# Worlds between Words

The politics of intra-European movement discourses

Mark M.A.C. van Ostaijen

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Worlds between Words

The politics of intra-European movement discourses

Werelden tussen woorden
De politiek van intra-Europese bewegingsvertogen

Proefschrift

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Prof.dr. H.A.P. Pols
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Mark Maria Adrianus Cornelis van Ostaijen

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Promotiecommissie

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	prof.dr. J. L. Uitermark
Copromotor:	dr. P. W. A. Scholten

Voor ons pa en ma

PREFACE

WHO

Woorden vooraf[1]

"We are accidents, waiting to happen" (Radiohead, There There)

Beginnen aan een woord vooraf heb ik altijd ervaren als een luxe-moment dat ik me niet kon veroorloven. Nu ik deze eerste zin onder ogen zie, ontvouwt het zich met een combinatie van ongemak en opluchting. Het voelt eervol om het meest gelezen deel van mijn proefschrift nu te mogen schrijven.

'Een proefschrift schrijven is een eenzame activiteit', zo werd mij bij aanvang toevertrouwd. Ik heb het echter vooral als een *sociale* activiteit ervaren[2]. Een sociale disciplineringsactiviteit. Ik heb het als een onderdeel van mijn ontwikkeling gezien om mijn eigen weg te vinden in dat academische civilisatieproces. En dat deed ik niet alleen. Een groot aantal hebben daaraan een belangrijke bijdrage geleverd.

Mijn initiële ambitie om een proefschrift te schrijven, leidde me via Eric Corijn, de NSOB, Willem Schinkel en drie jaar docentschap aan de EUR naar een onderzoeksproject met Peter Scholten en Godfried Engbersen. Zij hebben het uiteindelijk mogelijk gemaakt om mijn proefschrift-ambitie te verwezenlijken. Daarom is het gepast hen beiden allereerst te bedanken. Peter in de eerste plaats omdat hij de persoon was die iedere professional uiteindelijk nodig heeft: iemand die 'het' in je ziet. Sinds de dag dat ik bij Peter binnenliep viel alles op z'n plek. Twee Brabanders, met een voorliefde voor wielrennen die naast politiek ook nog eens een fascinatie delen voor migratie- en integratievraagstukken. Het bleek een ideale combinatie. Peter, ik dank je oprecht als aimabele collega en professionele begeleider voor het vertrouwen dat je in me hebt gesteld en de schitterende dingen die we hebben kunnen realiseren. Ik heb veel geleerd van jouw brede palet aan academische, sociale en ondernemende talenten. De *NIG Supervisor of the Year Award* komt jou dan ook als geen ander toe. Daarnaast Godfried, die als academicus en intellectueel de juiste snaar bij mij wist te raken. Het zal je verbazen hoevaak ik iets 'in de kantlijn' heb genoteerd vanwege jouw onuitputtelijke kennisreservoir dat zich niet beperkt tot sociologische klassiekers. Jouw eloquentie en vermogen om publieke sociologie te bedrijven, binnen én buiten de academie is erg inspirerend. Jullie opereerden beiden als ideale scherpslijpers wat mijn academisch werk voorzag van dramaturgie[3], creativiteit en verbeeldingskracht[4]. Ik weet zeker dat jullie kritische sturing voorgoed is genesteld in mijn schrijfproces.

Daarnaast wil ik mijn waardering uitspreken voor 'de constante factor', voor em. prof. dr. dr. (sic!) Anton C. Zijderveld. Beste Anton, onze vriendschap is een geschenk met meerdere gezichten. De intellectuele, cultuursociologische, kunstzinnige, kritisch-politieke, literaire, epistolaire en muzikale vriendschap die wij in de afgelopen jaren

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2   Dat is haast niet verwonderlijk en kan aangemerkt worden als sociologische beroepsdeformatie

3   de wet van Tsjechov

4   IMAGINATION

hebben opgebouwd is alles behalve staccato maar beschouw ik als een legato voor het leven. Met zo'n leermeester heb je geen opleiding meer nodig. Ischa Meijer stelde al eens: *"een leermeester leert je niets. Hij wijst je de weg"*. Hij had ongelijk. Jij doet beiden. Ik hoop dat we de aankomende jaren onze vriendschap, en die met Angelika, in goede gezondheid voort mogen zetten, want zoals wij weten: *"age is an issue of mind over matter. If you don't mind, it doesn't matter"* (Mark Twain).

Tevens ben ik vele collega's van de vakgroep Bestuurskunde en Sociologie erkentelijk. Te beginnen bij Vincent en Menno die het mogelijk maakte om aan de EUR te kunnen werken. Graag dank ik ook Willem Schinkel, aangezien jouw subversieve denkvermogen, retorische kracht en intellectuele autonomie me definitief richting 'de wetenschap', EUR en proefschrift bewogen. Jouw kritisch vermogen wens ik iedere promovendus toe. Voorts dank u ook graag Kees van Paridon, Peter Hupe, Jacko van Ast, Koen Stapelbroek en Wim Derksen voor de goede professionele én persoonlijke samenwerking en uiteraard Yneke en Karin voor de jarenlange ondersteuning.

Voorts ook een woord van dank voor andere collega's zoals: Ingmar, Stephan, Iris, Ruth, Ewald, Frank, Wouter, Sanne, Jaron, Erik en Marije. Ook de intra-disciplinaire groep met Gijs van Oenen, Christiaan van der Veeke en Elke Muller en de seminars van Erwin Dekker en Arjo Klamer, dank ik voor de creatie van intellectuele vrijplaatsen waar denk-kracht geen disciplinaire grenzen kent.

Daarnaast dank ik ook graag Shivant, mijn 'partner in crime' (Jhagroe, 2016). Samen-werken met jou kent geen equivalent en is een voorrecht. Ik hoop ons kritisch potentieel in de toekomst nog ten volle te kunnen benutten. Will, jij bent de verpersoonlijking dat tegendelen elkaar aantrekken. Alles wat ik aan jou waardeer heb ik zelf niet en dat houd ik ook graag zo. Ik wens iedere vakgroep op z'n minst 'een William' toe, je bent 'one of a kind'. Natalya, jou wil ik danken voor een schitterende serie Masterclasses. Een prachtig instituut dat bijna 7 jaar lang heeft getoond dat 'de luie student' niet bestaat als er maar uitdagend onderwijs wordt geboden. Dank voor het gedeeld enthousiasme en de col-legiale steun.

Tevens wil ik graag mijn mede-primaten, Warda, Ilona en Rianne bedanken. Onze Primus-bijeenkomsten waren de inhoudelijke 'krenten in de pap' en zulke bijeenkomsten zijn van onschatbare waarde voor iedere academicus. Onze samenkomst toonde aan dat het delen van een academische fascinatie niet alleen hoeft te leiden tot saaie papers, dubieuze congresbezoekjes of het uitzitten van onduidelijke presentaties. De sociale en culturele reikwijdte van ons 'instituut' gaf een nieuwe dimensie aan 'academic citizenship'.

Ik ben erg dankbaar dat ik mijn voorliefde voor onderzoek én onderwijs in Rotterdam vorm heb kunnen geven, of zoals Weber stelde: *"iedere jongeman die zich geroepen voelt wetenschapper te worden, moet zich realiseren dat de taak die hem wacht twee kanten heeft. Hij moet niet alleen als geleerde gekwalificeerd zijn, maar ook als leraar"* (2012: 12). Ik

ben blij dat ik die 'twee kanten' in Rotterdam heb mogen ontwikkelen, met zulke goede mensen om me heen.

A special word of thanks I'd like to dedicate to Steven Griggs. When I started my Ph.D. I aimed to spend a particular period abroad to finish my Ph.D. Your welcome and my stay in Leicester met al my expectations and I will remind our conversations at the coffee corner, at DMU, your kitchen table in Stoke-on-Trent and in (southern) Peak District. The convenience of my stay in Leicester showed why academic life can be 'gifted'. Also thanks to Stefania Romano as the perfect host, colleague and friend in that same period.

Next to this, I'd like to thank my talented colleagues within the project of IMAGINA-TION, Ursula, Maria Luzia, Jonas, Gregg, Karin, Andrea, Deniz and Deniz. I experienced our collaboration as a smooth and successful ideal typical research project. Many thanks for this.

Mijn beste vrienden van de Spiders, Dun Tjappies, de 'Jonge én Oude lullen' en de kennismigranten aan de andere kant van de oceaan wil ik ook bedanken. Of we nu tullepeteren in Tullepetaonestad, het Gelkingehof bezetten in Groningen, tienen in Amsterdam, wandelen over de Utrechtse Heuvelrug of afzien tijdens de Tour de Braun, jullie tonen me keer op keer dat nabijheid geen voorwaarde is voor betrokkenheid[5]. Ik ben jullie erg erkentelijk.

Speciale vermelding is er voor beeldtalent Nanne Meulendijks, dé beste illustrator van Nederland. Wat ik heb met het Woord heb jij met het Beeld. Ik vind het eervol dat jij de omslag van dit proefschrift hebt ontworpen en ik vind het bijzonder dat we onze fascinaties éindelijk een keer kunnen bundelen, middels dit boek.

Dan Corné. Jouw broer mogen zijn vervult me met trots. Alles wat wij delen, koester ik intens. Je weet: 'getuige ben je niet voor even, maar voor heel het leven', en ik ben blij dat jij wil getuigen in dit academische huwelijk.

Pa en ma. Als liefde eruit bestaat dat je iemand anders dingen gunt die je zelf niet direct zou wensen voor jezelf, dan houden jullie onbegrijpelijk veel van me. Ik dank jullie beiden omdat jullie, allebei op geheel eigen manier, mij daarvan bewust maken en er altijd voor me zijn.

Het is een goed gebruik om af te sluiten met enige woorden van dank richting degene die het dichtst bij je staat. Zonder twijfel valt die eer toe aan jou, mijn lieve Nadine. Ondanks dat dit proefschrift gaat over taal, ontschieten mij de woorden om uit te drukken wat je voor me betekent. Je leert me meer dan boeken kunnen vertellen. Ik ben jou erg dankbaar voor de gedaanteverwisseling die je onderging van *een* collega naar *mijn* vriendin. Jouw liefde, toewijding en *'positive vibe'* hebben dit proefschrift mede mogelijk gemaakt. Ik ben blij om jouw *typ* te mogen zijn. Dankjewel, voor wie je bent.

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5   of zoals de naamgever van deze universiteit al eens verwoordde: 'ruimte scheidt de lichamen, niet de geesten' (ik word daar iedere dag aan herinnerd op Rotterdam CS)

"Every book is a lie" (Hugo Claus)

"The state is this well-founded illusion, this place that exists essentially because people believe that it exists. […] be careful, all sentences that have the state as subject are theological sentences-which does not mean that they are false, inasmuch as the state is a theological entity, that is an entity that exists by way of belief" (Bourdieu, 2014: 10).

"Bring down the government. They don't speak for us" (Radiohead, No Surprises)

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''Each theory is an ideology'' (Sedlacek, 2011: 300)

''[…] what is sometimes called administrative science, that is, the discourse that agents of the state produce about the state, a veritable ideology of public service and public good'' (Bourdieu, 2014: 5)

I

RESEARCH AT THE FRONT DOOR

1

> *<<MvO: ''maybe it is good that I start explaining why I wanted to speak with*
> *you and what questions I will ask. […] In general, we study the urban effects*
> *of Eastern-Europeans….''*
> *>>ST: ''And who are Eastern-Europeans for you?''*

Imagine yourself. You are a young PhD candidate trying to conduct your first explorative interview to better understand the Polish community in The Hague. For this reason you go on a bright and sunny Sunday morning to the Polish Church service in a beautifully ornamented building in the centre of The Hague. As a former Catholic, you observe people who are active in singing and praying activities, and you see familiar Catholic practices. Afterwards you agreed upon an interview with the priest, Slawowir Trypuc. The above dialogue marks the beginning of your interview, and you continue:

> *<<MvO: ''That's a good question. Well, that has been a primary concern,*
> *how to define this group. And we define this group per country on the basis*
> *of size. Thus in the Netherlands that includes Poles, Hungarians, Bulgarians*
> *and Romanians.*
> *>>ST: ''and who is Middle-Europe?''*
> *<<MvO: ''well, for me that has multiple interpretations''*
> *>>ST: ''where is the border line?''*
> *<<MvO: ''For me, nowhere […] that is open to me''*
> *>>ST: ''[…] if someone defines Poland as Eastern-Europe, that doesn't sound*
> *well. We are Middle-Europe […]. Poland is truly the middle!''*

Three years after conducting this interview, the confrontation with the priest on the labels I used still holds relevance. I didn't thought the term 'Eastern and Middle Europe' would be a source for controversy. However, I was wrong. The priest confronted me with the politics behind labels and categories which are never neutral. He confronted me with the contestation, controversy and politicisation of the issues going on at the time regarding 'free movement' in Europe and the Netherlands.

This 'free movement' of people in Europe has been developing since the Treaty of Rome (1957) [6] and as such, is considered one of the 'cornerstones' in the development of the European Union. Guaranteed by EU law and enshrined in the principles of the Lisbon strategy it has been created as one of the instruments to create 'more and better jobs, by reducing obstacles to mobility' (EC, 2005). This instrument created an area in which not just capital, goods and services can move relatively freely but also people (also known as

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6   *''The activities of the Community shall include […] the abolition, as between member states, of obstacles to freedom of movement for persons, services and capital''* (Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, 1957)

'the four freedoms'). It has been applauded by European citizens as one of the primary benefits of the EU and it is regarded as an important component in *"creating a European employment market"* (Eurobarometer, 2004; Heinz and Ward-Wamedinger, 2006: 7) [7]. Especially after the EU enlargements in 2004 and 2011 with various new member states, the scale of that movement has grown significantly. More than 2.2 million people from Poland advantaged this freedom to engage in international movement between 2004-2007 (Kindler, 2017) and contributed to a 'new face' of East-West migration in Europe (Favell, 2008; Favell and Recchi, 2010; Black et al. 2010). Despite its success, this 'new face' also caused contestation. In France, the 'Polish plumber' played a significant role in the rejection of the EU constitution in 2005, in Sweden there were fierce debates around 'new' beggars and homeless people (Favell and Nebe, 2009) and in 2010 one Dutch alderman spoke about a 'tsunami of Eastern-Europeans'. After all, the priest illustrated the highly politicised state of the debate in the Netherlands at that time.

Now, imagine yourself once again. One month after the interview with the priest, you wake up and walk to the front door to pick up your newspaper. On the opinion page, you read an article written by your Deputy Prime Minister entitled: 'Code Orange for free labour movement within the EU', alongside an article in UK newspaper *The Independent*: 'So much migration puts Europe's dykes in danger of bursting'. He rings the 'alarm bell' for the 'negative' consequences of 'free movement' within the EU. What do you do?

In any case, I was flabbergasted. The topic of my PhD research had reached my front door and showed itself to be an enduring issue. Furthermore, the article rearticulated the idea of 'freedom of movement' from a *solution* into a *problem*. And in the context of this opinion article, one Dutch political party opened a 'Polish complaint desk' ('Polenmeldpunt') to collect issues with Polish people. It showed that this politicisation, controversy and contestation was not going away. It demonstrated that it was a salient issue which could not be reduced to a single local priests view. Instead, it showed that this politicisation was staged nationally with multiple institutions, actors and discourses present.

Finally, imagine that you study dozens of Parliamentary Letters of the European Commission and the Dutch National Government. Amongst these documents, you have studied Dutch and European policy letters on 'free movement', articulating their view as:

> *'Mobility generates social and economic benefits. Increased intra-EU labour mobility will widen employment opportunities for workers and help employers fill vacancies better and faster. [...] There has been a significant increase in the number of workers that indicate ''firm intentions'' [...] to move to*

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7 The 'free movement' of persons aims to develop a flexible pool of labour that will reduce transaction costs, counteract on market imperfections, increase the prosperity of labourers and will contribute to the economic development of sending and receiving countries (Heinz & Ward-Wamedinger, 2006). Therefore, the freedom of movement is perceived as beneficial for Europe (Kelo & Wachter 2006)

work abroad. [...] This represents a significant mobility potential' (European Commission, 2014: 10, 2).

'With the arrival of labour migrants from CEE countries, the parallel with the sixties and seventies forces itself, when also large extensions of groups came to the Netherlands. Than it was presumed, that they would stay for their durance of the demand of labour forces, and to return back to their land of origin [...] Now, after forty years, there are still efforts to overcome these backlashes. We can't allow that in a certain time again an extensive group stayed unnoticed and which came at large socio-economic distance' (Letter to Parliament, 2009: 103, 4).

Now, with such international perspectives it became clear to me that this issue could not be isolated locally or nationally. Also, because at that time some national Ministers asked the European Commission for attention since *''this type of immigration burdens the host societies with considerable additional costs"* (Mikl-Leitner et al., 2013, see also: Hundstorfer et al., 2015). The European Commission formally responded by confirming that *''there is not just simply one single perspective on free movement. There are a variety of experiences" (*Reding, 2014: 1). Moreover, the then Home Affairs Commissioner, Cecilia Malmström, criticized this member-states letter since *"EU citizens who have the right to travel, live, work and study where ever they want in the Union are put on a par with immigrants from countries outside the EU. For instance, they are being called 'EU immigrants', a concept that does not exist".* She even stated that: *"they are mixing apples and oranges"* by *''mixing up internal EU mobility and immigration"* (Hansen, 2015). Also, Vivian Reding, the then Commissioner for Justice wanted *"to make it absolutely clear: free movement is a fundamental right, and it is not up for negotiation. Let language not betray us: European citizens exercising their right to free movement are not 'immigrants'"* (Reding, 2013).

But why are we 'mixing apples and oranges'? Let language not betray us? And why does 'EU immigrants' not exist? How to make sense of this contestation and politicisation? Why do these levels 'speak' different languages? What's the reason behind such different problematizations and what are the institutional consequences? This completed the messiness and wickedness of the issue I was dealing with. However it was now totally clear for me that if I wanted to understand this issue, I should understand it as a politicized struggle over its meaning by different actors. To make *sense* of this, I decided that the multiple meanings on European migration and mobility were not an *insignificant* but a key element of what was going on. Therefore, the first adjustment I made in order to better understand this issue was constructing a neologism to create conceptual distance on forehand ('intra-EU mobility' over labour migration' or vice versa). As such, I constructed a catch-all term ('general signifier') to study all synonyms in the case studies referring to

human movement *within* the European territory, such as 'mobility', 'migration' or 'free movement'. The usage of a neologism sensitizes this research from the start on *politicized or nationalized conceptualisations* of human movement. Thus, I selected an alternative conceptualisation, to approach the object of study as 'intra-European movement'. This shifted the research focus from *migration politics* towards the *politics of intra-European movement discourses*[8].

To analyse this contestation, I studied the literature on migration studies, or studies on intra-European mobility depicting the 'new face of East-West migration' (Favell, 2008; Guild and Mantu, 2011; Glorius et al., 2013; Black et al., 2010; Gabriel and Pellerin, 2008; Menz and Caviedes, 2010; Boswell and Geddes, 2011; Engbersen et al., 2013; Recchi, 2015; Janta et al., 2011; Datta et al., 2007). Studying this strand of literature gave me little guidance of how to study this contestation. It appeared that there was limited attention for the interpretive side of the contestation, politics or politicisation behind the categories, discourses and narratives used. And in addition to that, how the discursive struggle of authorities shaped and influenced the institutional actions on European migrants and mobile workers. More generally, it seemed that this contestation has been taken for granted or has not been problematized at all. Therefore, this study is primarily an interpretive contribution to that strand of literature understanding the politicisation of intra-European movement. My claim is not that 'free movement' or 'intra-European movement' has not been studied empirically, but that studies on 'free movement' had limited attention for the interpretative, discursive and political aspects (Balch, 2010; Boswell and Geddes, 2011; Geddes and Scholten, 2016). Overall, this reveals an absence of interpretive approaches which focus on the discursive struggle between political authorities in making sense of intra-European movement.

To overcome this lack of interpretive studies in mobility and intra-European movement research, and to be able to study this contestation, I draw on qualitative methods and include discursive techniques, focussing on *discursive practices* around intra-European movement. To understand these discursive practices, I interpretively *study* how authorities *observed* intra-European movement. Drawing on key references in the field, I show the significance of numbering and of *poetic elements* such as metaphors and myths. By drawing on this literature, refining it and applying it to the topic of intra-European movement, it shows the relevance of a discursive perspective to understand contemporary contestation, politicisation and controversies in a multi-level institutional setting.

To be able to do that, this book investigates policy-making processes in the domain of intra-European movement by the case studies of the European Commission and Dutch

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8   I consciously re-articulate the topic under study as 'intra-European movement' 1) to create conceptual distance in the vocabulary I use and the empirical matter I study 2) to provide with inclusiveness to the variety of vocabularies in the empirical cases studied. Next to this, this subtitle is in reference to Hajer's (1997) work on the 'politics of environmental discourses'

national and local governments. Through empirical work this book shows the multiple meanings given to this topic, traces the contestation in its multi-level setting, how this lead to a variety of institutional practices and adds insights to our analysis of contemporary politics. These insights have importance to the question how current governments 'solve' issues such as migration. As such, its shows the importance to understand migration and mobility as social and contingent constructs.

By studying the *politics* of migration discourses, I do not study *real migration* practices but discursive practices creating *migration as reality*. This approach problematizes the construction of 'truth' and puts emphasis on communications of knowledge exchange and the analysis of meaning about 'truth' (Hajer and Versteeg, 2005; Howarth and Griggs, 2013: 325). As such, it is not the *migration phenomenon itself* that holds importance, but the way in which actors make sense and discursively construct a *phenomenon as migration*. The ontological status of 'real migration statements' is not 'reality' but discursive truth claims about that reality. These 'truth claims' or operations are positioned in an 'agonistic field' which incorporates concepts of social conflict, disputes, forces and power (Latour and Woolgar 1979: 237; Lyotard, 1975). Consequently, 'truth claims' or 'data' are a product of a contingent and temporary consensus rather than a discovery or proof of a fixed social reality (Fischer, 2003). As such, by approaching 'migration' as 'truth claims *about* migration' enables migration to be approached as a socially *mediated* and *contested concept*.

1.2 AIMS AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This book aims to show how institutional discourses on intra-European movement are related to the institutional actions present in a multi-level perspective. To meet this aim, it examines the discourses on intra-European movement applying it to Dutch and European Commission case-studies. Therefore, this study aims to answer the following main research question:

> *How can intra-European movement discourses within the European Commission and the Netherlands be conceptualized and analysed, and how are institutional discourses related to institutional actions?*

The main research question is composed of three sub-questions:

1. *How can institutional discourses, institutional actions and the relationship between both be conceptualized and analysed?*
2. *What kind of institutional discourses and institutional actions of intra-European movement can be identified in the Netherlands and the European Commission?*

3. *How are the institutional actions related to institutional discourses of intra-European movement in the Netherlands and the European Commission?*

1.3 BOOK OUTLINE

This book adds a *discursive* and *institutional perspective* to the case of intra-European movement. Part I includes the introduction of the theme, the theoretical accounts and the specificity of the discursive approach. It draws on the work of others (Hajer, 1997; 2003; Schmidt, 2008; 2011) to redevelop the specificities of a discursive approach in a multi-level policymaking setting into a 'comparative discourse approach'. Part II includes the chapter 3, 4, 5 and 6 and consists of the empirical substance of this research. Chapter 3 and 4 both investigate the discourses present at the European and Dutch national level and what kinds of consequences are related to these discourses. But while chapter 3 is based on an analysis of political documents, chapter 4 is based on interviews with Dutch and European policymakers. Chapter 5 shows how the processes of numbering and framing influence the institutional actions of the Dutch national government while chapter 6 shows the significance of local governments on intra-European movement in this multi-level setting to develop new laws and legislation. Finally, part III consists of chapter 7 which comes back to the central research questions, summarizes the findings and addresses the bigger picture of this research. To summarize, this book has a threefold structure:

1. HOW: Introduces the theme and theorizes 'how' I approached the issue of intra-European movement
2. WHAT: Includes the empirical substance of the book, showing 'what' kind of data has been collected
3. WHY: Accounts 'why' this research was relevant, concludes on its practical and theoretical contributions and discusses further avenues of research

Part	Chapter	Title	Substance	Publications	RQ
HOW					
I	**1**	Research at the front door	Introduction of the theme and focus of the book		RQ 1
	2	Making up theories	Explicating and explaining the research approach		RQ 1
WHAT					
II	**3**	Contested proposals	How is intra-European migration defined in European and Dutch policy documents and what are the consequences?	*Critical Policy Studies*	RQ 2, 3
	4	Contested beliefs	How do intra-European and Dutch policymakers define European migration and what are the consequences?	*Policy & Politics (In review)*	RQ 2, 3
	5	Contested knowledge	How are numbers used to legitimate intra-European migration discourses and what are the consequences?	*Critical Policy Studies*	RQ 2, 3
	6	Contested governance	How do governance actors manage intra-European migration in a multi-level setting?	*Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies (JEMS)*	RQ 2, 3
WHY					
III	**7**	Contested conclusions	Can we explain and discuss the research findings?		RQ 1, 2, 3

MAKING UP THEORIES – THEORIES AS METHODS, METHODS AS THEORY

"There can be no pure perception, no pure datum, exactly as there can be no pure observational language, since all languages are impregnated with theories and myths. Just as our eyes are blind to the unforeseen and unexpected, so our languages are unable to describe it" (Popper, 1968: 368)

"The discourse of the world passes through open eyes, eyes open at every instant as for the first time'" (Foucault, 2008: 90)

2

Knowledge *"cannot be defined without understanding what gaining knowledge means"*. In other words, knowledge can only be approached *"by considering a whole cycle of accumulation: how to bring things back to a place for someone to see it for the first time…"* (Latour, 1987: 220). I am highlighting this Latourian perspective on knowledge and the importance of explicating *gaining* knowledge because in this chapter I explicate how I 'gained' and constructed knowledge, how I collected 'data', how I will make 'truth claims' and how I can say something 'knowledgeable'. In that operation I made use of Chekhov's law[9]. In the following chapter I account for my assumptions, political-normative and ideological position. To do this, I will report about choices made, sometimes based on ideological, principal or even pragmatic reasons. Therefore, in the upcoming chapter I make an arbitrary but helpful distinction between epistemology and ontology and present some assumptions in my understanding of the politics of migration discourses, the central theme of this book. I will briefly sketch how I approached migration as discursive battleground. After this, I will introduce the discursive and interpretive analyses which enabled me to do this research and elaborate how this study can be read in terms of scientific rigor, systematicity and reliability. Finally, I will reflect on the socialized and disciplining ritual of producing a chapter like this[10]. But first, as I wanted to know how I could understand the contestation surrounding migration, I will elaborate on how I relied on and studied the literature on migration. In particular its case study on intra-European mobility, European labour migration and free movement.

2.1 MIGRATION STUDIES AND INTRA-EUROPEAN MOBILITY

Generally, 'classical' migration studies look at the 'allocation of human beings across space' by the distribution of economic opportunities over physical space (Massey et al., 1993; Portes, 2010; de Haas, 2014). A range of contributors has studied migration as the result of geographic differences in the supply and demand for labour (Massey et al., 1993: 433; Lewis, 1954; Greenwood, 1985). Some contributors pointed out the importance of individual choice, in which individual decisions to migrate are mainly based on rational comparisons of utility maximisation (Borjas, 1994; Portes, 2010; Sjaastad, 1962; Todaro, 1969; Chiswick, 2000) or as embedded in larger units such as families or households. In these larger units migration is regarded as a collective act to minimize risks, maximize

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9   Chekhov's law: if a murder is committed in the final act of a theatre play then the weapon must have been introduced in the first act. And next to this, one should not introduce ten guns in the first act if there is only one shot in the end. This points at the importance of considerate timing and selection from the author to its audience. I thank Godfried Engbersen for introducing this dramaturgic analogy to me

10   The title of this chapter is in reference to Hacking's (2002) 'making up people'

benefits and to loosen constraints (Stark and Bloom, 1985; Lauby and Stark, 1988; Taylor, 1986). Other contributors argue that international migration is caused by the intrinsic labour demands of modern industrial societies, the pull factors in receiving countries (Piore, 1979) or engrained in the expansion of capitalist economic relations (Massey, 1993: 445; Portes and Walton 1981; Sassen 1988; Alba and Nee, 2009). Obviously, this 'classical' migration literature gives little guidance on how to understand the contestation or politicization of migration or mobility better. As more 'realist' approaches, it holds limited sensitivity for the *politics* behind social categories such as 'migrants'.

There has been some criticism on 'classical' migration approaches for treating the state as *"an aberration disrupting the 'normal' functioning of the market"* (Castles and Miller, 2009: 24) or of taking the existence of states and their practices largely for granted (Torpey, 1998: 240; Zolberg, 2015). This state-ignorance contributes to a *state-centred construc-tiveness* and a reflection deficit on statecraft (Salt, 1987). It leads to 'simplifications' and uncritical accounts about how scholarly concepts of migration are used for state purposes (Boswell, 2007; Bommes and Maas, 2005: 179). This is problematic since this dominance of state perspectives leads to a ''*frequent uncritical adoption of policy categories to classify migrants and migration"* (de Haas, 2014: 60). This even leads up to others arguing that ''*migration research is caught in specific national normative and discursive traditions, thus replicating the dominant images of the migration 'problem' carried in domestic public and political debates"* (Lavenex, 2005: 243). It is for instance argued that migration scholars tend to use concepts such as 'the country of origin' as a self-evident unit of analysis, depicted as 'methodological nationalism' (de Haas, 2014; Wimmer and Glick-Schiller, 2003). Moreover, this 'concomitant ignorance of origin country factors' (de Haas, 2014: 6) and the significance of nations could lead to an uncritical adaption and dissemination of 'nation-state-centered paradigms' and 'national self-sufficiency' (Favell, 2005: 47).

This critical awareness caused a turn towards a more 'transnational', 'local' or 'mobility' approach in migration studies which criticizes nation-state constructions. For instance, from a 'transnational' perspective migration is not solely seen 'from a host country perspective' (Levitt and Jaworsky, 2007). Some pointed out the growing significance of 'locality' and the city-scale to look beyond the 'ethnic lens' in migration studies (Brenner, 2004; Glick-Schiller, Caglar and Guldbrandsen 2006; Glick-Schiller and Caglar, 2011), while others suggested a 'mobility paradigm', to understand social life from a more transient and moving perspective to criticize 'static categories such as the nation and the state' (Urry, 2007; Elliott and Urry, 2010). However, despite this criticism and criticism on this critism (Huijer, 2016)[11] the range of alternative 'turns' not much is known about the power and *politics of migration*, or the *discursive construction of* and *political contestation*

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11   ''*Scientific attention focusses primarily on the migrant. But since that migrant cannot exist without people who stay behind, one could expect that immobility is an as important research field as mobility. This is not the case. A course as immobilitystudies cannot be found at any university"* (Huijer, 2016: 37).

behind 'migration'. And it is *"strange that migration scholarship has had so little to say about […] power, since the question of power structures whether or not we can define a person who moves across state borders as a migrant"* (Glick-Schiller, 2009: 113). This is something I was interested in from the start. However, since my case study is not about *migration in general* but rather about *intra-European movement in specific*, I cannot solely rely on references to general migration studies but I also need to specify my argument within the strand of literature and case study on intra-European mobility.

Generally, there has been a wide range of scholarly attention for intra-European mobility which primarily addresses the economic, cultural and social drivers and consequences of this 'new face of East-West migration' (Favell, 2008; Guild and Mantu, 2011; Glorius et al., 2013; Black et al., 2010; Gabriel and Pellerin, 2008; Menz and Caviedes, 2010; Boswell and Geddes, 2011). Some studies primarily include a political-economical perspective, showing the most important consequences in terms of (macro-) economic developments of international labour migration in terms of dequalification, exploitation, commodification and exclusion (Favell, 2008; Janta et al., 2011; Datta et al., 2007; Andersen, 2013; van Ostaijen, Reeger and Zelano, 2017). Others focus on post accession migration developments and specific types of mobility, such as 'liquid mobility', 'mobility transition' or 'Eurostars' in which, European mobility is seen as a specific form of 'migration', with large variety in terms of settlement and attachment (Engbersen et al., 2013; Favell, 2008; Black et al., 2010; Glorius, et al., 2013). Others focus more on the lack of European political culture and the multi-level consequences for European governance and policy implementation (Recchi, 2015; Boswell and Geddes, 2011). Most of these studies contribute with an empirical investigation of the 'new face of East-West migration' (Favell, 2008). The studies in which migration and mobility have been critically studied from an interpretive or discursive perspective are limited (Balch, 2010; Squire, 2010; Iosifides, 2013). This absence of interpretive approaches focusing on the discursive struggle between political authorities in making sense of intra-European movement, left me puzzled. Because, if general migration studies *and* intra-European mobility research both do not provide guidance to understand the contestation, politicisation and controversies which I observed, how was I able to make sense of it? This drove me towards social-constructivist and interpretive approaches. In the following paragraph I will explain how I understood that tradition, what I mean by the concepts used and how it contributed to my research approach.

2.2 ONTOPOLITICAL EPISTEMOLOGY

I consider it relevant to explicate my epistemological and ontological position, since ''*no political analysis has ever been ontologically neutral*'' (Hay, 2006: 78), therefore, the upcoming paragraph can be understood as an ontopolitical epistemology, which I will explain

at the end of the next paragraph. First of all, to understand the contestation or politics of *intra-European movement discourses* I hold a social-constructivist and interpretive perspective, inspired by contributions on symbolic interactionism and social constructivism (Dewey, 1925; Mead, 1934; Gadamer, 1979). In this line of reasoning, one assumes that reality *cannot* be objectively identified, known and analysed. But this does not mean that 'anything goes' (Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Berger and Zijderveld, 2009). It means that knowledge about the world is always relative, not free-floating, but *related* and inter-related, structured by language (de Saussure, 1983). Moreover, knowledge is 'situated', 'local', 'contextual' and *interpreted* information (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012). Such an approach requires in the first place an eye on *social being* to *interpret information*, such as me, the author of this piece, before something knowledgeable can be said. Consequently, knowledge becomes a 'humanistic' and a social product, an outcome of social interactions (Berger, 1963). This implies that knowledge cannot fulfil the promise of uncovering 'truth' or 'actual mechanisms'[12] since it is socially mediated, locally situated and value-laden. As Mary Douglas puts it: *"systems of symbols get their meaning from social experience. […] There are no natural symbols; they are all social"* (1982, xix-xx). Things, for interpretive researchers, *come* into being and do not contain specific essences. Accordingly, this implies an anti-*essentialist* ontology, an ontology of *becoming*[13] since objects and human subjects do not have underlying fixed essences, governed by immutable natural laws (Bevir and Rhodes, 2000). Moreover, I assume that phenomena and their meanings are contingent, intertwined and shift in various directions (Griggs and Howarth, 2013; Gottweis, 2003). Things *become* social because they mean certain things to people, and this meaning is historically, socially, politically and culturally embedded (Hacking, 2002).

However, given these disclaimers, I *do* aim to gain knowledge and to make 'truth claims' about intra-European movement discourses. Therefore, I consider how claims about that movement come into being as potentially true or false, as *legitimate* claims of knowledge. Thus, in this study I focus on the politics of 'knowledge claims' and 'discursive practices' about intra-European movement. Consequently, I am fascinated, like others, by words, people and institutions that *make sense* of intra-European movement (Hacking, 2002). Because by seeing, thinking, writing and speaking about 'intra-European movement' and inscribing values to it does not only *describe* it, but also *constitute* and *produces* that 'movement' (Barad, 2003; Howarth, 2000). To be sensitive about this, I rely on a Foucauldian

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12   Positivist-realist scholars mostly presuppose that reality can be identified, known and analysed objectively and unmediated. This epistemological position even argues that although social reality is complex and multiple perspectives can exist, knowledge about this world can be produced without subjectification, if one follows the correct scientific procedures, methods and rules. In other words, reality does exist 'out there' and can be known in relation to the objective criteria of their very existence (Comte, 1975). I think it is a footnote to explicate that I do not confirm that thesis

13   which resembles with Thomas' way of avoiding the term 'society', instead using terms as 'social becoming' and 'social evolution' (Thomas, 1966)

discourse approach which regards power and knowledge as dispersed but also fundamentally intertwined since power is expressed by meaning-making practices of creating a joint understanding of the world (Hajer and Versteeg, 2005). This fascination drives me to how people create meaning by making up people, things, words and institutions, or as Hacking states this: *"categories of people come into existence at the same time as kinds of people come into being to fit those categories, and there is a two-way interaction between those processes"* (2002: 48). This approach problematizes the construction of 'truth' as a contingent and powerful sense-making construction (Hajer and Versteeg, 2005; Howarth and Griggs, 2013: 325). As such, it is not the *migration phenomenon itself* that holds importance, but how power is mediated by the discursive construction of a *phenomenon as migration*. This 'politics' of 'truth claims' or operations are articulated in an 'agonistic field' which is sensitive for social conflict, disputes and power (Latour and Woolgar 1979: 237; Lyotard, 1975).

Speaking from poststructuralist and critical political theory, *politics* is not just considered as the institutionalized decision-making process of bargaining and consensus building. Instead, institutionalized practices are perceived as a result of societal resistance and struggle to define legitimate power, norms and classifications (Mouffe, 2000; Schmitt, 2000). From this perspective, institutional politics is a *contingent* process founded by friction, opposition and resistance. It assumes that the social world is constituted by differences, fractions and antagonisms which structure the status-quo instead of consensus, commonalities and agreement. In this way, 'conflict and disagreement –not the disappearance of difference- are the defining features of political and social life' (Waldinger and Soehl, 2010; Pearson and Citrin, 2006: 220). Consequently, institutionalized *politics* is seen as the procedural, institutionalized and professionalized consolidation of conflict, which is enacted daily in Houses of Parliament. Importantly, this does not mean that struggles *disappear* when power, norms and categories are codified, consolidated and established in bureaucratized institutions. Where there is power there's resistance (Foucault, 1979: 125), since the stabilisation of a certain norm implies contestation and conflict. This contestation is 'not only legitimate but also necessary' since any consensus is a ''*conflictual consensus*'' (Mouffe, 2013: 8). Consequently, this makes it possible to distinguish *'the political'* as the ever-going, non-state related form of struggle (Schmitt, 2000) from '*politics',* which refers to an ensemble of practices, discourses and institutions that seek to consolidate a certain order of human coexistence. This consolidated order is also known as 'the police' and is constituted by potentially conflicting conditions of

'politics' (Ranciere, 2001; Mouffe, 2013: 2)[14]. Let me illustrate, by two movie dialogues, how I perceive power and knowledge as fundamentally intertwined by the discursive, and thus constitutive and political, construction of 'homosexuals' and 'rehabilitation'.

Box 1: Movie dialogues

''You know your problem Henry is that you are hung up on words, on labels, that you believe they mean what they seem to mean. AIDS, homosexual, gay, lesbian, you think these are names that tell you who someone sleeps with? They don't tell you that. No. Like all labels they tell you one thing and one thing only: where does an individual's sole identity fit in the food chain. In the pecking order. None of ideology or sexual taste but something much simpler, clout. Not who I fuck or fucks me but who will pick up the phone when I call, who owes me favours. This is what a label refers to.
Now to someone who does not understand this, homosexual is what I am because I have sex with men but really this is wrong. Homosexuals are not men who sleep with other men. Homosexuals are men who in 15 years of trying can't pass a pissant anti-discrimination bill through city council. Homosexuals are men who know nobody and who nobody knows, who have zero clout. Does this sound like me Henry? No.
I have clout. Lots. …
I don't want you to be impressed. I want you to understand"
(Al Pacino, Angels in America)

Parole Hearings Man: *'''Ellis Boyd Redding, your files say you've served 40 years of a life sentence. Do you feel you've been rehabilitated?'*
Red: *'Rehabilitated? Well, now let me see. You know, I don't have any idea what that means'.*
Parole Hearings Man: *'Well, it means that you're ready to re-join society...'*
Red: *'I know what you think it means, sonny. To me, it's just a made up word. A politician's word, so young fellas like yourself can wear a suit and a tie, and have a job. What do you really want to know? Am I sorry for what I did?'*
Parole Hearings Man: *'Well, are you?'*
Red: *'There's not a day goes by I don't feel regret. Not because I'm in here, because you think I should. I look back on the way I was then: a young, stupid kid who committed that terrible crime. I want to talk to him. I want to try to talk some sense to him, tell him the way things are. But I can't. That kid's long gone, and this old man is all that's left. I got to live with that. Rehabilitated? It's just a bullshit word. So you go on and stamp your form, sonny, and stop wasting my time. Because to tell you the truth, I don't give a shit'''.*
(Morgan Freeman, the Shawshank Redemption)

Language matters. The above dialogues show how language, as discourse, is constitutive and intertwines politics and knowledge. It also illustrates two examples of struggle with 'the police' or the constituted order of politics by the usage of discursive labels. It is this struggle of the political that constitutes my study to the politics of intra-European move-

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14   While Ranciere (2001) uses the distinction 'la police' and 'politics' to understand the consolidated order from 'the part that has no part' which he sees as politics. To overcome conceptual complexity I will not use the Rancierian conceptual accounts of 'police' and 'politics' but I do rely on his approach of looking at the consolidated order of policing as antagonistically determined by politics.
      While we could go into in-depth analysis about the (post-foundational) philosophical contributions of this difference and how the work of Mouffe builds upon notions of Lefort, Schmitt and Ranciere, for the aim of this chapter it is important to acknowledge this difference to review the lines of thought in migration theory (van der Veeke, 2013). Moreover, in this perspective, 'politics' is the game that connects in the *present* a relationship between an *open future* and a *closed history* (van Middelaar, 2009).

ment discourses. Because whether or not one perceives intra-European movement as a problem, depends on the discursive elements used.

Do not misunderstand me: I do not deny the existence of 'moving people' or *okay*, 'migrants', they can exist. But let's put it in a more classical philosophical quest: I do assume that a tree can fall without someone observing it. But more importantly, I also assume that one can only *know* and *say* something knowledgeable about that tree when someone has *sensory experience* about it. Shortly, let's rephrase it in a Kantian sense: I do not deny das *Ding an sich*, but one can only *know* das *Ding an sich* by human, sensory experience. And then the interpretation starts, and as Popper claims: *''there can be no pure observational language''* (1968: 368), so than phenomena get interpreted and inscribed by values (Zijderveld, 2006). And discourse analysts, doubt a *''sharp separation between questions of fact and questions of value''* (Griggs and Howarth, 2013: 16), because 'facts' are always 'socially constructed' and discursively produced. I highlight this position, to meet common concerns that surround interpretive approaches as if it denies any actual existence. This is not the case which I expressed above but has also been expressed more effectively by others:

> *''The fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has nothing to do with whether there is a world external to thought […]. An earthquake or a falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists, in the sense that it occurs here and now, independently of my will. But whether their specificity as objects is constructed in terms of 'natural phenomena' or 'expressions of the wrath of God', depends on the structuring of a discursive field. What is denied is not that such objects exist externally to thought, but the rather different assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects outside any discursive condition of emergence''* (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 108).

Importantly, there are no objects external to subjective thought, outside any discursive field[15]. By taking a closer look, and by taking this position, my epistemological and onto-logical accounts merge. Because, whether I can generate knowledge about data depends on the ontological specificity of this data, and as such, my epistemological assumptions are ontologically loaded (Hay, 2006). Moreover, my epistemological and ontological ac-counts merge into an *ontopolitical episteme*, since every interpretation in political analysis presupposes a contestable ontological perspective and involves the projection of certain ideals into our objects of investigation (Connolly, 2008; Griggs and Howarth, 2011)[16]. These explications about my *ontopolitical* epistemology are about the degree of certainty of which I can legitimately claim knowledge beyond the immediate context of my obser-vations. In line with that, I round off with two considerations:

a. When epistemology is about the 'degree of certainty to legitimately claim knowledge', and when I focus within discourse on *''the views that can be legitimately accepted as knowledge''* (Fischer and Gottweis, 2012: 11), this research is not only about *studying* (discursive) legitimacy, but also *creating* (discursive) legitimacy. This 'double-ness' makes me sensitive to the *translations* I legitimately claim (Latour, 2000);

b. The implications of my ontological choices are not limited to epistemology, they also have methodological consequences. I will explain these consequences in the final paragraphs of this chapter[17].

These disclaimers have importance, since it guides this books perspective. One of the consequences is that I approach *language as discourse* by referring to different discourse-theoretical approaches. In the following paragraph I will explicate *who* inspired me in this approach and *how* I applied this discursive perspective to this research.

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15   I can illustrate this, by explaining why I deviate from one important contributor to social-constructivist think-ing, and one of my sources of inspiration, the sociologist Robert Merton. I deviate from Merton's 'famous' re-articulation of the Thomas theorem by introducing the 'self-fulfilling prophecy' by which he stated that *''the self-fulfilling prophecy is, in the beginning, a false definition of the situation evoking a new behavior which makes the originally false conception come true''* (Merton, 1968: 477). In his approach Merton seems to assume to have objective and true knowledge about what a *false* definition of the situation is. Moreover, he stated that *''beliefs not always have to father the reality''* which seem to point at his belief of a 'true' reality which, after all, can be known by him as a researcher. Just to make my position even more clear and explicit, I deviate and criticize Merton and others who distinguish *objective* and *subjective* realities or *brute* or *institutional* facts (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Searle, 1995). Against Searle, I assume there can be no physical brute facts *without* a process of institutionalization. Also the 'physical brute fact' of snow on the top of the Mount Everest is in my view an insti-tutional fact (Searle, 1995). Against Durkheim, I assume there are no social facts that transcend the individual perception. Consequentially, all social facts are individually valued and thus institutional facts. Again, I do not deny that there is a world beyond sensory experience, but we can only *understand* and say something *knowable* of this world by means of that sensory experience. Or as stated by Griggs & Howarth: *''objects and things in this approach certainly 'exist' independently of any particular discourse, but their meaning and significance – and how they are engaged with by social actors – depends on their position within particular symbolic frameworks''* (2013: 18).

16   Since 'every interpretation in political analysis is an 'ontopolitical interpretation' (Connolly, 1995).

17   I just want to *'resist the temptation to divorce the problem of method from deeper issues of ontology, explanation, ethics, and normative evaluation'* (Glynos & Howarth, 2007).

2.3 DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

More generally, from a positivist perspective, language is mostly seen as a neutral *means* describing the world outside. By post-positivist or post-structuralist approaches, language itself becomes problematized and seen as a performative *medium* that does not just *describe* but also *constitute* the world it refers to. By approaching language as *discourse* I refer to language and its potential power to structure, highlight and silence specific elements, next to its potential to discipline what can and cannot be thought and serve as precursors to particular outcomes (Keller and Poferl, 1998; Litfin, 1994). Discourse can be articulated within 'all kinds of spoken and written interaction, formal and informal' (Potter and Wheterell, 1987: 7). Consequently, I do have a *non-intentional approach* to discourses, since discourses do not *want* anything[18]. I do not aim to step into the 'fallacy of misplaced concreteness' (Whitehead, 1925), by reifying an abstract notion such as discourse as intentional agent. In that sense discourses have no *essential core* that push forward or *intent* to change something. Instead, I use 'discourse' as a deductive concept to understand agential practices.

I have to admit that by this approach I consciously 'close off' some alternatives routes in discourse analysis. I am not a linguist and therefore, I am not interested in textual 'moves'. I am also not solely interested in governmentality, bio-politics or hegemony of broad political-social practices (Foucault, 1981; Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). Instead, I want to understand the political contestation regarding intra-European movement, which can at best be understood from a discursive perspective. Therefore, I zoom in on individual *situated and embedded* 'texts and talk' in their social, institutional and political setting channelled through a particular set of routines, rules and norms, which emerge *"from practices rooted in basic social structures and ideological practices"* (Fischer, 2003: 76; Fairclough, 2003; Fischer and Forester, 1993; Forester, 1999). Therefore, I focus on text and talk to understand meanings in embedded contexts.

Since we stand on the 'shoulders of giants' (Merton, 1965), there are many fields[19] distinguished in discourse analysis.[20] There have been many interpretive attempts to analyse contested discourses, meanings and the implications *for policymaking*. While

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18   comparable with Luhmanns approach on communications (Luhmann, 1995).

19   There are many fields and schools distinguished in discourse theory, methods and analyses. It stretches from Frankfurt style critical theory and Foucauldian poststructuralism to a Bourdieu-inspired emphasis on institutional practices, Laclau influenced focusses on phantasy and neo-Gramscian studies of hegemonic discourse (Fischer and Gottweis, 2012).

20   From more verbal or corpus linguistics approaches for the sake of grammar (Schnurr & Wharton et al., 2016), to meso-structural perspectives on the organisational impact of discourses on human capital, communication and management processes (Fairclough, 1992; Vaara & Tienari, 2010) to more macro-structures of hegemonic discourses in the positioning of society vis-à-vis governments (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). Because I encountered the pitfalls of the dogmatism in this segmented field personally, I feel the urge to clearly position myself in this discursive field without an aim for new dogmatism.

conventional (rational, historical or sociological) institutionalist schools privilege actors *or* structures, poststructuralist political analysis tends to avoid this dichotomization (Schmidt, 2010). For instance, for Foucault there is no *a priori* autonomous subject, instead the subject operates in a context of regulated practices where ideas are formed which gives very limited agency to subject positions (Hajer, 1997). As such, Foucault approaches individual action in a reductionist way and 'stresses discourses rather than beliefs' (Bevir and Rhodes, 2000: 13). This is also how Hajer interprets Foucault and a point of deviation for this study, because 'a rejection of autonomy does not need to entail a rejection of agency' (Bevir and Rhodes, 2000: 14). Therefore, I rely on others, who signify the *enabling* possibilities of the subject to act (Hajer, 1997; Potter and Wheterell, 1987; Bevir and Rhodes, 2000). Consequently, I do not approach subjects as passive actors but as conscious and active agents articulating themselves within or sometimes even outside a discursive field or discipline. Because actors *do* politics and institutions *shape* policy making ''*these processes need to be understood within the discourses where actors are constituted and institutions framed as relevant within a given policy field. These are extremely important analytic considerations which address dimensions of power widely ignored in conventional policy analysis*'' (Gottweis, 2003: 254). Instead of advocating institutional thinking on the one hand or methodological individualism on the other, my interpretive approach acknowledges the importance of structural phenomena to understand politics, policy as dimensions of power without *reducing* actors as the sole outcomes of these power structures[21]. With this focus, I link in with general interpretive policy analysis which focuses on the ways meanings are articulated, created and contested. Moreover, in that approach policies are characterized as ''*the contingent outcomes of political struggles between competing discourses*'' (Miller, 2002; Griggs and Howarth, 2013: 22).

Roughly interpreted, it can be seen that within social-constructivist literature on policymaking there are two angles, without implying that both angles are mutually exclusionary. The first angle primarily focuses on the *content* that has been produced. This covers a wide range of linguistic, media and cultural researchers that focus on the role and usage of narratives, meanings and metaphors (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Stone, 1988; Yanow, 2000; van Hulst, 2008; van Leeuwen, 2007). The second angle primarily concerns the *institutional implications* of this content. This covers a wide range of policy scientists, institutional and governance scholars that focus on the social construction of problem definitions to understand institutional stability, change and policy implementation (Gusfield, 1981; Schneider and Ingram, 2001; Schneider and Sidney, 2009). Consequently, Hajer (1997) distinguishes both angles as *content* and *context* which Schmidt (Schmidt

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21   Moreover all actions, objects and practices are socially meaningful and shaped by social and political struggles embedded in specific historical settings (Fischer, 2003 Howarth, 2000: 9). They are finite and contingent productions of which its production involves the exercise of power (Griggs and Howarth, 2013). Such discourses have formative and constitutive power in structuring social definitions, meanings and the interactions in a social system.

and Radaelli, 2004; 2008) defines as *substantive content* and *discursive interactions*. Since I am interested in understanding institutional contestation and its implications for policy-making from a discursive perspective, I am interested in both angles. Therefore, to embed my approach better, I highlight two key references which suggest including both angles in their research, Vivien Schmidt and Maarten Hajer.

First of all, Hajer (1997) suggests that he analyses both the *context*, when he analyses discourses as related to the social practices in which it is produced, and the *content*, when he analyses discourse as ideas, concepts and categorisations. By combining both he argues to have a 'clear institutional dimension' by approaching discourse as ''*the ensemble of ideas, concepts and categorizations that are produced, reproduced and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities*'' (Hajer, 1997: 44). Secondly, Schmidt suggests an analysis of both, when she analyses the significance of *substantive content* of the discourse by 'embedded' or 'endogenous' elements such as ideas, beliefs, perspectives, paradigms and images. Next to this, she focuses on the *context* of how this substantive content is conveyed by 'sentient agents and their discursive interactions', in order to study 'the outcomes' such as institutional stability and policy change 'not as the power of interests but the power of ideas' (Schmidt, 2010; 2011). Combining both angles, Hajer's work in the 'politics of environmental discourse' and Schmidt's work on discursive institutionalism in the EU, has substantial relevance for my discursive approach to understand institutional contestation and its implications for policymaking. But, while I do acknowledge the importance of both scholars, I also think that both approaches can be refined in their approach on *content* and *context*.

DISCURSIVE LEGITIMATION

First of all, I acknowledge the conceptual complexity of distinguishing content and context, of separating discourses and actions or practices[22]. A *constitutive* approach on language, mostly links language and practices together, as discourse. And separating content and context, language and practice, is stepping into a widely held dispute to what extent discourses *are* practices and to what extent language *is* action (Austin, 1962; Searle, 1995; Fischer, 2003; Wagenaar, 2015; Gottweis, 2013; Schaffer, 2016) [23]. Relying on more post-structuralist notions of language, linguistic structures profoundly shape one's view of reality, instead of being only a neutral medium *mirroring* it. Linguistic descriptions not only describe, because *''any description depends on the presence (through its absence)*

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22   When practice 'refers to the construction of social realities through actions that invoke beliefs, ideology and power' (Fischer and Gottweis, 2013: 13) discourses and actions are inseparable, since 'representation is intervention' (Gottweis, 2003: 251). But merging discourses, argumentation and deliberation to practice obfuscates rather than explicates the relationship between discourses and institutional action.

