Why do some countries send big delegations to multilateral negotiations, whereas others send very small ones? This article looks at both the causes of variation in state delegations to multilateral conferences but also at the consequences of such variation at both micro- and macrolevel. It tests the arguments derived from liberal theory of international regimes, using the case of the NPT Review Process. The results suggest that economic and security interests drive states’ participation in the multilateral settings; normative concerns about global public goods matter less. The article also argues that while countries which are more abundantly present in the negotiations do not tend to get more from international organisations; countries which have been less present during the negotiations tended to be more interested in alternative forum shopping in the form of ‘nuclear ban treaty’ negotiations.

Additional Metadata
Keywords conference diplomacy, delegation size, IAEA, Non-Proliferation Treaty, nuclear nonproliferation, regime complex
Persistent URL hdl.handle.net/1765/116433
Journal British Journal of Politics and International Relations
Citation
Onderco, M. (2019). Variation in Delegation Size in Multilateral Diplomacy. British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 21(2), 421–438. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1765/116433