This paper explores how the specification of the earnings function impacts the optimal tax treatment of human capital. If education is complementary to labor effort, education should be subsidized to offset tax distortions on labor supply. However, if most of the education is enjoyed by high ability households, education should be taxed in order to redistribute resources to the poor. The paper identifies the exact conditions under which these two effects cancel and education should be neither taxed nor subsidized. In particular, with non-linear tax instruments, education should be weakly separable from labor and ability in the earnings function. With linear taxes, education should also feature a constant elasticity in a weakly separable earnings function.

Additional Metadata
Keywords earnings function, human capital, optimal education subsidies, optimal linear and non-linear taxation
JEL H2, Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue (jel), H5, National Government Expenditures and Related Policies (jel), I2, Education and Research Institutions (jel), J2, Time Allocation, Work Behavior, and Employment Determination and Creation; Human Capital (jel)
Publisher CES IFO
Persistent URL
Jacobs, B, & Bovenberg, A.L. (2008). Optimal Taxation of Human Capital and the Earnings Function. CES IFO. Retrieved from