In this paper, we introduce and analyze resource location games. We show core non-emptiness by providing a set of intuitive core allocations, called Resource-Profit allocations. In addition, we present a sufficient condition for which the core and the set of Resource-Profit allocations coincide. Finally, we provide an example showing that when the sufficient condition is not satisfied, the coincidence is not guaranteed.

Additional Metadata
Keywords Cooperative game, Core, Resource-Profit allocations, Reallocation of resources
Persistent URL dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2019.04.002, hdl.handle.net/1765/119649
Journal Operations Research Letters
Citation
Schlicher, L.P.J, Musegaas, M, & Westerink-Duijzer, L.E. (2019). Resource location games. Operations Research Letters, 47(4), 300–304. doi:10.1016/j.orl.2019.04.002