Risk sensitivity, independence of irrelevant alternatives and continuity of bargaining solutions
Bargaining solutions are considered which have the following four properties: individual rationality, Pareto optimality, independence of equivalent utility representations, and independence of irrelevant alternatives. A main result of this paper is a simple proof of the fact that all such bargaining solutions are risk sensitive. Further a description is given of all bargaining solutions satisfying the four mentioned properties. Finally, a continuous bargaining solution, satisfying the first three properties, is given which is not risk sensitive.
|Persistent URL||dx.doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(83)90031-8, hdl.handle.net/1765/111744|
|Journal||Mathematical Social Sciences|
de Koster, M.B.M, Peters, H.J.M, Tijs, S.H, & Wakker, P.P. (1982). Risk sensitivity, independence of irrelevant alternatives and continuity of bargaining solutions. Mathematical Social Sciences, 4(3), 295–300. doi:10.1016/0165-4896(83)90031-8