Risk Sensitivity, Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Continuity of Bargaining Solutions
January 1983
Article
issue 3 pp 295-300.
| Related Files |
|---|
View PDF Version
(RiskSensitivity_1983.pdf, 0.5MB) |
Bargaining solutions are considered which have the following four properties: individual rationality, Pareto optimality, independence of equivalent utility representations, and independence of irrelevant alternatives. A main result of this paper is a simple proof of the fact that all such bargaining solutions are risk sensitive. Further a description is given of all bargaining solutions satisfying the four mentioned properties. Finally, a continuous bargaining solution, satisfying the first three properties, is given which is not risk sensitive.
Keywords
Automatically Extracted Terms
- solution
- bargaining
- property
- bargaining solutions
- bargaining solution
- point
- theorem
- proof
- risk sensitivity
- proposition
- koster
- utility
- sensitivity
- section
- player
- paper
- kalai
- theorem 3.1
- result
- player i
