Equilibrium Directed Search with Multiple Applications
2003-01-09
Research Paper
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We analyze a model of directed search in which unemployed job seekers observe all wage offers. We allow for the possibility of multiple applications by workers and ex post competition among vacancies. For any number of applications, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium in which vacancies post a common wage. When workers apply to only one vacancy, a single wage is paid and the resulting equilibrium is efficient. When workers make multiple applications, there is dispersion in wages paid, and equilibrium may be inefficient. We show that our results also hold in a steady-state version of the model.
Keywords
Classifications using
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) Classification System
- J64 : Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
- D83 : Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge
- J41 : Contracts: Specific Human Capital, Matching Models, Efficiency Wage Models, and Internal Labor Markets
Automatically Extracted Terms
- vacancy
- worker
- probability
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- market
- labor
- applicant
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- labor market
- rst-round oer
- level
- equation
- search
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- bertrand competition
