Sugden’s team preferences
An inquiry into the nature of team-directed reasoning
In this paper, I presented Sugden’s theory of team reasoning. I argued that (A), Sugden’s theory is not able to sufficiently account for challenges between individual self-interest and team goals. The point I made is that there is a difference between saying that individuals engage in team-directed reasoning and have to solve a coordination or cooperation problem together, and claiming that, because of engaging in team-directed reasoning, self-interest will be ignored. (B) Exploiting this argument, I proposed to think of team-directed reasoning as an agent being aware of the group goal, but that this way of thinking does not lead one to ignore their self-interest. However, I showed that on this account, teamdirected reasoning does not solve coordination problems anymore. Hence, I conclude that team-directed reasoning does not offer a solution to coordination and cooperation problems.
|Series||Erasmus Student Journal of Philosophy (ESJP)|
|Journal||Erasmus Student Journal of Philosophy|
Schönhuber, J. (2020). Sugden’s team preferences. Erasmus Student Journal of Philosophy, 2020(18). Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1765/129058