De methode der rechtswetenschap vanuit kritisch-rationeel perspectief

This book is meant to be a qualitative analysis of the relatively recent debate on the methodology of jurisprudence in the Netherlands from a critical rationalist point of view. It may, however, also serve as an introduction to critical rationalism and its importance to jurisprudence, in particular, and the social sciences in general. Jurisprudence (following Popper and in particular Hans Albert) can be called a technological science (together with the other social sciences). A distinction is made between (more or less metaphysical) â?~system critics (including design)â?T and (more ore less empirical) technological (in the strict sense of the word) research. It is concluded that the methodology of jurisprudence has traditionally been a methodology which is perfectly compatible with Poppers critical rationalism. Juridical decision-making has been used by Popper as an example of scientific decision-making in general. (For example, a legal scholar reading Open Society will easily see that it is, to a large extent, a book with legal character). Jurisprudence as such can be a model for the methodology of science in general. In the Dutch debate it was proposed by some that legal scientists should look to other sciences to learn how to become â?~more scientificâ?T. This may very well be true for legal scholars who have forgotten what their traditional task was and have been influenced by the relativistic and positivistic paradigm. Jurists who know better will rightly think that jurisprudence should take its proper place again: at the heart of the academy.

• View at Worldcat

Free Full Text ( Final Version , 667kb )