In this chapter, our goal is to discuss whether and how bank lobbying in the United States leads to regulatory capture. First, we provide an overview of the importance of and motivations behind bank lobbying. Second, we examine the impact of lobbying on banking regulation and supervision by reviewing recent empirical evidence. Third, we discuss the effect of the rising influence of the banking industry on the global financial crisis. Finally, we conclude with policy implications.

Banks, capture, financial crisis, lobbying, political economy, regulation, supervision
Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior (jel D72), Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Mortgages (jel G21), Government Policy and Regulation (jel G28), Political Economy (jel P16)
hdl.handle.net/1765/109092
Rotterdam School of Management (RSM), Erasmus University

Igan, D, & Lambert, T. (2018). Bank Lobbying: Regulatory Capture and Beyond. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1765/109092