Abstract In a multiperiod setting, decision-makers can learn about the consequences of their decisions through experimentation. We examine how polarization and political instability affect learning through experimentation. We distinguish two cases: (i) the decision to be made is not salient and does not affect the outcome of subsequent elections (exogenous elections) and (ii) the decision is salient and the election outcome depends on it (endogenous elections). It is shown that while the possibility of learning increases activism, the existence of political instability distorts learning. Furthermore, we demonstrate that, when elections are exogenous, polarization between political parties does not always decrease active learning.

active learning, elections, polarization (social sciences), political stability
Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior (jel D72), Asymmetric and Private Information (jel D82)
dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9442.00001, hdl.handle.net/1765/12284
Scandinavian Journal of Economics
Erasmus School of Economics

Ossokina, I.V, & Swank, O.H. (2003). Polarization, Political Instability and Active Learning. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 105(1), 1–14. doi:10.1111/1467-9442.00001