23   instead of beliefs (Sabatier, 1997) or ideas (Hay, 2007) to understand actions

of a fullness which, while it is the condition of any description, makes any pure description utterly impossible" (Laclau, 2000: 81). Moreover, 'descriptions' have a performative effect, because: *''if new modes of description come into being, new possibilities for action come into being in consequences"* (Hacking, 2002: 108). While I could add another paragraph to linguistic discussions on discourse, which I consider relevant, I would prefer to explicate my constitutive approach on language as discourse, without assuming that language and practice are the same or are implicitly related to each other. I conceptually prefer to distinguish them to make it possible to empirically study both and how they are related since I would rather not assume that they '*exactly overlap*'[24]. Instead, by separating and explicating both it becomes possible to study *moments of antagonism*s, *moments of dislocation* when discourses and actions do and do not overlap (Laclau, 2000: 76). And to specify this approach, to be able to study both institutional discourses and actions, I focus on the *discursive legitimation* of both. This needs some explanation.

By conceptualizing discourse as *''the ensemble of ideas, concepts and categorizations that are produced, reproduced and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities"* (Hajer, 1997: 44) highlights the distinction between the 'ensemble of ideas, concepts and categorizations' as *institutional discourse* from the 'produced, reproduced and transformed set of practices' as *institutional actions* (Hajer, 1997)[25]. Both institutional discourse and institutional actions are the practices *''through which people experience the world, specifies the views that can be legitimately accepted as knowledge and constitutes the actors taken to be the agents of knowledge"* (Fischer and Gottweis, 2012: 11). This distinction enables me to focus on how agents discursively construct 'ideas, concepts and categorizations' next to 'actions' as *'legitimately accepted knowledge'* (Hajer, 1997; Fischer and Gottweis, 2012: 11). This makes it possible to focus on the *discursive legitimation* of institutional actions and institutional discourses, more specifically, how *agents* discursively legitimate institutional discourses such as 'ideas, concepts and categorizations'[26] next to institutional actions, a specific 'set of practices'[27],

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24   This distinction can be related to more post-structuralist accounts as consisting on the one hand the *''grammar or cluster of rules which make some combinations and substitutions possible and exclude others"*. This is known as 'discourse' and *''broadly coincides with what in Lacanian theory is called the 'symbolic'"*. And as Laclau acknowledges, *''if the symbolic was all there was in social life, social logics and social practices would exactly overlap. But we know there is more in social practices than the enactment of the symbolic through institutionalized performances. There is, in our analysis, the moment of antagonism, which - as we pointed out above - is not part of social objectivity but the limit of objectivity (of the symbolic) constituting itself"* (Laclau, 2000: 76)

25   This study takes a step *back* and focuses on what happens before, on what Hajer (1997) termed as, 'discursive structuration' or 'discursive institutionalisation' processes

26   More specifically, this has been conceptualized and operationalized by 'poetic elements' such as concepts, metaphors, myths and numbers. Next to this, 'storyline' elements are distinguished, such as 'objectives', 'subjectives' and 'type of intervention'. In chapter 4 this is operationalized by 'beliefs' and 'meanings'. In chapter 5 this is done by operationalizing 'numbering' and 'framing'. Finally in chapter 6 we operationalized this by political elements.

27   More specifically, institutional actions are operationalized in chapter 3 as 'policy proposals', in chapter 4 this has been operationalized by 'actions' referring to policies, laws, legislation, collaborative venues, networks and in chapter 6, this has been operationalized by 'policy elements'.

on intra-European movement. This is all situated in a 'discursive field', which refers to the embedded context of discourse and meaning-making processes. Snow (2013) defined discursive fields as evolving *''during the course of discussion and debate, sometimes but not always contested, about relevant events and issues, and encompass cultural materials (e.g., beliefs, values, ideologies, myths) of potential relevance and various sets of actors […] whose interests are aligned, albeit differently, with the issues or events in question, and who thus have a stake in how those events and issues are framed and/or narrated"* (Snow, 2013: 1). Within such a discursive field consisting 'texts, documents, interviews and social practices' (Griggs and Howarth, 2013: 48) as 'embedded' contexts of 'cultural materials', I situate the foregoing concepts. The following figure 1 visualizes how I conceptually relate the discursive legitimation of institutional actions and institutional discourses embedded within a discursive field[28]. And while this figures includes some clear arrows, these arrows are not intended as causal relationships but as visualisations of conceptual relations[29].


Figure 1: *conceptual visualisation*

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28   Discourse is the overall term which covers the practice of discursive legitimation of institutional actions and institutional discourses. There is a distinction between the general approach on 'discourse' and the specific approach on 'institutional discourse', which implies that by 'discourse' I intend to focus on the overall definition given (Hajer, 1997: 44) while institutional discourse is more a communicative approach on discourse. This is the consequence of separating language and action, which implies that institutional discourse 'only' includes a more 'light' or communicative approach on discourse. This will be more elaborated in the following paragraph

29   For instance the arrows in the upcoming figure seem to be unidirectional. This could give the impression of a causal relationship which is not assumed. It could also give the impression that institutional discourses and actions do not influence or relate back to discursive legitimation, which is also not the case. I do hold a more reciprocal conceptual process in which I do acknowledge a more interrelated process, but for matters of visual clarity and to indicate my research design better, which centralizes the intentionality of agents and their discursive legitimation, this seemingly unidirectional visualisation is a better visual and heuristic starting point to simplify the conceptual starting points than visualizing a more complex two-sided process from the beginning.

First of all, *legitimation* is conceptualized as 'the creation of a sense of understandable, necessary or acceptable actions in a specific setting' (Van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999). *Discursive* legitimation is defined as the discursive technique that explains and justifies social activity, which provide in 'good reasons, grounds, or acceptable motivations for past or present action' (Van Dijk, 1997, 255). It is the justification of salient elements of the institutional order by giving a normative dignity to its practical imperatives (Boltanski and Thevenot, 1991). In contrast, delegitimation establishes a sense of negative, morally reprehensible or otherwise unacceptable actions (Rojo and Van Dijk, 1997; van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999; Vaara and Monin, 2008; Vaara and Tienari, 2008; 988; Vaara and Monin, 2010). To operationalize discursive legitimation, I rely on the work of Van Leeuwen (2007; 91) who distinguished four key categories of discursive legitimation:

– *authorization* (tradition, custom, law, persons in whom institutional authority is vested);
– *moral evaluation* (specific value systems that provide moral basis for legitimation);
– *rationalization* (utility of specific actions based on knowledge claims);
– *mythopoesis* (narratives relating issues to the past or future)

This focus on discursive legitimation is not just simply to *bypass* the conceptual complexity between discourse and action or practice, it is mainly to explicate how I conceptually separate and relate both to empirically study 'the constitutive role of discourse in political processes' (Hajer, 1997: 58). Because, of this conceptual relationship, I do acknowledge the constitutive or performative role of discourse since *'discourse constitutes social practice and is at the same time constituted by it'* (Healey, 1999; Howarth and Griggs, 2006; Leeuwen and Wodak 1999: 92; Hibberd, 2005)[30]. Discourses *actively act* or *do* something rather than merely passively contain something (Prior, 2008; Cooren, 2004). As such, powerful discourses can have a 'feed-forward' effect, 'a precursor to action', 'a signpost for action' or a 'theory of causation' for institutional actions and practices (Verloo, 2005; Schram, 1995; Fischer, 2003; van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999; Berger and Luckmann, 1966: 106; Austin, 1962; 1975; Schaffer, 2016). But *how* does this 'feed-forward' or 'signpost' effect work? In order to study this *performative* potential of language I focus on how language is articulated, created and performed by *agents*. This points at how agents make up collective

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30   The concept of 'performativity' meandered from the early works of Austin (1962) to that of Butler (2008). Austin separated the performative from the constative, and broadened it towards a theory of 'speech acts', since 'the issuing of the utterance is the performing of an action' (Austin, 1975:6). It indicates the power of speech acts to imply effects or consequences within or without that speech act. Austin (1962) distinguished illocutionary and perlocutionary speech acts. Illocutionary speech acts imply what they say at the same time, for instance 'I do' at a wedding. Whereas perlocutionary speech acts imply something that lies outside the speech act, for instance civic resistance or compliance. Other writers such as Searle, Derrida and Fish developed this speech act theory to the point where Butler and Sedgwick applied it to dominant claims about gender, sex and identity formation (Loxley, 2007). It has shown the relevance of this theory in our understanding of the implications of performances on identity, politics and social problems.

constructions, which have the potential to transform a statement into an object or a fact into an artefact[31]. This is also applicable to a phenomenon such as migration, which only becomes imaginable when, for instance, nations started to organize themselves by states (bureaucracies) and when states started to invent borders which enabled registering, counting and monitoring practices which made it possible to depict nation-state border crossing *as* migration and subjects involved *as* migrants (Scott, 1998; Hacking, 2002). In other words, once discursive distinctions are made, new realities come into being. And this constitutive and 'performative' role of language, articulated and enacted by agents through text and talk, is what concerns me in *the politics of* intra-European movement *discourses.*

Therefore, I focus on *how agents discursively legitimate* institutional actions and institutional discourses. This involves an analysis of policy documents, formulations of individual policymakers and statements of politicians to investigate to what extent they constitute or redefine the institutional order in which they are embedded. This implies a bottom-up study of discourse and of 'the actions and beliefs out of which they emerge' (Bevir and Rhodes, 2006: 71). This approach not only analyses 'subject positions' but also includes 'structure positionings', structural elements that *reproduce or destabilize* institutions (Hajer, 1997). And for that reason, I zoom in on the discourses of individual embedded actors. By relying on the work of Thomas (Thomas, 1923; Thomas and Thomas, 1928: 572)[32], *agents* are an important starting point for policy analysis, especially if one wants to understand policy implications (Merton, 1968; see also: Goffman, 1959). This is why this study turns to agents, to gather insights about the institutional level, since what policy actors do *''is a result of how they define the situation in which they are called on to act. A limited appreciation is reflected today in some of the work on decision-making, but on the whole this point is grossly ignored''* (Blumer, 1969: 19). These discourses are not approached as isolated and individualized discourses but as being part of a more collective

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31   "*The word 'normal' has long served for description and evaluation, but evolved into two roles. One is the Quetelet-Durkheim conception of the normal as the right and the good. The other is the Galtonian notion of the normal as the mediocre, and in need of improvement. In either role, the idea of the normal presents itself as the seal of objectivity and impartiality, a neutral bridge between 'is' and 'ought'* (Hacking, 1990: xi).

32   which shows that the individual definition of a situation structures that situation for others and subsequent developments

and embedded institutional context[33]. Generally, institutions and its agents are studied by the *sedimented articulated practices* within its *discursive field* by which these institutions come into being.

After conceptualizing language as discourse and introducing a focus on discursive legitimation, in the following I will specifically explicate how institutional actions and institutional discourses are conceptualized and related, returning to the initial key references of Hajer and Schmidt. Because, as noticed before, both Hajer (1997) and Schmidt (2008; 2011) include analyses of both *content* and *context*, of both discourse and actions (Torfing, 2001). They both have a focus on agents. Hajer 'allocates a central role to discoursing subjects' (Hajer, 1997: 58). While Schmidt focuses on policy discourses produced by policymakers and politicians which consist of individuals and groups in non-coherent 'epistemic communities' 'at the centre of policy construction involved in the creation, elaboration, and justification of policy and programmatic ideas' (Schmidt, 2008: 310). Therefore, I do not claim that both approaches do not focus on agents (Bell, 2011). However, both approaches need refinement in their agential approach on *content* and *context,* which I will explicate in the following paragraphs[34].

INSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSE[35]

First of all, both works of Hajer (1997; 2003) and Schmidt (2008; 2011) contain a limited operationalized research design which makes it hard to understand *how* content has been analysed. This is not just a lack of both scholars only but can be positioned in the general context of discursive studies in which operationalization is not always self-evident, despite a range of contributions in this field (Fairclough, 2003; Wodak, 2009).

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33 in which institutions are perceived as 'sedimented products of contingent beliefs and preferences' which enable or restrict the re-articulation of human beings in relation to and in the reproduction or destabilisation of those institutions (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Hajer, 1995; Bevir & Rhodes, 2000: 30) that produce them. I understand institutions in its Weberian or Mannheimian sense, as representing the substantial or value rationality opposing the more procedural and instrumental rationality. In this sense, institutional rationality represents values, norms and goals while organisational rationality roughly depicts procedures and means to reach those goals. Important from this perspective of institutions is the process of institutionalisation, the process of social values and norms become part of an non-reflected realm, of a common norm, part of broader societal procedures and organisations (Zijderveld, 2000). By this process of institutionalisation actors can reproduce and stabilize or disconfirm and change societal institutions. As such, I have a comparable approach to institutions as I have to discourses, which is a contingent, anti-essentialist and non-intentional approach. Institutions are nothing by essence, do not think or want anything. Institutions are institutionalisations, reifications of social norms and values. And as such, institutions are like clichés (Zijderveld, 1982).

34 Highlighting agents operationalized by discursive legitimation explicates my empirical approach of agents because *"to explain social institutions […] is to show how they arise as the result of the action and interaction of individuals"* (Elster, 1989: 13).

35 There is a distinction between the general approach on 'discourse' and the specific approach on 'institutional discourse', which implies that by 'discourse' I intend to focus on the overall definition given (Hajer, 1997: 44) while institutional discourse is more a communicative approach on discourse. This is the consequence of separating language and action, which implies that institutional discourse 'only' includes a more 'light' or communicative approach on discourse.

However, some studies include a large span of interpretation, implicit assumptions and a non-mutual exclusionary approach of concepts, layers and elements. To illustrate, studies can present the multifacetedness of 'discursive multiplicity' and 'different normative contexts in which different values were defended' only to conclude that *''local stakeholders reinterpret discourses in their own way''* (Warner and van Buuren, 2011: 798*).* Sometimes, operationalization is just absent based on 'intuition', or elements are conceptualized as 'a state of mind' in a particular period. Others lack a clear and replicable conceptual lens, evolving into very ill defined operationalization and, therefore, loose-end empirical results, by which could lead to the question: what did you *not* observe in the end? (Hajer, 1995; 2003; Howarth and Griggs, 2006; Balch, 2010; Carrete and Gasper, 2010; Verheul, 2014; Roberts, 2016) Let me be more specific.

Hajer distinguishes three layers in the analysis of policy discourses (Hajer, 2003: 104): 1) storylines, metaphors and myths; 2) policy vocabularies (concepts and terms) and 3) epistemic notions (rules of formation). This threefold distinction is based on a '*layered chronology*' in the manifestation of discourses to understand processes of 'discourse structuration' and 'discourse institutionalisation' (Hajer, 1997). Also, Schmidt considers 'endogenous' elements such as ideas, beliefs, perspectives, paradigms and images by the 'background discursive abilities' (which enable them to speak, argue and act) and 'foreground discursive abilities'[36] (the abilities to think and argue 'outside' institutions in a critical way and to take action to change it[37]) of agents (Schmidt, 2008; 2010; 2011). But both approaches lack clarity in their operationalization, since they for example relate particular elements without explanation, which obfuscates how their analysis is built up. For instance, in his first layer Hajer merges all 'ideas, concepts, metaphors and storylines' together without explanation. And it remains unclear *how* story-lines are analysed (Hajer, 2003). Even though Hajer conceptualized his most important concepts (discourses, discourse coalitions, storylines) in later work, it stays rather implicit *how* elements are operationalized and *how* the analysis is built up (Hajer, 1993; 1995; 1997; 2003; 2005). Also, in Schmidt's approach *how* ideas, beliefs, perspectives, paradigms and images are operationalized and *how* her analysis of 'endogenous' elements is constructed, is kept implicit.

While I agree with Hajer and Schmidt on many points, my research design deviates from Hajer's account on what is called 'the first layer' of policy discourses, consisting

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36   'hintergrund' and 'vorgrund' links in with more phenomenological theories of human activity as neither constituted nor constitutive, but simultaneously being both (Schutz, 1932)

37   Schmidt refers with this notion to Habermasian 'communicative action' as a response to 'macro-sociologists like Foucault and Bourdieu who see little escape from the ideational domination of the powerful' (Schmidt, 2010; 2013: 94). For instance Schmidt (2001) illustrates the ways in which policy discourse shapes communicative action among political actors in their translation of problems into policy issues (Fischer and Gottweis, 2013). In this perspective, institutions do not cause political action, rather, discourses shape actors behaviour, which causes political action. The interests of actors are influenced by institutional structures through which they are pursued (Fischer and Gottweis, 2013).

of 'storylines, metaphors and myths that help sustain the societal support for particular policy programmes' (Hajer, 2003, 104). While Hajer lumps all elements (such as storylines, metaphors and myths) together, in this study storyline elements are separated from metaphors and myths as poetic elements. This separation and explication is not just applied for aesthetic reasons only but in order to have a more refined understanding of *how* 'the constitutive role of discourse' really works (Hajer, 1997: 58). In that regard, I want to be able to know exactly which element has more or less significance in the discursive legitimation of what? For that aim, it is not sufficient to study discourse with a general approach on 'storylines', but this instead demands an operationalization of the *content* in terms of different elements (such as storyline elements and poetic elements). Next to this, Hajer's third layer of 'epistemic notions' ('a state of mind' in a particular period) is excluded in my approach, mainly because this layer is too loosely conceptualized and former applications do not contribute to a refined operationalization (Hajer, 2003: 106). But this is not only the case with the work of Hajer, Schmidt also lumps 'endogenous' elements such as ideas, beliefs, perspectives, paradigms and images together which does not really contribute to our understanding of why these elements are merged and how the analysis is built up.

In this approach, I deviate from how ''*the argumentative approach operationalizes the idea that discourse is constitutive […]*'' (Hajer, 1997: 72). More specifically, I move away from Hajer's application of 'operationalisation' and from previous constitutive assumptions between discourses and institutional actions. Instead, (while the specificities are outlined in the subsequent chapters) I operationalized institutional discourse in chapter 3 by 'poetic elements' such as concepts (terms with structuring use value), metaphors (analogies), myths (repeatedly used public narratives) and numbers (quantifications). Next to this, 'storyline' elements are distinguished, such as 'objectives' (problem definitions and aims), 'subjectives' (the subjects of targets) and 'type of intervention' (course of action). In chapter 4 this is operationalized by 'beliefs' (convictions and thoughts) and 'meanings' (norms and values). In chapter 5 this is done by operationalizing 'numbering' (topic selection and data collection) and 'framing' (naming, classification and narrating). Finally in chapter 6 we operationalized this by political elements (political leadership and politicisation of the issue). By operationalizing institutional discourses, this study adds insights to the significance of specific discursive elements. This is needed to 1) better approach and study institutional discourses and to 2) construct a more reliable and explicit research approach. This is all in order to have a more refined understanding *how* 'the constitutive role of discourse' really works in political processes (Hajer, 1997: 58).

INSTITUTIONAL ACTIONS

Both Hajer and Schmidt not only focus on discursive 'tropes' or content but study this in relation to the institutional context. For instance, Hajer studied 'storylines' as 'vehicles of change' which 'are analysed in connection to the specific discursive practices in which they are produced' (Hajer, 1997: 72). He identifies "*storylines as the signpost for action within institutional practices*" (ibid: 264) and sees processes of de- and re-institutionalization, of disembedding and re-embedding with, what he admits, "*uncertain outcomes*" (1997: 263). Schmidt is also interested in the substantive content of discourse and especially also "*how it exerts a causal influence*" in "*political reality and, thereby, engender institutional change or continuity*" (Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004: 204; Schmidt, 2008: 305). She shows interest in the "*transformative power of ideas and discourse*" since they "*provide the recipes, guide-lines, and maps for political action and serve to justify policies and programs*" (Schmidt, 2008: 306), since "*discourse, in short, is an important factor in the explanation of policy change*" (Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004: 207)[38]. While both scholars have large significance in the institutional analysis on the constitutive dimension of discursive content, it is not always clear *how* they conceptualized discourses as 'signpost for action' or the 'causal influence' of discourse. Instead it is rather obfuscated how this 'transformative' relation-ship between discourse and actions are operationalized and *how* the influence of 'story-lines' on 'action' are analysed. This is probably informed by a *constitutive* approach on discourse, which suggests that 'actions and practices are *constituted* by the concepts and beliefs' (Connolly, 1983: 36). Also, Hajer and Schmidt implicitly *assume* this relationship between discourse and action. But *assuming* a linkage between institutional discourses and actions[39], obfuscates *how* these discourses are related to policy actions, such as poli-cies, laws and legislation. It is this process of which Schmidt acknowledges that:

> "*we still have no way of considering the process by which such ideas go from thought to word to deed, that is, how ideas are conveyed, adopted, and adapted, let alone the actors who convey them to whom, how, where, and why. This raises the question of agency, which brings us to the concept of discourse*" (Schmidt, 2008: 309).

Both Hajer and Schmidt struggle with how '*ideas go from thought to word to deed*' or assume a constitutive relationship between discourse and action. To –again- *overcome*

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38   others even look at "*causal linkages between policy narratives and policy outcomes*" (Shanahan, Jones, McBeth and Lane, 2013: 477). This approach reduces discourse as 'simply another variable of empirical testing' (Howarth and Griggs, 2013: 305).

39   When practice 'refers to the construction of social realities through actions that invoke beliefs, ideology and power' (Fischer and Gottweis, 2013: 13) discourses and actions are inseparable, since 'representation is inter-vention' (Gottweis, 2003: 251). But merging discourses, argumentation and deliberation to practice obfuscates rather than explicates the relationship between discourses and institutional action.

this constitutive perspective on discourse, I should not only operationalize institutional discourse but also institutional actions. Therefore, I operationalized institutional actions in chapter 3 as 'policy proposals' (strongly related to 'type of intervention'), as 'actions' in chapter 4 (collective or individual acts or non-acts) referring to policies, laws, legislation, collaborative venues and networks. Finally, this has been operationalized in chapter 6 by 'policy elements' (coordination, interactions and relationships of actors and institutions, next to the development of policies, laws and legislation).

More specifically, I am not just 'counting' the institutional actions, but focussing on how agents in text and talk *discursively legitimate* certain institutional actions. I contribute with an *agential perspective* and a focus on discursive legitimacy, explained in the previous paragraph. I do acknowledge that adding to the conceptual complexity between discourse and action with a perspective on how agents discursively legitimate discourses and actions does not fully resolve how 'ideas go from thought to word to deed'. But I also do not aim to solve the full conceptual complexity between discourse and action. Instead, I aim to contribute with an empirical applicable operationalisation *how* to study discursive *content* in its embedded institutional *context* to understand policy actions (Torfing, 2001). By studying how 'actions' such as policies, laws and legislation are discursively *legitimated,* this study operationalizes institutional actions to empirically study 'the constitutive role of discourse in political processes' (Hajer, 1997: 58). Now, let us conceptualize the setting of these political processes.

MULTI-LEVEL SETTING[40]

I do not just study 'discourse coalitions' or 'epistemic communities', but rather the discursive legitimation of institutional actions and discourses articulated and embedded within a *multi-level* governmental *setting*. By a case study selection (outlined later) of multiple levels (Dutch local, national and European case) this demands attention for the discursive legitimations of multiple authorities handling with the issue of intra-European movement. To understand these multiple discourses a *comparative approach* is demanded. Both Hajer and Schmidt provide with limited guidance for such a comparative approach. Firstly, Schmidt does account for the multi-level context ''*because the EU governance system is multi-actor in the fullest sense of the term*'' (Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004: 199). But in explaining how member-states respond to European policies she includes 'problems', 'policy legacies' that have a 'goodness of fit', 'actors preferences', 'institutional capacity to act' and 'discourse'. This is rather remarkable since in a more constitutive approach, all mentioned

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40   I am using this grammar while I do acknowledge the limits of this term since 'the multi-level language gives preference to actors on various 'state' levels and is linked to an extension of the classical federalist practice of territorial representation'. It 'reifies a notion of politics working on separate planes' which becomes 'a self-fulfilling hypothesis' (Diez, 1999: 605)

factors can be discursive. As such, it does not suggest an integral social-constructivist or constitutive approach on discourses, but instead a more communicative approach on discourse as 'mediating' factor[41]. This also guides her *comparative* perspective when she approaches discourse as mere communicative or coordinative device, in analysing how policies are adopted, rejected or implemented by 'policy learning'[42]. In that approach, the EU is characterized as "*a multi-actor systems in which trans-European coordinative discourses among policy actors overlap with the national ones on policy formulation, while mostly leaving to national political actors the communicative discourse to national publics*" (Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004: 199). It reveals her 'thin' or more *communicative perspective* on discourse derived from a more *federalist comparative perspective* (Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004; Schmidt, 2008)[43].

Also, Hajer discusses this element of multiple levels when he touches upon problems of inter-discursivity when ''*ideas make perfect sense within the discourse in which they were constituted, but then subsequently become an element in a debate that is conducted by a far more diverse group of actors and in the context of acts and practices that do not function according to the discursive logic of that original discourse*'' (1997: 46). Despite this comparative sensitivity and his study of the development of discourse coalitions in two case studies (Britain and the Netherlands) his analysis remains on the national level of both cases, leaving out a comparative perspective. Uncoincidentally in later work, he distinguishes '*studies into national discourse*' and '*comparative studies*' as separate, in which his 'environmental politics' work can be positioned as the former (Hajer and Versteeg, 2005: 183). In conclusion, both Hajer and Schmidt provide us with limited guidance for a multi-level or comparative approach. This provided the main reason to develop a multi-level or *comparative discourse approach* to empirically follow the development of discourses throughout time (see next paragraph). Therefore, to be able to gain comparative understanding about multiple case studies involved, this study adds a comparative approach to the work of Hajer and Schmidt, to understand the position of the cases vis-a-vis each other.

For that reason, I draw upon literature on governance in multi-level settings to analyse horizontal and vertical interactions in case studies. In particular vertical governance interactions in multi-level settings gained much scholarly attention (Pralle, 2003; Guiraudon, 2000; Bache and Flinders 2004; Piattoni 2010). For instance, Hooghe and Marks (2001)

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41   From a more constitutive perspective on discourse, 'problems' or the 'goodness of fit, are discursive constructions. While Schmidt acknowledges that 'discourse may operate on all mediating factors', this is limitedly applied

42   Consequently, this leads to a causal influence of discourse explaining policy change, since it is stated that ''discourse can be the most important among a range of factors, a cause, and a defining one, since it may serve to reconceptualise interests, chart new institutional paths and reframe cultural norms" (Schmidt & Radaelli, 2004: 206). This is a clear reification and an illustration of the fallacy of misplaced concreteness (Whitehead, 1925) of discourse as if discourse is an agent that intentionally does or wants something

43   by institutional settings such as 'simple' or 'compound' polities

indicated *multi-level governance* as an important way of vertical governance actions in a multi-level setting. Scholten (2013) redeveloped this into four ideal types in order to understand the interactions between governmental levels: centralist, localist, multilevel and decoupled governance (Scholten and Penninx, 2016). The *centralist* ideal type exhibits a clear hierarchy and division of labour between government levels. The *localist type identifies a more* bottom-up perspective in which local governments formulate policies horizontally. *Multilevel governance* refers to interaction and coordination of relations between the various levels of government without clear dominance. Finally, *decoupled* implies a situation characterised by the absence of any meaningful policy interaction between the levels.

These ideal-types could give guidance in the discursive understanding of our cases from a comparative perspective. However, while this strand of literature is helpful in understanding relationships within a multi-level setting, it is not always empirically helpful, as it has a blind-eye for the local level[44] and is ill-sensitive for the discursive content constitutive for such interactions. For instance, Hooghe and Marks' conceptually *assume* governance interactions in a multi-level setting while Scholten's conceptualisation does not solve the puzzle to understand *why* decoupling occurs. For instance, one could question the extent to which decoupled governance is still a matter of governance (since limited interactions does not have to add up to *any* type of governance). Next to this, the literature has limited sensitivity for discourses to understand governance. It merely includes insights about intergovernmental or supranational processes of Europeanization which lack a social-constructivist or interpretive perspective on how discourses shape the institutional context of cooperation and coordination (Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004).

COMPARATIVE DISCOURSE APPROACH

This study contains a comparative *and* discursive perspective to acknowledge its multi-level setting and to redevelop argumentative and discursive institutionalist approaches (Hajer, 1997; Schmidt, 2010). In that regard, termed as *comparative discourse approach* I developed a typology of ideal types which includes a focus on discourse within a multi-level setting[45]. This multi-level or *comparative discourse approach* empirically enables us

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44 Next to that, Hooghe and Marks largely neglect the growing significance of local governments. While local governments and especially large cities are more and more becoming entrepreneurial and in charge of policies such as integration (Castles & Miller, 2009; Scholten, 2013; Emilsson, 2015; Alexander, 2003; Caponio & Borkert, 2010; Scholten & Penninx, 2016). Therefore, I aim to also acknowledge the significance of the city scale and local governments (Glick-Schiller and Caglar, 2008; 2011: Barber, 2013).

45 Ideal types are *"constructed concepts endowed with a degree of consistency, seldom found in actual history"* (Weber, 2002: 55). This quotation continues as follows: "*Precisely because of the impossibility of drawing sharp boundaries in historical reality, our only hope of identifying the particular effects of these religious ideas must come through an investigation of their most consistent (or 'ideal') forms".* Ideal types draw attention to the typical features of a specific phenomenon, in order to build a picture of its key characteristics in order to unveil social phenomena (Ringer 1997).

to follow the development of certain discourses throughout time and examines how discourses are (re)produced in different institutional contexts. This evolved into a typology which is sensitive to *discourses in a multi-level setting*, without *essentializing* the structures of the setting, such as 'levels', to understand the discourses present. Since discourses are not fixed but heterogeneous in nature (Hajer, 1993), without scale or level boundaries, the case study selection of authorized levels provides this study with institutional reference points where certain discursive articulations can be studied. As such, this typology enables me to study these levels where discourses become consolidated to make authorized judgements and public decisions possible.

This typology is based on two axes which have extensively been elaborated in the previous paragraphs: 'institutional discourses' and 'institutional actions'. Concisely summarized, on the one hand we operationalized *institutional discourses* by 'poetic' elements' such as concepts, metaphors, myths and numbers, 'storyline' elements, such as objectives and subjectives (chapter 3), 'beliefs' and 'meanings' (chapter 4), 'numbering' and 'framing' (chapter 5) and 'political elements' (chapter 6). And on the other hand, *institutional actions* are operationalized as 'policy proposals' (chapter 3), 'actions' (chapter 4) and 'policy elements' (chapter 6). This makes it possible to draw a typology in a two-by-two table[46] with the X-axe as 'institutional discourses' and the Y-axe as 'institutional actions', both of which add up to a general approach on discourse (Hajer, 1997: 44). There is gradual difference between them in terms of the extent discourses or actions hold consistency. This results in a typology with four ideal types, which visually could suggest hard dividing lines between the types, but which should be understood in a gradual perspective. This typology creates a heuristic framework to comparatively study consistency in institutional actions and institutional discourses in a multi-level setting. As such, four ideal types of *multi-level discourses* can be distinguished:

A. *Action dislocation*
(Consistent institutional discourses/ inconsistent institutional actions)
This type characterizes a *dislocatory situation* of consistent discourses combined with inconsistent actions. This marks a *situation of dislocation*. For instance, this depicts a situation when within a case concepts of European mobility are present, combined with a range of practices to combat illegal European citizens. Since the actions are limitedly congruent with the discourses present, a situation can, therefore, be characterized as 'action dislocation'.

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46   which is 'one of the biggest methodological innovations in social science' (Godfried Engbersen suggested that this quote can be attributed to Paul Lazarsfeld)

B. *Multi-level coupling*

(Consistent institutional discourses/ consistent institutional actions)

This type characterizes a regime situation when *between cases* consistent institutional discourses and consistent institutional actions occur. This involves a commensurable situation in which discourses and actions could be coordinated or even linked. For instance, this could indicate a situation when between cases European mobility concepts are used related to actions to stimulate mobility, which indicates 'multi-level coupling'.

C. *Multi-level decoupling*

(Inconsistent institutional discourses/ inconsistent institutional actions)

This type characterizes a regime situation when *between cases* inconsistent discourses are related to inconsistent institutional actions. This type refers to a situation when institutional actions and institutional discourses are both inconsistent. For instance, this situation can be characterized when the domain of free movement concepts of EU citizens and European migrants are both inconsistently present combined with a practices that both stimulate and combat the integration and illegality of European citizens. This would mark a situation in which both discourses and actions are fully inconsistent in relation to each other. It could result in the absence of joint discourses, actions and coordination between cases which could create 'dialogues of the deaf', policy 'paralysis' or 'policy stalemates' which indicates 'multi-level decoupling'.

D. *Discursive dislocation*

(Inconsistent institutional discourses/ consistent institutional actions)

This type characterizes –like the action dislocation type- a *dislocatory situation* when consistent institutional actions are present but combined with inconsistent institutional discourses. This can occur when within a case particular institutional actions are present, but which are combined with inconsistent institutional discourses. This marks a *situation of dislocation.* For instance, this characterizes a situation when consistent practices aim to stimulate the 'integration' of 'European migrants' while metaphors refer to the importance of 'flexibility on the Market' and refer to a past of guestworker migration. Since the discourses are then limitedly congruent with the actions present, such as a situation can therefore be characterized as 'discursive dislocation'.

This conceptualisation results in a typology of four ideal-types[47]:

Figure 2: *Comparative discourse analysis*

Figure 2 holds mainly interpretive and explorative value. It does not assume any causal relationships between the axes, but envisages four 'scenarios' or ideal typical situations to *understand* the empirical case studied. Thus, this comparative discourse approach mainly contains interpretive aims and deviates from aiming to explain institutional change (Schmidt, 2008) which is a difference between an understanding or interpretive (*verstehende*) and an explanatory (*erklarende*) approach (Weber, 1978; Winch, 2008; Simmel, 2011). The real contribution of this approach is not to be found in its *prescriptive* force, but in the ability to *understand* 'the discursive power struggles' within the politics of migration (Hajer, 1997)[48].

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47   Some theorists would argue that this is a 'discourse-light' or 'thin discourse' approach, since it does not take into account overarching discourses (capitalism, neo-liberalism) that structure and hegemonize our ways of thinking. But this study is not a 'discourse-lite' approach with a 'thin analysis' of discourses about a minimal and cognitive conception of discourse, 'reduced to simply another variable that can be subjected to empirical testing' (Howarth and Griggs, 2013: 305). It is also not a 'thick analysis' of discourses covering a wide span of periods, pinpointing the hegemony of discourses as articulated practices throughout time regulating broader social and political relations (Hajer, 1997; Griggs and Howarth, 2013). This study takes an intermediate position, in connecting the macro-perspective to develop theoretical understanding of discursive practices, the meso-institutionalist perspective to understand embedded institutional structures and the micro-perspective to understand embedded agential beliefs and meanings.

48   Foucauldian approaches of discourse analysis therefore generate only limited policy recommendations. That is not too surprising, as Foucault sought not to provide a judgement about 'what should be done', but to trace the development of social discourses during the modern era (cf. Hajer, 1995; Sharp and Richardson, 2001).

One final note to the extent to which the typology consists (in)consistency *between or within* cases. There is a difference between the A and D types (action dislocation and discursive dislocation) and the B and C (multi-level decoupling and multi-level coupling) types. The A and D types are types referring to the situation *within* one level, while the B and C types refer to the situation *between* levels. Obviously, the B and C types refer to a more 'stable' *regime situation* in which multiple levels have consistent or inconsistent institutional actions *and* discourses. It is 'stable' because these types include situations of inconsistent (C) or consistent (B) discourses and actions *between* levels. In contrast to these more stable situations *between levels*, are the A and D types, which characterize a moment of *dislocation*[49], this dislocation can occur *within or between levels*. It depends on the research aim and research focus when and why one studies this within or between cases, since *dislocation* can occur within and between cases. By *dislocation* I mean an 'out-of-jointness', crisis or absence of a certain structure which shows the incompletion of discourse (Howarth and Griggs, 2013). Dislocation is the 'condition or possibility for a policy transformation' (Torfing, 2001: 288). As such, a moment of dislocation refers to a moment of crisis, like in the Greek etymologic sense of crisis, which refers to 'separation'. Moments of dislocation indicate a *separation* of institutional discourses and actions. For instance, action dislocation and discursive dislocation embody such a moment of dislocation, since they characterize a situation in which institutional actions and discourses do not relate, 'fit' or 'match', but are '*separated*'. It characterizes a situation when there is inconsistency between actions *and* discourses[50]. Such moments of dislocation can be a result of *antagonistic struggle* 'outside' or within these institutions. From a constitutive perspective on language, which assumes a relationship between language and practice, it can be expected that such situations will not last for a long time because its lacks consistency. Because of a mismatch between the actions and discourses, actors in such situations will look for opportunities to reconnect discourses and actions again. In such a situation '*'a window of opportunity is opened, and old and new agencies begin to struggle over how to reform current policy*'' (Torfing, 2001: 288). When a situation changes from a moment of dislocation *within* a level (A) or (D), to a new stable situation *between* levels (B) or (C), this could indicate a 'regime shift', a change in both institutional discourses and actions (Mossberger and Stoker, 2001)[51]. This can be the result of adaptations by policy entrepreneurs adjusting the existing actions and discourses (Mosse, 2004). The

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49   Any identity or order is marked by what Laclau (2005: 69–71) calls a 'constitutive outside'. This absence or negativity prevents the full constitution of a discursive structure, so that every structure is dislocated (Griggs and Howarth, 2013: 21)

50   'Equivalence' in such cases refers to equivalences or similarities with previous phases within that level. Dislocation 'presupposes the existence of a particular policy path, since it is only in relation to the structured coherence of a particular policy path that a dislocating event can be identified as such' (Torfing, 2001: 290)

51   however I do not apply a regime analysis, I do find it helpful to see discursive regimes by the focus of regime analysis which is on the internal dynamics of coalition building, on civic cooperation or informal modes of coordination across institutional boundaries

different ideal types within this heuristic framework enable to 'trace' these changes within and between multiple levels throughout time.

2.4 RESEARCH DESIGN: KNOWLEDGE CLAIMS

Now that we have sketched out the ontological, epistemological and methodological groundwork by which this research is guided, we can continue with some specificities of the research design of this study. As referred in the first paragraph of this chapter, the implications of my ontological choices are not limited to epistemology, they also have methodological consequences. With 'methodology' I refer to the analytical strategy and research design chosen. Therefore, this section mainly covers issues of *methodology*, while the usages of particular methods (selection, process of analysis) are depicted within the subsequent empirical chapters. As such, I distinguish *methodology* from *methods*. While methodology implies the principles that could guide the choice of method, 'it should not be confused with the methods and techniques of research' (Hay, 2006). In that regard, I understand methodology as the means by which I reflect upon the appropriate methods to acquire knowledge of intra-European movement. More importantly, this implies that ontology, epistemology and methodology have a close relationship which is also 'directional, since ontology logically precedes epistemology, which precedes methodology' (Hay, 2006: 84). These are important linkages, which imply that most of my methodology is directed by the previous accounts on epistemology and ontology, or as Bevir and Rhodes (2006: 81) suggested:

> "*Often methodological rigor is held up as a way of producing secure facts that others can replicate and accept. In contrast, we might suggest that methods and the facts they construct should be evaluated together as parts of larger narratives or theories. We will accept methods as 'rigorous' – or to use a more accurate term, 'appropriate' – only if we adopt philosophical theories that imply that the relevant methods are suitable for the objects to which they are applied. […] An interpretive approach, […] rejects the stress on methodological rigor as a bewitching effect of the positivist philosophy of the natural sciences*".

The above statement and my previous references are not to bypass 'appropriate' methodological concerns. Instead, I will now articulate various 'subjective' moments in the data gathering process and other methodological concerns.

CASE STUDY APPROACH

This study contains a *thematic* case study approach on European migration and mobility, redefined as *intra-European movement*. This study also contains a nested and embedded *institutional* case study approach with a focus on the Dutch local and national government and the European Commission. By these multiple institutional case studies I aim to gain a *''holistic understanding of a problem, issue or phenomenon…because the case is investigated from many different angles and pays attention to many different dimensions of the issue, case study is typically able to avoid the kind of essentialist and context-free analysis…allow[ing] for a highly complex and nuanced understanding of the subject of inquiry''* (Hesse-Biber and Leavy, 2011: 256). In particular, this study contains multiple 'local' contexts as practical unities (Thomas, 1993). The empirical data will show that it is not limited to 'two' institutional cases because sometimes it includes a comparative case study approach of two 'governmental authorities' indicated (Dutch national and EC level) sometimes of three (Dutch local, Dutch national and EC level) and sometimes a single case (Dutch national level)[52]. A short overview of this variance in the case study approach is highlighted in the following table:

	Chapter 3	Chapter 4	Chapter 5	Chapter 6
Cases	European National	European National	National	European National Local
Field research	Desk research[54] Secondary literature	Interviews[55] Secondary literature	Interviews[56] Desk research[57]	Interviews[58] Desk research[59] Focus group[60]

However its methodological and case-study variance, all chapters are concerned about the general research question and are related to all three (local, national, European) 'uni-

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52 Because discourses are not fixed and are heterogeneous of nature (Hajer, 1993), without scale or level boundaries, this selection of authorized levels is mainly to have two formal and institutional *reference points* where certain discourses can be produced. It is an empirical question to what extent there are multiple discourses present and to which 'levels' they can be related

53 On the EC level 430 documents, boiled down to 15 while on the Dutch level this dossier included 332 documents boiled down to 53 documents

54 Both interview rounds resulted in 21 in-depth semi-structured interviews on both levels

55 Two interview rounds resulted in 22 in-depth semi-structured interviews

56 This dossier included 332 documents boiled down to 53 documents

57 Several interview rounds resulted in 16 in-depth semi-structured interviews

58 On the EC level 430 documents, boiled down to 15. On the Dutch level this dossier included 332 documents boiled down to 53 documents. On the local level a dossier of more than 500 documents boiled down to 34 documents

59 12 focus group participants, adding up to 26 unique stakeholders for this chapter

ties' identified. There has been some substitution in the data gathering of the subsequent chapters[60]. But overall, in terms of unique empirical material this study relies on three dossiers of *desk research* (consisting of 430 EC documents, of which 15 were selected for analysis; 332 documents on the Dutch level of which 53 were selected for analysis and more than 500 documents on the local level a dossier of which 34 were selected for analysis). In terms of interviews, this study relies on three levels of semi-structured *in-depth interviews* (9 European level interviews, around 20 Dutch national level interviews, 12 Dutch local level interviews). In terms of *focus groups*, this study relies on two organized 'urban living labs'[61], which consisted of 16 and 12 participants. This adds to a total of around 70 respondents. However, since some data of particular interviews covered more than one chapter next to the fact that some interview respondents also participated (for critical member check) in the focus groups, this resulted in an overall amount of around 60 unique respondents. The specificities regarding the research design such as criteria of case study selection, criteria of selecting and analysing the data and about how interpretations have been made, are explained in the subsequent empirical chapters of part II.

CRITICAL REFLEXIVITY

To be able to develop 'reliable' and post-positivist research I base myself on a range of academic criteria that suit a social-constructive epistemology, such as critical member check, trustworthiness by transparency, critical triangulation and critical reflection (Swartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012). I will concisely describe how these elements are included in this research because *"nothing is original"* (Kleon, 2012) but we can build in critical checks and reflexivity to construct reliable research findings.

First of all, '*reflexivity*' refers to my active consideration of and engagement with the ways in which my own sense making can be related to my knowledge claims. As such, reflexivity contributes to the transparency and trustworthiness of knowledge generation. Rather than presenting academic work as 'an exercise in vanity or self-indulgence', reflexivity is a scientific activity contributing to the systematicity of interpretive research and it puts the subjectivity of my interpretation up front, rather than trying to mask or ignore it (Swartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012: 105). Because as interpretive researcher, I do not seek to *mirror* the world, my primary concern is in checking my own meaning making, or how I construct legitimate knowledge claims. Not with aiming to solely 'get the facts right' since

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60   This is influenced by the data collection process of the IMAGINATION project of which the data of this book is related to

61   first focus group (12-12-2014, 16 respondents) second focus group 13-11-2015 (12 respondents). Not all data from all interviews and all focus groups have been directly used for the articles and chapters in this book. However, what *has* been used, is specified in the subsequent chapters.

there is not one version of social reality. Rather, I articulate various perspectives, which enables me to understand what I studied in its full complexity.

The central methodological point is that as a critical or social constructive and interpretive researcher, I am not trapped more by the prejudice or assumptions of the social reality of which I am engaged. As such I am alert of having partial knowledge and multiple perspectives, which cannot be avoided, but can only be explicitly acknowledged (Swartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012). By 'reflexivity' I am also aware of what I am *not* hearing, about the silences in my interviews and documents. This is not to claim that reflexivity is an overall panacea, but with an interpretive ethic I aim to critically increase the insights about the ways in which my personal characteristics as individual researcher have influenced the construction of knowledge claims (Swartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012). Reflexivity has been applied in this research by a critical member check and critical triangulation.

CRITICAL CHECK

Some of the key data I collected (explained later) was in the form of interviews and documents. In order to check the interpretations of these interviews and documents, it is valuable to check my interpretations with the members from which the data is derived (Angen, 2000). By member checking, members can reflect on the conclusions, analyses and interpretations and can add suggestions or adjustments. During the fieldwork, I organized two focus groups with interviewed and non-interviewed respondents, active within the field of intra-European movement (also explained in the upcoming chapters in the studies involved). Besides that this was an additional way of data gathering, it also served as a member check on the data presented. Within a group of active participants, respondents could react and adjust their perspectives on the interpretations made so far. This enabled to re-articulate or confirm the findings. As such, it provided as an important external check of legitimation.

This check can also be done by triangulation, which is an activity by which different methods and sources are taken into account in order to have a more accurate perspective on a certain phenomenon (Olsen, 2004). It is a form of data checking by multiple sources of data. By *critical* triangulation, multiple positions are taken into account not to *merge* these viewpoints to one 'objective' perspective, but to understand the multiple complexities of the social reality under study (Jhagroe, 2016). By gathering interview data, document data and focus group data this research critically triangulated a multiplicity of data sources as a check on the analysis and interpretations made.

TRUSTWORTHINESS, TRANSPARENCY AND OTHER DISCLAIMERS

I hope by explicating my ontological, epistemological and methodological accounts that it is clear that I deviate from the *narrative* of 'objective' knowledge. It is not a coincidence that I use the first person singular in this text to acknowledge the subjectivity of myself as a researcher on the data gathered. While Oscar Wilde stated that ''*man is least himself when he talks in his own person. Give him a mask, and he will tell you the truth.*'' I think that using the first person singular this covers or masks the active presence of subjectivity behind research projects, which is an important act of transparency. It breaks down the 'fourth wall', the imaginary 'wall' between the authors or characters in a play and the reader or spectators in theatre (Schwartz-Shae and Yanow, 2012; Jhagroe, 2016). I think that it is impossible to gain knowledge 'from a point external to it' (Schwartz-Shae and Yanow, 2012) and researchers should strive not to make themselves invisible in the research they conduct[62]. Instead, I acknowledge my subjectivity which engages with my data. By a reflexive treatment I do not aim for a total control, which is impossible. Therefore, by being explicit about how I constructed my knowledge claims, I aim to transparently account for potential differences between others and myself.

Furthermore, it is important to mention some disclaimers since this paragraph on 'research design' could have raised some ambiguity. Previously, I explicated my aim to analyse the data by an ideal-typical scheme by a refined operationalization. This could suggest that I link in with a front-loaded, standardized research process, which could be at odds with a more iterative, abductive discursive and interpretive research approach. Firstly, in response, I would like to highlight that this ideal-typical scheme is not to generate hypotheses in the start which can be evaluated or even tested at the end. Instead it is included as heuristic tool to understand and interpret the results better in terms of the cases involved. Secondly, by an explicit aim to operationalize discourse analysis one could get the impression that this is to enhance the 'reliability' or 'validity' of the results, maybe even to minimize its 'arbitrariness'. Of course, this is not the case. The aim is to contribute to more *reliable* discursive research approaches by explicating concepts, positions and methods used. By a transparent and critically reflexive approach I aim that such operationalisations improve the field of discourse analysis. However, this is not supposed to operationalize discourse as an 'empiricist variable'. By now, I have reflected on and explicated my position in multiple ways. As a result, the reader should be well prepared for a more iterative, abductive and post-positivist approach than positivist interpretations of 'reliability' and 'operationalisation' generally assume.

Finally, by an iterative and abductive research approach I cannot and do not want to hide that this research was not designed as a front-loaded, standardized and a-priori fixed

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62   In survey research this is known as the 'interviewer effect', in laboratory studies this is known as reducing the 'bias'

approach. In contrast to what the reader may have got from the former two chapters, and by forming this content into a close-circuit book-form, the upcoming chapters also include data generated as part of the international research project IMAGINATION. This resulted in project papers and peer-reviewed articles, which are sometimes included in this book (for example, see one article on 'the commodification of mobile workers': van Ostaijen, Reeger and Zelano, 2017). This means that I was part of a project in which first there was data, and then theorisation started. In other words, the previous chapters have been added *after* the empirical chapters have been finished. Afterwards, the empirical chapters were interpreted again and the introduction and conclusions have been drafted. So not only do the subsequent chapters have an abductive approach, but this whole book is the result of an overall *abductive* and iterative research design, of *back-and-forth reasoning* (Berg and Lune, 2004; Timmermans and Tavory, 2012). I think this specific (critical) approach strengthens the research data not just checking the data at the end, but also *along the way*. Since more and more PhD's are part of (international) research projects in which they compartmentalize their research in different articles and re-composed them in the end, I think it is important to transparently explicate the *non-linearity* of such research. This is the case for this research and this book. For that reason I critically explicate and transparently report about this, rather than to suggest that this research developed in a linear fashion or by a standardized or a-priori fixed approach. I hope the previous paragraphs contributed to this and explained why I think that potentially *"every book is a lie"* (Hugo Claus). The following chapters unfold the *politics of intra-European movement*, or the *discursive construction* and *political contestation* related to 'mobility' and 'migration'.

WHAT

''One has to get inside the defining process of the actor in order to understand his action'' (Blumer, 1969: 16)

''All societies produce strangers; but each kind of society produces its own kind of strangers, and produces them in its own inimitable way'' (Bauman, 1995: 1)

II

CONTESTED PROPOSALS – DUTCH AND EUROPEAN LETTERS

3

ABSTRACT

This chapter displays how discourses around intra-European movement are constructed to reveal the performativity of discourses. Therefore, it mainly aims to deliver theoretical contributions to the field of discursive policy analysis by empirical case study material.

The overall argument is that discursive policy analysis benefits from an analytical framework that deals with a refined operationalization including 'storyline' and 'poetic' elements. This framework is applied to intra-European movement in the cases of the European Commission and The Netherlands. These cases are particularly interesting, since both authorities have competing constructions of 'intra-European movement', highlighting 'migration' versus 'mobility'. As such, the chapter displays the importance of 'poetic elements', opens up the discursive black box of discourse analysis and unravels the performative potential of certain discourses.

''The working of words upon actions is the basic political action'' (De Jouvenel, 1963, 99)

INTRODUCTION

The EU enlargements of 2004 and 2011 shed a new light on the European continent. New member states joined the EU and EU citizens could freely move around a new territory. This simultaneously resulted in policy proposals on the EU level to stimulate this mobility, while in some member states, like the Netherlands, more repressive policy proposals were promoted. Not insignificantly, while the EU speaks about 'mobility', the Dutch government refers to 'migration'. One could argue that the new European borders produced varied governmental discourses within one legislative area. Therefore, this chapter holds a discursive perspective to understand these contradicting governmental discourses. In order to do so, first the policy discourses are *descriptively* reconstructed while secondly, the *performativity* of these discourses on policy proposals is highlighted. Thus, this chapter primarily aims to deliver theoretical contributions to the field of discursive policy analysis by delivering empirical case study applications within the case of 'intra-European movement' as general signifier.

The case of 'intra-European movement' is selected because of its discursive complexity and its contested political context. In general, migration issues are politically contested, deliver wicked problems, diverse problem definitions and policy controversies (Van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999; Scholten, 2013). Especially by studying two governmental authorities that hold contradicting views, this case is well suited to understand the definition of problems, ideas and meaning that guide particular actions (Stone, 1988; Fischer, 2003; Yanow, 1996). Moreover, it questions which discourses are present around intra-European movement and to what extent are they preceding policy proposals? Therefore the research question of this chapter is: '*Which governmental discourses on intra-European movement can be identified at the European (European Commission) and Dutch national level and how did these discourses affect policy proposals (in the period 2002-2014)?*' The analysis is built up in the following way. Firstly, the theoretical premises and methodological implications are described. Secondly, the empirical findings are presented on the domain of intra-European movement. Finally it concludes on these findings.

THEORETICAL OUTLINE

The politics of migration or mobility are analysed in many ways but since the so-called 'argumentative turn', discourse theory emerged in migration studies and policy analysis too (Fischer and Forester, 1993; Van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999; Balch, 2010). This

perspective understands the usage of language as a *medium* through which actors *create* the world (Hajer, 1993). It puts attention on language as a *performative* or *constitutive* dimension of 'reality', understood as discourse, by actively producing society by attributing meaning, norms and power which disciplines human agencies to think, speak and act in a certain way (Throgmorton, 1993; Foucault, 1994; Fischer, 2003). Therefore discourses are defined as 'an ensemble of notions, ideas, concepts and categorisations through which meaning is allocated to social and physical phenomena, and which is produced and reproduced in an identifiable set of practices' (Hajer 1995: 44). This definition of discourse, embraces both 'texts' and 'practices' and explicitly emphasizes performativity (Hibberd, 2005).

This study primarily holds a discursive-institutional approach within the tradition of 'discourse as practice' (Fairclough, 1992; Jacobs, 1998; Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004; Schmidt, 2008; 2011). It examines linguistic practices within particular discursive events, including policy documents (Hastings, 1999). This perspective makes it possible to observe how discourses institutionalize and affect social outcomes, or stated by Hajer (1995: 264): *'The main theoretical thesis (…) is that one can observe how the institutional practices (…) work according to identifiable policy discourses that through their storylines provide the signpost for action within these institutional practices'*. Within this discursive-institutional approach a textually oriented discourse analysis is applied (Fairclough, 1992; Hajer, 1995; Sharp and Richardson, 2001). This does not imply a sole focus on text as such, but a dialectical relationship between social practice and discursive practice since *'discourse constitutes social practice and is at the same time constituted by it'* (Leeuwen and Wodak 1999: 92). Changes at the social level can be constituted through changes in linguistic practices since language itself is seen as a form of action (Hastings, 1999; Yanow, 2003).

However, by assuming this dialectical relationship, this study does not want to keep the linkage between rhetoric and action implicit (Sharp and Richardson, 2001). Therefore, it is important to explicate the operationalization of policy discourses, to separate its 'rhetorical' or 'linguistic' component from its proposed 'materialized' component (Fairclough, 2012). By this, it becomes possible 1) to show some key strategies of discursive *legitimation* and 2) to show the *performative* potential in the justification of courses of action. The aspects of legitimacy and performativity have therefore a very central role in the operationalization and analysis.

