The paper develops a model to examine rent seeking in innovation and export licenses, with an application to Vietnam rice exports. Firms can lobby for export restrictions or for free trade. Innovation is introduced as a cost-reducing technology. The analysis focuses on the innovation incentives of the firm lobbying for export restrictions, and the determinants of lobbying incentives. The analysis shows that firms lobbying for export restrictions may have lower incentives to adopt technological innovations under export restrictions than under free trade. The findings can help to identify economic inefficiency when the political elites use export restrictions to seek rents.

Additional Metadata
Keywords Trade restrictions, export licenses, innovation, monopoly, rent seeking, free trade, economic development
JEL Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior (jel D72), Economic Impacts of Globalization: Economic Development (jel F63), General Financial Markets (jel G1), Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies (jel L12), Agriculture; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Other Primary Products (jel O13), Technological Innovation (jel Q55)
Persistent URL hdl.handle.net/1765/115607
Series Econometric Institute Research Papers
Citation
Vu, T.N, Vo, D.H, & McAleer, M.J. (2019). Rent Seeking for Export Licenses: Application to the Vietnam Rice Market (No. EI2019-09). Econometric Institute Research Papers. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1765/115607