This is a normative study with theoretical and empirical aspects of the impact of the M aastricht Treaty's (1991) convergence conditions. The study is carried out in a dynamic game context. Starting from the Treaty, four possible scenarios are compared: a noncooperative scenario, a cooperative scenario, a noncooperative convergence scenario and a cooperative convergence scenario. In these last two scenarios, the EU Member States pursue a restricted policy. This restriction is implied by the convergence criteria.

Additional Metadata
Keywords Convergence analysis, Coordination, Dynamic models, Economics, Nash games
Persistent URL dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0967-0661(97)00036-1, hdl.handle.net/1765/116013
Journal Control Engineering Practice
Citation
Douven, R.C.H.M, & Plasmans, J. (1999). Convergence and coordination in the EU: A dynamic games approach. Control Engineering Practice, 5(4), 561–566. doi:10.1016/S0967-0661(97)00036-1