Delegation or Voting
Collective decision procedures should balance the incentives they provide to acquire information and their capacity to aggregate private information. In a decision problem in which a project can be accepted or rejected once information about its quality has been acquired or not, we compare the performance of a delegation structure with that of two voting procedures. Delegation makes one's acceptance decision pivotal by definition. The decisiveness of one's vote in a voting procedure depends on the other agent's vote. This in turn determines the decision to acquire information. In the debate about a rational choice foundation of Condorcet's Jury Theorem, the distribution of information was left exogenous. Mixed (acceptance) strategies were required to validate the Theorem. Endogenizing information acquisition as we do reveals mixed (acceptance) strategies to be detrimental for welfare as they lead to indifference between buying and not buying information.
|Keywords||effort, information, jury theorem, voting|
Swank, O.H., & Visser, B.. (2001). Delegation or Voting (No. TI 02-005/1). Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6830