Recently there has been an increased attention towards the ex-post evaluation of competition policy enforcement decisions and in particular merger decisions. In this paper we study the effects of two mobile telecommunication mergers on prices. We apply a standard difference-in-differences approach which is widely used in the literature on ex-post evaluation of mergers. For the Austrian T-Mobile/tele.ring merger, we conclude that after the acquisition (for which remedies were imposed) prices in Austria did not increase relative to the considered control countries. For the Dutch T-Mobile/Orange merger, we observe an increase in the mobile tariff prices in the Netherlands in the analysed period, relative to the control countries. We cannot firmly establish whether this price increase was exclusively caused by the T-Mobile/Orange merger or in part by possible price effects brought about by the KPN/Telfort merger consummated two years earlier in the Netherlands. However, we believe that such price increase could be linked to the structural changes brought by both KPN/Telfort and T-Mobile/Orange mergers together.

Additional Metadata
Keywords Competition law enforcement, Ex-post studies, Merger control, Telecommunications
Persistent URL dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10645-017-9308-5, hdl.handle.net/1765/103142
Journal De Economist
Citation
Aguzzoni, L. (Luca), Buehler, B. (Benno), Di Martile, L. (Luca), Kemp, R.G.M, & Schwarz, A. (Anton). (2017). Ex-post Analysis of Mobile Telecom Mergers: The Case of Austria and The Netherlands. De Economist, 1–25. doi:10.1007/s10645-017-9308-5