NGOs' or even more general 'stakeholders' when looking at the actors in and tactics of anti-corporate movements (den Hond & de Bakker, 2007; den Hond & de Bakker, 2012; Doh & Teegen, 2003; Yaziji & Doh, 2010). Our findings draw attention to the important role of loosely organized and networked individual activists without or with several organizational memberships in constructing and maintaining transnational and national level resistance networks. In doing so, we shift attention from the study of organizations and their tactics to the process of organizing and the idiosyncratic decisions and circumstances that influence it. Examples for such decisions and influences are the personal network of a UK citizen who lived and worked in Orissa that came handy when a local movement tried to gain international support or the decision of a young tribal leader, under the influence of pro-corporate individuals, to put his own education first rather than continuing to fight for his community. Such characteristics and individual decisions represent crucial nodes in the organizing process and future studies...
should pay more attention to the interactions and microdynamics that are crucial for the course and success of these movements.

Finally, our findings also show that corporations are not passive targets of anti-corporate mobilization. Counter-movement activities conducted by or in the name of the corporation can have a big influence on anti-corporate movements. Our narrative mainly illustrates corporate counter-mobilization through co-optation. Jika, a young tribal leader who, supported by national and local level activists, had played an important role in the Niyamgiri resistance movement as a community mobilizer, spokesperson and guide for national and foreign movement supporters was co-opted by Vedanta personnel and other movement supporters until he publicly announced his support for the mining venture in a youtube video. Other mechanisms like CSR/publicity, lobbying and strategic adaptation, as expressed for example in the increased use of youtube videos by Vedanta in response to activists' protest videos are only explored in passing and should be examined in more detail in future studies.

This second paper emphasizes the role of more and less organized corporate and non-corporate actors also in counter-mobilization. Much of the counter-organizing that happened in support of Vedanta’s mine was not directly authorized or ordered by Vedanta managers but happened within a more broadly defined pro-Vedanta counter-movement space that comprised Vedanta managers, local business men, co-opted community members and former resistance activists, and even local politicians and potentially some journalists. The third and final paper examines the discursive processes that create the precondition and discursive environment for these coalitions to form and to justify their activities.

### 6.1.3 Outside instigators and criminals

The final solo-authored paper in this dissertation, *Outside instigators and criminals: Legitimacy attacks on anti-corporate protesters through adversarial framing*, examines how supporters of the Niyamgiri mining project framed their adversaries.

I begin the paper by pointing to the diversity of public and private entities that might support a large scale industrial project such as the Niyamgiri mine and attached refinery (Aaltonen, 2013). While Aaltonen (2013) focused on how these entities try to establish the legitimacy of a project, Based on the literature on framing contests and adversarial framing (Benford & Snow, 2000; Guérard, Bode & Gustafsson, 2013; Kaplan, 2008), I highlight
the potential for using another strategy to push such a contested project ahead by weakening the resistance against it: legitimacy attacks on those who challenge the legitimacy of the project and argue that this is an understudied topic in the management and organization studies.

Based on the literature, I outline two master frames that seem to find widespread application across a range of movements in different locations: the outsider and the criminal master frame. These frames seem to be widely used by those in power to defend their position when they are under attack and can also be identified in the empirical material of discourse around the contested Niyamgiri mine. Moreover, given the context of the Indian government’s fight against Maoists in which the struggle about mining in Niyamgiri is set, it appears that the criminal master frame is extended to a terrorist frame that delegitimizes mining opponents by branding them as Maoists. This practice has serious implications for activists and communities in Niyamgiri as my narrative shows.

The paper again highlights the importance of corporate non-market strategies at the grassroots level (Walker, 2009, 2012) that we have already pointed to in chapter four. It contributes to the literature that examines discursive processes between corporations and their societal environment (Calton & Payne, 2003; Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003) in three ways. First by removing the corporate-centric perspective and developing a vocabulary for the way in which managers and other supporters of a corporate project frame their adversaries. Second, by broadening the view on a broader alliance of pro-corporate actors who discursively delegitimize anti-corporate protest. And, finally, by spelling out the effects that such adversarial framing has for its social movement targets. I also discuss whether such adversarial framing has the potential to contribute to the emergence of ‘dangerous stakeholders’ who lack legitimacy but possess power and urgency with negative consequences for community stakeholders and the corporation.

6.2 Discussion

Below, I jointly discuss the three papers of which the first one is a theoretical piece, written at a time when neither the emerging themes of the later two papers nor the methodological focus of the empirical part of this dissertation were clear. First (6.2.1), I apply the LtO concept to the case study of Vedanta in Niyamgiri and point to the transient nature of the concept that makes corporate claims to having (permanently) obtained the
LtO questionable. The multilevel concept of the LtO, however, is valuable in that it allows for a joint discussion of the interplay of local, national and global responsibilities that influence the local operations of multinational corporations. I then discuss three trends in section 6.2.2 that will only result in a higher need for extractive industry corporations to add local responsibilities to their internationalization plans. In the third section of the discussion (6.2.3), I take a more critical perspective and question the meaning of the LtO for the day-to-day decision making of managers in the extractive industry and highlight its theoretical limits. Sections four and five of this discussion return to chapters four and five, respectively, and draw a more detailed image of the grassroots processes underlying transnational advocacy as well as the organizing and counter-organizing between opponents and proponents of a contested corporate project.

6.2.1 A license to operate for Vedanta?

Vedanta's contested mine in Niyamgiri is a prime example for the kinds of conflicts that motivated the writing of chapter three on the license to operate. Practitioners in multinational enterprises and CSR professionals invented the LtO discourse as a reaction to the local pressures and transnational campaigns they were facing but the theoretical literature on international business strategy and influences on the location decisions of MNEs fell behind in terms of theorizing the stakeholder pressures that influence (re)location decisions, the financial viability of projects and the reputation of multinational operations.

The Vedanta case clearly shows the relevance of our multi-level conceptualization of the LtO. Albeit the legal license for operating a mine in Niyamgiri had long been granted to the corporation, it was unable to establish this mine for the lack of a local license to operate. Moreover, an international campaign had formed that promoted the Niyamgiri case to attack the overall legitimacy of extractive industry operations on indigenous peoples' ancestral land. Figure 13 below shows the application of our multilevel model to the Vedanta case and highlights the interrelations between the three levels as well as the order in which the different licenses became relevant in this particular case because they were granted to the company or challenged.
Our example points to the dynamic nature of the LtO and the importance of all three levels for the implementation of a local operation. In the end, Vedanta was unable to achieve an LtO at all levels at any point in time. Following strong civil society opposition in India and later also in the UK, as well as a law suit in the Indian Supreme Court, Vedanta lost the legal license it had initially been granted by the Orissa government. It appears that the perception of an LtO can only ever be a snapshot, a fragile state, easily interrupted at any point in time by challenges at the local, national or global level.

The transient nature of the LtO questions its usefulness for practitioners. Claims to having 'obtained' an LtO are inadequate and fail to grant legitimacy to a project contrary to the apparent hopes among practitioners. However, our attempt to focus attention on the local responsibilities and not only the local responsiveness of corporations is relevant and not only for the minerals and oil industry. Also other resource intensive or otherwise locally invasive industries like agriculture and food & beverage production have to navigate the challenges of governmental approval coupled with grassroots resistance against their invasive operations. The example of protests against Coca-Cola's plant in Kerala, India show how quickly a lack of local responsiveness can result in a threat to the local license to operate, as well as high financial and reputational costs. I will therefore discuss local responsibilities as a key challenge for extractive industry operations in more detail below.
6.2.2 Local responsibilities as a key challenge for extractive industry operations

Our second goal in chapter three was to expand the international business literature to pay attention to local factors other than culture and market preferences that influence localization decisions and the balance between global integration and local responsiveness. Traditionally, the extractive industry is seen as highly integrated with an emphasis on standard operations and products across the globe and little relevance of the local context in shaping operations (Ghoshal & Noria, 1989). We criticize this perspective, arguing that local responsibility should be added to the rather narrow consideration of the responsiveness to local markets.

