

'Low' culture, laymen, and the vernacular traditions in the Low Countries¹

*Ruben S. Buys
Erasmus University of Rotterdam
The Netherlands*

It must have been around the 1530s that Dirck Volkertsz. Coornhert, the famous Dutch proponent of free thought and toleration, decided not to write any of his texts in Latin. This was, of course, an odd decision. Did not all scholars use Latin, many of them even going as far as to describe common language as rude, uncivilised and barbarian? For Coornhert, though, using his mother tongue was nothing less than a matter of principle. It was his conviction that knowledge should be accessible for every right-thinking individual, be he learned or layman. Hiding knowledge behind the walls of an exclusive language was therefore of no use. Hence, Coornhert wrote a vast number of Dutch texts, among which also *Zedekunst*, published in 1586, the first ethics to appear in any national language of post-Roman Europe.

Although Coornhert thus may have been the first to write an 'European' vernacular ethics, he certainly was not the first author who used the Dutch language as a means to transport moral and philosophical ideas to a broad, non-Latin speaking audience. From as early as the thirteenth century onwards many authors deliberately wrote philosophical tracts in the vernacular.

This paper's aim is to shed light on the interaction between philosophy and what we may call 'low' or popular culture. I hope to show that philosophical ideas played an important role in one of the greatest shifts in Western civilization – namely the downfall of nobility and clergy and the rise of 'layman culture' during the late Middle Ages and Early Modernity. I will try to do so by considering the nature and function of vernacular philosophy in the Low Countries between 1280 and 1600. It is in this unique and highly urbanised area that some important features of popular culture and modern Western citizenship arose, such as freedom of conscience, pragmatism, and social mobility. In this process, philosophical texts in the language of the common man were not merely a reflection of his world and life experience. Instead, these texts were clearly constructed for his moral instruction and the creation of responsible and self-conscious citizens. In this sense, vernacular philosophy functioned as an important intermediary between science and scholarship on the one hand and 'low' or popular culture on the other.

On a more general level, my historical exposé supports the view that philosophy and culture interact with each other. Insofar as philosophy tries to answer real questions of concrete individuals relating to the world, human existence, and society, it can have a significant influence on cultural development. My short history of the Low Countries will, I hope, teach us that philosophy can make a real difference in the lives of common people and can play an important role in popular culture.

Two preliminary questions

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What is so interesting about vernacular philosophy anyway? As these texts are produced for common people, would it not be wiser to invest our precious time to the study of Latin texts, which after all was the language of scholars – the language of Aquinas and Erasmus? Well, what makes vernacular texts interesting is their intended public: these texts were not meant for a Latin-speaking minority of scholars and scientists living in the relative isolation of their universities and monasteries, but for people living and acting in the ‘real’ world. By the real world I mean: the regional courts and, of course, the cities. Cities in particular were a factor of growing importance during the late Middle Ages. As a matter of fact, within the walls of these cities a new kind of human being came into existence: the citizen or *burgher*. Protected by their city walls and city privileges, these citizens were increasingly self-sufficient and ‘bossy’. They were socially mobile and self-made men, pragmatists with specific intellectual needs. This ‘new man’ increasingly escaped the traditional three-class society that consisted of nobles, clergymen and peasants. More and more, the *burgher* began to form a kind of fourth class, intangible for the traditional three-class hierarchy. This, of course, goes particularly for the urban middle-classes and the city elites. So, if we plan to trace philosophy and its function in popular culture during this period, texts that were produced for this particular group of people are our best shot.

This may well explain my interest in layman’s culture as well as vernacular texts. But, and here is the second preliminary question, why should we be especially interested in *Dutch* sources? Why, in other words, would the region of the Low Countries (today roughly the Netherlands and Belgium as you all know) be of so much interest to us?

