2001-10-09
Incentives for Effective Risk Management
Publication
Publication
Under the new Capital Accord banks can choose between different type of risk management systems. Using a stylized model of risk management systems which differ in quality and by modelling the relationship between the bank board and the risk manager, we consider the incentives for the adoption of a particular system. We show that in some cases banks may adversely adopt an unsophisticated risk management system in order to evade regulation.
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| hdl.handle.net/1765/6840 | |
| Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper Series | |
| Organisation | Tinbergen Institute |
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Daníelsson, J., Jorgensen, B., & de Vries, C. (2001). Incentives for Effective Risk Management (No. TI 01-094/2). Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper Series. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6840 |
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