While it is true that vertically integrated upstream oil and mining majors have little need to be responsive to local market needs, many examples show that their extractive operations are prone to fail if corporations do not take responsibility for their impacts on affected communities. Given the high business risk emanating from local resistance, especially in the extractive industry, and the resulting relevance of the license to operate discourse among practitioners, we argue that it is high time to also introduce the idea of local responsibility to the international business strategy literature.

Traditionally, extractive industry multinationals' localization decisions are based on the availability of natural resources and negotiations with host country governments (see Kraemer & van Tulder, 2007). We add the ability for exercising local responsibility to such considerations and draw on the LtO discourse to argue that managers have realized this need - at least rhetorically. We argue that embedding an extractive industry operation into the local context and safeguard operations by establishing good community relationships is a much needed capability that requires a higher level of local responsiveness than the traditional integration-responsiveness grid suggests.

Three trends support this argument. First, extractive industry corporations increasingly need to move into remote frontier zones that are often inhabited by indigenous peoples to find exploitable reserves (Coumans, 2008). In the past two decades, awareness about the negative impact of resource extraction on indigenous peoples has been growing. Activists and policymakers around the world foster the right of indigenous peoples to determine what happens on their ancestral land. And while many laws, such as the right to Free Prior Informed Consent to resource extraction granted by the Philippines' Constitution, currently lack proper implementation (e.g. Minter et al. 2012), a host of organized advocates is active to support individual communities and push for implementation. Moreover, given
the globalization of information and the activities of internationally networked activists, the likelihood that individual cases of local community resistance receive global attention and support is likely to rise.

Second, rising resource prices and new extraction techniques like fracking make it economically viable to exploit so far untapped reserves - also in the developed world. This has resulted in a new wave of local resistance movements against fracking but also against coal mining in countries like Germany, the US or the UK. These movements challenge the industry and the ruling parties mainly over environmental concerns and it is yet to be seen in how far they might connect to other local resistance movements worldwide to form a broad coalition against resource extraction that would further challenge the overall legitimacy (or global LtO) of this contested industry. What is clear, however, is that more broadly stakeholder sensitivity to environmental, social and ethical considerations has been growing (Du et al. 2011) and that, despite their claims to CSR, the extractive industry is at the receiving end of resistance emerging from this growing awareness locally and internationally.

The final trend is what Scherer & Palazzo (2011) call the emergence of 'political CSR' where corporations contribute to the provision of public goods and influence global regulation of the role of business in society. Especially in an already contested industry like the extractive sector that is operating in locales where nation states have little influence, do not provide basic services to the population, and where a law enforcement is weak, corporations cannot rely on the national rules of the game as a source of legitimacy. Given the overall erosion of pragmatic and cognitive legitimacy, so the authors argue, Suchman's (1995) third form of legitimacy, moral legitimacy, becomes more important. Moral legitimacy, "moral judgments about the corporation's output, procedures, structures, and leaders" is discursively constructed between the corporation and its "relevant publics" (Scherer and Palazzo, 2011: 916).

The above discussion suggests that multinational corporations in the mining and oil industry face many pressures for local responsibility and that the relevance of such responsibilities has been largely ignored in international business (but see Kolk & van Tulder, 2010). While national level influences on the CSR activities of multinational firms have been studied and compared extensively (see Fransen 2013 for an overview), we still know very little about how multinationals might negotiate tensions between the different contexts in which they operate (but see Pinkse, Kuss & Hoffmann, 2010) and whether and
how multinationals’ standardized codes of conduct and claims to CSR are applied on the ground in an attempt to establish moral legitimacy that Scherer & Palazzo (2011) discuss as a key ingredient of the license to operate.

Our multilevel conceptualization of the LtO is an attempt to start bringing together considerations about the legitimacy of contested industries like the extractive sector (global license), with the difficulty of complying with national level political economic structures and navigating negotiations with host country governments (national license), and finally the growing need for multinationals to establish the moral legitimacy of their operations among local community stakeholders and their international supporters (local license). Bringing together these three levels of engagement in one concept, we go beyond narrow managerial definitions of the LtO and present a starting point for a more fundamental discussion about the various responsibilities multinationals need to juggle when establishing local operations. However, this first paper can also be criticized as overly optimistic about the ability to establish a dialogue among equals between corporations and local stakeholders and too ignorant of the ideology shaping the knowledge and activities of corporations (Kuhn & Deetz, 2008) as I will discuss in more detail below.

6.2.3 A critical appraisal of the value of the LtO concept

Based on our multilevel LtO concept, one could argue that the ability to engage in community dialogue and achieve a certain level of local situatedness is a crucial strategic capability that can help 21st century extractive industry firms to obtain a competitive advantage (McWilliams & Siegel, 2011; Porter & Kramer, 2006). We depart from the corporate discourse about the need for a local license and, like other scholars before us (e.g. Calton & Payne, 2003; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011), take a willingness among corporate managers to engage in a 'dialogue among equals' with their stakeholders for granted. We do not explore alternative, less benign, ways of obtaining this competitive advantage outside of the LtO concept or the relevance actually attached to this LtO in day-to-day decision making and corporate practices on the ground.

For example, Calton and Payne (2003) argue that managers cannot refuse dialogue anymore when it comes to global concerns about human or labor rights and the environment. This might be true for some highly exposed Western multinationals like Unilever, who due to its massive impact, exposure, claims to responsibility and the public pressure it receives, cannot but participate in the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil. Next
to the fact that the relevance and impact of such high-level initiatives is debatable (Fransen & Kolk, 2007; Utting, 2002), as soon as we leave the level of global multi-stakeholder initiatives that involve the top 50 MNEs from the Western world, the prospects become even more bleak.

Extractive industry companies have repeatedly shown that local values, worldviews, needs and expectations are rather irrelevant for their daily practice. Where ExxonMobil imposes a narrow definition of CSR and shows no sign of attempting to come to a shared definition with community stakeholders (Conley & Williams, 2005), mining companies impose their definition of who belongs to the local community and perceptions of what community stakeholders are owed (Cragg & Greenbaum, 2002). Community expectations to procedural justice and the different worldviews of indigenous stakeholders are largely ignored (see e.g. Whiteman 2009, Mander & Tauli-Corpuz, 2006). The daily reality of extractive industry operations is miles apart from a theoretically discussed level playing field or the 'reflective managerial practice' that would grant moral legitimacy to community stakeholders (Calton & Payne, 2003; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011).

Moreover, the theoretical debate on these topics is skewed towards the Western multinational corporation. Also our conceptualization of the license to operate only makes sense in this context. Other corporations with large scale operations and similar challenges in terms of community relations, such as the many multinationals with their origins in emerging or developing economies that are often (partly) state-owned (such as China's big three: CNPC, SINOPEC, and CNOOC, Petronas from Malaysia, or Petrobras from Brazil) are less susceptible to reputation threats and attacks in the Western media and are supported by their governments in their negotiation with host countries. Our LtO model is therefore only applicable to a specific kind of multinational: the Western publicly traded multinational corporation and excludes other firms that have risen to global importance without finding the level of theoretical attention that their relevance would imply.

By disseminating the CSR discourse of Western multinationals about their need to obtain a LtO, we are also running the risk of contributing to the 'imperialism of a Western CSR discourse' that lets these multinationals appear superior versus their counterparts from developing/transition economies (Khan & Lund-Thomsen, 2011). However, studies on the local impact of CSR, however, show little difference between what Western multinationals achieve versus for example Chinese multinationals (Hilson, 2012; Pegg, 2012). Until now it seems that, independent of their country of origin, multinationals have not been able to
tackle the real governance and human rights challenges that many resource rich countries face (Banerjee, 2007; Pegg, 2012; Utting 2005). Elaborating theoretical concepts like the LtO within a traditional and largely uncritical CSR framework does therefore little to challenge the ideologies, interpretive schemata and 'imperatives' underlying actual corporate practice (Kuhn & Deetz, 2008).