Well, for one thing, this part of Europe has had an important role in the transition from Middle Ages to Modernity and Enlightenment. During the Middle Ages it became one of the most urbanised areas in Europe. Trade became of utmost importance and Low Countries cities like Brussels, Antwerp, Ghent and Bruges became extremely wealthy. In the sixteenth century lack of effective centralised government and other factors led to a turbulent reception of the Reformation –and Calvinism in particular– and then to the famous Dutch Revolt, in which, as you all know, the Northern provinces began an eighty-years war against Philip II, monarch of the mighty Spanish empire that controlled vast parts of the world. In the seventeenth century the resulting tiny Republic of the Seven Provinces became a world power of itself, as it conquered the seas over Spain and Portugal.

Intellectually, the Low Countries were a melting pot of new ideas. It is here that, during the seventeenth century, Descartes published his works that were eventually to revolutionise Europe and the whole Western world. It is here that Spinoza developed his rationalistic and naturalistic ideas and thus founded an important undercurrent of radical thinkers that influenced European thought in a profound way, as Jonathan Israel and others have shown. It is here, in the Low Countries and in Holland in particular, that the Enlightenment actually began, as Jonathan Israel concluded only recently.² But already in the Middle Ages, the Low Countries had an unique position in European culture. Just as in Italy and a few other regions in Europe, the high degree of urbanisation made possible an “emancipation of the common man”, resulting in a basic conception of individuality. Of course, the late medieval and early modern notion of individuality was still very different from the type of individuality we experience today, but it nevertheless was a great step beyond the conception of the self that was based on the traditional three-class society. In the wake of this development also the notion of individual consciousness could grow. Already during the fifteenth century, typical layman movements arose in the Low Countries; movements that combined Christian piety with a strong sense of

² See Israel 2001 and 2006. M. Jacob.

individual consciousness and a personal relation to God (*Devotio moderna*). To put it *very* shortly, the mercantile spirit of the Low Countries' citizens together with this awareness of religious and moral individuality led to a strong sense of toleration, which was seen as a most effective way to streamline society and social relations. Needless to say, the notion of toleration was of great importance to the rise of Modernity, and to the division of Church and State in particular. Of course, there is much, much more to say about these interesting and influential developments, but I will leave it here.

So, though other regions of Europe to some extent showed similar developments, the Low Countries may serve as an important example of the early modern development of popular culture and the role that philosophy played in this development.

Vernacular philosophy in the Low Countries (1280-1600)

Let's have a look, then, at vernacular texts on philosophy in the Low Countries in the period between 1280 and 1600.³

I will explore two perspectives that in my view are dominant in this tradition:

1. 'downsizing' philosophy: i.e. forging a rational attitude for the *populus*, the people.
2. 'upgrading' popular culture: i.e. creating justifications for common life practice.

1. The 'downsizing' or popularisation of philosophy

When one reads these late medieval and early modern vernacular texts, one will be surprised by the emphasis that authors put on reason and its ideal role in the lives of commoners. After all, we are used to the image of the Middle Ages as a profoundly religious period, that had no high value of human reason, at least not in the non-academic context. Of course, we philosophers know our bit of medieval philosophy and we are familiar with the quite important role reason plays in the work of Thomas Aquinas and the like. But if we look away from the context of medieval university life, we are used to believe that people lived in an almost thoughtless piety. The so-called Dark Ages are the centuries, it is believed, in which the light of reason was hindered by the omnipresence of faith in common life or, if you please, in popular culture. The idea of self-conscious individuals within the medieval world is not too familiar to us.

It is therefore refreshing to read texts of a philosophical nature that are clearly meant for and read by non-learned people or commoners with a great deal of self-consciousness.

Jacob van Maerlant, for one, stated in his *Spiegel historiae*, the vast work discussing the whole of human history that he composed between 1283 and 1288:

He who wants to follow wisdom/
Should stay calm/
And live by right reason/
He should with all his heart/
Reflect and consider/
What he could come across.