'Legitimation' is defined as a discursive technique that explains and justifies social activity, and typically involves providing 'good reasons, grounds, or acceptable motivations for past or present action' (Van Dijk, 1997, 255). Within this focus, 'legitimation' can be conveyed through discourses whose outcomes reward legitimate actions (Van Leeuwen, 2007). And 'performativity' is seen as the discursively regulated practices within policy communication that reify them in that very process (Feldman, 2005). The 'performative potential' of discourses is how powerful discourses contribute to dominant strategies for

action (Healey, 1999; Howarth and Griggs, 2006). By operationalizing this legitimation process it becomes possible to study to what extent policy discourses influence policy proposals and 'provide a signpost for action' since discourses *serve as precursors to policy outcomes'* (Hajer and Versteeg, 2005, 178). From this perspective, discourses have a *feed-forward effect* on policy proposals, assuming that the construction of policy discourses affects the construction of policy proposals (Schneider and Sidney, 2009; Jacobs, 1998; Schmidt, 2008; 2011) because: *'Putting forth a diagnosis also includes a prognosis of what should be done to solve the alleged problem. How problems firstly are constructed as problems and secondly how they are framed have a crucial impact on the policy design that is developed to tackle the problems'* (Jørgensen, 2012, 50). Or in other words, policy design includes a clear diagnosis of 'a problem', followed by a clear prognosis and call for action what is needed to be done, since social problem conceptions involve a 'theory of causation' (Verloo, 2005).

Therefore, specific attention is put on 'policy proposals': the proposed 'courses of action' that evolve from a certain discursive construction. And a policy proposal differs from 'policy practices', since it merely focuses on the initial phase of policy discourses instead of whether or not these proposals became routinized in institutional practices. These policy proposals can be measures, laws and legislations[63], which *could* have been implemented. Consequentially, since the main focus is on the initial process of discursive legitimation (*pre*-structuration) (Hajer, 1995). Therefore, this chapter does not focus on policy phases, such as the formulation or implementation phase, but merely on the construction processes of discursive legitimations.

OPERATIONALISATION

To be able to study discourses, a well-operationalized research design is important. One of the main contributors in the field is the work of Hajer, which distinguishes three layers in the analysis of policy discourses (2003, 104):
– Storylines, metaphors and myths
– Policy vocabularies (concepts and terms)
– Epistemic notions (rules of formation)

This Hajerian perspective involves a layered chronology in the manifestation of discourses to understand discourse structuration and discourse institutionalisation (Hajer, 1995; Schmidt, 2008; 2011). Former applications of this approach assume an interrelationship between these layers, include a large span of interpretation and a non-mutually

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63   This could imply a wide range of proposals regarding adaptation to laws, application criteria, setting up new data systems, invention of legislation or the organisation of controlling or cooperative actions.

exclusionary approach of these layers. It stays rather implicit *how* the discursive analytic framework is empirically applied and *how* theoretical concepts are operationalized (Hajer, 1995; 2003; Balch, 2010).

Therefore, the theoretical focus in this study *deviates* in its *focus* and *design* from the Hajerian approach. First of all, this chapter focuses on the initial phase of discursive legitimation. This focus is needed to open up the discursive black-box how discourses gain legitimacy (even before the phase of discourse structuration or institutionalisation). Secondly, the research design deviates from Hajer's account on what is called 'the first layer' of policy discourses, consisting of 'storylines, metaphors and myths that help sustain the societal support for particular policy programmes' (Hajer, 2003, 104). While Hajer lumps all together, in this chapter, storyline elements are separated from metaphors and myths as poetic elements. This separation and explication is needed to understand the legitimation processes better and to overcome the general under-operationalization in discourse analysis, sometimes even based on 'intuition' (Hajer, 1995; Howarth and Griggs, 2006; Balch, 2010; Carrete and Gasper, 2010). Consequently, the layer of epistemic notions is excluded, which is conceptualized as 'a state of mind' in a particular period (Hajer, 2003). Mainly because this layer is too loosely conceptualized and former applications did not contribute to a refined operationalization (Hajer, 2003: 106). Therefore, the following conceptualisation draws upon alternative studies to explicate 'poetic' and 'storyline' elements.

First of all, discourses maintain **poetic elements** or tropes (Throgmorton, 1993). By poetic elements we mean concepts, metaphors, myths and numbers. *Concepts* are repeatedly used structuring and forming terms and labels (Hajer, 2003; Van Ostaijen and Scholten, 2014). This strongly relates to *metaphors*, which seduce the reader to see something *as* something else (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). Metaphors can contain the power of becoming small self-fulfilling prophecies, becoming a guide for future action (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, 156) or can function as *'the premises upon which decisions are made'* (Edelman, 1971: 68). Concepts can also have this use-value, but metaphors can function in a symbolic analogy (Schon, 1979; Stone, 1988; Yanow, 1996; 2003; Charteris-Black, 2006). And the more coherent a policy discourse is developed, the more critical metaphors become (Chilton and Ilyin, 1993). *Myths* are repeatedly used public narratives holding certain assumptions and which could occur as historic continuity or with reference to the past as source for the current (Schama, 1988). Myths are socially unquestioned and constructed public narratives of a particular culture, which 'diverts attention from a puzzling part of reality' (Malinowski, 1948; Yanow, 1996, 191). Finally, counting by *numbers* is a way to classify objects (Cohen, 1982). Behind the usage of numbers lay deliberate decisions about how to count *as* since a phenomenon is perceived at least frequent enough to bother counting (Stone, 1988: 172). Numbers are the final poetic element because *'numbers work*

exactly like metaphors' and as such *'numbers are another form of poetry'* (Stone, 1988, 163-165). All the above are the 'poetic' elements of policy discourses.

Secondly, discourses contain **storyline elements**, which are the 'narrative' components of discourses (Throgmorton, 1993). The storyline elements can be specified by *objectives* and *subjectives* (Linder, 1995; Schneider and Ingram, 1997). Overall, the objective is considered as the problem definition, so 'what is defined *as* problem' while the subjectives are the targeted populations or fields to which problems and objectives are related (Stone, 1988; Linder, 1995; Schneider and Ingram 1993; 1997). Both are closely affiliated since the objective can imply a certain subjective or vice versa by the *type of intervention* or prognosis (Verloo, 2005). Therefore, the type of intervention is the third element, and by focussing on the proposed 'course of action' it looks at the performativity of discourses (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982; Linder, 1995, Hibberd, 2005). By the type of intervention, the normative guidance for action on policy proposals can be studied (Schneider and Ingram, 1997). Poetic and storyline elements do not occur in an isolated context, but get meaning in relation to each other. This leads up to the following grid (see table 1), operationalized for a comprehensive discursive policy analysis. This grid holds a central place in the upcoming data analysis.

The aim of this grid is threefold:
–   Firstly, to open up the discursive black box of discourse analysis;
–   Secondly, to study to what extent this comprehensive operationalization contributes to an empirical case studies analysis;
–   Thirdly, by putting explicit attention to the performative element of discourses, contributing to go beyond mere descriptive-analytical accounts on metaphor or discourse analysis[64]

RESEARCH METHODS

This study is an interpretative discourse analysis on the discourses produced in the field of intra-European movement, which serves as general signifier or 'object of research' (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992; Yanow, 2003). To be able to focus on governmental

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64   An important critique on this approach could be that there is a circular way of reasoning in this contribution. A researcher will find discursive performativity if he deconstructs how policy proposals are legitimated. However, this does not display *how* this performativity works and which poetic or storyline elements deliver legitimacy to evolve in policy proposals. This approach is aimed to display how this legitimation process works and which elements in policy discourses maintain an important function to do legitimate policy proposals.

Table 1. Analytic grid

Policy analysis	Termed as	Operationalized	Characterized
Policy discourse	Poetic elements	Concepts	Structuring and legitimizing terms (Hajer, 2003; Van Ostaijen and Scholten, 2014) → Terms with structuring use-value
		Metaphors/ metonymy	To see something *as* something else (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Stone, 1988; Yanow, 1996) → Analogies or examples
		Myths	Bring coherence by legitimizing cultural assumptions which diverts attention from incommensurable values (Malinowski, 1948; Schama, 1988; Yanow, 1996; Hajer, 2003) → Repeatedly used public narratives
		Numbers	Quantifications and objectifications to classify (Cohen, 1982; Stone, 1988; Yanow, 2003) → Numbers, estimations, amounts and percentages
	Storyline elements	Objectives	Problem definitions and policy aims (Stone, 1988; Linder, 1995)
		Subjectives	The ones, populations or fields to which problems and objectives are targeted (Schneider and Ingram, 1993; 1997)
		Type of intervention	Course of action implied by policy instruments (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982; Linder, 1995)
		→	→
			Policy Proposals

policy discourse, it starts by distinguishing two public authorized levels of governance, more or less (manifestly) present in the field of intra-European movement [65].

Firstly, the European Union is selected, since EU legislation made the 'free movement' of persons possible, by a 'removal' of certain physical borders. This legislation, followed by European policies implementing Article 21/ 22 of the Treaty of Rome and Lisbon makes the European Union an inevitable starting point for analysis. For the European Union, the focus is on the ways how 'intra-European movement' is communicated by the European Commission (by means of certain Directorate-Generals (DG's)), towards its controlling institutional authority, the European Parliament. Secondly, as member-state, the Netherlands is selected, since the Netherlands have historically played a foundational role in the construction of the EU and the Euro and have been a proponent of the European free movement regulations (Hollander, 2013). Next to this, the 'opening of the borders' for Polish (2007) and Bulgarian and Romanian citizens (2014) resulted in numerous governmental communications positioning the Netherlands as member-state in the EU. Besides, the Netherlands was one of the countries that co-authored a letter to the European Commission demanding attention towards 'negative side-effects' of intra-European movement (Mikl-Leitner et al., 2013)[66].

It makes sense to select the European and Dutch governmental level since they hold different perspectives on 'intra-European movement'. While the EU refers to 'free movement' as the 'mobility' of 'mobile workers', the Dutch national government refers to this as the 'migration' of European 'migrants'. The European Union and the Dutch national state are also selected, since both levels have played a significant role in the current governance of intra-European movement (Sciortino, 2000) and because of their administrative and legislative relevancy[67].

DATA SELECTION

One frequently used method in qualitative case study research is desk research of written material (Yin, 1994). In this study, by a textually oriented discourse analysis, attention has been put on key texts (Fairclough, 1992; Sharp and Richardson, 2001). A 'textual' analysis is inevitable to grasp the discourses within this topic. Regarding this desk research, governmental documents on intra-European movement were studied, produced by the

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65 Note, because discourses are not fixed and are heterogeneous of nature (Hajer, 1993), without scale or level boundaries, this selection of authorized levels is mainly to have two formal and institutional *reference points* where certain discourses can be produced. It is an empirical question to what extent there are multiple discourses present throughout time.

66 Finally, the researcher is able to understand Dutch, which was an important prerequisite to select the Dutch case as well.

67 To what extent discursive differences or similarities could be related to the institutional context would be interesting but lies outside the scope of this research.

European Commission (EC) and the Dutch national government as communications with the European Parliament and the Dutch Parliament, within a fixed period (2002-2014)[68]. Several strategies were applied to select the most relevant documents.

On the European level, first the most relevant DG's were selected. By means of the organisational objectives listed at their websites[69] and by a first interpretative study of their policies (a document search on the EC website[70] by specific selection criteria[71]) a top five of most relevant DG's has been prioritized. By this selection process, all official documents of the DG's Home Affairs, Employment, Justice, Freedom and Security (JLS) and Internal Market were selected online[72] by the search words 'migration', 'mobility' and 'movement'. By adding all 'hits', this resulted in 430 documents, allocated as follows:

DG	Mobility	Migration[67]	Movement	Total
Home Affairs	13	101	2	116
Employment	19	0	25	44
JLS	6	229	9	244
JUST	1	0	23	24
Internal Market	1	1	0	2
Total	40	331	59	430

To overcome a qualitative in-depth study of all 430 documents, an interpretative selection step was needed. Therefore, a close reading of all document abstracts provided a qualitative indication if a document was about intra-European movement. This enabled to qualitatively separate the most relevant 'COM' documents (Communication from the Commission) from other documents on the basis of their irrelevancy[74]. This made it possible to boil down all documents to 15 in the end, which were in-depth interpretatively

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68 Within this timeframe (2002-2014) almost all member states have 'opened their borders' in different phases. Therefore, this timeframe should be comprehensive to cover all policy proposals regarding 'migration', 'movement' and 'mobility' at European and Dutch level

69 http://ec.europa.eu/about/ds_en.htm

70 http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/index.cfm?fuseaction=search&language=en&CFID=18332434&CFTOKEN=edec79f4a0f83f39-D4315D06-E8B1-199E-C04456F6FE77A762&jsessionid=9504547c631080f-b7e633c632c59743c2624TR

71 document selection on the basis of 'department' (the five mentioned); 'time': 01-01-2002 until 01-01-2014; 'document type': all; and 'language': 'English'

72 by ec.europa.eu website

73 the large amount of documents regarding 'migration' is because most documents concerned the migration of Third Country Nationals. These were excluded from this study, since this study is about intra-European movement of European citizens instead of Third Country Nationals

74 To illustrate this, for instance, a lot of documents regarding 'movement' in the area of infrastructure, climate change or maritime affairs could get filtered out by this procedure.

studied. Because of the size of these documents, this resulted in a large data file[75]. This procedure secured the selection process with the most relevant EC documents present.

On the Dutch national level, a comparative procedure was performed with some adjustments (because of a different context). Firstly since communications of all Dutch departments are less substantial as on the EC level, it was possible to search on *all* communications from government towards Parliament instead of selecting on beforehand on DG's or Departments. Next to this, online searches need to be applied by the number of a dossier[76]. On the basis of the search on the Dutch translation of the terms 'mobility', 'migration' and 'movement'[77] four dossier numbers[78] rose, of which '29407' is the most relevant ('free movement of employees from new EU member states'). This dossier included 332 documents (2002-2014). Comparable with the EC document search, all 332 Dutch documents have been interpretatively studied by their abstracts and selected on their qualitative relevancy. This resulted in 53 documents, which also contributed to an extensive data file[79].

In this way, on both levels, a comprehensive and comparative data selection process was completed. First of all, by focusing on the communicative letters of the executive board (Commission and national government) to their controlling powers (Parliaments). Secondly, by completing a comparative selection process of all documents by the digital search engines of these authorities on three key words ('migration', 'mobility' and 'movement'). Thirdly, by selecting a comparative time frame (2002-2014). Finally, by interpreting the relevancy of data by prescanning, since all documents included abstracts. And if the abstracts were not insightful enough, the documents were studied at hand. This made it possible to control a comparable selection process of both 'nested cases' within the topic of 'intra-European movement'.

DATA ANALYSIS

All selected documents were printed and chronologically (based on publication date) analysed. By a qualitative in-depth analysis of the data, all documents were coded by the items of the grid (table 1). First by hand-coding and highlighting all relevant words, phrases and paragraphs in the documents that fitted the grid. Secondly, all coded elements were processed in a comprehensive Microsoft Excel matrix. The matrix allocated all data separated on their year of publication and their Dutch or European 'authorship'.

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75   All EC documents contain about >20 pages. This resulted in a up to 400 page dossier.

76   Letters to Parliament (Brieven aan de Tweede Kamer) by www.tweedekamer.nl and https://zoek.officielebekend-makingen.nl

77   'mobiliteit', 'migratie' and 'verkeer'

78   32680; 29407; 83432; 29911

79   This resulted in a more than 400 page dossier

This gave an overview of all poetic and storyline elements in all studied documents. By re-reading the matrix and checking the data context in the documents over and over again, an intensive interpretative analysis was applied which made it possible to distinguish certain policy discourses, and discursive shifts in the documents.

By this approach, this type of research can be indicated as a matter of back-and-forth reasoning (Berg and Lune, 2004) or abductive research (Yeung, 1997; Danemark, 2002). By an abductive approach the researcher goes back and forth between theoretical concepts (the deductive grid) and the empirical findings. By doing this kind of discourse analysis, the researcher could delineate discursive shifts, depending on discursive coherence or variance in the empirical data (Healey, 1999).

In line with the twofold aim of the research question, this chapter now firstly *descriptively reconstructs* the findings on governmental discourses[80] followed by the findings on policy proposals. After the presentation of both findings, an *analysis* section is included, investigating the *performativity* of these discourses on policy proposals. This is first structured by the European Commission case, followed by the Dutch case. This structure aims to chronologically unravel the formation of discourses and its policy implications throughout time.

FINDINGS EUROPEAN DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

The analysis on poetic elements show that there are 'skills shortages', 'mismatches' and 'skills shortfalls' [concepts] on the labour market which need a removal of all kinds of 'labour market bottlenecks', 'barriers', '(cultural) obstacles', 'hurdles' and 'gaps' [concepts/metaphors] (EC, 2002: 72, 694; 2004: 66; 2007: 24, 773; 2011: 248; 2013: 837; 2014: 10). Next to this, citizens [micro-subject] must be equipped as 'human capital' to stimulate them as 'adaptive workforce', to challenge 'labour market pressures' and to overcome 'labour mismatches' [concepts]. Therefore, 'human resource development' and 'flexicurity' are needed, for a better 'talent pool' in order to make 'life long learning' possible [concepts] (EC, 2002: 72; 2004: 66; 2007: 773). Especially in order to 'counteract braindrain and brainwaste' and to promote 'braincirculation' [metaphors] (EC, 2011: 248). This is needed in order to do justice to 'the fundamental principle', the 'cornerstone', the 'Four Pillars' and 'four fundamental freedoms' of the EU of which the EC is the 'guardian' [concepts/metaphors] (EC, 2002: 72, 3). Therefore, the European Commission needs to intervene and take action because all numbers show 'low mobility levels' (EC, 2002: 72; 2007: 24) and 'an absence of a mobility culture' [myth]. Since the 'mobility rate is lower than the

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80   This discursive reconstruction approach is comparable with the reconstruction of Fairclough (2012) on 'knowledge-based economy'

rate of Third Country Nationals' (EC, 2002: 72; 2007: 24; 2007: 773; 2011: 248; 2014: 10). Because the share of intra-EU mobility is lower (2.8%) than the share of TCN's (4%), and since presented research shows that 'only 325.000 persons move annually, while 2.9 million would like to move'. This shows a 'mobility potential' that needs to be developed [numbers/ concepts] (EC, 2014: 10). Because 'the freedom of movement makes a positive contribution to labour markets throughout Europe' and 'it is a powerful and positive symbol of what Europe means for the individual citizen' (EC, 2011: 248) [myth].

Most of the poetic elements contribute to the storyline elements such as objectives targeted at more 'open', 'flexible', 'efficient', 'integrated' or 'accessible' labour markets (EC 2002: 72, 694; 2007: 773; 2014: 10). The overall objective is to:

> *'Promote active citizenship and social inclusion, and reduce inequality, but also to ensure the development of the Single Market and the successful integration of the European economy under the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)'* (EC, 2002: 72, 6).

The identified problems such as 'low geographic mobility', 'low occupational mobility' and 'fragmented information' [objectives] (EC 2002: 72; 2004: 66; 2007: 773) are the reasons why European 'labour markets' [macro-subject] ('Single Market', 'European markets', 'EU-labour markets') and secondly, the micro-subject of the 'EU citizen' ('EU migrant workers', 'intra-EU mobile citizens', 'intra-EU movers', 'mobile workers') need intervention by the European Commission. This in order to create a 'more efficient allocation of resources', 'more integrated labour markets' and 'labour markets that are better able to adjust to asymmetric shocks' (EC, 2014: 10). Therefore, information systems about job opportunities need to be better accessible for everybody (EC 2002: 72; 2004: 66; 2007: 773).

Throughout all periods the EC discourse is quite consistent. This can be illustrated by zooming in on one of the 'four fundamental freedoms': the 'free movement of people'[81], which is mainly interpreted as 'the free movement of *workers*'. The Commission communicated about this:

> *'The free movement of persons as one of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by Community law and includes the right to live and work in another Member State. Initially, this freedom was essentially directed towards economically active persons and their families. Today the right of free movement within the*

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81   If we study the Guideline 2004/38/EG of the EP and the Council (29/04/2004) the freedom of persons is mainly about the freedom of movement of European citizens, regarding Citizenship of the Union. This can be displayed by movement within the internal market (p78), but is not a prerequisite for the application of European Union citizenship rights

> *Community also concerns other categories such as students, pensioners and EU citizens in general […]. Free movement is a means of creating a European employment market and of establishing a more flexible and more efficient labour market, to the benefit of workers, employers and Member States'* (EC, 2002: 694,3).

The above citation explicates the 'free movement of economically active persons and their families' which primarily aims a 'more flexible and efficient labour market, to the benefit of *workers*'. This shift in focus is built up from a free movement of people *considered as* free movement of economically active persons *considered as* free movement of workers *considered as* a means to create flexible labour markets. This example shows the coherence of the EC discourse on EU citizens *as* workers, contributing to the overall aim of Europe *as* flexible labour markets. This example shows how discursive power works to 'perspectivise' something *as* something different. This perspectivation makes it hard to neglect alternative constructions. When 'free movement' is considered *as* 'a means of creating a European employment market', then it becomes very legitimate and persuasive to stimulate the flexibility and mobility within this market. By 'free movement' as the *means* in the construction of a market makes it legitimate to stimulate 'movement', and to problematize 'low intra-EU mobility' [numbers], the 'absence of a mobility culture' [myth] and persuasively develop the 'mobility potential' [concept] and more geographic and occupational mobility [objective]. This example underlines the action-oriented potential of certain concepts and myths creating a legitimate perspective to act upon.

FINDINGS ON EUROPEAN POLICY PROPOSALS

From 2002 onwards the European Commission presented an 'Action Plan for Skills and Mobility' (EC, 2002: 72). This Action Plan lasted for several years[82] to combat 'occupational mobility', 'geographic mobility' and to stimulate information and transparency to achieve '*open and more accessible labour markets*' (EC, 2002: 72, 20). In order to reach more 'occupational mobility', the documents calls for a 'Europass framework' 'to support the transferability of qualifications' by a 'MobiliPass'. Next to this, to achieve 'lifelong learning', 'E-learning programs' are announced. And to get more 'geographic mobility' the 'Health Insurance Card' is announced to make social security and pension rights 'portable' (EC, 2004: 66; 2007: 24). Next to this a 'Language Action Plan' and a 'Research-

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82 Multiple of the studied documents are related to this Action Plan, because several additional features throughout time are related to this. Therefore, it could seem that this Action Plan is the only document of policy proposals, which is not the case. In fact this is the overarching concept of several documents and proposals throughout time on this topic at EC level

ers Mobility Portal' are included, to 'strengthen mobility for education' (2004: 66, 19) to enlarge the mobility of workers in general and researchers in particular.

In order to improve 'fragmented' information, the 'European Job Mobility Portal', Mobility Information campaigns and the modernization of EURES ('a cooperation network for exchanging vacancies and facilitating intra-EU labour mobility' as 'one-stop mobility information portal') are presented (EC, 2007: 24, 3; 2014). All policy proposals, aim to tackle the earlier indicated 'objectives' such as 'low occupational mobility', 'low geographic mobility' and 'fragmented information', stated as:

> *'Mobility generates social and economic benefits. Increased intra-EU labour mobility will widen employment opportunities for workers and help employers fill vacancies better and faster. […] More integrated labour markets would enable the EU interdependent economies to better adjust to asymmetric shocks. […] There has been a significant increase in the number of workers that indicate "firm intentions" […] to move to work abroad. […] This represents a significant mobility potential and a challenge for the EURES network'* (EC, 2014: 10, 2).

The above citation directly links the objective of 'integrative markets', with the subjectives of the 'labour market' and the 'EU citizens' as 'worker', the problem of both 'immobilities', the metaphor of 'asymmetric shocks' with the myth of a 'mobility potential' which legitimizes the launch or the improvement of EURES.

ANALYSIS

The discursive findings show how a specific 'mobility' discourse is built up by the European Commission. First, it constructs 'Europe' *as* liberal labour markets and Europeans *as* economic individuals. It shows a *liberal-economic discourse* of a functional demand and supply of rational citizens on a Single Market. Secondly, the EC sees 'free movement' as the cornerstone of '*development of the Single Market and the successful integration of the European economy under the Economic and Monetary Union*' (EC, 2002, 72, 6). By seeing 'Europe' as one geographically borderless and consistent zone, European citizens are one and undivided economic workforce, not segregated by their national cultures. And by Europe as 'Internal Market', European citizens can move freely as Europeans, not as migrants, maybe because 'mobility' is a more 'comforting alternative' (Carrete and Gasper, 2010, 7). However, this perspective acknowledges movement of Europeans as 'mobility' contrasting with the movement of 'Third Country Nationals' as 'migration'.

From this 'comforting' perspective, not hampered by nation-state borders, European citizens should 'move', because their 'movement' prospers the development of 'human resources' and the 'Single Market'. European citizens hold a great 'potential' which needs to be fulfilled by their movement. But a significant discursive shift occurs when 'free movement' becomes a *need* to 'move' and 'the freedom of movement makes a positive contribution to labour markets throughout Europe' (EC, 2011). When 'Europe' is seen *as* a market the 'freedom of movement' is the instrument to stimulate that market, counteracting low spatial (social-geographic) and occupational (social-economic) mobility. These notions construct the European discourse as an evident 'mobility' discourse. This resembles with other research stating that European discourse is centred *'around mobility and migration as labour market tools for increasing flexibility and competitiveness'* (Balch, 2010, 175). Therefore 'hurdles', 'obstacles' and 'skills shortages and bottlenecks' need to be combatted (EC, 2002: 72; 2013: 837; 2014: 10). By analysing the Commission's communication by its poetic and storyline elements, a delineated liberal-economic discourse about rational citizens, flexible markets and the necessity of free movement as instrument for this economic reality becomes visible:

> *'It is the joint responsibility of Member States and EU institutions to uphold the right to free movement, including by countering public perceptions that are not based on facts or economic realities'* (EC, 2013: 837,13).

Most of the proposed policies (such as the Europass framework, the Health Insurance Card, the MobiliPass and the Job Mobility Portal) are legitimized by poetic elements. For instance, the Health Insurance Card needs to contribute to 'reducing time of social security claims' and to 'streamline administrative practices and cooperation' (EC, 2007: 24, 6). The Job Mobility Portal needs to contribute to 'more transparency', while the Europass framework, which includes the Mobilipass, needs to contribute to 'the transparency and transferability of qualifications' (2002: 72, 13). Like the EURES example has shown, most policy proposals are legitimized by earlier formulated poetic and storyline elements. These proposals show *how* discursive power works, when something is 'perspectivised' *as* something different. When 'free movement' is considered *as* 'a means of creating a European employment market', than interventions (such as the Europass framework, the MobiliPass and the Job Mobility Portal), which need to stimulate the flexibility of this market, seem legitimate. By analysing the European Commission discourse highlights this 'perspectivation', and how a persuasive discursive reality is constructed, to legitimize certain policy interventions.

FINDINGS DUTCH GOVERNMENTAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

First of all, in the beginning period[83] (2004-2007) regarding the 'opening of the borders' *'a postponement would do more harm than that it would protect the Dutch labour market'* because of a 'tight labour market' [concepts]. In this regard the Dutch government wanted to make sure that 'disturbances' and 'repression' on the labour market are banned (2004; 2005; 2006) by creating 'a level playing field' (2004) and enlarge 'the human capital' [concepts] (2005) all in order to stimulate the Netherlands as 'trade nation' (2005; 21) [metaphor]. The national government has attention for 'repression' on the labour market, for 'façade constructions' and 'black work' [concepts] to lead labour migration 'into good tracks' (2008) [metaphor] because *'labour migration effects a better functioning of corporate life, more dynamics in the economy and therefore creation of new jobs'* (2006; 53) [myth]. And most poetic elements aim to secure Dutch economy [objectives] by 'opening the borders' to maximize profits of the free movement of people:

> *'The fundament of economic cooperation within the EU is consisted by the Internal Market. The goal of this it to achieve a European Economic Space wherein 'the four freedoms' are secured. The Netherlands has, as trading nation, large interests with a good functioning of that internal market which is free of unneeded trading barriers'* (Letter to Parliament, 2005: 21, 2).

In this first period, identified problems are related to 'barriers', such as 'labour market tests' and 'labour permits' (TWV's), a 'minimum of bureaucracy' (2004) 'bureaucratic romp lump' (2006) and 'administrative burdens' (2005) [concepts] which could harm secure welfare state accessions and economic prosperity. The Dutch government wants to regulate this new legislation smoothly to maximize profits for the Dutch economy, because they don't want to: *'Shoot ourselves in our own foot to hold a too restrictive policy. Especially, in a situation with a strong labour demand, a shortage could lead to a diminished effect on the economic development'* (2006, 2). This is mainly targeted at two subjectives. One latent group (the benefits of the Dutch population) and one manifest group, the migrants, referred to as 'CEE-employers', 'CEE-employees', 'CEE-landers', 'foreigners', 'immigrants', 'allochtons' or 'CEE-migrants' (2004; 2005; 2006). Therefore the government announces 'flanked policies' [intervention] of 'preventive and repressive instruments' (2006: 53, 2) to improve adequate housing and to maximize profits for Dutch economy (2006: 53, 6).

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83   The reconstruction of the Dutch case analysis is presented in three abductively separated chronological timespans, since in the Dutch case several discursive shifts occurred.

In the second period (2008-2011), new actors and a change in tone of voice occurs. All kinds of 'shortages', 'inappropriate usages' and 'reverse sides' such as '06-busses' and 'explosive firms' occur [concepts/ metaphors]. Simultaneously the urgency of numbers shifts. First, one could observe an under expectation ('no extra rise' in 2007), later this evolves, by matters of available estimations, to an over expectation of the population size. Next to this, new concepts arose (such as 'regional attachment' regarding 'homeless shelters', 'language demand' regarding integration and 'over occupation' and 'housing nuisance' regarding housing), since they don't want 'a repetition of history' (2008, 99) [myth] because:

> *'With the arrival of labour migrants from CEE countries, the parallel with the sixties and seventies forces itself, when also large extensions of groups came to the Netherlands. Than it was presumed, that they would stay for their durance of the demand of labour forces, and to return back to their land of origin. The consequences of this misapprehension are known. Extensive groups of migrants came in a position of backlashes, which influenced next generations. Now, after forty years, there are still efforts to overcome these backlashes. We can't allow that in a certain time again an extensive group stayed unnoticed and which came at large socio-economic distance'* (2009: 103, 4).

This results in a strong socio-cultural focus on policy proposals regarding 'abuses' and 'reverse sides' because: *'it is unwanted when large groups of newcomers have an isolated existence'* (2009: 103, 4) and *'it must be prevented that they get social benefits and stay at the sideline'* (2011: 118, 7). The objectives change from an economic to socio-cultural 'bottlenecks', 'shadow sides', 'problems' and 'side-effects' (2008; 2013). Problems are mentioned such as 'mobile banditism', 'nuisance', 'deterioration', 'homelessness', 'isolation' and 'exploitation' (2008; 2013) while 'abuses' and 'irregularities' are targeted at 'migrants' and actors such as 'malafide employment agencies' and 'slum landlords' as deviant target groups [subjectives]. Therefore interventions are proposed so that: *'[…] the government and others can combat abuses quicker and better'* (2008: 98, 7). The final period (2011-2014) can be introduced by:

> *'The free movement of workers is one of the most important pillars of the EU. One Europe with open borders is important for the Netherlands. The Netherlands has known after all always an open, international oriented economy. In general, labour migrants from other EU countries deliver a positive contribution to our economy. But there are also problems, and I don't want to close my eyes for that'* (2013: 162, 5).

In the final period both discourses seem to merge, since economic metaphors ('The Netherlands as open economy') are combined with more socio-cultural concepts ('problems'). This is illustrative in this period, where legal-economic concepts ('unfair competition', 'level playing field', 'greying' and 'greening' of society, 'the best and the brightest', 'a race to the bottom' and 'the costs of labour migration') are more often combined with socio-cultural concepts ('nuisance', 'integration' and 'deterioration') (2013, 1). This is legitimized because: '*from the past we know that it is of large importance that migrants are straightaway entrained in the Dutch society. They have to know their rights and duties*' (2014: 187, 4) [myth]. Therefore, on housing, local governments cannot 'look away', 'close their eyes' or 'persist' any longer to overcome 'deadlocks' and 'NIMBY feelings' (2012: 150; 2013: 162) [concepts/ metaphors]. And rising numbers play an important role to keep a strong-shared 'sense of urgency'. However, ironically, non-rising numbers do not delegitimize interventions, because: *'problems are not always findable in statistics'* (2013: 177) and *'the unavailability of good quantified insights cannot be a cause to do nothing'* (2012; 150).

In this final phase the objective is to combat social problems in order to stimulate economic profits. On subjectives, it shows a return to the macro-subject of the 'labour market', next to the micro-subject of the 'CEE-migrant' which is replaced after 2011 by 'EU-labour migrants' and 'EU citizens' next to 'non-economically active migrants', 'knowledge migrants' and 'mobile EU citizens' (2013-2014, 172; 174; 175; 177; 180; 181; 187) [subjectives].

FINDINGS ON DUTCH POLICY PROPOSALS

In the beginning (2004-2007), most interventions aim to enlarge 'full free movement' (2006: 44; 51; 53) to reduce all kinds of 'barriers', such as 'labour market tests' and 'labour permits'. Therefore 'bureaucracy' (2004) 'bureaucratic romp lump' (2006) and 'administrative burdens' (2005) need to be minimized. Stated by:

> '*The Cabinet wants to take several measures which cause some guarantees to combat unfair competition in the (structural) situation of free movement of workers. Therefore it will take some flanked measures, especially concerning labour conditions and housing […]. In this way there will be a controlled transition to the situation of full free movement*' (Letter to Parliament, 2006: 2-3).

Policy proposals aim to maximize 'full free movement' and to reduce unwanted 'side effects'. Therefore 'flanked' policies of 'preventive and repressive instruments' (2006: 53, 2)

are announced to maximize profits for Dutch economy (2006: 53, 6), such as governmental fines to reduce underpayment (Law on Minimum Hour Wage, WML), or incentives to maximize equal treatment for EU mobile worker and Dutch citizens (such as the Law labour conditions border crossing labour (WAGA) and the Law allocation labour recruitment intermediaries (Waadi)). Next to these laws and legislation to 'reduce barriers', numerous new interventions were announced to combat economic irregularities on the labour market. In that regard, the capacity of control agencies (such as the Labour Inspection, the Alien Police, the Social Intelligence and Investigation Service) will be extended. Next to this, to 'combat' economic irregularities an 'Intervention team Covenant' and an 'Approach Malafide Infrastructure' (AMFI, to combat slum landlords) are proposed. Thus by these 'flanked' policies, economic and legal proposals need to maximize profits and regulate the labour market.

In the second period (2008-2011) the tone of voice differs because *'we don't want a repetition of history'* (2008, 99). The freedom of movement remains unquestioned, but some 'problems' and 'adjustments' need to be taken into consideration:

> *'To lead CEE-migration into good tracks, the Cabinet announces a packet of measures, aimed to prevent or answer earlier mentioned problems […]. The Cabinet takes the borders of European legislation into account, The Cabinet will make an effort to realize adjustment on a certain point of this legislation'* (Letter to Parliament, 2011: 2).

Therefore, the 'Action Plan housing and integration labour migrants' is developed (2008: 98) to stimulate housing agencies to develop more and better temporary housing accommodations. Besides, the 'Action Plan Nuisances and Deterioration' (2008) is developed to control and regulate unwanted neighbourhood consequences related to this 'new' type of housing. Next to this, some repressive measures are proposed as well, such as the 'Regional Coordination centre Combatting of Fraud' (RCF), an adjustment of the 'Fraud Law' (2011; 118) and the 'National Steering Group Intervention teams' (LSI) to combat 'abuses related to welfare provisions' (2011: 118). And the 'Action Plan reduction Malafide recruitment Agencies' should deliver more control on temporary employment agencies. Thus, on a range of social and economic issues, action plans are proposed in this second period.

The final period (2011-2014) covers economic proposals to combat the evasion of minimum wages by self-employed employees with the 'Method façade independency'. This is related to a broad Ministerial approach 'Method Façade constructions' to 'be better able to do maintenance and control' on the work floor by a 'Identification pass'. Next to this, a revision of the 'Law Labour Aliens' and a 'Pilot Residence Termination EU citizens' are proposed to control irregularities on the work floor and to terminate the residence

permit of irregular EU workers (2013: 172: 181). Secondly, all kinds of social legislation were proposed to regulate the housing market better and to counteract housing shortages[84]. This was labelled as an 'integral packet of measures' (2011: 118; 132) to 'streamline' administrative services to an 'intensive cooperation' of actions (2011: 132). This resulted in the 'Operation Plan 2014-2015' to have a better cooperation between housing actors. Finally, new legislation is proposed to improve registration procedures, in order to equip municipalities to improve the efficacy of their policies towards CEE populations.

ANALYSIS

By analysing the **poetic** and **storyline** elements, three distinct periods can be characterized in Dutch national discourses. The first period holds a strong liberal focus on the 'opening' of the borders by minimizing 'administrative burdens' and maximizing the impacts of 'the four freedoms'. Measures are mostly aimed to the most profitable timing implementing new EU legislation for the Dutch economy (2004: 1, 3) and discussions mainly focused on whether labour market restrictions were appropriate. This is the discursive period when EU mobility is constructed as *labour* mobility. Indicative, proposals are termed as 'flanked' policies, because legislation should not hamper the free movement aims. Therefore, 'preventive and repressive instruments' are proposed to regulate labour market and welfare state claims. Therefore the discourse in this first period can be characterized as a *legal-economic discourse*.

The second discursive period includes socio-cultural and legal issues on labour migration, such as 'abuses', 'reverse sides' and 'isolation'. When social 'problems' evolve, all kinds of 'Action Plans' (2011) have been proposed to combat housing irregularities and fraudulent practices. The second discursive period shows how and why the Dutch discourse became a distinct *migration* discourse. In this period, all kinds of explicit and implicit parallels were made by referring to EU labour in terms of 'again', 'also' and to learn 'lessons of the past' (2009; 2011)[85]. By drawing explicit references to the recent (guest worker) past, Dutch authorities legitimized comparisons with migrant history, especially referring to Turkish and Moroccan migrants who migrated to the Netherlands in the 60s and 70s. By calling upon this historic legacy, political urgency could be put

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84   such as the 'Pilot Approach Nuisance EU citizens' to control nuisances related to EU citizens. Furthermore, adaptations on the 'Law and legislation on the living environment' (BRO), the 'Crisis and Recovery Law' (CHW) and 'Vacancy Law' (LSW) were proposed. A 'Steering Group Experimental Housing' (SEV) and the program 'Flexible Housing labour migrants' are installed to develop 'pilots and experiments' for new forms of housing and a 'Boost Team' (Aanjaagteam) is established to move up all partners in the same direction. Next to this a 'Guidance Housing labour migrants' is developed to help municipalities to get their housing issue in sight.

85   this is also visible by the title of the Parliamentary Commission 'Lessons of Recent Labour Migration' (LURA), which shows the focus on 'lessons' and 'labour migration'

upon these 'mobile workers' *as* 'migrant' group. Eventually, this made it possible to connect 'mobile work' to a policy approach which needs to attack the 'misapprehensions', 'backlashes' and 'socio-economic distances' (2009) from the past by early interventions because *'we don't want a repetition of history'* (2008, 99). By this historic parallelization evolving from a 'guestworker syndrome' (Friberg, 2012), authorities legitimately started to include all kinds of national presumptions about 'failures' and 'lessons' from that collective past. Consequentially, all sorts of 'action plans', 'pilots' and 'an integral packet of measures' became legitimate to counteract the 'reverse sides' (2011) and 'lessons' of that past. By historical perspectivation the Dutch case study displays how and why Dutch authorities made it legitimate to see 'mobile workers' as 'labour *migrants*', and 'labour mobility' as 'labour *migration*'. This displays how the Dutch discourse on 'intra-European movement' became a *migration* discourse, which evidently deviates from the European *mobility* discourse earlier outlined.

Finally, both discourses earlier identified get a close issue connection in the final period, merging within an 'integral packet of measures' (2011). The final period starts off when discourses include both *legal-economic* and *socio-cultural* elements by connecting aims to stimulate the labour market with interventions to regulate housing issues and the societal participation of migrants. All kinds of laws were proposed to control housing issues better and to regulate irregularities on labour market, in order to combat 'shadow sides' (2013; 175) and to make EU migration 'maintainable' and 'compliable' (2013, 172; 174).

Thus, the analysis unravels three distinct discursive periods regarding 'intra-European movement' at the Dutch national level: from a more legal-economic discourse (2004-2007), to a legal socio-cultural discourse (2008-2011) towards a merging of both in the final phase (2011-2014). It also shows that most of the proposed policies are legitimized by poetic elements. For instance, the 'flanked policies' are legitimized by the metaphor to see the Netherlands *as* 'trade nation', therefore prescribing not to intervene too much in the liberal market. The 'Action Plans' in the second period, are directly legitimized by guestworker myths and 'lessons from the past', aiming for early interventions towards migrants. And the 'Pilot Residence Termination' in the final period is legitimized because people have 'to know their rights and duties' (2014; 187; 4) to combat 'shadow sides'. As such, the discursive power of poetic (and storyline) elements to 'perspectivise' something *as*, causes a persuasive discursive reality, which legitimizes policy interventions. The Dutch case shows the performative potential of discourses and displays contingent shifts throughout time.

CONCLUSIONS

The main question was: '*Which governmental discourses on intra-European movement can be identified at the European (EC) and Dutch national level and how did these discourses affect policy proposals (in the period 2002-2014)?*' By a refined application of discourse analytical tools, a legal-economic discourse on European Commission level and a legal-economic, legal socio-cultural and a combination of both discourses on the Dutch national level have been distinguished. To meet the aim to deliver theoretical contributions to the field of discursive policy analysis, the following conclusions are considered.

Firstly, this study shows that a refined operationalization of discourse analytical tools is not only theoretically relevant, but also holds empirical importance. This study critically examines the Hajerian approach and delivers empirical evidence that a refined deductive alternative contains relevant contributions to the field. The distinction between poetic and storyline elements enables an analysis of the interplay between both elements. Consequentially, this showed that poetic elements (such as concepts, metaphors, myths and numbers) have an important instrumental and legitimizing value for storyline elements and the overall discourse. This deviates theoretically from Hajer's account, and empirically displays the importance of poetic elements as building blocks, constructing a certain storyline with the 'right' value-laden or normative perspective. When market metaphors are used positioning mobility as *labour* mobility, economic objectives become more legitimate.

Secondly, this study displays the discursive necessity of poetic elements. Because, when poetic elements are used to problematize (which is mostly the case in governmental communications), this is mostly followed by a policy proposal or 'course of action'. It resembles the literature (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Yanow, 1996; Verloo, 2005) and shows the *mediating* role of poetic elements, connecting a policy objective *with* a policy proposal *by* the construction of a problem *as*. Therefore, poetic elements are an important signpost and mark the direction of a proposal. This notion nuances the feed-forward effect and the prescriptive effect of policy discourse on policy proposals (Schmidt, 2008; 2011; Schneider and Sidney, 2009). It is not the whole discourse that has prescriptive value for policy proposals, but it needs to be specified by the focus on poetic elements. This study shows the relevance and importance of poetic elements for discourse and policy analysis[86].

Thirdly, this study shows *how* performativity works. First by showing how poetic elements legitimize storyline elements. And secondly, by showing how (poetic and) storyline elements legitimize a certain policy discourse and its proposed 'course of action'. This

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86   Besides, an explicit distinction between poetic and storyline elements contributes to the replicability and internal validity of doing discourse analysis, and it unravels the instrumental interplay between both elements.

'two-step' distinction opens up the discursive black box of performativity and displays the 'performative potential' of discourses by the legitimizing role of poetic and storyline elements. For instance, at the level of the EU, repeatedly the myth is used that the EU has a 'traditional lack of mobility culture' so that the EU can be presented *as* fragmented, disintegrated, inflexible and immobile labour markets. Therefore, all kind of 'hurdles' and 'bottlenecks' need to be removed to become more integrated, flexible and mobile (EC, 2011a) contributing to EURES as a legitimate proposal. Regarding the Dutch case, they use the myth that they don't want 'a repetition of history' (2009: 103, 4). Therefore it becomes legitimate to see mobile workers *as* migrants and focus on migrant 'problems', 'abuses' 'and 'reverse sides' known from the past. Consequentially, all kinds of 'Action Plans' are proposed, to learn from 'lessons' of the past (2009; 2011)[87]. Both concise examples highlight the discursive processes how a poetic element (myth) legitimizes storylines and a certain discourse and how a discourse legitimizes a certain course of action. These examples unravel how discursive legitimation and performativity works. It shows the construction of a certain discourse, creating a certain version of 'reality' that necessitates a particular action.

Fourthly, although it was not the main aim of this chapter to unravel the distinctive elements between mobility and migration discourses, it does shows the specificity between the European 'mobility' and Dutch 'migration' discourses. It displays how the European Commission understands, 'perspectivizes' and legitimizes 'intra-European movement' *as* 'mobility'. Because of the historical construction of Europe as 'Single' or 'Internal Market', 'free movement' is considered *as* 'a means of creating a European employment market', which now became *the means* for further European integration. This contrasts with the Dutch case showing how historic references legitimized an approach of EU labourers *as* migrants. And by seeing this group *as* migrants this implied that all kinds of policy actions (in the sphere of 'integration' and participation) could be developed on the basis of insights and 'lessons' from the past. It shows the importance of the historical context to understand the specificities of both mobility and migration discourses to 'perspectivize' something *as* and how this has contributed towards legitimate courses of action.

This study also contains limitations. Since this chapter studied *how* discourses affect policy proposals, it had a minimal focus on whether the presence of a certain discourse *did not* affect policy proposals. As such, this study did not include many exceptions to the rule of performativity. This limitation could be an interesting focus for future research, to show to what extent elements have prescriptive value for policy actions and why not. From this point of view, it would be interesting to study why and when a certain persuasive discourse is not legitimate enough to cause a 'course for action', disentangling

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87   Hajer would have mentioned these *constitutive myths*, repeatedly used *saga* which functioned as an *emblem* (Hajer, 2003)

the conditions of discursive illegitimacy. Next to this, including more and different case studies would gain broader insights about the applicability of the research grid.

Finally, this study shows that the concepts 'mobility' and 'migration' are not just different words for the same empirical phenomenon, but rather display an institutionalist-discursive 'top of the iceberg' since they represent distinct institutional perceptions, interests and authorities. And from a more political-administrative perspective, this case study selection of the European and Dutch case shows the institutional tensions and mismatches between two authoritive levels that deal with the same empirical phenomenon. The discursive perspective adds to our understanding of institutional deadlocks next to cooperation between the European Commission and member-states.

But especially, for migration scholars this study unravels the discursive and normative dimension in migration research, since 'migration' or 'mobility' are not only objective empirical phenomena. It shows that the usage of a certain concept ('migration' or 'mobility') can be linked to a certain authorized perspective on the empirical issue. This study shows that there is a political dimension observable in 'migration' and 'mobility' research, which deserves consideration in future research.

CONTESTED BELIEFS – DUTCH AND EUROPEAN POLICYMAKERS

ABSTRACT

One of the cornerstones of the European Union is the free movement of people, which is not uncontested especially between European and national authorities. But what is the reason behind such contestation and what are the institutional consequences? Therefore, this chapter zooms in, by a discursive approach, on how European and Dutch policymakers discursively legitimate this situation, themselves and others. This analysis reveals a European *legal discourse* in contrast with a Dutch *national discourse*, evolving into a range of divergent institutional consequences.

It displays that Dutch and European policymakers do not only have a different perspective on the situation, and define themselves in varied ways but also differently define problems: even the contestation is contested. By unravelling both case study discourses it shows *how* situational definitions guide specific actions and gives an insightful understanding about the contestation between member-states and European Commission on free movement.

INTRODUCTION

> ''*When we are in conversation with the European Commission on free movement, we sometimes talk in opposite directions. That is very hard. […] The Commission has a completely different approach. They are real believers. Which is very hard. [...] sometimes we don't have the exact figures, which make it hard to say something about the substance of a problem. […] and more specifically: if it is a problem. That's what it is all about*'' (Ministry Social Affairs policymaker 2)

How can we understand the above statement in which a Dutch national civil servant indicates the complexities of policy-making on the issue of free movement at the European level? Within several member-states free movement has been contested and politicized in various directions. The 'Polish plumber' played for instance a significant role in the French rejection of the EU constitution in 2005, in Sweden there were fierce debates around 'new' beggars and homeless people, a Dutch vice-prime minister called upon a 'Code Orange' for a better awareness on the 'shadow sides' of EU mobility, a Dutch aldermen indicated a 'tsunami of Eastern-Europeans' (Trouw, 2008) while 'free movement' was one of the focal points in the 'Brexit' debate (Favell & Recchi, 2010; Asscher & Goodhart, 2013). It shows the contested context of free movement in Europe within member-states, but there was also disagreement between member-states and the European Commission. For example, national Ministers asked the Commissions attention "since this type of immigration burdens the host societies with considerable additional costs" (Mikl-Leitner et al., 2008) and to combat 'the improper and abusive use' of the Posted Workers Directive (Hundstorfer et al., 2015). In a response, the European Commission concluded that: ''the overall evidence suggests that this situation is not placing major issues and burdens on the local communities or local public services" (EY, 2014, p. 2). It shows the 'free movement' as site of contestation and multiple meanings context. But what is 'free movement'? From my point of view, 'free movement' cannot be considered as 'one monolithic factor' (Zamponi & Bosi, 2016). Instead, it needs to be analyzed by the multiple dimensions of actors dealing with it. In this respect, I argue that answering this question requires identifying the professionally shared perceptions on 'free movement' since this has a strong effect on its social construction and how policies are designed. Therefore, I hold a discursive approach, to understand how professional policymakers discursively legitimate 'free movement'.

I apply this discursive approach to the case studies of the Netherlands and the European Commission and focus on the 'actions and beliefs' of individual policymakers (Bevir & Rhodes, 2006, p. 71). By that approach I question: How can we explain the contestation between Dutch and European policy actors on 'intra-European movement' and what are the institutional consequences? The article is built up in the following way. Firstly, I

will introduce the theoretical premises and methodological implications. Secondly, the empirical findings are presented on the domain of intra-European movement, while I finally conclude on these findings.

THEORETICAL OUTLINE

Especially after the EU enlargements in 2004 and 2011 with various Central and Eastern European countries, the scale of intra-European movement has grown significantly which defined a 'new face of East-West migration' in Europe (Favell, 2008; Favell & Recchi, 2010). While most studies presented new empirical data on migration (Glorius, et. al, 2013) or new ways to define mobility (Engbersen et. al, 2013) the 'politicisation', contestation or discursive struggle on 'internal mobility' gained limited attention (Menz & Caviedes, 2010; Boswell & Geddes, 2011; Balch, 2010).

In order to understand the perceived contestation better, I had to move to more discursive literature. Because only studying language or narratives does limitedly account for the performativity of language and the institutional consequences (Warner & Van Buuren, 2011). Therefore, I conceptualize language, text and talk as 'discourse' which refers to ''the ensemble of ideas, concepts and categorizations that are produced, reproduced and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities'' (Hajer, 1997, p. 44). By a discursive analysis this study puts attention on language as a performative or constitutive dimension of 'reality', and looks how meaning is articulated and mediated by discourses (Howarth, 2000; Fischer, 2003; Béland, 2007). Moreover, discourses actively act or do something rather than merely passively contain something (MacKenzie, 2006; Wilkie & Michael, 2009). As such, powerful discourses can have a 'feed-forward' effect, 'a signpost for action' or a 'causal role' for institutional actions (Rubington & Weinberg, 1995; Hajer, 1997; Berger & Luckmann, 1966, p. 106; Hay & Rosamond, 2002). But ''we still have no way of considering the process by which such ideas go from thought to word to deed […]. This raises the question of agency, which brings us to the concept of discourse'' (Schmidt, 2008, p. 309). Therefore with a discursive approach on the beliefs and actions of policymakers I aim to understand how ideas, or beliefs, go 'from word to deed'. This makes it possible not only just to understand and describe the empirical substance of particular institutional discourses but also relate it to the institutional actions.

To make it empirically applicable I focus on individual situated and embedded 'spoken and written interaction, formal and informal' (Potter & Wheterell, 1987, p. 7) 'texts and talk' of professional policymakers, because these discourses ''provide the 'frames' with which people make sense of particular issues and give sense to them'' (Vaara & Tienari, 2008, p. 987). This 'text and talk' does not emerge 'out of the blue', but is channelled

through a particular set of routines, rules and norms (Forester, 1999). Therefore, this study focusses on the discursive repertoires of policymakers how they make sense of a situation (Thomas, 1928; Thomas & Thomas, 1928: 572; Merton, 1938), as part of their routinized, institutional and organisational context (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Hajer, 1995). This has importance since ''limited appreciation is reflected today in some of the work on decision-making, but on the whole this point is grossly ignored" (Blumer, 1969, p. 19). With policymakers I mean individuals and groups 'at the centre of policy construction involved in the creation, elaboration, and justification of policy and programmatic ideas' (Schmidt, 2008). More specifically, I will study how individual policymakers discursively legitimate the social situation of 'free movement' and the position of internal and external organisations. In the following I will explain how I conceptualized, operationalized and applied this threefold distinction.

CONNECTING INSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSES AND ACTIONS

To understand the discourses of individual policymakers I focus on their discursive legitimation. 'Legitimation' is conceptualized as the creation of a sense of understandable, necessary or acceptable actions in a specific setting while 'discursive legitimation' is defined as the discursive technique that explains and justifies social activity, and typically involves providing 'good reasons, grounds, or acceptable motivations for past or present action' (Van Dijk, 1997, p. 255; Van Leeuwen & Wodak, 1999). In contrast, delegitimation establishes a sense of negative, morally reprehensible or otherwise unacceptable actions (Rojo & Van Dijk, 1997; van Leeuwen & Wodak, 1999).

To study discursive legitimation we take up the work of Van Leeuwen (2007; p. 91) who distinguished four key categories of discursive legitimation: authorization, moral evaluation, rationalization and mythopoesis (Rojo & Van Dijk, 2007; Van Leeuwen & Wodak, 1999; Vaara & Tienari, 2008; 2010; Joutsenvirta & Vaara, 2009; Vaara, Kleymann & Seristö, 2004).