This is exactly the critique I faced when I first arrived in the field and discussed my early theoretical work with Indian activists. They kept challenging me with two questions: 'Why take the pains of developing theory around something that does not create real positive impact for anyone on the ground?' and 'Where are the voices of your so-called stakeholders in all this theory?' These two simple questions challenged my initial conception of the research project and helped me to pay more attention to the doubts I experienced every time I was reading traditional academic work on CSR that for example examined the content of CSR reports.

As a result, the two empirical papers have a strong grassroots orientation and pay attention to the processes of organizing and framing and their effects for actors on the ground, rather than studying CSR codes of conduct, websites or reports in which natural resource companies speak about their alleged responsibilities vis-a-vis (imagined) communities. Departing from high-level theoretical discussions about an inherently managerial concept like the LtO, this dissertation project evolved into a study of the messy reality of organizing processes around a contested natural resource extraction project where the 'community' turned out to be a constantly changing translocal network. Focusing on the the perceptions and discourse of actors on both sides of the conflict, I was able to study the emergence, internationalization and re-localization of an anti-corporate resistance movement and the discourse and counter-organizing of project proponents. In doing so, I hope to provide a deeper insight into the challenges multinationals face on the ground, the complex nature of anti-corporate mobilization, and also shed some light on the discursive roots of social movement repression. In the following sections I discuss the two empirical papers (chapters four and five) in more detail.

6.2.4 Expanding our understanding of transnational anti-corporate advocacy

In chapter four, Kraemer, Whiteman & Banerjee highlight the agency and importance of a variety of more or less organized NAN actors in creating the networks and providing the local information and connections that are the precondition for transnational advocacy.
In doing so, we draw a picture of complex and often conflictual interactions in transnational advocacy networks that so far received little attention in the management and organization studies.

It appears that transnational networks often fail to deliver their "promises of empowerment" and often have unwanted consequences for local activists (Rodrigues, 2011: 3). Supporting such earlier work, the findings presented in this dissertation show the often complicated and changing relationships between local, national and international activists over time and point to the struggle between internationalization and localization of the movement in Niyamgiri. In the process of internationalization, the interests of domestic activists might be neglected or overshadowed by the needs of the fast-paced 'international advocacy apparatus'. Transnational advocacy directed at corporations depends on creating media awareness in their Western countries of origin where corporate shareholders and customers reside. Campaigns are thus tailored to fit the understanding and perceptions of this target audience which often means simplification of complex local political and social challenges and, sometimes, their outright misrepresentation (Mendelson & Glenn, 2002; Rodrigues, 2011). The random presentation of 'local spokespeople' to the Western media in London and the neglect of other similar struggles in various locations across the country are only two examples of this in the present case.

Many NAN actors were therefore torn between the hope for increased awareness and support from Western stakeholders on the one and the fear of misrepresentation and negative impacts of the transnational campaign on the cohesion and goals of the local movement on the other hand. As a result, domestic activists worked hard to (re-)localize the movement in several ways. First and foremost, they connected the struggle in Niyamgiri to a network of other past and present movements and Indian social movement organizations, transferred learnings, and created an exchange between key movement figures from different locations and linked the Niyamgiri struggle discursively to the fight of disadvantaged communities for land rights and participation in decision-making about natural resource and other large scale industrial projects on their land. This was an attempt to counteract the narrow representation of the Niyamgiri movement as the struggle of a 'noble savage-like' indigenous tribe for their livelihood that was prevalent in the Western media. Second, they tried to support the formation of a strong local movement leadership that could assure a reliable long-term mobilization of the Niyamgiri communities. Finally, activists supported the communities to take legal action against Vedanta at the local and
national level which ultimately resulted in the Supreme Court decision for local voting about the project that ended in its unanimous rejection.

Previous management and organization studies on anti-corporate mobilization fail to capture the tension between the internationalization and localization of anti-corporate movements and tend to present a too benign image of transnational mobilization that neither takes into account the complexity of actors and their interactions, nor the potential negative effects of transnational mobilization observed by authors from other fields (e.g. Mendelson & Glenn, 2002; Rodrigues, 2011). The work presented here expands our knowledge and thinking about transnational anti-corporate activism in several ways.

First, it expands the notion of the 'boomerang model' of transnational advocacy (Keck & Sikkink, 1998) as it has been applied to the context of anti-corporate mobilization (McAteer & Pulver, 2009; den Hond & de Bakker, 2012; Joutsenvirta, 2011). McAteer & Pulver (2009: 3) describe the 'corporate boomerang' as follows: "corporate-focused TANs emerge when local communities, living at points of production or extraction, are blocked in their efforts to influence the operating practices of a corporate subsidiary. Appeals to local corporate managers may fail because they are protected by local governments loath to challenge corporate practices and jeopardize the economic base of the locality." Den Hond & de Bakker (2012) extend these ideas further and distinguish three different types of TANs: the 'classic' case of mobilization against an individual corporation, the possible expansion of protest and tactics to other corporations in the same sector, and third, transnational protest against individual corporations with the ultimate goal of changing government behavior.

Based on our findings, I suggest a possible extension to these ideas about anti-corporate mobilization that emphasizes attention to a potentially existing and effective national level advocacy network as I encountered it in the case studied here. First of all, not all local channels to influence a subsidiary were blocked. Unlike workers in sweatshops (den Hond, de Bakker & de Haan, 2010), the local communities threatened by the Niyamgiri mine were able to apply local tactics with a material impact on the firm such as local mass protests and road blockades. These were complemented by national level activities like litigation and protests in Delhi and, finally, by transnational advocacy that targeted the corporate headquarters in London. Many cases of anti-corporate mobilization will happen in local and national contexts that are similar to the one studied here, where a strong NAN can provide support to local activists. Management and organization studies of anti-
corporate mobilization therefore need to pay more attention to existing mobilization structures and the ways in which transnational advocacy efforts can complement national-level activism if we want to better understand the diversity of anti-corporate movements and the dynamics within them (see 6.2.5).

Second, this conception of TANs as a potentially complementary support mechanism that 'docks on' to an existing NAN for a specific campaign has implications for notions of agency and power relations within TANs that have so far largely been ignored by management and organization studies. The idea of the traditional boomerang model that portrays national level activists as recipients of resources and support from their Western counterparts (Keck & Sikkink, 1998) has been unquestioningly taken over by management and organization scholars who applied this model to anti-corporate movements. My findings challenge this view and draw a different image where increased attention is paid to the agency and importance of NAN activists who are not only able to create leverage for local movements but also attempt to orchestrate and regulate transnational advocacy efforts by challenging and counteracting the representations and activities of TAN activists.

Third and finally, my findings point to the establishment of a translocal resistance network (Banerjee, 2011) by NAN activists. Translocal resistance is different from the transnational advocacy model in that it proclaims the rootedness of individual movements in their local context while at the same time emphasizing the establishment of lateral connections between such locally rooted movements across the globe. Where the traditional boomerang model stands for transnational advocacy, the extension for including NANs suggested above is exemplary for translocal movements. Based on my findings, I argue that these translocal movements are based on personal eye-level relationships between individual activists, who might be independent or part of an international NGO. In that they go beyond the transactional relationships that are typical for TANs, where local activists 'trade' grassroots information and logistic support for the international awareness and support created by international NGOs. These traditional relationships surfaced in the present case for example when NGO staff from London traveled to Niyamgiri or sent film teams there without consulting with local activists and often resulted in confusion, disappointment or anger among Indian activists. NAN activists, however, were happier to interact with NGO members and other activists who were looking to strengthen the broader translocal coalition against minerals-based development that was building connections.
between the movement in Niyamgiri and other local movements against Vedanta in Zambia and South Africa.

