The modal-epistemic argument for the existence of God is flawed
In a recent article, Emanuel Rutten has presented a novel argument for the existence of God, defined as a personal being that is the first cause of reality. An interesting feature of the argument, which caused quite a stir, is that it does not fall within any of the traditional categories of arguments for God’s existence. Rutten calls his argument a modal-epistemic one, which reflects the fact that the first premise of his argument states that all possible truths are knowable. The main purpose of this article is a simple one: to point out that Rutten’s modal-epistemic argument is flawed.
|Keywords||God, Modal-epistemic argument, Personal first cause, Rutten|
|Persistent URL||dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11153-018-9664-3, hdl.handle.net/1765/111323|
|Journal||International Journal for Philosophy of Religion|
Wintein, S. (2018). The modal-epistemic argument for the existence of God is flawed. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 1–16. doi:10.1007/s11153-018-9664-3