Table 2: Discursive legitimation

Legitimation		
Elements	**Types**	**Legitimation by reference to**
Authorization	- Personal authority - Expert authority - Role model authority - Authority of tradition - Authority of conformity	The authority of tradition, custom and law, and of persons in whom institutional authority is vested
Moral evaluation	- Evaluation by normalization/ naturalization - Abstraction - Analogies	Specific value systems that provide moral basis for legitimation
Rationalization	- Instrumental rationalization - Theoretical rationalization	Utility of specific actions based on knowledge claims that are accepted in a given context as relevant
Mythopoesis	- Moral tales - Cautionary tales	Narratives relating the issue to the past or future

These elements of legitimation can occur separately or in combination with each other and can be used to legitimize or delegitimize a social act. A focus on discursive legitimation enables to study *how* individual policymakers discursively legitimate the institutional context of the *situation* at hand and the institutional *actions* involved. This is needed in order to understand the contestation earlier introduced. Both elements will be explicated in the following paragraph. Table 2 concisely summarizes the elements.

OPERATIONALISATION

A focus on discursive legitimation is not sufficient, since it is a *means* thus one always has to understand what is discursively legitimated. To meet that aim, I operationalized the focal points for analysis as discursive reference to:

1. A specific social situation
2. The position or role of the internal organisation,
3. The position or role of external/ organisations

More specifically, we analysed our data by how individual policymakers construct a social situation, internal or external organisations by references to *beliefs* (convictions and thoughts), *meanings* (norms and values) and *individual or collective contributions* (to 'institutional arrangements' like policies, laws, legislation, collaborative venues, and communicative networks) (Hajer, 2005). By analysing our data with this operationalisation, this transparently explicates how we analysed discursive legitimation. This is done to overcome the acknowledged 'extreme difficulty' to 'operationalize beliefs on the policy

process' (Saurugger, 2013, p. 902) and to deviate from other interpretative studies with a limited attention for operationalization (Balch, 2010; Carrete and Gasper, 2010; Warner and van Buuren, 2011; Verheul, 2014). The presentation of the findings section is also guided by bracketing operationalized elements such as [situational]; [internal organisation]; [external organisation] references in close relation with found [beliefs], [meanings] and [actions]. This is included in the findings to transparently report to the reader which elements we attributed to which data. Table 3 summarizes all elements.

Table 3: References

References to	Operationalization	Characterized
A specific social situation	Beliefs	Convictions and thoughts *(beliefs; convictions; foundations; principles)*
The position or role of the internal organisation	Meanings	Norms and values *(Prescriptions; valuations; norming; imperatives)*
The position or role of external organisations	Actions	Individual or collective contributions to policies, laws, legislation, collaborative venues, networks

METHODS

This study is an interpretative analysis of actor discourses involved in intra-European movement. The case of 'intra-European movement' is selected as *embedded case* because of its wickedness and contestation. In general, migration issues are politically contested, deliver wicked problems, diverse problem definitions and policy controversies (Van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999; Scholten, 2013). To be able to focus on individual discourses, it distinguished two public levels of government, more or less (manifestly) present in authorized claims on intra-European movement[88].

Firstly, the European Commission is selected, since EU legislation made the 'free movement' of persons possible, by a 'removal' of certain physical borders. This legislation, followed by European policies implementing Article 21/ 22 of the Treaty of Rome and Lisbon makes the European Commission an inevitable starting point for analysis. More generally, the 'role of language has largely been largely neglected' in studies of the EU (Diez, 1999) therefore it holds importance to select the European Commission. Secondly, as member-state, the Netherlands is selected, since the Netherlands has historically played a foundational role in the construction of the EU next to the founding of the

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88   Note, because discourses are not fixed and are heterogeneous of nature (Hajer, 1995), without scale or level boundaries, this selection of authorized levels is mainly to have two formal and institutional *reference points* where certain discourses can be produced.

Euro and since they historically have been a proponent of the European free movement regulations (Hollander, 2013). The European Union and the Dutch national state are also selected, since both levels have played a significant role in the current governance of intra-European movement (Sciortino, 2000) and because of their administrative and legislative relevancy. This is obvious for the EC case, by its European legislation which made European free movement possible. Next, the Netherlands opened their labour market borders for A8 countries (such as Poland) in 2007 but was one of the countries that co-authored a letter to the European Commission demanding attention towards 'negative side-effects' of intra-European movement (Mikl-Leitner et al., 2013). As such, because of their political-institutional relevance it makes sense to select the European and Dutch governmental level to study the contestation around 'intra-European movement'.

For this aim, two rounds of qualitative semi-structured interviews have been conducted. First I held 12 interviews with Dutch policymakers involved in EU movement in general. Respondents were professionals working at Ministries of Social Affairs and Employment, Internal Affairs and municipalities of Rotterdam and The Hague which mainly included national and municipal policymakers and two local aldermen. They were selected based on their professional expertise, being active and working on 'intra-European movement' on a daily and professional basis. An additional round of in-depth semi-structured interviews was followed with European policymakers involved in EU movement in general. First, 4 sensitizing interviews were completed at the Permanent Representative level of three member-states (Sweden, Austria and The Netherlands) to gain insight on existing member-state discourses on the EU level. Additionally, this was completed with 5 more interviews of policymakers working at Commission Directorate-General level which includes two interviews with professionals at the DG Internal Market and Services, two at the DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion[89] and one at DG Justice and Consumers. They were also selected based on their professional expertise, being active and working on 'intra-European movement' on a daily and professional basis. All interview respondents were selected by snowball sampling. This holds some clear biases, but because this study focuses on specific professional groups, the references and network capital of respondents were important to get access to authorities in the field. Both interview rounds resulted in 21 in-depth semi-structured interviews on both levels executed by two PhD candidates as part of an international the research project.

These interviews were conducted in summer of 2015 and had comparative interview questions which enabled a semi-structured approach. The researchers met during the interview process in several research meetings, workshops and conferences and discussed the findings and progress of these interviews. Along the way in the research project there have been several Skype-calls securing the general progress of the fieldwork. All experts

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89   One Head of the Sector Free Movement of Workers; one policymaker at Social Security Coordination

agreed to record the interview, which were transcribed and transposed into Microsoft Excel, to analyse the data along the predefined codes and sub codes derived from the operationalization of the grid (see Table 2). This has been done by hand-coding and highlighting all relevant words, phrases and paragraphs in the data that fitted the grid. By this approach, this type of research can be indicated as a matter of back-and-forth reasoning or abductive research (Berg and Lune, 2004; Timmermans and Tavory, 2012). We will now first concisely introduce the political-institutional context of the European and Dutch case. Secondly we will present the findings by *reconstructing* the discourses of the European Commission case, followed by the Dutch case.

EUROPEAN AND DUTCH CONTEXT ON 'INTRA-EUROPEAN MOVEMENT'

Most studies position the freedom of movement and its regulations clearly in the institutional context of EU policies and the process of European integration (Gabriel and Pellerin, 2008; Boswell and Geddes, 2011; Geddes and Scholten, 2016). Since the Treaty of Rome in 1957, leading up to the Schengen Agreement (1985), freedom of movement was of major importance in the European collaboration between member states. An important focus of the EU is to enlarge the flexibility in European labour markets by removing 'barriers', 'obstacles' and 'disturbances' (European Commission, 2002; 2007). This contrasts with EU policies aimed at Third Country Nationals (TCN's), migrants from outside the European Union, which still need specified permission to get access, work and residency in the EU. Although national and local governments are free to adopt integration measures on a voluntary basis, mandatory measures or any provision related to entitlements are in this perspective perceived as illegitimate 'disturbances' of European free movement regulations.

In The Netherlands, after the enlargements, the number of (officially registered) residents from 'Central and Eastern European' (CEE) countries in the Netherlands increased rapidly. In the late 1990s, there were about 50,000 CEE residents, while in 2003, shortly before the EU-enlargement of 2004, this number grew from 62,000 up to 177,000 CEE residents (Statistics Netherlands, 2014). Like many EU member states (such as Austria and Germany), the Netherlands also imposed a transitory regime to free movement of workers from Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. By this intervention, the Dutch government aimed to regulate the inflow of accession state nationals better, mainly based on their labour market participation. This resulted in the Netherlands that for instance Polish (A8) workers needed a work permit until May 2007 and Romanians and Bulgarians workers (A2) until January 2014 to be employed in the Netherlands. Before and after these transitional arrangements, freedom of movement and its consequences became a key political concern. In general on both the European and Dutch level there

have been distinct considerations in regulating intra-European movement which give context to the following findings.

FINDINGS: EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Firstly, European policymakers mainly define 'intra-European movement' as 'freedom of movement' in general or as 'mobility' in particular since it is about: *"intra-EU labour mobility and free movement for EU citizens"* (Policymaker 2, DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion). In order to provide clearance, respondents pointed at the importance to position 'freedom of movement' in its *legal* context. In this positioning all kinds of linguistic and legal considerations were taken into account, especially related to other topics such as 'Roma citizens', 'EU citizenship', 'discrimination' or 'social security'. The awareness and acknowledgement of this legal context was repeatedly an important starting point, which can be exemplified by:

> *"So what we are doing, is that we have an article of the Treaty which is article 45, and the regulation 492/ 2011 which is a codification of former regulation 161268, and we follow their application"* (Policymaker 1, DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion)

The above quote shows that 'what the situation is' ('mobility') [situation], is connected to 'what we do'. And 'what we do' is mainly defined in terms of 'following or implementing' directives, principles or rules [internal organisation]. Next to this, defining the situation as 'freedom of movement' is also followed by legal convictions on 'fundamental rights' [beliefs] which serves as a basis to differentiate the position of the European Commission from member-states as well:

> *"In member states, it's not such a fundamental difference, and here it is. That is true. […] It's for a reason that we are in the DG dealing with fundamental rights, which is a fundamental difference from the migration discourse. So for us it is a very different concept, and in member states it might be less felt"* (Policymaker, DG Justice and Consumers)

Defining the European position as 'fundamental' and its work as concerned with 'fundamental rights' characterizes how European policymakers define their internal organisation [beliefs and meanings]. When defining problems, some maintain an explicit construction of what Europe is, especially in comparison towards member-states. For instance, when one European policymaker reflected on the fictitious case when a Swedish

employer would discriminate Swedish employees by benefitting EU citizens over Swedish workers, he shows what kind of problems do or do not relate to the European Commission [beliefs and meanings]:

> *"This would not be a problem, because legally there have been several decisions from the Court of Justice, it's what we call reverse discrimination, it does not fall under EU law. If a member state chooses to treat its own citizens worse than EU citizen... It can be against national constitution for example. National discrimination, but it's not a problem of European equality. It's about the treatment of Swedish nationals, in Sweden"* (Policymaker DG Justice and Consumers)

It shows a quite delineated perspective when something can or cannot be considered as 'European' or 'national'. This is guided by *legal* norms (guided by EU law) as yardstick providing clearance. This rationale causes 'mobility' as primarily *legally* defined and legitimated by judicial self-references [beliefs and meanings]. Since their own position is mostly defined in terms of 'coordinating', 'harmonizing' or 'implementing' these principles, rules and directives, because: "*for us what is important is to see that the Directive is well implemented*" (Policymaker 1, DG Internal Market and Services), or stated as:

> *''We don't have harmonisation in Europe [...]. So coordination system must be put into place, which is based on a number of principles. [...]. This is like the basic structure, I mean the fact that there is a coordination system means that, of course, as I said, there are huge differences among the systems, so the main challenge of course is to ensure this works smoothly"* (Policymaker 2, DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion).

Explicating this harmonisation role and making sure that things work 'smoothly' comes along with references to member-states [external organisations] are doing or not doing to optimize this harmony, or as one policymaker stated it: "*And also not forget that an article of the treaty as article 45, which concerns free movement of workers and the regulation which implements this article, are directly applicable in the national order. So the member states do not need to take implementing measures*" (Policymaker 1, DG Employment, Social Af-

fairs and Inclusion). By this self-image of 'implementing', 'harmonizing' and 'regulating' directives, conflicting perceptions mainly derived from member-states, are not part of the professional domain of European policymakers, or as stated by one policymaker:

> *"Everybody speaks about facilitating free movement, but at the end, we can see that there are some problems and there are some member states that argue that there are abuses and so. I mean, we think that the mechanisms are there, I mean, the regulation of coordination, you have this kind of mechanism to avoid abuses. So there is a probably practical problem to resolve, not a legal problem. It's up to the member states, but of course they have to respect the EU rules on free movement of workers, they cannot for example discriminate on the basis of nationality"* (Policymaker 1, DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion)

The above quote illustrates how European policymakers define their own work [internal organisation] and how this deviates from member-state concerns [external organisation]. Policymakers do acknowledge problems raised by member-states, however, *defined* as 'practical' instead of a 'legal' problem, these problems are perceived as non-European issues [beliefs and meanings]. This resembles with a more general downgrading of contestation:

> *"Free movement as such has been very well accepted by member states, it's just the reality that, the principle as such is not under discussion a part from the UK. Even the more critical, and member states of the letter and stuff, the principle as such of free movement is uncontested. […]"* (Policymaker DG Justice and Consumers)

By legal convictions, they seem to prioritize stability while contestation seems to be outsourced [values and norms]. This de-contestation seems essential in the construction of their professional reality, stated by a European policymaker:

> *''I would say that on free movement is mostly a political issue, it's to be decided at the political level. We can influence it at technical level, but it won't be us who will be deciding. Since the current Commission Juncker has made declaration in a month or so, it's a no go, restricting free movement"* (Policymaker DG Justice and Consumers)

It shows that European policymakers position politics 'on another level', which outsources the conflict from their professional routines [internal organisation]. Because in the end, there is a strong conviction that: *''Nobody questions the principle of free movement […]*

But it doesn't mean that there are not different voices and different concerns" (Policymaker 2, DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion) [situation]. It displays strong beliefs, based on legal principles that these values are uncontested and legitimate what they do or don't do [actions].

Asked about what *did* changed actions on 'free movement', European policymakers referred to the court case of 'Metock' referred as 'game changer' since 'Metock' explicated the steering limits of member states ('Metock' refers to the European Court of Justice decision[90]). As a court case, this was perceived as important for European policymakers, since it raised awareness about the legitimacy of concerns of member-states. It resulted in collaborative venues for the exchange of information and knowledge gathering [actions] or as a policymaker indicated:

> *"In order to appease, we said "we do take you seriously", "this is the ruling of the court, this is how the law should be read, but we do see that you have concerns and we want to address that". So they set up the FreeMov-meeting to address problems that member states have. Not only celebrate the free movement of persons, but also be able to address court rulings, problems, studies etc."* (Policymaker DG Justice and Consumers)

It resulted in the origination of the FreeMov expert group, which meets 3 to 4 times a year in Brussels [actions]. This group includes ministerial experts of member states and the European Commission in which new studies are presented, latest case law and jurisprudence is discussed and best-practices are debated[91]. This FreeMov Group complements the already existing Administrative Commission which includes a representative of the government of each EU country and a representative of the Commission. This Administrative Commission, was referred to as a platform of '*technical discussion*' on '*a more technical level' (*Policymaker 2, DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion). Thus, while there was already an Administrative Commission, the establishment of the FreeMov group was one of the institutional actions to 'take' member-states 'serious' [external organisation]. But mainly to 'address court rulings' because: ''*we are not going to change the Directive, so the basic rules are going to stay the same because you just don't know what is going to happen if you open it up*'' (Policymaker DG Justice and Consumers)[92].

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90   'Metock' refers to the European Court of Justice Decision on the rights of non-EEA country members who are married to an EEA citizen in the UK and is employed, self-employed or self-sufficient.

91   For aims of clearance, this is a different expert group than the Free movement of Workers Advisory Committee which from 2011 consists of governmental actors, trade union representatives and employers' association representatives

92   Their proactive stance is shown when they refer to the Commission as the 'Guardian of the Treaties' (SOLVIT)

Next to such a new venue, European policymakers also referred to new policies, laws and legislation in which member-state concerns were addressed. For instance, the 'Directive on the enforcement of rights of workers moving within in the European Union' was mentioned since *'public authorities are not aware, of what is the EU law'* (Policymaker 1, DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion) [external organisation]. Next to this, European policymakers mentioned a range of other actions to further 'harmonize' and 'coordinate' the Single Market, such as the 'Professional Qualifications Directive' which need to 'harmonize' professional qualifications better, the 'European professional card' (EPC) need to speed up this recognition process, the 'common training framework' need to 'harmonize' qualification standards while the Electronic Exchange of Social Security Information (EESSI) need to enable an effective exchange of personal documents. All these policies are defined to further 'harmonize', streamline and 'implement' a more 'obstacle-free' freedom of movement [actions].

SUB-ANALYSIS

In general, our analysis shows that European policymakers discursively legitimate 'intra-European movement' as 'free movement' and 'mobility'. The findings display legal convictions, based on values inclined in laws and regulations that guide their own institutional capacity to act. It displays *how* free movement and their own institutional position are discursively legitimated mainly by legal beliefs and meanings. The analysis unfolds a legal and technical discourse, discursively legitimated by *expert authorisation* based on references to law and legislation. Legitimated by *expert authorisation*, they raise convictions that in the end 'nobody questions free movement' and that 'restrictions are a no go'. It exemplifies the process of 'black boxing': making things appear as fixed, natural or essential as effective way of steering away opposing forces (Callon and Latour, 1981). This 'black-boxing' is done by a legal and technical discourse of: *essentializing* the situation ('we are dealing with fundamental rights'), *neutralizing* their own organisational situation ('we only follow the application'), and *depoliticizing* other interests ('nobody questions free movement'). European institutional actions are therefore defined as 'technical' to 'only' 'implement' laws, 'complete' the Single Market or to 'address court rulings' which are 'in line with the fundamental principles'. It shows how contestation is outsourced. This resembles with studies to corporate representatives also maintaining a legalistic discourse to distance themselves from the political role of the organisation (Joutsenvirta and Vaara, 2009). By studying European policymakers, we also observe a legal-technical discourse which problematizes and externalizes contestation as something outside of their professional practices and *guides* institutional actions. We will now study the Dutch case on this topic.

FINDINGS: THE NETHERLANDS

In defining the situation, Dutch national and local policymakers mostly articulated this as 'EU labour migration' by referring to the moment 'when the borders opened' and the moment when 'labour market permits were abandoned' and the 'labour market opened' [beliefs]. This 'opening' and 'closing' of the Dutch territorial and economic borders serves as primary reference point in defining intra-European movement from the Dutch perspective [situation], or as one policymaker indicated it: *''The turning point was in 2007 when the borders opened for Polish people, when the labour market permit was abandoned. […] It was running over our feet"* (Municipal policymaker). More specific, EU citizens are defined as 'migrants' and their movement as 'migration', which can be exemplified as:

> *"I see Polish migrants as migrants. Otherwise one neglects the possible problems. And then the integration perspective is important. […] The idea that these are only mobility workers neglect in my eyes the integration problems"* (Ministerial civil servant)

When EU citizens are defined as *migrants* and as *labour* migrants[93], consequentially these 'new' EU citizens and their *migrant* issues became also defined as 'integration'. In line with that [conviction] Dutch policymakers have a self-image which is mainly consisted of looking for solutions to problems, or stated as:

> *"[…] we do have real problems and you need to look for solutions. We signal problems. Maybe also derived from our history. That we do not want that problems will repeat" (*Ministry Social Affairs policymaker 1)

Next to the importance to discursively define this as *migration*, it also legitimates the self-image of Dutch policymakers in what they do [internal organisation]. Dutch respondents legitimated their position on the indicated problems because 'one must have an eye for the consequences' or 'shadow sides' of this migration [beliefs], which can be exemplified by:

> *''Around 2006 we received signals from the neighbourhoods: nuisance, street prostitution, alcohol problems, overcrowded housing and parking issues. [...] And when Polish people finish their work, nice weather, beer on the street. That is a form of happiness which residents experience as nuisance. […]*

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93   after a period in which EU citizens were termed as 'MOE-landers' (which is a Dutch abbreviation of 'Middle- and Eastern European-landers'). This label was used in the period 2003-2013, after 2013 it became abandoned, since most policy actors acknowledged that this label was not appropriate anymore.

> *These were signals that really exist. No nagging complainers, but understand-able stories of nuisance"* (Former aldermen The Hague).

It illustrates a Dutch focus on 'problems', 'issues' and 'nuisance' which resembled with former insights derived from 'our history'. This refers to the history of guestworker migration of the 60s and 70s of Moroccan and Turkish migrants and their 'integration'. This reference to their 'common history' has importance in legitimating that they cannot 'turn a blind eye' to 'the problems' of which 'we know from the past should not be neglected' (Letter to Parliament, 2011). This specificity of articulating free movements as migration and EU citizens as migrants, has also been acknowledged by policymakers, especially when they refer to external organisation, as noted by one policymaker:

> *"Day 1 when I came working here, someone explained to me that there is a large difference between those terms and that it makes a lot of difference in Europe which word one uses. It should be mobility, yes. Yes, it was about subtleties, at least apparently, but a crucial difference in Brussels, they made me understand yes. […] our International Department are careful about that and will use the words mobility or mobile EU citizens. But if we write our Letter to Parliament we just talk about EU labour migrants"* (Ministry Social Affairs policymaker 3)

Dutch policymakers seem to be aware that their specific articulation of 'intra-European movement' differs from others [external], especially from the European Commission. Policymakers reflected on this difference as: *''The Commission has a completely different approach. They are real believers. Which is very hard. We need to do harder our best for them'* (Ministry Social Affairs policymaker 2). Since '*for them, the freedom of movement is considered holy"* (Ministry Social Affairs policymaker 3) [beliefs]. However, the different beliefs between the Dutch and European level have not been problematized by Dutch actors. Instead, they internalized this contestation as being part of their daily profession, illustrated by one former alderman of Rotterdam as:

> *''They were situated at an enormous high level of abstraction. Europe must be able and all will be less than expected, and they had a different agenda. […] The freedom of people was more important than the nuisance in those neighbourhoods"* (Former alderman Rotterdam)

His counterpart in The Hague also reflected on this collaboration as:

''When you arrive in Brussels, you are a bit seen as an undesirable person. The city of The Hague with 500.000 inhabitants, and there are more of that in Europe. You are not Paris or London. […] So what are you complaining about man? A little bit that feeling" (Former alderman The Hague)

It shows that Dutch policy actors were aware of the different situational definitions, and acknowledged, with other beliefs, that their own organisational [internal] position was different from other organisations such as the European Commission [external]. The awareness of this difference, has been internalized.

Next to these beliefs, on the national level, different venues and policies were orchestrated. As a result, collaborative venues[94] and a 'Municipalities network' were created (Ministry of Internal Affairs, 2011)[95]. In addition, a working group ('norms-meeting') was installed, to discuss housing issues [actions]. Respondents referred to these institutional actions in order to 'discuss issues', 'tackle problems' and 'share information'. These new venues influenced new laws and legislation[96] for instance on housing by an 'Intention Declaration' and a 'National Declaration Housing Labour migrants' (Ministry of Housing, Neighbourhoods and Integration, 2010). This involved a range of actions on the national level resulting in new policies, laws and legislation [actions]. Besides these 'national' actions, there has also been collaboration on the European level. Dutch policy actors indicated the importance of venues at the European level to get 'topics on the agenda', as one policymaker indicated: *'at a certain moment we were in Brussels every week'* (Ministry Social Affairs policymaker 4). Collective actions were mostly staged at the Administrative Commission, which was considered 'as the only institutional place to discuss and modify laws and legislation'. As such, Dutch policymakers defined this venue as important to explain their perspective on this topic, but also to 'propose adjustments' to existing EU laws and legislation, for instance on the Posted Workers Directive. But besides these communicative venues, Dutch policy actors stated that 'real' new European laws and legislation seem to be limited [actions].

SUB-ANALYSIS

In general, Dutch policy actors defined 'intra-European movement' in terms of a 'container metaphor' (Charteris-Black, 2006) of 'opening' and 'closing' territorial and economic nation-state borders which guides the discursive construction of this situation as 'migration'. This contributes to a *national* discourse of 'migrants' and their 'integra-

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94   firstly, a managerial group structure (of political representatives); secondly, a steering group structure (of administrative supervisors); and thirdly, a working group structure (of administrative policymakers) was set up to collaborate and discuss issues regarding CEE migration.

95   joined by 80 municipalities which included 5 annual meetings

96   'Act Exceptional Measures for Urban Problems' (also called 'the Rotterdam Act')

tion'. By *mythopoesis*, by discursive legitimations to a common past and 'our history', they legitimate their present position and future actions. The findings display the importance of *mythopoesis*, references to the past to construct values that guide the situation, internal and external constructions. It displays *how* migration and the Dutch institutional position are discursively legitimated mainly by historical and territorial beliefs and meanings. This *national* discourse is constructed by a practice of *containering* the situation ('opening and closing of borders'), *historicizing* their own actions ('we don't want problems to repeat') and *politicizing* the position of others ('they are real believers'), since most Dutch respondents regret that the European level does not fully understand their situation of 'solving problems'. By studying Dutch policy actors, we observe the significance of a national discourse which *guides* particular actions and practices in a profound way.

CONCLUSIONS

The main question of this chapter was: '*How can we explain the contestation between Dutch and European policy actors on 'intra-European movement and what are the institutional consequences?*' First of all, this study reveals two different discursive definitions of the situation by policy actors. The findings show a *legal discourse* on the level of the European Commission and a *national discourse* on the Dutch level. In reference to legal authority, European policymakers discursively *essentialize* the situation, *neutralize* their own organisational situation, and *depoliticize* other interests, since in the end 'nobody questions free movement'. This 'black-boxing' strategy on the EC level contradicts with the strategy of 'containering' on the Dutch level. The analysis shows a *national discourse* in which Dutch policymakers discursively *container* the situation, *historicize* their own actions and *politicize* the position of others. Consequentially, the situation is defined as 'migration', EU citizens as 'migrants' and their issues as 'integration'. The analysis shows how the European Commission mainly relies on *authorisation* and discursive legitimation strategy to define the situation, their own internal organisation and external others by means of the authority of custom, law and institutions in whom institutional authority is vested. It also shows how this contradicts with the Dutch discursive legitimation strategy of *mythopoesis* in defining the situation, their own internal organisation and external others by means of references to a 'common' past or future. These findings give empirical substance and a more comparative, public and administrative application to the literature on discursive legitimation (Van Dijk, 1997; Van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999; Van Leeuwen, 2007; Rojo and Van Dijk, 2007; Van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999; Vaara and Tienari, 2008; 2010; Joutsenvirta and Vaara, 2009; Vaara, Kleymann and Seristö, 2004). This is summarized in the following table:

Table 4: Summary

	European Commission	The Netherlands
Specific social situation	*Essentializing*	*Containering*
Position/ role of the internal organisation	*Neutralizing*	*Historicizing*
Position/ role of external/ organisations	*Depoliticizing*	*Politicizing*
Discursive legitimation	**Authorization**	**Mythopoesis**

Furthermore, a close examination of both cases shows us that European Commission policymakers downgrade and outsource contestation about the issue 'as problem', while Dutch policymakers did acknowledged the situation as 'problem'. This is interesting, because without contestation, without a situation being defined as 'a problem', such a situation lacks any incentives to look for 'solutions'. Without mutual acknowledgment of what the problem is about or even about the existence of a problem, there is no legitimacy to act upon it. By depoliticizing free movement, European policymakers do not acknowledge the 'problems' of 'others'. It shows the social construction of problems and the acceptance of 'problems' as a strategic choice of governmental action. This study shows *how* this happened and explains why Dutch and European policy actors conflict and to what the Dutch Ministerial policymaker in the first quote referred to. She referred to the non-acknowledgment of the *Dutch* problems in the *European* content. The analysis shows that it is not only because of 'conflicting frames' that ''participants disagree both with one another and about the nature of their disagreements" (Rein and Schön, 1994, p. 145). It also reveals that even 'the nature of their disagreement' and thus the acknowledgment of a problem is contested. Without the acknowledgment of disagreement or a problem of both parties, there can be a single party disagreement, but there will be no mutual incentives to look for solutions. This case shows how ignorance, neglect or the non-acknowledgement of problems can be a discursive strategy to deal with contestation.

Finally, this study did not only aim to show the empirical substance of 'dissenting narratives' or the different 'normative context of values' (Warner and Van Buuren, 2011). Because this study also investigated what the institutional consequences are of 'dissenting' discourses. The analysis shows some contradictions, not only in terms of discourses but also in terms of institutional actions. It shows how for instance on the European level, policymakers mainly act according to 'court law' and define issues as significant when 'fall under EU law'. Consequentially, European actions were developed to address a further 'harmonizing' and 'coordinating' of member-state concerns considering the 'completion' of the 'Single Market'. On the other hand, it displays why on the Dutch national level all kinds of actions were developed to address the integration of migrants, such as new policies, laws and legislation on housing, language and registration. It seems obvious, but this study shows *how* words matter and how words guide a range of opposing or contradictory institutional actions such as policies, laws and legislation. By distinguishing the discursive legitimation of the

situation, internal and external organisations by beliefs, meanings and actions, this study operationalizes 'meaning in action' (Wagenaar, 2015) and gives an empirical application how 'dialogues of the deaf' could evolve (Warner and van Buuren, 2011), while a range of interpretative studies link all kind of elements together (Bevir and Rhodes, 2006; Hajer, 1997; Schmidt, 2011). By unravelling both case study discourses it shows how situational definitions guide specific actions (Thomas and Thomas, 1928, p. 572). Many studies have shown the importance of this situational definition, fewer studies have shown *how* this works. By unravelling individual beliefs and meanings, and their references to actions by discursive legitimations I contribute to unravel this process in between.

CONTESTED KNOWLEDGE - POLITICS OF NUMBERS

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
ABSTRACT

Numbers and data collection play a key role in political framing. To explore *how* this works, this chapter provides a case-study analysis of European mobile workers in the Netherlands. Following the increase of intra-European movement, European mobile workers have emerged as an important but contested policy target group for receiving countries. This chapter examines how numbers contributed to the framing process of this topic. This study reveals how frames legitimize the *strategic usage of numbers* and the indication of issues *as* problems. This contributes to our understanding of the importance of numbers in the framing process of target groups.

'When something is measured, people tend to notice it more'
(Stone, 1988: 178).

INTRODUCTION

'At a certain moment we observed a stagnation in the increase of official registrations of intra-EU migrants (…). But when a new minister came to office and interpreted the same figures, he said: 'the amounts are still increasing'. Which are both true, but it's about how you frame it, you can go any way. Framing is very important in this issue, in a lot of political dossiers, but certainly in this dossier' (MCS3)

How can we understand the above statement of a Ministerial civil servant and grasp the relevance of numbers in the 'very important' issue of framing? From a rationalist perspective, numbers provide an objective means of identifying issues or problems and thus pinpointing areas for governmental intervention (Niskanen, 2007). Various studies however, have proven this to be far more complex. The methods of quantified data collection (Porter, 1995), the selection and definition of items on which data are collected (Jasanoff, 2004), as well as the definition of groups involved (Pierce et al., 2014; Schneider and Ingram, 1997; Yanow, 2003) are often much more contested.

To understand this contestation we connect the issue of numbering to the framing literature in public policy studies. While various studies consider the role of stories, categories, symbols, myths and metaphors, less attention has been paid towards the contribution of numbers in framing studies (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Stone, 1988; Yanow, 2003; Bacchi, 2009). Instead, numbers have mostly been studied as an instrument to 'account' (Miller and Napier, 1993), as population management (Rose, 1991), as 'rhetoric of objectivity' or uniform communication (Desrosières, 1993; Porter, 1995; Rojo and van Dijk, 1997; Cohen, 1999). This is an important gap, since *'numbers, in fact, work exactly like metaphors'* (Stone, 1988: 165).

In this study we approach numbers as socio-political constructions. We adopt a constructivist approach in which we focus on political actors and authorities involved in the framing process of 'intra-European movement'. In that process, we understand the importance of 'numbers' in the discursive legitimation of 'frames'. We examine how authorities 'clothe their choices in objective technical terms' or in 'simply rationalizations' (Schneider and Ingram, 1997: 158-165). By this approach we contribute to the role of data and statistics in the framing of target groups, and in legitimating action toward these groups (Van Leeuwen, 2007; Pierce, et al., 2014).

'Intra-European movement' is a case where numbering of involved groups has played a key role. In the EU enlargements of 2004 and 2007, various Central and Eastern-European (CEE) countries joined the EU, such as Poland, Hungary and Romania, which provided access to the right of free movement within the EU[97]. While the European Commission framed this as 'mobility' and defined these groups as 'EU mobile citizens' making use of their right of free movement, local and national governments in countries such as the Netherlands framed these groups as 'CEE migrants' and their movement as 'migration'. Or, even more specific, Dutch authorities framed these migrants as 'MOE-lander' ('MOE' as Dutch abbreviation of 'CEE') (Letter to Parliament, 2001: 5). In that regard, the Dutch government claimed to have received an inflow of 'more than 300.000 MOE-landers' after 2004 and local governments advocated specific measures to stimulate the 'integration' of these 'MOE-landers' (Statistics Netherlands, 2011; Municipality Rotterdam, 2013). Key in this political agenda setting involved the data production by various Dutch research agencies and 'planning offices' to indicate the population size and the socio-economic position of these 'CEE migrants'. As such, numbering plays a key role in public and political debates, yet, we do not fully understand what role numbering plays in framing specific target groups. Therefore, this chapter examines how numbers contribute towards legitimate frames of 'intra-European movement'.

For that purpose we include an empirical case study on 'intra-European movement' in the Netherlands. This serves as a *strategic case study* because of the perceived relevance to monitor and register this population in the Netherlands. We pose the following research question: *'How has numbering legitimized the framing of 'MOE-landers' in The Netherlands?'* We will address this question through an interpretative case study analysis of official Dutch documents regarding 'EU migrants' and a series of semi-structured interviews with respondents involved in policymaking as well as in registration and data collection.

THE POLITICS OF FRAMING

From a social-constructivist perspective, policy problems are not 'discovered' but socially constituted as part of a broader social and interactive process. The notion of frames emphasizes how policies are based on plot lines and storytelling that *"holds disparate elements together long enough to energize and guide action"* (Weick, 1995: 61). Convincing frames are an ideological and political result of contingent disputes defined as a graspable situation one can act upon (Rein and Schon, 1977). It includes a comprehensive definition of social problems related with relevant political solutions. The concept 'frame' points at the

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97   Accession of A8 countries in 2004 (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta and Cyprus) and A2 countries in 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania)

more static concept by which subjects and issues are addressed. Instead, fram*ing* points at the more interactive, dynamic and politically sensitive understanding to conceptualize frames. As such, we approach *framing* as an intersubjective and socio-political process (Van Hulst and Yanow, 2014). More specifically, we approach framing as how specific language and concepts are used (*naming*), how involved groups are defined (*classifying*) and how a causal story with prescriptive solutions is constructed (*narrating*).

Firstly by *naming,* policy-relevant actors draw on language that reflects their understanding of the issue. By the creation of concepts, labels and metaphors, issues can be defined (Rein and Schon, 1977; Van Hulst and Yanow, 2014). Secondly, framing involves *classifications* or categorizations of 'the social' in groups and categories that are distinguished by a convincing set of characteristics (Bowker and Star, 1999; Starr, 1992; Bacchi, 2009). To classify a group is not a neutral but primarily a *social* and a *relational* activity reflecting a hierarchical order (Hacking, 2007). This occurs by the introduction of new categories, which include or exclude people; reifying the social world they refer to (de Zwart, 2005). For instance, it differs throughout societies whether 'Jews' are classified in terms of 'ethnicity', 'race' or 'religion' (Starr, 1992). As such, classifications can contribute towards the 'recognition of shared characteristics', to create 'a bond of uniformity' or to a 'shared community' (Schneider and Ingram, 1997). Thirdly, framing ensures that these names and categories are positioned in a certain *story, a narrative* with a problem and a convincing perspective on its control (Stone, 1988). With these elements policy framing can include a *feed-forward effect*, which could trigger all kinds of consequences such as policies, instruments or beneficial arrangements (Schneider and Ingram, 1997). This is the 'normative leap', the call for policy action, which is its *performative potential* (de Zwart, 2005)

By the elements of naming, classifying and narrating, policy frames can be constructed and studied to display how *specific* values are attributed to *specific* groups. When political actors highlight an issue, communication informs with the intention to manipulate, silence or mystify some elements (Wodak, 2009; Van Hulst and Yanow, 2014). We are interested in how political actors construct legitimate names, classifications or narratives with the use of numbers. In the following we will explain what we understand by numbers and numbering.

THE POLITICS OF NUMBERING

Policies can become more convincing and persuasive by the strategic usage of data, statistics and registrations (Edelman, 1971; Yanow, 2003). Data and statistics are very important as 'input' for policy design and are used to make policies persuasive (Cohen, 1999). Especially on target groups, statistical data plays a key role in policy design

processes since numbers can create benchmarks if presented as 'hard data' (Desrosières, 1993; Simon, 2015; Porter, 1995).

The use of numbers *seems* very natural, objective or neutral, because of its 'ordering capacity' and technicality by which one can objectify, quantify and depoliticize subjective problems (Porter, 1995; Rose, 1999; Cohen, 1999). But from a social-constructivist perspective, numbers are not 'discovered' and data collection on populations is not a neutral form of counting but rather social-politically constituted, since numbers include deliberate decisions about *how* to count and *why* a phenomenon is perceived interesting enough to bother counting (Simon, 2005; Schinkel, 2013; Starr, 1992; Stone, 1988: 172). As such, numbering is a socio-political process of inclusion, exclusion and selection, since numbers make it possible for governments to govern (Rose, 1999). These numbers are not just 'out there', since actors have *agency* and strategic interests in numbering activities (Porter, 1995; Jasanoff, 2004). In this context, it is important to study *by whom, how* and *why* numbers are produced. This is why we focus on number*ing*. We approach numbering as the socio-political process of knowledge production by actors in the use of numbers (Porter, 1995). We understand numbering by the elements of *selection of topics* on which numbers are collected and *methods of data collection* (Starr, 1992; Simon, 2015).

First of all, the *selection of topics* or domains on which numbers are collected (or equally important, on those which numbers are *not* collected) is often not merely an expert choice, but part of a socio-political process (Salter, 1988; Jasanoff, 2004). *Topic selection* involves a focus on which topics data is collected. Secondly, *methods of data collection* focus on how data is gathered. Both can be affected by institutional constraints or strategic motivations. For instance, in some countries like the United States, data collection about ethnicity is based on a census where citizens declare their ethnicity themselves (Simon, 2005). In other countries, ethnicity is 'deduced' from a broader set of data on family decent, which has large consequences for the definition of 'minorities', 'migrants' and 'inflows'. By these elements of *topic selection* and *methods of data collection* we understand numbering as a socio-political process of 'making up numbers'[98]. We expect a relevance of numbering in framing processes. By this conceptual distinction and operationalization we aim to study numbering and framing as separate conceptual phenomena. This leads to the following overview in Table 5, which concisely summarizes the operationalized elements by which framing and numbering are analysed:

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98   We left out elements data analysis, visualization and processing since this could conceptually interfere

Table 5: Operationalisation of framing and numbering

Framing		
Elements	**Defined as**	**Indicators**
Naming	*Creation of specific tags*	*Concepts, labels and metaphors*
Classification	*Attribution of characteristics*	*Characteristics and categories*
Narrating	*Construction of a narrative*	*Problems, solutions and interventions*
Numbering		
Elements	**Defined as**	**Indicators**
Topic selection	*Selection of topics*	*Issues, topics, domains*
Data collection	*Collection of data*	*Methods and techniques*

RELATING NUMBERING AND FRAMING

To study *how* numbers legitimate frames, 'legitimation' is conceptualized as the creation of a sense of understandable, necessary or acceptable actions in a specific setting (Van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999). It is the justification of salient elements of the institutional order by giving a normative dignity to its practical imperatives (Boltanski and Thevenot, 1991). In contrast, delegitimation establishes a sense of negative, morally reprehensible or otherwise unacceptable actions (Rojo and Van Dijk, 1997; van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999). We study the legitimation of practices of a specific institutional order by *discursive* practices, and by *discursive* legitimation. From a discursive perspective, legitimacy is created within specific discourses, since discourses produce knowledge and '*provide the 'frames' with which people make sense of particular issues and give sense to them*' (Vaara and Tienari, 2008: 987). To study discursive legitimation we take up the work of Van Leeuwen (2007; 91) who distinguished four key categories of discursive legitimation: authorization, moral evaluation, rationalization and mythopoesis (Van Leeuwen, 2007; Rojo and Van Dijk, 2007; Van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999; Vaara and Tienari, 2008: 988). As such, this focus on discursive legitimation enables us to study *how* numbers discursively legitimate frames. Table 6 concisely summarizes the elements by which we operationalize discursive legitimation (Van Leeuwen, 2007; Van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999).

Table 6: Operationalization of discursive legitimation

Legitimation		
Elements	**Types**	**Legitimation by reference to**
Authorization	- Personal authority - Expert authority - Role model authority - Personal authority - Authority of tradition - Authority of conformity	The authority of tradition, custom and law, and of persons in whom institutional authority is vested
Moral evaluation	- Evaluation by normalization/ naturalization - Abstraction - Analogies	Specific value systems that provide moral basis for legitimation
Rationalization	- Instrumental rationalization - Theoretical rationalization	Utility of specific actions based on knowledge claims that are accepted in a given context as relevant
Mythopoesis	- Moral tales - Cautionary tales	Narratives relating the issue to the past or future

These elements of legitimation can occur separately or in combination with each other and can be used to legitimize or delegitimize a social act (van Leeuwen, 2007). By the distinction of these four elements we analyse how numbers discursively legitimate frames. We expect relevancy of numbers within framing processes, since we presume that numbers are not just 'out there'. But it is quite unknown how to understand this relevancy, especially in this case. Based on previous studies, we expect that numbers are mostly used to objectify or depoliticize political discourses. Hence, we expect that numbers, as 'rhetoric of objectivity' (Rojo and van Dijk, 1997; van Leeuwen, 2007) legitimize frames by *rationalization* or *objectification*. In that interactive process we focus on political actors, experts and professionals who generate knowledge, and have the (institutional) justification to legitimate its validity (Hacking, 2007: 297).

METHODS

This study is based on a qualitative analysis of framing and numbering activities in the field of 'intra-European movement' in The Netherlands. To unravel the dynamics between framing and numbering, 'intra-European movement' is selected as an embedded case study. The Dutch case is selected as it involves a (relatively) new 'migrant' category, which means that processes of categorization may be relatively new and visible. The Dutch case is also selected because of its historical specificity in ethnic registrations (Bijl and Verweij, 2012), since data collection on migrants exists longer in the Netherlands than in other

countries, such as in France (de Zwart, 2005). The Dutch case is a strategic case study to analyse the relevancy of numbering in framing processes.

Specifically, to study this relevancy, we focus in particular on the position of governmental organisations and data producers. First we did a qualitative desk research of the policy process, secondly we interviewed respondents and stakeholders and thirdly we focussed on how knowledge and information circulated between those actors. As such, we focussed on a wide variety of data and knowledge producers, such as universities, NGO's and private research agencies related to this topic such as the Dutch Social and Cultural Planning Office (SCP) and the Statistics Office (CBS). Important to mention is that our analysis was not limited to these agencies and that we did not pre-defined the selection of respondents in our research design. The point of departure was not the institutional differences of these agencies, but when data has been used or was of relevance for (policy related) stakeholders in this topic. Furthermore, our analysis focused on the period 2000-2015, a couple of years before the Dutch borders 'opened' for 'mobile workers' from Central and Eastern Europe until recent policies.

First, the research design was based on a qualitative document analysis. This included primary (policy documents, Letters to Parliament) and secondary (literature) sources covering policies regarding EU mobile workers and 'migrants'. Additionally, this involved an analysis of primary (research reports, advisory studies) sources, of all relevant data producers within the topic at hand. More specifically, we studied all studies spurred by Ministries and that were reported within Letters to Parliament.

Subsequently, we completed two rounds of interviews. First we held 12 qualitative semi-structured interviews with stakeholders regarding issues of registration in general. This included national and municipal policymakers, lobbyists and private parties active with 'intra-European movement' in their daily work. This round of interviews sensitized our perspective on registration issues and its consequences in the Netherlands in general. This evolved into a second round of 10 additional in-depth semi-structured interviews with different experts such as national policymakers, researchers and statisticians at data offices. These interviews were held in the summer of 2015 and focussed on the preliminary issues found in the first round of interviews.

DATA ANALYSIS

The desk research was primarily executed by online searches of Letters to Parliament by the number of a dossier[99]. The basis of the search was on the Dutch translated terms 'mobility', 'migration' and 'movement'. From here, four dossier numbers rose, of which '29407' was the most relevant ('free movement of employees from new EU member states'). This

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[99]   Online searches by www.tweedekamer.nl and https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl

dossier included 332 documents (2002-2015), which have been interpretatively studied by their abstracts and selected on their qualitative relevancy. It resulted in 53 documents which contributed to an extensive data file. This, together with the research documents produced by research agencies on this topic collected by extensive agency searches made up our data file. Secondly, the qualitative semi-structured interviews were conducted along pre-structured interview guidelines. The experts for the interviews were selected by snowball sampling because this study focuses on numbering and framing, the references and network capital of respondents were important to get access to authorities in the field. This holds some biases, since we had to rely on the willingness and cooperation of respondents to get to additional informed respondents. This may have led to a very specific sample of respondents, but because of their expertise this specificity was needed. We did not only focussed on a specific set of respondents, but also included respondents with a variety of affiliations, such as ministerial, municipal and NGO related respondents. This mixture enabled us to check the data from a variety of perspectives along the way. Next to this, our desk research also made it possible to triangulate and check the reliability of our interview data by multiple sources.

All experts agreed to a recorded interview, which were transcribed and transposed to the programme ATLAS.ti, a software programme used for analysing qualitative data. The interview data was analysed along the codes and sub-codes derived from the operationalization of the grid (explained below). This has been done by hand-coding and highlighting all relevant words, phrases and paragraphs in the documents that fitted the grid. By this approach, this type of research can be indicated as a matter of back-and-forth reasoning (Berg and Lune, 2004) or abductive research (Timmermans and Tavory, 2012). With an abductive approach, the researcher went back and forth between theoretical concepts and the empirical findings. By doing this kind of analysis, the researcher distinguished frame elements in the empirical data. This analysis is based on an analysis of the empirical material by predefined codes, the deductive grid of framing, numbering and legitimation elements (comprehensively visualized by table 5 and 6). As such, framing has been analysed by the elements of naming, classification and narrating. Numbering has been analysed by the elements of topic selection and data collection. And legitimation has been analysed by the elements of authorization, moral evaluation, rationalization and mythopoesis. For aims of transparency and reliability of the analysis, these elements are included between parentheses (for instance by '[naming]') in the analysis paragraphs to transparently report to the reader which elements we attributed to which data.

We will now first *contextualize* the Dutch case study. Secondly, we will *reconstruct* the findings in three periods and after the presentation of these findings, we will finalize with a *concluding* section.

FRAMING AND NUMBERING REGARDING INTRA-EUROPEAN MOVEMENT

THE DUTCH CONTEXT

Migration or mobility from Central and Eastern Europe should be positioned in the institutional context of EU policies and the process of European integration (Gabriel and Pellerin, 2008). Since the Treaty of Rome in 1957, leading up to the Schengen Agreement (1985), freedom of movement was of major importance in the European collaboration between member states. An important focus of the EU is to guarantee labour mobility, to enlarge the flexibility in European labour markets to strengthen the Single Market by removing 'barriers', 'obstacles' and 'disturbances' that limit flexibility on the labour markets (European Commission, 2002; 2007: 4). Removing barriers also means that citizens of EU member-states are not perceived as 'migrants' under EU law, but as 'mobile workers' (Favell, 2008; Guild and Mantu, 2011). This contrasts with EU policies aimed at Third Country Nationals (TCN's), migrants from outside the European Union, which still need specified permission to get access, work and residency in the EU. Although national and local governments are free to adopt integration measures on a voluntary basis, mandatory measures or any provision related to entitlements are in this perspective perceived as illegitimate 'disturbances' of the EU principle of free movement.

The political context of that moment, with fierce political turmoil in the aftermath on the assassination of right-wing politician Pim Fortuyn, stimulated an anti-immigrants debate. The Dutch context was strongly fuelled by politicized backlashes on 'immigration', 'islam' and what has been termed 'the multicultural drama' (Scheffer, 2000). This also legitimated restrictive transitional arrangements, which caused that accession state nationals could travel to and settle but had limited access to the Dutch labour market. By this intervention, the Dutch government aimed to better regulate the inflow of accession state nationals, mainly based on their labour market participation. This resulted in the Netherlands where for instance Polish workers needed a work permit until May 2007 and Romanians and Bulgarians workers until January 2014 to be employed in the Netherlands. Since the lifting of these transitional arrangements, 'migration' from CEE

countries and 'migrant' monitoring and registration became a key political concern in the Dutch national political arena in the late 2000s. Not only on the national level but also on the local level of municipalities who asked attention for the 'tsunami' of Eastern Europeans (Zuidervaart, 2010). The previous chapter showed three distinct discursive periods or frames regarding 'intra-European movement' at the Dutch national level: from a more legal-economic discourse (<2007), to a legal socio-cultural discourse (2008-2011) towards a merging of both in the final phase (2011>). We will now concisely summarize these three periods.

The first period is characterized by the transition period installed until 2007, which imposed strict limitations on mobility of EU citizens from new member states. In this period discourses held a mere economic perspective on an intra-European mobility paradigm and a strong liberal focus on the 'opening' of the borders by minimizing 'administrative burdens' and maximizing the impacts of 'the four freedoms'. Attention is mainly devoted to the most profitable timing in the implementation of new EU legislation for the Dutch economy and to optimize the EU's internal market function (Letter to Parliament, 2004: 1). Indicative, Dutch policies are termed 'accompanying policies', because legislation should not hamper the free movement aims. This first period is thus characterized as a *legal-economic discourse*. The second discursive period (2007-2011) is characterized by the lifting of the temporary restrictions and shows a shift towards socio-cultural and legal issues. There is more focus on social 'problems' and 'reverse sides' such as housing irregularities and fraudulent practices. Moreover, in this period, all kinds of parallels are made to 'learn lessons of the past', implicitly defining this too as a migrant (and integration) issue with a focus on housing, language and neighbourhood problems (Letter to Parliament, 2009; 2011)[100]. Consequentially, all sorts of 'pilots', 'Action Plans' (2011) and 'an integral packet of measures' are proposed to counteract these 'reverse sides' and benefit from those 'lessons' of that past. Thus, this second period is characterized as a *legal socio-cultural discourse.* Thirdly, both discourses earlier identified get a close issue connection in the final period (>2011). In this period, discourses include both *legal-economic* and *socio-cultural* elements by connecting aims to stimulate the labour market with interventions to regulate housing issues and the societal participation of migrants. All kinds of laws were proposed to control housing issues more effectively and to regulate irregularities in the labour market, in order to combat 'shadow sides' (Letter to Parliament, 2013; 175) and to make EU migration 'maintainable' and 'compliable' (Letter to Parliament, 2013, 172; 174). This turned a focus on exploitation in the Dutch labour market, to illegal temporary labour agencies *and* affordable housing. Thus the final period

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100   Also visible by the title of the Parliamentary Commission 'Lessons of Recent Labour Migration' (LURA), which shows the focus on 'lessons' and 'labour migration'

is characterized as the merging of both *legal-economic* and *socio-cultural* discourses. These three periods constitute the background of the in-depth analysis.

FIRST PERIOD (<2007): NAMING AND CATEGORIZING 'MOE-LANDERS'

In the pre-2007 period, the issue of European mobility is mostly covered in terms of 'European enlargement' and seen as a positive development (SER, 1993: 7). It includes a strong distinction between 'Eastern' and 'Western' Europe, sometimes with a label such as 'Middle and Eastern Europe' (SER, 1993; 1999; 2001) [naming]. The label 'Middle and Eastern Europe' originated in a study on the expected trading contributions of potential member states by a 'gravity model' (Gros and Steinherr, 1993)[101] (see figure 3).

Economic centers in Europe 2000

Figure 3: *Economic centres in Europe (Gros and Steinherr, 1993)*

Within this 'gravity model', all countries behind 'Eastern Germany' were classified as economic '*periphery*' with '*limited gravity*' (SER, 1993: 152). In this study the label '(Middle and) Eastern Europe' was mainly based on economic index data, territorial proximity and geopolitical developments at that time [classification].

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101   Based on export quota and percentages of the GDP (SER, 1993: 152)

This was not unimportant because this early characterisation of 'Eastern Europe' resonated in other official documents. Of large importance was the European Integration Consortium report (Boeri and Brucker, 2000) which defined these countries as 'CEECs' (Central and Eastern European Countries). In discussions about European enlargement, the Dutch Cabinet explicitly referred to this report in terms of 'labour migration', 'flows' and the 'migration' of 'migrants' from 'Middle and Eastern European countries' (Letter to Parliament, 2000: 3). One year later, the Dutch Minister declared that he had attention for impacts of 'labour migration' and 'mobility' from 'MOE-landen' (again, 'MOE' is the Dutch abbreviation of 'CEE') (Letter to Parliament, 2001: 5). From this onwards, the label 'MOE-lander' originated, referring to a migrant who originates from one of the Central or Eastern European countries. As such, this new policy category was strongly characterized by geopolitical developments, territorial enlargements and net economic benefits of member-state accessions [naming and classification]. To contextualize the origination of this label, figure 4 shows the development of the label 'MOE-lander' within Dutch media (national and local newspapers)[102] and within Dutch governmental documents (Parliamentary documents)[103]. It shows the emergence of this label, displaying that the term 'MOE-land' hardly existed before 2003 and was initially mainly used within Parliament (2006-2008) while afterwards within media (2010-2013) with a peak in 2012. For aims of clearance and language sensitivity, in the following we will continue to use the Dutch term 'MOE' instead of 'CEE' to show the contingent development of this new term in the Dutch discourse.


