Using a 1993 Dutch policy reform and a regression discontinuity design, we find children of parents whose disability insurance (DI) eligibility was reduced are 11% less likely to participate in DI themselves, do not alter their use of other government programs, and earn 2% more as adults. The reduced transfers and increased taxes of children account for 40% of the fiscal savings relative to parents in present discounted value terms. Moreover, children of treated parents complete more schooling, have a lower probability of serious criminal arrests and incarceration, and take fewer mental health drugs as adults.

Additional Metadata
Persistent URL hdl.handle.net/1765/128256
Journal American Economic Journal. Applied Economics
Citation
Dahl, G.B., & Gielen, A.C. (2020). Intergenerational Spillovers in Disability Insurance. American Economic Journal. Applied Economics. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1765/128256