It has been argued that some conflicts between corporations and local stakeholders cannot be analyzed as dyadic conflicts because they really are extensions of already existing conflicts (den Hond, de Bakker & de Haan, 2010). My findings support such ideas and point to the processes by which such extensions are being actively created by activists that operate at the national and translocal level.

6.2.5 Adversarial framing as potentially harmful corporate communicative practice

Social movements like the one studied here try to influence the discourse and values in a society and are part of a network of discourses that multinational corporations are embedded in (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). They compete with a host of private and public actors that are supportive of a certain corporate activity (Aaltonen, 2013) in a framing contest (Benford & Hunt, 2003) that mainly is about explaining what is at stake and thereby mobilizing people to action. The construction of frames that provide interpretive templates and meaning to actions is an essential component of organizing around contested corporate projects. And while we know a lot about how movements frame issues (e.g. Carroll & Ratner, 1996; Snow, 2004) the “resistance of those under fire has been mainly overlooked” (Guérard, Bode & Gustafsson, 2013: 782), especially in management and organization studies.

Chapter five exposes the interpretive schemata applied by those in power to make sense of resistance and delegitimize the threatening alternative vision of reality propagated by protesters. It also examines the implications are for protesters and the communities that happen to be caught in the conflict. I show how the outsider and criminal master frames are adapted to the specific context studied here. Given that framing represents collective interpretations at the micro level (Goffman, 1974) and frames are used as tools for mobilization (Snow, 2004), frames and framing are the building blocks for macro-level institutionalized conventions (Gray, Purdy & Ansari, 2015). How adversaries are framed can therefore have far-reaching implications for their public perception and the perception of challenges to the corporate-driven and rapid industrialization-based development model that many governments are supporting. A normalization of repression of protest against this model might be the result.
Now what is the role of the corporation in all this? The expanding responsibilities of corporations bear the risk that companies "are criticized for what others have done" (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011: 913). On the one hand, a focus on process and organizing around contested corporate projects requires a more differentiated perspective than simply blaming 'the corporation' for the negative impact of adversarial framing. On the other hand, corporate and governmental elites can amplify and strategically deploy frames (Gray, Purdy & Ansari, 2015; Chong & Druckman, 2007; Scheufele & Scheufele, 2013) which means that the statements of corporate managers or high government officials might be intentional. In any case, they have the potential to permeate and can create far-reaching consequences if they are taken up by other pro-corporate actors who apply these frames to justify attacks and criminal activities as when anti-mining protestors are beaten up by pro-mining youths with cricket bats sponsored by the corporation (Kraemer, Whiteman & Banerjee, 2013). The corporation might have no control over such activities but does that mean it cannot be held responsible?

Below, I will first point to directions for future research that follow from this discussion before I focus on the practical implications of this work.

6.3 Directions for Future Research

6.3.1 Process studies of organizing and action nets

The idea of TANs and NANs is only an incomplete representation of the organizing processes underlying their formation. With our narrative and analysis in chapter four, we already point to the fluid nature of organizing around the contested Niyamgiri mine. This notion of organizing is being been taken one step further by Hernes (2008) and Czarniawska (2008).

A focus on the organizing processes around contested corporate projects challenges much of the existing literature on contested corporate activity in two ways. First, it highlights that corporations do not confront some static 'opposition' that can easily be captured with the tools of stakeholder identification and salience (e.g. Mitchell, Agle & Wood 1997). The findings presented here show the complex and constantly evolving conglomerate of actors at the local, national and international level that create the perception of opposition among corporate managers. Actors such as NANs and TANs that
target corporate activities in a specific location result over time from the 'relating' that they do, the "continuous work of connecting and disconnecting in a fluctuating reality" (Hernes, 2008: xv, citing Cooper 1981). These actors might have a different constituency and relationship with each other at any point in time and cannot be sufficiently described with traditional stakeholder labels.

The entities observed in chapter four - NAN, TAN, and 'the corporation' - are tangled (Hernes, 2008) which means that they emerge and co-evolve in interaction and, through their relating, form an action net (Czarniawska, 2008). The label of who is organizing and who is counter-organizing seems arbitrary in this context where all entities engage in activities like recruiting, mobilizing, financing, educating, popularizing, and attacking. What is important in this perspective, however, are the interpretive templates chosen by individuals and groups as they engage in these actions (Czarniawska, 2008).

Future work in the field of stakeholder management should pay more attention to this transience of alliances and identities and focus on the study of the unifying interpretive templates that constitute 'actors' through activities rather than fixed identities. Traditional descriptive stakeholder labels such as 'the community' thus become worthless if they do not qualify what the community stands for and what its demands are at a certain point in time and how these demands might change in interaction with other (groups of) actors such as corporations and their supporters or international NGOs and their local representatives. Also Aaltonen (2013) has pointed to the conglomerate of public and private entities and individuals that might support large-scale industry projects although they might not share many characteristics otherwise.

Future studies should examine in more detail the activities within such action nets as they emerge around contested corporate projects rather than trying to categorize corporate stakeholders. Haug (2013) for example focuses on meetings as a central element of the process of social movement organizing and mobilizing. Other aspects, however, such as recruitment, education or the establishment of linkages between different movements that I have touched upon in chapter four are so far understudied.

The formation of translocal movements is an interesting case in point when it comes to examining organizing processes. How are these translocal connections forged and how do corporations defend themselves against more and more interconnected localized yet internationally networked movements? Indian and UK activists in the present case were working hard to build a broad alliance against Vedanta by connecting the struggle in
Niyangiri to local movements in Zambia, Trinidad and Tobago and South Africa where the corporation also had operations. Examining these translocal connections around the different operative sites of an individual corporation would add a meso-level perspective to existing studies looking either at movements against individual corporations (e.g. McAteer & Pulver, 2009; Joutsenvirta, 2011) or industry-level mobilization (den Hond, de Bakker & de Haan, 2010).

6.3.2 Managerial discourse

The social connection model of responsibility (Young, 2008) highlights the role of corporations in creating and/or maintaining the structural conditions that benefit them. Next to deliberate acts like negotiations with host governments or the membership in CSR initiatives to prevent attention to the underlying structural disparities that cause global inequality, managerial discourse is an important, yet so far understudied, tool by which corporations influence the conditions in which they operate.

Kuhn and Deetz (2008) also point to the need to pay more attention to communication processes and practices within corporations if we want to take the critique of CSR beyond ideology critique. To this I would add the need to look for communication processes and practices around contested corporate projects to include also other entities that might support a corporate project at a given point in time. The authors call for an "enriched theory of communication" (Kuhn & Deetz, 2008: 190) that "focuses on understanding the cultural politics of experience and processes of domination in interaction, has a strong conception of 'other' and 'otherness', and is grounded in conflict theories". The case studied in this dissertation highlights the abysmal distance between progressive academic ideas and the grassroots reality of corporate practice and communication where project opponents are perceived as 'troublemakers' 'mischief mongers' or 'terrorists'. Future studies should work to close this gap between academic discourse and grassroots practice.

6.3.3 The effects of 'protest as terrorism' and the role of corporations in movement repression

Given recent arguments about the potential of frames to get amplified and reified into institutionalized conventions (Gray, Purdy & Ansari, 2015), future studies could also take interest in the framing of activists as terrorists and whether this frame is in the process of becoming a generalized perception of protest as an illegal disruption of the 'normal' order.
It appears that since the US 'War on terror' in the early 2000s an amplification of the terrorist frame is happening in terms of scope and regularity/frequency (Gray, Purdy & Ansari, 2015). Starting with the heavy policing of the anti-globalization protests in the last years, the treatment of anti-corporate protest has become rougher, also in the so-called developed world. Although there are no killings of activists involved, the repression of anti-corporate and protest against the extractive industry in Germany and the framing of the resistance is comparable to that described in chapter five. With a new wave of anti-fracking protests around the world emerging, the study of corporate framing of protest is a promising area for future research as is the role of corporations in policing such protest.