Figure 4: *allocation of Dutch media and parliamentary attention on CEE issues*

Against the backdrop of labels such as 'migrants' from 'MOE-landen', 'MOE labour migrants', and 'MOE employers' (Letter to Parliament, 2004: 1) the Cabinet used different

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102   Searched by 'moe-lander' in LexisNexis

103   Searched by: 'moe-land*' in https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl

statistics to define their governmental approach. At first, the Cabinet expected that '*large scale migration flows will not occur*' with an expected number of '44.000 migrants' by 2030 (Letter to Parliament, 2000: 3; 2001; 5). However, the Ministry of Social Affairs spurred the Statistics Office to 'provide indications of the scale of labour migration flows to the Netherlands from Middle and Eastern European countries' (Central Planning Office, 2004: 1). This resulted in the first monitor on 'MOE-8' countries that forecasted the amount of 'immigrants' '*between the 5 and 10 thousand per year between mid 2004 and 2006*' (Central Planning Office, 2004: 16).

Since the pre-2007 period was characterized by a transitory regime, the Dutch Cabinet could regulate the 'inflow' of 'labour migrants' by means of 'labour market permits'. As such, positioned within the broader mobility paradigm, intra-EU mobility was framed purely as a form of *labour* migration (Letter to Parliament, 2004: 17) and migration as labour market issue [narrating]:

> '*The fundament of economic cooperation within the EU is consisted by the Internal Market. The goal of this is to achieve a European Economic Space wherein 'the four freedoms' are secured. The Netherlands has, as trading nation, large interests with a good functioning of that internal market which is free of unneeded trading barriers*' (Letter to Parliament, 2005: 21, 2).

Within that labour market narrative, the Cabinet expected an inflow of 'gross 10.000 temporary labour migrants' with a 'maximum limitation of 22.000 migrants' before May 2005, which may not be 'trespassed', otherwise policies need to be reconsidered (Letter to Parliament, 2004: 17). By May 2005 however, the amount of labour market permits had 'doubled' to almost 25.000. This was more than the critical juncture set before, but this increase was presented as 'minimal' (Letter to Parliament, 2005: 18). One year later, the Cabinet wanted to know if labour market limitations could be removed and requested the policy advisory office Ecorys to estimate the population size [topic selection]. They indicated (on the basis of secondary data) that the '*gross labour migration in 2006 will be between 53,000 and 63,000 persons*' (Ecorys, 2006: 198). The Cabinet presented this as a 'limited' number, and decided to remove all limitations on labour market access combined with an extra focus on 'irregular employment', 'false self-employment' and 'uneven competition' next to the already existing 'accompanying policies' (Letter to Parliament, 2006: 56). The economy needed 'extra hands' and the Cabinet was willing to liberalize the labour market [narrating]. If there were deviancies, they were relativized by the argument that, in general the overall perspective held a mere positive trend and that history has shown a different trend, stated by the Minister of Social Affairs:

> *'We had a debate on large inflows in 1962 when we agreed to open up our borders in the Benelux. We had that debate in 1970 when we agreed to open our borders within the European Community. And we have had it with the accession of Spain and other countries. The experience was time and again that the problems we had when the borders were closed disappeared when the borders opened […]. New statistics show even more shortages on the labour market […]. So, it is always possible to close the eyes for the facts and to exploit fear, but the experiences are showing another direction'* (Parliamentary debate, 2007: 53)

By references to the past and with new statistics showing even more shortages, the liberalization argument was legitimated. An analysis of the pre-2007 period shows that, with labour market permits as primary source [data collection], it became legitimate to frame the issue as a *labour market* issue and EU citizens as *labour* migrants. This data collection made it legitimate to construct European mobility as labour market activity:

> *'It causes extra economic growth, more dynamics in the corporate sector and more labour positions. These positive effects are hard to measure or to visualize than when in an individual case Dutch labour supply is repressed by labour supply from the new member-states'* (Letter to Parliament, 2006: 55: 3).

By regulating a delineated amount of people to the Dutch labour market, EU mobility was framed by the Dutch state as *labour* mobility and labour *migration*. And since this *migration* originated from the '*MOE-landen*' this made it legitimate to label these 'migrants' as 'MOE-landers'.

To conclude, by referring to the tradition of a 'trading nation' and to previous acts, laws and European Treaties, Dutch authorities legitimized 'intra-European movement' mainly as a labour market issue [authorization/ mythopoesis]. This legitimized data collection by measuring labour market permits. Limitations on labour market permits were legitimized with arguments to ensure economic growth and prosperity connected with measures to protect certain vulnerable domains in the Dutch economy [moral evaluation]. Interestingly, increasing numbers, and the consequences of increasing numbers, were delegitimized on the basis of past experiences [mythopoesis].

SECOND PERIOD (2007-2011): AMBIGUOUS NUMBERS

From 2007 onwards, Polish citizens were no longer obliged to have a labour market permit to get access to the Dutch labour market. Consequently, the population size could

no longer be monitored by the amount of issued labour market permits. As a result, the Cabinet lacked strong monitoring instruments and commissioned new research on the 'societal position' of 'MOE-landers' [topic selection]. These studies (Risbo, 2008; 2009; Forum, 2009), combined quantitative and qualitative methods and redefined the characteristics of 'MOE-landers'.

First, new research included new definitions dividing the population into *permanent* and *temporary* groups. Since citizens who stay shorter than 4 months are not obliged to formally register themselves at the Municipal Registration Office (GBA), it was stated that these so-called 'flexible' groups of mobile workers remain out of sight for official authorities (Letter to Parliament, 2007; 75: 8). Consequently, the Minister turned his attention on data collection methods since *'this group does not register themselves at the GBA, it must be thought through if and in which way a better view can be possible'* (Letter to Parliament, 2008; 81: 3). This resulted in attempts to connect information systems of the Tax Service and the Employment Centre enabling 170 municipalities to get a better insight of the residential addresses of temporary labour migrants (Letter to Parliament, 2008; 81: 10).

Secondly, new research identified 'problems' on 'integration issues of migrants', such as 'mixed marriages, social contacts, modern attitudes and language' (Risbo, 2008). Surveys indicated that 'three quarters of the MOE-landers do not or speak minimal Dutch' (Risbo, 2009: 14). This caused a change in characterisations: *'three studies*[104] show that MOE-landers have limited contact with people out of their own group' (Letter to Parliament, 2009: 103; 7). The Cabinet found it important to *'be alert and attention for integration is needed. It is societally unwanted that large groups of newcomers have an isolated existence'* (Letter to Parliament, 2009; 103: 4). Therefore, new data collection changed the [classifications] towards migrants and their socio-cultural position:

> *'With the arrival of labour migrants from MOE-landen, the parallel with the sixties and seventies forces itself, when also large extensions of groups came to the Netherlands. [...]*
>
> *Now, after forty years, there are still efforts to overcome these backlashes. We can't allow that in a certain time again an extensive group stayed unnoticed and which came at large socio-economic distance'* (Letter to Parliament, 2009: 103, 4).

This integration-related narrative contrasted with the previous economic narrative. New data collection was legitimated because of references to the past and previous insufficient integration policies. Therefore, the Cabinet concluded *'it is important to monitor this group*

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104   These were Risbo, 2008; Risbo, 2009; FORUM, 2009

well (by repeated, comparable research) and to keep a renewed integral policy approach of the composition in education-, labour market position, integration and criminality' (Letter to Parliament, 2008; 81: 4).

Since the Cabinet could no longer rely on labour market permits, they asked several research institutes to estimate the amount of 'MOE-landers'. One policy research institute estimated the amount on 'minimal 100,000 persons' based on Employment Centre data (Regioplan, 2008), while the Dutch Statistics Office (based on municipal registrations) reported about '70,000 people with a nationality from one of the MOE-countries' (Letter to Parliament, 2007; 75: 2). From this new data collection, the Cabinet concluded that there '*is certainly no rise in the amount of labour migrants'* (Letter to Parliament, 2007; 75: 2). This approach was continued in the upcoming years *'because the Netherlands is not a preferred country for this group'* (Letter to Parliament, 2008: 81, 5). Even when new research[105] presented data on '200,000 employees of MOE countries' (Research voor Beleid, 2008), the Minister noted this as 'exaggerated' and indicated that *'there are no signals of an increase of the inflow of Polish people'* (Letter to Parliament, 2008; 99, 1; 97, 2) expecting that the growth will stagnate (Letter to Parliament, 2009; 103, 2). Ministerial civil servants confirmed that the responsible Minister at that time (Donner, Christen-Democrats) was in strong favour of the European freedom of movement and resisted to change the existing pro-European narrative favouring a relativizing approach.

This relativizing approach was continued when new studies presented increasing numbers. The Statistics Office reported about '94,000 employees' (Letter to Parliament, 2008; 97, 2) while other research reported between '158,000 employees' (SEO, 2008) and '166,700 persons from the MOE countries' (Risbo, 2009). All studies differed in their [data collection] methods, indicating population size on the basis of *employment statistics* of the Employment Services (UWV) and the Chamber of Commerce (Statistics Netherlands, 2008; SEO, 2008; Regioplan, 2008), a combination of both (Risbo, 2009) or based on surveys at employment services (Research voor Beleid, 2008). In a reaction to this new data, the Minister of Social Affairs pointed at the methodological limitations of these studies, problematizing the variety in the studies. He contested the topic selection and data collection processes since he doubted how groups were *grouped as* 'MOE' and to what extent groups were well distinguished between 'temporary' or 'permanent' categories and their way of data gathering (Letter to Parliament, 2008; 98: 2). Significantly, data collection about this 'MOE group' moved to the top of the political agenda.

To conclude, this period is characterized by the removal of labour market permits and a search for alternative monitoring. Consequentially, this legitimized a variety of data collection to keep the population in sight [authorization]. Additionally, those studies included a focus on socio-cultural issues, legitimized by references to insufficiencies of past

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105   On the basis of a study on employment agencies

integration measures [mythopoesis]. Moreover, growing numbers were delegitimized on the basis of insufficiencies in the data collection process [rationalization]. It caused a narrative change from migrant *labourers* towards labour *migrants,* which changed the classification of this 'group' and 'topics' of new data collection.

THIRD PERIOD (2011-2015): LEGITIMATING NUMBERS

The third period was characterised by the start of a new Cabinet (led by the Liberal Party) and a new Minister of Social Affairs (Kamp, Liberal Party) coming to power in 2011. This Minister changed the tone of the issue, as a civil servant indicated that '*we got a General on the top. That was a new and confrontational experience*' (MCS2). This new tone can be illustrated by the approach on population size, since this Minister stated:

> '*The increase of the amount of labour migrants from MOE-landen has been much larger than expected. In the first estimation in 2004 it was about 15,000, in 2007 the expectation was that 100,000-120,000 labour migrants would work in the Netherlands, according to the last estimation it is in the meanwhile almost 200,000*' which could be expected to increase in the up-coming years' (Letter to Parliament, 2011; 118: 1).

The Minister of Social Affairs thus put attention to the 'sharp increases' from the past, the low expectations and the 'expected increases' for the future adding up to 'almost 200,000 labour migrants'. The amount '200,000 labour migrants' was legitimated by an estimated '165,000 migrants' of earlier research together with 18,000 registered or 27,000 estimated self-employed (Risbo, 2009). However, this has been indicated as '*an underestimation of the factual amount of self-employed*' (Letter to Parliament, 2011; 188; 4). Three months later, all of a sudden the Statistics Office also confirmed the Ministerial statement of '200,000 labour migrants'. By a 'new approach', as one respondent indicated it, connecting two population sizes (of municipal data of '117,000 MOE-landers' combined with employee data of '81,000 employees'), they confirmed the new statement of the Minister that there were '*more than 200,000 MOE-landers*' in the Netherlands (Statistics Netherlands, 2011) [data collection]. Subsequently, this new number of '200,000' legitimized a wide variety of 'problems', 'negative effects' and 'nuisances' (concerning registration, labour market fraud, social security, housing, language and integration) (Letter to Parliament, 2011; 118). New data collection made new problems 'legible' and contributed to a focus on 'integration' [narrating].

Notwithstanding the fixation on the new number of '200,000', the existing official data collection system was regarded inadequate: '*The total number of migrants from MOE countries is unknown. This is mainly caused because of a large part of them is not registered.*

We are left with estimations' (Letter to Parliament, 2011; 188; 3). By referring to new research it is stated that sometimes 'up to 80% of the total population' did not register in the Municipal or Alien Administration (Risbo, 2009) and the Minister demanded clear data, illustrated by a Ministerial civil servant:

> *'Our own director and Minister asked repeatedly: With how many are they? How many are there? And a sort of incomprehension of why can't you just tell this to me? Because in the Netherlands we know everything and why can't you just tell me how many Polish people are here?'* (MCS1)

This led the Ministries of Social Affairs and Internal Affairs to spur Utrecht University to *estimate* the total population size. By a capture-recapture approach, coupling the databases of the municipal administration systems (GBA), Employment Centres (Polis) and the Recognizing Service System (HKS) of the Police, this study gave an estimated overview of registered and non-registered MOE-landers (Van der Heijden, 2011; 2013) [data collection]. This resulted in estimations 'between 260,000 and 305,000 MOE-landers' in 2008, '286,000 and 325,000 MOE-landers' in 2009 and an amount of '340,000 MOE-landers' in 2010 (Van der Heijden, 2011; 2013). The data collection was based neither on interviews, surveys nor employer statistics but on estimations of coupled data systems and 'on statistical methods' (Letter to Parliament, 2011; 130; 2). This resulted in amounts that were *'much higher than those circulating before'* (ibid.). While the Cabinet acknowledged the methodological limitations of this data collection, the number '300,000 migrants' *'caused an enormous shock'* (MCS1) and became an overall reference point (Letter to Parliament, 2011; 132), confirmed by a Ministerial civil servant:

> *'Because those numbers were so high, that remained the number what was mentioned all the time. Van der Heijden set the bar very high that other figures always were a bit disappointing. […] That became the number where everybody worked with at that time'* (MCS1)

These new numbers gave input for new narratives, such as that: *'We must ensure that with the expected increases of the amount of labour migrants that the problems will not increase as well'* (Letter to Parliament, 2013; 162; 6). As such, the selection of topics also became characterized by 'disadvantages' and 'problems' that could lead to 'uneven competition, exploitation and overcrowded housing' (Letter to Parliament, 2012; 149; 1) [narrating]. In the meantime, other research (Engbersen et al., 2011) indicated that substantial parts of the Polish migrants held high unemployment rates (13%), which was 'three times as high as the autochthonous population' (Letter to Parliament, 2011; 132; 25). As a consequence, the Cabinet concluded that new data collection laws were needed to register *all* persons

from the beginning of their stay in the Netherlands (Letter to Parliament, 2011; 118; 6; 130; 3). The Minister of Internal Affairs concluded that: *'the high percentage of non-registered underlines the importance of the recently developed policies […]. Especially the measures taken around the improvement of registration of labour migrants plays a role'* (Letter to Parliament, 2011; 130; 3).

We can conclude that the delegitimation of data collection legitimated the demand for new data collection, by estimations. Ironically, when these estimations were ready, they again legitimated the demand for new data collection, by refined registrations. Consequentially, the Minister declared that '*the Cabinet strives, together with the Statistics Office and the Social and Cultural Planning Office, to get more unity in the usage of definitions and estimation-methods'* (Letter to Parliament, 2011; 132; 4). To meet that aim, the Ministry of Social Affairs spurred the Statistics Office to develop an overview study 'Migrant monitor 2007-2012' for a comprehensive insight on the total population of migrants from the EU[106]. On the basis of both data sources, a new label was introduced, 'EU-10', which consisted all former 'MOE-8 countries' including Bulgaria and Romania [naming]. On the basis of this data collection, the Cabinet concluded that 'this group increased from 139,090 persons to 236,620 persons in the first quarter of 2012' (Letter to Parliament, 2013; 162; 2) and then to '246,660 persons in the last quarter of 2012' (Letter to Parliament, 2014; 187: 4). In the end, this 'unified' data collection revealed a strong discrepancy between registered data of Bulgarian and Romanian migrants of the Statistics Office ('almost 32,000 persons') and estimations of Van der Heijden ('110,000 migrants'). On the basis of this discrepancy, the Cabinet concluded:

> *'The big difference between the amount of registered migrants from Bulgaria and Romania and the estimations of prof. dr. Van der Heijden emphasizes the need to improve the registration, harmonizing the data systems and to attack illegal labour and irregular employment'* (Letter to Parliament, 2013; 162; 3).

It shows that delegitimized numbers can also legitimize new laws and legislation. Furthermore, while the Cabinet initiated all kinds of new policies, they were confronted with lower numbers on two topics. Firstly, they were confronted with relatively small amounts on welfare claims (by the Statistics Office), but the Minister stated that: *'Despite this is about a relative small amount of people, it does not mean that the Cabinet will not put efforts to prevent a 'honeypot effect' on the Dutch system'* (Letter to Parliament, 2013; 153; 6). By references to an unknown future the Minister legitimized repressive measures to

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106   The Statistics Office gathered information on persons who are, by the registered data of the municipal administration (GBA), born in another EU member-state and of whom at least one parent is born in a foreign country. Additionally this is compared with employee data of the Polis administration (UWV) on EU nationalities.

prevent 'welfare tourism'. Secondly, the European Commission publicized a 'fact finding' study on 'the social security claims and non-contributive cash benefits' of European mobile workers concluding that 'welfare tourism' is not or has limited presence in Europe. As a response, the Dutch Minister stated that '*this conclusion does not hold any guarantee that this will not occur in the future*' and that '*[…] problems are not always findable in statistics. While the bottlenecks caused by freedom of employees are certainly visible in society*' (Letter to Parliament, 2013; 177;1-2). Furthermore, the Minister pointed at the methodological limitations and that: '*comforting developments in the past are no guarantee for the future*' (Letter to Parliament, 2013; 181; 2). Next that it shows a struggle to push forward a particular narrative with certain numbers, it also shows that by references to an (unknown) future [mythopoesis] or limitations in data collection [rationalization] alternative policy solutions are legitimized.

To conclude, in this period there was an urge to delegitimate past data and to legitimate improved future data [mythopoesis/ rationalization]. By this new estimated data, 'improved' policies were legitimized to 'combat' 'illegal labour' and 'irregular employment' and to contribute to '*the manageability of EU-labour migration*' (Letter to Parliament, 2014; 187: 7). Even when numbers were low, this was delegitimized by reference to an unknown future or by methodological limitations [mythopoesis/ rationalization]. It shows discursive legitimation as strategic process.

CONCLUSION

This chapter posed the question '*How has numbering legitimized the framing of 'MOE-landers' in The Netherlands?*' In the first period, characterized by a more legal-economic framing, the population was indicated and monitored by means of labour market permits. This was legitimated by references to the Netherlands as a 'trading nation' and past agreements on the European level [authorization/ mythopoesis]. Consequentially, this category was characterized as foreign *labourers* on the Dutch labour market. Increasing numbers or problems were delegitimized by references to the past [mythopoesis]. In the second period, labour market permits could no longer monitor the population size. Consequently, this legitimated [authorization] the demand for a range of studies to focus on socio-cultural issues, such as migrant integration, in order to overcome insufficient policies of the past [mythopoesis]. Increasing numbers were delegitimized by references to a variety of methods of data collection [rationalization]. In the third period, previous data collection was problematized since new research showed the importance of temporary groups, which putted pressure on past registration procedures [rationalization]. This resulted in estimations which showed steep 'increases' and made it possible to *problematize* and delegitimize former registration procedures which legitimized new repressive

policies [rationalization/ mythopoesis]. As such, numbers contributed to the discursive legitimacy of specific political frames, and by focussing on the case of 'MOE-landers', this chapter displayed *how* this works.

Theoretically we expected that numbers legitimize frames by rationalization, as 'rhetoric of objectivity' (Rojo and van Dijk, 1997). While we indicated that politicians usually 'clothe their choices in objective technical terms' or in 'simply rationalizations' (Schneider and Ingram, 1997: 158-165) our study shows that numbers not only legitimize by rationalisation, but also by authorisation and mythopoesis. This shows the broad and important function of numbers in the discursive legitimation process, delivering new theoretical insights (van Leeuwen, 2007; Rojo and van Dijk, 2007; Vaara and Tienari, 2008; Vaara and Monin, 2010). In line with this, our analysis shows that numbers are not static endeavours, but contingent and on-going socio-political constructions, and need to be analysed as number*ing.* By numbering, authorized actors can legitimize their framed position. And depending on the contingent frame adaptation of authorized actors, numbers contribute to the framing of 'MOE-lander' issues.

Secondly, our study shows that numbers do not have a sole capacity to legitimize frames, but it also shows the relevancy and importance of numbers in legitimating certain frames. Our analysis displays that numbers do not have autonomous authority to speak 'truth to power'. Numbers do not have the authority to define what can or cannot be said, what is legitimate or not to be spoken about (by rationalization). It shows that actor frames can (de-)justify certain data as important or irrelevant on the basis of past performances, unknown futures [mythopoesis], insufficient data collection [rationalisation] or institutionalized laws and legislation that push forward a certain decision [authorisation]. Like discourses, frames *produce* knowledge. This nuances the autonomous position of data and numbers in the production of public policy. Nevertheless, our case also reveals the relevance and importance of numbers in the legitimation of an issue *as* a problem. Or as one statistician noted: '*in the usage of data there are always different points of view. And which point of view you use depends on what you want to describe*' (RSO). As such, this study displays the *politics of numbers* since the legitimacy of numbers depends on the authority of actors, stated by a Ministerial civil servant: *'you have to interpret the numbers and that is politics'* (MCS3).

This points out at our third concluding point, since this study not only displays *how* but also reveals *why* certain actors are able to impose their perspective on a certain moment. Not coincidentally, our case study focuses on political and policy discourses, frames and narratives on 'intra-European movement'. As such, we focussed on 'political knowledge' displayed in power relations of political authorities who mainly have the institutional authority to impose a certain worldview on an issue (Wodak, 2009). Why some frames prevail in this case study is much influenced by the fact that Ministers have the institutional capacity to use and neglect certain knowledge to push forward a particular agenda. This

political-institutional dimension is important to understand why certain numbers prevail to justify certain frames in a specific period. Next to this, the institutional or professional loyalty of policymakers towards their political principal shows the importance of political authority to understand why certain knowledge prevails in a certain period. It is part of the administrative professionalism and loyalty why certain numbers are considered relevant or significant in a specific period of time. And since an important element of 'political knowledge' is also the ability to manipulate, silence or mystify knowledge, this discursive-institutional or political-institutional dimension is important to understand why and how certain authorities can impose a particular perspective on an issue (Schmidt, 2011; Wodak, 2009; Van Hulst and Yanow, 2014). This chapter revealed the contingent development of these political particularities in the Dutch case on 'MOE-landers'.

Fourthly, our study displays the importance of mythopoesis (reference to issues in the past or future) in the analysis of numbering and framing. It points to the importance of time. The recurrent usage of mythopoesis shows the importance of time scales, timing and time horizons to (de)legitimize numbers in a certain policy approach ('unknown future') or in the delegitimation of past policy approaches (*'We can't allow that in a certain time again an extensive group stayed unnoticed'*). This points at the importance of how the past, present and future are discursively constructed to (de-) legitimize a certain number. It reveals that numbers can be delegitimized by numbers. This contrasts with metaphors, since metaphors cannot be delegitimized by metaphors. It shows that 'numbers do *not* exactly work like metaphors' (Stone, 1988).

Fifthly, our study speaks to the broader literature on the politics of numbers. Speaking to the more (post-) structuralist, Foucauldian or constitutive body of literature on numbering (Rose, 1999; Schinkel, 2013), this study shows the importance of actor agency to understand frame structures. Within a post-structuralist approach, actors, subjects and agents are the means by which formative rules, structures and mechanisms are displayed. However, our study shows the importance of actor agency to overcome the 'structuralist trap' regarding individuals solely as bearers of a certain structure. It shows that personal, political and professional affiliations of actors contribute to why and how numbers are legitimized or delegitimized.

Finally, speaking to the broader literature on (im)migration studies and studies on 'CEE migration' (Favell, 2008; Gabriel and Pellerin, 2008; Guild and Mantu, 2011) this study unravels the normative dimension in 'migration' research. This chapter nuances the autonomous and neutral position of numbering agencies, research institutes and academic communities. Therefore, this study adds critical awareness and reflexivity towards the socio-political context in which migration studies *as* numbering activity of itself is also active. This could be an interesting starting point, looking at the political-normative contributions of migration scholars and research, for conditioning future 'mandated' science and research [mythopoesis] (Salter, 1988).

CONTESTED GOVERNANCE-GOVERNMENTS IN A MULTI-LEVEL SETTING

ABSTRACT

'Intra-European movement' from new member states provides a governance challenge to European countries like the Netherlands. Freedom of movement within the EU enables mobility but also has important social consequences at the urban level in particular. This chapter discusses to what extent local, national and European governments have inter-acted in the governance of 'intra-European movement' and how this has affected their policies regarding migrants from Central and Eastern Europe in particular. Focusing on the Dutch case, including the cities of The Hague and Rotterdam, the chapter shows a development from a decoupled relationship, to localist governance and only recently evidence of emerging 'multi-level governance.' Speaking to the broader literature on multi-level governance, this chapter firstly shows that in spite of its broad theoretical application, multi-level governance should be seen as one of the varied types of governance in a multi-level setting. And secondly, it shows how and why local governments can play a key role in the bottom-up development of governance in a multi-level setting.

INTRODUCTION

After the EU enlargements of 2004 (Poland, Baltic States and other countries) and 2007 (Rumania, Bulgaria), intra-European movement from new member states in Central and Eastern Europe to the 'old' EU increased rapidly. In countries like the United Kingdom, Sweden and the Netherlands, intra-European mobile workers became one of the most significant immigration categories. The EU principle of free movement thus changed the context of immigration and integration policies at the local and national level in these countries in a profound manner (Balch 2010; Menz and Caviedes 2010; Friberg 2013; Black *et al.* 2010; Van Puymbroeck *et al.* 2011).

This chapter discusses the politics of intra-European movement in a multilevel setting of the European, national and local level. It questions how local, national and European governments interacted in the governance of CEE migration to the Netherlands, how these interactions can be explained, and to what kind of governance arrangements this has lead. This speaks to the broader literature on multi-level governance, in particular by examining how and why governance structures may or may not emerge in multi-level settings. Whereas most studies on multi-level governance focus on Europeanization and on the EU-member state nexus (Hooghe and Marks 2001; Bache 2008), this chapter examines the role of local governments as actors in multi-level settings (Brenner, 2004). Intra-European movement is chosen as a strategic case study, which includes local, national and European governance levels. To this aim, we adopt a typology of governance arrangements in multi-level settings that focuses in particular on how 'vertical' relations between levels of governments can be configured (Scholten, 2013). We contribute to existing literature by analysing how and why local governments influence the development of governance arrangements in a multi-level setting.

This chapter is organized as follows. Firstly, we discuss different perspectives on governance in multi-level settings and outline our research method. Secondly, we analyse how relations between European, national and local governments have been organized and how this has affected the policies at different levels. Thirdly, we analyse these policy practices in terms of the different governance arrangements, finalizing with some conclusions.

GOVERNANCE IN MULTI-LEVEL SETTINGS

The term 'governance' refers to pluri-centric processes that bring together autonomous yet interdependent actors in their efforts to provide solutions to specific issues (Kersbergen and van Waarden 2004). This can involve horizontally structured arrangements between multiple fields of public, private and societal actors (Rhodes, 1997) as well as

vertical relations between different government levels. These relationships can be viewed 'upward' from nation-states towards international institutions, or 'downward' from the European to the local level (van Kersbergen and Van Waarden 2004; Fenger and Bekkers 2007). As such, governance is conceptualized as steering by a multiplicity of vertical and horizontal relationships.

This vertical dimension of governance, governance in multi-level settings, gained much scholarly attention (Hooghe and Marks 2001; Bache and Flinders 2004; Piattoni 2010). For instance, Hooghe and Marks (2001) payed attention to multi-level governance as an important way of governance in a multi-level setting and distinguished a type I and type II mode. Type I refers to how policy competencies are distributed over multiple levels in a clear and formalized division of labour, capturing in particular the formal distribution of competencies between levels of government. Type II refers to more flexible and adaptable modes of interaction between government levels. Especially Marks and Hooghe's type II is helpful in the study of how multi-level governance evolves in practice per policy domain or sector.

However, this framework for studying governance in multi-level settings holds two limitations. First, it has been developed (and applied in particular) with reference to European-national relations. For instance, many studies focused on Europeanization as the key driver behind multi-level governance (Bache 2008), or on the political dimension of nation-states towards EU interactions. Consequently the role of local governments is weakly conceptualized in this framework. This involves not only their role in the implementation of specific policies, but also as actors in processes of agenda setting and policy formulation in such multi-level settings. This is an important limitation against the background of a growing role of local governments in general and cities in particular in global and multi-level systems (Brenner 2004; Holston and Appadurai 1999; Isin 2000; Le Gales 2002; Sassen 1999). Therefore, cities should not only be studied as subnational governments that are affected by Europeanisation (Emelianoff 2013), but as key players in multi-level networks and as motors of policy dynamics 'from below.'

From this perspective, local governments develop various strategies to influence national and EU policymaking (Heinelt and Niederhafner, 2008). One strategy involves lobbying or negotiating policy preferences at other levels of government, also described as 'vertical venue shopping' (Pralle 2003; Guiraudon 2000). This means that if local governments cannot achieve certain policy preferences at their own level, they can act as policy entrepreneurs in relation with other levels of government. Venue shopping can take place via formal channels where governments of different levels meet, but also via informal policy lobbying or political networks. Such efforts to influence governance processes at other levels also involves networking and coalition building with other cities or local governments (Gustavsson, Elander and Lundmark 2009) and transnational municipal networks (Kern and Bulkeley 2009).

The second limitation of Hooghe and Marks' type I and type II multi-level governance is that their types assume governance in a multi-level setting. However, the interaction between local, national and European governments as actors in a multi-level setting could cause many different types of governance configurations. Therefore to have an improved understanding of governance in a multi-level setting, this chapter includes a typology which describes four ideal types of governance in multi-level settings. In this typology, 'multi-level governance' is just one probable ideal type that theoretically can be distinguished. Next to multi-level governance, the typology includes centralist, localist and decoupled configurations between governmental levels. The analysis of these models dependent on the interaction between actors from different government levels, driven by specific policy and political factors (Scholten 2013). For instance, some actors may define an issue as a distinct national concern, while others are influenced by local politicization which affects their governance strategies. Political factors may play a role as well, by specific political party compositions and specific political debates (Breeman et al., 2015). Let us consider these four types of governance types that we will include in this analysis on CEE migration.

OPERATIONALIZING TYPES OF GOVERNANCE

The *centralist type* of governance in multi-level settings involves a top-down relationship when it comes to the relation between national and local governments (Sabatier 1986). In terms of vertical relations this type emphasizes hierarchical policy coordination, with virtually no role for local governments in agenda setting and policy formulation. This type is most likely to emerge when there is a clear national political primacy with clear political leadership, when there is a strong national policy coordination structure and when the problem is defined primarily as a national issue. This type holds similarity with the concept of 'government' seen from a vertical (multi-level setting) perspective. However, horizontally it has attention for the structured arrangements between multiple public, private or societal actors solely active on the national, central level.

This can be contrasted with a *localist governance type* that refers to governance modes that have (actively of passively) devolved policies to (regional or) local governments. This involves a bottom-up approach where policies are not just implemented but also put on the agenda and formulated by local governments (Sabatier 1986). This perspective is most likely to emerge when problems are defined as 'local' and in need of 'local' solutions, for instance phrased as 'close to the citizen'. Defining issues as distinctly local often requires local leadership on the involved topic, or politicization at the local level. In this type, local governments are not just policy followers in a hierarchical relationship with central government levels, but they are policy entrepreneurs themselves (John 2001). It is this type

that is most likely to be associated with strategic 'vertical venue shopping.' Horizontally it includes structured arrangements between multiple public, private or societal actors primarily active on the local or regional level.

The *multi-level governance* type distinguishes itself from top-down or localist governance structures by formal or informal vertical interaction between various government levels within a specific policy domain. This includes 'vertical venues' for governments from different levels to jointly engage in policy coordination. This can involve institutional fora, regular meetings or networks where organisations from different levels meet. A multi-level governance type is most likely to emerge in situations where the multi-level character of a policy problem is explicitly recognized. This can be the case when problem frames and political frames at different levels are convergent, and can be facilitated by vertical structures or networks. Consequently, specific venues or forums are required for vertical interaction and cooperation. Horizontally it includes structured arrangements between a variety of public, private or societal actors active on multiple levels.

A fourth type refers to the situation that policies are formulated and implemented on different levels, but without any meaningful interaction. This can be defined as *governance decoupling*, or the absence of any form of vertical relations or arrangements in multi-level settings. In contrast to the other types, this type marks the absence of joint policy coordination. Evidently, this type can lead to policy conflicts between government levels. Policy paralysis or 'policy fiascos' may result when differences between governance levels result in contradictory policies or in the absence of adequate policies (Bovens and 't Hart 1996; Super 2008). In table 7 we operationalized these types of governance arrangements in a multi-level setting primarily by its policy and political elements focussing on horizontal and vertical relationships, interactions and coordination.

This operationalization structures our analysis, including the empirical analysis. It explicitly included policy and political factors to understand governance configurations. This chapter analyses how and why specific multi-level configurations were developed in the Netherlands in response to intra-European movement. We will analyse these configurations in terms of the four types and focus in particular on the role of local governments as actors in the development of these configurations.

Table 7: Operationalisation of governance arrangements in multi-level settings

	Elements	Centralist governance	Localist governance	Multi-level governance	Governance decoupling
Political elements	- Political leadership (by executives) - Politicization of the issue (by political actors)	- Political primacy - National political leadership - Centralist political network	- Politicization at the local level - Local leadership - Vertical venue shopping	- Convergence of political leadership and politicisation - Vertical political networks	- Disconnected leadership - Contested politicisation
Policy elements	- Coordination, interactions and relationships of actors and institutions - Development of policies, laws and legislation	- Central hierarchical policy coordination - Issue connections with broader central policies - Horizontally structured arrangements with multiple actors active on the central level	- Vertical and horizontal policy coordination at local level - Little or no central policy coordination - Horizontally structured arrangements with multiple actors on the local or regional level	- Weak central policy coordination structures - Formal and informal vertical structures - Horizontally structured arrangements with a variety of actors on multiple levels	- Policy contradictions or conflicts between different levels - Absence of coordination and interactions

METHODS

This chapter involves an in-depth qualitative case study of governance in the Netherlands in response to intra-European movement after the EU enlargements of 2004 (Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Slovenia) and 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania). This intra-European movement from Central and Eastern Europe is positioned in the institutional context of EU policies and the process of European integration (Gabriel and Pellerin, 2008). Therefore, the case of intra-European movement was selected as a strategic case because of its distinct multi-level character, relating to the EU principle of free movement as well as to national and local policies of migrant integration. The Dutch case was selected since the Netherlands, like the UK and Sweden, experienced a relative large increase of CEE migration since the EU-enlargements of 2004 and 2007. The Netherlands has now 120,000 registered and 340.000 estimated CEE migrants (Statistics Netherlands 2012; Van der Heijden *et al.* 2013). Next to this, the Netherlands has historically played a foundational role in the construction of the EU, the Euro and has been a proponent of the European free movement regulations (Hollander 2013). In order to capture governance configurations also including local governments, we will focus on two cities in the Netherlands that have received relatively high numbers of CEE migrants: The Hague and Rotterdam. These cities are of comparable size (Rotterdam 607.000 inhabitants and The Hague 510.000 inhabitants) and both have relative large CEE residing and working populations: Rotterdam is now home to between 31,000 and 50,000 estimated CEE migrants, while The Hague accommodates between 17,000 and 33,000 estimated CEE migrants (Municipality Rotterdam, 2013; Municipality The Hague, 2014). The largest groups are Poles, Bulgarians, Hungarians and Romanians (Statistics Netherlands 2012). In terms of research methods we used a combination of desk research (key document analysis), semi-structured interviews and a focus group.

The desk research includes key policy memoranda from the European, national and the local governmental levels. All local governmental documents produced by Rotterdam and The Hague, all national governmental documents produced by the Dutch national ministries and all European documents produced by the European Commission in the period 2002-2015 were studied on their importance and relevance on 'CEE migration' or 'EU mobility'. For the analysis of the EU policy context, we analysed key EU policy documents. To select these documents, first the most relevant DG's were selected. By means of the organisational objectives listed at their websites[107] and by a first interpretative study of their policies (a document search on the EC website by specific selection criteria[108]) a top five of most relevant DG's was prioritized. By this selection process, all official documents

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[107]   http://ec.europa.eu/about/ds_en.htm

[108]   document selection on the basis of 'department' (the five mentioned); 'time': 01-01-2002 until 01-01-2014; 'document type': all; and 'language': 'English'

of the DG's Home Affairs, Employment, Justice, Freedom and Security (JLS) and Internal Market were selected online[109] by the search words 'migration', 'mobility' and 'movement'. By adding all 'hits', this resulted in 430 documents which needed an interpretative selection step. By a close reading of these documents' abstracts a qualitative indication was provided whether a document was indeed about intra-European movement[110]. This made it possible to bring down the number of documents to 15 in the end, which were in-depth interpretatively analysed. Because of the size of these documents, this resulted in a large data file[111]. This procedure secured the selection process with the most relevant EC documents present.

On the national level this was executed by online searches by the number of a dossier[112]. On the basis of the search on the Dutch translation of the terms 'mobility', 'migration' and 'movement'[113] four dossier numbers[114] rose, of which '29407' was the most relevant ('free movement of employees from new EU member states'). This dossier included 332 documents (2002-2015) which have been interpretatively studied by their abstracts and selected on their qualitative relevancy. This resulted in 53 documents, which contributed to an extensive data file[115].

On the local level of The Hague and Rotterdam, online searches on the Dutch translation of the terms 'mobility', 'migration' and 'movement' resulted in more than 500 documents (2002-2015) which have been interpretatively studied by their abstracts and selected on their qualitative relevancy. This resulted in 34 documents, mostly consisting of annual 'migrant monitors' ('Monitor EU arbeidsmigratie'), and additional letters, policy communications, laws and legislations which were mostly related to the monitors. In this way, on all levels, a comprehensive and comparative data selection process was completed for the desk analysis.

Furthermore, we included 16 qualitative semi-structured interviews with stakeholders in EU mobility along pre-structured interview guidelines (see table 8).

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109   by ec.europa.eu website

110   To illustrate this, for instance, a lot of documents regarding 'movement' in the area of infrastructure, climate change or maritime affairs could get filtered out by this procedure.

111   All EC documents contain about >20 pages. This resulted in a up to 400 page dossier.

112   Letters to Parliament (Brieven aan de Tweede Kamer) by www.tweedekamer.nl and https://zoek.officielebekend-makingen.nl

113   'mobiliteit', 'migratie' and 'verkeer'

114   32680; 29407; 83432; 29911

115   This resulted in a more than 400 page dossier

Table 8: List of interview respondents

#	Affiliation	Type
1	Ministry of Internal Affairs	National Public
2	Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment	National Public
3	Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment	National Public
4	Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment	National Public
5	Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment	National Public
6	Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment	National Public
7	Municipality The Hague	Local Public
8	Municipality The Hague	Local Public
9	Polish Embassy	National Public
10	LTO, Agrarian lobby organisation	National employers org
11	OTTO workforce (temporary empl agency)	National Private
12	Municipality Rotterdam	Local Public
13	Municipality Rotterdam	Local Public
14	Polonia	Local NGO
15	Municipality Delft	Local Public
16	Municipality Lansingerland	Local Public

These were held before and after summer 2015 and included national and municipal poli-cymakers, lobbyists and private parties. Respondents were primarily local, regional and national civil servants, NGO representatives, private agencies and entrepreneurs active with EU migration and mobility in their daily work. The experts for the interviews were selected by respondent driven sampling. This holds some clear biases, but as this study fo-cusses on governance approaches, the references and network capital of respondents are important for getting access to authorities and participants in the field. In the respondent selection process, two key criteria were considered: (1) their professional relevance and (2) the geographical dimension. Since we focus on Rotterdam, The Hague and the Dutch case in general, this was an important selection criterion. Next to this, it was important to have respondents that were professionally affiliated to the case in the period of study (also considering public, private and NGO organisations). Table 2 shows the distribution of interview respondents. Most respondent names have been anonymised apart from the names of the aldermen since their professional positions made anonymisation impos-sible). All experts agreed to record the interview, which were all transcribed and trans-posed to the programme ATLAS.ti, a software programme used for analysing qualitative data. The interview data was analysed using the codes and subcodes derived from the operationalization of types of governance.

Thirdly, we organized a focus group with 12 stakeholders[116] in which the preliminary findings of this study were discussed (see table 9 for the list of participants). The participants were again selected on their professional affiliation (public, private, NGO) and geographical location. They were asked comparable questions as in the semi-structured interviews. This data was also transcribed and analysed by the same codes and sub codes used in the interview analysis. In total, 16 expert interviews and 12 focus group participants are included, adding up to 26 unique stakeholders in this research.

Table 9: Attendees Focus group

	Organisation	Type
1	Ministry of Internal Affairs	National Public
2	Municipality The Hague	Local Public
3	Ministry of Social Affairs	National Public
4	Municipality Westland	Local Public
5	Municipality Rotterdam	Local Public
6	SNCU	National Private
7	VHA	National Private
8	Barka	National NGO
9	BOOR	Local NGO
10	Obs Kameleon	Local NGO
11	IDHEM	Local NGO
12	IDHEM	Local NGO

'INTRA-EUROPEAN MOVEMENT': POLITICS IN A MULTI-LEVEL SETTING

To understand the configuration of relations between levels of government, we first need to contextualize these levels. Especially with the politicization of CEE migration and the rise of populist discourse in national and local politics, politics matter regarding this issue. In this section, we first explore the context on the EU, national and local level.

EU POLICIES

Migration from Central and Eastern Europe should be positioned in the institutional context of the EU (Gabriel and Pellerin 2008). The European policy context on 'CEE

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116   this took place on Friday November 13th 2015

migration' focuses on 'mobility' derived from the European 'free movement regime' (Recchi, 2015). This is since the European Commission (EC) perceives 'free movement' as the cornerstone of '*development of the Single Market and the successful integration of the European economy under the Economic and Monetary Union*' (EC, 2002, 72, 6). And by Europe as 'Internal Market', European citizens can move freely as 'mobile' Europeans, not as migrants. This 'mobility' perspective contrasts with the movement of 'Third Country Nationals' as 'migration' of 'migrants' from outside the European Union, which need specified requirements to get access, work and residency in the EU (Favell 2008; Guild and Mantu 2011). Therefore, the 'movement' of European 'mobile' citizens needs to prosper the development of the 'Single Market' stimulated by the EC by removing 'barriers', 'obstacles' and 'hindrances' that frustrate flexibility (European Commission, 2002; 2004; 2007: 4). Therefore 'hurdles', 'obstacles', 'skills shortages and bottlenecks' need to be combatted (EC, 2002: 72; 2013: 837; 2014: 10) which resulted in policies such as the Europass framework, the MobiliPass and the Job Mobility Portal (EC, 2002: 72, 13).

Although national and local governments are free to adopt integration measures on a voluntary basis, mandatory measures or any provision related to entitlements are in this perspective perceived as 'burdens' and 'hindrances' that illegitimately disturb the EU regime of free movement (Recchi, 2015). However, over the past couple of years, the European Commission has announced several soft-governance measures in relation to the position of EU migrants. In 2013, the EC issued a policy paper on the free movement of people that included a number of actions to help local and national authorities in the member states to regulate new forms of EU migration (European Commission, 2013). By this Action Plan the Commission acknowledges the difficulties and explicitly takes a role on supporting local authorities by implementing EU policies.

NATIONAL POLICIES

Within this European framework, the Netherlands has historically played a foundational role in the construction of the EU, the Euro and has been a proponent of the European free movement regulations (Hollander, 2013). Migration from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) to the Netherlands did also not just start with the EU-enlargements of 2004 and 2007 but after these enlargements, the number of (officially registered) residents from CEE countries in the Netherlands increased rapidly. In the late 1990s, there were about 50,000 CEE residents, while in 2003, shortly before the EU-enlargement of 2004, this number grew to 62,000 CEE residents, now adding up to 120,000 CEE residents (Statistics Netherlands, 2014).

In Dutch (national) politics, 'free movement' became an important political issue, under pressure of anti-immigrant and anti-EU parties such as the Freedom Party (PVV), in the 2000s. This was in the aftermath of assaults on politician Pim Fortuyn (2002) and filmmaker Theo van Gogh (2004) that immigration issues became strongly politicized. Therefore, by the accession of the new European member states in 2004, the Netherlands imposed a transitory regime to free movement of workers from CEE countries until 2007. Consequently, Polish citizens needed a work permit until May 2007 and Romanians and Bulgarians citizens until January 2014 to freely work in the Netherlands. These transitional arrangements did have an effect, but in the end numbers more than doubled between 2004 and 2015. This made free movement, the transitional regime and the increasing numbers of CEE citizens in the Netherlands important political and policy issues at the Dutch national level.

The central items on the national policy agenda concerned mainly labour market issues. This includes both illegal practices, like malafide temporary employment agencies that avoid legal minimum wage, as (semi-) legal practises such as 'self-employment' or the 'posting' of workers that result in 'unjust competition' for Dutch workers (Temporary Parliamentary Commission 2011). Next to this, housing was of primary interest because with a large stock of social housing in the Netherlands, temporary and more permanent housing was a problem. Mobile workers, especially those who have more permanent settlement intentions, face problems with the Dutch housing stock. A final issue is related to registration, since registration procures are not suited for 'temporary residents'. Mobile workers are not obliged to register themselves if they stay less than four months in the Netherlands. Therefore, new registration tools were needed to get better insight in 'temporary migrant' groups (Ministry of Internal Affairs 2013).

LOCAL POLICIES

From a political historical perspective, Rotterdam has been characterized by a working-class image, continuously led by the Labour Party (PvdA) from World War II, which influenced the local political culture (van Ostaaijen 2010). The 2002 local elections marked a turning point in Rotterdam's politics and administrative culture, described by some as a 'regime change' (Tops 2007). These elections were won by the 'populist' termed political party (Liveable Rotterdam with 34.7 per cent), which resulted in the first executive board without the Labour Party. Although the Labour Party regained control of the City Council after the 2006 and 2010 elections, Liveable Rotterdam won the elections again in 2014. Next to the dynamic political climate of Rotterdam, this political turmoil needs to be addressed because of the significant importance of issues related to migrants, immigration and integration. From their entrance in 2002 'Liveable Rotterdam' criticized the approach towards migrants, criminality and safety issues. Also in 2014, one of the

contested issues concerned the issue of CEE migration since they 'wanted a quota on the 'inflow' of Central and Eastern Europeans' (Leefbaar Rotterdam, 2014: 8). Rotterdam registered 14,883 CEE migrants at the end of 2014 (Municipality Rotterdam, 2015). Since many CEE migrants do not register, the municipality of Rotterdam estimated that it hosts between 31,000 and 50,000 CEE residents in 2013 in total and between 18,000 and 38,000 non-registered CEE migrants (Municipality Rotterdam, 2014).

The political development of Rotterdam is only partially reflected in The Hague, as it did not have this abrupt political change in the council composition. However, in The Hague, historically led by the Labour Party and the Christen-Democrat party, an anti-immigrant party entered the political stage in 2010; the local branch of the Freedom Party (PVV) entered the City Council. While they had local successes, the Freedom Party did not take office in the municipality of The Hague. In The Hague 16,831 registered CEE migrants resided in 2014, which was a doubling from 2009 (Municipality The Hague, 2014)[117]. And since many CEE migrants do not register, the municipality estimated that it hosts about 33,000 CEE residents in 2014.

In both cities there was significant political attention for CEE migration. In The Hague the Labour Party studied the position of Polish residents in The Hague, which caught attention of the City Council (PvdA 2008). Also in Rotterdam, several political parties asked attention for new residents from CEE countries, which resulted in research by the municipality aimed to explore the situation of Polish residents in the city (Municipality Rotterdam, 2008a). From that moment on, both cities defined 'CEE labour migration' as a local political issue that required monitoring and intervention (Municipality Rotterdam 2008b; Municipality The Hague 2009). Coincidentally or not, the aldermen in both cities responsible for policies on CEE migrants, were representatives of the Labour Party (Karakus in Rotterdam and Norder in The Hague).

'INTRA-EU MOVEMENT': THE POLICY PROCESS IN A MULTI-LEVEL SETTING

After this empirical sketch of problem definitions and the level-specific political and policy context on intra-European movement, we will now focus on the governance process and the interaction between these levels. To what extent did the various governmental levels interact, what were their strategies, and how can these vertical interactions be described in terms of the four ideal typical configurations of governance in multi-level settings? We distinguished three periods since the EU enlargement in 2004: decoupling from 2004 to

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117   As context: the annual growth of the CEE population in The Hague was plus twenty per cent between 2009 and 2012, and seven per cent in 2014

2007, localist governance from 2007 to 2011, and the gradual emergence of multi-level governance since 2011. We will now reconstruct these phases.

FIRST PHASE: DECOUPLING

During the period before and shortly after the EU enlargement of 2004, the European Commission was primarily focused on the enforcement of the free movement principle (European Commission 2010). The main concern on the EU agenda was the transitional regimes of member-states and the removal of restrictions and barriers to 'finalize' the Single Market and free movement (European Commission 2007; 2010). This was comparable with the Dutch national level, since there was elaborate consideration about 'suspending measures' in the transitional period (Letter to Parliament, 2004). In this period, national discussions focuses primarily on labour market permits, labour market tests and the extension or abolishment of restrictions (Letter to Parliament, 2004). On the local level, local authorities focussed primarily on the most immediate concerns, like housing issues, non-registration, and homelessness. Rotterdam and The Hague tried to set up interactions with other large cities such as Amsterdam and Utrecht. This however failed, reflected by a municipal civil servant of The Hague: *''Utrecht said: 'we do not see this problem. We do not have any labour migrants'. And Amsterdam said exactly the same''* (MCS4). Since collaboration with partner municipalities was blocked, Rotterdam and The Hague collaborated together and with their own local private agencies and civil society organisations. These local (horizontal) governance relations were mainly focussed on proper housing accommodations with housing corporations and labour agencies (such as Vestia; Haaglanden; Jobcenter) to combat illegal housing situations. This was mainly executed by the municipalities of Rotterdam and The Hague and several labour agencies (such as ABU, NBBU and VIA). Consequentially these municipalities developed all kinds of horizontal relationships with employment agencies, NGO's, the police and social services to tackle issues such as housing controls, labour market controls and safety regulations.

Vertical interactions between the different governmental levels on issues of CEE migrants were largely absent in this period. There were no vertical relations or venues for institutional collaboration or coordination, or as one civil servant from The Hague noted: *''In that period I felt myself as someone shouting in the desert''* (MCS4). Because there were no coordinated interactions between the national or European level, nor between the local and the national level. The interactions between national and EU institutions were primarily concerned with extensions on the implementation of free movement for CEE

workers, while local governments were concerned with ad-hoc solutions. This period can be characterized by different problem perceptions, deviating political urgencies and policy concerns. Hence, we refer to the governance mode in this period in terms of *decoupling*.

SECOND PHASE: LOCALIST GOVERNANCE

This first phase of decoupling started to change from about 2007. This change was driven by local governments in particular, and triggered an increasing involvement of the national level. Based on horizontal local relations, The Hague and Rotterdam cooperated with local organisations on issues such as housing, labour market and safety. For instance, on social issues, The Hague cooperated with different actors (such as the police, NGO's (IDHEM), schools (Nova College), youth work (The Mall), housing corporations, employment agencies and the Labour Inspection). On homelessness, nuisance and alcohol abuse, The Hague had interactions with several NGO's (Salvation Army, Kessler Foundation, Parnassia, IDHEM) and an employment agency (Otto Workforce). Next to this, Rotterdam signed a covenant on data exchange with the Tax Services and CWI (Centre for Work and Income), with the municipality of The Hague, employers, employers interest organisation (ABU, VIA, NBBU) and the unemployment services (UWV) (Municipality Rotterdam 2008b; 2010). Next to this, Rotterdam signed a 'Covenant housing arrears' with housing corporations and employers to attack incompatibilities in the housing stock (Municipality Rotterdam, 2008b).

However, Rotterdam and The Hague not only developed horizontal networks. One of the first substantial efforts by Rotterdam and The Hague to put 'CEE migration' on the national agenda involved a meeting with a wide range of public, private and semi-public stakeholders, the so-called 'Poles Summit'. This 'summit' was jointly organized by Rotterdam and The Hague in December 2007. Next to 42 other Dutch municipalities, two national Ministers attended the summit. Especially the responsible Minister of Social Affairs (Donner, Christen Democrats) questioned the concerns of these municipalities since he did not favoured extra measures. After this first 'Poles Summit', several other summits were held, with the cities of The Hague and Rotterdam drawing further political attention to the 'integration problems' concerning 'CEE migrants'. Notably, the two aldermen of both cities took a very critical stance in respect of this inflow of migrants. For example, The Hague's alderman Norder referred to a 'tsunami of East European migrants' (Zuidervaart, 2010), while his Rotterdam counterpart Karakus used the Dutch expression 'mopping the floor with the tap wide open' referring to the impossibility to combat

the social consequences of 'CEE migration'. He demanded better legislation to combat illegal landlords.

From that moment on, both cities developed a twofold strategy of pragmatic ad-hoc solutions on the local level and 'vertical venue shopping' in relation to the national level. The acquisition of ('horizontal') support from other municipalities was an important element in that new strategy of Rotterdam and The Hague. In this period, Rotterdam and The Hague became close partners, also within the G4 (the association of the four largest Dutch cities). For instance they cooperated with Amsterdam and Utrecht and implemented policies for homeless people with the NGO of Barka (Polish civil society organisation). This involved non-obligatory efforts to assist homeless 'mobile EU citizens' to return to their home country by voluntarily participation. Furthermore, they shared transnational interests with the municipalities of Gent, Antwerp (Belgium), Mannheim and Duisburg (Germany), Margate, and Birmingham (UK) within the European networks of Urbiscoop en Eurocities (Municipality Rotterdam, 2010)[118]. In that network, Rotterdam organized the Integrating Cities Conference aimed at more local knowledge sharing and advocated a study into local policies for economic migration within the EU (Eurocities, 2009). Puymbroeck (*et al.* 2011: 313) commented: ''*It shows how cities want to engage in knowledge building and exchange ''bottom-up'', but at the same time need the cooperation of higher government levels to avoid balancing permanently on the edge of what is legally permissible*''.

