1995
Do Executives Work Harder When They Are Monitored?
Publication
Publication
Explores whether eclectic theory leads to better predictions about internal control systems in corporations than does principal-agency theory. Ability of eclectic theory to explain various puzzles for principal-agent theory; Test of hypotheses on the use and effects of monitoring in hierarchies; Study of whether top managers work harder when they are monitored.
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| hdl.handle.net/1765/12846 | |
| ERIM Article Series (EAS) | |
| Kyklos: international review for social sciences | |
| Organisation | Erasmus Research Institute of Management |
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Barkema, H.G. (1995). Do Executives Work Harder When They Are Monitored?. Kyklos: international review for social sciences, 19–42. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1765/12846
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