Moreover, framing has an impact on social movements by considerably shaping their 'cultural opportunity structure' (Benford & Snow, 2000). A hostile public opinion reduces movements' room for maneuver in that it impedes their ability to recruit new members and find public support (Williams, 2004). We know too little about the impact of movement criminalization on future mobilization and the connection to a potential radicalization of movements as a reaction to narrowing opportunity structures and increasing repression (but see Della Porta & Fillieule, 2004).

6.3.4 The mining industry as an 'extreme case' to examine stakeholder tactics

More studies of mobilization against the mining industry would be needed to uncover differences in such resistance as compared to protest targeted at big customer brands from the apparel, electronics and oil industry (e.g. Khan, Munir & Wilmott 2007; den Hond & de Bakker, 2012; Zyglidopoulos, 2002). Much of the mining industry (with a few exceptions like De Beers) and also many oil companies are less receptive to the protest of individual customers through so-called 'buycotts' and attacks on their brand image. Some of the mechanisms of the corporate boomerang model do not take effect for these industries as they also do not for state-owned corporations or those from developing or transition countries. We know far too little about whether and how the activities of such companies can be controlled and what can be done to advance their social and environmental practices on the ground.

The mining industry, however, depends on Institutional investors for finance and we should examine in more detail the power and influence of institutions such as the ethics committee of the Norwegian Pension Fund, whose decisions also influence other institutional shareholders and can therefore be crucial in reigning powerful corporations.
Another interesting avenue for further research is the effectiveness of local mobilization in creating a material impact on the firm. Such tactics are often ignored in studies of transnational and translocal resistance that largely focus on elite and mass participation tactics with a symbolic or material impact on corporations (e.g. den Hond, de Bakker & de Haan, 2010). However, such local impacts can be highly effective in an industry such as the mining industry that is highly dependent on particular locations where natural resources are found and where the most relevant local stakeholders are not employees like in the apparel industry but surrounding communities who are freer to organize protests and blockades that have the potential to bring entire operations to a standstill with high financial losses for affected corporations (Franks, 2014). Some attention has been paid in other fields to the impact that the costs of protest have for movement targets' willingness to change (Luders, 2006) but we know too little about how relevant these locally imposed costs are versus for example the reputational damage that is often the goal of transnational mobilization against mining corporations.

Finally, future research in management and organization might want to examine mineral rich locations as sites of continued protest and mobilization that become fixed actors in a global action net against mining. The fact that "the mineral will always be in the ground" as one informant put it, represents a constant temptation for its exploitation and might result in continuous mobilization. In the social movement literature some attention has been paid to de-mobilization and re-mobilization of movements. What can we learn from these that will help us understand the potential reification of action nets and the potential emergence of new action nets in a context of long-term or repeated mobilization against mining? Given such important practical questions, I will now turn to the practical implications of this study.

6.4 Practical Implications

What to make of the findings presented above in terms of practical recommendations? How not to fall into the trap of suggesting yet another managerial approach to corporate-community relations? There are three areas where I feel, the findings presented above could have an impact: the interactions within transnational movements, notions of what constitutes a practical approach to CSR in the mining industry, and the education of (future) managers.
6.4.1 International NGOs in transnational campaigns and the emergence of self-organized translocal movements as an alternative

My findings highlight the importance of paying attention to internal organizing processes in TANs and have implications for the practice of individuals and groups engaged in transnational advocacy. Actors in international NGOs in many cases might need to re-think their engagement with local and national level activists and the role that international organizations can and should play in transnational advocacy efforts. Our findings show that although they were (at least sometimes) aware of the criticism by Indian activists, international NGO staff pushed ahead with their strategies for the transnational campaign and carried out the local activities that were required for it (e.g. local video shoots, sending of journalists to Niyamgiri). The effectiveness of TANs largely depends on their ability to deal with the "differences in interests, identities and ideologies" represented within them (den Hond & de Bakker, 2012: 292). We still know too little about the complex interactions within movements, a promising field for future studies.

Recent organization studies literature points to meetings as important spaces for mobilizing and organizing activities in movements (Haug, 2013) and it would be worthwhile to pay attention to how international actors can best dock onto existing mobilization structures and how this could be facilitated by a structure of (online or offline) meetings with relevant NAN actors. Also, exploring how online communities and other online platforms and asynchronous communication tools could be made more useful for creating meaningful exchange and engagement among actors in TANs. The question here would be how we can facilitate the establishment of stronger and trusted connections between the various actors involved in TANs, facilitate information sharing and joint decision-making.

6.4.2 CSR in the extractive industry

In terms of what constitutes CSR in the extractive industry, I want to suggest in line with others (Banerjee, 2011; Whiteman, 2009) that it is first and foremost the ability to influence decisions about what happens on their land that will be able to change corporate-community relations in the extractive industry. As long as communities are not involved at eye level, from the beginning of negotiations with host governments, and in a way where they really have a say about whether or not extraction is going to happen rather than just being participants in staged public deliberation processes (Lee & Romano, 2013), other
CSR measures will always remain only a payback for negative social and environmental impacts that leaves behind a bad aftertaste. The tactic of Vedanta, and many other mining and oil multinationals still seems to be to 'test the waters' and attempt to catch communities off guard by quickly pushing through extractive projects with self-interested local governments and then produce facts - such as by constructing a refinery at the foot of a mountain for which an extraction permit has not yet been obtained. The Vedanta case is maybe one of the few where this tactic has not worked out.

Given such experiences, it does not surprise that communities are extremely weary of negotiations with mining or oil companies and reject their offers of stakeholder engagement. Another implication of my findings is that even if communities have no previous negative experiences with extractive industry firms themselves, the extensive efforts of NAN activists to embed them within a wider context of anti-corporate/anti-mining mobilization, makes it impossible for firms to engage with them on a 'clean slate'. The way in which community engagement and CSR strategies are currently developed still suggests such a 'clean slate' approach that is very unlikely to be successful. The idea of embeddedness of anti-corporate mobilization in a web of past and current struggles and the relevance of the particular context should influence the planning of stakeholder engagement and CSR activities.

6.4.3 A coalition against the policing of protest as terrorism

As I argue in chapter five, anti-corporate movements are at threat of being framed as criminals and terrorists. Above (6.3.3) I give more examples of terrorist framing. These examples show that the findings presented above have a far wider reach than the Niyamgiri mountains. Just recently Intercontinental Cry, a non-profit working in the field of indigenous peoples' rights, published an article in its online magazine titled "Peru, an 'anti-mining terrorist' in the making". In the article, the organization describes how members of the national Peruvian police were caught on video as they attempted to portray an anti-mining protestor as a dangerous individual by placing a weapon into his hand and then taking a photo of him. The staged image later appeared in the national media, together with an article describing the protesting man as a danger to the public. It was retracted only after the intervention of Intercontinental Cry. Next to reporting this police practice, the organization argues further that the protests against the Tia Maria mine had been accompanied by several similar media headlines that framed the protest as 'terrorism'. It
further quotes a spokesperson of Southern Copper who apparently argued that the company's decision to cancel the mining project in March 2015 had been due to the ongoing "anti-mining terrorism" in the region.

Social movements are essential for shaping societal values (Rochon, 1998). As societies around the world are trying to negotiate the value attached to the environmental and social costs of economic development 'imperatives', the framing of protest as terrorism is a dangerous tendency that warrants its own concerted countermovement complete with large-scale awareness raising and legal support for those affected. Organizations fighting for the right to free spe”h and human rights around the world try to tackle these challenges but do not draw on a shared narrative yet when it comes to opposing movement criminalization. This seems very much needed if we do not want to lose the diversity of worldviews represented especially by indigenous movements (Mander & Tauli-Corpuz, 2006) and our ability to create economic and social innovation as a counterweight to the mainstream.

