Bargaining solutions are considered which have the following four properties: individual rationality, Pareto optimality, independence of equivalent utility representations, and independence of irrelevant alternatives. A main result of this paper is a simple proof of the fact that all such bargaining solutions are risk sensitive. Further a description is given of all bargaining solutions satisfying the four mentioned properties. Finally, a continuous bargaining solution, satisfying the first three properties, is given which is not risk sensitive.

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hdl.handle.net/1765/11817
Mathematical Social Sciences
Erasmus School of Economics

de Koster, R., Peters, H., Tijs, S., & Wakker, P. (1983). Risk Sensitivity, Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Continuity of Bargaining Solutions. Mathematical Social Sciences, (3), 295–300. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1765/11817