Unionization Structure, Licensing and Innovation
2005-12-06
Research Paper
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Taking technological differences between firms as given, we show that the technologically advanced firm has a stronger incentive for technology licensing under a decentralized unionization structure than with centralized wage setting. Furthermore, We show that, in presence of licensing, the incentive for innovation may also be stronger under decentralized unions. Unions have a clear preference for centralization only if productivity improvements are relatively small.
Keywords
Classifications using
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) Classification System
- L13 : Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- D43 : Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- O34 : Intellectual Property Rights: National and International Issues
Automatically Extracted Terms
- institute
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- universiteit van amsterdam
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- innovation arijit mukherjee
- i h 1
- enrico pennings **
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