6.4.4 Management education

My findings also have implications for management education. A first step to overcome the "dominant conflict frame" among managers when it comes to stakeholder relationships (Kuhn, 2008: 1246), is the acknowledgement of the "constitutive force" (Kuhn, 2008: 1227) of communication in organizations. This needs to be followed by attempts to deliberately change the way managers communicate with and about stakeholders and implies what could be labeled 'ideology work' in manager and management education. What is a better place to start with this than management schools? It is there where management and organization scholars have the chance to shape the interpretive schemata of future managers and develop their ability to perceive and include a broader set of values into their daily decision making practice. A change in how we educate managers of the future and current managers, beyond the Principles for Responsible Management Education (see e.g. Alcaraz & Thiruvattal, 2010) has the potential to change the high-level narrative of CSR that is often unrelated to the day-to-day communication and practice in corporations.

The case presented here could easily be turned into a role play that would allow students to take over the roles of corporate managers facing the pressure to create support for their project by means of CSR, communication, and negotiation with the government.
Other students would take over the role of international NGO staff in need for a 'big scoop' and driven by the desire to generate the highest possible support among Western stakeholders in order to put pressure on the corporation. Finally, others would act as national and local level community stakeholders, faced with a double challenge of mining and external mobilization. Such role plays or the work with interactive case studies and the analysis of real-world cases go a long way in building empathy and the ability to change perspectives that is essential in today's world where corporate staff needs to be responsive to multiple pressures and where we should inspire a new generation of entrepreneurs.
7. EPILOGUE

Victory! What now?

You, might ask yourself that question, now that you made it to the end of this dissertation (Consider yourself a member of an eclectic group!). I have asked it multiple times in the past months and thinking about an answer has been challenging. It made me question the practical meaning of my academic work and the value of a victory that might only be a temporary one as I have discussed above. I will try my best to first quench your hunger for some news from Niyamgiri and will then outline a couple of thoughts about how I might be able to follow my passion for "supporting the underdogs" rather than getting rid of it, as was once suggested to me by a member of my department after a presentation of my work.

7.1 Updates from Niyamgiri

It is hard to find out about what is currently happening in Niyamgiri from Europe. The transnational advocacy caravan has moved on and online news coverage of the area has become much scarcer since the final community vote and subsequent victory over Vedanta in August 2013. The words 'Niyamgiri' or 'Vedanta' combined with the names of the three most relevant international NGOs that had driven much of the transnational campaign do not deliver much in terms of recent articles or updates since the Dongria Kondh's public vote against Vedanta in August 2013.

The imperatives of their trade require these organizations to move on and focus their attention on more pressing topics that demand public attention. There is a lack of attention to the consequences of mobilization beyond the immediate 'win' over the target which is not only typical for advocacy organizations but also for much of the research on social movements (Giugni, 1998, 2004). One of the few exceptions, Khan, Munir and Willmott (2007) show the potential for transnational advocacy to create negative outcomes for those they are intended to protect. In their case, Bangladeshi soccer ball producers and their families were much worse off after the 'successful' transnational campaign against child labor in the industry. Also the anti-sweatshop movement only had small impacts on workers' actual labor conditions (Armbruster-Sandoval, 2004). Given such examples, it is
valid to ask, where has their victory left the Dongria Kondh? And what are their prospects for the future?

One has to dig a bit deeper and look for translocal movement actors such as the makers of the Foil Vedanta blog who are more actively working to expose the shortcomings of the company and continue to connect activists translocally while attacking Vedanta at its headquarters in London. Also the Indi’n media still do pay some attention to the emblematic case that had high symbolic value for the question of how the country is balancing its hunger for economic growth with a responsibility to assure the welfare of the millions of people who still depend on their land and surrounding natural resources for survival. In January 2015 under the title ‘Revisiting the legend of Niyamgiri’, one of the big Indian dailies takes its readers back to Niyamgiri. The article lists a couple of the current challenges that people in Niyamgiri still face despite their victory: lack of appropriate education in their native language, survival in a market economy where intermediaries almost always get the better of them, and the incursion of the military and police forces into their lands due to alleged Maoist activities. Finally, the article also highlights the potential for local organizations that were formed during the resistance to also achieve improvements on other pressing issues the communities face. Whether or not these mobilizing structures persist will be shown but it might very well be one of the positive outcomes of movement activity together with the increased connection and feeling of unity among communities that a shared victory brings.

For NAN activists, the victory against Vedanta is a positive sign for a successful application of the Forest Rights Act (2006) that allows forest dwelling communities to decide about the use of their traditional land. In that sense, the Niyamgiri victory has the chance to influence future tactics and political opportunities as it has the potential to turn around every mining MoU signed in the past years.

At the same time, however, the Niyamgiri conflict also stands for a growing criminalization of participants in anti-corporate movements. The government has continued anti-Maoist operations in the Niyamgiri hills and the news report small ‘successes’ such as the discovery of an empty Maoist camp in the area. The Dongria Kondh, however, took a clear stance against the Maoists when they attended the public votes about the mine in great numbers after Maoists had tried to deter this democratic process. NAN activists also continued to highlight the difference between the Niyamgiri resistance and Maoists. Nevertheless, in October 2014, another activist was arrested under
charges of being a Maoist. Haribandhu Kadraka, according to other activists, had repeatedly protested the police atrocities and combing operations in Niyamgiri. He also is an important figure in the communist party that had been a strong force behind the local movement against the mine and refinery. In November 2015, Drika Kadraka, another Dongria Kondh activist, committed suicide after being arrested by the anti-Maoist CRPF forces in Niyamgiri.

Next to this cost of the Niyamgiri success, more positive personal impact of mobilization (Giugni, 2004) can be observed as well. Jika, again, is an interesting case here. His Facebook profile picture, that shows him in full Dongria Kondh traditional adornment together with national politician Rahul Gandhi during his visit to Niyamgiri in 2008, indicates that Jika still connects to his time as a central figure in the resistance movement despite his defection in 2009, the Vedanta-sponsored education and the production of a music CD with Dongria Kondh music - also financed and promoted by Vedanta. More recent pictures on his Facebook profile strongly speak to his wish to benefit his community and show that he has not turned his back on his heritage. They show a much different, more corpulent and modernly dressed Jika in blue jeans and white shirt, with short hair and without the Dongria hairpins. He shares images of himself as a translator at a tribal fair and the organizer of a cricket tournament for Dongria boys. Another picture shows him together with a group of traditionally dressed Dongria Kondh as he supports them in filling in application forms for some unknown benefit.

For Jika, the conflict about the mine definitely had profound and in many ways positive biographical and economic consequences. For the majority of the Dongria Kondh, individual economic or career benefits have not accrued although may be that mobilization resulted in a stronger sense of community and collective identity (Hunt & Benford, 2004) a revival of traditions and indigenous identity as it has happened elsewhere (Murray Li, 2000). What is clear though, is that the risk of mining in Niyamgiri is present despite the Dongria Kondh's temporary victory over one company. The chance that another mining company might apply for a lease to mine one of the bauxite rich mountains in the region is looming over the Niyamgiri communities like the sword of Damocles.

Repeated mobilization might be necessary to protect the mountain in the long run and might demand a high toll in terms of arrests, criminalization and conflict within the

---

communities created by individuals 'selling out' to the company. There is an often neglected 'toll' that communities pay for mobilizing when they lose time and resources that otherwise would have gone into generating a livelihood. Especially for subsistence farmers and the very poor this might become an issue that can hamper movement participation or creates even greater poverty than before. As a result, resistance can erode and communities might become more susceptible to accepting CSR and offers for compensation and ultimately give way to the mine they never wanted.

