The Babylonian bridal auction, described by Herodotus, is regarded as one of the earliest uses of an auction in history. Yet, to our knowledge, the literature lacks a formal equilibrium analysis of this auction. We provide such an analysis for the twoplayer case with complete and incompete information, and in so doing identify what we call the "Herodotus Paradox".

Additional Metadata
Keywords second price, transfer to loser
JEL Noncooperative Games (jel C72), Auctions (jel D44)
Publisher Tinbergen Institute
Persistent URL hdl.handle.net/1765/20754
Series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper Series
Journal Discussion paper / Tinbergen Institute
Citation
Baye, M.R, Kovenock, D, & de Vries, C.G. (2010). The Herodotus Paradox. Discussion paper / Tinbergen Institute. Tinbergen Institute. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1765/20754