While these cities broadened their horizontal mandate with each other and in collaboration with other NGO's and private organisations (such as Barka and temporary labour agencies), they also aimed for vertical interactions. Rotterdam wanted to 'knock at the door of the national government' to get things arranged, since they realized 'we cannot do things on our own' (Municipality Rotterdam 2008b: 27). Therefore, both aldermen of The Hague and Rotterdam held an intensive lobby at the National Parliament, as one former aldermen noted: *"Along the way I went through all chairmen of all political parties in Parliament and described the problem. […] I've shown how many people we encountered in those houses, which scared people. Then the government is awakened by the Parliament: you have to do something about this!"*. The Hague and Rotterdam also proactively invited Dutch Parliamentarians and Euro-parliamentarians and guided them through the city and showed them their problems. However, vertical interactions remained limited. While municipalities and Ministers spoke at several occasions about this topic, there seemed to be no shared sense of urgency. Or as one ministerial civil servant indicated this relationship:

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118   Next to this, in 2012 the Rotterdam aldermen Karakus, the mayor, the head police officer and the public prosecutor had a work visit to Romania and Bulgaria and visited several places to see the local context of where migrants come from.

"We didn't have much to offer. And our Minister was convinced that these municipalities should not complain so much. […] Next to this he thought that these municipalities were addressing issues that should have been addressed in the past. And that they now use the emergence of new EU citizens to get money from the national government. He didn't want to go along with that" (MCS1).

This stalemate is also confirmed by a municipal civil servant of The Hague, who reflected on this period as:

''The Ministry of Social Affairs really obstructed any interactions. Really by saying: well, municipality The Hague, do it yourself. Sort it out. We had hard and heavy conversations. […] and I noticed that at that time both Ministries of Social Affairs and Internal Affairs were not cooperating with each other" (MCS2)

It illustrates a period with different political leadership, problem definitions and policy concerns on the national and local level, which did not result in direct vertical interactions. Despite their concerted horizontal efforts, their vertical relationships and policy coordination stayed minimal. Hence, this phase can be seen as a '*localist*' type of governance in this multi-level setting.

THIRD PHASE: TOWARDS MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE

The governance interactions changed in 2011 when a new Cabinet was installed and a new Minister of Social Affairs (Kamp, Liberal Party) took office. This new Minister changed the local-national nexus in a significant way, reflected by a ministerial civil servant as ''*the tone became different: stricter"* (MCS1) since ''*we got a General on the top. That was a new and confrontational experience"* (MCS2) and importantly ''*Kamp said: 'those municipalities were right, we had made a mess of it'"* (MCS3). At the same time, the Dutch national Parliament installed a Temporary Parliamentary Commission 'lessons concerning recent labour migration' (LURA)[119]. It was confirmed as a 'breakthrough' by multiple civil servants in terms of national issue awareness on CEE migration. This resulted in a welcoming approach towards the municipalities and changes in policy issues related to 'CEE migration' (Letter to Parliament 2011). Organisationally an interdepartmental 'Taskforce EU labour migrants' was installed at the Ministry of Social Affairs which coor-

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119   The effectiveness of the local imagery on this national commission, can be illustrated by the beginning of the rapport: *''(…) images dominated like a tsunami of Eastern Europeans, uncontrollability of inflows and modern slavery in the Netherlands"* (Temporary Parliamentary Commission 2011, p. 5).

dinated relationships and interactions between all governmental and non-governmental parties, reflected by a ministerial civil servant:

> *''The ones that shouted the hardest were put on our table. The municipalities of The Hague, Rotterdam and Westland played a very important role in that trajectory (…). Mostly we gave them pre-access in confidential pieces, often they put things on our agenda. […] we really had weekly contact. That was really very intensive"* (MCS4)

This leadership change triggered intensive contact between the municipalities of Rotterdam, The Hague, Westland and the Ministries of Social Affairs and Internal Affairs. As a result, as befits the Dutch tradition of corporatism, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment developed a threefold collaborative structure: firstly, a managerial group structure (of political representatives); secondly, a steering group structure (of administrative supervisors); and thirdly, a working group structure (of administrative policymakers) was set up to collaborate and discuss issues regarding CEE migration. These structures had a clear 'vertical' character: municipalities (including The Hague and Rotterdam) and various stakeholders were represented in these steering groups. Next to this, steered by The Hague and Rotterdam, the Ministry of Internal Affairs facilitated a 'Municipalities network' to discuss local problems and policy initiatives related to CEE migration, joined by 80 municipalities which included 5 annual meetings to share specific knowledge on this topic (Ministry of Internal Affairs 2011). In addition, initially stimulated by private partners, a working group ('norms-meeting') was installed on Ministerial level, to discuss housing issues. These 'vertical' national-local consultative structures led to a number of national policy measures on the topic of CEE migration, mainly related to registration, work and enforcement of labour regulations, social provisions, (short stay) housing, civic integration and repatriation (Letter to Parliament 2011; 2012)[120]. Through these working groups, municipalities and other stakeholders gained influence in the development of new laws and legislation. As the director of a private temporary employment agency noted: "*Before letters went to the Parliament, I saw it in a concept version. And you don't have to agree on all elements, but you try to steer a bit"*. Or as the former aldermen of The Hague adds to this: "*We delivered complete paragraphs, which were one-to-one taken over […]. We read along, we saw concept Letters to Parliament, we wrote paragraphs. […] we had an enormous influence"*.

   This influence resulted in an 'Intention Declaration' to enlarge the local governmental instruments (Ministry of Housing, Neighbourhoods and Integration, 2010). Next to this,

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120   such as for instance: a Toolkit for effective estimations, a new registration system RNI, and adjustments to the 'Act Exceptional Measures for Urban Problems' to combat slum landlords

this Ministry spurred the 'National Declaration Housing Labour migrants' which was signed by several municipalities (Rotterdam and The Hague), ministries and corporations which agreed to build extra housing capacity. Furthermore, the Ministry of Social Affairs cooperated with Rotterdam, an employment agency (ABU), a control agency (SNCU) and the Chamber of Commerce Rotterdam to attack malafide labour agencies in 'R-AMU'[121]. And finally, to improve registration procedures, the Ministry of Internal Affairs developed a new law 'Register Non Inhabitants', applied by 18 (pilot) municipalities to monitor the 'temporary' group of CEE migrants who were largely 'out of sight'[122].

While various interactions were getting institutionalized within the local-national nexus, Rotterdam also developed an explicit strategy regarding 'Brussels' (Municipality Rotterdam 2012: 2). The Rotterdam Mayor Aboutaleb issued an opinion paper in the Committee of the Regions to address the local importance and regretted 'that the Commission's Social Investment Package neglects the role of local and regional authorities' (Committee of the Regions 2013: 3). In addition, The Hague and Rotterdam issued a Memorandum of Understanding by the transnational city network of Urbiscoop, with collegial cities in the Benelux area. This instance of vertical venue shopping that was increasingly directed at the EU level was now also joined by Dutch national government. The Minister of Social Affairs and Employment (Asscher) politicized intra-European movement and its consequences for receiving countries and cities (Ministry of Social Affairs, 2013a). He put priority on bilateral collaboration (with Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia) and also on EU lobbying, to combat irregular labour constructions and mala fide temporary labour agencies (Letter to Parliament 2013: 6).

In this regard, in 2012 the Minister co-organized a conference together with the German Ministry of Interior Affairs[123] and he co-authored an opinion article in *The Independent* and the Dutch daily *De Volkskrant (*Asscher and Goodhart 2013). In this article, the Minister drew attention to the downsides of CEE labour migration and addressed the issue of European awareness on this topic. This article was followed by a 'EU labour migration Summit' in September 2013 in The Hague, organized by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment together with the local governments of Rotterdam and The Hague. This summit was attended, next to many Dutch municipalities, employment and housing agencies, also by the Romanian Minister of Social Affairs and the Bulgarian vice-minister

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121   Next to this, Rotterdam cooperated with the national government on regional controls and maintenance on arrears in housing and employment in the Pilot RCF (Regional Control Fraud).

122   Next to this, a revision on the 'Act Exceptional Measures for Urban Problems' (also called 'the Rotterdam Act') was introduced on request of Rotterdam. This act enables a selective settlement policy in vulnerable urban districts: low income households are not allowed to settle there. After an intensive lobby by Rotterdam, the Act was revised in 2013, the so-called Rotterdam Act II. The revision was a direct response to Rotterdam's concerns about housing problems of 'CEE migrants', providing the local government instruments to combat irregular landlords as well as to ban persons that have disturbed public order from living in specific neighbourhoods.

123   called 'free movement and participation of EU citizens - making it work for all'

of Labour. At this summit, especially the bilateral and national efforts of cooperation and collaboration (to combat fraud, mala fide employers and slum landlords) were discussed.

In addition, more horizontal coordinated interactions became visible on the national level. First, in 2013, the Dutch minister of Immigration (Teeven), together with colleague ministers of Germany, Austria and the United Kingdom, asked the European Commission to consider the need for EU citizens to undergo civic integration. They asked for more discretion in terms of tightening migrants' rights to social security and to fight fraud and systematic abuse effectively (Mikl-Leitner et. al, 2013). Besides, the Dutch Minister of Social Affairs (Asscher) signed a letter together with colleague ministers of Sweden, Belgium, France, Austria, Germany and Luxemburg to make adjustments to the Posting of Workers Directive (Hundstorfer et al., 2015). All these efforts illustrate the importance of horizontal relationships to aim for vertical interactions with the EU.

In response, the European Commission proposed an explication of existing legislation and promoting the exchange of best practices at the local level in particular (European Commission 2013; Letter to Upper House 2013). Therefore, vertical interactions on EU mobility or CEE migration between member-states and European Commission have a different institutionalized outlook than the local-national interactions described above. Communication between the Dutch national government and the European Commission is more irregular, indicated by a ministerial civil servant:

> ''No, working groups do not exist. […] such meetings that we had with the Commission, I would not say these are institutionalized meetings. It is an ad-hoc meeting. And it establishes several times, as much as needed. But the Commission is not the authority who structurally wants to broach such meetings with several member-states'' (MCS3).

In sum, in this period we see nascent *multi-level governance*, mainly regarding multiple horizontal interactions related to intensive vertical interactions between the national and local level, and with the European level to a limited extent. After existing local horizontal interactions, also the Dutch national government coordinated horizontal interactions between ministries, other EU member-states and stakeholders. Efforts were made for 'horizontal' coalition building with the aim of 'vertical' issue awareness towards the EU. While the national-European vertical interactions seem to be limited, this period clearly shows the establishment and institutionalisation of local-national interactions, hence a multi-level governance arrangement in this third phase.

Table 10: Periodic overview of Dutch governance arrangements related to 'CEE migration'

	2004-2007	2007-2011	>2011
Political elements	**Governance decoupling** - Divergent leadership between local and national level - Comparable politicisation on national and EU level concentrating mainly on regulation and implementation of intra-European movement	**Localist governance** - Local politicization - Local leadership by aldermen - Vertical venue shopping by municipalities - Deviating politicization between local versus national and European level - EU mobility paradigm is maintained at EC and national level	**Multi-level governance** - Convergence of political leadership between local aldermen and ministers - Convergent politicisation of the issue by Ministers and aldermen
Policy elements	- Mainly ad-hoc policy measures at the local level - Policy contradictions between local and national levels - Absence of coordination and interactions between local and national level	- Structural policies at the local level; - Horizontal policy coordination at local level with local stakeholders to solve local concerns - Little or no central policy coordination	-- Institutionalization of vertical relations between national and local government - Coherent national-local policy approach, - Joint national-local policy lobby towards EU, - Development of soft-governance framework at EU level

CONCLUSION

This chapter displays that a nascent multi-level governance structure on 'intra-European movement' was not so much established top-down by European institutes or member states, but rather 'bottom-up' by coordinated efforts by local governments. Speaking to the literature on multi-level governance, this shows the relevance of the agency of local governments in general and cities in particular in the development of multi-level governance. Our analysis displays the importance of local governments in the establishment of horizontal and vertical governance configurations in multi-level settings. Local governments frequently engage in 'vertical venue shopping' in an effort to influence agenda setting and policy formulation at other levels of government. As our analysis unfolds, this can lead to the establishment of more permanent 'vertical' structures that facilitate collaboration across governmental levels. Also, we found examples in which local governments first built 'horizontal' coalitions with other local public, private or NGO relationships, in order to broaden their mandate towards 'vertical' relations with the national or EU level.

Our case-study of how Dutch cities (Rotterdam and The Hague) responded to the increased 'intra-European movement' clearly shows the importance of local entrepreneurship in the establishment of vertical governance relations in a multi-level setting. This entrepreneurship was driven by various factors: a specific problem perception (as CEE migrants settle in specific cities first, local consequences became manifestly visible), policy concerns (on labour market issues, housing and registration) and political leadership (by aldermen driven by clear political agendas). This entrepreneurship needs to be understood in its political context, since this issue caught attention when intra-European movement became politicized by 'populist' and more mainstream political parties in both cities and National Parliament. In Rotterdam and The Hague there was broad political consensus to intervene on this issue, put on the agenda by political parties and studies of the Council (PvdA 2008; Municipality Rotterdam 2008a). In the same way, after broad political consensus the Temporary Parliamentary Commission put the issue on the national agenda, which under a new Cabinet, made it legitimate for the new Ministers to react on this issue. Our analysis thus shows the importance of politicisation and the significance of political actors in the changing establishment of governance arrangements between levels throughout time.

Strategies to influence policymaking at other levels of government included various forms of 'vertical venue shopping'. In our case, we found four key steps of how local governments strategically organized agenda setting at the national and later the EU level. Firstly, agenda setting was launched by active media attention (the aldermen of The Hague calling for a 'tsunami' and the Minister for 'Code Orange'). Secondly, this was continued by broadening the mandate with horizontal public and private partners

(Rotterdam collaborated with The Hague and Westland, temporary labour agencies and NGO's while the Dutch government collaborated with Dutch civil organisations, Sweden, UK and Germany). Thirdly, this was follow-up by the organization of a political event to influence the topic ('Poles Summits' and the 'EU Summit'). And fourthly, in the reorganization of administrative efforts, the topic got institutional urgency. In Rotterdam, The Hague and the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs, integral 'Taskforces EU labour migration' were installed as an 'umbrella' position towards regular policies. Such efforts by the two Dutch local governments have not been without effect. Incrementally, vertical multi-level governance structures emerged, mainly with the national level and other stakeholders.

This chapter speaks to the broader literature of multi-level governance, raising attention to the agency of local (as well as national and European) governments in establishing horizontal and vertical governance configurations in a multi-level setting (Hooghe and Marks 2001; Bache and Flinders 2004; Piattoni 2010). Rather than taking multi-level governance as a given, or as 'independent variable', our study shows why one cannot assume 'multi-level governance' but it has relevance to study this as one of more ideal typical configurations. It displays that a better understanding is required how and why multi-level governance evolves under specific circumstances, as a 'dependent variable.' This contributes to a more precise theoretical understanding and conceptualisation of multi-level governance. In fact, in our analysis we only found some evidence of institutionalized vertical relations that can be termed as 'multi-level governance' in the most recent stage of policies regarding 'intra-European movement'. In earlier stages, despite a multiplicity of horizontal relationships on the local governance level, vertical relations were either absent or only ad-hoc. In this respect, an important lesson from our analysis is that in spite of its broad theoretical definition and application in the literature, multi-level governance is hard to achieve in practice and need to be seen as one of the varied types of governance in a multi-level setting.

WHY

''As Kierkegaard - quoted by Derrida - said: 'the moment of the decision is the moment of madness''' (Laclau, 2000: 79)

''Die Wissenschaft 'soll' nicht 'du sollst' sagen'' (Heinrich Rickert)

II

CONTESTED CONCLUSIONS

''What various forms of rationality claim to be their necessary existence, has a history which we can determine completely and recover from the tapestry of contingency'' (Foucault, 1989: 252)

''One of the most general functions of the state is the production and canonization of social classifications'' (Bourdieu, 2014: 9)

"Reality is the consequence of the settlement of a dispute rather than its cause" (Latour and Woolgar, 1979: 236)

7

The aim of this study was to understand the contestation on intra-European movement in a multi-level setting. In order to enhance our understanding of this topic, I developed a discursive analytical approach. After six chapters, the central argument of this book is that: *what* migration or mobility is depends first and foremost on *how* this phenomenon is discursively defined. Consequently, whether migration or mobility appear as problem or solution should be seen as the outcome of a discursive struggle over the definition and meaning of intra-European movement.

This concluding chapter has three objectives. Firstly, in paragraph 7.1, I *summarize* the previous chapters and answer the research questions. Secondly, in paragraph 7.2, by means of the typology of the comparative discourse approach, the main conclusions are *confronted* with different bodies of literature. Next, in paragraph 7.3, I *investigate* with what kind of open ends does this research leave us? In other words, what is the 'bigger picture' and future research agenda for discursive studies on movement, migration and mobility? Finally, in paragraph 7.4, I *conclude* with an epilogue by *referring back* to my initial puzzle and surprise about solving policy controversies, incomprehensibility and contestation as democratic and political phenomena.

7.1 ANSWERING THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This study set out to answer the following main research question:

> *How can intra-European movement discourses within the European Commission and the Netherlands be conceptualized and analysed, and how are institutional discourses related to institutional actions?*

The main research question is composed by three sub-questions:

1. *How can institutional discourses, institutional actions and the relationship between both be conceptualized and analysed?*
2. *What kind of institutional discourses and institutional actions of intra-European movement can be identified in the Netherlands and the European Commission?*
3. *How are the institutional actions related to institutional discourses of intra-European movement in the Netherlands and the European Commission?*

The combined answer to these three questions, adds up to the answer of the main research question. In the following paragraphs I will address all three questions separately.

## 7.1.1 CONCEPTUALIZING AND ANALYSING INTRA-EUROPEAN MOVEMENT DISCOURSES

The first research question points at the conceptualisation and analysis of intra-European movement discourses. Since this question concerns the conceptual groundwork of this study, which has been extensively elaborated in chapter 2, the following is a *concise summary* of paragraph 2.3.

Since this research is not primarily about intra-European movement but rather about *discourses* of intra-European movement, I first conceptualized intra-European movement *discourses*, which turns our focus to discourse and how legitimate claims on reality are made. To meet this issue, as outlined in chapter 2, discourse is conceptualized as ''*the ensemble of ideas, concepts and categorizations that are produced, reproduced and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities*'' (Hajer, 1997: 44). This definition enables to separation of the 'ensemble of ideas, concepts and categorizations' as *institutional discourse* from the 'produced, reproduced and transformed set of practices' as *institutional actions* (Hajer, 1997)[124]. Both institutional discourse and institutional actions are the practices ''*through which people experience the world, specifies the views that can be legitimately accepted as knowledge and constitutes the actors taken to be the agents of knowledge*'' (Fischer and Gottweis, 2012: 11). This distinction enables focus on how agents discursively construct 'ideas, concepts and categorizations' next to 'actions' as *legitimately accepted knowledge* (Hajer, 1997; Fischer and Gottweis, 2012: 11). This makes it possible to focus on the *discursive legitimation* of institutional actions and institutional discourses, more specifically, how *agents* discursively legitimate institutional discourses such as 'ideas, concepts and categorizations'[125] next to institutional actions, a specific 'set of practices'[126], on intra-European movement. This has been visualized as follows:

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124   This study takes a step *back* and focuses on what happens before, on what Hajer (1997) termed as, 'discursive structuration' or 'discursive institutionalisation' processes

125   More specifically, this has been conceptualized and operationalized by 'poetic elements' such as concepts, metaphors, myths and numbers. Next to this, 'storyline' elements are distinguished, such as 'objectives', 'subjectives' and 'type of intervention'. In chapter 4 this is operationalized by 'beliefs' and 'meanings'. In chapter 5 this is done by operationalizing 'numbering' and 'framing'. Finally in chapter 6 we operationalized this by political elements.

126   More specifically, institutional actions are operationalized in chapter 3 as 'policy proposals', in chapter 4 this has been operationalized by 'actions' referring to policies, laws, legislation, collaborative venues, networks and in chapter 6, this has been operationalized by 'policy elements'.

By a conceptualization of institutional discourses *and* institutional actions, the relationship between both has been *theorized.* Not surprisingly, a close reader already observed that within this conceptualisation the 'ensemble of ideas, concepts and categorizations' is *distinct* but also conceptually *related* to the 'set of practices', by the *discursive legitimation* of *agents* as professional individuals and groups 'at the centre of policy construction' (Schmidt, 2008). Thus, the 'relationship', between intra-European movement *discourses* and *institutional actions* is theorized by how agents, actors or subjects *discursively legitimate* both. Furthermore, as explicated in chapters 5 (beliefs) and 6 (numbers), 'discursive legitimation' is defined as the discursive technique that explains and justifies social activity, and typically involves providing 'good reasons, grounds, or acceptable motivations for past or present action' (Van Dijk, 1997, 255). More specifically, to analyse this relationship between institutional discourses and actions, discursive legitimation has been operationalized based on the work of Van Leeuwen (2007: 91)[127] to empirically study 'the constitutive role of discourse in political processes' (Hajer, 1997: 58).

7.1.2 THE IDENTIFICATION OF DUTCH AND EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSES

The aim of this research question is primarily empirical, therefore the following is a concise empirical summary of the chapters in part II. Moreover, to adequately answer the second research question we will first re-articulate the identified Dutch institutional discourse followed by the European institutional discourse.

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127   Based on four key categories of discursive legitimation: authorization, moral evaluation, rationalization and mythopoesis (Van Leeuwen, 2007; Rojo and Van Dijk, 2007; Van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999; Vaara and Tienari, 2008: 988).

DUTCH INSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSES

As shown in chapter 3 [proposals] I distinguished three periods in the Dutch national institutional discourses. The first period (2004-2007) holds a strong liberal focus on the 'opening' of the borders by minimizing 'administrative burdens' and maximizing the impacts of 'the four freedoms'. This was legitimated by references to maintain the image of the Netherlands as a 'trading nation' and past agreements on the European level. Discussions mainly focused on the timing of labour market restrictions, and as such measures aimed to stimulate the 'right' time to implement new EU legislation for the Dutch economy. The analysis in chapter 5 [numbers] also shows a dominance of legal-economic discursive elements, and the important focus on labour market permits, especially to monitor this group as foreign *labourers* on the Dutch labour market. This is the discursive period when EU mobility became constructed as *labour* mobility. Indicatively, proposals were termed as 'flanked' policies, including 'preventive and repressive instruments' to regulate labour market and welfare state claims. Therefore the discourse in this first period is characterized as a *legal-economic* institutional discourse.

The second period (2008-2011) includes socio-cultural and legal issues, and points at 'abuses', 'reverse sides' and 'isolation'. This discursive period shows when and how *labour mobility* or *European free movement* became *labour migration*. A close examination of the second period (2008-2011) displays how Dutch authorities made it legitimate to see 'mobile workers' as 'labour *migrants*', and 'labour mobility' as 'labour *migration*'. This was mainly legitimated by all kinds of explicit and implicit historical parallels by referring to EU labour migration in terms of 'again', 'also' and the importance to learn 'lessons of the past'[128]. By referring to the recent past (of guest worker migration), Dutch authorities *perspectivized* EU free movement *as* migration. With comparisons to 'our' recent history, especially referring to Turkish and Moroccan migration in the 60s and 70s, European free movement became silently 'just another form of migration'. By references to this legacy, 'mobile workers' were seen *as* 'migrants'. This resembles with the findings in chapter 5 [numbers] which shows how additional research strengthened a focus on socio-cultural issues, such as language, participation and integration[129]. Eventually, this legitimated claims on 'integration' and to counteract 'misapprehensions', 'backlashes' and 'socio-economic distances' of 'mobile work' since *'we don't want a repetition of history'* (Letter to Parliament, 2008: 99). Such historic parallels legitimized all sorts of 'action plans', 'pilots' and 'an integral packet of measures' to counteract the 'reverse sides' (2011) and to profit from the 'lessons' of that past. Concluding, this is the period when the Dutch institutional discourse on 'intra-European movement' became a *migration* discourse.

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128   this is also visible by the title of the Parliamentary Commission 'Lessons of Recent Labour Migration' (LURA), which shows the focus on 'lessons' and 'labour migration'

129   Because by an opening of labour market borders, in this period labour market permits were no longer sufficient to monitor the population size. This spurred additional research

Finally, both identified institutional discourses get a close issue connection in the third period (2011-2014), which includes both *legal-economic* and *socio-cultural* elements. It is a period which claims to 'stimulate the labour market' on the one side, combined with the need to improve housing and societal participation of EU migrants on the other side. It is an interesting period, since EU mobility has been institutionalized *as* migration and combines economic and socio-cultural features, which can be illustrated by: ''*labour migrants from other EU countries deliver a positive contribution to our economy. But there are also problems, and I don't want to close my eyes for that'* (Letter to Parliament, 2013: 5 (162)). It is a period with a focus on 'labour migrants' and their 'positive contribution to *our* economy' but which also causes 'problems'. This merging of legal-economic concepts and metaphors ('unfair competition', 'level playing field', 'greying' and 'greening' of society, 'the best and the brightest', 'a race to the bottom' and 'The Netherlands as open economy') are related to socio-cultural concepts and metaphors ('nuisance', 'integration' and 'deterioration'). This is again legitimated by references to 'our' common history because: '*from the past we know that it is of large importance that migrants are straightaway entrained in the Dutch society. They have to know their rights and duties*' (Letter to Parliament, 2014: 4 (187)), all in order to combat 'shadow sides' and to make EU migration 'maintainable' and 'compliable' (Letter to Parliament, 2013). The analysis in chapter 5 [numbers] also shows that in this period the monitoring of this 'migrant' group became more complex[130], resulting in estimations which enabled a further *problematization of* this phenomenon. Nevertheless, it shows a period of discourse structuration or institutionalization (Hajer, 1997), of European movement as 'migration' with economic benefits *and* social costs. Thus, the Dutch institutional discourses vary from a more legal-economic (2004-2007), to a legal socio-cultural (2008-2011) towards a merging of both discourses in the final phase (2011-2014).

However the differences in the subsequent periods and the variety of discursive elements and constructions found, my interviews, focus groups and desk research showed a large consistency within the Dutch institutional discourses on intra-European movement. Despite the variance in periods, chapter 4 [beliefs] also shows the dominance of a clear 'container metaphor' (Charteris-Black, 2006) which guides thoughts of 'opening' and 'closing' borders. This can be pointed at territorial or welfare state borders and guides a *national* discourse of 'migrants' and their 'integration'. Chapter 4 [beliefs] show how such a *national* discourse is constructed by the practice of *containering* the situation ('opening and closing of borders') and *historicizing* their own actions ('we don't want problems to repeat'). The analysis shows how such a *national* discourse refers to 'our' economy,

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130   since new research showed the importance of temporary, back-and-forth mobility, which putted pressure on 'normal' registration procedures

'our' country and 'our' history to legitimate knowledge claims. Now let us consider the discursive constructions in the European context.

EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSES

The analysis of European institutional discourses in chapter 3 [proposals] shows more consistency throughout time than the Dutch institutional discourses. Consequently, it was possible to create a more coherent characterisation of the European institutional discourse. The analysis of chapter 3 shows that a construction of 'Europe' *as* market ('Single Market' or 'Internal Market') and Europeans *as* movers on that market ('free movers'), contributes to a consistent institutional 'mobility' discourse. It is a *liberal-economic institutional discourse* constructed by a range of liberal market assumptions, grounded in presumptions on a functional demand and supply by well-informed and rational citizens. Because of its consistency, in the following I will decompose and re-articulate how the EC constructs this institutional mobility discourse.

The EC signifies 'free movement' as 'the cornerstone' of 'development of the Single Market' and 'the successful integration of the European economy'. This is needed in order to do justice to 'the fundamental principle', the 'cornerstone', the 'Four Pillars' and 'four fundamental freedoms' of the EU of which the EC is the 'guardian'. This resembles with findings in chapter 4 [beliefs] which show that European policymakers consider something as 'European' or 'free movement' when something 'falls under' EU law. Consequently, they 'only' 'coordinate', 'implement' or 'harmonize' EU laws and principles. To make this 'harmonisation' or 'integration' possible, free movement must create a 'more efficient allocation of resources' and more 'labour markets that are better able to adjust to asymmetric shocks'. This is frustrated by all kinds of market 'mismatches', 'labour market bottlenecks', 'barriers', '(cultural) obstacles', 'hurdles' and 'gaps'. But to overcome these frustrations, EU citizens must be equipped as 'human capital' and 'adaptive workforce', to challenge these 'labour market pressures' and 'mismatches'. Therefore, 'human resource development' and 'flexicurity' are needed, for a better 'talent pool' in order to make 'life-long learning' possible.

By constructing 'Europe' as one territorial borderless ('free') and consistent ('Single') market, and European citizens as 'the human resources' of that market, free movement is discursively legitimated as 'mobility'. By this 'mobility' discourse, 'free movement' becomes the *means* in the construction of a European market. This legitimises the stimulation of 'movement' and to problematize immobility. Thus, the *need* to 'move' has importance since 'the freedom of movement makes a positive contribution to labour markets throughout Europe' (EC, 2011). As such, 'mobility' becomes an imperative, since European citizens *should* 'move', because they have a 'mobility potential' which contributes to the development of the 'Single Market'. This makes mobility a positive signal and

instrument to further improve Europe and the 'Single market'. It shows the issue connection between mobility (as instrument to further 'improve', 'harmonise' and 'integrate') and the existence of 'Europe'.

This resembles with the analysis in chapter 4 [beliefs], which shows a strong legal and technical discourse of European policymakers. It shows how they construct their own actions, mainly as 'technical' tools or instruments to 'only' implement laws, 'complete' the Single Market or to reach a consensus. This is based on the belief that in the end 'nobody questions' free movement since it is 'in line with the fundamental principles'. It shows how 'free movement' is constructed *as* 'a means of creating a European employment market', which legitimises the stimulation of flexibility and mobility within this market, to problematize 'low intra-EU mobility' and to position oneself as the 'implementer' and 'harmonizer' of these 'principles'. Both chapter 3 and 4 show the consistency of the European discourse in text and talk, which differs from the Dutch institutional discourse analysed. Now we concisely summarized the institutional discourses, we will investigate institutional actions in the following paragraph.

7.1.3 THE IDENTIFICATION OF DUTCH AND EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONAL ACTIONS

The examination below is a summary and therefore a *non-exhaustive* attempt (a more extensive investigation can be found in the previous chapters) to investigate the *character* of institutional actions in both contexts.

DUTCH INSTITUTIONAL ACTIONS

According to the analysis of chapter 3 [proposals], three discursive periods occurred in the analysis of Dutch institutional actions: from a more *legal-economic* (2004-2007), a *socio-cultural* (2008-2011) to a *merging* of both in the final period (2011-2014). This is an important contextual feature to understand the institutional actions.

In the first period (2004-2007), actions mainly had a *preventive* and *repressive* character. Preventive proposals aimed to enlarge 'full free movement' to reduce all kinds of 'barriers', such as 'labour market tests' and 'labour permits'. This was meant to minimize 'bureaucratic romp lump' (2006) and 'administrative burdens' by means of 'flanked policies' ('geflankeerd beleid') to maximize profits for the Dutch economy. Consequently, a variety of preventive actions were announced such as governmental fines to 'combat underpayment' (Law on Minimum Hour Wage) and laws to improve 'equal treatment' for EU workers and Dutch citizens (such as the Law labour conditions border-crossing labour). Next to these *preventive* laws and legislation, numerous new *repressive* actions were

announced to combat irregularities on the labour market. In that regard, the capacity of control agencies (such as the Alien Police) was proposed to be extended. Next to this, an 'Intervention Team Covenant' and an 'Approach Malafide Infrastructure' were proposed to 'combat slum landlords'. By these 'flanked' policies, economic and legal interventions aimed to maximize profits and regulate the labour market. As the analysis of chapter 6 [mlg] shows that this is also the period when local governments asked for more attention on social and local issues. On the local level, actors mainly wanted to improve the labour market situation and the housing situation of 'CEE migrants'. The Hague and Rotterdam cooperated with local organisations on issues such as housing, labour market and safety. They also focused on issues related to homelessness, nuisance and alcohol abuse, drawing further political attention to the 'integration problems' concerning 'CEE migrants'.

In the second period (2008-2011) the tone of voice differed on the national level indicated earlier as *'we don't want a repetition of history'* (Letter to Parliament, 2008: 99) therefore 'problems' and 'adjustments' had to be taken into consideration. This pushed forward all kinds of *stimulating* and *repressive* actions with a focus on 'answers' to 'problems'. For example, adjustments on the 'Fraud Law' and the development of the 'Regional Coordination centre to combat Fraud' (RCF), the instalment of a 'National Steering Group Intervention teams' (LSI) to combat 'abuses related to welfare provisions' and an 'Action Plan reduction Malafide recruitment Agencies' to control temporary employment agencies better. It illustrates a focus on 'problems' that are not only related to the labour market. Also in this period, the claims of local governments were taken into consideration. Chapter 6 shows that by support of other (international) municipalities the influence of Rotterdam and The Hague grew. This resulted in new venues such as a 'Municipalities network' and working groups ('norms-meeting'), which contributed to new laws and legislation. For instance on housing, an 'Action Plan housing and integration labour migrants', the 'Action Plan Nuisances and Deterioration', an 'Intention Declaration' and a 'National Declaration Housing Labour migrants' were developed to improve the housing situation of 'CEE migrants' and to stimulate housing agencies to develop more and better temporary housing accommodations. It is a period of multiple institutional actions, a development phase of new venues, laws and legislations on the Dutch local and national level.

In the final period (2011-2014) all kinds of actions were proposed on the national level to combat irregularities by the self-employed with an 'Identification pass' within an approach to tackle 'façade independency'. Next to this, a revision of the 'Law Labour Aliens' and a 'Pilot' on the 'Residence Termination EU citizens' were proposed to control irregularities on the work floor and to terminate the residence permit of irregular EU workers better. However, next to these 'work floor' and labour market actions, a range of actions were proposed to counteract housing shortages. This resulted in the 'Operation Plan 2014-2015' to have a better cooperation between housing actors. Next to this, new

legislation was proposed to better equip municipalities to improve the efficacy of their policies resulting in a new law 'Register Non Inhabitants'[131]. This is also the period of more institutional actions towards 'Europe', mostly staged at the Administrative Commission to discuss laws and legislation. Next to this, Dutch authorities collaborated more internationally to shared interests with partners. For instance, Minister Asscher (Social Affairs) organized a conference together with the German Ministry of Interior Affairs in Rotterdam and a 'EU labour migration Summit' in The Hague[132] with attendance of Bulgarian and Romanian Ministers. Finally, there were a range of collaborative actions aimed to influence the Posted Workers Directive in 'Europe' (Hundstorfer et al., 2015).

EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONAL ACTIONS

There has been a wide range of institutional actions (venues, policies, laws and legislation) with a high degree of consistency. From 2002 onwards, the European Commission presented an 'Action Plan for Skills and Mobility' which pushed forward all kinds of actions, such as for example, a 'Europass framework' 'to support the transferability of qualifications' by a 'MobiliPass'. Secondly, 'E-learning programs' are announced to achieve 'lifelong learning' and to enable more 'geographic mobility'. Thirdly, the 'Health Insurance Card' was announced to make social security and pension rights 'portable' and to 'streamline administrative practices and cooperation'. Fourthly, a 'Language Action Plan' a 'Researchers Mobility Portal' a 'European Job Mobility Portal' and the improvement of EURES were proposed, to 'strengthen mobility for education' and to improve 'fragmented' information. Fifthly, the 'Professional Qualifications Directive', the 'common training framework' and the 'European professional card' (EPC) were developed to standardize professional qualifications[133]. Finally, the 'Directive on the enforcement of rights of workers moving within in the European Union' was developed to explicate the rights and legal position of mobile workers within the EU. It characterizes a range of new policies and legislation to enhance mobility by a better circulation of data, information, goods and people.

However, next to these new policies, the European Commission also felt the pressure of member-states[134] during these years to address their concerns related to free movement. In terms of actions, the EC announced 'five actions to make a difference' (European Commission, 2013). These actions aimed to 'help' member-states improving the implementa-

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131 applied by 18 (pilot) municipalities to monitor the 'temporary' group of CEE migrants who were largely 'out of sight'

132 At this summit, especially the bilateral and national efforts of cooperation and collaboration (to combat fraud, mala fide employers and slum landlords) were discussed.

133 Finally, the Electronic Exchange of Social Security Information (EESSI) was developed, which allows a more effective exchange of personal documents.

134 concerns of national governments were published in Ministerial letters

tion of free movement to their local context. For that aim 1) a 'handbook on marriages of convenience' was announced, to help member-states counteract potential abuses of free movement[135] 2) a practical guide to sensitize systems to control the residence address of people and to implement EU legislation towards social security better 3) investments in local capacities to get access to European investment funds 4) a conference on mayors and 5) an online training module. These actions were all announced to help local authorities in implementing free movement. It showed EC actions addressing the needs of member-states. As a consequence, in this period also the 'FreeMov expert group' originated. This is a venue for experts, which occurs 3 to 4 times a year in Brussels. It includes ministerial experts of member states and the European Commission and complements the already existing Administrative Commission[136]. However, while there has been a range of consistent new policy proposals and some adjustments in actions and venues, overall these new developments were limited[137].

7.1.4 DISCURSIVE LEGITIMATION

After conceptualizing and showing the observed institutional discourses *and* institutional actions, we can now empirically substantiate their relationship[138], guided by earlier conceptualisations on the agential perspective on *discursive legitimation*.

The analysis in chapter 3 [proposals] shows that most of the institutional actions are legitimized by poetic elements. For instance, the Dutch 'flanked policies' are legitimized by the *metaphor* to see the Netherlands *as* 'trade nation'. In the second period, the 'Ac-

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135   This is legitimated as: '*according to Europol, some organised crime networks arrange marriages of convenience between third-country nationals and mobile EU citizens to gain entry and legal stay in the EU. In this field, Europol and Eurojust can offer assistance and support to national authorities, particularly in cases linked to trafficking in human beings*" (EC, 2013: 8).

136   includes a representative of the government of each EU country and a representative of the Commission

137   The previous summary has value since any kind of academic research constructs coherence not only by an explicit account of the research steps, but also by an explicit consideration of answering the research questions. Since I make 'truth claims' on such reliability to my own students, I do think it has value not to bypass those basics in my own work. Next to academic 'reliability' I do consider that the previous conceptual and empirical substance provides as stepping stones for the upcoming paragraphs.

138   The relationship between institutional discourses and institutional actions is not a direct relationship. One could get the impression that this study, only points to the feed-forward effect of institutional discourses on actions. This would assume a linear or direct relationship between institutional discourses and actions: [discourses→actions]. I think that the empirical material shows a more reciprocal process. As indicated, institutional discourses influence institutional actions, but *also vice versa* institutional actions influence institutional discourses. However, since I assess this relationship by discursive legitimacy of agents, I mainly assessed the relationship of institutional discourses and institutional action. This could have the effect that this study is oversensitive for the influence of institutional discourses and under-sensitive for the role of actions. I do acknowledge this oversensitivity in the approach on discursive legitimation. This is guided by the assumption that actions can only be analysed by studying how agents discursively legitimate these actions. This however does not point at a direct relationship between discourses and actions. It acknowledges that they influence each other vice versa, but that our assessment has a particular discursive approach which could give the impression of overemphasizing the discourse-side of the relationship. It holds importance to acknowledge this particularity.

tion Plans' are legitimized by guestworker *myths* and 'lessons from the past'. In the final period, the 'Pilot Residence Termination' is legitimized by the *concept* of combatting 'shadow sides'. Next to this, the European analysis shows that 'free movement' can be considered to be a *metaphor* for 'a European employment market' which enables the European Commission to understand, 'perspectivize' and legitimize 'intra-European movement' *as* 'mobility'. This *market metaphor* makes all kinds of interventions legitimate (such as the Europass framework, the MobiliPass and the Job Mobility Portal) to further improve the 'transparency' and 'transferability of qualifications' and the flexibility of this 'market'. Next to this, there is this recurrently used *myth* in which the history of the EU is constructed by a 'traditional lack of mobility culture'. By this myth, the EU can be presented *as* fragmented, disintegrated, inflexible and an *immobile market* which makes it legitimate to problematize immobility. Therefore, all kind of 'hurdles' and 'bottlenecks' need to be removed to live up to the standard of a true integrated, flexible and mobile market. Next to this, the analysis also shows the importance of time in constructing specific poetic elements. For instance, historic Dutch references to former guestworker *migration* made it possible to perceive EU labourers as *migrants*. And by seeing this group *as* migrants this legitimized all kinds of policy actions (in the sphere of 'integration' and participation) based on 'lessons' from that historic past. Also on the European level, references to the 'foundational role' or 'principle' of free movement, as one of the 'pillars' of the European project to point at a 'traditional lack of mobility culture' can be observed as a specific social construction of time. These two elements, substantiate the relationship between institutional discourses and institutional actions, not as a direct but rather *mediated* relationship. Based on these findings we will now speak back to the literature and give a more detailed account about how these findings substantiate the relationship between institutional discourses and institutional actions:

1. The analysis of Dutch and European Commission discourses shows the significance of poetic elements to 'perspectivize', in order to construct a *persuasive* discursive reality. The analysis of chapter 3 and 4 shows the *discursive necessity* of poetic elements and unravelled the significance of poetic elements in having intertextual *instrumental and legitimizing* value for storyline elements and the overall discourse. For instance, when poetic elements are used to problematize something. Chapter 3 shows that this is mostly followed by a policy proposal. It shows the *mediating* role of poetic elements, connecting a policy objective *with* a policy proposal *by* the construction of a problem *as* […]. In analysing the Dutch and European discourses it was not the overall discourse that was 'a signpost for action' (Hajer, 1997) but specific beliefs and poetic elements which mediate in forecasting the 'arrow of action'.

   This finding specifies the overall assumed notions of 'feed-forward effects', 'theories of causation' or 'signpost' effects of institutional discourse on institutional actions derived from constitutive perspectives on discourse (Schmidt, 2008; 2011; Schneider

and Sidney, 2009; Verloo, 2005; Schram, 1995; Fischer, 2003; van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999; Berger and Luckmann, 1966: 106; Austin, 1962; 1975; Schaffer, 2016). The empirical analysis of this study shows that it is not the *overall* institutional discourse that holds constitutive, performative and prescriptive value for institutional actions, but that the devil is in the poetic *details*[139]. Most examples show the significance of myths, metaphors, concepts and beliefs in legitimating storylines and the overall institutional discourse in order to legitimize courses of action. It highlights the significance of poetic elements for understanding discourses, and more specifically, the significance of *specific* poetic elements for understanding actions. For instance, chapter 5 [numbers] shows that numbers do not have the autonomous authority to speak 'truth to power'. This nuances the autonomous position of numbers. Numbers 'need' other poetic elements to become legitimate in the overall institutional discourse while other chapters specify the significance of specific 'other' poetic elements such as metaphors, myths and concepts. This finding sensitizes the literature on the performativity of discourses. However, this attention for poetic elements resembles with the literature which highlights metaphors (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Stone, 1988). Other policy theorists have incorporated the role of storylines, ('generative') metaphors and 'framing devices' for the justification, legitimation and implementation of policy decisions (Rein and Schön, 1993; Hajer, 1997; Hood, 1998; Yanow, 1996; van Hulst, 2008). But despite the widely acknowledged importance of metaphors for public policy, not all studies explicate *how* this works. This research *conceptually broadens* the significance of metaphors and *empirically specifies* the significance of poetic elements. It broadens the significance of the metaphor by acknowledging metaphorical value in other 'poetic elements' and shows their *mediating* role in connecting a policy objective *with* a policy proposal *by* the construction of a problem *as [...]*. This study contributes to the literature (Bevir and Rhodes, 2006; Hajer, 1997)[140] since it does not isolate the metaphor but acknowledges *metaphorical value* in other 'poetic elements'. Moreover, it empirically specifies the role of poetic elements by nuancing the role of numbers, since numbers are part of the production of legitimate frames and discourses. It shows that numbers do not have the autonomous authority to speak 'truth to power'. As such, this study nuances the position of numbers, while it highlights the role of myths, metaphors and concepts;

2. Secondly, in line with the above, 'time constructions' have an *overall* significance in legitimating particular poetic elements. We have seen this *significance of time* in the European myth of a 'tradition lack of mobility culture' to problematize immobility and promote mobility and in the Dutch metaphor of a 'trading nation' of the mythi-

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139   this sentence is constructed for aesthetic reasons, since this cannot be considered as demonic or as 'details'

140   For instance Hajer links 'storylines, metaphors and myths' all together as 'the first layer' of policy discourses which help or 'sustain the societal support for particular policy programmes' (Hajer, 2003, 104).

cal 'lessons from the past'. As such, both cases epitomizes the role of *mythopoesis*, of demonstrating how constructions of the past and future, the construction of time scales, timing and time horizons, holds significance in legitimising poetic elements, the overall institutional discourse and creating urgency for institutional actions.

The question is: is mythopoesis just one way of discursive legitimation, and does chapter 4 [beliefs] show that also authorisation is also an important discursive legitimation strategy, mainly observed by the European Commission? The answer is: yes. However, the analysis shows that references to the past, building up specific social constructions of time, have an *overall significance* in discursive legitimation processes. Regardless of whether one refers to authority, expert knowledge, moral evaluations or rationalisations, all can be legitimated by specific historical references. For instance the authorisation strategy of the European Commission has a vested interest in the historic legacy and gains legitimacy by references to the past. Therefore, in this section I would like to highlight the overall significance of mythopoesis. More specifically, the present constructions of the past legitimate future actions. This highlights the need for a better interpretive understanding of social constructions of time since ''*we lack explicit conceptualizations of time*'' (Fleischer, 2013: 314; Adam, 1998; Goetz and Meyer-Sahling, 2009).

This 'lack', historical-institutionalist accounts points out the importance of institutional legacies which created certain path dependencies since history leaves an imprint on the current and the future (Peters, 2012). This relates to narrative studies which showed that audiences favour people who recall a historical narrative that accords with their own stance (Sheafer et al., 2011). This makes history not a formal or pre-defined understanding of the past but a social *re-construction of the current* and *future* by the *past* (see also: Rein and Schön 1977; van Hulst, 2008). This research not only shows the importance to recall a sound historical narrative for politicians, but also empirically substantiates how, by references to a (common) history, *institutional discourses about the past* can become an important legitimation for *institutional actions in the future.* As such, this study highlights mythopoesis, or the social construction of time, as having *overall significance* in legitimating particular poetic elements.

This study applies the 'substantial *content*' of both Hajer and Schmidt, in its 'discursive' and institutional *context*. By showing the significance of metaphorical value in poetic elements and time constructions this study did not search for ''*causal influence*'' but also did not aim to find ''*uncertain outcomes*'' (Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004: 204; Hajer, 1997: 263). Instead it shows how institutional discourses ''*provide the recipes, guidelines, and maps for political action and serve to justify policies and programs*'' (Schmidt, 2008: 306). It shows how discourses can be 'transformative' and work as 'vehicles of change', as '*signpost for action*' (Hajer, 1997). It shows how '*ideas go from thought to word to deed*' to contribute to an

important field of study because *'we still have no way of considering this process'* (Schmidt, 2008: 309). As such this study adds conceptual refinement and empirical substance to the constitutive role of language in policymaking practices. It shows how institutional discourses shape institutional actions and how this constituency comes into being.

More generally, this study empirically substantiates the well-known Thomas Theorem: *"If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences"* (Thomas and Thomas, 1928: 572). While many studies have shown the importance of situational definitions, metaphors and beliefs to understand institutional actions, few studies have shown *how* this works. By not assuming a constitutive link between discourse and action, but by using a detailed study of 'how a situation is being defined as real', this study unravels 'how they are real in their consequences' with a focus on discursive legitimation. I did this by questioning which discursive elements have significance in legitimising actions. But, does it need to have distinctions, such as for instance poetic and storyline elements, to gain this understanding? No, I do not think these particular distinctions are necessary for any future study. However, it holds importance for a well-designed research approach to focus on the *metaphorical value* of operationalized *discursive elements*, to understand 'how a situation is being defined as real' and 'how it becomes real in their consequences'.

Since we now have discussed the specificities and substance of discursive legitimacy, the question is: how is legitimacy created? This is a key question, especially in public decision-making practices[141]. This study does not include insights into how one can *create* legitimacy (prescriptive) but rather includes insights into how legitimacy *has been created* (interpretive). Our both case studies show how poetic elements and beliefs legitimate storyline elements and the need for actions. It unravels the *immanent logic and contingent references* of a quite autonomous European and Dutch discourse which *''select their own histories and futures; they build up their own chains of causation"* (Luhmann and Fuchs, 1988: 24). This points at the autonomy (or in political terms 'sovereignty') of self-legitimating discourse[142]. But are discourses completely self-legitimating? The analysis of chapter 5 [numbers] for instance shows how actors 'make up' numbers to increase the legitimacy of their claims. However, this does not imply that one could 'make up' a metaphor or number completely out of the blue to legitimate actions. The analysis does not show that poetic elements or beliefs are completely free-floating, but need to be understood within the embedded context of historical, authorized or expert references to gain legitimacy. Moreover, the credibility of discursive elements depends on their observed consistency *''with rules, norms and values cherished by the section of the popula-*

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141   For instance, Engbersen et.al (1991: 145) pointed at the Aristotelian distinction between logos, ethos and pathos while Hajer (1997: 281) pointed at the importance of trust, acceptability and credibility to justify a certain course of action.

142   Moreover, this self-legitimation is an essential *political* act, since *"politics ought to be defined on its own terms, as a mode of acting put into practice by a specific kind of subject and deriving from a particular form of reason"* (Ranciere, 2001: 1).

tion which is interpellated by the particular (ideological or hegemonic) project" (Torfing, 1999: 152). The analysis shows that any governmental level has its specific historical, cultural and social context which can be a source of legitimacy and can provide with a form of 'cherished consistency'. Therefore institutional discourses are not 'anything goes' articulations, but its legitimation needs to be understood in its *institutional, sedimented and embedded context* of articulated practices (Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004). Within such a context, *some* agents have more credibility to politicize consistent and legitimate claims than others, since they can modify an already existing discourse (Laclau, 1996; Marttilla, 2015). It is important to acknowledge this *contextual* and *agential significance* in the creation of legitimate discourses, to understand the *immanent logic and contingent references* and why certain claims become legitimate. Such an approach enables us to sidestep the 'structuralist trap' and makes it possible to study *agents* and their *institutional context* to understand why certain discourses gain legitimacy (see also: Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004).

7.2 THE BIGGER PICTURE

In the following paragraph I first reconsider the heuristic typology of ideal types, introduced in chapter 2, to comparatively study the cases. As such, four ideal types are distinguished as:


Figure 2: *Comparative discourse analysis*

Firstly, if we reconsider the above typology, it enables us to position the three cases throughout time in four distinct situations. In terms of institutional discourses in the period of 2004-2011 our analysis shows *multi-level coupling* between the national-European level combined with a situation of *multi-level decoupling* between the local versus the national-European level. However, this situation shifted after 2011 to a situation of *multi-level coupling* between the local-national level combined with a situation of *multi-level decoupling* between the local-national versus European level. This is visualized in Table 11:

Table 11: summary multi-level analysis

	2004-2011	>2011
Local	Multi-level decoupling	Multi-level coupling
National		
European	Multi-level coupling	Multi-level decoupling

What does this typology contribute to our understanding of the cases? The empirical application of the typology enables a more *contingent perspective* on the development of institutional discourses on multiple levels throughout time. Because, our comparative analysis shows two phases, before and after 2011, marked by a regime shift in terms of institutional discourses and actions. This needs some explanation.

Our analysis of chapter 6 shows an activist lobby of the municipalities of Rotterdam and The Hague in the first phase (2004-2011). It was guided by a strong lobby to the National Parliament, fierce public interviews, inviting Parliamentarians to their cities to 'see the problems themselves', organizing conferences and inviting Ministers to those conferences to ask them to 'take responsibility' on this topic. They acted as a democratic counterforce, mobilizing their local powers and networks to make their voices heard at the national level. In the phase 2004-2011, these municipalities raised 'concerns' and 'problems' related to more social-cultural issues such as housing, language and integration. This differed from the Dutch national and European level discourse with a focus on legal and economic issues. In this phase, municipal discourses contained different metaphors ('CEE migrants'), concepts ('problems') and political elements ('Poland Summit') generally ignored or not fully acknowledged by the Dutch national level. The first phase can therefore be characterized as a discursive phase of *consistency within* but *difference between* the local and national-European level, combined with more *consistency between* the national-European discourses[143]. Because the national government applied a quite

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143   analysed by 'poetic' elements' such as concepts, metaphors, myths and numbers, 'storyline' elements, such as objectives and subjectives, 'beliefs' and 'meanings', 'numbering' and 'framing' and 'political elements')

similar discursive approach as the European Commission with attention for the 'Single Market', the importance of 'trade', 'flexible markets' and 'open borders' for 'competitive economies'.

Also in terms of institutional actions[144] the municipalities of Rotterdam and The Hague developed policies to combat nuisance, alcohol abuse and homelessness related to 'CEE migrants'. Despite the urgency and political attention raised by those municipalities (organizing Summits, media interviews), the national government limitedly developed new legislation. National involvement mainly concerned the adjustment of existing policies or improving 'standing policies'. The Minister at that time accused these municipalities of pointing at problems that had no relation with 'CEE migration' whatsoever. It was claimed that the municipalities were using this issue to get finances for already existing problems they should have been able to solve themselves. It marked the beginning of a 'standstill' situation which only resulted in flanked policies to stimulate the Dutch labour market in its international context. The first phase can therefore be characterized as a consistent national-European action setting, combined with an inconsistent action setting between the local and national-European level.

However, the consistency within and between the national-European discourses and actions (2007-2011) on the importance of 'free movement' came under pressure, because it was no longer sufficient to deal with the issues raised by these municipalities. While the 'responsible' Ministry (Social Affairs and Employment) did not changed much, some other Ministries did acknowledge the socio-cultural problems raised, for example, language and integration (Letter to Parliament, 2010: 106). Consequently, various Ministers developed different approaches. While the Ministers of Spatial Planning, Housing and Internal Affairs (van Middelkoop, Van der Laan, Spies) showed willingness to acknowledge housing problems and nuisance related issues, the 'responsible' Ministry of Social Affairs (Donner) did not wanted to give in. This caused a *moment of dislocation*, a moment of crisis in which the institutional discourses on the national level were not consistent with the institutional actions anymore[145]. It caused a 'two-stream approach' on the Dutch national level continuing the former liberal-economic discourses, while some Ministries changed to more social-economic actions to meet the concerns of the local municipalities. This characterized a *situation* of *action dislocation* on the national level. This continued and the actions between the national and local level became more and more consistent. This resulted in that the discursive and action consistency between the national and European levels became increasingly under pressure. This situation could not stand and eventually resulted in a *regime shift*. The political momentum of new elections, a change of govern-

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144   operationalized by 'policy proposals', 'actions' and 'policy elements'

145   this is a moment of dislocation, since it embodies a moment of crisis. In the Greek etymologic sense, crisis refers to 'separation'. This is also how this 'moment of dislocation' is referring to: a separation and non-constitution between discourses and actions

ment, and a new 'responsible' Minister of Social Affairs, lead to the *moment of dislocation* turning back into a situation of *multi-level coupling* between the local-national level[146]. A new Cabinet, a new Minister of Social Affairs (Kamp) and a Parliamentary Commission was installed to study the 'Lessons from recent labour migration' (LURA), which reconfigured consistency between the local and national institutional discourses. From that moment onwards, both levels articulated 'problems' facing issues with 'language, housing and registration'.

