We investigate the effect of corruption and industry sector size on energy policy outcomes. The main predictions of our theory are that: (i) greater corruptibility of policy makers reduces energy policy stringency; (ii) greater lobby group coordination costs (increased industry sector size) results in more stringent energy policy; and (iii) workers’ and capital owners’ lobbying efforts on energy policy are negatively related. These predictions are tested using a unique panel data set on the energy intensity of 11 sectors in 12 OECD countries for years 1982–1996. The evidence generally supports the predictions.

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doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2003.08.001, hdl.handle.net/1765/11220
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
Erasmus School of Economics

Dijkgraaf, E., Frederiksson, P., & Vollebergh, H. (2004). Corruption and energy efficiency in OECD countries: Theory and evidence. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 47(2), 207–231. doi:10.1016/j.jeem.2003.08.001