Philosophical theories of fairness propose to divide a good that several individuals have a claim to in proportion to the strength of their respective claims. We suggest that currently, these theories face a dilemma when dealing with a good that is indivisible. On the one hand, theories of fairness that use weighted lotteries are either of limited applicability or fall prey to an objection by Brad Hooker. On the other hand, accounts that do without weighted lotteries fall prey to three fairness paradoxes. We demonstrate that division methods from apportionment theory, which has hitherto been ignored by philosophical theories of fairness, can be used to provide fair division for indivisible goods without weighted lotteries and without fairness paradoxes.

Additional Metadata
Keywords apportionment, fair division, fairness, fairness of lotteries, indivisibility, indivisible good, John Broome, lotteries
Persistent URL dx.doi.org/10.1177/1470594X17715248, hdl.handle.net/1765/104617
Journal Politics, Philosophy and Economics
Citation
Wintein, S, & Heilmann, C. (2018). Dividing the indivisible: Apportionment and philosophical theories of fairness. Politics, Philosophy and Economics, 17(1), 51–74. doi:10.1177/1470594X17715248