Combined with a wide range of local-national institutional actions this evolved into a variety of new policies (for instance, on homelessness), laws (on registration), legislation (on housing) and venues ('municipalities network'). However, with more consistency between the local and national institutional actions, the inconsistency between the national and European level grew since European discourses and actions remained almost the same. Consequently, the actions and discourse became *consistent within but different between* the national and European level. Actions and discourses were again consistent within each level but varied differently between different levels. The European Commission acknowledged the 'concerns' of member-states such as The Netherlands, but mainly aimed to explain existing laws and legislation for a better 'implementation' and 'harmonization' of standing policies. Since European discourses remained consistently articulated at legal and economic issues, the position of Dutch national authorities 'in Brussels' became contested. This went on, even up to the point that some policymakers indicated the situation as 'ridiculous' since the Minister was unable to collaborate internationally. This was a direct consequence of the regime shift and the recoupling of the national government which caused a range of different policy interventions. Therefore, in the second phase (>2011) there was consistency between local-national discourses and actions, combined with inconsistency between the local-national and European level. Consequently, this caused a *multi-level coupling* between the local and national level, combined with *multi-level decoupling* between the local-national and European level[147]. If we combine our comparative discourse findings of dislocatory moments with the discursive findings of time constructions and poetic elements, we reach the question: how does this typology contribute to a better understanding of the cases?

Firstly, the typology is a visualisation and an institutional perspective to separate and understand discourses and actions in a comparative perspective. By this conceptual separation it becomes possible to analyse to what extent discourses and actions are (in) consistent, throughout time. This enables us to highlight *moments of dislocation*. These

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146   important to say is that this political momentum was with the instalment of a new Cabinet in 2010, which resulted that the tone of voice and a wide range of laws and legislation was announced in April 2011

147   the analysis shows that there is no need to problematize multi-level decoupling, like there is no need to prioritize coupling. Because the analysis shows that even despite 'decoupling', levels have the autonomy and democratic sovereignty to develop their own policies, laws and legislation, which can be valued from a democratic point of view in which such decoupling or coupling is just a particular performance of democratic politics.

are moments of crisis when discourses and actions are no longer equivalent, or separated. For example, when 'speech' and 'acts' differ. This is always a transitory moment, since actors will aim to bring back consistency in the regime practices of power and control[148]. This conceptual separation of institutional discourses and actions, and positioning this in a comparative perspective, makes it possible to empirically study these moments of dislocation, which are marking moments in terms of regime shifts.

Secondly, the conceptual separation shows the importance of understanding discursive (in)consistency in a comparative perspective. When 'basic' poetic elements not only have *consistency within* but also *inconsistency between* levels, it is hard to establish actions. Cooperation between those levels is even harder. The typology provides with a discursive perspective on institutions *''to shed new light on the functioning of those institutions, how power is structured in institutional arrangements, and how political change in such arrangements comes about''* (Hajer, 1997: 264). Moreover, it provides with a framework to understand the gradual power differences and the contingency of institutional discourses and actions throughout time. As such, the typology makes it possible to study the (in)consistency of discourses and practices throughout time, between multiple levels and in relationship to each other. It also enables to analyse new configurations between levels, which illustrates how this typology adds to the institutional relevance of discursive analyses. As such, this adds up to the point that discourse analysis should not be defined in contradiction to any institutional analysis, but holds significant perspectives to understand institutional actions. Overall, the typology illustrates the importance of a discursive perspective to understand governance in a multi-level setting.

Thirdly, it enables the gradual identification and depiction of the role and position of multiple levels related within a specific policy domain. As such, the typology enables us to identify the *entrepreneurial role* of the local level, the *mediating significance* of the national level, and the *consistent position* of the European level. Because, while the literature on multi-level governance has a blind-eye for the local level[149] this study empirically shows the significance of local governments, and especially large cities, being in charge of policies such as integration and migration and becoming increasingly entrepreneurial in policy development (Alexander, 2003; Caponio and Borkert, 2009; Scholten and Penninx, 2016). This study shows how two large city governments developed their own policies *and* influenced the national discourse by significant local pressure. By a range of

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148   This is possible since we conceptualized moments of dislocation as moments of crisis. In contrast to 'normal politics' which can be uncoordinated, we refer to this a moment of dislocation in the Greek etymologic sense of crisis which refers to 'separation'. This is also how I defined a 'moment of dislocation' since it is referring to: a *separation* of institutional discourses and actions

149   Next to that, Hooghe and Marks largely neglect the growing significance of local governments. While local governments and especially large cities are more and more becoming entrepreneurial and in charge of policies such as integration (Alexander, 2003). Therefore, I aim to also acknowledge the significance of the city scale and local governments (Glick-Schiller and Caglar, 2008; 2011: Barber, 2013).

strategies and by maintaining a consistent discursive and action approach they managed to influence the agenda of the national level. Next to the significance of local governments, it also shows how a national level maintains control by a *regime shift*[150] (Emilsson, 2015). By *mediation, translation and brokerage* of the institutional discourse on the Dutch national level, the national level could overcome a moment of dislocation and maintain control (Mosse, 2004). A comparative perspective adds a nuanced perspective on the significance of local governments and nation-states, as embedded entrepreneurs in times of Europeanization (Glick-Schiller and Caglar, 2008: Barber, 2013; Emilsson, 2015).

Finally, more as a by-product of this typology and more from a discursive perspective, the analysis also provides a different sense of what we generally consider as 'conflict' or 'disagreement'. The cases show that fierce conflicts were limited[151] as long as assumptions related to the 'floating' signifier (which consist the 'essential' core or belief) or 'nodal point' remain uncontested (Griggs and Howarth, 2013)[152]. Conflicts and 'multi-level decoupling' was possible as long as contested actors did not question the core legitimacy of the 'European project'[153]. For instance, when Dutch actors problematized free movement, this started with a disclaimer: ''*Freedom of movement in Europe is one of the central achievements of the European integration process […] we are fully committed to the common European right to the freedom of movement […]. However, […]*'' (Mikl-Leitner et al., 2013: 1). This can also work the other way around, for instance when vice-president of the EC, Vivian Reding, gave a speech with local mayors in Brussels, mentioning that:

> ''*Even though realities on the ground may differ, today's discussions have confirmed that […] there is a strong consensus that the free movement of people is one of Europe's strongest assets. It is not only a fundamental freedom, a*

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150   It points at the significance of *brokerage* of nation-states in Europe and the importance of national authorities to adequately articulate the interests of their people on an European level. It is exactly this brokerage or translation process which *resignifies the nation-state* in processes of Europeanisation. But this translation process always involves a *contribution* and *loss* of meaning in such a re-articulation, which is a 'price to pay' (Latour, 1987). This is also visible in this case, since by re-articulation, the Dutch national government *contributed* with labour market issues but also *lost* sight on the socio-cultural issues that were initially put up front by the Dutch municipalities. In the end, they did managed to improve existing legislation on labour market issues, but hardly left out any improvements in terms of social-cultural legislation. It merely shows the contested position of the nation-state in bargaining between different scales which has 'a price to pay'.

151   But how do we need to understand this 'conflictual consensus'? Because despite constant multi-level *decoupling* between the levels identified, 'manifest conflicts' were limited. Limited in the sense that we observed some fierce media statements of an alderman ('tsunami'), strong opinion articles of the Dutch Minister ('Code Orange') and we observed some Ministerial Letters ('burdens') in which those levels conflicted.

152   Floating signifiers are 'ideological elements that are not securely fixed in a particular discourse and can be constructed in diverse ways', while 'empty signifiers are points of fixation that can hold together multiple and even contradictory demands in a precarious unity'. Moreover, 'floating signifiers', can in 'certain circumstances be articulated by rival political projects seeking to fix their meaning and import'. 'Nodal points' are 'those privileged points of signification within a discourse that partially fix the meaning of practices and institutional configurations' (Griggs and Howarth, 2013: 21).

153   since 'free movement' has been perceived as 'one of the most important pillars on which Europe is built'.

legal right, but also a common European value on which our Union is based.
In short: it would be the wrong response to question the right to free move-
ment in order to address local challenges". (Reding, 2014: 1)

It shows the importance of a *discursive fundament*, of discursive cornerstones which are 'indisputable' and secure an uncontested 'ground' belief to be able to exchange conflicting views (Warner and van Buuren, 2011: 795)[154]. In the end, who can be against movement as being free (see also: Connolly, 1983)?[155] Pragmatically, when the 'fundamental principle' is kept uncontested, all other problems are just details within 'the bigger picture' of this 'fundamental principle'. This shows the importance of *discursive ambiguity* and to have a 'margin of negotiation' to make deliberation and conflict possible (Stone, 1988; Rein and Schon, 1996: 90; Boswell, 2013; Latour, 1987: 208; Bruner, 1991). This is especially important for entrepreneurial or brokering actors, such as in this case the local municipalities and the Dutch national government, to translate and mediate their institutional discourses (Mosse, 2004). The mutual acceptance of a floating *signifier* ('freedom of movement') left open enough ambiguity for actors such as the Dutch local and national government to adapt to it and adjust to it on their own terms. Ironically, one could argue that their status of *agreement* made *contestation* possible, or as Bourdieu suggested: '*for conflict over the social world to be possible, a kind of agreement is needed on the grounds of disagreement and on their modes of expression*" (2014: 4). Such a signifier provides actors with an agreeable ground to disagree and substantiates the argument of Oppenheim (1961: 9) who suggested that: *"meaningful disagreement about the value of freedom depends on the agreement on that about which one disagrees"*. This accounts for the importance to understand policy contestation by means of a 'conflictual consensus', on which we will reflect in the closing paragraphs.

7.3 HOW DOES MIGRATION MEAN?

This discursive perspective not only holds relevance for political scientist or policy scholars but also for migration studies, since it shows the political multifacetedness of migration as concept. And now, after the analysis of the politics of migration and mobility discourses, I can ask 'how does migration mean?', like Dvora Yanow (1996) asked 'how does a policy mean' and John Ciardi (1959) asked 'how does a poem mean'. How does intra-European movement, migration or mobility mean and what it is, depends first

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154 The importance of uncontested 'core beliefs' resembles with Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (1999) suggesting that 'deep core beliefs' and 'belief systems' does not change easily.

155 Connolly shows why 'freedom' has this positive connotation, but also that 'freedom is perhaps the most slippery and controversial concepts we shall discuss' (1983: 140).

and foremost on the way in which this phenomenon is discursively defined. That is also what the conflict is about: a conflict of meaning attributed to a particular phenomenon. This more interpretive approach into policy studies enables me to highlight the more 'human' face of policymaking by which human perception is not a 'mirror of nature' but an interpretation of it (Rorty, 1979). From this point of view *''there is no single, correct solution to a policy problem any more than there is a single correct perception of what that problem is''* (Yanow, 1996: 3). But this does not mean that 'anything goes' (Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Berger and Zijderveld, 2010). It means that knowledge about the world is always relative, not free-floating, but *related* and interrelated, structured by language (de Saussure, 1983). This shows the importance of language, of the disciplinary practice of discourses to understand action. Now let me refer back to the initial question of this paragraph: how does migration mean? This study shows the relevance of a discursive perspective for migration and intra-European mobility studies. Since it shows the importance of understanding concepts of migration and mobility by the way of *how* those phenomena are discursively defined. But what does this add to the identified literature on migration and studies on intra-European movement (paragraph 2.1)?

First of all, from a discursive perspective, this study shows that concepts like 'migration' and 'mobility' are not innocent, neutral or self-evident concepts, but politicized in various ways on different governmental levels. Because movement cannot exist without a point of fixation (Huijer, 2016). Movement is always interpreted in a political context of fixed concepts. We have seen Dutch institutional discourses about 'migrants' and their 'integration', but also European institutional discourses about 'mobile workers' and the importance of 'European mobility' for the 'Single market'. As such, this study not only agrees with critical migration scholars about the limited-reflexivity on state-related influences but also *shows* active state-specific discourses (Lavenex, 2005; de Haas, 2014; Wimmer and Glick-Schiller, 2003). It shows how (nation-) states influence the definition of movement *as* migration or *as* mobility and of movers *as* migrants or *as* mobile workers. For instance, by showing the specific poetic elements (chapter 3), beliefs (chapter 4), numbering activities (chapter 5) and governance actions (political elements), this study shows the non-neutrality of 'migration'. As such, this research empirically substantiates 'migration' and 'mobility' as non-innocent, non-neutral but as *essentially contested concepts*[156]. They are *contestable* when 'standards and criteria of judgement are open to contestation' and they are *essentially contestable* because 'universal criteria of reason', are not sufficient to solve such contestation (Connolly, 1983: 225). Suggesting migration and mobility as essentially contested concepts charges those:

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156   Let me state this clear, I do not have the naïve assumption that by unfolding a certain politicized discourse we can avoid it. Instead, by explicating the specificity of a certain discourse one can reflexively position oneself towards this discourse and the (implicit) assumptions that come along.

> *"who construe the standards operative in their own way of life to be fully expressive of God's will or reason or nature with transcendental provincialism; they treat the standards with which they are intimately familiar as universal criteria against which all other theories, practices and ideals are to be assessed. They use universalist rhetoric to protect provincial practices"* (Connolly, 1983: 226).

The analysis shows why migration and mobility can hardly be seen as 'universal criteria' and why this study does not aim to protect 'provincial practices'. Instead of considering 'migration' as a *descriptive*, *unmediated* or *apolitical* phenomenon, this study shows them as *political product of social mediation,* which demands political sensitivity in the usage of 'migration' and 'mobility' grammar. Therefore, I consider it useful to have more political sensitivity and acknowledgment in the concepts used. This can be done when migration scholars not only acknowledge the etymological origin of migration by change and *move-ment* for the object of research (migration as transformation of being), but also acknowledge and address this etymological origin regarding their own transformation of knowledge. Such acknowledgment accounts for *change, movement and transformation* of the object and the subject of analysis[157] and is sensitive for migration as a *translated,* mediated and transformed phenomenon (Latour, 2000: 48-51). In short, such acknowledgment is sensitive for the *politics* that construct a phenomenon *as* migration.

The analysis of chapter 5 shows how the origin (registrations or estimations), interpretation ('increases' or 'remains stable') and course of action ('no need' versus 'cannot turn a blind eye') of data about migration, is part of a broad process of negotiation, interpretation and transformation. The analysis also shows how Dutch authorities re-articulated EU movement as migration by historical references to a 'common past' and how governmental authorities *translated* such movement into migration. Acknowledging this 'politics of migration' does not only account for transformations of the ones who move, but also account for transformations of the ones who re-articulate that movement. The variety in the empirical analysis shows the importance of acknowledging the political, mediated and contingent character of 'migration'. By acknowledging 'migration' as political mediated concept, it is not the *migration phenomenon itself* that holds importance, but the way in which actors make sense and discursively construct a *phenomenon as migration*. By such acknowledgment scholars should no longer only point at *politics* as external to research (by particular states, nations or transnational organisations) but also at politics as within research (Jasanoff, 2000; Salter, 1988). Migration is only a usable concept as a 'by-product of an agonistic activity'. In that perspective, statements on migration can

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157   since ontologically, something considered as migration is a social act done in the past of which future implications are based

better be understood as operations within an agonistic field (Latour and Woolgar, 1979: 237).

It enables the acknowledgement that not only research subjects *migrate* but that we[158] as researchers also *migrate*, by *transforming* and *moving* knowledge. In that enquiry we 'make up people' by concepts such as migrants, migration and mobility (Hacking 2002). If we are aware about the mediating position we take as researchers in the *chain of trans-formations* that 'make up migrants', it enables to understand what we add and leave out in those transformations. Therefore let us *''rejoice in this long chain of transformations, this potentially un-endless sequence of mediators instead of begging for the poor pleasures of adequatio''* (Latour, 2000: 79). In other words, let us account for the mediating, translating and *transforming* role we play in defining this *being* into concepts such as migration, mobility or movement.

As a result, this study shows the importance of acknowledging 'power' not only in terms of institutional politics but especially in terms of *power by and within* migration research. This study empirically substantiates how 'migration' and 'mobility' are politically constructed, also legitimated with work of migration researchers, which is part of migration as a *political-normative* expression[159]. It signifies the importance to acknowledge human movement, migration and mobility as politically mediated phenomena. The variety in the empirical analysis shows the importance to acknowledge the political, mediated and contingent character of 'migration'. By such acknowledgment scholars should no longer only point at *politics* as external to research (by particular states, nations or transnational organisations) but also at politics as within research (Jasanoff, 2000; Salter, 1988). In that perspective, statements on migration can be better understood as political operations, which are operations with political consequences.

7.4 EPILOGUE

> *''Instead of living in different worlds, [this] may be only words apart''* (Davidson, 1973: 989)[160]

Let us return to the surprise I introduced in chapter 1 when I was confronted with the contested meanings of the Polish priest, Dutch Minister and European Commission.

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158 With 'we' I consciously position myself as being part instead of outside of migration studies. My analysis is not an external view on migration studies but comes from within

159 If we follow critical-realist theory, which argues that any scholarly notion is inherently political, this claim could be made relevant for other social phenomena as well.

160 This may leave us with the situation that 'the truth of a sentence is relative to the language it belongs' (Davidson, 1973: 989). While 'nothing is original' (Kleon, 2012) the title of this book was 'invented' before my eyes recognized this sentence as valuable for this research.

I was puzzled by this contestation. Therefore, I wanted to know why these actors did not 'speak' each other's language, what their consequences could be and how I was able to make sense of this. Let me reflect on that endeavour. This study showed the significance of discourses to understand institutional actions and policymaking. It showed by a detailed analysis, amongst others, the metaphorical value of poetic elements and the significance of time references in the legitimation of action. But *why* did this contestation occurred? This study shows that such contestation can at best be understood from the *immanent logic and contingent* articulations of particular discourses. This study revealed that *what* migration or mobility are, depends first and foremost on the way *how* this phenomenon is discursively and politically defined. Consequentially, whether migration or mobility appear as 'problem', 'solution', 'a return from the past' or 'as hope for the future' should be seen as the outcome of a discursive struggle over the definition and meaning of intra-European movement. A discursive perspective enables to study *how* actors create consistency and credibility to articulate legitimate claims. Moreover, this study unravels *how* discourses ''*select their own histories and futures*'' and how ''*they build up their own chains of causation*'' (Luhmann and Fuchs, 1988: 24). But driven from such an immanent logic, such discourses ''*are made within some system of ideas and standards which is comprehensible and plausible to the actors involved*'' (Anderson 1978: 23) which may be incomprehensible and implausible for actors *not* involved. Because ''*what counts as real in one system may not be in another*'' (Davidson, 1973: 986). I think the analysis shows some incomprehensibility of different 'systems of ideas' within the case-study of 'intra-European movement'.

The previous chapters have shown a variety of beliefs on 'intra-European movement'. We have witnessed a *political-national* discourse in the Dutch context with historical references which defined 'intra-European movement' as migration of migrants who are in need of integration. In contrast we witnessed a *legal-technical* discourse in the European context consisted of beliefs about 'intra-European movement' as mobility of EU citizens in need of full access to the European labour market. It shows the existence of distinct and contested *policy paradigms* which are logical and not falsifiable (Rein and Schon, 1996; Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003). They both link to 'deeply symbolic meanings of society', which are both rational and legitimate, constituted by their 'own' scientific subfields[161]. Since the previous chapters contributed to unravel ''*how competing policy actors construct contending narratives*'' we can now consider how to ''*make sense of it and deal with such*

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[161]   In short, mobilism is covered by a range of social scientific scholars who argue that social science should take advantage of the 'mobilities paradigm', providing with a 'mobility lens' to recreate theories and methods in social science. It critiques an a-mobile social science, acknowledging a more sedentary and liquid approach to social life. It critiques more 'older' sociological approaches which prefer more 'solid' systems such as nations, states and societies bound by territoriality and fixed identities. Such a 'migrationism' stands in contrast to 'mobilism' which enacts and reifies the 'solid' institutions of human movement they observe (Urry, 2007; Portes, 2010; Sjaastad, 1962; Todaro, 1969; Borjas, 1994; Chiswick, 2000).

uncertain, messy challenges" (Fischer and Gottweis, 2012: 7). In other words, after the empirical substance, the remaining question is 'how to *solve* this contestation?

Literature on 'contestation' resembles more generally with work on 'inaccessible narratives' of 'battles over meaning of sides who do not understand one another' and 'intractable policy controversies' (Rein and Schön, 1994; Rein and Schön, 1996; 95; McBeth, et al., 2010; Roberts, 2016). This body of literature shows that when beliefs are 'rooted in incompatible values', a policy conflict can take the form of reasonable disagreements which can last over time (Schön and Rein, 1993; Roberts, 2016). Moreover, policy controversies:

> *''[…] cannot be understood in terms of the familiar separation of questions of value from questions of fact, for the participants construct the problems of their problematic policy situations through frames in which facts, values, theories and interests are integrated. Given the multiple social realities created by conflicting frames, the participants disagree both with one another and also about the nature of their disagreements"* (Schön and Rein, 1993: 145)

In such a situation of 'incommensurability', 'policy disputes' or 'policy paradigms' much is 'taken for granted' and 'unamenable to scrutiny as a whole' (Hall, 1993: 279)[162]. This makes resolution hard, especially when such 'policy paradigms' regulate 'what is defined as a meaningful problem, considered worthy as data and considered legitimate' (O'Sullivan, 2005: xv). But still, how can we *solve* such incomprehensibility?

There has been a wide range of literature aimed at overcoming such 'incommensurability' because the future of democracy *"depends on the practical feasibility of resolving the controversies that inevitably arise and increasingly confront liberal democracies"* (Rein and Schon, 1996: 96)[163]. Some of the governance and management literature problematizes decoupling and disagreement because they restrict the probability of solutions for governance and public management processes (Lousberg, 2012; Scholten, 2013). Therefore a variety of (infra)structural adjustments have been developed, such as 'reflexive insti-

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162   Policy paradigms are frameworks that govern the policy process in 'embodying linguistic, normative, epistemic, empirical and methodological dimensions'. With the concept 'policy paradigm' I draw on the analogy of Kuhn's exemplary analysis of normal science and scientific paradigms (Kuhn, 1962). In general, first and second order change maintain or continue the 'status quo' or the 'main principles'. First order change is seen as the more incremental or routinized procedures of change and adjustments. Second order 'may move one step beyond in the direction of strategic action' (Hall, 1993: 280). It is the reflexivity of 'third order' change that can be subversive, 'more problematic' and could bring discontinuities in the policymaking process. Over the years the Hall/ Kuhn approach on policy paradigms has been criticized as a simplistic systemic view to understand change. I do not use the concept 'paradigm' to explain change in the policy system in response to external/ internal events. I do use this concept to understand the distinctiveness and incommensurability of discourses active on both level studied.

163   It draws upon Rawlsian notions of democracy, reason and truth to which Rein and Schon add that: ''frame-critical policy analysis is an attempt to address the Rawlsian question of reasonable pluralism in situated policy controversies".

tutional arrangements' (Hajer, 1997), 'collaborative dialogues' (Innes and Booher, 2003) 'democratic political deliberations' (Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003), 'consensus building and mutual recognition' (Forester, 1999) and 'communicative practices' (Fischer and Gott- weis, 2012). For instance Hajer suggest that '*classical-modernist institutions will have to readjust in order to prevent end-of-pipe deadlocks*" (Hajer, 2003: 110) and proposes to create *"a civic stage […] where people contribute knowledge and take part in deliberations"* in which *"governments, firms and citizens should come to understand as an essential part of decision-making on issues with great societal repercussions"* (Hajer, 1997: 288). Others suggest that *"only through a dialectical process of critical reflection and collective learning can we develop new and innovative policy solutions that speak to contemporary realities"* (Fischer and Gottweis 2012: 7). Some stimulated more 'interactive governance' by tools for public actors to improve the performance of networks and partnerships (Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004; Torfing, Peters, Pierre, Sorensen, 2013) or contributed with insights towards a 'genuinely deliberative society' (Boswell, 2013).

Although I do value these adjustments, the previous analysis taught me not to add another paragraph to this neo-Habermasian revitalisation of democracy (see also: Van Oenen, 2012; van der Veeke, 2013). While most of the previous studies consider deliberative democratic infrastructures as democratic means of *opening*, I consider such infrastructures as methods of *closing*, affirming 'la police', of neutralizing and rational- izing democratic conflict and politics. Such infrastructures seem to me mere expressions of '*the desire to expunge contestability*" and as Connolly argues:

> *"Expresses a wish to escape politics. It emerges either as a desire to rationalize public life, placing a set of ambiguities and contestable orientations under the control of a settled system of understandings and priorities […] bringing all citizens under the control of consensus which makes politics marginal and unimportant"* (Connolly, 1983: 213).

Therefore, in line with Fischer (2003) and Yanow (2003) I think it should not be the role of the interpretive policy analyst to 'solve' political problems, 'to suggest more effective and efficient solutions' (Hajer and Wagenaar, 2013) or to suggest deliberative infrastructures that seek for consensus to bring controversies to an end or aim to 'eliminate dissensus' (Connolly, 1991; Ranciere, 2001). Instead, I aim to contribute to the *logic of critique* to render visible the contingent character of practices by showing how power, exclusion and closure in its formation, production and reproduction works. In contrast to political domination, I hold an ethical conception that starts by acknowledging the radical con- tingency and fragility of things by 'affirming the contestability of political decisions and social practices' (Griggs and Howarth, 2013: 50). This engagement is needed to articulate the *ultimate incompleteness* any consensus which continuously remind audiences of the

lack of any ultimate foundation in democracy (Lefort, 1988; 2000; 2016; Ingram, 2006), by *explicating* instead of *solving* controversies which keeps them contestable and negotiable (Gottweis, 2003), because:

> *''The only democratic society is one which permanently shows the contingency of its own foundations – in our terms, permanently keeps open the gap between the ethical moment and the normative order''* (Laclau, 2000: 86)

Through this study, I rearticulated the 'tapestry of contingency' of the normative orders present, by an *agonist approach* to make 'meaningful disagreement' possible (Davidson, 1973)[164]. This marks interpretive research as a *political* practice which, to put it in Geertz' words, "*is a science whose progress is marked less by a perfection of consensus than by a refinement of debate*" and only improves *''the precision with which we vex each other''* (Geertz, 1973: 29). Such an interpretive approach is *''essentially contestable''* and in that endeavour does not substantiate the 'empty place of power' (Lefort, 1988; 2000; 2016; Ingram, 2006; Bevir and Rhodes, 2000: 10; Geertz, 1973). Instead it can be seen as a practice of *opening* instead of closing, a practice of unfolding silences, displaying hidden elements and explicating dominance and hegemony. Such research continuously opens up self-affirmative, self-enhancing and self-referencing discursive practices and is by that practice *''intrinsically incomplete''* (Geertz, 1973: 29). As such, this research contributes to a more politicized ontology[165] which does not problematize but acknowledge disagreement (Ranciere, 2001)[166]. Our empirical analysis shows the importance of not problematizing contestation as an *end-state* of political affairs, but rather to approach contestation as a *means* to study the reasons, strategies and logics of meaning making. My analysis empirically substantiates such meaning making and reveals that it can be a strategic choice to conflict and deviate. It shows that such an approach on *contestation* and *disagreement* is 'not only legitimate but also necessary' to understand the politics of intra-European movement (Mouffe, 2013).

By this ethical and critical 'methodology', I consciously deviate from a long *apolitical* tradition of social engineering or '*solutionism*' in public administration and public man-

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164 All these attempts assume 'essentially that there is something neutral and common that lies outside all these conceptual schemes' or paradigms (Davidson, 1973). This is a rather naïve assumption and with Davidson I would argue that: *''we need a theory of translation or interpretation that makes no assumptions about shared meanings, concepts or beliefs''* (1973: 992).

165 which leads others to argue about the importance to *de-politicize* the decision-making process to build consensual agreements (de Bruijn, ten Heuvelhof and in 't Veld, 2010).

166 Because a reduction of conflict is a reduction of politics and democracy, or as Ranciere puts it: *''The essence of consensus is not peaceful discussion and reasonable agreement as opposed to conflict or violence. Its essence is the annulment of dissensus as the separation of the sensible from itself. […] Consensus is the reduction of politics to the police. In other words, it is the 'end of politics' and not the accomplishment of its ends but, simply, the return of the 'normal' state of things which is that of politics' non-existence''* (2001: 14).

agement aiming to *solve* political issues (Heidelberg, 2015). I deviate from this practice of solutionism because it risks ''*applying to the state a 'state thinking'*'' (Bourdieu, 2014: 2) and could have the ambition to 'eliminate dissensus' (Connolly, 1991; Ranciere, 2001). Public Administration as discipline and field of study is constituted by a long tradition to increase rationalisations of public decision-making (van Ostaijen, 2016). In a way, I do contribute to such rationalisations with this book, which is almost impossible for any scientific or academic research to escape, but it is not my aim to contribute to an end-state of rational consensus. Instead I aim to display hidden elements to 'refine the debate' as a practice of *opening* instead of closing. Because, as Bourdieu suggested, if we consider the state as 'the organization of consent', its 'foundation is not necessarily a consensus' but the ''*existence of exchanges that lead to a dissension*'' (Bourdieu, 2014: 5).

Therefore, I resist, which is an essential *ethical* and *political* position, to deeper embed the consolidated order of 'la police' (Ranciere, 2001)[167]. By that practice I added to the struggle, to the politics of intra-European movement discourses, not driven by the naïve assumption that we should *solve* 'incommensurable' or 'intractable' controversies or contestations. By showing discursive articulations, I added reflexive *understanding* of policymaking in a contested and multi-level setting. I see this as one of the main contributions as social researcher, of relating rather unrelated worlds, of connecting 'those parts which are no part' (Von Eggers, 2013: 15)[168].

Moreover, as a social researcher, I prefer to ''*force all normative assumptions into the open, and not to let them lie half concealed in the jungle of fact and inference to slaughter the unwary*'' (Dahl, 1947: 4). The previous endeavour has been an attempt to bring my own normative accounts, and how I studied the controversies I encountered, 'into the open'. With that endeavour, I refuse to be a social engineer who solves issues by generating answers (see: Burawoy, 2005)[169]. Instead, I embrace the position of an interpretive academic being reflexive instead of prescriptive, contributing with complexity instead of complexity *reduction*. It is this complexity-increasing, interpretive and reflexive task that I am fully accountable for my '*intrinsically incomplete*' analysis. As such, this study is a political act to raise understanding of varied positions, to increase complexity and to add multiplicity. From that perspective, this study cannot be separated but is inherently part of the politics it studied. It was a political act to methodologically, conceptually and critically contribute to that struggle. Therefore this research did not only study the

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167   By relying on the convincing analysis of Von Eggers (2013), I consider this work as being part of *politics*. From a Foucauldian and Rancierian point of view, this texts is part of the politics since, by opening up 'police' discourses, it disrupt the 'existing order'.

168   Therefore, this study can be seen as a local and direct political intervention by showing how intra-European movement discourses of 'the police' enable processes of subjectification and identification of 'those parts which are no part' (Von Eggers, 2013).

169   regarding the typology of Burawoy (2005: 11) I would obviously prefer a position as critical or public social scientist instead of professional or policy social scientist

contested meaning making and politics of European movement discourses, but is also the *ontopolitical* embodiment of it. Let us now *disagree* with what has been suggested.

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APPENDIXES

Appendix I: All Letters to Parliament

Author	Title	Document number/ date
Vice-minister Social Affairs Rutte	Free movement labourers from new EU member states/ extension of the EU: advantages and disadvantages of a direct free movement of labourers	29407 (1) 23-01-2004
- (Ditto)	Free movement labourers from new EU member states	29407 (8) 13-02-2004
Minister Social Affairs De Geus	- (Ditto)	29407 (14) 29-04-2004
-	-	29407 (16) 02-07-2004
Vice-minister Social Affairs Van Hoof	-	29407 (17) 08-07-2004
- (ibid.)	-	29407 (17 reprint) 08-07-2004
-	-	29407 (21) 21-05-2005
-	-	29407 (31) 15-02-2006
-	-	29407 (32) 31-03-2006
-	-	29407 (33) 20-04-2006
-	-	29407 (44) 25-04-2006
-	-	29407 (51) 15-09-2006
-	-	29407 (53) 10-10-2006
-	-	29407 (54) 28-11-2006
-	-	29407 (56) 12-12-2006
Minister Social Affairs Donner	-	29407 (70) 24-04-2007
-	-	29407/ 30678 (72) 16-05-2007
-	-	29407 (73) 14-08-2007
-	-	29407 (75) 27-11-2007
Minister Social Affairs Donner and Housing, neighbourhoods and integration Vogelaar	-	29407 (81) 16-06-2008
Minister Housing, neighbourhoods and integration Vogelaar	-	29407 (95) 30-09-2008
Minister Social Affairs Donner	-	29407 (96) 09-10-2008
-	-	29407 (97) 03-11-2008
Minister Social Affairs Donner and Housing, neighbourhoods and integration Van der Laan	-	29407 (98) 28-11-2008
Minister Social Affairs Donner	-	29407 (99) 11-12-2008
Minister of Housing, neighbourhoods and integration Van der Laan	-	29407 (103) 23-11-2009
Minister Social Affairs Donner	-	29407 (105) 23-03-2010

Appendix I: All Letters to Parliament (continued)

Author	Title	Document number/ date
Minister of Housing, neighbourhoods and integration Van der Laan	-	29407 (106) 25-06-2010
Minister Social Affairs Donner	-	29407 (108) 28-09-2010
Minister Social Affairs Kamp	-	29407 (116) 01-03-2011
-	-	29407 (118) 14-04-2011
Minister Internal Affairs Donner	-	29407 (130) 15-09-2011-
Minister Social Affairs Kamp	-	29407 (132) 18-11-2011
-	-	29407 (141) 23-03-2012
Minister Internal Affairs Spies	-	29407 (146) 11-04-2012
Minister Social Affairs Kamp	-	29407 (149) 28-08-2012
Minister Internal Affairs Spies	-	29407 (150) 25-09-2012
Minister Immigration, Integration and asylum/ Leers	-	29407 (151) 02-11-2012
Minister Social Affairs Asscher	-	29407 (153) 14-01-2013
Minister of Housing Blok	-	29407 (154) 18-01-2013
Minister Social Affairs Asscher	-	29407 (162) 07-03-2013
Vice-minister Safety and Justice Teeven	-	29407 (171) 05-07-2013
Minister Social Affairs Asscher	-	29407 (172) 10-03-2013
-	-	29407 (174) 09-09-2013
-	-	29407 (177) 16-10-2013
Minister Social Affairs Asscher and Vice-minister Safety and Justice Teeven	-	29407 (180) 03-12-2013
Minister Social Affairs Asscher	-	29407 (181) 02-12-2013
-	-	29407 (187) 11-02-2014
Minister of Housing Blok	-	29407 (188) 27-02-2014
Parliamentary Commission Lessons recent labour migration	List of questions and answers	32680 (10) 20-10-2011

English summary

> *"It should be clear now why most people do not write and do not read scientific texts. No wonder! it is a peculiar trade in a merciless world. Better read novels!"* (Latour, 1987: 60)

This book can be read in multiple ways. Primarily it is a study about the governance of migration and mobility policies. But secondly, it is also a methodological or theoretical refinement of the conceptual apparatus and approaches in discourse analysis. Thirdly, it is a critical reflection on the usage of concepts such as 'migration' and 'mobility' within sociological migration studies. Therefore, this book is built up by three parts, which can be read at best chronologically, while there is no need for a linear reading. Part I ('HOW') consists of the topical introduction, the epistemological and ontological stances taken and how this research is conducted. Part II ('WHAT') includes the empirical data of the fieldwork and connects four articles. Part III ('WHY') answers the sub-research questions and returns to the initial theoretical premises and investigates what kind of consequences this research has.

RESEARCH DESIGN

When the European Union 'expanded', new member states joined the European territory and labour markets of 'old' and 'new' member-states could gain economic profits from this more flexible and expanding free movement of goods, services, capital and people. This happened on several occasions such as in 2004 when seven new member-states such as Poland, Hungary and Slovakia joined the EU. Moreover, in 2007 citizens of these countries were able to enter the Dutch labour market and both 'Eastern' and 'Western' countries could profit from this situation. Especially after the EU enlargements in 2004 and 2011 with various new member states, the scale of that movement has grown significantly. For example, more than 2.2 million people from Poland profited from this new freedom to engage in international movement between 2004-2007 (Kindler, 2017) and contributed to a 'new face' of East-West migration in Europe (Favell, 2008; Favell and Recchi, 2010; Black et al. 2010).

But it turned out, not to be so simple. In France, the 'Polish plumber' played a significant role in the rejection of the EU constitution in 2005, in Sweden there were fierce debates around 'new' beggars and homeless people (Favell and Nebe, 2009) and in the Netherlands one Dutch alderman spoke about a 'tsunami of Eastern-Europeans', the vice-prime-minister handed in an opinion article on a 'Code Orange for free labour movement within the EU', and one Dutch political party opened a 'Polish complaint desk' to collect the problems faced with Polish people ('Polenmeldpunt'). When I started this research in this highly politicized and contested field of studies, I asked myself how to

make sense of such contestation and politicisation? What is the reason behind such different problematizations and what are the institutional consequences?

To make *sense* of this, I decided to look at the multiple meanings and contestation on European migration and mobility not as *insignificant* but instead as *key* of what was going on. The first adjustment I made in order to better understand this issue was constructing a neologism to include but not to prioritize any interpretation on forehand ('intra-EU mobility' over 'labour migration' or vice versa). Therefore I constructed a distanced and catch-all term ('general signifier') to study all synonyms in the case studies referring to human movement *within* the European territory, such as 'mobility', 'migration' or 'free movement'. This shifted the research focus from *migration politics* towards the *politics of intra-European movement discourses*

To be able to study such contestation, I draw on qualitative methods and include discursive analyses, focussing on *discursive practices* around intra-European movement. To understand these discursive practices well, I *interpretively studied* how authorities *observed* intra-European movement. As such, this study investigates the policy-making processes in the domain of intra-European movement in the case studies of the European Commission, Dutch national and local governments and sets out to answer the following main research question:

> *How can intra-European movement discourses within the European Commission and the Netherlands be conceptualized and analysed, and how are institutional discourses related to institutional actions?*

The main research question is composed of three sub-questions:

1. *How can institutional discourses, institutional actions and the relationship between both be conceptualized and analysed?*
2. *What kind of institutional discourses and institutional actions of intra-European movement can be identified in the Netherlands and the European Commission?*
3. *How are the institutional actions related to institutional discourses of intra-European movement in the Netherlands and the European Commission?*

By empirical work this book shows the multiple meanings given to this topic, traces the contestation in its multi-level setting, what kind of institutional practices came forth and adds insights to our analysis of contemporary politics. These insights have importance to understand how current governments 'solve' wicked, contested or complex issues such as migration. This is done by the following case-study selection and methods of study:

|	Chapter 3	Chapter 4	Chapter 5	Chapter 6
Title	Contested proposals	Contested beliefs	Contested numbers	Contested governance
Cases	European National	European National	National	European National Local
Fieldwork	Desk research Secondary literature	Interviews Secondary literature	Interviews Desk research	Interviews Desk research Focus group

THEORETICAL STARTING POINT

Since this research is not primarily about intra-European movement but about *discourses* of intra-European movement, I first conceptualized intra-European movement *discourses*, which turned the focus to discourse and how legitimate claims are made. To meet this issue, as outlined in chapter 2, discourse is conceptualized as ''*the ensemble of ideas, concepts and categorizations that are produced, reproduced and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities*'' (Hajer, 1997: 44). This definition enables to separate the 'ensemble of ideas, concepts and categorizations' as *institutional discourse* from the 'produced, reproduced and transformed set of practices' as *institutional actions* (Hajer, 1997). This distinction enables to focus on how agents discursively construct 'ideas, concepts and categorizations' next to 'actions' as *'legitimately accepted knowledge'* (Hajer, 1997; Fischer and Gottweis, 2012: 11). This makes it possible to focus on the *discursive legitimation* of institutional actions and institutional discourses, more specifically, how *agents* discursively legitimate institutional discourses such as 'ideas, concepts and categorizations' next to institutional actions, a specific 'set of practices', on intra-European movement. Thus, the 'relationship', between intra-European movement *discourses* and *institutional actions* is theorized by how agents, actors or subjects *discursively legitimate* both. This has been visualized as follows:

Concisely summarized, *institutional discourses* are operationalized by for instance 'poetic elements' (such as concepts, metaphors, myths and numbers) and 'storyline elements' (such as objectives and subjectives) (in chapter 3), 'beliefs' and 'meanings' (in chapter 4), 'numbering' and 'framing' (in chapter 5) and 'political elements' (in chapter 6). And on the other hand, *institutional actions* are operationalized as 'policy proposals' (chapter 3), 'actions' (chapter 4) and 'policy elements' (chapter 6).

But this study not only focuses on the sole discourse, it also aims to study these discourses in its institutional context and adds a comparative *and* discursive perspective to acknowledge its multi-level setting and to redevelop argumentative and discursive institutionalist approaches (Hajer, 1997; Schmidt, 2010). To meet that aim, this study includes a typology which is based on two axes: 'institutional discourses' and 'institutional actions'. This makes it possible to draw a typology by a two-by-two table in which on the X-axe 'institutional discourses' and Y-axe 'institutional actions' are positioned, which both add up to a general approach on discourse (Hajer, 1997: 44). This multi-level or *comparative discourse approach* enables to follow the empirical development of discourses throughout time and how discourses are (re)produced in different institutional contexts. As such, four ideal types of *multi-level discourses* can be distinguished:

This *comparative discourse* typology creates a heuristic framework to comparatively study consistency in institutional actions and institutional discourses in a multi-level setting.

INSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSES AND ACTIONS

Chapter 3 distinguishes three phases in the development of Dutch national institutional discourses. Starting the analysis in 2004, the first phase (2004-2007) holds a strong liberal focus on the 'opening' of the borders by minimizing 'administrative burdens' and maximizing the impacts of 'the four freedoms'. This was legitimated by references to maintain the image of the Netherlands as a 'trading nation' and past agreements on the European level. Discussions mainly focused on the timing of labour market restrictions, and as such measures aimed to stimulate the 'right' time to implement new EU legislation for the Dutch economy. The analysis in chapter 5 [numbers] also shows a dominance of legal-economic discursive elements, and the important focus on labour market permits, especially to monitor this group as foreign *labourers* on the Dutch labour market. This is the discursive phase when EU mobility became constructed as *labour* mobility. Indicative, proposals were termed as 'flanked' policies, including 'preventive and repressive instruments' to regulate labour market and welfare state claims. Therefore in this first phase the discourse is characterized as a *legal-economic* institutional discourse.

In this first phase (2004-2007), actions mainly had a *repressive* and *preventive* character. Preventive proposals aimed to enlarge 'full free movement' to reduce all kinds of

'barriers', such as 'labour market tests' and 'labour permits'. This was meant to minimize 'bureaucratic romp lump' (2006) and 'administrative burdens' by means of 'flanked policies' ('geflankeerd beleid') to maximize profits for the Dutch economy. Consequentially, a variety of preventive actions were announced such as governmental fines to 'combat underpayment' (Law on Minimum Hour Wage) and laws to improve 'equal treatment' for EU workers and Dutch citizens (such as the Law labour conditions border-crossing labour). Next to these *preventive* laws and legislation, numerous new *repressive* actions were announced to combat irregularities on the labour market. In that regard, the capacity of control agencies (such as the Alien Police) was proposed to extend. Next to this, an 'Intervention team Covenant' and an 'Approach Malafide Infrastructure' were proposed to 'combat slum landlords'. By these 'flanked' policies, economic and legal interventions aimed to maximize profits and regulate the labour market. As the analysis of chapter 6 also shows, this is also the period when local governments asked attention for more social and local issues. On the local level, actors mainly wanted to improve the labour market situation and the housing situation of 'CEE migrants'. The Hague and Rotterdam cooperated with local organisations on issues such as housing, labour market and safety but also related to homelessness, nuisance and alcohol abuse, drawing further political attention to the 'integration problems' concerning 'CEE migrants'.

The second phase (2008-2011) includes socio-cultural and legal issues, and points at 'abuses', 'reverse sides' and 'isolation'. This discursive period shows when and how *labour mobility* or *European free movement* became *labour migration*. A close examination of the second phase (2008-2011) displays how Dutch authorities made it legitimate to see 'mobile workers' as 'labour *migrants*', and 'labour mobility' as 'labour *migration*' mainly legitimated by all kinds of explicit and implicit historical parallels by referring to EU labour migration in terms of 'again', 'also' and the importance to learn 'lessons of the past'. By referring to the recent past (of guest worker migration), Dutch authorities *perspectivized* (constructing a *persuasive* discursive reality) EU free movement *as* migration. With comparisons to 'our' recent history, especially referring to Turkish and Moroccan migration in the 60s and 70s, European free movement silently became 'just another form of migration'. By references to this legacy, 'mobile workers' were seen *as* 'migrants'. This resembles with the findings in chapter 5, which shows how additional research strengthened a focus on socio-cultural issues, such as language, participation and integration. Eventually, this legitimated claims on 'integration' and to counteract 'misapprehensions', 'backlashes' and 'socio-economic distances' of 'mobile work' since *'we don't want a repetition of history'* (Letter to Parliament, 2008: 99). Such historic parallels legitimized all sorts of 'action plans', 'pilots' and 'an integral packet of measures' to counteract the 'reverse sides' (2011) and to profit from the 'lessons' of that past. Concluding, this is the phase when the Dutch institutional discourse on 'intra-European movement' became a *migration* discourse.

In this second phase (2008-2011) the tone of voice differed on the national level earlier indicated as *'we don't want a repetition of history'* (Letter to Parliament, 2008: 99) therefore 'problems' and 'adjustments' had to be taken into consideration. This pushed forward all kinds of *stimulating* and *repressive* actions with a focus on 'answers' to 'problems' such as adjustments on the 'Fraud Law' and the development of the 'Regional Coordination centre to combat Fraud' (RCF), the instalment of a 'National Steering Group Intervention teams' (LSI) to combat 'abuses related to welfare provisions' and an 'Action Plan reduction Malafide recruitment Agencies' to control temporary employment agencies better. It illustrates a focus on 'problems' not only related to the labour market. Also in this phase, the claims of local governments were taken into consideration. Chapter 6 shows that this is also the period of local aldermen talking publicly in the media about a 'tsunami of Eastern Europeans' and indicting the situation as 'mopping with the tap wide open'. It is by support of other (international) municipalities that the influence of Rotterdam and The Hague grew. This resulted in new venues such as a 'Municipalities network' and working groups ('norms-meeting'), which contributed to new laws and legislation. For instance on housing, an 'Action Plan housing and integration labour migrants', the 'Action Plan Nuisances and Deterioration', an 'Intention Declaration' and a 'National Declaration Housing Labour migrants' were developed to improve the housing situation of 'CEE migrants' and to stimulate housing agencies to develop more and better temporary housing accommodations. It is a phase of multiple institutional actions, a development phase of new venues, laws and legislations on the Dutch local and national level.

Finally, both identified institutional discourses get a close issue connection in the third phase (2011-2014), which includes both *legal-economic* and *socio-cultural* elements. It is a phase which claims to 'stimulate the labour market' on the one side, combined with the need to improve housing and societal participation of EU migrants on the other side. It is an interesting period, since EU mobility was institutionalized *as* migration and combines economic and socio-cultural features, which can be illustrated by: ''*labour migrants from other EU countries deliver a positive contribution to our economy. But there are also problems, and I don't want to close my eyes for that'* (Letter to Parliament, 2013: 5 (162)). It is a period with a focus on 'labour migrants' and their 'positive contribution to *our* economy' but which also causes 'problems'. This merging of legal-economic concepts and metaphors ('unfair competition', 'level playing field', 'greying' and 'greening' of society, 'the best and the brightest', 'a race to the bottom' and 'The Netherlands as open economy') are related to socio-cultural concepts and metaphors ('nuisance', 'integration' and 'deterioration'). This is again legitimated by references to 'our' common history because: *'from the past we know that it is of large importance that migrants are straightaway entrained in the Dutch society. They have to know their rights and duties'* (Letter to Parliament, 2014: 4 (187)), all in order to combat 'shadow sides' and to make EU migration 'maintainable' and 'compliable' (Letter to Parliament, 2013). The analysis in chapter 5 [numbers] also shows that

in this period the monitoring of this 'migrant' group became more complex, resulting in estimations which enabled to *problematize* this phenomenon even more. Nevertheless, it shows a period of discourse structuration or institutionalization (Hajer, 1997), of European movement as 'migration' with economic benefits *and* social costs. Thus, the Dutch institutional discourses show a large variety ranging from a more legal-economic (2004-2007), to a legal socio-cultural (2008-2011) towards a merging of both discourses in the final phase (2011-2014).

In this final phase (2011-2014) all sorts of actions are proposed on the national level to combat irregularities by self-employed with an 'Identification pass' in a approach to attack 'façade independency'. Next to this, a revision of the 'Law Labour Aliens' and a 'Pilot' on the 'Residence Termination EU citizens' were proposed to control irregularities on the work floor and to terminate the residence permit of irregular EU workers better. But next to these 'work floor' and labour market actions, a range of actions were proposed to counteract housing shortages. This resulted in the 'Operation Plan 2014-2015' to have a better cooperation between housing actors. Next to this, new legislation was proposed to equip municipalities better to improve the efficacy of their policies resulting in a new law 'Register Non Inhabitants'. This is also the phase of more institutional actions towards 'Europe', mostly staged at the Administrative Commission to discuss laws and legislation. Next to this, Dutch authorities collaborated more internationally to shared interests with partners. For instance, Minister Asscher (Social Affairs) organized a conference together with the German Ministry of Interior Affairs in Rotterdam and a 'EU labour migration Summit' in The Hague with attendance of Bulgarian and Romanian Ministers. And finally, a range of collaborative actions aimed to influence the Posted Workers Directive in 'Europe' (Hundstorfer et al., 2015).

Contrastingly, in Europe, the analysis of institutional discourses in chapter 3 shows more consistency throughout time than the Dutch institutional discourses. This had as a consequence that there is more continuation in the characterisation of the European institutional discourse. The analysis of chapter 3 shows that a construction of 'Europe' *as* market ('Single Market' or 'Internal Market') and Europeans *as* movers on that market ('free movers'), contributes to a consistent institutional 'mobility' discourse. It is a *liberal-economic institutional discourse* constructed by a range of liberal market assumptions, grounded in presumptions on a functional demand and supply by well-informed and rational citizens. Because of its consistency, in the following I will decompose and re-articulate how the EC constructs this institutional mobility discourse.

First of all, the EC signifies 'free movement' as 'the cornerstone' of 'development of the Single Market' and 'the successful integration of the European economy'. This is needed in order to do justice to 'the fundamental principle', the 'cornerstone', the 'Four Pillars' and 'four fundamental freedoms' of the EU of which the EC is the 'guardian'. This resembles with findings in chapter 4 which show that European policymakers considered something

as 'European' or 'free movement' when something 'falls under' EU law. Consequentially, they 'only' 'coordinate', 'implement' or 'harmonize' EU laws and principles. To make this 'harmonisation' or 'integration' possible, free movement must create a 'more efficient allocation of resources' and more 'labour markets that are better able to adjust to asymmetric shocks'. This is frustrated by all kinds of market 'mismatches', 'labour market bottlenecks', 'barriers', '(cultural) obstacles', 'hurdles' and 'gaps'. To overcome these frustrations, EU citizens must be equipped as 'human capital' and 'adaptive workforce', to challenge these 'labour market pressures' and 'mismatches'. Therefore, 'human resource development' and 'flexicurity' are needed, for a better 'talent pool' in order to make 'lifelong learning' possible.

By constructing 'Europe' as one territorial borderless ('free') and consistent ('Single') market, and European citizens as 'the human resources' of that market, free movement is discursively legitimated as 'mobility'. By this 'mobility' discourse, 'free movement' becomes the *means* in the construction of a European market. This legitimates to stimulate 'movement' and to problematize immobility. Thus, the *need* to 'move' has importance since 'the freedom of movement makes a positive contribution to labour markets throughout Europe' (EC, 2011). As such, 'mobility' becomes an imperative, since European citizens *should* 'move', because they have a 'mobility potential' which contributes to the development of the 'Single Market'. This makes mobility a positive signal and instrument to further improve Europe and the 'Single market'. It shows the issue connection between mobility (as instrument to further 'improve', 'harmonise' and 'integrate') and the existence of 'Europe'.

This resembles with the analysis in chapter 4, which shows a strong legal and technical discourse of European policymakers. It shows how they construct their own actions, mainly as 'technical' tools or instruments to 'only' implement laws, 'complete' the Single Market or to reach a consensus. This is based on the belief that in the end 'nobody questions' free movement since it is 'in line with the fundamental principles'. It shows how 'free movement' is constructed *as* 'a means of creating a European employment market', which legitimate to stimulate the flexibility and mobility within this market, to problematize 'low intra-EU mobility' and to position oneself as the 'implementer' and 'harmonizer' of these 'principles'. Both chapter 3 and 4 show the consistency of the European discourse in text and talk, which differs from the Dutch institutional discourse analysed. Now we concisely summarized the institutional discourses, we will investigate institutional actions in the following paragraph.

