The Imitation Game: Response to Collins and Evans
In an extensive reply to my paper on the Imitation Game and experimentation, Collins and Evans respond to my attempt to resituate the debate towards a more ‘generative’ register of interpreting the Imitation Game experiments. While they are generally positive about the empirical part of the paper, in which I re-read from a generative register a range of Imitation Game experiments conducted over past years, they are critical about how I frame the argument. They argue that my paper offers some interesting points of principle about the nature of the philosophy and sociology of scientific knowledge. Unfortunately, most of Collins and Evans's response seems to be based on a misinterpretation of my argument and confusion about the goal of the article. Their response is unfortunate as the overall purpose of my paper is rather to show the opportunities of the Imitation Game as a valuable form of experimentation. Collins and Evans's remarks however do offer a useful opportunity to clarify the purpose of the article and to address some of their questions and concerns, which is what I do in this response. .
|Persistent URL||dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2019.05.002, hdl.handle.net/1765/119902|
|Journal||Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A|
Wehrens, R.L.E. (2019). The Imitation Game: Response to Collins and Evans. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A (Vol. 76, pp. 91–93). doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2019.05.002