Wie so der wijsheit wille volgen,
Wiltu bliven onverbolgen
Ende met rechter redene leven,
Du moetster toe dijn herte geven
Te vorpeinsene ende te vorwegene
Al dat di mach comen te jegene.⁴

The basic idea being that

Man does not possess anything better
Than reason and intellect.

Die mensce en hevet niet beters in
Dan redene ende zin.⁵

³ For some more information on the authors considered here, see at the end of this contribution.

⁴ *Spiegel historiae* ['Mirror of history'] (*Sp.hist.* I, 8/ kap. 34 *Seneca van groter wijscheden* ['Seneca of great wisdom'], line 1-14 (ed. De Vries–Verwijs 1863, part I, p. 412).

Animals do not possess this quality of reasoning. It is an unique gift from God to mankind. And therefore, Maerlant continues:

If [man] follows [reason], he is superior to the animals (...). In doing so, man follows God.	In desen doene, in derre maniere, Hevet hi vordeel voer die diere, (...) In desen volget hi Gode naer. ⁶
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This is, however, not to say that reason has unlimited rights in man's life. In other parts of his work Maerlant is clearly convinced of the role of faith. Thus, in his so-called *Derde Martijn*, the third dialogue between Jacob and Martijn, he states:

Reason does not wear the crown, here, But sincere faith, That is beyond all doubt.	Redene en draghet hier niet die crone, Maer tghelove sonder hone, Dat en twwelde nie. ⁷
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Writing some fifty years later, around 1330, Jan van Boendale supplied his readers with a large amount of moral advice. In his moral exposition *Lekenspiegel*, or *Layman's Mirror*, a rational attitude towards life is omnipresent. Living in accordance with reason, Boendale asserted, is the best road to go. Boendale, in fact, does not very much on a theoretical level address the issue of reason and its nature and function. His work is clearly meant for moral instruction on a more practical level. But on that practical level he continuously stresses the importance of a rational way of handling all aspects of life. Thus, the *Lekenspiegel* creates a commonsensical approach to reason, often resulting in a kind of rational-practical calculus that sometimes reminds one of Epicurean thought. Boendale's argument often has a strong utilitarian side: humbleness, for instance, though surely an important virtue, is not promoted for it being good in itself, but for its useful benefits, 'for humbleness' Boendale says in *Lekenspiegel*, 'will only bring you honour and it will improve your situation'.⁸

Dirc Potter, writing his works between 1410 and 1430, called upon his readers to follow an inner authority: reason. And Potter is quite anti-clerical in this – as popular educator he does not want to leave his readers to the mercy of church hierarchy or clerical authority, but tries to move them to employ their own reason instead. Reason, for Potter, is useful in both the spiritual and the practical realm. Throughout Potters work, reason is the ultimate justification ground of the virtues he proclaims. But at the same time, reason is also the ultimate means for social self management and social success. In short, with the help of rationality one is able to

help oneself and earn a living, as well as lead a happy life and obtain an eternal life.⁹

In the work of both Boendale and Potter the religious perspective surely is not absent. But it seems clear that reason and faith are sort of independent paths. Boendale, for instance, at the same time stresses not to worry about one's own reputation (for God's reward is far more precious than all worldly praise) and calls on his readers to continuously employ reason to defend and expand one's personal honour and reputation.

⁵ *Sp.bist.* I, 8, LXXI/ line 5-6.

⁶ *Sp.bist.* I, 8, LXXI/ line 7-8.

⁷ *Derde Martijn*, r. 215v-217. Vertaling van eigen hand.

⁸ 'want daarvoor kunt u alleen maar eer ontvangen en u komt er beter vanaf', *Lsp.* III 3, vs. 52-53 (J-P p. 130).

⁹ 'u selven mede helpen moecht ende den cost daer mede winnen moecht ende oic een heerlijc leven mede leyden moecht ende dat ewighe leven daer mede winnen moecht', see *Blome der doecheden*, f. 130 verso. See also Corbellini 2000, p. 149.

