The Effects of Learning in Interactive Monetary Policy Committees
March 2004
Research Paper
This publication is part of collection
| Related Files |
|---|
View PDF Version
(2004-0292.pdf, 0.4MB) |
We develop a theoretical framework for studying the effects of interaction on the quaJity of decision-making by monetary policy committees. We show that interaction, i.e. increasing one's expertise through an exchange of views, is most likely not to result in interdependent voting behaviour.Therefore, and in contrast to earlier literature, we find that interaction is beneficial for the collective outcome.
Keywords
Classifications using
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) Classification System
- E52 : Monetary Policy (Targets, Instruments, and Effects)
- D71 : Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- E58 : Central Banks and Their Policies
- D83 : Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge
Automatically Extracted Terms
- member
- committee
- board
- decision
- meeting
- committee members
- board members
- policy
- voting
- skill
- interaction
- policy meeting
- effect
- interest
- board meeting
- result
- position
- interest rates
- committee size
- expertise
