A comparison of individual and collective decision making for standard gamble and time trade-off
Quality-Adjusted Life-Years (QALYs) are typically derived from individual preferences over health episodes. This paper reports the first experimental investigation into the effects of collective decision making on health valuations, using both time trade-off (TTO) and standard gamble (SG) tasks. We investigated collective decision making in dyads, by means of a mixed-subjects design where we control for learning effects. Our data suggest that collective decision making has little effect on decision quality, as no effects were observed on decision consistency and monotonicity for both methods. Furthermore, QALY weights remained similar between individual and collective decisions, and the typical difference in elicited weights between TTO and SG was not affected. These findings suggest that consulting with others has little effect on health state valuation, although learning may have. Additionally, our findings add to the literature of the effect of collective decision making, suggesting that no such effect occurs for TTO and SG.
|Keywords||Collective decision making, Health state valuation, Standard gamble, Time trade-off|
|Persistent URL||dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10198-019-01155-x, hdl.handle.net/1765/123711|
|Journal||The European Journal of Health Economics|
Attema, A.E, Bleichrodt, H, l’Haridon, O. (Olivier), & Lipman, S.A. (Stefan A.). (2020). A comparison of individual and collective decision making for standard gamble and time trade-off. The European Journal of Health Economics. doi:10.1007/s10198-019-01155-x