Later on in this contribution, we will see that especially Boendale and Potter went far in trying to connect with the social-economic context of their intended public of urban middle-classes, city elites and lower nobility.

From the 1430s onwards the so-called *Rhetorijckers* or rhetoricians took control of the literary landscape of the Low Countries. They gathered in their so-called ‘chambers of rhetoric’, specialised in competing with other members and other chambers in tournaments that tested their rhetorical skills. The works produced were as diverse as their numbers were, but many a fifteenth century rhetorician accepted reason as an instrument through which man ‘truly realizes the meaning of God’s creation’.¹⁰ Or, as the factor of the Diest chamber “De Christusooghen” asserts in a *Spel van sinne*:

God made man so rational, so noble, wise, subtle in keen intellect, that by ingenious and profound inquiry, he should part from ignorance and idleness.	De mensche is van Godt ghemaect soo redelijck So edelijck // wijs // subtiel / van verstande cloeck Dat hy met een constich / diepsinnich ondersoect Van Onwetentheyt en Ledicheyt moet scheyden ¹¹
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The practical approach of Boendale and Potter that we saw before is now often replaced by an orientation towards rational contemplation. In *Exempel van Redene en de Broesche Mensche* (produced somewhere between 1450 and 1500)¹² the main character, having a zest to living, is being guided to reflection and contemplation by a personification of reason:

Examine your conscience And understand what I [Reason] tell you: Look back, fearless friend!	Hierbi thuwer conscientien ga Ende wilt verstaen dat ic [Redene] u telle: Sich omme, vreeseloes gheselle!
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Only in this way one was supposed to be able to lead a moral life and counter all setbacks of this earthly existence. But reason, in the view of these rhetoricians, was not only a useful means to acquire an attitude of accepting misfortune, but it could also be seen as a means to actively manipulate the course of things in nature and in social life. In fact, whoever surrenders to Lady Fortune, denies his very essence as human being, ‘for he denies the rationality that he is obliged to use, dehumanising himself in listening more to *cupido* and fate’, as the author of the 1482 Dutch text *Van de drie Blinde Danssen* says.¹³

During the sixteenth century, vernacular writers such as Dirck Volkertszoon Coornhert continued to treat reason kindly. For Coornhert, reason was the ‘divine spark’ [*voncxken des Godlijcken Lichts*] in man, connecting him with his divine origin. Through reason, man would be able to reach to the heavens, as it unlocks the door to truth, beauty, and a life of moral perfection. In Coornhert’s words:

For [the eye of reason] only beholds the true end of all good, that is God, the fountain of all good and goodness in	Want haar oghe [nl. van de opperste rede] ziet alleenlyck op het ware eynde alre ghoeden, dat is op Gode, alder ghoeden fonteyne ende de ghoedheyd
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¹⁰ See Pleij 1985, p. 81.

¹¹ Spel van sinne van De Christusooghen (Diest), 1561. Silvius, W., *Spelen van Sinne vol scoone moralisaciën vvtleggingen ende bediedenissen op alle loeflijcke consten vvaerinne men claelijck ghelyck in eenen Spieghel, Figuerlyck, Poetelijck ende Retorijckelijck mach aenschouwen (...)*, Antwerpen 1562, p. Xx3r (many thanks to Ruud Reyckaert for his transcription).

¹² See Heeroma 1972. Also Pleij 1985 (p. 75, nt. 16) and Kalff 1907, p. 130.

¹³ ‘Omme deswille dat hi versmaet de redelicheyt die hi sculdich is te besighen ende meer tot *cupido* ende auenture gheneghen is so ontmenscht hi hem seluen’, *Van de drie Blinde Danssen*, ed. Schuijt 1955, p. 51.

