Lobbying of Firms by Voters
2009-07-28
Research Paper
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A firm may induce voters or elected politicians to support a policy it favors by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district whose voters or representatives support the policy. In equilibrium, no one vote may be decisive, and the policy may gain strong support though the majority of districts suffer from adoption of the program. When votes reveal information about the district, the firm's implicit promise or threat can be credible.
Keywords
Classifications using
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) Classification System
- C72 : Noncooperative Games
- D78 : Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
- D72 : Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Automatically Extracted Terms
- district
- tariff
- investment
- voting
- equilibrium
- policy
- interest
- districts vote
- strategy
- legislator
- equilibria
- investment vote
- favor
- voter
- model
- benefit
- probability
- contribution
- information
- group
