To analyze the optimal social insurance package, we set up a two-period life-cycle model with risky human capital investment in which the government has access to labor taxation, education subsidies, and capital taxation. Social insurance is provided by redistributive labor taxation. We point out that both education subsidies and capital taxation are used as catalysts to facilitate social insurance by mitigating distortions from labor taxation. Moreover, we derive a Ramsey rule for the optimal combination of these two instruments. Relative to capital taxation, optimal education subsidies increase with their relative effectiveness to boost labor supply and with households’ underinvestment in education, but they decrease with their relative net distortions. For the optimal absolute levels, indirect complementarity effects (i.e., influencing the effectiveness of the other instrument) do matter. Numerical simulations confirm that the catalysts are strategic substitutes and indicate that capital taxation is more important.

Additional Metadata
Keywords Human capital investment · Education subsidies · Capital taxation · Risk · Social insurance
JEL Efficiency; Optimal Taxation (jel H21), Education and Research Institutions (jel I2), Time Allocation, Work Behavior, and Employment Determination and Creation; Human Capital (jel J2), Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General (jel D80)
Persistent URL hdl.handle.net/1765/124536
Journal International Tax and Public Finance
Citation
Schindler, D.S., & Yang, H. (2013). Catalysts for social insurance: education subsidies versus physical capital taxation. International Tax and Public Finance, 22, 274–310. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1765/124536