Reason, Coornhert continues, is a ‘clear mirror (...) in which the sun of eternal intellect directly beams its own image’.¹⁵ Reason, in fact, was such a strong force in man that Coornhert did not even thought it necessary to exclude non-Christians from obtaining divine truth by it. Since all humans share reason, it should be possible for everyone to arrive ‘at Knowledge, at Virtues, at Christ, and through Him at God’, and all this without the ‘Literal Law of God’. [‘Sonder eenigh behulp van de Letterlijcke Wet des Heeren heeft [de Rede] vermoghen ghehadt omme den goedwillighen Menschen te brengen tot Kennisse/ tot Deughden, tot Christum ende deur Christum tot Gode’]¹⁶.

In the work of Hendrick Laurensz. Spieghel and Marcus Aurelius Gillis van Diest one finds similar ideas. Reason, here, is portrayed, rather in a Stoic-Sokratic fashion, as a means to know God directly, without interference of the so-called “visible Church” and its ceremonies. An idea, by the way, that already displays their acquaintance and affinity with sixteenth century spiritualism.

It is in these ways that vernacular texts promoted a philosophical attitude towards life and strongly incited to ‘personal rationality’. But this is not to say that, in doing so, authors simply copied academic philosophical views to the popular context. Quite on the contrary, philosophy was carefully accommodated to the actual situation of a public that lacked a common background of higher learning. First of all, most of the traditional philosophical disciplines were absolutely useless to the common man. Vernacular authors therefore did not care much for metaphysics, physics or logic. Instead, they offered their readers practical philosophy: knowledge about *how they should live*; in other words, ethics. Moreover, the type of ethics they presented to vernacular readers was quite different from ethics as it was fashioned at the universities. Vernacular authors were not interested in the long and subtle arguments of scholars, but searched for a compact, easy-to-grasp and easy-to-apply body of ethical rules, such as these particularly could be found in the works of the classical authors. Hence, vernacular authors included all kinds of classical maxims and citations in their texts. This commonsensical approach, in which many ideas of classical and Christian origin were incorporated, was much better adapted to the lives of the people that were addressed by vernacular texts. The focus on practical life and how one should behave is also evidenced by the fact that many texts, especially during the late Middle Ages, discuss ethics and etiquette alike. Boendale, for one, tells us to lead a wise, prudent, and modest life, at the same time explaining social rules and table etiquette:

And do not drink the moment you also have some bread in your mouth. Also, do not sop [food] in a beaker that you share with somebody else, for that is not polite.	En drinct oec niet die stont Dat ghi broet hebt inden mont. Inden nap oec, des bedinct, Daer een ander met u uit drinct, En sopt niet; want sijsd ghewes Dat dat onhoefscheit es. ¹⁷
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The result is a varied guide to civilised life.

B. ‘Upgrading’ or *philosophising* popular culture.

¹⁴ *Zedekunst (Zd.k.)* II, ii, 21.

¹⁵ *Zd.k.* II, ii, 26 and II, ii, 25.

¹⁶ See D.V. Coornhert, *Onverstandig blijven is des menschen enige zonde...*, ed. Colom 1630, part I, p. 131r.

¹⁷ *Lsp.* III 4, vs. 311-316.

If philosophy was being ‘down-sized’ for effective popular use, vernacular texts also often sought to intellectualise and in fact justify some of the basic characteristics of late-medieval and early-modern popular culture; in other words, they tried to upgrade it. Almost all vernacular authors I met with and read during my investigations, attempted to legitimate city-life and mercantilism. To mention Boendale once again: he distinguishes *four* classes in society, especially emphasizing the great societal value of merchants and traders. Often, they also explicate their conviction that common people, too, can be responsible and conscious individuals, able of making decisions for themselves.

