The trends in the composition of the disability insurance (DI) program show the strong increase in the incidence of mental disorders in its rolls over the past decade. In fact, the OECD reports that the share of individuals with mental health conditions represents one third of all DI claimants, a value almost 10 percentage points larger than in 2000 (OECD, 2009). Mark Duggan (2015) claims in a Testimony before the Senate Budget Committee, that it is the liberalization of the medical eligibility criteria for DI which has led to higher application rates from individuals with ”subjective” health conditions in the US.

Such developments may be becoming the greatest challenge of the program for most industrialized countries, all the more given the low employment participation of the mentally ill, half that of individuals with other health condi- tions (OECD, 2009). If this is due to the strong work incapability arising from such type of conditions, DI is much needed as an earnings loss compensation for this incapability. However, if this simply points to a stronger distaste for work from the mentally ill, the distorted work incentives from DI can be easing their exit from the labor market.

hdl.handle.net/1765/98420
Netspar Discussion Papers
Erasmus School of Economics

Garcia Mandico, S., García-Gómez, P., Gielen, A., & O'Donnell, O. (2016). Back to Work: Employment Effects of Tighter Disability Insurance Eligibility in the Netherlands (No. 01/2016-012). Netspar Discussion Papers. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1765/98420