Chain interdependencies, measurement problems and efficient governance structure: cooperatives versus publicly listed firms
We determine the circumstances when the absence of public listing, often believed to be a disadvantage, makes a cooperative the unique efficient governance structure. This is established in a multi-task principal-agent model, capturing that cooperatives are not publicly listed and their CEOs have to bring the downstream enterprise to value as well as to serve upstream member interests. Not having a public listing prevents the CEO from choosing the level of the downstream activities too high. Cooperatives are uniquely efficient when the upstream marginal product multiplied with a function increasing in the strength of the chain complementarities is higher than the downstream marginal product.
|Keywords||Agency theory, Cooperatives, Corporate governance, Production functions, Studies|
|Persistent URL||dx.doi.org/10.1093/erae/jbr007, hdl.handle.net/1765/37798|
Feng, L., & Hendrikse, G.W.J.. (2012). Chain interdependencies, measurement problems and efficient governance structure: cooperatives versus publicly listed firms. European Review of Agricultural Economics, 39(2), 241–255. doi:10.1093/erae/jbr007