Matching with Multiple Applications
2001-08-27
Research Paper
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We analyze the implications of multiple applications by job seekers for the micro-foundations of the aggregate matching function. We emphasize a coordination failure caused by multiple applications that has not been previously considered, namely, that firms can waste time and effort processing an applicant who is ultimately hired by another firm.
Keywords
Classifications using
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) Classification System
- J64 : Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
- D84 : Expectations; Speculations
- J41 : Contracts: Specific Human Capital, Matching Models, Efficiency Wage Models, and Internal Labor Markets
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