On the Role of Pre-Determined Rules for HRM Policies
February 2011
Research Paper
This publication is part of collection
| Related Files |
|---|
View PDF Version
(2011-0341.pdf, 0.2MB) |
Using simple game-theoretical models, this paper studies the role of pre-determined rules for HRM policies. We consider a model in which HRM decisions affect employees' self-images and thereby their motivation. We show that in the absence of written rules, managers are too reluctant (1) to differentiate between employees on the basis of their abilities, and (2) to terminate employment of employees on probation. Generally, organizations benefit from committing to strict rules for various HRM practices.
Keywords
Classifications using
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) Classification System
- M5 : Personnel Economics
- D82 : Asymmetric and Private Information
- D83 : Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge
Automatically Extracted Terms
- employee
- manager
- ability
- model
- di ¤erentiation
- message
- ¤erentiation
- indi ¤erent
- commitment
- strategy
- e ¤ort
- 1 2
- equilibrium
- decision
- worker
- condition
- equation
- di ¤erentiate
- ¤erentiate
- threshold
