Cooperation in a modified version of the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma game
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization p. 613- 619
In this paper we consider a series of finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma games in which the payoff the players receive in a period depends on how they have played the game in the past. We show that this modification of the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma game makes cooperation a feasible equilibrium configuration in the beginning of play.
|Prisoners' dilemma, finitely repeated games, game theory|
|Game Theory and Bargaining Theory (jel C7), Noncooperative Games (jel C72)|
|Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization|
|Organisation||Erasmus School of Economics|
Janssen, M.C.W, Gorter, J, & Meerendonk, S. (1997). Cooperation in a modified version of the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma game. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 613–619. doi:10.1016/S0167-2681(97)00016-4