A
Accountable: \( p \) is an accountable subject if \( p \) possesses the responsibility-relevant abilities.

Accountability, Deep: see D.

Actions Disclosing a Normative Disagreement (ADND): self-disclosing, intelligible actions of a responsible agent who disagrees with the normative expectations transgressed.

Alternative Intentions, Principle of (PAI): see P.

Alternative Possibilities, Principle of (PAP): see P.

Authorization Accounts, Hierarchical: see H.

Autonomous Action Condition: a condition that accounts for the distinction between those who are temporarily or at a certain occasion deprived of their responsibility-relevant abilities or lack the opportunity to exercise them autonomously and those who are not.

Autonomous Human Beings: human beings whose actions (generally) reflect their norms and values and who are capable of critically reflecting on their actions and the underlying norms and values.

Autonomy Condition: a condition that accounts for the distinction between the mentally or volitionally incapacitated or immature people and the mentally and volitionally sound and mature ones.

Autonomy-Undermining Circumstances: circumstances that diminish an agent’s \( p \) deep responsibility for \( a \) without severing \( p \)'s relation to the bodily movements (or lack thereof) that constitute \( a \).

Avoidability, the Principle of: see P.

B
Blameworthy: \( p \) is blameworthy (or praiseworthy) for \( a \) if \( p \) is an accountable subject who did \( a \) and \( a \) fails or succeeds to fulfil some legitimate expectations.

Blameworthy, Exemplary: action \( a \) of person \( p \) is exemplary blameworthy if (1) \( p \) is a normal human being, (2) \( a \) is a true action of \( p \), (3) \( a \) is something that no normal human being should do, and (4) \( p \) did \( a \) under normal circumstances.

Blameworthy Action, Exemplary (EBA): a wrong action of a human being who possesses all the relevant abilities
to act in an appropriate way and who has no excuse not to do so.

C

Causal Circumstances: a set of conditions or events that necessitate or stand in nomic connection with something later, an effect.

Cause, a: an event or condition within the causal circumstances.

Compatibilism (F): the view that determinism is compatible with free will.

Compatibilism (R): the view that determinism is compatible with responsibility.

Conditional Analysis: the analysis of “p could have done otherwise” in terms of “p would have done otherwise if p had willed, chosen or decided so.”

Condition, Intentional Action: see 1.

Condition, Intentionality: see 1.

Conditional Normative Disagreement: a normative disagreement that can be solved by a minor adaptation of the content of the expectation disagreed on.

Conditions, Excusing: see E.

Conditions, Exempting: see E.

Consequence Argument: if determinism is true, our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and that what happened in the remote past. But it is not up to us what went on before we were born, and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore, the consequences of these things (including our present acts) are not up to us (Van Inwagen, 1983, p. 16).

Counterexamples, Frankfurt: examples in which a counterfactual intervener figures.

Counterfactual Intervener: someone who (or something that) would intervene to secure that person p does action a, but who (or what) does not intervene because p does a without intervention.

D

Deep Accountability: our status as appropriate subjects of the reactive attitudes and emotions such as resentment, blame, indignation, and praise.

Deep Responsibility: deep accountability.

Determined: an event is determined if there are conditions the joint occurrence of which is sufficient for the occurrence of the event (Kane, 1996, p. 8).
**Determinism**: the theory that all our mental events, including our choices and decisions, and also our actions, are effects of certain things and therefore have to happen or are necessitated, and cannot be owed to origination (Honderich, 1993, p. 138).

**Determinism, Hard**: see H.

**Determinism, Near**: see N.

**E**

**Exemplary Blameworthy Action, (EBA)**: see B.

**Excusing Conditions**: conditions that alter an agent’s blameworthiness or praiseworthiness.

**Exempting Conditions**: conditions that alter an agent’s accountability.

**F**

**Free Will Issue**: the issue whether the freedom that is necessary for responsibility should be understood in terms of alternative possibilities.

**H**

**Hard Determinism**: the view that determinism is true and that, therefore, we are not responsible.

**Hierarchical Authorization Accounts**: accounts that defend the view that agent p’s authorization of an action a makes a an autonomous action of p no matter what the circumstances in the past or present are.

**Hierarchical Authorization Views**: hierarchical authorization accounts.

**I**

**Incompatibilism (F)**: the view that determinism is incompatible with free will.

**Incompatibilism (R)**: the view that determinism is incompatible with responsibility.

**Intentional Action Condition**: a condition that accounts for the distinction between those who suffer no responsibility-relevant disabilities or the disability of execution (normal intentionally acting human beings) but who either have or lack the opportunity to bring them into action.

**Intentionality Condition**: a condition that accounts for the distinction between those who suffer from the inability to translate the output of their responsibility-relevant abilities into action and those who do not.

**J**

**Justification Issue**: the issue whether our daily practices of moral responsibility are justified if there exist no robust
alternative possibilities.

M Moral Sentiments: reactive attitudes and emotions such as resentment, blame, indignation, and praise.

N Near-Determinism: the view that while there is indeterminism at the micro-level—the level of the small particles—there is still determinism at the macro-level, which includes neural events and everything with which we are ordinarily familiar (Honderich, 1993, p. 140).

Normative Expectations: general expectations about what should and should not be done in certain circumstances.

Normal Human Beings: human beings who possess the responsibility-relevant abilities in sufficient degree.

O Only-Because Principle: the principle that states that persons are not morally responsible for what they have done, if they did it only because they could not have done otherwise.

Origination: a clear and distinct activity of a single being of causing or initiating a mental event, choice, decision, or an action.

P Pessimism, Ultimacy: see U.

Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP): the principle that states a person \( p \) is only responsible for an action \( a \), if \( p \) could have done otherwise than \( a \) (Frankfurt, 1969).

Principle of Alternative Intentions (PAI): the principle that states that a person \( p \) is deeply responsible for \( a \) if \( p \) had the opportunity, or was able to intend otherwise than \( a \).

Principle of Avoidability: the principle that states that if people are not able to avoid a specific moral wrong they are not deeply responsible for it.

Principle, Ultimacy (UP): the principle that states that the availability of alternative possibilities are necessary at some stage in a person’s life history (leading up to action \( a \)) in order for this person to be responsible for \( a \) (Kane, 1996, p. 42).

R Reactive Sentiments: moral sentiments.

Responsibility-Relevant Abilities (RR abilities): the abilities that make us accountable.

Responsibility, Superficial: see S.
Responsibility, Deep: see D.

Responsible, Holding: the susceptibility to a certain range of reactive emotions and attitudes when certain expectations are breached (Wallace, 1994, p. 21).

Responsible, Holding Morally: to hold a person to moral expectations that one accepts (Wallace, 1994, p. 51).

S

Skeptical Challenge: the challenge to explicate a condition that accounts for the autonomy-related distinctions between deeply responsible human beings (as we normally assume ourselves to be) and non-deeply accountable ones.

Superficial Responsibility: our status as agents who sometimes do things that we should not have done (or leave undone what we should have done) and, sometimes, do so freely (without being forced or interfered with by powers “outside ourselves”).

U

Ultimacy-Pessimism: the view that we are not responsible for those actions that can be traced back to an origin outside ourselves plus the belief that if determinism is true the origin of our choices, decisions, and actions, always lies outside ourselves.

Ultimacy Principle: see P.

Unconditional Normative Disagreement (UND): a normative disagreement that cannot be solved by an adaptation of the content of the expectation concerned.