Some of these authors, however, dared go still further in their acceptance of popular culture. Striking examples of this are Boendale and Potter, whose interpretations of reason show a rather unexpected side. Admittedly, for these authors too, reason is a controlling factor in the emotional economy of man, as a rational attitude leads to modesty: ‘No-one should desire too much’, Boendale says, ‘Instead, one should stay calm and modest’.¹⁸ But according to Boendale and Potter, reason is not only a sound instrument to modesty and self-control, it can also make life happier on a more practical level, as reason helps you to get what you want. Reason is to be used to defend and increase one’s personal honour and reputation, one’s rights and one’s belongings. Reason is an indispensable means to influence one’s *environment* as well. Thus, Potter tells us around 1420 to employ reason wisely as to get the mistress of your liking. And once you are involved in such adultery, you should still use reason to hide this compromising fact. For God sees your indiscretion anyway, but if other people come to know it, that will really hurt your reputation!

Employing reason, then, is necessary both to control the inner world of the emotions and to influence the outside world. In the work of Boendale and Potter this leads to quite a new interpretation of the interaction between the individual and the outside world. Modesty is a nice thing, that’s for sure, but never should one go so far as to forget one’s own interest. In fact, both Boendale and Potter attach great value to self-interest. In discussing the core Christian value of charity or neighbourly love, Boendale stresses that the Bible tells us to love our neighbours *as* ourselves. ‘It does not say’, he writes, ‘*more than* ourselves. For many have suffered from that’.¹⁹ ‘So’, he continues, ‘you should love the other in such a way that it does not harm you’, and: ‘He who passes over an opportunity for the good of someone else, does not act wisely’.²⁰ This is hardly what one would expect from a text aiming at medieval laymen. Yet in Potter’s work one finds the same. Indeed, Potter speaks his mind even more openly.

We should take this positive evaluation of self-interest as a deliberate intellectual underpinning of the common attitude of common people living in the turbulent environment of the Middle Ages. Late-medieval city life was full of dangers of both a social and a physical nature. Self-interest was of the utmost importance for personal survival and vernacular authors just offered the justification of such an attitude. This also clarifies the abundant presence of classical thinkers in their works, whose texts were far more suited for the daily practice of non-learned people: Christian texts were often too abstract or too focused on religious piety, whereas writers like Seneca, Epiktétos and Cato offered all kinds of ideas on how to manage one’s life in a more practical sense.

¹⁸ ‘Niement en sal verwinnen,/ Elc sal hem selven stillen/Ende hem houden in maten’, see *Lekenspiegel* (*Lsp.*) III 3, lines 507-509.

¹⁹ ‘Maer meer dan ons en staet daer niet;/ Want daer is den menighen of comen/ Vele scaden, scanden ende onvromen’, see *Lsp.* III 20, lines 50-52.

²⁰ ‘Die sijns selfs orbare laet/ Om dinc die enen andren baet, Dat en hoort den wijsheit niet toe. Hebt enen andren lief alsoe/ Dat ghire niet in en wert ghescaet’, see *Lsp.* III 3, lines 220-224.

Conclusion

We now have seen that vernacular philosophy aimed to fulfil an intermediate role in medieval culture. Authors who chose to write in the language of common man, tried to extract valuable knowledge from ‘official philosophy’, as taught at the academe, and sought to transport this knowledge to a public consisting of unlearned laymen. In this process, they were well aware of the need to accommodate their message to their readers. In order to do so, they carefully selected useful philosophical ideas –mainly with regard to morals– and presented these in a way unlearned people could actually understand and use them.

Also, they tried to create an intellectual underpinning of key elements of popular culture. They sought to legitimate citizenship and mercantilism. Some even went so far as to formulate justifications for self-interest, a key feature of medieval popular culture – and one much despised by most scholars. In doing so, vernacular philosophers showed a real interest in their intended readers. Vernacular authors thus created moral-practical guidebooks for self-made men and medieval yuppies.

Vernacular philosophy thus contributed to popular culture and, what is more, it was a stimulating force in the emancipation of common man. In this way, it took part in the rise of a new world order, in which commoners could raise their voices more easily and shape their lives more freely. Philosophy could only do this, however, by accommodating itself to the needs of the common man. It had to take interest in the way common people experienced their world. And, to say something daringly after all, this may well be a general lesson we could learn from history: philosophy only makes sense when it seeks to connect to real life.

