Social interaction, co-worker altruism, and incentives
July 2010
Article
volume 69, issue 2 pp 293-301.
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Social interaction with colleagues is an important job attribute for many workers. To attract and retain workers, managers therefore need to think about how to create and preserve high-quality co-worker relationships. This paper develops a principal-multi-agent model where agents do not only engage in productive activities, but also in social interaction with their colleagues, which in turn creates co-worker altruism. We study how financial incentives for productive activities can improve or damage the work climate. We show that both team incentives and relative incentives can help to create a good work climate.
Keywords
Classifications using
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) Classification System
- D86 : Economics of Contract Law
- M50 : Personnel Economics: General
- J41 : Contracts: Specific Human Capital, Matching Models, Efficiency Wage Models, and Internal Labor Markets