What if Gulbenkian had been Persche: taxing charitable giving in Europe
Many EU Member States only grant tax incentives to resident charities. This limits the choice of donors and restricts the free movement of capital. The paper discusses this problem and the action taken by the European Commission, the ECJ (the Stauffer and Persche cases) and private organisations. The case law of the European Court of Justice again set an important boundary to the fiscal autonomy of the EU Member States.
|Note||Accepted Manuscript, published in N.º 4, Ano III, Inverno, p.137-155|
Hemels, S.J.C.. (2011). What if Gulbenkian had been Persche: taxing charitable giving in Europe. Revista de Financas Publicas e Direito Fiscal. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1765/23173