However that may be, vernacular philosophy really made a difference in late medieval and early modern European culture.

The example of vernacular philosophy in late medieval and early modern Europe raises all kinds of interesting new questions that are yet to be answered. It is clear that there exists a big difference between vernacular philosophy and the ‘mainstream’ scholastic tradition of the period. But what, precisely, is the relation between these two traditions? What kind of academic sources did vernacular authors use? And how exactly did they transform them to meet the demands of their own product, directed as it was to a different and unlearned audience? Or, the other way around, we might also ask whether vernacular philosophy influenced scholastic thinkers.

Yet another interesting area of research concerns the relation of vernacular philosophy with humanism. After all, humanists shared many characteristics with the vernacular tradition. They, too, were mostly interested in how man should live. And they, too, often tried to approach ethics in a pragmatic, less theoretical way. Again, many humanists did not identify themselves with traditional university teaching (e.g. Erasmus). Instead, they tried hard to relate to real-life problems and the actual events, such as wars, taking place in the actual world they lived in – e.g. Lipsius’ *De Constantia*, which tellingly enough was translated into Dutch and other vernaculars almost immediately. But humanism, of course, is a typically high-culture phenomenon. Humanists were highly learned ‘universal men’, who believed truth to be found in the knowledge from Antiquity. They preferred to use eloquent and complex Latin sentences and often looked down upon common culture and the so-called barbarism of the unlearned masses.

It is my intuition that during the sixteenth century vernacular philosophy and humanism to some extent converged. Coornhert, for instance, should be taken as a humanist spirit writing in Dutch. He was part of the so-called ‘Republic of Letters’ –the network of scholars throughout Europe–, and corresponded with high-culture humanists such as the

famous Leiden professor Justus Lipsius, as well as with humanist book printers like the Antwerp publisher Christoffel Plantijn. This applies to some extent to Gillis and Spieghel too. As a preliminary hypothesis, I would like to suggest that towards the end of the sixteenth century vernacular philosophy reached full maturity. By that time vernacular authors had succeeded in successfully ‘educating’ and ‘emancipating’ their laymen audience.

Coornhert is a clear example of this fusion of humanist and vernacular trends. Coornhert himself was to have quite some impact on seventeenth century authors, as he influenced progressive forces within the Dutch Reformed Church. He can even be connected to the radical Amsterdam circle around Spinoza, in which people like Lodewijk Meyer and Jarich Jelles took up ideas relating to the nature and function of reason thus linking Coornhert’s work indirectly to the radical Enlightenment.²¹

It is in this way that we are all to some extent children of the vernacular tradition in philosophy that helped shape our own way of looking at the world.

Important vernacular authors in the Low Countries between 1280 and 1600

<i>Authors</i>	<i>Main works</i>
Jacob van Maerlant (c. 1230-c. 1300)	<i>Spiegel historiael</i> (1290) <i>Wapene Martijn</i> (-) <i>Rijmbijbel</i> (-)
Jan van Boendale (1280-1365)	<i>Der leken spieghel</i> (1325-1328) <i>Het boec van Sidrac</i> (1329) <i>Het Boec vander wraken</i> (-)
Dirc Potter (c. 1370-1428)	<i>Blomme der doecheden</i> (-) <i>Van Mellibeo ende van sinre vrouwen Prudencia</i> (-) <i>Der minnen loep</i> (c. 1411)
the rhetoricians (from 1430 onwards)	many poems, plays, songs and other texts
Dirck Volckertsz. Coornhert (1522-1590)	<i>Synodus van der conscientien vryheydt</i> (1582) <i>Zedekunst dat is wellevenskunste</i> (1585) <i>Opperste ghoeds nasporinghe</i> (1590)

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²¹ See for instance Fix 1991.

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