In this paper we consider a series of finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma games in which the payoff the players receive in a period depends on how they have played the game in the past. We show that this modification of the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma game makes cooperation a feasible equilibrium configuration in the beginning of play.

Prisoners' dilemma, finitely repeated games, game theory
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory (jel C7), Noncooperative Games (jel C72),
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Erasmus School of Economics

Janssen, M.C.W, Gorter, J, & Meerendonk, S. (1997). Cooperation in a modified version of the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma game. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 613–619. doi:10.1016/S0167-2681(97)00016-4