The final section below introduces some early stage ideas about the chance that exists for communities in a strong negotiation position based on economic alternatives to mining. I will draw on a brief comparison of the Niyamgiri and POSCO cases to make my point that next to translocal campaigning it might be translocal trade relationships that could create an alternative future for economically weak communities around the world that are threatened by land-loss through industry.

7.2 A translocal network of economic alternatives to mining

When one compares the movement in Niyamgiri with the anti-POSCO movement at Orissa's coast (Park, 2011), it appears that Dhinkia and the surrounding communities can rely on a solid income from the production and sales of betel leaves that is not available in Niyamgiri and leaves the Dongria Kondh in a weak negotiation position on purely economic grounds. The villages in the proposed POSCO project area are able to reject corporate offers for compensation as insufficient by calculating the long-term value of their land over generations based on the annual income that can be earned from selling betel leaves. This is a rare example of a strong economic argument against mining in the poorest of all Indian states. Having realized this difference and having heard stories from activists about walking over a 'carpet of rotting mangoes' in Niyamgiri during mango season, made me think. What if there was a way for the Niyamgiri communities to form a cooperative and earn a fair income with their agricultural produce rather than being cheated by middlemen or not being able to visit the local market at all due to anti-Maoist combing operations? What if they would produce value added products from the abundance of wild and forest cultivated plants like mangoes and pineapples? What if they would be able to sell these products to conscious customers in India and beyond? Customers, who want to
learn more about their cause and are willing to support the protection of their mountain range with their wallets rather than with their feet?

This is just the beginning of an idea to create translocal connections between past and present anti-mining and similar struggles about the right to land by subsistence and farming communities and sympathetic supporters all around the world through a network of local producers who sell their products under one brand. Not only would this social business provide fair payment for these products. It would also re-invest into these communities by supporting the formation of co-operatives, providing training and support in new product development, and provide an online platform for communities to share their struggles with the world and connect to other communities worldwide to form translocal networks. Customers would benefit from delicious value added ethically produced agricultural products with a story that are not only guilt-free but help communities develop at their own pace and gain the traction they need to make decisions about their future.

Up until now this is just a dream. One that shows that with the end of this dissertation the journey has not ended. There's much to learn still and I feel that finishing 'the book' has little to do with having accomplished closure. To the contrary, I feel more than ever motivated to go out and learn and explore new fields such as the world of social business into which I have set foot in the past years next to finishing this dissertation. Setting up such a business starting from the broad outlines I shared above has much appeal in a hands-on way that allows faster iterations and more direct feedback loops than they are possible in the academic world.

On the other hand I feel that much remains to be done in the academic world which motivates me to keep one foot rooted there while dipping the other into more unknown waters. This is grounded in the conviction that innovative approaches to management education as I called for above need people with experience in both worlds who are willing to inspire the next generation of corporate managers to rethink the way in which business needs to be done.
REFERENCES


Holzscheiter, A. (2011). The representational power of civil society organizations in global AIDS


KPMG international survey of corporate responsibility reporting, Amsterdam: KPMG.


Nasser, J. (2010), Chair BHP Billiton Plc., Speech at Annual General Meeting.


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## APPENDIX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Short description / pseudonym</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Duration (mins)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Lawyer focusing on human rights law, regularly supports jailed activists from various movements across India</td>
<td>Delhi</td>
<td>25.11.2008</td>
<td>10 with &amp; 50 without recording</td>
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<td>NGO Project Coordinator working with an international NGO on social and economic justice topics in Orissa and other states</td>
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<td>Sanjay &amp; Medha</td>
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<td>Delhi</td>
<td>24.2.2008</td>
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<td>Medha</td>
<td>Delhi</td>
<td>8.3.2010</td>
<td>72</td>
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<td>Spokesperson of the anti-POSCO movement, member of the communist party</td>
<td>Bhubaneswar</td>
<td>1.12.2008</td>
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<td>Journalist and activist working on grassroots media production</td>
<td>Bhubaneswar</td>
<td>1.12.2008</td>
<td>45, no recording</td>
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<td>Human rights lawyer working with several Orissa movements, group discussion together with Delhi activists</td>
<td>Bhubaneswar</td>
<td>2.12.2008</td>
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<td>Jika - tribal activist and temporary central figure in the anti-Vedanta movement</td>
<td>Bissam Cuttack</td>
<td>3.12.2008</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bissam Cuttack</td>
<td>7.12.2008</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bissam Cuttack</td>
<td>5.2.2009</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bhubaneswar</td>
<td>19.3.2010</td>
<td>95</td>
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<td>Niyamgiri leader of a tribal (land) rights organization active across India</td>
<td>A village in Niyamgiri</td>
<td>6.12.2008</td>
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<td>Role</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Duration</td>
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<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Seasoned female activist who was a central figure in the Kashipur movement of the 1980s</td>
<td>Paikmal</td>
<td>11.12.2008</td>
<td>25</td>
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<td>Interview with the former and the current leader of a successful anti-industry movement, members of the conservative BJP</td>
<td>Paikmal</td>
<td>11.12.2008</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>Senior human rights activist involved in several struggles across Orissa, member of the communist party</td>
<td>Paikmal</td>
<td>12.12.2008</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Another seasoned female activist of the Kashipur movement</td>
<td>Paikmal</td>
<td>12.12.2008</td>
<td>30</td>
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<td>Staff of an international NGO involved from early on in the mobilization against Vedanta's refinery and mine in Niyamgiri</td>
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<td>19.12.2008</td>
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<td>Senior human rights activist involved from very early on in the anti-Vedanta movement</td>
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<td>9.1.2009</td>
<td>about 75, no recording</td>
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<td>Head of a local NGO working with communities affected by 'natural and man-made disasters'</td>
<td>Bhubaneswar</td>
<td>15.1.2009</td>
<td>49</td>
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<td>Staff of a development NGO that mainly works with tribal villages across Orissa, also in Niyamgiri</td>
<td>Bhubaneswar</td>
<td>21.1.2009</td>
<td>45, no recording</td>
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<td>Focus group with six participants occupying one or several of the following roles: NGO staff/consultant, lawyer, activist and researcher</td>
<td>Bhubaneswar</td>
<td>23.1.2009</td>
<td>85</td>
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<td>Local Manager of an international NGO involved from early on in the mobilization against Vedanta's refinery and mine in Niyamgiri</td>
<td>Bhubaneswar</td>
<td>11.2.2008</td>
<td>53</td>
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<tr>
<td>Founder of an organization whose goal it is to form a national alliance of grassroots organizations, communities, and support organizations who struggle against mining</td>
<td>Delhi</td>
<td>27.2.2009</td>
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<tr>
<td>Name of Interviewee</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Duration and Notes</td>
</tr>
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<td>---------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
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<td>Head of the South Asia team at an international human rights NGO also working on the case of Vedanta in Niyamgiri</td>
<td>London, UK</td>
<td>28.7.2009</td>
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<td>Staff of an international indigenous peoples NGO also working on the case of Vedanta in Niyamgiri</td>
<td>London, UK</td>
<td>28.7.2009</td>
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<tr>
<td>Activist working extensively with several anti-mining struggles in India and internationally</td>
<td>Utrecht, The Netherlands</td>
<td>3./4.8.2009</td>
<td>2-3 hours, no recording</td>
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<td>A member of staff of an international indigenous peoples NGO also working on the case of Vedanta in Niyamgiri</td>
<td>Phone interview</td>
<td>1.10.2009</td>
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<td>UK photographer and activist who has been supporting the anti-Vedanta struggle from early on</td>
<td>Phone interview</td>
<td>11.12.2009</td>
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<td>Coordinator of a Delhi-based networked support organization for people's movements across India</td>
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<td>13.3.2010</td>
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<td>Campaigns Manager of an international NGO involved from early on in the mobilization against Vedanta's refinery and mine in Niyamgiri</td>
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<td>Senior Fellow and Executive Director of an important Indian NGO working on natural resources and energy security</td>
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<td>Charles</td>
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<td>Staff member of a Orissa NGO working with tribal communities mainly on community forest rights</td>
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<td>105, no recording</td>
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<td>Bhubaneswar</td>
<td>24.3.2010</td>
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<td>Senior activist and socialist who has been a central figure in several farmer's movements against industrialization in Western Orissa</td>
<td>Bhubaneswar</td>
<td>25.03.2010</td>
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Spokesperson of the local chapter of CPI-ML which heavily supported the tribal organization spearheading the anti-Vedanta movement in Niyamgiri

