1996
The Price of Land and the Process of Expropriation
Publication
Publication
De Economist p. 53- 77
This paper applies a game theoretic model to situations in which the Dutch government expropriates land from some farmers in order to create a new public project. The model is a version of a finite period bargaining model with asymmetric information and one-sided offers. It is shown that the model can explain some casual observations as the fact that usually, but not always, the government and the farmers settle by agreement.
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| doi.org/10.1007/BF01680261, hdl.handle.net/1765/11648 | |
| De Economist | |
| Organisation | Erasmus School of Economics |
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Janssen, M., Gerth, C., Jansen, L., & Niehoff, M. (1996). The Price of Land and the Process of Expropriation. De Economist, 53–77. doi:10.1007/BF01680261 |
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