A firm may induce voters or elected politicians to support a policy it favors by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district whose voters or representatives support the policy. In equilibrium, no one vote may be decisive, and the policy may gain strong support though the majority of districts suffer from adoption of the program. When votes reveal information about the district, the firm's implicit promise or threat can be credible.

Additional Metadata
Keywords influence, lobbying, special interests, voting
JEL C72, Noncooperative Games (jel), D72, Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior (jel), D78, Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation (jel)
Publisher Tinbergen Institute
Persistent URL hdl.handle.net/1765/16516
Dahm, M, Dur, A.J, & Glazer, A. (2009). Lobbying of Firms by Voters (No. TI 2009-069/1). Discussion paper / Tinbergen Institute. Tinbergen Institute. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1765/16516