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<th>Spokesperson of the local chapter of CPI-ML which heavily supported the tribal organization spearheading the anti-Vedanta movement in Niyamgiri</th>
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Leader of the anti-POSCO movement

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<th>Leader of the anti-POSCO movement</th>
<th>Dhinkia</th>
<th>2.4.2010</th>
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Six women from the anti-POSCO movement

<table>
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<th>Dhinkia</th>
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<th>15</th>
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Reporter of an Orissa TV channel that regularly reports about people's movements

<table>
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<th>Bhawanipatna</th>
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Lawyer who was strongly involved in legal actions against Vedanta

<table>
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<th>Delhi</th>
<th>22.4.2010</th>
<th>65</th>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>47 interviewees in 42 interviews</th>
<th>~176 h</th>
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Appendix 1: Interviews with social movement actors and supporters

Appendix 2: Interviews with corporate managers, consultants & government officials

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<th>Duration (mins)</th>
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<td>Plant Manager, Vedanta</td>
<td>Keonjhar</td>
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<td>CSR Manager, Vedanta</td>
<td>Keonjhar</td>
<td>14.1.2009</td>
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<td>Interview and walk through the colony with intermittent conversations with inhabitants</td>
<td>Jharsuguda</td>
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<td>PR Manager, POSCO</td>
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<td>180 total, 125 mins recorded</td>
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<td>Interviewee</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Duration</td>
</tr>
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<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
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<td>CEO Lanjigarh Refinery, Vice President Mines, Vedanta</td>
<td>Bhubaneswar</td>
<td>23.1.2009</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Bhubaneswar</td>
<td>15.4.2010</td>
<td>124</td>
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<td>Professor at a private management school who is consulting mining companies on resettlement policies and plans</td>
<td>Bhubaneswar</td>
<td>27.1./11.2.2009</td>
<td>about 120, no recording</td>
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<td>Head CSR &amp; PR, Vedanta Lanjigarh Refinery</td>
<td>Lanjigarh</td>
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<td>Assistant Manager PR, Vedanta Lanjigarh Refinery</td>
<td>Lanjigarh</td>
<td>5.2.2009</td>
<td>39 mins with, 15 without recording</td>
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<td>Associate GM Corporate Affairs, Vedanta</td>
<td>Bhubaneswar</td>
<td>14.2.2009</td>
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<td>Interview with three consultants working for Vedanta and other clients on mitigating environmental and social risks</td>
<td>Delhi</td>
<td>9.03.2010</td>
<td>120</td>
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<td>Head of the Scheduled Cast Research &amp; Training Institute who supported mining in Niyamgiri as a way to develop tribal regions</td>
<td>Bhubaneswar</td>
<td>23.3.2010</td>
<td>20, no recording</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bhubaneswar</td>
<td>12.4.2010</td>
<td>25, no recording</td>
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<td>New PR Manager, POSCO</td>
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<td>Delhi</td>
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<td>72</td>
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**17 interviews with 16 interviewees** ~ 18 hrs
**PHD PORTFOLIO**

Name PhD student:  Romy Kraemer  
Erasmus Department:  Rotterdam School of Management  
Research School:  Business-Society Management  
PhD-period:  Sept. 2006-end 2016  
Promotor:  Prof.dr. Rob van Tulder  
Co-promotor:  Prof.dr. Gail Whiteman

## PhD training

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<td>Statistical Methods</td>
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### Specific courses

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous Wisdom</td>
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<td>Comparative Political Economy</td>
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<td>Strategy and international business</td>
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<td>Advanced Topics in Organization Theory</td>
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### Seminars and workshops

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<tr>
<th>Seminars and workshops</th>
<th>2010</th>
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<tr>
<td>Advanced Topics in Grounded Theory, 5 day summer school</td>
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Critical Management Studies, Lund University 2010

5th Organization Studies Summer Workshop, 2010 Margaux, France

Resources, Empire and Labour: A Workshop on Globalization and Alternatives, Sudbury, Canada 2010

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<th>Presentations &amp; international conferences</th>
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<tr>
<td>International Association for Business in Society Conference, Florence, Italy 2007</td>
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<td>Paper presented at the European International Business Academy Conference, Catania, Italy 2007</td>
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<td>World Petroleum Congress, Madrid, Spain 2008</td>
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<td>Paper presented at the European Group for Organizational Studies Conference Amsterdam 2010</td>
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<th>Teaching</th>
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<tr>
<td>Individual Lectures in Companies and Ecologies and International Business-Society Management at the Rotterdam School of Management 2007-2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethics (BA), Business Ethics (MA) and Corporate Social Responsibility (MA) at the Kühne Logistics University, Hamburg, Germany since 2015</td>
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Dissertations in the last five years


Benschop, N, Biases in Project Escalation: Names, frames & construal levels, Promotors: Prof. K.I.M. Rhode, Prof. H.R. Commandeur, Prof. M. Keil & Dr A.L.P. Nuijten, EPS-2015-375-S&E, hdl.handle.net/1765/79408


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Ma, Y., *The Use of Advanced Transportation Monitoring Data for Official Statistics*, Promotors: Prof. L.G. Kroon and Dr Jan van Dalen, EPS-2016-391-LIS, hdl.handle.net/1765/80174


Mihalache, O.R., *Stimulating Firm Innovativeness: Probing the Interrelations between...*
Managerial and Organizational Determinants, Promotors: Prof. J.J.P. Jansen, Prof. F.A.J. van den Bosch, & Prof. H.W. Volberda, EPS-2012-260-S&E, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/32343


Oord, J.A. van, Essays on Momentum Strategies in Finance, Promotor: Prof. H.K. van Dijk, EPS-2016-380-F&A, hdl.handle.net/1765/80036


Porck, J., No Team is an Island: An Integrative View of Strategic Consensus between Groups, Promotors: Prof. P.J.F. Groenen & Prof. D.L. van Knippenberg, EPS-


Tuncdogan, A., *Decision Making and Behavioral Strategy: The Role of Regulatory Focus in Corporate Innovation Processes*, Promotors: Prof. F.A.J. van den Bosch,


Waltman, L., Computational and Game-Theoretic Approaches for Modeling Bounded Rationality, Promotors: Prof. R. Dekker & Prof. U. Kaymak, EPS-2011-248-
LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/26564


What does it mean when a corporation claims to have a ‘license to operate’ in a local community? How does a member of an indigenous tribe make it to London to protest against a multinational mining company? How do managers perceive and speak about protest against their company and how does this discourse matter for social movement repression?

First, I argue, based on a literature review, that responsiveness to local community needs has become an important factor influencing the ability of multinational enterprises to successfully internationalize their operations. Then, I explore the practitioner concept of the license to operate and develop this into a theoretical framework. Based on a case study of an anti-mining movement, that grew from the initial local community resistance in a remote Indian mountain range into a translocal movement, I try to answer the remaining questions empirically. To shed light on the organizing processes in anti-corporate movements, my co-authors and I trace the journey of a young man who for a short time became one of the leading figures in the anti-mining movement but later changed sides to support the company. We also highlight the importance of national advocacy networks for successful movement building across borders. Finally, I analyze the managerial discourse about the anti-mining resistance and link it to the repression of social movement actors by the police and other stakeholders. Overall, this dissertation builds on and advances the growing literature on anti-corporate social movements.