There has been a wide range of institutional actions (venues, policies, laws and legislation) with a high degree of consistency. From 2002 onwards, the European Commission presented an 'Action Plan for Skills and Mobility' which pushed forward all kinds of actions, such as a 'Europass framework' 'to support the transferability of qualifications' by a 'MobiliPass'. Next to this, 'E-learning programs' are announced to achieve 'lifelong

learning' and to get more 'geographic mobility'. Besides, the 'Health Insurance Card' was announced to make social security and pension rights 'portable' and to 'streamline administrative practices and cooperation'. Next to this, a 'Language Action Plan' a 'Researchers Mobility Portal' a 'European Job Mobility Portal' and the improvement of EURES were proposed, to 'strengthen mobility for education' and to improve 'fragmented' information. Next to this, the 'Professional Qualifications Directive', the 'common training framework' and the 'European professional card' (EPC) were developed to standardize professional qualifications. Furthermore, the 'Directive on the enforcement of rights of workers moving within in the European Union' was developed to explicate the rights and legal position of mobile workers within the EU. It characterizes a range of new policies and legislation to enhance mobility by a better circulation of data, information, goods and people.

But next to these new policies, the European Commission also felt the pressure of member-states during these years to address their concerns related to free movement. In terms of actions, the EC announced 'five actions to make a difference' (European Commission, 2013). These actions included all kinds of actions to 'help' member-states improving the implementation of free movement to their local context. It showed EC actions addressing the needs of member-states. As a consequence, in this period also the 'FreeMov expert group' originated, which is an expert meeting venue, that gathers 3 to 4 times a year in Brussels and includes ministerial experts of member states and the European Commission and complements the already existing Administrative Commission. But while there has been a range of consistent new policy proposals and some adjustments in actions and venues, overall, these new developments were limited.

CONTRIBUTIONS

Now I would like to reflect on the contributions of the subsequent chapters of this book:

1. Chapter 3: the analysis of Dutch and European Commission discourses shows the significance of poetic elements (such as metaphors, myths, concepts and numbers) to 'perspectivize', to construct a *persuasive* discursive reality. The analysis of chapter 3 and 4 shows the *discursive necessity* of poetic elements and unravelled the significance of poetic elements in having intertextual *instrumental and legitimizing* value for story-line elements and the overall discourse. For instance, when poetic elements are used to problematize something, chapter 3 shows that this is mostly followed by a policy proposal. It shows the *mediating* role of poetic elements, connecting a policy objective *with* a policy proposal *by* the construction of a problem *as*. In analysing the Dutch and European discourses it was not the overall discourse that was 'a signpost for action'

(Hajer, 1997) but specific beliefs and poetic elements which mediate in forecasting the 'arrow of action'.

Moreover, sensitivity for poetic elements resembles with the literature which highlights metaphors (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Stone, 1988). Other policy theorists have also incorporated the role of storylines, ('generative') metaphors and 'framing devices' for the justification, legitimation and implementation of policy decisions (Rein and Schön, 1993; Hajer, 1997; Hood, 1998; Yanow, 1996; van Hulst, 2008). But despite the wide acknowledgment of the importance of metaphors for public policy, not all studies explicate *how* this works. This research *conceptually broadens* the significance of metaphors and *empirically specifies* the significance of poetic elements. It broadens the significance of the metaphor by acknowledging metaphorical value in other 'poetic elements'.

This finding specifies overall assumed notions of 'feed-forward effects', 'theories of causation' or 'signpost' effects of institutional discourse on institutional actions derived from constitutive perspectives on discourse (Schmidt, 2008; 2011; Schneider and Sidney, 2009; Verloo, 2005; Schram, 1995; Fischer, 2003; van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999; Berger and Luckmann, 1966: 106; Austin, 1962; 1975; Schaffer, 2016). The empirical analysis of this study shows that it is not the *overall* institutional discourse that holds constitutive, performative or prescriptive value for institutional actions, but that the devil is in the poetic '*details*'. Most examples show the significance of myths, metaphors, concepts and beliefs in legitimating storylines and the overall institutional discourse in order to legitimate courses of action. This finding highlights the significance of poetic elements to understand discourses, and more specifically, the significance of *specific* poetic elements to understand institutional actions.

2. Chapter 4: the analysis shows the importance of time in legitimating poetic elements. For instance, both cases epitomizes the role of *mythopoesis*, of how constructions of the past and future, the construction of time scales, timing and time horizons, holds significance in legitimating poetic elements, the overall institutional discourse and creating urgency for future actions. This makes history not a formal or pre-defined understanding of the past but a social *re-construction of the current* and *future* by the *past* (see also: Rein and Schön 1977; van Hulst, 2008). This research not only shows the importance to recall a sound historical narrative for politicians, but also empirically substantiates how, by references to a (common) history, *institutional discourses about the past* can become an important legitimation for *institutional actions in the future.*

3. Chapter 5 shows that numbers are part of the production of legitimate frames and discourses. It shows that numbers do not have the autonomous authority to speak 'truth to power' which nuances the position of numbers. For instance, numbers 'need' other poetic elements to become legitimate in the overall institutional discourse or

frame. This finding sensitizes the literature on constitutive perspectives on institutional discourses.

4. <u>Chapter 6:</u> shows the upward techniques of influence to get local interests heard. More specifically, the analysis shows how the municipalities of Rotterdam and The Hague developed effective strategies to initiate their own vocabulary to claim attention for their local 'problems' which needs new national policies, laws and legislation.

Now, based on these insights, what does this contribute to the specific *bodies of literature* identified?

1) CONCEPTUAL REFINEMENT OF DISCURSIVE APPROACHES

By conceptual separating institutional discourses and institutional practices this study delivers insights to discursive techniques not to implicitly assume its relationship, but to empirically study this relationship in an institutional perspective (Bevir and Rhodes, 2006; Hajer, 1997). Next to this, it does not isolate the metaphor but acknowledges *metaphorical value* in more 'poetic elements', and it empirically nuances the role of numbers, while highlighting the role of myths, metaphors and concepts. More generally, it shows how discourses can work 'transformative', as 'vehicles of change', as '*signpost for action*' (Hajer, 1997), and shows how '*ideas go from thought to word to deed*' to contribute to an important field of study because *'we still have no way of considering this process'* (Schmidt, 2008: 309). As such this study adds conceptual refinement and empirical substance to the constitutive role of language in policymaking practices. It shows how institutional discourses shape institutional actions and how this constituency comes into being.

2) GOVERNANCE 'MIGRATION' AND 'MOBILITY'

Firstly, if we reconsider the comparative discourse typology, it enables to position the three cases throughout time in four distinct situations. In terms of institutional discourses, in the period of 2004-2011, our analysis shows *multi-level coupling* between the national-European level combined with a situation of *multi-level decoupling* between the local versus the national-European level. However, this situation shifted after 2011 into a situation of *multi-level coupling* between the local-national level combined with a situation of *multi-level decoupling* between the local-national versus European level. This can be visualized as:

	2004-2011	>2011
Local	Multi-level decoupling	Multi-level coupling
National	Multi-level coupling	
European		Multi-level decoupling

The first phase can be characterized as a discursive phase of *consistency within* but *difference between* the local and national-European level, combined with more *consistency between* the national-European discourses, because the national government applied a consistent discursive approach like the European Commission with attention for the 'Single Market', the importance of 'trade', 'flexible markets' and 'open borders' for 'competitive economies'. Also in terms of institutional actions it resulted in 'flanked policies' to 'stimulate the Dutch economy' in its international context. The first phase can therefore be characterized as a consistent national-European action setting, combined with an inconsistent action setting between the local and national-European level.

However this consistency within and between the national-European discourses and actions, this came under strong pressure, because it was no longer sufficient to get at grips with the issues raised by the municipalities. While the 'responsible' Ministry (Social Affairs and Employment) did not change much, some other Ministries did acknowledged the socio-cultural 'problems' raised on for instance language and integration (Letter to Parliament, 2010: 106). Consequentially, various Ministers developed different approaches, which caused a *moment of dislocation*, a moment of crisis in which the institutional discourses on the national level were not consistent with the institutional actions. This situation could not stand and eventually resulted in a *regime shift*. By a political momentum of new elections, a change of government and a shift of Ministers in 2010, the new 'responsible' Minister of Social Affairs turned the *moment of dislocation* back into a situation of *multi-level coupling* between the local-national level. *W*ith the instalment of a new Cabinet, a new Minister took office (Kamp), a Parliamentary Commission was installed to study the 'Lessons from recent labour migration' (LURA), which reconfigured consistency between the local and national institutional discourses. From that moment onwards, both levels articulated 'problems' facing issues with 'language, housing and registration'. This resulted in a wide range of local-national institutional actions and a variety of new policies (for instance, on homelessness), laws (on registration), legislation (on housing) and venues ('municipalities network'). But since European discourses remained consistently articulated at legal and economic issues, the position of Dutch national authorities 'in Brussels' became contested, even up to the point that some policymakers indicated this situation as 'ridiculous' since the Minister was hardly unable to collaborate internationally. This was a direct consequence of the regime shift and the recoupling of the national government which caused a range of different policy interventions. Therefore, a second phase emerged (>2011) of consistency between local-

national discourses and actions, combined with inconsistency between the local-national and European level. Consequentially, this caused *multi-level coupling* between the local and national level, combined with *multi-level decoupling* between the local-national and European level. The typology makes it possible to study the (in)consistency of discourses and practices throughout time, between multiple levels and in relationship to each other. It also enables to analyse new configurations between levels, which illustrates how this typology adds to the institutional relevance of discursive analyses.

3) CRITICAL REFLECTION ON 'MIGRATION' AND 'MOBILITY'

This discursive perspective not only holds relevance for political scientist or policy scholars but also for migration studies, since it shows the political multifacetedness of migration as concept. How does intra-European movement, migration or mobility mean and what it is, depends first and foremost on the way in which this phenomenon is discursively defined. That is also what the conflict is about: a conflict of meaning attributed to a particular phenomenon. This study shows the relevance of a discursive perspective for migration and intra-European mobility studies, since it shows the importance to understand concepts of migration and mobility by the way *how* those phenomena are discursively defined.

First of all, from a discursive perspective, this study shows that concepts like 'migration' and 'mobility' are not innocent, neutral or self-evident concepts, but politicized in various ways on different governmental levels. We have seen Dutch institutional discourses about 'migrants' and their 'integration', but also European institutional discourses about 'mobile workers' and the importance of 'European mobility' for the 'Single market'. As such, this study not only agrees with critical migration scholars about the limited-reflexivity on state-related influences but also *shows* active state-specific discourses (Lavenex, 2005; de Haas, 2014; Wimmer and Glick-Schiller, 2003). It shows how (nation-) states influence the definition of movement *as* migration or *as* mobility and of movers *as* migrants or *as* mobile workers. For instance, by showing the specific poetic elements (chapter 3), beliefs (chapter 4), numbering activities (chapter 5) and governance actions (political elements), this study shows the non-neutrality of 'migration'. As such, this research empirically substantiates 'migration' and 'mobility' as non-innocent, non-neutral but as *essentially contested concepts*.

Instead of considering 'migration' as a *descriptive*, *unmediated* or *apolitical* phenomenon, this study shows it as a *political product of social mediation,* which demands political sensitivity in the usage of 'migration' and 'mobility' grammar. Therefore, I consider it useful to have more political sensitivity and acknowledgment in the concepts used. This can

be done when migration scholars not only acknowledge the etymological origin of migration by change and *move-ment* for the object of research (migration as transformation of being), but also acknowledge and address this etymological origin regarding their own transformation of knowledge. Such acknowledgment accounts for *change, movement and transformation* of the object and the subject of analysis and is sensitive for migration as a *translated,* mediated and transformed phenomenon (Latour, 2000: 48-51). In short, such acknowledgment is sensitive for the *politics* that construct a phenomenon *as* migration.

The analysis of chapter 5 shows how the origin (registrations or estimations), interpretation ('increases' or 'remains stable') and course of action ('no need' versus 'cannot turn a blind eye') of data about migration, is part of a political process of negotiation, interpretation and transformation. The analysis also shows how Dutch authorities re-articulated EU movement as migration by historical references to a 'common past' and how governmental authorities *translated* such movement into migration. Acknowledging this 'politics of migration' does not only account for transformations of the ones who move, but also account for transformations of the ones who re-articulate that movement. The variety in the empirical analysis shows the importance to acknowledge the political, mediated and contingent character of 'migration'. By such acknowledgment scholars should no longer only point at *politics* as external to research (by particular states, nations or transnational organisations) but also at politics as within research (Jasanoff, 2000; Salter, 1988). In that perspective, statements on migration can better be understood as political operations, which are operations with political consequences.

DEMOCRATIC-ETHICAL RESEARCH POSITION

Finally, this study showed the significance of discourses to understand institutional actions and policymaking. It showed by a detailed analysis, amongst others, the metaphorical value of poetic elements and the significance of time references in the legitimation of action. But despite revealing the immanent logic and the construction of these discourses and contestation, it did not answer *why* this contestation occurred.

There has been a wide range of literature aimed to overcome such 'incommensurability' (Rein and Schon, 1996: 96). Some of the governance and management literature problematizes decoupling and disagreement because they restrict the probability of solutions for governance and public management processes (Lousberg, 2012; Scholten, 2013). Therefore a variety of (infra)structural adjustments have been developed, such as 'reflexive institutional arrangements' (Hajer, 1997), 'collaborative dialogues' (Innes and Booher, 2003) 'democratic political deliberations' (Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003), 'consensus building and mutual recognition' (Forester, 1999) and 'communicative practices' (Fischer and Gottweis, 2012). Some stimulated more 'interactive governance' by tools for public actors

to improve the performance of networks and partnerships (Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004; Torfing, Peters, Pierre, Sorensen, 2013) or contributed with insights towards a 'genuinely deliberative society' (Boswell, 2013).

Although I do value these adjustments, in line with Fischer (2003) and Yanow (2003) I think it should not be the role of the interpretive policy analyst to 'solve' political problems, 'to suggest more effective and efficient solutions' (Hajer and Wagenaar, 2013) suggesting deliberative infrastructures that seek for consensus to bring controversies to an end or aim to 'eliminate dissensus' (Connolly, 1991; Ranciere, 2001). Our analysis empirically substantiates such meaning making and reveals that it can be a strategic choice to conflict and deviate. It shows that normalizing *contestation* and *disagreement* is 'not only legitimate but also necessary' to understand the politics of intra-European movement (Mouffe, 2013). By this ethical and critical 'methodology', I consciously deviate from a long *apolitical* tradition of social engineering or '*solutionism*' in public administration and public management aiming to *solve* political issues (Heidelberg, 2015).

As such I resist, which is an essential *ethical* and *political* position, to deeper embed the consolidated order of 'la police' (Ranciere, 2001). Instead, I hold a critical research ethos which positions this study as 'essentially contestable' and hopefully makes 'meaningful disagreement possible'. By that practice I added to the struggle, to the politics of intra-European movement discourses, not driven by the naïve assumption that we should *solve* 'incommensurable' or 'intractable' controversies or contestations. By showing discursive articulations, I added reflexive *understanding* of policymaking in a contested and multi-level setting. The previous endeavour has been an attempt to explicate my own normative accounts and how I studied the controversies I encountered 'into the open'. With that endeavour, I refuse to be a social engineer who solves issues by generating answers (see: Burawoy, 2005). Instead I embrace the position of an interpretive academic being reflexive instead of prescriptive, contributing with complexity instead of complexity *reduction*. It is this complexity-increasing, interpretive and reflexive task that I am fully accountable for. Let us now *disagree* of what has been suggested.

Dutch Summary/
Nederlandstalige samenvatting

Dit proefschrift kan op verschillende manieren gelezen worden. Het is allereerst een *bestuurskundige studie* naar de governance van het beleidsdomein 'migratie' en 'mobiliteit'. Het is ook een *methodologische of theoretische verfijning* van het begrippenapparaat en de benaderingswijzen in de discursieve analyse. Ten slotte is het een *kritische reflectie* op de wijze waarop er in de sociologische migratieliteratuur wordt omgegaan met de begrippen 'migratie' en 'mobiliteit'. De argumentatielijn is opgebouwd uit drie delen, die zich chronologisch het beste laat lezen, maar waarbij de lineariteit van een boek niet noodzakelijkerwijs de meest wenselijke cumulatie van inzichten zal opleveren. Deel I ('HOW') leidt het thema in, richt zich op de kennistheoretische uitgangspunten van dit onderzoek, besteedt aandacht aan de methodologische opzet en daarmee hoe het onderzoek is uitgevoerd. Deel II (WHAT) omvat de empirische dataverzameling en is een bundeling van artikelen die de belangrijkste bevindingen van het onderzoek beslaan. In Deel III (WHY) worden de onderzoeksvragen beantwoord, worden de bevindingen terugvertaald naar de theoretische uitgangspunten uit deel I en wordt er stilgestaan bij de consequenties van die confrontatie voor de onderzoekspositie die ik inneem.

ONDERZOEKSOPZET

Dit boek gaat over migratie. Of over mobiliteit. Of, over allebei. Het gaat in ieder geval over de verschillende discoursen die actief zijn rondom migratie- en mobiliteitsissues. Daarom heb ik vrij vroeg in het onderzoek voor een neologisme gekozen om niet 'in' het ene of andere discourse te stappen, en het als zodanig te reproduceren, maar middels het begrip 'intra-European movement' enige discursieve distantie aan te geven ten opzichte van het veld dat ik heb bestudeerd. Toen ik met dit promotieonderzoek aanving werd mij namelijk vanaf het begin duidelijk dat er verschillende betekenissen werden toegekend aan bijvoorbeeld 'Midden en Oost-Europese migratie'. In gesprek met een Poolse priester moest ik direct in het defensief over het label 'Oost-Europa', wethouders benoemde het 'integratieprobleem van migranten' en ondertussen schreef vicepremier en Minister van SZW Asscher opinieartikelen over een 'Code Oranje'. Die spierballentaal stond in scherp contrast met de gedistantieerde retoriek in 'Brussel', alwaar eerder werd gesproken over het belang van 'flexibiliteit' van werknemers, de bijdrage aan de 'Single Market' en hoe Europa af moet komen van haar 'immobiliteits-traditie'. Ik kreeg al vroeg de indruk dat er verschillende talen werden gesproken. Met enige affiniteit voor discursieve analyse wilde ik wel eens weten of het alleen bij woorden bleef en of die woorden ook gevolgen zouden hebben. En zoja, wat die gevolgen dan zouden kunnen zijn. Dat vormde het startpunt van mijn fascinatie en van dit onderzoek, wat uitmondde in de volgende onderzoeksvraag:

*Hoe kunnen intra-Europese bewegingsdiscoursen in de Europese Commissie
en Nederland geconceptualiseerd en geanalyseerd worden, en hoe zijn insti-
tutionele discoursen gerelateerd aan institutionele praktijken?*

Deze hoofdvraag valt uiteen in drie subvragen:

1. *Hoe kunnen institutionele discoursen, institutionele praktijken en de relatie tussen
beiden geconceptualiseerd en geanalyseerd worden?*
2. *Wat voor institutionele discoursen en praktijken van 'intra-Europese beweging' kunnen
er geïdentificeerd worden in Nederland en de Europese Commissie?*
3. *Hoe zijn de institutionele praktijken gerelateerd aan de institutionele discoursen van
'intra-Europese beweging' in Nederland en de Europese Commissie?*

Bovenstaande vragen zijn onderzocht op basis van desk research, secundaire literatuur-
studie, interviews en focus group gesprekken. Ieder hoofdstuk heeft een specifieke selectie
van case-studies en onderzoeksmethodiek, zoals hieronder weergegeven.

	Hoofdstuk 3	Hoofdstuk 4	Hoofdstuk 5	Hoofdstuk 6
Titel	Contested proposals	Contested beliefs	Contested numbers	Contested governance
Cases	Europees Nationaal	Europees Nationaal	Nationaal	Europees Nationaal Lokaal
Veldwerk	Desk research[171] literatuurstudie	Interviews[172] literatuurstudie	Interviews[173] Desk research[174]	Interviews[175] Desk research[176] Focus groepen[177]

THEORETISCHE VERTREKPUNTEN

Binnen de discursieve literatuur is er vrij veel aandacht voor het onderscheid tussen
discursieve inhoud (*content*) en de institutionele gevolgen (*context*), oftewel voor de

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170   430 documenten teruggebracht naar 15 op EC niveau; 332 documenten, teruggebracht tot 53 documenten op NL Rijksniveau

171   Twee interviewrondes resulteerde in 21 semigestructureerde diepte-interviews op beide niveaus

172   Twee interviewrondes resulteerde in 22 semigestructureerd diepte-interviews op beide niveaus

173   Dit dossier omvatte 332 documenten, teruggebracht tot 53 documenten op NL Rijksniveau

174   Verschillende interviewrondes resulteerde in 16 semigestructureerd diepte-interviews

175   430 documenten teruggebracht naar 15 op EC niveaus; 332 documenten, teruggebracht tot 53 documenten op NL Rijksniveau Op lokaal niveau omvatte di teen dossier van meer dan 500 documenten die teruggebracht zijn naar 34 documenten

176   12 focus group deelnemers, wat optelt tot 26 unieke respondenten voor dit hoofdstuk

performatieve werking van taal. Sterker nog, het begrip 'discourse' *impliceert* dit non-descriptieve maar meer performatieve perspectief op taal. Echter door dit meestal te *veronderstellen* blijft in verschillende studies het performatieve aspect impliciet, en wordt minimaal geëxpliciteerd *hoe* bepaalde discoursen gerelateerd zijn aan de handelingen die daarmee gepaard kunnen gaan. In dit proefschrift heb ik een poging ondernomen om die impliciete veronderstelling te expliciteren. Niet louter uit theoretische fascinatie, maar ook om empirisch beter te begrijpen hoe taal z'n schaduw vooruit kan werpen op het handelingsvermogen van mensen. Om dat adequaat te kunnen bestuderen, heb ik een conceptueel onderscheid gemaakt tussen 'institutional discourses' (institutionele discoursen) en 'institutional actions' (institutionele acties) en richt ik me primair op hoe handelende beleidsactoren deze discoursen en praktijken *discursief legitimeren*. Eén en ander heb ik als volgt gevisualiseerd:

Door te onderzoeken hoe actoren praktijken en discoursen legitimeren heb ik bestudeerd hoe en in hoeverre discoursen en praktijken gerelateerd zijn aan elkaar. Kortweg heb ik enerzijds *institutionele discoursen* geoperationaliseerd middels 'poetic elements' (zoals concepten, metaforen, mythes en cijfers) en 'storyline elements' (zoals objectives and subjectives) (in hoofdstuk 3), 'beliefs' en 'meanings' (in hoofdstuk 4), 'numbering' en 'framing' (in hoofdstuk 5) en 'political elements' (in hoofdstuk 6). Anderzijds, zijn *institutionele acties* geoperationaliseerd als 'beleidsvoorstellen' (hoofdstuk 3), professionele 'acties' (hoofdstuk 4) en 'policy elements' (hoofdstuk 6). Maar dit proefschrift richt zich niet alleen op discoursen alleen, het betrekt de bestudering van discoursen met name in de institutionele context om de performatieve werking van discoursen en praktijken in vergelijkend perspectief te begrijpen. Dit vergelijkend perspectief is opgebouwd uit meerdere cases (zoals het lokale Nederlandse gemeenteniveau, nationale Nederlandse Rijksniveau; Europese Commissie niveau) wat het mogelijk maakte om de ontwikkeling

van die discoursen, door de tijd heen en in een 'multi-level setting', te bestuderen. Dat vergelijkende perspectief maakte het ook mogelijk om na te gaan hoe discoursen en praktijken *binnen één case* zich verhielden ten opzichte van de andere cases. Op die manier kon ik bestuderen wanneer en hoe verschillende niveaus (in)consistentie vertoonden in hun discoursen en praktijken, waardoor ik discoursen of praktijken kon vergelijken en kon bestuderen of er sprake was van 'koppelingen' tussen niveaus. Dergelijke 'koppelingen' van discoursen of praktijken kunnen namelijk van belang zijn in het aanduiden van de governance van gecoördineerde beleidsopvattingen of -praktijken. Om dat mogelijk te maken heb ik gebruik gemaakt van vier ideaaltypen die als een heuristisch framework hebben gediend om de ontwikkeling van de cases te kunnen begrijpen.

Door middel van bovenstaande typologie zijn de verschillende cases en de ontwikkeling die ze hebben doorgemaakt op het gebied van intra-Europese bewegingsdiscoursen en -praktijken in kaart gebracht.

DISCOURSEN EN PRAKTIJKEN

Deel II (WHAT) vormt vervolgens een bundeling van reeds gepubliceerde of *in review* zijnde artikelen die delen behandelen van het hiervoor gepresenteerde perspectief. Zodoende behandelt hoofdstuk 3, hoe de discoursen rondom intra-Europese beweging op het Nederlands nationale en Europese niveau geconstrueerd zijn in de brieven van de Re-

gering en Commissie. Dat hoofdstuk toont een drievoud van perioden in het Nederlandse discourse op Rijksniveau. In de eerste periode (2004-2007) is er sprake van een meer liberaal discourse dat zich met name richt op de openingstelling van de arbeidsmarktgrenzen en welke minimale drempels er gelegd kunnen worden aan mobiliteitswerkers om de positief economische impact van de 'vier vrijheden' maximaal te garanderen. Dit komt ook terug in hoofdstuk 5, wat het belang toont van de tewerkstellingsvergunningen (TWV's) om deze populatie te kennen, registreren en managen. Het is de periode waarin 'EU mobiliteit' werd vertaald naar 'arbeidsmobiliteit'. Door te refereren aan Nederland als 'handelsnatie' werd de discussie met name ingericht op de juiste timing om de Europese wet- en regelgeving te implementeren door middel van 'geflankeerd beleid'. Deze periode is daarom gekarakteriseerd als een legaal-economisch institutioneel discourse op nationaal Nederlands niveau. Vervolgens zien we in die periode ook een veelvoud van repressieve en preventieve praktijken om 'volledige vrije mobiliteit' te garanderen, om de barrières te beslechten en de 'bureaucratische rompslomp'. Zo is er beleid aangekondigd om 'onderbetaling tegen te gaan' (Wet Minimum uurloon), om 'gelijke behandeling' te bevorderen (Wet arbeidscondities grensoverschrijdend werk), tevens is ook de capaciteit van de Vreemdelingenpolitie uitgebreid en een Aanpak Malafide uitzendbureaus opgezet om 'huisjesmelkers' tegen te gaan. Dit 'geflankeerde beleid' moest een maximale impact opleveren voor de Nederlandse economie. Tevens laat hoofdstuk 6 zien dat dit ook de periode is waarbij de lokale overheid probeert om de stedelijke problematiek voor het voetlicht te krijgen, maar daar nauwelijks gehoor krijgt.

De tweede periode (2008-2011) richt zich veel meer op sociale en culturele issues zoals 'schaduwzijden', 'misbruik', 'integratie' en 'taal'. Het is de periode waarin het concept 'arbeidsmobiliteit' verandert naar 'arbeidsmigratie' en 'mobiliteitswerkers' naar 'arbeidsmigranten'. Met allerlei impliciete en/ of expliciete historische verwijzingen ('weer', 'ook', 'wederom') naar het recente gastarbeidersverleden wordt Europese mobiliteit gelegitimeerd als een nieuwe vorm van 'migratie', met 'migranten' wat 'wederom' integratie-uitdagingen geeft. Ook hoofdstuk 5 laat zien dat dit tevens de periode is waarin er door middel van verschillende soorten onderzoek de nadruk wordt gevestigd op issues als taal, participatie en registratie. Het zorgt ervoor dat de Minister aan de Tweede Kamer meldt dat 'we niet willen dat de geschiedenis zich herhaalt'. Het is de periode waarin sociale en culturele elementen de boventoon voeren en gekarakteriseerd kan worden als een sociaal-cultureel discourse. Hoofdstuk 6 toont dat in deze periode de lokale overheden ook meer druk opvoeren op de nationale overheid om de stedelijke problematiek te erkennen. Het is de periode waarin de Haagse wethouder Marnix Norder (PvdA) openlijk spreekt over een 'tsunami van Oost-Europeanen' terwijl zijn Rotterdamse collega Karakus de situatie duidt als 'dweilen met de kraan open'. Door middel van het organiseren van conferenties, het beïnvloeden van Kamerfracties en door boute stellingname in de media probeert men het nationale debat te beïnvloeden, wat op het einde van deze periode ook lukt. Want in deze

periode verandert de toon waardoor er 'antwoorden' op 'problemen' moesten komen. Er wordt een 'gemeentenetwerk' opgetuigd en er worden op Rijksniveau 'werkgroepen' geïnstalleerd, resulterend in een 'Actieplan huisvesting en integratie arbeidsmigranten', 'Actieplan Overlast' een 'intentieverklaring' en een 'Nationale verklaring huisvesting arbeidsmigranten' om bijvoorbeeld de huisvesting van 'arbeidsmigranten' te verbeteren. Maar het leidt ook tot de Wet fraudebestrijding, de ontwikkeling van een 'regionaal co-ordinatiecentrum fraudebestrijding en een Landelijke stuurgroep interventieteams (LSI).

Ten slotte komen beide discoursen gezamenlijk terug in de laatste periode (2011-2014) waarbij er zowel nadruk is op het economische belang ('stimuleren van de arbeidsmarkt'), alsmede op het sociaal-culturele belang om 'problemen' aan te pakken (verbeteren van de huisvestingssituatie en registratieprocedure). Het is de periode waarin 'arbeidsmigranten' zowel 'een belangrijke bijdrage leveren' aan de Nederlandse economie, maar dat 'we ook niet onze ogen moeten sluiten voor de problemen' die daarmee gepaard gaan. Allerlei metaforen, concepten en mythen illustreren beide discoursen, zoals het belang van een 'open economie', de strijd om 'the best and the brightest', dat er geen sprake mag zijn van een 'race to the bottom' en dat er geen 'oneerlijke competitie' mag zijn. Tegelijkertijd wordt het belang van 'integratie', 'overlast' en 'verloedering' aangehaald. Hoofdstuk 5 toont ook de lastigheid in deze periode om de populatie in beeld te houden, vanwege het wegvallen van de TWV's waardoor er 'geen zicht' meer is op de aard van de 'problematiek'. Hierdoor wordt de laatste periode gekenmerkt door het samengaan van beide discoursen. Vervolgens zien we in deze periode een grote variëteit aan praktijken zoals de 'identificatiepas', de 'Aanpak schijnzelfstandigheid', een 'pilot' op de verblijfsbeëindiging, een 'operatieplan 2014-2015' om wederom huisvestingsactoren afgestemd te krijgen en nieuwe wetgeving om de registratieprocedures te vereenvoudigen, zoals de Wet Registratie Niet-Ingezetenen (RNI). Het is ook de periode, zo toont hoofdstuk 6, waar de lokale overheden volledig zijn gefaciliteerd door de Rijksoverheid om richting te geven aan het debat en aan oplossingsrichtingen voor beleid en wetgeving. Of zoals een beleidsmedewerker het uitdrukte: 'die gemeenten leverden volledige paragrafen aan die wij één-op-één overnamen'. Het is tevens de periode van de 'Code Oranje', dat ook nationaal 'de dijken op doorbreken staan' en dat Minister Asscher met lokale en andere nationale overheden samen op wil trekken richting 'Brussel' om tot bilaterale belangendeling en Europese overeenstemming te komen in specifieke wetgevingsdossiers (zoals omtrent het Posted Workers Directive).

De veranderlijkheid in de Nederlandse situatie (lokaal en nationaal) staat in scherp contrast met de situatie op het niveau van de Europese Commissie (EC) waar er minder veranderingen waar te nemen zijn in het discourse en de handelingspraktijken. Hoofdstuk 3 toont ook meer consistentie in het Europese discourse door de tijd heen, waarbij er een herhaaldelijke nadruk is op het belang van Europa als 'markt', ('Single Market' of 'Internal Market') en waarbij Europeanen bewegen op die markt (free movers) en bijdragen aan een consistent 'mobiliteitsdiscourse'. Dit liberaal-economisch institutioneel discourse is

gebaseerd op 'free movement' als de 'hoeksteen' van de ontwikkeling van de 'Single Market' en de 'succesvolle integratie van de Europese economie'. Dit dient om recht te doen aan het 'fundamentele principe' en de 'vier pilaren' van de 'vier fundamentele vrijheden' van de EU waar de EC de 'bewaker' van is. Ook hoofdstuk 4 toont dit perspectief van Europese beleidsmakers op deze Europese werkelijkheid aangezien de EC 'alleen maar' haar beleid 'coördineert', 'harmoniseert' en 'implementeert'. Uiteindelijk moet 'free movement' bijdragen aan een betere integratie en harmonisatie van de markt en daarvoor moeten allerlei drempels worden gereduceerd. Op deze wijze dienen Europese burgers ook mobiel te zijn want 'the freedom of movement heeft een positieve bijdrage aan arbeidsmarkten door geheel Europa'. Zodoende moet men ook mobiel zijn om niet te vervallen in 'the traditional lack of a mobility culture' maar om het mobiliteitspotentieel dat ten grondslag ligt aan de ontwikkeling van de 'Single Market' volledig te vervolmaken. Ook hoofdstuk 4 toont de overtuiging van beleidsmakers dat zij hun acties met name als 'technische instrumenten' zien om de Single Market te complementeren. Zowel hoofdstuk 3 als 4 geven blijk van dit consistente beleidsdiscourse.

Vervolgens zien we dit ook terug in de praktijken van de EC waarbij er al sinds 2002 een 'Action Plan for Skills and Mobility' is gepresenteerd om de transparantie en toepasbaarheid van competenties voor verschillende beroepen beter overdraagbaar te maken. Er zijn voorstellen voor een 'Europass framework' 'een 'MobiliPass', 'E-learning programs' om 'lifelong learning' en 'geografische mobiliteit' mogelijk te maken. Een 'Health Insurance Card' is voorgesteld om de 'administratieve praktijken te stroomlijnen'. Daarnaast zijn er een 'Language Action Plan' a 'Researchers Mobility Portal' a 'European Job Mobility Portal' en een verbetering van EURES (arbeidsportal) voorgesteld om de 'onderwijs-mobiliteit te versterken' en om 'fragmenteerde' informatie tegen te gaan. Daarnaast is er een 'Professional Qualifications Directive', een 'common training framework' en een 'European professional card' (EPC) ontwikkeld om professionele kwalificaties verder te standaardiseren. Het karakteriseert een variëteit van nieuw beleid en wetgeving welke de mobiliteit van mensen, data en informatie moet stimuleren in een beter gestroomlijnd Europa. Tegelijkertijd is er met name de laatste jaren meer en meer druk vanuit specifieke lidstaten (zoals Nederland) om tegemoet te komen aan de 'uitdagingen' waarmee ze zich geconfronteerd zien. Dit resulteerde in enkele toezeggingen om te helpen staand beleid beter uit te leggen en te implementeren.

OPBRENGSTEN

Maar wat levert een dergelijke analyse van zowel het Nederlandse als EC niveau nu op? Laten we de hoofdstukken eens kort nalopen:

1. <u>Hoofdstuk 3</u>: de analyse toont het metaforisch belang van poetic elements in de legitimering van een eigenstandig migratie- of mobiliteitsdiscourse. Hoofdstuk 3 en 4 laten zien hoe belangrijk 'poetic elements' zijn, namelijk het belang van concepten, metaforen en mythen om een bepaald discourse en bijbehorende praktijken te legitimeren. Het zijn zowel steeds op Nederlands als op Europees niveau de *metaforen* ('Nederland als handelsnatie'), *mythen* ('lessen van het verleden') en *concepten* ('schaduwzijden') die een specifieke handelingswijze (pilot verblijfsbeëindiging), beleid (geflankeerd beleid) of wetgeving (Wet RNI) legitimeren. Ook in Europa legitimeert het ideaalbeeld van convergentie in de dominante marktmetafoor ('Single Market' of 'Common Market') geflankeerd met bepaalde mythen ('traditional lack of mobility culture') een brede variëteit aan interventies om de transparantie, overdraagbaarheid en flexibiliteit binnen die convergente 'markt' te vergroten.

   Voorts laat deze studie zien dat, in tegenstelling tot wat er in de literatuur veelal wordt aangenomen, dat niet het *gehele discourse* handelingsconsequenties kan hebben, maar dat die performativiteit met name zit in het gebruik van de 'juiste' metaforen, concepten en mythen. Ondanks dat er veel studies zijn verschenen naar metaforen, toont deze studie het *metaforische belang* aan van poetic elements, namelijk dat die performatieve werking, zoals die vaak is aangeduid bij metaforen, niet louter is voorbehouden aan de metafoor. Die performatieve werking is breder aan te duiden bij poetic elements. Want indien poetic elements gebruikt worden om iets te problematiseren, dan had dat meermaals directe handelingsconsequenties. Zo tonen hoofdstuk 3 en 4 de 'discursieve noodzakelijkheid' van poetic elements: als [deze metafoor] dan [deze interventie]. Het toont dat woorden niet 'alleen maar woorden zijn' en specifieker dat met name de poetic elements een bepalende factor zijn om gepaard gaande praktijken te initiëren.

2. <u>Hoofdstuk 4:</u> een studie naar hoe beleidsmakers deze thematiek 'vertalen' toont het belang van tijdsconstructies. Om bepaalde mythen, metaforen of concepten te legitimeren werkt het om specifieke referenties te maken naar het verleden of de toekomst. Zo is een referentie naar 'ons gastarbeidersverleden' belangrijk om Europese mobiliteit als 'arbeidsmigratie' te positioneren en vervolgens om te leren van 'lessen uit dat verleden' om urgentie te verlenen aan interventies gericht op de 'integratie' van die 'migranten'. Maar ook in Europa wordt de mythe van een 'lack of mobility culture' geconstrueerd om Europa als immobiel te presenteren en allerlei interventies te presenteren die vervolgens mobiliteit moeten stimuleren. De analyse van hoofdstuk 4 laat zien dat dergelijke tijdsreferenties belangrijk zijn omdat ze 'poetic elements' op een zeer specifieke en contextuele wijze legitimeren

3. <u>Hoofdstuk 5</u>: laat daarbij zien dat niet *alle* poetic elements eenzelfde metaforische waarde hebben en relativeert het belang van 'numbers'. Hoofdstuk 5 laat zien dat de productie van cijfers *onderdeel is van* en *moeizaam tegenkracht kan geven aan* gelegi-

timeerde politieke frames. Sterker nog, cijfers hebben geen eigenstandige legitimiteit, 'spreken niet voor zichzelf' en kunnen maar moeizaam bijdragen aan 'speaking truth to power'

4. <u>Hoofdstuk 6</u>: is een meer politiek-institutionele analyse van de verschillende opwaart-se beïnvloedingsmechanismen die een overheid ter beschikking heeft om belangen gehoord te laten worden en door te laten klinken. Meer specifiek laat het zien hoe de gemeenten Rotterdam en Den Haag er in dit thema in geslaagd zijn om een eigen taal te ontwikkelen om daarmee nationaal beleid af te dwingen.

Op basis van de voorgaande oogst, hoe kunnen we deze inzichten terugvertalen naar de verschillende *bodies of literature* waar dit proefschrift een bijdrage aan wil leveren?

1) CONCEPTUELE VERFIJNING VAN DISCURSIEVE BENADERING

Door een conceptueel onderscheid te maken tussen institutionele discoursen en praktijken biedt deze studie een verfijning en explicatie van discursieve analysetechnieken in een institutioneel perspectief, namelijk in relatie tot de handelingsconsequenties. Vervolgens door enerzijds niet het gehele discourse maar de metaforische waarde van poetic elements uit te lichten en anderzijds de rol en waarde van cijfers te relativeren, levert deze studie conceptuele reflectie aan de discursieve literatuur. Uiteraard is die metaforische waarde niet voorbehouden aan poetic elements, maar het biedt nieuwe onderzoekswegen om de performatieve werking van taal op institutionele arrangementen specifieker te operationaliseren en empirisch te bestuderen. Daarnaast biedt het een empirische toepassing over de constitutieve of performatieve rol van taal en hoe in dit themaveld institutionele discoursen institutionele praktijken kunnen vormgeven en het toont hoe, een dergelijk 'feed-forward effect' werkt.

2) INZICHT IN DE GOVERNANCE VAN 'MIGRATIE' EN 'MOBILITEIT'

Naast dat dit proefschrift de ambitie bezit om een conceptuele vraag te beantwoorden, wil het ook nagaan *hoe* die institutionele discoursen en praktijken aan elkaar gerelateerd zijn. Om die vraag te beantwoorden heb ik niet alleen ingezoomd op een specifiek discourse op een enkel casestudy niveau, maar heb ik de ontwikkeling van discoursen en praktijken a) door de tijd heen en b) tussen verschillende casestudies proberen te begrijpen *ten opzichte van elkaar*. De opbrengst daarvan heb ik gevisualiseerd in onderstaande tabel waarbij helder wordt dat de cases ten opzichte van elkaar door de tijd heen zijn veran-

derd. Was er eerst nog sprake van een koppeling tussen het nationaal-Europees discourse met dito praktijken in de periode 2004-2011, in 2011 veranderde deze situatie door een lokaal-nationale koppeling. Zodoende ontstonden er door de tijd heen verschillende configuraties.

	2004-2011	>2011
Lokaal	Multi-level decoupling	Multi-level coupling
Nationaal	Multi-level coupling	
Europees		Multi-level decoupling

Deze vergelijkende analyse toont twee duidelijke afbakeningen in de tijd die, voor en na 2011, gemarkeerd zijn door een regime shift in discoursen en praktijken. Hoofdstuk 6 toont hoe de druk van de lokale overheden (met name gemeente Rotterdam en Den Haag) in de periode 2004-2010 opliep. In eerste instantie hield de nationale overheid vast aan het nationaal-Europese discourse over het belang van een 'Europese markt' en bijbehorende minimalisering van drempels ter flexibilisering van die markt. Maar naarmate de tijd vorderde en de gemeenten via allerlei kanalen de druk wisten op te voeren kwam de nationale overheid terecht in wat ik benoem als een *moment of dislocation*: een crisismoment waarbij discourse en praktijken niet geheel consistent zijn. Zodoende ontstond er op Rijksniveau ambiguïteit, waarbij verschillende Ministeries uiteenlopende praktijken en talen praktiseerden, vooral vergeleken met het 'verantwoordelijke' Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (SZW). Uiteindelijk zorgde het politieke momentum van nieuwe verkiezingen ervoor dat de nationale overheid uiteindelijk rondom de installering van het nieuwe Kabinet Rutte-I (2010) erkenning gaf aan de lokale problematiek. Niet alleen nam de Rijksoverheid volledig het discourse van de gemeenten over (gericht op 'integratie', 'migranten', 'problemen' en 'overlast'), tegelijkertijd resulteerde dit in een reeks aan nationale praktijken die hiermee in lijn lagen. De lokale problematiek van Rotterdam en Den Haag kreeg namelijk nationale aandacht wat zich vertaalde in een veelvoud aan nieuwe nationale wetgeving, beleid en overlegorganen. Hierdoor was er een overgang van een *moment of dislocation* naar een nieuwe *multi-level coupling*. Want de koppeling tussen de nationale en Europese overheid werd ingeruild voor een koppeling met de lokale overheid. Echter bleef dat niet zonder enige consequentie. Aangezien de Europese overheid nauwelijks haar discourse of praktijken wijzigde resulteerde dat erin dat (m.n. in de eerste periode na 2010) de nationale overheid nauwelijks zaken kon doen in 'Brussel'. Sterker nog, het nationale discourse en bijbehorende praktijken stonden inmiddels zo ver af van wat men in 'Brussel' had afgesproken dat, zoals een beleidsmaker het formuleerde, 'we nog geen deuk in een pakje boter konden slaan in Brussel'. Het illustreert de institutionele consequenties die kunnen voortkomen uit discursieve wendingen. Het zorgde ervoor dat

de afstemming en coördinatie in en met 'Brussel' moeizaam verliep. De typologie maakt het mogelijk om de (in)consistentie van discoursen en praktijken door de tijd heen, op meerdere niveaus te duiden en in verhouding tot elkaar te begrijpen. Het maakte het tevens mogelijk om nieuwe configuraties tussen beleidsniveaus te analyseren. Ten slotte illustreert de typologie de *institutionele relevantie* van een discursieve analyse.

3) KRITISCHE REFLECTIE OP 'MIGRATIE' EN 'MOBILITEIT'

Tegelijkertijd heeft deze studie op basis van voorgaande ook de ambitie om een bijdrage te leveren aan de sociologische migratieliteratuur. Ondanks dat deze studie geen empirische studie is naar migratie, migranten of migratiestromen levert het wel degelijk een bijdrage aan migratiestudies. Want dit proefschrift laat zien dat wat migratie en mobiliteit is, afhankelijk is van de manier hoe een dergelijk fenomeen discursief is gedefinieerd. Meer specifiek, of migratie of mobiliteit verschijnen als 'probleem', 'oplossing' of 'een herhaling uit het verleden' kan gezien worden als het resultaat van een politiek-discursieve strijd over de definitie en betekenis van, wat ik heb vertaald als, 'intra-Europese beweging'. Deze studie laat zien dat daar het beleidsconflict zich ook rondom organiseert, rondom de strijdige betekenisgevingssystemen die actief zijn op verschillende beleidsniveaus. Een meningsconflict dat is gekoppeld aan een specifieke interpretatie van een fenomeen, in dit geval mobiliteit en migratie. Zodoende levert deze studie empirisch inzicht op hoe migratie en mobiliteit een politiek product zijn van onderhandeling en strijd. Die politieke gevoeligheid is van belang bij een 'wicked issue' zoals migratie en mobiliteit.

In lijn daarmee toont deze studie aan, in verschillende hoofdstukken (hoofdstuk 3, 4 en 5), dat migratie en mobiliteit geenszins neutrale of apolitieke begrippen zijn. Dat lijkt op het eerste ogenblik een platitude, maar dat is nauwelijks het geval. In het algemeen wordt er binnen de migratiestudies weinig rekenschap gegeven over migratie als politiek of normatief beladen begrip. Deze studie laat zien dat zelfs het concept 'migratie' of 'mobiliteit' uitingsvormen zijn van verschillende politieke betekenissystemen waar vervolgens allerlei praktijken aan gekoppeld zijn. Het toont hoe (natie-) staten betrokken zijn bij de beïnvloeding van de definitie van 'beweging' als migratie of mobiliteit, en reizigers als 'migranten' of 'mobiele werkers'. Dat is geen neutrale beschrijving, maar een vorm van politieke betekenisgeving. Door te tonen welke 'poetic elements' daarmee gepaard gaan (hoofdstuk 3), op basis van welke overtuigingen beleidsmakers handelen (hoofdstuk 4), hoe onderzoeksinstituten een bijdrage leveren aan de politisering van 'migratie' (hoofdstuk 5), en tot welke governance praktijken het een en ander kan leiden (hoofdstuk 6) biedt deze studie een gelaagd perspectief op de politieke betekenisgeving van migratie en mobiliteit. Zo toont deze studie een gradueel perspectief op de politieke interpretatie

en betekenisgeving waaraan verschillende, niet louter politiek-institutionele, praktijken gekoppeld zijn. Met name hoofdstuk 5 laat ook zien dat 'politiek' niet een extern maar inherent onderdeel uitmaakt van migratie-onderzoek. Zodoende zouden ook migratie-onderzoekers er goed aan doen om die politieke betekenisgeving rondom migratie, als '*essentially contested concept',* te erkennen. Enige gevoeligheid voor het machtsbesef dat inwerkt op en uitgaat van migratie-onderzoek zou al winst zijn aangezien deze studie laat zien dat iets definiëren als migratie al aangemerkt kan worden als een politieke daad. Een daad met handelingsconsequenties.

DEMOCRATISCH-ETHISCHE ONDERZOEKSPOSITIE

Ten slotte probeer ik na te gaan door middel van de complexiteit die ik toevoeg wat ik als bestuurskundige of bestuurssocioloog kan zeggen over het omstreden karakter van het vraagstuk van 'intra-Europese beweging'.

Ten eerste toont dit boek dat conflicterende betekenisgeving het beste begrepen kan worden vanuit de immanente logica en contingentie van een bepaald systeem, context of instituut. Discursieve analyses dienen daarom rekening te houden met de context waarin discoursen en praktijken tot stand komen. Maar als er dan strijdige discoursen en opvattingen zijn welke resulteren in conflictueuze praktijken, hoe kan een interpretatieve analyse van een bestuurskundige daar dan van hulp zijn?

Ondanks dat er wijdverbreide literatuur bestaat die tracht daarin oplossingen aan te dragen, is het mij nooit te doen geweest om een paragraaf of alternatief aan te dragen in die bestuurskundige oplossingsgerichtheid. Veelal bestaat dergelijke oplossingsgericht-heid eruit dat conflicten moeten worden bestreden ('opgelost') of waarbij allerlei infra-structurele alternatieven worden aangedragen om tot betere of 'interactieve' governance te komen. Ik bestrijdt het idee dat wij als wetenschappers dienen bij te dragen aan een betere (''effectieve' of 'efficiënte') vorm van (consensus-georiënteerde) besluitvorming. In tegendeel, ik zou juist willen pleiten voor een meer gepolitiseerde vorm van besluitvor-ming. Democratie verhoudt zich maar moeizaam met wensbeelden vanuit efficiëntie en effectiviteit. Daarom neem ik liever een wat meer fatalistische positie in (Frissen, 2013). Ook omdat ik daarbij de rol van de (interpretatieve) wetenschapper niet wil overschat-ten. Wij kunnen 'problemen' niet oplossen door kwesties te rationaliseren, we kunnen ze hooguit begrijpelijk maken. Dit onderzoek en mijn wetenschapspositie bestaat er niet uit om controverses tot een einde te brengen, om dissensus te elimineren of om tot complexi-teitsreductie te komen. Hoogstens kan ik die vergroten. Ik bied namelijk empirische en theoretische reflectie, welke eerder bijdraagt aan de meervoudigheid van perspectieven dan aan complexiteitsreductie. Dat heeft tot gevolg dat ik bijvoorbeeld aantoon dat het

Nederlandse debat veel weinig verhullende woorden nodig had ('MOE-landers', 'Polen-meldpunt', 'tsunami', 'Code Oranje', 'Polentop') om tot enigerlei vorm van handeling te komen. Door middel van de meervoudigheid van migratie *en* mobiliteit te tonen hoop ik de waarde daarvan op basis van het onderhavige onderzoek te hebben aangetoond.

Ik claim deze ethische positie om de verwachtingen te managen van diegene die allerlei beleidsaanbevelingen zouden verwachten van deze bestuurskundige studie. Een derge-lijke positie zie ik ook voor me weggelegd in de (nabije) toekomst. Als dat op logica wijst is het een *kritische* logica in plaats van een *ingenieurslogica* die erop uit is om te tonen hoe macht werkt, welke uitsluitingsmechanismen het produceert en welke blinde vlekken en onvoorziene gevolgen het met zich meebrengt. Dit is in lijn met mijn politieke en democratie-opvatting door met een dergelijk kritische logica de onvolmaaktheid van de democratie bloot te leggen. Als zodanig valt onenigheid nauwelijks te problematiseren, maar als uitgangspunt voor onderzoek te nemen. Daarmee neem ik bewust een ethische positie in die uitgaat van strijd en conflict dan daar reden in te zien het op te lossen. Het markeert mijn (interpretatief) onderzoek als een politieke praktijk die *'essentieel aanvechtbaar'* is (Bevir and Rhodes, 2000: 10; Geertz, 1973: 29). Het is een praktijk van openen in plaats van sluiten, door dominantie en hegemonie uit te dagen. Ik hoop ook u uitgedaagd te hebben.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Mark M.A.C. van Ostaijen (1984) graduated in Leisure Studies at *Tilburg University* and after he was awarded a VSB scholarship, he completed his *MA European Urban Cultures* (POLIS) for which he studied at the Tilburg University, Free University of Brussels, University of Art & Design Helsinki and Manchester Metropolitan University.

After his Master graduations, Mark worked at the *Netherlands School of Public Administration* (NSOB) in The Hague and as lecturer at the Department of Public Administration, *Erasmus University Rotterdam*. In 2013 Mark received, together with prof.dr. Godfried Engbersen and dr. Peter Scholten, a *NWO JPI Urban Europe* Research Grant on the project 'IMAGINATION', to study the urban consequences of Central and Eastern European migration. Therefore, from 2013 onwards, he worked as a lecturer and PhD candidate at the Department of Public Administration and Sociology at *Erasmus University Rotterdam*. During his Ph.D. Mark completed the graduate school program of the *Netherlands Institute of Government* (NIG) and finished the IMISCOE summerschool on migration at *Princeton University*. Furthermore, he finished his University Teaching Qualification (BKO), chaired and co-founded the IMISCOE PhD Network and developed an annual series of Public Administration Masterclasses. During the fall of 2016 he was a visiting doctoral research fellow at *De Montfort University* in Leicester (UK).

Currently, from April 2017 onwards, Mark is affiliated as post-doctoral researcher with *Tilburg University*, conducting *NWO Urban Europe* research on smart urban intermediaries (SmartUrbI). He publishes academic and non-academic work on migration, populism, local governance and (urban) politics. Currently, he is also a columnist for Binnenlands Bestuur. His work has been published in academic journals such as *Comparative Migration Studies, Comparative European Politics* and *Critical Policy Studies*, next to popular venues such as *De Volkskrant, Idee, TSS, NRC Handelsblad* and *Trouw.* For more information: www.markvanostaijen.nl

The European 'free movement of people' has created 'a new face' within the European Union. The European Commission understands it as a part of 'the pillars', 'a big achievement' and 'a fundamental right not up for negotiation'. However, in France, the 'Polish plumber' played a significant role in the rejection of the EU constitution, in the Netherlands authorities spoke about a 'tsunami of Eastern-Europeans' and in a Ministerial letter, member-states stated that 'this type of immigration burdens the host societies with considerable additional costs'.

This book interpretively investigates the institutional consequences of such different viewpoints. As such, this study opens the way for a better understanding of free movement, showing how language shapes our view of what movement is, how those perceptions differ between governmental authorities and what the institutional consequences are. By a discursive analytical approach, this book identifies the importance of 'migration' and 'mobility' discourses in the language of intra-European movement politics.

Combining social and political theory with detailed empirical analysis, the author illustrates the dynamics of intra-European movement discourses between the European Commission, the Dutch national government and the municipalities of Rotterdam and The Hague. He shows that what migration or mobility is depends first and foremost on how such a phenomenon is discursively defined. Consequently, whether migration or mobility appear as problem or solution should be seen as the outcome of a discursive struggle over the definition and meaning of intra-European movement.

As such, this book is relevant for multiple publics. It is an innovative study about the multi-level governance of migration and mobility policies, a methodological and theoretical refinement of discursive approaches and it offers a critical reflection on 'migration' and 'mobility' concepts. For instance, it reveals why poetic elements and time constructions are important, how local municipalities can be significant in national policy development and why numbers do not 'speak truth to power'. Therefore, it has relevance for readers interested in discursive analysis, governance studies and sociological migration theory.

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